History of Free Thought in Reference to The Christian Religion
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Title: History of Free Thought in Reference to The Christian Religion
Author: Adam Storey Farrar
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Most recently updated: June 16, 2020
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF FREE THOUGHT IN REFERENCE TO THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION ***
History of Free Thought
in Reference to
The Christian Religion
Eight Lectures
Preached Before The
University of Oxford, in the year M.DCCC.LXII., on the Foundation of the
Late Rev. John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury.
By
Adam Storey Farrar, M.A.
Michel Fellow of Queen’s College, Oxford.
New York:
D. Appleton And Company,
443 & 445 Broadway.
1863
CONTENTS
Will of Rev. John Bampton.
Preface.
Analysis of the lectures.
Lecture I. On The Subject, Method, And Purpose Of The Course Of Lectures.
Lecture II. The Literary Opposition of Heathens Against Christianity in
the Early Ages.
Lecture III. Free Thought During The Middle Ages, and At The Renaissance;
Together With Its Rise in Modern Times.
Lecture IV. Deism in England Previous to A.D. 1760.
Lecture V. Infidelity in France in the Eighteenth Century, and Unbelief in
England Subsequent to 1760.
Lecture VI. Free Thought In The Theology Of Germany From 1750-1835.
Lecture VII. Free Thought: In Germany Subsequently To 1835; And In France
During The Present Century.
Lecture VIII. Free Thought in England in the Present Century; Summary of
the Course of Lectures; Inferences in Reference to Present Dangers and
Duties.
Notes.
Lecture I.
Lecture II.
Lecture III.
Lecture IV.
Lecture V.
Lecture VI.
Lecture VII.
Lecture VIII.
Index.
Footnotes
WILL OF REV. JOHN BAMPTON.
Extract From The Last Will And Testament Of The Late Rev. John Bampton,
Canon Of Salisbury.
-------------------------------------
“——I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to the Chancellor, Masters,
and Scholars of the University of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all
and singular the said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the intents and
purposes hereinafter mentioned; that is to say, I will and appoint that
the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford for the time being shall
take and receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and (after
all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions made) that he pay all the
remainder to the endowment of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be
established for ever in the said University, and to be performed in the
manner following:
-------------------------------------
“I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in Easter Term, a
Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads of Colleges only, and by no others,
in the room adjoining to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten in
the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach eight Divinity Lecture
Sermons, the year following, at St. Mary’s in Oxford, between the
commencement of the last month in Lent Term, and the end of the third week
in Act Term.
“Also I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall
be preached upon either of the following Subjects—to confirm and establish
the Christian Faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics—upon the
divine authority of the holy Scriptures—upon the authority of the writings
of the primitive Fathers, as to the faith and practice of the primitive
Church—upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ—upon the
Divinity of the Holy Ghost—upon the Articles of the Christian Faith as
comprehended in the Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds.
“Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons
shall be always printed, within two months after they are preached; and
one copy shall be given to the Chancellor of the University, and one copy
to the Head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor of the city of
Oxford, and one copy to be put into the Bodleian Library; and the expense
of printing them shall be paid out of the revenue of the Land or Estates
given for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the Preacher
shall not be paid nor be entitled to the revenue before they are printed.
“Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be qualified to preach
the Divinity Lecture Sermons, unless he hath taken the degree of Master of
Arts at least, in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge; and
that the same person shall never preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons
twice.”
PREFACE.
The object of this Preface is to explain the design of the following
Lectures, and to enumerate the sources on which they are founded.
What is the province and mode of inquiry intended in a “Critical History
of Free Thought”?(1) What are the causes which led the author into this
line of study?(2) What the object proposed by the work?(3) What the
sources from which it is drawn?(4)—these probably are the questions which
will at once suggest themselves to the reader. The answers to most of them
are so fully given in the work,(5) that it will only be necessary here to
touch upon them briefly.
The word “free thought” is now commonly used, at least in foreign
literature(6), to express the result of the revolt of the mind against the
pressure of external authority in any department of life or speculation.
Information concerning the history of the term is given elsewhere.(7) It
will be sufficient now to state, that the cognate term, _free thinking_,
was appropriated by Collins early in the last century(8) to express Deism.
It differs from the modern term _free thought_, both in being restricted
to religion, and in conveying the idea rather of the method than of its
result, the freedom of the mode of inquiry rather than the character of
the conclusions attained; but the same fundamental idea of independence
and freedom from authority is implied in the modern term.
Within the sphere of its application to the Christian religion, free
thought is generally used to denote three different systems; viz.
Protestantism, scepticism, and unbelief. Its application to the first of
these is unfair.(9) It is true that all three agree in resisting the
dogmatism of any earthly authority; but Protestantism reposes implicitly
on what it believes to be the divine authority of the inspired writers of
the books of holy scripture; whereas the other two forms acknowledge no
authority external to the mind, no communication superior to reason and
science. Thus, though Protestantism by its attitude of independence seems
similar to the other two systems, it is really separated by a difference
of kind, and not merely of degree.(10) The present history is restricted
accordingly to the treatment of the two latter species of free
thought,—the resistance of the human mind to the Christian religion as
communicated through revelation, either in part or in whole, neither the
scepticism which disintegrates it, or the unbelief which rejects it: the
former directing itself especially against Christianity, the latter
against the idea of revelation, or even of the supernatural generally.
An analogous reason to that which excludes the history of Protestantism,
excludes also that of the opposition made to Christianity by heresy, and
by rival religions:(11) inasmuch as they repose on authorities, however
false, and do not profess to resort to an unassisted study of nature and
truth.
This account of the province included under free thought will prepare the
way for the explanation of the mode in which the subject is treated.
It is clear that the history, in order to rise above a chronicle, must
inquire into the causes which have made freedom of inquiry develop into
unbelief. The causes have usually been regarded by theologians to be of
two kinds, viz. either superhuman or human; and, if of the latter kind, to
be either moral or intellectual. Bishop Van Mildert, in his History of
Infidelity, restricted himself entirely to the former.(12) Holding
strongly that the existence of evil in the world was attributable, not
only indirectly and originally, but directly and perpetually, to the
operation of the evil spirit, he regarded every form of heresy and
unbelief to be the attempt of an invisible evil agent to thwart the truth
of God; and viewed the history of infidelity as the study of the results
of the operation of this cause in destroying the kingdom of righteousness.
Such a view invests human life and history with a very solemn character,
and is not without practical value; but it will be obvious that an
analysis of this kind must be strictly theological, and removes the
inquiry from the province of human science. Even when completed, it leaves
unexplored the whole field in which such an evil principle operates, and
the agencies which he employs as his instruments.
The majority of writers on unbelief accordingly have treated the subject
from a less elevated point of view, and have limited their inquiry to the
sphere of the operation of human causes, the _media axiomata_ as it
were,(13) which express the motives and agencies which have been
manifested on the theatre of the world, and visible in actual history. It
will be clear that within this sphere the causes are specially of two
kinds; viz. those which have their source in the will, and arise from the
antagonism of feeling, which wishes revelation untrue, and those which
manifest themselves in the intellect, and are exhibited under the form of
difficulties which beset the mind, or doubts which mislead it, in respect
to the evidence on which revelation reposes. The former, it may be feared,
are generally the ground of unbelief; the latter the basis of doubt.
Christian writers, in the wish to refer unbelief to the source of
efficient causation in the human will, with a view of enforcing on the
doubter the moral lesson of responsibility, have generally restricted
themselves to the former of these two classes; and by doing so have
omitted to explore the interesting field of inquiry presented in the
natural history of the variety of forms assumed by scepticism, and their
relation to the general causes which have operated in particular ages:—a
subject most important, if the intellectual antecedents thus discovered be
regarded as causes of doubt; and not less interesting, if, instead of
being causes, they are merely considered to be instruments and conditions
made use of by the emotional powers.
A history of free thought seems to point especially to the study of the
latter class. A biographical history of free thinkers would imply the
former; the investigation of the moral history of the individuals, the
play of their will and feelings and character; but the history of free
thought points to that which has been the product of their characters, the
doctrines which they have taught. Science however no less than piety would
decline entirely to separate the two;(14) piety, because, though admitting
the possibility that a judgment may be formed in the abstract on free
thought, it would feel itself constantly drawn into the inquiry of the
moral responsibility of the freethinker in judging of the concrete
cases;—science, because, even in an intellectual point of view, the
analysis of a work of art is defective if it be studied apart from the
personality of the mental and moral character of the artist who produces
it. If even the inquiry be restricted to the analysis of intellectual
causes, a biographic treatment of the subject, which would allow for the
existence of the emotional, would be requisite.(15)
The province of the following work accordingly is, the examination of this
neglected branch in the analysis of unbelief. While admitting most fully
and unhesitatingly the operation of emotional causes, and the absolute
necessity, scientific as well as practical, of allowing for their
operation, it is proposed to analyse the forms of doubt or unbelief in
reference mainly to the intellectual element which has entered into them,
and the discovery of the intellectual causes which have produced or
modified them. Thus the history, while not ceasing to belong to church
history, becomes also a chapter in the history of philosophy, a page in
the history of the human mind.
The enumeration of the causes into which the intellectual elements of
doubt are resolvable, is furnished in the text of the first Lecture.(16)
If the nature of some of them be obscure, and the reader be unaccustomed
to the philosophical study necessary for fully understanding them;
information must be sought in the books to which references are elsewhere
given, as the subject is too large to be developed in the limited space of
this Preface.
The work however professes to be not merely a narrative, but a “critical
history.” The idea of criticism in a history imparts to it an ethical
aspect. For criticism does not rest content with ideas, viewed as facts,
but as realities. It seeks to pass above the relative, and attain the
absolute; to determine either what is right or what is true. It may make
this determination by means of two different standards. It may be either
independent or dogmatic;—independent if it enters upon a new field
candidly and without prepossessions, and rests content with the inferences
which the study suggests;—dogmatic, when it approaches a subject with
views derived from other sources, and pronounces on right or wrong, truth
or falsehood, by reference to them.
It is hoped that the reader will not be unduly prejudiced, if the
confession be frankly made, that the criticism in these Lectures is of the
latter kind. This indeed might be expected from their very character. The
Bampton Lecture is an establishment for producing apologetic treatises.
The authors are supposed to assume the truth of Christianity, and to seek
to repel attacks upon it. They are defenders, not investigators. The
reader has a right to demand fairness, but not independence; truth in the
facts, but not hesitation in the inferences. While however the writer of
these Lectures takes a definite line in the controversy, and one not
adopted professionally, but with cordial assent and heartfelt conviction,
he has nevertheless considered that it is due to the cause of scientific
truth to intermingle his own opinions as little as possible with the facts
of the history. A history without inferences is ethically and religiously
worthless: it is a chronicle, not a philosophical narrative. But a history
distorted to suit the inferences is not only worthless, but harmful. It is
for the reader to judge how far the author has succeeded in the result:
but his aim has been not to allow his opinions to warp his view of the
facts. History ought to be written with the same spirit of cold analysis
which belongs to science. Caricature must not be substituted for portrait,
nor vituperation for description.(17)
Such a mode of treatment in the present instance was the more possible,
from the circumstance that the writer, when studying the subject for his
private information, without any design to write upon it, had endeavoured
to bring his own principles and views perpetually to the test; and to
reconsider them candidly by the light of the new suggestions which were
brought before him. Instead of approaching the inquiry with a spirit of
hostility, he had investigated it as a student, not as a partisan. It may
perhaps be permitted him without egotism to explain the causes which led
him to the study. He had taken holy orders, cordially and heartily
believing the truths taught by the church of which he is privileged to be
an humble minister. Before doing so, he had read thoughtfully the great
works of evidences of the last century, and knew directly or indirectly
the character of the deist doubts against which they were directed. His
own faith was one of the head as well as the heart; founded on the study
of the evidences, as well as on the religious training of early years. But
he perceived in the English church earnest men who held a different view;
and, on becoming acquainted with contemporary theology, he found the
theological literature of a whole people, the Germans, constructed on
another basis; a literature which was acknowledged to be so full of
learning, that contemporary English writers of theology not only
perpetually referred to it, but largely borrowed their materials from
German sources. He wished therefore fully to understand the character of
these new forms of doubt, and the causes which had produced them. He may
confess that, reposing on the affirmative verities of the Christian faith,
as gathered from the scriptures and embodied in the immemorial teaching of
Christ’s church, he did not anticipate that he should discover that which
would overthrow or even materially modify his own faith; but he wished,
while exploring this field, and gratifying intellectual curiosity, to
re-examine his opinions at each point by the light of those with which he
might meet in the inquiry. The serious wish also to fulfill his duty in
the sphere in which he might move, made him desire to understand these new
views; that if false, he might know how to refute them when they came
before him, and not be first made aware of their existence from the harsh
satire of sceptical critics. His own studies were accordingly conducted in
a spirit of fairness—the fairness of the inquirer, not of the doubter; and
a habit of mind formed by the study of the history of philosophy, was
brought to bear upon the investigation of this chapter in church history:
first, of modern forms of doubt, and afterwards the consecutive history of
unbelief generally. Accordingly, while he hopes that he has taken care to
leave the student in no case unguided, who may accompany him in these
pages through the history, he has wished to place him, as he strove to
place himself, in the position to see the subject in its true light before
drawing the inferences; to understand each topic to a certain extent, as
it appears when seen from the opposite point of view, as well as when seen
from the Christian. And when this has been effected, he has criticised
each by a comparison with those principles which form his standard for
testing them, the truth of which the study has confirmed to the writer’s
own mind. The criticism therefore does not profess to be independent, but
dogmatic; but it is hoped that the definite character of the results will
not be found to have prevented fairness in the method of inquiry. If the
student has the facts correctly, he can form his own judgment on the
inferences.
The standard of truth here adopted, as the point of view in criticism, is
the teaching of Scripture as expressed in the dogmatic teaching of the
creeds of the church; or, if it will facilitate clearness to be more
definite, three great truths may be specified, which present themselves to
the writer’s mind as the very foundation of the Christian religion: (1)
the doctrine of the reality of the vicarious atonement provided by the
passion of our blessed Lord; (2) the supernatural and miraculous character
of the religious revelation in the book of God; and (3) the direct
operation of the Holy Ghost in converting and communing with the human
soul. Lacking the first of these, Christianity appears to him to be a
religion without a system of redemption; lacking the second, a doctrine
without authority; lacking the third, a system of ethics without spiritual
power. These three principles accordingly are the measure, by agreement
with which the truth and falsehood of systems of free thought are
ultimately tested.(18)
The above remarks, together with those which occur in the text, where
fuller explanation is afforded, will illustrate the province of the
inquiry, and the spirit in which it is conducted.(19)
The explanation also of the further question concerning the object which
the writer proposed to effect, by the treatment of such a subject in a
course of Bampton Lectures, is given so fully elsewhere, that a few words
may here suffice in reference to it.(20) Experience of the wants of
students in this time of doubt and transition, which those who are
practically acquainted with the subject will best understand, as well as
observation of the tone of thought expressed in our sceptical literature,
led him to believe that a history, natural as well as literary, of doubt;
an analysis of the forms and a statement of the intellectual causes of it,
would have a value, direct and indirect, in many ways. His desire, he is
willing to confess, was to guide the student, rather than to refute the
unbeliever. He did not expect to furnish the combatant with ready-made
weapons, which would make him omnipotent in conflict; but he hoped to give
him some suggestions in reference to the tactics for conducting the
contest. The Lectures have a polemical aspect, but they seek to obtain
their end by means of the educational. The writer has aimed at assisting
the student, in the struggle with his doubts, in the inquiry for truth, in
the quiet meditative search for light and knowledge, preparatory to
ministering to others. The survey of a new region, which ordinary works on
the history of infidelity rarely touch, may lay bare unsuspected or
undetected causes of unbelief; and thus indirectly offer a refutation of
it; for intellectual error is refuted, when the origin of it is referred
to false systems of thought. The anatomy of error is the first step to its
cure.
In another point of view, independently of the value of the line of
inquiry generally, and the special suitability of it to individual minds,
there is a further use, which in the present day belongs to it in common
with all inquiries into the history of thought.
It is hard to persuade the students of a past generation that the historic
mode of approaching any problem is the first step toward its successful
solution. Yet a little reflection may at least make the meaning of the
assertion understood. If we view the literary characteristic of the
present, in comparison with that of past ages, we are perhaps right in
stating, that its peculiar feature is the prevalence of the method of
historical criticism. If the four centuries since the Renaissance be
considered, the critical peculiarity of the sixteenth and seventeenth will
be found to be the investigation of ancient literature; in the former
directed to _words_, in the latter to _things_. The eighteenth century
broke away from the past, and, emancipating itself from authority, tried
to rebuild truth from its foundations from present materials, independent
of the judgment formed by past ages. The nineteenth century unites both
methods. It ventures not to explore the universe, unguided by the
experience of the past; but, while reuniting itself to the past, it does
not bow to it. It accepts it as a fact, not as an authority. The
seventeenth century worshipped the past; the eighteenth despised it: the
nineteenth mediates, by means of criticism. Accordingly, in literary
investigations at present, each question is approached from the historic
side, with the belief that the historico-critical inquiry not only
gratifies curiosity, but actually contributes to the solution of the
problem. Some indeed assert(21) this, because they think that the historic
study of philosophy is the whole of philosophy; and, believing that all
truth is relative to its age, are hopeless of attaining the absolute and
unaltering solution of any problem. We, on the other hand, are content to
believe that the history of philosophy is only the entrance to philosophy.
But in either case, truth is sought by means of a philosophical history of
the past; which, tracking the progress of truth and error in any
particular department, lays bare the natural as well as the literary
history; the causes of the past, as well as its form. Truth and error are
thus discovered, not by breaking with the past, and using abstract
speculations on original data, but by tracing the growth of thought,
gathering the harvest of past investigations, and learning by experience
to escape error.
These considerations bear upon the present subject in this manner: they
show not only the special adaptation to the passing tastes of the age, of
an historic mode of approaching a subject, but exhibit also that the mode
of proof and of refutation must be sought, not on abstract grounds, but
historic. The position of an enemy is not to be forced, but turned; his
premises to be refuted, not his conclusions; the antecedent reasons which
led him into his opinion to be exhibited, not merely evidence offered of
the fact that he is in error.
This view, that doubt might be refuted by the historic analysis of its
operation, by laying bare the antecedent grounds which had produced it,
will explain why the author was led to believe that a chapter of mental
and moral physiology might be useful, which would not merely carry out the
anatomy of actual forms of disease, but discover their origin by the study
of the preceding natural history of the patients.
These remarks will perhaps suffice for explaining the object which was
proposed in writing this history; and may justify the hope that this work,
thus adapted to the wants of the time, may offer such a contribution to
the subject of the Christian evidences, as not only to possess an
intellectual value, but to coincide with the purpose contemplated by the
founder of the Lectures.
It remains to state the sources which have been used for the literary
materials of the history. Though they are sufficiently indicated in the
notes, a general description of them may be useful.
They may be distributed under four classes;
1. The histories which have been professedly devoted to the subject.
2. The notices of the history of unbelief in general histories of the
church or of literature.
3. (Which ought indeed to rank first in importance;) the original
authorities for the facts, i.e. the works of the sceptical writers
themselves; or of the contemporary authors who have refuted them.
4. The monographs, which treat of particular writers, ages, or schools, of
sceptical thought.
In approaching the subject, a student would probably commence with the
first two classes; and after having thus acquired for himself a _carte du
pays_, would then explore it in detail by the aid of the third and fourth.
1. The works which have professedly treated of the history of infidelity,
as a whole, are not of great importance.
One of the earliest was the _Historia Univ. Atheismi_, 1725, of Reimannus;
and the _De Atheismo_, 1737, of Buddeus. (An explanation of the word
_Atheism_, as employed by them, is given in Note 21. p. 413.) hey furnish,
as the name implies, a history of scepticism, as well as of sceptics; yet,
though the labours of such diligent and learned men can never be useless,
they afford little information now available. Their date also necessarily
precluded them from knowing the more recent forms of unbelief. Perhaps
under this head we ought also to name the chapters on polemical theology
in the great works of bibliography of the German scholars of the same
time, such as Pfaff (_Hist. Litt. Thol._); Buddeus (_Isagoge_); Fabricius
(_Delectus Argum._); Walch’s (_Biblical Theol. Select._); which contain
lists of sceptical works, either directly, or indirectly by naming the
apologists who have answered them. The references to these works will be
found in Note 39. p. 436.
Among French writers, the only one of importance is Houtteville, who
prefixed an Introduction to his work, _La Religion Chrétienne prouvée par
des faits_, 1722, containing an account of the writers for and against
Christianity from the earliest times. (Translated 1739.) It contains
little information concerning the authors or the events, but a clearly and
correctly written analysis of their works and thoughts.
Among the English writers who have attempted a consecutive history of the
whole subject was Van Mildert, afterwards bishop of Durham, who has been
already named. The first volume of his _Boyle Lectures_, in 1802-4, was
devoted to the history of infidelity; the second to a general statement of
the evidences for Christianity. This work, on account of its date,
necessarily stops short before the existence of modern forms of doubt; and
indeed evinces no knowledge concerning the contemporary forms of
literature in Germany, which had already attracted the attention of Dr.
Herbert Marsh. The point of view of the work, as already described, almost
entirely precludes the author from entering upon the analysis of the
causes, either emotional or intellectual, which have produced unbelief.
Its value accordingly is chiefly in the literary materials collected in
the notes; in which respect it bears marks of careful study. Though mostly
drawn from second-hand sources, it exhibits wide reading and thoughtful
judgment.
A portion of the Bampton Lectures for 1852, by the Rev. J. C. Riddle, was
devoted to the subject of infidelity. The author’s object, as the
title(22) implies, was to give the natural history of unbelief, to the
neglect of the literary. Psychological rather than historical analysis was
used by him for the investigation; and his examination of the moral causes
of doubt is better than of the intellectual. The notes contain a
collection of valuable quotations, which supplement those of Van Mildert,
but are unfortunately given, for the most part, without references.
This completes(23) the enumeration of the histories professedly devoted to
infidelity, with the exception of a small but very creditable production
published since several of these lectures were written, _Defence of the
Faith; Part I. Forms of Unbelief_, by the Rev. S. Robins, forming the
first part of a work, of which the second is to treat the evidences; the
third to draw the moral. It does not profess to be a very deep work;(24)
but it is interesting; drawn generally from the best sources, and written
in an eloquent style and devout spirit.
2. The transition is natural from these works, which treat of the history
of unbelief or give lists of the works of unbelievers, to the notices of
sceptical writers contained in general histories of the church or of
literature.
In this, as in the former case, it is only in modern times that important
notices occur concerning forms of unbelief. The circumstance that in the
early ages unbelief took the form of opposition or persecution on the part
of heathens, and that in the middle ages it was so rare, caused the
ancient church historians and mediæval church chroniclers to record little
respecting actual unbelief, though they give information about heresy.
Even in modern times, it is not till the early part of the eighteenth
century that any attention is bestowed on the subject. The earlier
historians, both Protestant, such as the Magdeburg Centuriators, and
Catholic, like Baronius, wrote the history of the past for a controversial
purpose in relation to the contests of their own times: and in the next
period, in the one church, Arnold confined himself to the history of
heresy rather than unbelief; and in the other, Fleury and Tillemont wrote
the history of deeds rather than of ideas, and afford no information,
except in a few allusions of the latter writer to the early intellectual
opposition of the heathens.
But about the middle of the eighteenth century, in the period of cold
orthodoxy and solid learning which immediately preceded the rise of
rationalism, as well as in that of incipient free thought, we meet not
only with the historians of theological literature already named above,
but with historians of thought like Brucker, and of the church like
Mosheim, possessed of large taste for inquiry, and wide literary
sympathies, who contribute information on the subject: and towards the
close of the century we find Schröckh, who, in his lengthy and careful
history of the church since the Reformation,(25) has taken so extensive a
view of the nature of church history, that he has included in it an
account of the struggle with freethinkers. Among the same class, with the
exception that he differs in being marked by rationalist sympathies, must
be ranked Henke.(26)
In the present century the spread of the scientific spirit, which counts
no facts unworthy of notice, together with the attention bestowed on the
history of doctrine, and the special interest in understanding the
fortunes of free thought, which sympathy in danger created during the
rationalist movement, prevented the historians from passing lightly over
so important a series of facts. It may be sufficient to instance, in
proof, the notices of unbelief which occur in Neander’s _Church History_.
General histories also of literature, like Schlosser’s _History of
Literature in the Eighteenth Century_, or the more theological one of
Hagenbach (_Geschichte des 18__n__ Jahrhunderts_) incidentally afford
information.
The various works just named are the chief of this class which furnish
assistance.
3. After a general preliminary idea of the history has been obtained from
these sources, in order to prevent being confused with details; it is
necessary to resort next to the original sources of information, without
careful study of which the history must lack a real basis.
In reference to the early unbelievers, the direct materials are lost; but
the contemporary replies to these writings remain. In the case of later
unbelievers, both the works and the answers to them exist. It will be
presumed that in so large a subject the writer cannot have read all the
sceptical works which have been written, and are here named. With the
exception however of Averroes and of the Paduan school,(27) in which cases
he has chiefly adopted second-hand information, and merely himself
consulted a few passages of the original writers, he has in all other
instances read the chief works of the sceptical writers, sufficiently at
least to make himself acquainted with their doubts, and in many cases has
even made an analysis of their works. The reader will perceive by the
foot-notes the instances in which this applies.
It may be due to some of the historians who have made a special study of
particular periods from original sources, to state, that so far as his
limited experience extends he can bear witness to their exactness.
Leehler’s work on English deism, for example,(28) is a singular example of
truthful narrative; and Leland’s,(29) though controversial, is worthy of
nearly the same praise.
4. There remains a fourth source of materials in the separate monographs
on particular men, opinions, or schools of thought. We shall enumerate
these according to the order of the lectures; dwelling briefly on the
majority of them, as being described elsewhere; and describing at greater
length those only which relate to the history of the theological movements
in Germany described in Lectures VI. and VII.; inasmuch as references are
there frequently made to these works without a specific description of
their respective characters.
In relation to the early struggle of Paganism against Christianity,(30)
the work of Lardner, _Collection of Ancient Jewish and Heathen Testimonies
to the Truth of the Christian Religion_ (1764-7) (Works, vols. vii.-ix.),
is well known for carefulness of treatment and the value of its
references. Portions also of the works of J. A. Fabricius, especially his
_Bibliotheca Græca_ and _Lux Evangelii_ (1732) are useful in reference to
the lost works, and for bibliographical knowledge: also a monograph by
Kortholt, _Paganus Obtrectator_ (1703), on the objections made by
Christians in the early ages, gathered from the Apologies.
Among recent works it is only necessary to specify one, viz. the second
series of the _Histoire de l’Eglise Chrétienne_, by E. de Pressensé
(1861), containing _La Grande Lutte du Christianisme contre le Paganisme_,
the account of the struggle both of deeds and ideas on the part of the
heathens against Christianity, and of the apology of the Christians in
reply. The sketches of the arguments used both by the heathens, as
recovered from fragments, and by the Christian apologists, are most ably
executed. The frequent references to it in the foot-notes will show the
importance which the writer attaches to this work.(31)
The long period of the middle ages, together with early modern(32)
history, so far as the latter bears upon the present subject, is spanned
by the aid of four works; Cousin’s Memoir on Abelard (1836); the _La
Reforme_ of Laurent (1861), a professor at Ghent; the _Averroes_ of E.
Renan (1851), one of the ablest among the younger writers of France; and
the _Essais de Philosophie Religieuse_ of E. Saisset (1859). All these
works are full of learning; some of them are works of mind as well as of
erudition. Cousin’s treatise is well known,(33) and may be said to have
reopened the study of medieval philosophy. The contents of Laurent’s work
are specified elsewhere.(34) That of Renan, besides containing a sketch of
the life and philosophy of Averroes, studies his influence in the three
great spheres where it was felt,—the Spanish Jews, the Scholastic
philosophers, and the Peripatetics of Padua. The work of Saisset is a most
instructive critical sketch on religious philosophy.
The period of English Deism(35) is treated in two works; the well-known
work of Leland above cited, and the one also named above by Lechler, now
general superintendent at Leipsic; a work full of information, and
exceedingly complete; one of the carefully executed monographs with which
many of the younger German scholars first bring their names into notice.
Though the interest of the subject is limited, it well merits a
translator.(36)
There is a deficiency of any similar work on the history of infidelity in
France,(37) treating it separately and exhaustively. The work which most
nearly deserves the description is vol. vi. of Henke’s
_Kirchengeschichte_.(38) This want however is the less felt, because
almost every portion of the period has been treated in detail by French
critics of various schools; among which some of the sketches of
Bartholmess, _Histoire Critique des Doctrines Religieuses de la
Philosophie Moderne_, 1855; and of Damiron, _Mémoires pour servir à
l’Histoire de Philosophie au 18__e__ siècle_;(39) are perhaps the most
useful for our purpose. One portion of Mr. Buckle’s _History of
Civilisation_, the best written part of his first volume, also affords
much information, in the main trustworthy, in reference to the
intellectual condition of France of the same period.(40)
A description of the events of a period so complex as that of the German
theological movement of the last hundred years(41) would have been an
object too ambitious to attempt, especially when it must necessarily, from
the size of the subject, be grounded on an acquaintance with single
writers of a school, or single works of an author used as samples of the
remainder; if it were not that abundant guidance is supplied in the
memoirs by German theologians of all shades of opinion, who have studied
the history of their country, and not only narrated facts, but
investigated causes. A few narratives of it also exist by scholars of
other countries; but these are founded on the former. We shall in the main
preserve the order of their publication in enumerating these various
works.
The materials for the condition of Germany at the beginning of the last
century, antecedently to the introduction of the new influences which
created rationalism,(42) are conveyed in Weismann, _Introductio in
Memorabilia Eccl. Hist._ (1718), and in Schröckh, _Christliche
Kirchengeschichte_ (1768-1812). The first distinct examination however of
the peculiar character of the movement which ensued, called Rationalism,
occurred in the discussion as to its meaning and province; in which
Tittmann, Röhr, Staüdlin, Bretschneider, Hahn, &c., were engaged; an
account of which, with a list of their works,(43) is given under the
explanation of the word “Rationalism” in Note 21, p. 416. The chief value
of these works at present is, partly to enable us to understand how
contemporaries viewed the movement while in progress; partly to reproduce
the state of belief which existed in the older school of rationalists, and
its opponents, before the reaction toward orthodoxy had fully altered
theological thought.
Whilst the dispute between rationalism and supernaturalism was still going
on, and the latter was gradually gaining the victory, through the reaction
under Schleiermacher just alluded to, an English writer, Mr. Hugh James
Rose,(44) published some sermons preached at Cambridge in 1825, which were
the means of directing attention to the subject both at home and abroad,
and stimulating investigation into the history. As this work, and
especially the reply of one writer to it, are often here quoted, it may be
well to narrate the interesting literary controversy, now forgotten, which
ensued upon its publication.
Mr. Rose described the havoc made by the rationalist speculations, alike
in dogma, in interpretation, and in church history, and attributed the
evil chiefly to the absence of an efficient system of internal church
government which would have suppressed such a movement. He was answered
(1828) by Mr. (now Dr.) Pusey, then a junior Fellow of Oriel, who, having
visited Germany, and become acquainted with the forms of German thought,
and the circumstances which had marked its development, conceived justly
that the reasons of a moral phenomenon like the overthrow of religious
faith in Germany must be sought in intrinsic causes, and not merely in an
extrinsic cause, such as the absence of efficient means of ecclesiastical
repression. In this work,(45) marked by great knowledge of the subject,
and characterized by just and philosophical reflections, the author
pointed out an internal law of development in the events of the history,
and traced the ultimate cause of the movement to the divorce between dogma
and piety which had characterized the age preceding the rise of
rationalism. His motive for entering the contest was, not the wish to
defend the movement, for his own position was fixed upon the faith of the
creeds; but seems to have been partly a love of truth, which did not like
to see an imperfect view of a great question set forth; and partly the
wish to prevent attention being diverted by Mr. Rose’s explanation, from
perceiving the extreme resemblance of the contemporary time in England to
that of the age which preceded rationalism.
To this work Mr. Rose replied in a Letter to the Bishop of London,
misunderstanding Mr. Pusey’s object, and conveying the impression that he
had made himself responsible for the rationalism which it had been the
object of the sermons to condemn. He felt himself however compelled, in a
second edition of the sermons,(46) to enter more largely into proofs from
German literature of the position which he had assumed; and produced a
collection of literary facts, of value in reference to the movement.
Mr. Pusey replied (1830) with a triumphant vindication alike of his own
meaning, and the truth of his own position.(47) The work is necessarily
less interesting than the former, as it turns more upon personal
questions, and is more polemical; but the literary information conveyed is
equally valuable.
If we may be permitted to form an opinion concerning the controversy, it
may perhaps be true to say, that Mr. Rose’s fault (if indeed we may say so
of one who so worthily received honour in his generation) was, that he
approached the subject from the polemic and practical instead of the
historic side. His work is like the description of a battle-field, which
gives an idea of the mangled remains that strew the field, but does not
recount the causes of contest, nor the progress of the action. The work of
his opponent describes the mustering of the forces preparatory to the
action, and the causes which led to the struggle. Perhaps, in a few
matters of detail, the former writer has taken a truer, though a less
hopeful, view than his opponent, of certain classes of opinions, or of
certain men; but the latter has better preserved the historical
perspective. The former saw mainly the old forms of rationalism, the
latter descried the partial return toward the faith which had already
begun, and has since gone forward so energetically.(48)
These works must always afford much information on the topics which they
embrace. It is proper however to add, that Dr. Pusey, some years ago,
recalled the remaining copies of the edition of his work. On this account
the writer of these lectures, when he has had occasion to give references
to it, has taken care not to quote it for opinions, but only for
facts.(49)
The attack of Mr. Rose on German theology caused replies abroad as well as
at home. Several German theologians were led to a more careful study of
their own history and position, to which references will be found in Mr.
Rose’s replies.(50)
Previously to the publication of Dr. Pusey’s treatises, a work had been
written with a purpose less directly controversial, by Tholuck: _Abriss
Einer Geschichte der umwälzung, welche seit 1750, auf dem Gebiete der
Theologie in Deutschland statt gefunden_, now contained in his _Vermischte
Schriften_, 1839, vol. 2.(51) It is valuable for the earlier history of
Rationalism. The spirit of it is very similar to that of Dr. Pusey’s work.
Indeed the latter author, though not aware of the publication of Tholuck’s
work, was cognisant of his views on these questions, through lectures
heard from him abroad.
These works however were all previous to the great agitation in German
theology, which ensued in consequence of Strauss’s _Leben Jesu_, in 1835.
After the first excitement of that event had passed, we meet with three
works, two French and one German, in which the history is brought down to
a later period. The French ones were, the _Histoire Critique du
Rationalisme_, 1841, of Amand Saintes, translated 1849; and the _Etudes
Critiques sur le Rationalisme Contemporain_, of the Abbé H. de Valroger,
1846; the latter of which works the writer of these lectures has been
unable to see. The German one was, _Der Deutsche Protestantismus_,
1847,(52) and is attributed to Hundeshagen, professor at Heidelberg.
The _Critical History_ of Amand Saintes, though thought by the Germans(53)
to be defective, in consequence of want of sufficiently separating between
the various forms of rationalism, is more replete than any other book with
stores of information, and extracts arranged in a very clear form.(54) It
is very useful, if the reader first possesses a better scheme into which
to arrange the materials. It is written also in a truly evangelical
spirit.
The work of Hundeshagen had a political object as well as a religious. It
was composed just before the revolution of 1848, when Germany was panting
for freedom; and its object was to defend the position of the
constitutional party in church and state; and with a view to establish the
importance of their moral and doctrinal position, he surveyed the recent
history of his country.
Hagenbach’s _Dogmengeschichte_ (translated), which was published nearly
about the same time, also contains a very interesting sketch, with
valuable notes, of the chief writers and works in the movement of German
theology.
The view of the history given in Tholuck and Hundeshagen is that which is
taken by the school called the “Mediation school” in German theology.(55)
The general cause assigned by them for scepticism was the separation of
dogma and piety; the recovery from the rationalistic state being due to
the reunion of these elements, which Hundeshagen shows to have been also
the great feature of the German reformation.
After an interval of about ten years, when the tendencies created by
Strauss’s movement had become definitely manifest, the history was again
surveyed in two works, the one, _Geschichte des Deutschen
Protestantismus_, by Kahnis (translated 1856), who belongs to the Lutheran
reactionary party; the other, _Geschichte der neuesten Theologie_, 1856,
by C. Schwarz, whose work is so candid and free from party bias, that it
is unimportant to remark the party to which he belongs.(56)
The narrative of Kahnis, originally a series of papers in a magazine, is
very full of facts, and generally fair; but it wants form. The author’s
view is, that the sceptical movement arose from abandoning the dogmatic
expression of revealed truth, contained in the old Confessions of the
Lutheran church; and he considers the reaction of the Mediation school in
favour of orthodoxy to be imperfect; the true restoration being only found
by returning to the Confessions.
The work of Schwarz is restricted to the latest forms of German theology,
and goes back no farther than the circumstances which led to the work of
Strauss. It is unequalled in clearness; bearing the mark of German
exactness and fulness, and rivalling French histories in didactic power.
These two works differ from most of those previously named, in being
histories of modern German theology generally, and not merely of the
rationalist forms of it.
Such are the chief sources in which a student may learn the view taken by
the German critics of different schools, concerning the recent church
history of their country at various moments of its progress. The fulness
of this account will be excused, if it provide information concerning
works to which reference is made in the foot-notes of those lectures which
treat of this period.
In describing the doubts of the present century in France,(57)
considerable help has been found in the _Hist. de la Littérature_, &c.
written by Nettement,(58) and in the _Essais_ of Damiron,(59) as well as
in criticisms by recent French writers; which are cited in the foot-notes
to the lecture which treats of the period.
The subject of the contemporary doubt in England(60) has been felt to be a
delicate one. It has however been thought better to carry the history down
to the present time, and to deal frankly in expressing the writer’s own
opinion. Delicacy forbade the introduction of the names(61) of writers
into the text of this part of the Sermons, but they have been inserted in
the foot-notes.
The mention of one additional source of information will complete the
examination which was proposed.
It will be observed, that references have been very frequently given in
the notes, to the Reviews, English and French, and occasionally German,
for papers which treat on the subjects embraced in the history. When the
writer studied the subject for publication, he took care to consult these,
as affording a kind of commentary by contemporaries on the different
portions of the history. It is hoped that the references to those written
in the two former languages will be found to be tolerably complete. The
enormous number of those which exist in German, together with the absence
for the most part of indexes to them, renders it probable that many
separate papers of great value, the special studies by different scholars
of passages in the literary history of their own nation, have been left
unenumerated. The German literary periodicals are indeed the solitary
source of information which the writer considers has not been fully worked
for these lectures.(62)
Among the articles in English Reviews, many bear marks of careful study;
and it is a pleasure to have the opportunity of rescuing them from the
neglect which is likely to occur to papers written without name, and in
periodicals. The freethinking Reviews have discussed the opinions of the
friends of free thought more frequently than the others; but those here
cited are of all shades of opinion; and the writer has found many to be of
great use, even when differing widely from the conclusions drawn. He is
glad indeed to take this opportunity of expressing his thanks to the
unknown authors of these various productions, which have afforded him so
much instruction, and often so much help. He trusts that he has in all
cases candidly and fully acknowledged his obligations when he has borrowed
their materials, or condensed their thoughts. If he has in any case,
through inadvertence, failed to do so, he hopes that this acknowledgment
will be allowed to compensate for the unintentional omission.
-------------------------------------
The reader being now in possession both of the purpose designed in the
lectures, and of the sources of the information used in their composition,
it only remains to add a few miscellaneous remarks.
In the delivery of the lectures, several portions were omitted, on account
of the excessive length to which they would have run. It has not been
thought necessary to indicate these passages by brackets; but, as those
who heard them may perhaps wish to have an enumeration, a list is here
subjoined.(63)
The notes, it will be perceived, are placed, some at the foot of the text,
others at the end. Those are put as foot-notes which either were very
brief, or which supplied information that the reader might be supposed to
desire in connection with the text. Most of those which are appended are
of the same character as the foot-notes; i.e. sources of information in
reference to the subjects discussed in the text. A few however supply
information on collateral subjects. The Notes 4, 5, and 49, will be found
to contain a history of Apologetic Literature parallel with the history of
Free Thought; and Note 21 discusses the history of some technical terms
commonly employed in the history of doubt.
The size of the subject has precluded the possibility of giving many
extracts from other works; but it may be permitted to remark, that the
literary references given are designed to supply sources of real and
valuable information on the various points in relation to which they are
cited. It can hardly be necessary to state, that the writer must not in
any way be held responsible for the sentiments expressed in the works to
which he may have given references. In a subject such as that which is
here treated, many of the works cited are neutral in character, and many
are objectionable. But it is right to supply complete literary materials,
as well as references to works which state both sides of the questions
considered.
The index appended is brief, and devoted chiefly to Proper Names; the
fulness of the Table of Contents seeming to render a longer one
unnecessary, which should contain references to subjects.
The writer wishes to express his acknowledgments to the chief Librarian of
the Bodleian, the Rev. H. O. Coxe, for his kindness in procuring for his
use a few foreign works which were necessary. He avails himself also of
this opportunity of expressing publicly his thanks to the same individual,
for the perseverance with which he has accomplished the scheme of
providing a reading-room in connection with the Bodleian Library, open to
students in an evening. Those whose time and strength are spent in college
or private tuition during the mornings, are thus enabled to avail
themselves of the treasures of a library, which until this recent
alteration was in a great degree useless to many of the most active minds
and diligent students in the university.
Thanks are also due to a few other persons for their advice and courtesy
in the loan of scarce books; also, in some instances, for assistance in
the verification of a reference;(64) and in one case, to a distinguished
scholar, for his kindness in revising one of the Notes.
The spirit in which the writer has composed the history has been stated
elsewhere.(65) His work now goes forth with no extraneous claims on public
attention. If it be, by the Divine blessing, the means of affording
instruction, guidance, or comfort, to a single mind, the writer’s labour
will be amply recompensed.
ANALYSIS OF THE LECTURES.
Lecture I.
_On the subject, method, and purpose of the course of Lectures._
The subject stated to be the struggle of the human mind against the
Christian revelation, in whole or in part. (p. 1.) Explanation of the
points which form the occasion of the conflict. (pp. 1-3.)
The mode of treatment, being that of a critical history, includes (p. 3)
the discovery of (1) the facts, (2) the causes, and (3) the moral.
The main part of this first lecture is occupied in explaining the second
of these divisions.
Importance, if the investigation were to be fully conducted, of carrying
out a comparative study of religions and of the attitude of the mind in
reference to all doctrine that rests on authority. (pp. 4-6.)
The idea of causes implies,
I. The law of the operation of the causes.
II. The enumeration of the causes which act according to this assumed law.
The empirical law, or formula descriptive of the action of reason on
religion, is explained to be one form of the principle of progress by
antagonism, the conservation or discovery of truth by means of inquiry and
controversy; a merciful Providence leaving men responsible for their
errors, but ultimately overruling evil for good. (p. 7.)
This great fact illustrated in the four Crises of the Christian faith in
Europe, viz. In the struggle
(1) With heathen philosophy, about A.D. 160-360. (p. 8.)
(2) With sceptical tendencies in Scholasticism, in the middle ages
(1100-1400). (p. 8.)
(3) With literature, at the Renaissance, in Italy (1400-1625). (p. 9.)
(4) With modern philosophy in three forms (p. 11): viz. English Deism in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (p. 11); French Infidelity in the
eighteenth century; German Rationalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth.
Proposal to study the natural as well as literary history of these forms
of doubt.—The investigation separated from inquiries into heresy as
distinct from scepticism. (p. 13.)
The causes, seen to act according to the law just described, which make
free thought develope into unbelief, stated to be twofold. (p. 13.)
1. Emotional causes.—Necessity for showing the relation of the
intellectual causes to the emotional, both per se, and because the idea of
a history of thought, together with the comparative rarity of the process
here undertaken, implies the restriction of the attention mainly to the
intellectual. (p. 13.)
Influence of the emotional causes shown, both from psychology and from the
analysis of the nature of the evidence offered in religion (pp. 14,
15).—Historical illustrations of their influence. (pp. 15-17.)
Other instances where the doubt is in origin purely intellectual (p. 17),
but where nevertheless opportunity is seen for the latent operation of the
emotional. (p. 18.)
Explanation how far religious doubt is sin. (pp. 19, 20.)
2. Intellectual causes, which are the chief subject of these lectures; the
conjoint influence however of the emotional being always presupposed.
The intellectual causes shown to be (p. 20):
(α) the new material of knowledge which arises from the advance of the
various sciences; viz. Criticism; Physical, Moral, and Ontological
science. (p. 21.)
(β) the various metaphysical tests of truth or grounds of certitude
employed. (p. 22.)
An illustration of the meaning (pp. 22, 23), drawn from literature, in a
brief comparison of the types of thought shown in Milton, Pope, and
Tennyson.
Statement of the exact position of this inquiry in the subdivisions of
metaphysical science (pp. 24, 25), and detailed explanation of the
advantages and disadvantages of applying to religion the tests of Sense,
subjective Forms of Thought, Intuition, and Feeling, respectively; as the
standard of appeal. (pp. 25-32.)
Advantage of a biographic mode of treatment in the investigation of the
operation of these causes in the history of doubt. (pp. 32-34.)
Statement of the utility of the inquiry:
(1) Intellectually, (α) in a didactic and polemical point of view, in that
it refers the origin of the intellectual elements in error to false
philosophy and faulty modes of judging, and thus refutes error by
analysing it into the causes which produce it; and also (β) in an indirect
contribution to the Christian evidences by the historic study of former
contests. (p. 36.)
(2) Morally, in creating deep pity for the sinner, united with hatred for
the sin. (p. 36.)
Concluding remarks on the spirit which has influenced the writer in these
lectures. (pp. 37, 38.)
Lecture II.
_The literary opposition of Heathens against Christianity in the early
ages._
_The first of the four crises of the faith._ (pp. 39-74.) Agreement and
difference of this crisis with the modern. (p. 40.) Sources for
ascertaining its nature, the original writings of unbelievers being lost.
(pp. 41, 42.)
Preliminary explanation of four states of belief among the heathens in
reference to religion, from which opposition to Christianity would arise:
(pp. 43-118) viz.
(1) the tendency to absolute disbelief of religion, as seen in Lucian and
the Epicurean school. (p. 43.) (2) a reactionary attachment to the
national creed,—the effect of prejudice in the lower orders, and of policy
in the educated. (pp. 45, 46.) (3) the philosophical tendency, in the
Stoics, (p. 44) and Neo-Platonists. (pp. 45, 46.) (4) the mystic
inclination for magic rites. (p. 47.)
Detailed critical history of the successive literary attacks on
Christianity. (p. 48 seq.)
1. that of Lucian, about A.D. 170, in the _Peregrinus Proteus_. (pp.
48-50.) 2. that of Celsus, about the same date. (pp. 50-55.) 3. that of
Porphyry, about 270. (pp. 56-61.) 4. that of Hierocles about 303, founded
on the earlier work of Philostratus respecting the life of Apollonius of
Tyana. (pp. 62-64.) 5. that of Julian, A.D. 363; an example of the
struggle in deeds as well as in ideas. (pp. 65-68.)
(Account of the _Philopatris_ of the Pseudo-Lucian. (p. 67.))
Conclusion; showing the relation of these attacks to the intellectual
tendencies before mentioned (p. 69), and to the general intellectual
causes sketched in Lect. I. (p. 69.)—Insufficiency of these causes to
explain the whole phenomenon of unbelief, unless the conjoint action of
emotional causes be supposed. (pp. 71, 72.)
Analogy of this early conflict to the modern. Lessons from consideration
of the means by which the early Church repelled it. (pp. 72-74.)
Lecture III.
_Free Thought during the middle ages, and at the Renaissance; together
with its rise in modern times._
This period embraces the second and third of the four epochs of doubt, and
the commencement of the fourth. Brief outline of the events which it
includes. (pp. 75, 76.)
_Second crisis_, from A.D. 1100-1400. (pp. 76-92.) It is a struggle
political as well as intellectual, Ghibellinism as well as scepticism. (p.
76.)
The intellectual tendencies in this period are four:
1. The scepticism developed in the scholastic philosophy, as seen in the
Nominalism of Abélard in the twelfth century. Account of the scholastic
philosophy, pp. 77-80; and of Abélard as a sceptic in his treatise _Sic et
Non._ (pp. 81-85.) 2. The _mot_ of progress in religion in the Franciscan
book called _The Everlasting Gospel_ in the thirteenth century. (pp. 86,
87.) 3. The idea of the comparative study of religion, as seen in the
legend of the book _De Tribus Impostoribus_ in the thirteenth century; and
in the poetry of the period. (pp. 88, 89.) 4. The influence of the
Mahometan philosophy of Averroes in creating a pantheistic disbelief of
immortality. (pp. 90, 91.)
Remarks on the mode used to oppose these movements; and critical estimate
of the period. (pp. 91, 92.)
_Third crisis_, from 1400-1625. (pp. 93-105.) Peculiarity of this period
as the era of the Renaissance and of “Humanism,” and as the transition
from mediæval society to modern. (p. 93.)
Two chief sceptical tendencies in it:
(1) The literary tendency in Tuscany and Rome in the fifteenth century;
the dissolution of faith being indicated by (a) the poetry of the romantic
epic. (p. 94.) (b) the revival of heathen tastes. (p. 95.)
Estimate of the political and social causes likely to generate doubt,
which were then acting. (pp. 97, 98.) the unbelief was confined to
Italy.—Reasons why so vast a movement as the Reformation passed without
fostering unbelief. (p. 99.)
2. The philosophical tendency in the university of Padua in the sixteenth
century. (p. 99 seq.) The spirit of it, pantheism (p. 100), in two forms;
one arising from the doctrines of Averroes; the other seen in Pomponatius,
from Alexander of Aphrodisias. (p. 101.) The relation of other
philosophers, such as Bruno and Vanini, to this twofold tendency. (pp.
102-104.)
Remarks on the mode used to oppose doubt (p. 104); and estimate of the
crisis. (p. 105.)
_Fourth crisis_; (pp. 105-339) commencing in the seventeenth century,
through the effects of the philosophy of Bacon and Descartes. (p. 106.)
The remainder of the lecture is occupied with the treatment of the
influence of Cartesianism, as seen in Spinoza.
Examination of Spinoza’s philosophy (pp. 106-110); of his criticism in the
_Theologico-Politicus_ (pp. 109-113); and of his indirect influence. (p.
113, 114.)
Concluding remarks on the government of Providence, as witnessed in the
history of large periods of time, such as that comprised in this lecture.
(p. 115.)
Lecture IV.
_Deism in England previous to A.D. 1760._
This lecture contains the first of the three forms which doubt has taken
in the fourth crisis. (p. 116.)—Sketch of the chief events, political and
intellectual, which influenced the mind of England during the seventeenth
century (p. 117); especial mention of the systems of Bacon and Descartes,
as exhibiting the peculiarity that they were philosophies of method. (pp.
117, 118.)
The history of Deism studied:
I. Its rise traced, 1640-1700. (pp. 119-125.) In this period the religious
inquiry has a political aspect, as seen (1) in Lord Herbert of Cherbury
(_De Veritate_ and _Religio Laici_) in the reign of Charles I. (pp. 119,
120.) (2) In Hobbes’s _Leviathan_. (pp. 121, 122.) (3) In Blount (_Oracles
of Reason_, and _Life of Apollonius_), in the reign of Charles II., in
whom a deeper political antipathy to religion is seen. (pp. 123, 124.)
II. The maturity of Deism (1700-1740), pp. 125-144. This period includes
(p. 127):
1. The examination of the first principles of religion, on its doctrinal
side, in Toland’s _Christianity not Mysterious_, &c. (pp. 126-130.) 2.
Ditto, on its ethical side, in Lord Shaftesbury. (pp. 130, 131.) 3. An
attack on the external evidences, viz. On prophecy, by Collins, _Scheme of
Literal Prophecy_, &c. (pp. 132-136). On Miracles, by Woolston,
_Discourses on Miracles_. (pp. 136-138); and by Arnobius. (p. 143.) 4. The
substitution of natural religion for revealed, in Tindal, _Christianity as
old as the Creation_. (pp. 138-140.), in Morgan, _Moral Philosopher_. (pp.
140, 141.), and in Chubb, Miscellaneous Works. (pp. 142, 143.)
III. The decline of Deism, 1740-1760. (pp. 144-153): 1. in Bolingbroke, a
combined view of deist objections. (pp. 143-147.) 2. in Hume, an assault
on the evidence of testimony, which substantiates miracles. (pp. 147-153.)
Remarks on the peculiarities of Deism, the intellectual causes which
contributed to produce it (pp. 154, 155); and a comparison of it with the
unbelief of other periods. (p. 156.)
Estimate of the whole period; and consideration of the intellectual and
spiritual means used for repelling unbelief in it (pp. 157-161); the
former in the school of evidences, of which Butler is the type, the
mention of whom leads to remarks on his _Analogy_ (pp. 157-159); and the
latter in spiritual labours like those of Wesley. (pp. 160, 161.)
Lecture V.
_Infidelity in France in the eighteenth century; and unbelief in England
subsequent to 1760._
INFIDELITY IN FRANCE (pp. 163-194).—This is the second phase of unbelief
in the fourth crisis of faith.
Sketch of the state of France, ecclesiastical, political (pp. 164, 165,)
and intellectual (partly through the philosophy of Condillac, pp. 166,
167), which created such a mental and moral condition as to allow unbelief
to gain a power there unknown elsewhere.—The unbelief stated to be caused
chiefly by the influence of English Deism, transplanted into the soil thus
prepared. (p. 203.)
The history studied (1) in its assault on the Church; as seen in Voltaire;
the analysis of whose character is necessary, because his influence was
mainly due to the teacher, not the doctrine taught. (pp. 169-176.) (2) in
the transition to an assault on the State, in Diderot, (pp. 179, 180); the
philosophy of the Encyclopædists (p. 177); Helvetius (p. 180); and
D’Holbach. (p. 181.) (3) in the attack on the State, in Rousseau (pp.
183-187).—Analysis of the _Emile_ for his views on religion, (p. 185), and
comparison with Voltaire. (p. 188.) (4) in the Revolution, both the
political movement and blasphemous irreligion (pp. 188, 189); and the
intellectual movement in Volney (Analysis of the _Ruines_, pp. 191, 192).
Estimate of the period (pp. 193, 194).
UNBELIEF IN ENGLAND, from 1760 to a date a little later than the end of
the century (pp. 194-209), continued from Lecture IV.
These later forms of it stated to differ slightly from the former, by
being partially influenced by French thought. (p. 195.)
The following instances of it examined:
(1) Gibbon viewed as a writer and a critic on religion (pp. 196-199). (2)
T. Paine: account of his _Age of Reason_ (pp. 199-201). (3) The socialist
philosophy of R. Owen (p. 202). (4) The scepticism in the poetry of Byron
and Shelley (pp. 203-207).
The last two forms of unbelief, though occurring in the present century,
really embody the spirit of the last.
Statement of the mode used to meet the doubt in England during this
period. Office of the Evidences (pp. 207-209).
Lecture VI.
_Free Thought in the Theology of Germany, from 1750-1835._
This is the third phase of free thought in that which was called the
fourth crisis of faith.—Importance of the movement, which is called
“rationalism,” as the theological phase of the literary movement of
Germany (p. 210).—Deviation from the plan previously adopted, in that a
sketch is here given of German theological inquiry generally, and not
merely of unbelief (p. 211).
Brief preliminary sketch of German theology since the Reformation. Two
great tendencies shown in it during the seventeenth century (p. 211).
(1) The dogmatic and scholastic, science without earnestness (p. 212). (2)
The pietistic, earnestness without science (p. 213).
In the first half of the eighteenth century, three new influences are
introduced (pp. 213, 214), which are the means of creating rationalism in
the latter half: viz.
(α) The philosophy of Wolff, explained to be a formal expression of
Leibnitz’s principles; and the evil effect of it, accidental and indirect
(pp. 214-216). (β) The works of the English deists (p. 216). (γ) The
influence of the colony of French infidels at the court of Frederick II.
of Prussia (p. 217).
The subsequent history is studied in three periods (p. 218); viz.
PERIOD I. (1750-1810).—Destructive in character, inaugurated by Semler
(pp. 218-234). PERIOD II. (1810-1835).—Reconstructive in character,
inaugurated by Schleiermacher (pp. 239-261). PERIOD III. (1835 to present
time)—Exhibiting definite and final tendencies, inaugurated by Strauss
(Lect. VII).
PERIOD I. (1750-1810), is studied under two Sub-periods:
Sub-period I. (1750-1790, pp. 219-228), which includes three movements;
(1) Within the church (p. 219 seq.); dogmatic; literary in Michaelis and
Ernesti; and freethinking in Semler (pp. 221-224), the author of the
historic method of interpretation. (2) External to the church (pp.
224-226); literary deism in Lessing, and in the Wolfenbüttel fragments of
Reimarus (p. 225). (3) External to the church; practical deism, in the
educational institutions of Basedow (p. 227).
Sub-period II. (1790-1810, pp. 227-234); the difference caused by the
introduction of two new influences; viz,
(α) The literary, of the court of Weimar and of the great men gathered
there (p. 228). (β) The philosophy of Kant, (the effect of which is
explained, pp. 229, 230); the home of both of which was at Jena.
As the result of these new influences, three movements are visible in the
Church (p. 230); viz,
(1) The critical “rationalism” of Eichhorn and Paulus, the intellectual
successors of Semler (pp. 231, 232). (2) The dogmatic, more or less
varying from orthodoxy, seen towards the end of this period in
Bretschneider, Röhr, and Wegscheider (pp. 233, 234). (3) The
supernaturalism of Reinhardt and Storr (p. 231).
PERIOD II. (1810-1835.)—Introduction of four new influences (p. 235),
which completely altered the theological tone; viz. (α) New systems of
speculative philosophy; of Jacobi, who followed out the _material_ element
of Kant’s philosophy (p. 235); and of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, who
followed out the _formal_ (p. 238). (β) The “romantic” school of poetry
(p. 239). (γ) The moral tone, generated by the liberation wars of 1813.
(p. 240.) (δ) The excitement caused by the theses of Harms at the
tercentenary of the Reformation in 1817. (pp. 240, 241.)
The result of these is seen (p. 241) in
(1) An improved doctrinal school under Schleiermacher (pp. 241-250),
(description of his _Glaubenslehre_, p. 245 seq.); and under his
successors, Neander, &c. (pp. 250-252.) (2) An improved critical tone (p.
252 seq.) as seen in De Wette and Ewald, which is illustrated by an
explanation of the Pentateuch controversy (pp. 254-258).
Concluding notice of two other movements to be treated in the next lecture
(p. 259); viz.
(1) an attempt, different from that of Schleiermacher, in the school of
Hegel, to find a new philosophical basis for Christianity; and (2) the
return to the biblical orthodoxy of the Lutheran church.
Remarks on the benevolence of Providence in overruling free inquiry to the
discovery of truth. (pp. 259-261).
Lecture VII.
_Free Thought in Germany subsequently to 1835; and in France during the
present century._
FREE THOUGHT IN GERMANY (continued).—History of the transition from Period
II. named in the last lecture, to Period III. (pp. 262-274.)
Explanation of the attempt, noticed pp. 242, 259, of the Hegelian school
to find a philosophy of Christianity. Critical remarks on Hegel’s system,
(pp. 263-267-267); its tendency to create an “ideological” spirit in
religion (p. 264):—the school which it at first formed is seen best in
Marheinecke. (p. 265.)
The circumstance which created an epoch in German theology was the
publication of Strauss’s _Leben Jesu_ in 1835 (p. 266). Description of it
(α) in its critical aspect (pp. 267, 270), which leads to an explanation
of the previous discussions in Germany concerning the origin and
credibility of the Gospels (pp. 268, 269); and (β) in its philosophical,
as related to Hegel (p. 270); together with an analysis of the work (p.
271). Statement of the effects produced by it on the various theological
parties. (pp. 272, 273.)
PERIOD III. As the result of the agitation caused by Strauss’s work, four
theological tendencies are seen; viz.
(1) One external to the church, thoroughly antichristian, as in Bruno
Bauer, Feuerbach, and Stirner. (pp. 274-276.) (2) The historico-critical
school of Tübingen, founded by Chr. Bauer. (pp. 277-279.) (3) The
“mediation” school, seen in Dorner and Rothe, (pp. 279-282.) (4) A return
to the Lutheran orthodoxy, (pp. 282-285,) at first partly created by an
attempt to unite the Lutheran and Reformed churches, (p. 282); seen in the
“Neo-Lutheranism” of Hengstenberg and Hävernick, (p. 282), and the
“Hyper-Lutheranism” of Stahl and the younger members of the school. (pp.
283, 285.)
Mention of the contemporaneous increase of spiritual life in Germany. (p.
285.)
Concluding estimate of the whole movement, (pp. 286, 287); and lessons for
students in reference to it. (pp. 288, 289.)
FREE THOUGHT IN FRANCE during the present century (pp. 290-305),
(continued from Lect. IV. p. 194.)
In its tone it is constructive of belief, if compared with that of the
eighteenth century.
From 1800-1852.
The speculative thought has exhibited four distinct forms. (p. 290.)
(1) The ideology of De Tracy, in the early part of the century. (2) The
theological school of De Maistre, &c. to re-establish the dogmatic
authority of the Romish church. (3) Socialist philosophy, St. Simon,
Fourier, Comte. (4) The Eclectic school (Cousin, &c.)
Remarks on the first school.—The recovery of French philosophy and thought
from the ideas of this school, partly due to the literary tone of
Chateaubriand. (pp. 290, 291.)
Influence of the Revolution of 1830 in giving a stimulus to thought. (p.
291.)
Remarks on the third school.—Explanation of socialism as taught by St.
Simon (pp. 292, 293); as taught by Fourier (pp. 293, 294); and difference
from English socialism. (p. 294.)
Positivism, both as an offshoot of the last school, and in itself as a
religion and a philosophy. (pp. 295, 296.)
Remarks on the fourth school.—Eclecticism as taught by Cousin, viewed as a
philosophy and a religion. (pp. 297-299.)
Remarks on the second school; viewed as an attempt to refute the preceding
schools. (p. 300.)
From 1852-1862.
New form of eclecticism under the empire (p. 302), viz. the historic
method, based on Hegel, as Cousin’s was based on Schelling.—E. Renan the
type. (pp. 302-304.)
Free thought in the Protestant church (pp. 304, 305) regarded as an
attempt to meet by concession doubts of contemporaries.
Lecture VIII.
_Free Thought in England in the present century: Summary of the Course of
Lectures: and Inferences in reference to present dangers and duties._
MODERN UNBELIEF IN ENGLAND (continued from Lect V.):—Introductory remarks
on the alteration of its tone. (pp. 306, 307.)—The cause of which is
stated to be a general one, the subjective tone created (p. 308) by such
influences as, (1) the modern poetry (p. 309), and (2) the two great
attempts by Bentham and Coleridge to reconstruct philosophy. (pp. 309,
310.)
The doubt and unbelief treated in the following order (p. 311):
(1) That which appeals to Sensational experience and to Physical science
as the test of truth; viz. (α) Positivism among the educated (p. 312). (β)
Secularism or Naturalism among the masses (p. 313); and in a minor degree,
(γ) The doubts created by Physical science (p. 314). (2) That which
appeals to the faculty of Intuition (p. 315);—expressed in literature, by
Carlyle, (pp. 316, 317); and by the American, Emerson. (p. 317.) Influence
also of the modern literature of romance, (p. 318.) (3) Direct attacks on
Christianity, critical rather than philosophical: viz. (α) The examination
of the historic problem of the development of religious ideas among the
Hebrews, by R. W. Mackay (pp. 319, 320). (β) A summary of objections to
revelation, by Mr. Greg, _The Creed of Christendom_ (p. 321). (γ) The
examination of the psychical origin of religion and Christianity, by Miss
S. Hennell, _Thoughts in aid of Faith_, (p. 323.) (4) The deism, and
appeal to the Intuitional consciousness, expressed by Mr. Theodore Parker
(pp. 325, 326), and Mr. F. Newman (pp. 326-329). (5) The traces of free
thought within the Christian church (p. 330); viz.: (α) The philosophical
tendency which originates with Coleridge. (pp. 330-333.) (β) The critical
tendency, investigating the facts of revelation. (pp. 334-336.) (γ) The
critical tendency, the literature which contains it. (pp. 336, 337.)
This completes the history of the fourth crisis of faith (p. 339), the
history of which began near the end of Lect. III. at p. 105.
SUMMARY of the course of lectures. (pp. 339-41.)—Recapitulation of the
original purpose, which is stated to have been, while assuming the potency
of the moral, to analyse the intellectual causes of doubt, which have been
generally left uninvestigated.
Refutation of objections which might be made; such as
(1) One directed against the utility of the inquiry. (p. 342.) (2) One
directed against its uncontroversial character.
A critical history shown to be useful in the present age, (1) in an
educational point of view for those who are to be clergymen, and to
encounter current forms of doubt by word or by writing (pp. 342-345); and
(2) in a controversial point of view, by resolving the intellectual
element in many cases of unbelief into incorrect metaphysical philosophy;
the value of which inquiry is real, even if such intellectual causes be
regarded only as the conditions, and not the causes, of unbelief. (p.
345.)
-------------------------------------
Further objections anticipated and refuted in reference (3) to the candour
of the mode of inquiry, and the absence of vituperation which is stated
not to be due to indifference to Christian truth, but wholly to the
demands of a scientific mode of treatment (p. 346); (4) to the absence of
an eager advocacy of any particular metaphysical theory; which is due to
the circumstance that the purpose was to exhibit errors as logical
corollaries from certain theories, without assuming the necessary
existence of these corollaries in actual life (p. 347); (5) to the
insufficiency of the causes enumerated to produce doubt without taking
account of the moral causes; which objection is not only admitted, but
shown to be at once the peculiar property which belongs to the analysis of
intellectual phenomena, and also a witness to the instinctive conviction
that the ultimate cause of belief and unbelief is moral, not intellectual;
which had been constantly assumed. (p. 347.)
-------------------------------------
THE LESSONS derived from the whole historical survey. (p. 348 seq.)
I. What has been the office of doubt in history? (p. 348.)
Opposite opinions on this subject stated. (p. 348.) Examination of the
ordinary Christian opinion on the one hand, which regards it as a mischief
(p. 348), and of Mr. Buckle’s on the other, which regards it as a good.
(p. 349.)
1. The office is shown to be, to bring all truths to the test. (p. 349.)
Historical instances of its value in destroying the Roman catholic errors.
(p. 350.)
2. Free inquiry also shown in some cases to be forced on man by the
presentation of new knowledge, which demands consideration. (p. 350.)
Denial of the statement that the doubts thus created are an entire
imitation of older doubt. (p. 352.)
3. The office of it in the hands of Providence to elicit truth by the very
controversies which it creates (p. 352); the responsibility of the
inquirer not being destroyed, but the overruling providence of God made
visible. (p. 353.)
II. What does the history teach, as to the doubts most likely to present
themselves at this time, and the best modes of meeting them? (p. 353.)
The materials shown to be presented for a final answer to these questions.
(p. 354.)
The probability shown from consideration of the state of the various
sciences, mechanical, physiological (p. 355), and mental (p. 355), that no
new difficulties can be suggested hereafter, distinct in _kind_ from the
present; nor any unknown kinds of evidence presented on behalf of
Christianity.
Analogy of the present age as a whole, in disintegration of belief, to the
declining age of Roman civilization. (p. 356.)
The doubts which beset us in the present age stated to be chiefly three
(p. 357), viz.:
1. The relation of the natural to the supernatural. This doubt is
sometimes expressed in a spirit of utter unbelief; sometimes in a tone of
sadness (p. 358), arising from mental struggles, of which some are
enumerated (p. 358). The intellectual and moral means of meeting these
doubts. (p. 359.)
2. The relation of the atoning work of Christ to the human race. (p. 360.)
Explanation of the defective view which would regard it only as
reconciling man to God, and would destroy the priestly work of Christ; and
statement of the modes in which its advocates reconcile it with
Christianity. (p. 361.)
The importance that such doubts be answered by reason, not merely silenced
by force. (p. 362.)
An answer sought by studying the various modes used in other ages of the
church (p. 362); especially by those who have had to encounter the like
difficulties, e.g. the Alexandrian fathers in the third century, and the
faithful in Germany in the present. (p. 363.)
This method shown to have been to present the philosophical prior to the
historical evidence, in order to create the sense of religious want,
before exhibiting Christianity as the divine supply for it. (p. 364.)
In regard to the historic evidence, three misgivings of the doubter
require to be met for his full satisfaction (p. 366); viz.
(α) The literary question of the trustworthiness of the books of the New
Testament.
The mode of meeting this explained, with the possibility of establishing
Christian dogmas, even if the most extravagant rationalism were for
argument’s sake conceded. (p. 367.)
(β) The doubt whether the Christian dogmas, and especially the atonement,
are really taught in the New Testament. The value of the fathers, and the
progress of the doctrine in church history, shown in reference to this
question. (p. 368.)
(γ) The final difficulty which the doubter may put, whether even apostolic
and miraculous teaching is to overrule the moral sense. (p. 369.)
The possibility shown of independent corroboration of the apostolic
teaching, in the testimony of the living church, and the experience of
religious men. (p. 371.)
The utter improbability of error in this part of scriptural teaching, even
if the existence of error elsewhere were for argument’s sake conceded. (p.
370.)
Difference of this appeal from that of Schleiermacher to the Christian
consciousness.
3. The relation of the Bible to the church, whether it is a record or an
authority. (p. 372.)
Statement of the modes of viewing the question in different ages. (p.
373.)
The Bible an authority; but the importance shown of using wisdom in not
pressing the difficulties of scripture on an inquirer, so as to quench
incipient faith. (p. 374.)
The mention of the emotional causes of doubt conjoined with the
intellectual, a warning that, in addition to all arguments, the help of
the divine Spirit to hallow the emotions must be sought and expected. (p.
375.)
Final lesson to Christian students, that in all ages of peril, earnest men
have found the truth by the method of study united to prayer. (pp.
376-379.)
LECTURE I. ON THE SUBJECT, METHOD, AND PURPOSE OF THE COURSE OF LECTURES.
LUKE vii. 51.
_Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you,
nay; but rather division._
The present course of lectures relates to one of the conflicts exhibited
in the history of the Church; viz. the struggle of the human spirit to
free itself from the authority of the Christian faith.
Christianity offers occasion for opposition by its inherent claims,
independently of accidental causes. For it asserts authority over
religious belief in virtue of being a supernatural communication from God,
and claims the right to control human thought in virtue of possessing
sacred books which are at once the record and the instrument of this
communication, written by men endowed with supernatural inspiration. The
inspiration of the writers is transferred to the books, the matter of
which, so far as it forms the subject of the revelation, is received as
true because divine, not merely regarded as divine because perceived to be
true. The religion, together with the series of revelations of which it is
the consummation, differs in kind from ethnic religions, and from human
philosophy; and the sacred literature differs in kind from other books.
Each is unique, a solitary miracle of its class in human history.
The contents also of the sacred books bring them into contact with the
efforts of speculative thought. Though at first glance they might seem to
belong to a different sphere, that of the soul rather than the intellect,
and to possess a different function, explaining duties rather than
discovering truth; yet in deep problems of physical or moral history, such
as Providence, Sin, Reconciliation, they supply materials for limiting
belief in the very class of subjects which is embraced in the compass of
human philosophy.
A conflict accordingly might naturally be anticipated, between the
reasoning faculties of man and a religion which claims the right on
superhuman authority to impose limits on the field or manner of their
exercise; the intensity of which at various epochs would depend, partly
upon the amount of critical activity, and partly on the presence of causes
which might create a divergence between the current ideas and those
supplied by the sacred literature.
The materials are wanting for detecting traces of this struggle in other
parts of the world than Europe; but the progress of it may be fully
observed in European history, altering concomitantly with changes in the
condition of knowledge, or in the methods of seeking it; at first as an
open conflict, philosophical or critical, with the literary pagans,
subsiding as Christianity succeeded in introducing its own conceptions
into every region of thought; afterwards reviving in the middle ages, and
gradually growing more intense in modern times as material has been
offered for it through the increase of knowledge or the activity of
speculation; varying in name, in form, in degree, but referable to similar
causes, and teaching similar lessons.
It is the chief of these movements of free thought in Europe which it is
my purpose to describe, in their historic succession and their connection
with intellectual causes.
We must ascertain the facts; discover the causes; and read the moral.
These three inquiries, though distinct in idea, cannot be disjoined in a
critical history. The facts must first be presented in place and time: the
history is thus far a mere chronicle. They must next be combined with a
view to interpretation. Yet in making this first combination, taste guides
more than hypothesis. The classification is artistic rather than logical,
and merely presents the facts with as much individual vividness as is
compatible with the preservation of the perspective requisite in the
general historic picture. At this point the artistic sphere of history
ceases, and the scientific commences as soon as the mind searches for any
regularity or periodicity in the occurrence of the facts, such as may be
the effect of fixed causes. If an empirical law be by this means
ascertained to exist, an explanation of it must then be sought in the
higher science which investigates mind. Analysis traces out the ultimate
typical forms of thought which are manifested in it; and if it does not
aspire to arbitrate on their truth, it explains how they have become
grounds on which particular views have been assumed to be true. The
intellect is then satisfied, and the science of history ends. But the
heart still craves a further investigation. It demands to view the moral
and theological aspects of the subject, to harmonize faith and discovery,
or at least to introduce the question of human responsibility, and
reverently to search for the final cause which the events subserve in the
moral purposes of providence. The drama of history must not develope
itself without the chorus to interpret its purpose. The artistic,—the
scientific,—the ethical,—these are the three phases of history. (1)
The chief portion of the present lecture will be devoted to explain the
mode of applying the plan just indicated; more especially to develop the
second of these three branches, by stating the law which has marked the
struggle of free thought with Christianity, and illustrating the
intellectual causes which have been manifested in it.
In searching for such a law, or such causes, we ought not to forget that,
if we wished to lay a sound basis for generalization, it would be
necessary not to restrict our attention to the history of Christianity,
but to institute a comparative study of religions, ethnic or revealed, in
order to trace the action of reason in the collective religious history of
the race. Whether the religions of nature be regarded as the distortion of
primitive traditions, or as the spontaneous creation of the religious
faculties, the agreement or contrast suggested by a comparison of them
with the Hebrew and Christian religions, which are preternaturally
revealed, is most important as a means of discovering the universal laws
of the human mind; the exceptional character which belongs to the latter
member of the comparison increasing rather than diminishing the value of
the study. All alike are adjusted, the one class naturally and
accidentally, the other designedly and supernaturally, to the religious
elements of human nature. All have a subjective existence as aspirations
of the heart, an objective as institutions, and a history which is
connected with the revolutions of literature and society. (2)
Comparative observation of this kind gives some approach to the exactness
of experiment; for we watch providence as it were executing an experiment
for our information, which exhibits the operations of the same law under
altered circumstances. If, for example, we should find that Christianity
was the only religion, the history of which presented a struggle of reason
against authority, we should pronounce that there must be peculiar
elements in it which arouse the special opposition; or if the phenomenon
be seen to be common to all creeds, but to vary in intensity with the
activity of thought and progress of knowledge, this discovery would
suggest to us the existence of a law of the human mind.
Such a study would also furnish valuable data for determining precisely
the variation of form which alteration of conditions causes in the
development of such a struggle. In the East, the history of religion, for
which material is supplied by the study of the Zend and Sanskrit
literature, (3) would furnish examples of attempts made by philosophers to
find a rational solution of the problems of the universe, and to adjust
the theories of speculative thought to the national creed deposited in
supposed sacred books. And though, in a western nation such as Greece, the
separation of religion from philosophy was too wide to admit of much
parallel in the speculative aspect of free thought, yet in reference to
the critical, many instances of the application of an analogous process to
a national creed may be seen in the examination made of the early
mythology, the attempt to rationalize it by searching for historical data
in it, or to moralize it by allegory.(66) Again, within the sphere of the
Hebrew religion which, though supernaturally suggested, developed in
connexion with human events so as to admit the possibility of the rise of
mental difficulties in the progress of its history, how much hallowed
truth, both theoretical and practical, might be learned from the divine
breathings of pious inquirers, such as the sacred authors of the
seventy-third Psalm, or of the books of Job and Ecclesiastes, which give
expression to painful doubts about Providence, not fully solved by
religion, but which nevertheless faith was willing to leave
unexplained.(67) If in the Oriental systems free thought is seen to
operate on a national creed by adjusting it to new ideas through
philosophical dogmatism; if in the Greek by explaining it away through
scepticism; in the Hebrew it is hushed by the holier logic of the
feelings. The two former illustrate steps in the intellectual progress of
free thought; the last exhibits the moral lesson of resignation and
submission in the soul of the inquirer.
Nor ought this method of comparison to be laid aside even at this point.
It would be requisite, for a full discovery of the intellectual causes
that the generalization should be carried further, and the operations of
free thought watched in reference to other subjects than religion.(68)
Reason in its action, first on Christianity both in Europe and elsewhere,
secondly on Jewish and heathen religions, lastly on any body of truth
which rests on traditional authority,—these would be the scientific steps
necessary for eliminating accidental phenomena, and discovering the real
laws which have operated in this branch of intellectual history. The
suggestion of such a plan of study, though obviously too large to be here
pursued, may offer matter of thought to reflective minds, and may at least
help to raise the subject out of the narrow sphere to which it is usually
supposed to belong. The result of the survey would confirm the view of the
struggle now about to be given which is suggested by European history.
When any new material of thought, such as a new religion which interferes
with the previous standard of belief, is presented to the human mind; or
when conversely any alteration in the state of knowledge on which the
human mind forms its judgment, imparts to an old established religion an
aspect of opposition which was before unperceived; the religion is
subjected to the ordeal of an investigation. Science examines the
doctrines taught by it, criticism the evidence on which they profess to
rest, and the literature which is their expression. And if such an
investigation fail to establish the harmony of the old and the new, the
result takes two forms: either the total rejection of the particular
religion, and sometimes even of the supernatural generally, or else an
eclecticism which seeks by means of philosophy to discover and appropriate
the hidden truth to which the religion was an attempt to give expression.
The attack however calls forth the defence. Accordingly the result of this
action and reaction is to produce scientific precision, either apologetic
or dogmatic, within the religious system, and scepticism outside of it;
both reconstructive in purpose, but the former defensive in its method,
the latter destructive. The elements of truth which exist on both sides
are brought to light by the controversy, and after the struggle has passed
become the permanent property of the world.
These statements, which convey a general expression for the influence of
free thought in relation to religion, are verified in the history of
Christianity.
There are four epochs at which the struggle of reason against the
authority of the Christian religion has been especially manifest, each
characterized by energy and intensity of speculative thought, and
exhibiting on the one hand partial or entire unbelief, or on the other a
more systematic expression of Christian doctrine; epochs in fact of
temporary peril, of permanent gain.(69)
In the first of these periods, extending from the second to the fourth
century, Christianity is seen in antagonism with forms of Greek or Eastern
philosophy, and the existence is apparent of different forms of scepticism
or reason used in attack. The very attempt of the Alexandrian school of
theology to adjust the mysteries of Christianity and of the Bible to
speculative thought, by a well meant but extravagant use of allegorical
interpretation, is itself a witness of the presence or pressure of free
thought. The less violent of the two forms of unbelief is seen in the
Gnostics, the rationalists of the early Church, who summoned Christianity
to the bar of philosophy, and desired to appropriate the portion of its
teachings which approved itself to their eclectic tastes; the more violent
kind in the rejection of Christianity as an imposture, or in the attempts
made to refer its origin to psychological causes, on the part of the early
enemies of Christianity, Celsus and Julian, prototypes of the positive
unbelievers of later times. The Greek theology, which embodied the
dogmatic statements in which the Christian Church under the action of
controversy gave explicit expression to its implicit belief, is the
example of the stimulus which the pressure of free thought gave to the use
of reason in defence.
As we pass down the course of European history, the Pagan literature which
had suggested the first attack disappears: but as soon as the elements of
civilization, which survived the deluge that overwhelmed the Roman empire,
had been sufficiently consolidated to allow of the renewal of speculation,
a repetition of the contest may be observed.
The revived study of the Greek philosophers, and of their Arabic
commentators introduced from the Moorish universities of Spain, with the
consequent rise of the scholastic philosophy in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, furnished material for a renewal of the struggle of reason
against authority, a second crisis in the history of the Church. The
history of it becomes complicated by the circumstance that free thought,
in the process of disintegrating the body of authoritative teaching, now
began to assume on several occasions a new shape, a kind of incipient
Protestantism. Doubting neither Christianity nor the Bible, it is seen to
challenge merely that part of the actual religion which, as it conceived,
had insinuated itself from human sources in the lapse of ages.
Accordingly, the critical independence of Nominalism, in a mind like that
of Abélard, represents the destructive action of free thought, partly as
early Protestantism, partly as scepticism; while the series of noted
Realists, of which Aquinas is an example, that tried anew to adjust faith
to science, and thus created the Latin theology, represents the defensive
action of reason. The imparting scientific definition to the immemorial
doctrines of the Church constituted the defence.
In the later middle ages, however, philosophy gradually succeeded in
emancipating itself so entirely from theology, that when the Renaissance
came, and a large body of heathen thought was introduced into the current
of European life by means of ancient literature, a third crisis occurred.
The independence passed into open revolt, and, fostered by political
confusion and material luxury, expressed itself in a literature of
unbelief.
The mental awakening which had commenced in art and extended to literature
paved the way for a spiritual awakening. The Reformation itself, though
the product of a deep consciousness of spiritual need, an emancipation of
soul as well as mind, is nevertheless a special instance of the same
dissolution of mediæval life, and must therefore be regarded as belonging
to the same general movement of free thought, though not to that sceptical
form of it which comes within the field of our investigation. For
Protestantism, though it be scepticism in respect of the authority of the
traditional teaching of the Church, yet reposes implicitly on an outward
authority revealed in the sacred books of holy Scripture, and restricts
the exercise of freedom within the limits prescribed by this authority;
whereas scepticism proper is an insurrection against the outward authority
or truth of the inspired books, and reposes on the unrevealed, either on
consciousness or on science. The one is analogous to a school of art which
desires to reform itself by the use of ancient models; the other to one
which professes to return to an unassisted study of nature. The spiritual
earnestness which characterized the Reformation prevented the changes in
religious belief from developing into scepticism proper; and the theology
of the Reformation is accordingly an example of defence and reconstruction
as well as of revulsion.
During the century which followed, mental activity found employment in
other channels in connexion with the political struggles which resulted
from the religious changes. But the seventeenth age was another of those
epochs which form crises in the history of the human mind. The
reconstruction at that time of the methods on which science depends, by
Bacon from the empirical side, by Descartes from the intellectual, created
as great a revolution in knowledge as the Renaissance had produced in
literature or the Reformation in religion; and a body of materials was
presented from which philosophers ventured to criticise the Bible and the
dogmatic teaching of the Church. This fourth great period of free thought,
which extends to the present time, has been marked by more striking events
than former ones.(70) Though the movement relates to a similar sphere, the
history is rendered more complex by union with literature, and connexion
as cause or effect with social changes, as well as by the reciprocal
operation of its influence in different countries. Language, which is
always a record of opinion, popular or scientific,(71) classifies the
forms of this last great movement of free thought under three names, viz.
Deism in England in the early part of the eighteenth century; Infidelity
in France in the latter part of it; and Rationalism in Germany in the
nineteenth; movements which exhibit characteristics respectively of the
three nations, and of their intellectual and general history. English
Deism, the product of the reasoning spirit which was stimulated by
political events, directed itself against the special revelation of
Christianity from the stand-point of the religion of natural reason, and
ran a course parallel with the gradual emancipation of the individual from
the power of the state. French infidelity, breathing the spirit of
materialist philosophy, halted not till it brought its devotees even to
atheism, and mingled itself with the great movements of political
revolution, which ultimately reconstituted French society. German
Rationalism, empirical or spiritual,(72) in two parallel developments, the
philosophical and the literary, neither coldly denied Christianity with
the practical doubts of the English deists, nor flippantly denounced it as
imposture with the trenchant and undiscriminating logic of the French
infidels; but appreciating its beauty with the freshness of a poetical
genius, and regarding it as one phase of the religious consciousness,
endeavoured, by means of the methods employed in secular learning, to
collect the precious ideas of eternal truth to which Christianity seemed
to it to give expression, and by means of speculative criticism to exhibit
the literary and psychological causes which it supposed had overlaid them
with error.
Nor has the activity of reason used in defence been less manifest in these
later movements. The great works on the Christian evidences are the
witness to its presence; and the deeper and truer appreciation of
Christianity now shown in every country, and the increasing interest felt
in religion, are the indirect effect, under the guidance of divine
Providence, of the stirring of the religious apprehension by
controversy.(73)
We have thus at once exhibited the province which will be hereafter
investigated in detail, and stated the general law observable in the
conflict between free thought and Christianity. The type reappears,
perpetuated by the fixity of mind, though the form varies under the force
of circumstances. Christianity being stationary and authoritative, thought
progressive and independent, the causes which stimulate the restlessness
of the latter interrupt the harmony which ordinarily exists between belief
and knowledge, and produce crises during which religion is re-examined.
Disorganization is the temporary result; theological advance the
subsequent. Whatever is evil is eliminated in the conflict; whatever is
good is retained. Under the overruling of a beneficent Providence,
antagonism is made the law of human progress.
The restriction of our inquiry to the consideration of the free action of
reason will cause our attention to be almost entirely confined to the
operation of reason in its attack on Christianity, to the neglect of the
evidences which the other office of it has presented in defence; and will
also exclude altogether the study of struggles, where the opposition to
Christianity has rested on an appeal to the authority of rival sacred
books; such for example as the conflict with rival religions like the
Jewish (4) or Mahometan (5); as well as of heresies which, like the
Socinian (6), claim, however unjustly, to rest on the authority of the
Christian revelation.
The law thus sketched of this struggle needs fuller explanation. We must
employ a more exact analysis to gain a conception of the causes which have
operated at different periods to make free thought develop into unbelief.
It will be obvious that the causes must depend, either upon the nature of
the Christian religion, which is the subject, or of the mind of man, which
is the agent of attack. The former were touched upon in the opening
remarks of this lecture, and may be reconsidered hereafter;(74) but it is
necessary to gain a general view of the latter before treating them in
their application in future lectures.
These causes, so far as they are spiritual and disconnected from admixture
with political circumstances, may be stated to be of two kinds, viz.
intellectual and moral; the intellectual explaining the types of thought,
the moral the motives which have from time to time existed.(75) The
actions, and generally the opinions of a human being, are the complex
result arising from the union of both. Yet the two elements, though
closely intertwined in a concrete instance, can be apprehended separately
as objects of abstract thought; and the forms of manifestation and mode of
operation peculiar to each can be separately traced.
In a history of thought, the antagonism created by the intellect rather
than by the heart seems the more appropriate subject of study, and will be
almost exclusively considered in these lectures. Nevertheless a brief
analysis must be here given of the mode in which the moral is united with
the intellectual in the formation of opinions. This is the more necessary,
lest we should seem to commit the mistake of ignoring the existence or
importance of the emotional element, if the restriction of our point of
view to the intellectual should hereafter prevent frequent references to
it.
The influence of the moral causes in generating doubt, though sometimes
exaggerated, is nevertheless real. Psychological analysis shows that the
emotions operate immediately on the will, and the will on the intellect.
Consequently the emotion of dislike is able through the will to prejudice
the judgment, and cause disbelief of a doctrine against which it is
directed.(76) Nor can we doubt that experience confirms the fact. Though
we must not rashly judge our neighbour, nor attempt to measure in any
particular mind the precise amount of doubt which is due to moral causes,
yet it is evident that where a freethinker is a man of immoral or
unspiritual life, whose interests incline him to disbelieve in the reality
of Christianity, his arguments may reasonably be suspected to be suggested
by sins of character, and by dislike to the moral standard of the
Christian religion, and, though not on this account necessarily
undeserving of attention, must be watched at every point with caution, in
order that the emotional may be eliminated from the intellectual causes.
It is also a peculiarity belonging to the kind of evidence on which
religion rests for proof, that it offers an opportunity for the subtle
influence of moral causes, where at first sight intellectual might seem
alone to act. For the evidence of religion is probable, not demonstrative;
and it is the property of probable evidence that the character and
experience determine the comparative weight which the mind assigns in it
to the premises.(77) In demonstrative evidence there is no opportunity for
the intrusion of emotion; but in probable reasoning the judgment
ultimately formed by the mind depends often as much upon the antecedent
presumptions brought to the investigation of the subject, as upon the
actual proofs presented; the state of feeling causing a variation in the
force with which a proposition commends itself to the mind at different
times. The very subtlety of this influence, which requires careful
analysis for its detection, causes it to be overlooked. Accordingly, in a
subject like religion, the emotions may secretly insinuate themselves in
the preliminary step of determining the weight due to the premises, even
where the final process of inference is purely intellectual.
We can select illustrations of this view of the subtlety of the operation
of prejudice from instances of a kind unlike the one previously named; in
which it will be seen that the disinclination of the inquirer to accept
Christianity has not arisen primarily from the obstacle caused by the
enmity of his own carnal heart, but from antipathy toward the moral
character of those who have professed the Christian faith.
Who can doubt, that the corrupt lives of Christians in the later centuries
of the middle ages, the avarice of the Avignon popes, the selfishness
shown in the great schism, the simony and nepotism of the Roman court of
the fifteenth century, excited disgust and hatred toward Christianity in
the hearts of the literary men of the Renaissance, which disqualified them
for the reception of the Christian evidences; or that the social
disaffection in the last century in France incensed the mind against the
Church that supported alleged public abuses,(78) until it blinded a
Voltaire from seeing any goodness in Christianity; or that the religious
intolerance shown within the present century by the ecclesiastical power
in Italy drove a Leopardi(79) and a Bini(80) into doubt; or that the sense
of supposed personal wrong and social isolation deepened the unbelief of
Shelley(81) and of Heinrich Heine?(82) Whatever other motives may have
operated in these respective cases, the prejudices which arose from the
causes just named, doubtless created an antecedent impression against
religion, which impeded the lending an unbiassed ear to its evidence.
The subtlety of the influence in these instances makes them the more
instructive. If, as we contemplate them, our sympathies are so far
enlisted on the side of the doubters that it becomes necessary to check
ourselves in exculpating them, by the consideration that they were
responsible for failing to separate the essential truth of Christianity
from the accidental abuse of it shown in the lives of its professors, we
can imagine so much the more clearly, how great was the danger to these
doubters themselves of omitting the introspection of their own characters
necessary for detecting the prejudice which actually seemed to have
conscience on its side; and can realize more vividly from these instances
the secrecy and intense subtlety of the influence of the feelings in the
formation of doubt, and infer the necessity of most careful attention for
its discovery in others, and watchfulness in detecting it in our own
hearts.
There are other cases of doubt, however, where the influence of the
emotional element, if it operates at all, is reduced to a minimum, and the
cause accordingly seems wholly intellectual. This may happen when the
previous convictions of the mind are shaken by the knowledge of some fact
newly brought before its notice; such as the apparent conflict between the
Hebrew record of a universal deluge(83) and the negative evidence of
geology as to its non-occurrence; or the historical discrepancies between
the books of Kings and Chronicles,(84) or the varying accounts of the
genealogy and resurrection of Christ. A doubt purely intellectual in its
origin might also arise, as we know was the case with the pious
Bengel,(85) in consequence of perceiving the variety of readings in the
sacred text; or, as in many of the German critics, from the difficulty
created by the long habit of examining the classical legends and myths, in
satisfying themselves about the reasons why similar criticism should not
be extended to the early national literature of the Hebrews. Causes of
doubt like these, which spring from the advance of knowledge, necessarily
belong primarily to the intellectual region. The intellect is the cause
and not merely the condition of them. But there is room even here for an
emotional element; and the state of heart may be tested by noticing
whether the mind gladly and proudly grasps at them or thoughtfully weighs
them with serious effort to discover the truth. The moral causes may
reinforce or may check the intellectual: but the distinctness of the two
classes is apparent. Though co-existing and interlocked, they may be made
subjects of independent study.
The preceding analysis of the relations of the moral and intellectual
facilities in the formation of religious opinions might enable us to
criticise the ethical inferences drawn in reference to man’s
responsibility for his belief. Those who think that our characters, moral
and intellectual, are formed for us by circumstances, are consistent in
denying or depreciating responsibility.(86) There is a danger however
among Christian writers of falling into the opposite error, of dwelling so
entirely on the moral causes, in forgetfulness of the intellectual, as to
teach not only that unbelief of the Christian religion is sin, (which few
would dispute,) but that even transient doubt of it is sinful; and thus to
repel unbelievers by imputing to them motives of which their consciences
acquit them.
A truth however is contained in this opinion, though obscured by being
stated with exaggeration, inasmuch as the fact is overlooked that doubts
may be of many different kinds. Sinfulness cannot, for example, be imputed
to the mere scepticism of inquiry, the healthy critical investigation of
methods or results; nor to the scepticism of despair, which, hopeless of
finding truth, takes up a reactionary and mystical attitude;(87) nor to
the cases (if such can ever be,) of painful doubt, perhaps occasionally
even of partial unbelief, which are produced exclusively by intellectual
causes, without admixture of moral ones. This variety of form should
create caution in measuring the degree of sinfulness involved in
individual cases of doubt. Yet the inclination to condemn in such
instances contains the fundamental truth that the moral causes are
generally so intertwined with the intellectual in the assumption of data,
if not in the process of inference, that there is a ground for fearing
that the fault may be one of will, not of intellect, even though
undetected by the sceptic himself. And a conscientious mind will learn the
practical lesson of exercising the most careful self-examination in
reference to its doubts, and especially will use the utmost caution not to
communicate them needlessly to others. The Hebrew Psalmist, instead of
telling his painful misgivings, harboured them in God’s presence until he
found the solution.(88) The delicacy exhibited in forbearing unnecessarily
to shake the faith of others is a measure of the disinterestedness of the
doubter. “If I say, I will speak thus; behold I should offend against the
generation of thy children.”
These remarks will enable us to estimate the manner and degree in which
the emotions may, consciously or unconsciously, influence the operations
of the intellect in reference to religion; and will clear the way for the
statement of that which is to form the special subject of study in these
lectures, the nature and mode of operation of the intellectual causes, and
the forms of free thought in religion to which they may give rise. This
branch is frequently neglected, because satisfying the intellect rather
than the heart, indicating tendencies rather than affording means to
pronounce judgment on individuals; yet it admits of greater certainty, and
will perhaps in some respects be found to be not less full of instruction,
than the other.
We must distinctly apprehend what is here intended by the term
“intellectual cause,” when applied to a series of phenomena like sceptical
opinions. It does not merely denote the antecedent ideas which form
previous links in the same chain of thought: these are sufficiently
revealed by the chronicle which records the series. Nor does it mean the
uniformity of method according to which the mind is observed to act at
successive intervals: this is the law or formula, the existence of which
has been already indicated.(89) But we intend by “cause” two things;
either the sources of knowledge which have from age to age thrown their
materials into the stream of thought, and compelled reason to
re-investigate religion and try to harmonize the new knowledge with the
old beliefs; or else the ultimate intellectual grounds or tests of truth
on which the decision in such cases has been based, the most general types
of thought into which the forms of doubt can be analysed. The problem is
this:—Given, these two terms: on the one hand the series of opinions known
as the history of free thought in religion; on the other the uniformity of
mode in which reason has operated. Interpolate two steps to connect them
together, which will show respectively the materials of knowledge which
reason at successive moments brought to bear on religion, and the ultimate
standards of truth which it adopted in applying this material to it. It is
the attempt to supply the answer to this problem that will give organic
unity to these lectures.
A few words will suffice in reference to the former of these two subjects,
inasmuch as it has already been described to some extent,(90) and will be
made clear in the course of the history. The branches of knowledge with
which the movements of free thought in religion are connected, are chiefly
literary criticism and science. The one addresses itself to the record of
the revelation; the other to the matter contained in the record.
Criticism, when it gains canons of evidence for examining secular
literature, applies them to the sacred books; directing itself in its
lower(91) form to the variations in their text; in its higher(92) to their
genuineness and authenticity. Science, physical or metaphysical, addresses
itself to the question of the credibility of their contents. In its
physical form, when it has reduced the world to its true position in the
universe of space, human history in the cycles of time, and the human race
in the world of organic life, it compares these discoveries with the view
of the universe and of the physical history of the planet contained in the
sacred literature; or it examines the Christian doctrine of miraculous
interposition and special providence by the light of its gradually
increasing conviction of the uniformity of nature. In its moral and
metaphysical forms, science examines such subjects as the moral history of
the Hebrew theocracy; or ponders reverently over the mystery of the divine
scheme of redemption, and the teaching which scripture supplies on the
deepest problems of speculation, the relations of Deity to the universe,
the act of creation, the nature of evil, and the administration of moral
providence.
There is another mode, however, in which speculative philosophy has
operated, which needs fuller explanation. It has not merely, like the
other sciences, suggested results which have seemed to clash with
Christianity, but has supplied the ultimate grounds of proof to which
appeal has consciously been made, or which have been unconsciously
assumed:—the ultimate types of thought which have manifested themselves in
the struggle.(93)
It will be useful, before exhibiting this kind of influence in reference
to religion, to illustrate its character by selecting an instance from
some region of thought where its effects would be least suspected. The
example shall be taken from the history of literature.
If we compare three poets selected from the last three centuries, the
contrast will exhibit at once the change which has taken place in the
literary spirit and standard of judgment, and the correspondence of the
change with fluctuations in the predominant philosophy of the time.—If we
commence with the author of the Paradise Lost, we listen to the last echo
of the poetry which had belonged to the great outburst of mind of the
earlier part of the seventeenth century, and of the faith in the
supernatural which had characterized Puritanism. His philosophy is Hebrew:
he hesitates not to interpret the divine counsels; but it is by the
supposed light of revelation. Doubt is unknown to him. The anthropomorphic
conception of Deity prevails. Material nature is the instrument of God’s
personal providence for the objects of His care.—But if we pass to the
author of the Essay on Man, the revolution which has given artistic
precision to the form is not more observable than the indications of a
philosophy which has chilled the spiritual faculties. The supernatural is
gone. Nature is a vast machine which moves by fixed laws impressed upon it
by a Creator. The soul feels chilled with the desolation of a universe
wherein it cannot reach forth by prayer to a loving Father. Scripture is
displaced by science. Doubt has passed into unbelief. The universe is
viewed by the cold materialism which arraigns spiritual subjects at the
bar of sense.—If now we turn to the work consecrated by the great living
poet to the memory of his early friend, we find ourselves in contact with
a meditative soul, separated from the age just named by a complete
intellectual chasm; whose spiritual perceptions reflect a philosophy which
expresses the sorrows and doubts of a cultivated mind of the present day,
“perplext in faith but not in deeds.”(94) The material has become
transfigured into the spiritual. The objective has been replaced by the
subjective. Nature is studied, as in Pope, without the assumption of a
revelation; but it is no longer regarded as a machine conducted by
material laws: it is a motive soul which embodies God’s presence; a
mystery to be felt, not understood. God is not afar off, so that we cannot
reach Him: He is so nigh, that His omnipresence seems to obscure His
personality.
These instances will illustrate the difference which philosophy produces
in the classes of ideas in which the mind of an age is formed. In Milton,
the appeal is made to the revelation of God in the Book; in Pope, to the
revelation in Nature; in the living poet, to the revelation in man’s soul,
the type of the infinite Spirit and interpreter of God’s universe and
God’s book.(95)
It is an analysis of a similar kind which we must conduct in reference to
sceptical opinions. The influence of the first of the two classes of
intellectual causes above named,(96) viz. the various forms of knowledge
there described, could not exist unobserved, for they are present from
time to time as rival doctrines in contest with Christianity; but the kind
of influence of which we now treat, which relates to the grounds of belief
on which a judgment is consciously or unconsciously formed, is more
subtle, and requires analysis for its detection.
We must briefly explain its nature, and illustrate its influence on
religion.
Metaphysical science is usually divided into two branches; of which one
examines the objects known, the other the human mind, that is the organ of
knowledge. (7) When Psychology has finished its study of the structure and
functions of the mind, it supplies the means for drawing inferences in
reply to a question which admits of a twofold aspect, viz. which of the
mental faculties,—sense, reason, feeling, furnishes the origin of
knowledge; and which is the supreme test of truth? These two questions
form the subjective or Psychological branch of Metaphysics. According to
the answer thus obtained we deduce a corollary in reference to the
objective side. We ask what information is afforded by these mental
faculties in respect to the nature or attributes of the objects
known,—matter, mind, God, duty. The answer to this question is the branch
commonly called the Ontological. The one inquiry treats of the tests of
knowledge, the other of the nature of being. The combination of the two
furnishes the answer on its two sides, internally and externally, to the
question, What is truth?
The right application of them to the subject of religion would give a
philosophy of religion; either objectively by the process of constructing
a _theodicée_ or theory to reconcile reason and faith; or subjectively, by
separating their provinces by means of such an inquiry into the functions
of the religious faculty, and the nature of the truths apprehended by it,
as might furnish criteria to determine the amount that is to be
appropriated respectively from our own consciousness and from external
authority.
The influence of the Ontological branch of the inquiry in producing a
struggle with Christianity, has been already included under the
difficulties previously named, which are created by the growth of the
various sciences.(97) It is the influence of the Psychological branch that
we are now illustrating, by showing that the various theories in respect
of it give their type to various forms of belief and doubt.
The well-known threefold distribution of the faculties that form the
ultimate grounds of conviction will suffice for our purpose: viz.,
sensational consciousness revealing to us the world of matter; intuitive
reason that of mind; and feeling that of emotion.(98) These are the forms
of consciousness which supply the material from which the reflective
powers draw inferences and construct systems.
It is easy to exhibit the mental character which each would have a
tendency to generate when applied to a special subject like religion,
natural or revealed.
If the eye of sense be the sole guide in looking around on nature, we
discover only a universe of brute matter, phenomena linked together in
uniform succession of antecedents and consequents. Mind becomes only a
higher form of matter. Sin loses its poignancy. Immortality disappears.
God exists not, except as a personification of the Cosmos. Materialism,
atheism, fatalism, are the ultimate results which are proved by logic and
history(99) to follow from this extreme view. The idea of spirit cannot be
reached by it. For if some other form of experience than the sensitive be
regarded as the origin of knowledge; if a nobler view be forced on us by
the very inability even to express nature’s phenomena without superadding
spiritual qualities; if regularity of succession(100) suggest the idea of
order and purpose and mind; if adaptation suggest the idea of morality; if
movement suggest the idea of form and will; if will suggest the idea of
personality; if the idea of the Cosmos suggest unity, and thus we mount
up, step by step, to the conception of a God, possessing unity,
intelligence, will, character, we really transfer into the sphere of
nature ideas taken from another region of being, viz., from our
consciousness of ourselves, our consciousness of spirit. It is mental
association that links these ideas to those of sense, and gives to a
sensational philosophy properties not its own. If however sensational
experience can by any means arrive at the notion of natural religion; yet
it will find a difficulty, created by its belief of the uniformity of
nature, in taking the further step of admitting the miraculous
interference which gives birth to revealed: and even if this difficulty
should be surmounted, the disinclination to the supernatural would
nevertheless have a tendency to obliterate mystery by empirical
rationalism, and to reduce piety to morality, morality to expedience,(101)
the church to a political institution, religion to a ritual system, and
its evidence to external historic testimony.
The rival system of proof founded in intuitive consciousness is however
not free from danger. A difference occurs, according as this endowment is
regarded as merely revealing the facts of our own inner experience, or on
the other hand as possessing a power to apprehend God positively, and
spirit to spirit.(102) The result of the former belief would be indeed an
ethical religion, compared with the political one just described. If it
did not rise from the law to the law-giver, it would at least present
morality as a law obligatory on man by his mental structure, independently
of the consideration of reward and punishment. The ideas of God, duty,
immortality, would be established as a necessity of thought, if not as
matters of objective fact. Yet religion would be rather rational than
supernatural; obedience to duty instead of communion with Deity; and
unless the mind can find ground for a belief in God and the divine
attributes through some other faculty, the idealism must destroy the
evidence of revealed religion. Or at least, if the mind admit its truth,
it must renounce the right to criticise the material of that which it
confesses to be beyond the limits of its own consciousness; and thus, by
abdicating its natural powers, blindly submit to external authority, and
accept belief as the refuge from its own Pyrrhonism.
If, on the other hand, instead of regarding all attempts to pass beyond
logical forms of thought to be mental impotence, the mind follows its own
instincts, and, relying upon the same natural realism which justifies its
belief in the immediate character of its sensitive perceptions, ventures
to depend with equal firmness on the reality of its intuitional
consciousness, religion, natural or revealed, wears another aspect; and
both the advantages and the dangers of such a view are widely
different.(103) The soul no longer regards the landscape to be a scene
painted on the windows of its prison-house, a subjective limit to its
perceptions, but not speculatively true; but it wanders forth from its
cell unfettered into the universe around. God is no longer an inference
from final causes, nor a principle of thought. He is the living God, a
real personal spirit with whom the soul is permitted to hold direct
communion. Providence becomes the act of a personal agent. Religion is the
worship in spirit. Sin is seen in its heinousness. Prayer is justified as
a reality, as the breathing of the human soul for communion with its
infinite Parent (8). And by the light of this intuition, God, nature, and
man, look changed. Nature is no longer a physical engine; man no longer a
moral machine. Material nature becomes the regular expression of a
personal fixed will; Miracle the direct interposition of a personal free
will. Revelation is probable, as the voice of God’s mercy to the child of
His love. Inspiration becomes possible, for the intuitional consciousness
seems adapted to be used by divine Providence as its instrument.(104)
But the type of mind created by the use of intuition as a test of truth is
rarely alone. It is cognate to, if it is not connected with, that produced
by the third of the above-named tests, feeling. The emotions, according to
a law of spiritual supply and demand, suggest the reality of the objects
toward which they are aspirations. The longing for help, the feeling of
dependence, is the justification of prayer; the sense of remorse is the
witness to divine judgment; the consciousness of penitence is the ground
for hope in God’s merciful interference; the ineradicable sense of guilt
is the eternal witness to the need of atonement; the instinct for
immortality is the pledge of a future life.
Yet the use of these tests of intuition and feeling in religion, though
possessing these advantages, has dangers. If the feelings, instead of
being used to reinforce or check the other faculties, be relied upon as
sole arbiters; especially if they be linked with the imagination instead
of the intuition; they may conduct to mysticism and superstition by the
very vividness of their perception of the supernatural.(105) Likewise the
intuitive faculty, if it be regarded as giving a noble grasp over the fact
of God as an infinite Spirit, may cause the mind to relax its hold on the
idea of the Divine Personality, and fall into Pantheism, and identify God
with the universe, not by degrading spirit to matter, but by elevating
matter to spirit.(106) Or, instead of allowing experience and revelation
to develop into conceptions of the fundamental truth whose existence it
perceives, it may attempt to develop a religion wholly _à priori_,(107)
and assert its right to create as well as to verify. Also, when applying
itself to revealed religion, this type of thought necessarily makes its
last appeal to inward insight. It cannot, like sensationalism, or
subjective idealism, admit its own impotence, and receive on authority a
revelation, the contents of which it ventures not to criticise. It must
always appropriate that which it is to believe. Accordingly it will have a
tendency to render religion subjective in its character, uncertain in its
doctrines, individual in its constitution.
These general remarks, every one of which admits of historic
exemplification,(108) will suffice to illustrate the kind of influence
exercised by these respective tests of truth in forming the judgment or
moulding the character in relation to the belief or disbelief of natural
and revealed religion. These effects are not adduced as the necessary
results but as the ordinary tendencies of these respective theories. The
mind frequently stops short of the conclusions logically deducible from
its own principles. To measure precisely the effect of each view would be
impossible. In mental science analysis must be qualitative, not
quantitative.
It will hardly be expected that we should arbitrate among these theories,
inasmuch as our purpose is not to test the comparative truthfulness of
metaphysical opinions, but to refer sceptical opinions in religion to
their true scientific and metaphysical parentage. Truth is probably to be
found in a selection from all; and historical investigation is the chief
means of discovering the mode of conducting the process. It is at least
certain, that if history be the form which science necessarily takes in
the study of that which is subject to laws of life and organic growth, it
must be the preliminary inquiry in any investigation in reference to
mental phenomena. The history of philosophy must be the approach to
philosophy.(109) The great problem of philosophy is method; and if there
be a hope that the true method can ever be found it must be by uniting the
historical analysis of the development of the universal mind with the
psychological analysis of the individual. The history of thought indicates
not only fact but truth; not only shows what has been, but, by exhibiting
the proportions which different faculties contribute toward the
construction of truth, and indicating tendencies as well as results,
prepares materials to be collated with the decision previously made by
mental and moral science concerning the question of what ought to be (9).
A definite conviction on this metaphysical inquiry seems perhaps to be
involved in the very idea of criticism, and necessary for drawing the
moral from the history; yet the independence of our historical inquiry
ought to be sacrificed as little as possible to illustrate a foregone
conclusion. It will be more satisfactory to present the evidence for a
verdict without undue advocacy of a side in the metaphysical
controversy.(110)
The execution of this design of analysing the intellectual causes of
unbelief will necessarily involve to some extent a biographical treatment
of the subject, both for theoretical and practical reasons, to discover
truth and to derive instruction. This is so evident in the history of
action, that there is a danger at the present time lest history should
lose the general in the individual, and descend from the rank of science
to mere biography.(111) The deeper insight which is gradually obtained
into the complexity of nature, together with the fuller conviction of
human freedom, is causing artistic portraiture and ethical analysis to be
substituted for historical generalization. The same method however applies
to the region of thought as well as will.
Thought, as an intellectual product, can indeed be studied apart from the
mind that creates it, and can be treated by history as a material fact
subject to the fixed succession of natural laws. But the exclusive use of
such a method, at least in any other subject of study than that of the
results of physical discovery, must be defective, even independently of
the question of the action of free will, unless the thoughts which are the
object of study be also connected with the personality of the thinker who
produces them. His external biography is generally unimportant, save when
the individual character may have impressed itself upon public events; but
the internal portraiture, the growth of soul as known by psychological
analysis, is the very instrument for understanding the expression of it in
life or in literature.(112) It is requisite to know the mental bias of a
writer, whether it be practical, imaginative or reflective; to see the
_idola specus_ which influenced him, the action of circumstances upon his
character, and the reaction of his character upon circumstances; before we
can gain the clue to the interpretation of his works. But if we wish
further to derive moral instruction from him, the biographical mode of
study becomes even more necessary. For the notion of freedom as the ground
of responsibility is now superadded; and the story of his life is the sole
means for such an apprehension of the causes of his heart-struggles as
shall enable us to take the gauge of his moral character, and appropriate
the lessons derivable from the study of it.
Indeed biographical notices, if they could be extended compatibly with the
compass of the subject, would be the most instructive and vivid mode of
presenting alike the facts relating to scepticism and their
interpretation. Such memoirs are not wanting, and are among the most
touching in literature. The sketch which Strauss has given of his early
friend and fellow student Maerklin,(113) gradually surrendering one
cherished truth after another, until he doubted all but the law of
conscience; then devoting himself in the strength of it with unflinching
industry to education; until at last he died in the dark, without belief
in God or hope, cheered only by the consciousness of having tried to find
truth and do his duty:—the sad tale, told by two remarkable biographers,
of Sterling,(114) doubting, renouncing the ministry, yet thirsting for
truth, and at last solacing himself in death by the hopes offered by the
Bible, to the eternal truths of which his doubting heart had always
clung:—the memoir of the adopted son of our own university, Blanco
White,(115) a mind in which faith and doubt were perpetually waging war,
till the grave closed over his truth-searching and care-worn spirit:—the
confessions of one of our own sons of the successive “phases of
faith”(116) through which his soul passed from evangelical Christianity to
a spiritual Deism, a record of heart-struggles which takes its place among
the pathetic works of autobiography, where individuals have unveiled their
inner life for the instruction of their fellow-men:—all these are
instances where the great moral and spiritual problems that belong to the
condition of our race may be seen embodied in the sorrowful experience of
individuals. They are instances of rare value for psychological study in
reference to the history of doubt; sad beacons of warning and of guidance.
Accordingly, in the history of free thought we must not altogether neglect
the spiritual biography of the doubter, though only able to indicate it by
a few touches; by an etching, not a photograph.
We have now added to the explanation before given of the province of our
inquiry, and of the law of the action of free thought on religion, an
account of the moral and intellectual causes which operate in the history
of unbelief, and have sufficiently explained the mode in which the subject
will be treated.
The use of the inquiry will, it is hoped, be apparent both in its
theoretical and practical relations. It is designed to have an
intellectual value not only as instruction but as argument. The tendency
of it will be in some degree polemical as well as didactic, refuting error
by analysing it into its causes, repelling present attacks by studying the
history of former ones.
It is one peculiar advantage belonging to the philosophical investigation
of the history of thought, that even the odious becomes valuable as an
object of study, the pathology of the soul as well as its normal action.
Philosophy takes cognisance of error as well as of truth, inasmuch as it
derives materials from both for discovering a theory of the grounds of
belief and disbelief. Hence it follows that the study of the natural
history of doubt combined with the literary, if it be the means of
affording an explanation of a large class of facts relating to the
religious history of man and the sphere of the remedial operations of
Christ’s church, will have a practical value as well as speculative.
Such an inquiry, if it be directed, as in the present lectures, to the
analysis of the intellectual rather than the emotional element of
unbelief, as being that which has been less generally and less fully
explored, will require to be supplemented by a constant reference to the
intermixture of the other element, and the consequent necessity of taking
account of the latter in estimating the whole phenomenon of doubt. But
within its own sphere it will have a practical and polemical value, if the
course of the investigation shall show that the various forms of unbelief,
when studied from the intellectual side, are corollaries from certain
metaphysical or critical systems. The analysis itself will have indirectly
the force of an argument. The discovery of the causes of a disease
contains the germ of the cure. Error is refuted when it is referred to the
causes which produce it.
Nor will the practical value of the inquiry be restricted to its use as a
page in the spiritual history of the human mind, but will belong to it
also as a chapter in the history of the church. For even if in the study
of the contest our attention be almost wholly restricted to the movements
of one of the two belligerents, and only occasionally directed to the
evidences on which the faith of the church in various crises reposed, and
by which it tried to repel the invader, yet the knowledge of the scheme of
attack cannot fail to be a valuable accompaniment to the study of the
defence.(117)
Thus the natural history of doubt, viewed as a chapter of human history,
like the chapter of physiology which studies a disease, will point
indirectly to the cure, or at least to the mode of avoiding the causes
which induce the disease; while the literary history of it, viewed as a
chapter of church history, will contribute the results of experience to
train the Christian combatant.
The subject will however not only have an intellectual value in being at
once didactic and polemical, offering an explanation of the causes of
unbelief and furnishing hints for their removal; but it cannot fail also
to possess a moral value in reference to the conscience and heart of the
disputant, in teaching the lesson of mercy towards the unbeliever, and
deep pity for the heart wounded with doubts. An intelligent acquaintance
with the many phases of history operates like foreign travel in widening
the sympathies; and increase of knowledge creates the moderation which
gains the victory through attracting an enemy instead of repelling him.
Bigotry is founded on ignorance and fear. True learning is temperate,
because discriminating; forbearing, because courageous. If we place
ourselves in the position of an opponent, and try candidly to understand
the process by which he was led to form his opinions, indignation will
subside into pity, and enmity into grief: the hatred will be reserved for
the sin, not for the sinner; and the servant of Jesus Christ will thus
catch in some humble measure the forbearing love which his divine Master
showed to the first doubting disciple.(118) As the sight of suffering in
an enemy changes the feeling of anger into pity, so the study of a series
of spiritual struggles makes us see in an opponent, not an enemy to be
crushed, but a brother to be won. The utility of a historic treatment of
doubt is suggested by moral as well as intellectual grounds.
I hope therefore that if I follow the example of some of my
predecessors,(119) in giving a course of lectures historical rather than
polemical, evincing the critic rather than the advocate, seeking for truth
rather than victory, analysing processes of evidence rather than refuting
results, my humble contribution toward the knowledge of the argument of
the Christian evidences will be considered to come fairly within the
design intended by the founder of the lecture.
It may well be believed that in the execution of so large a scheme I have
felt almost overwhelmed under a painful sense of its difficulty. If even I
may venture to hope that a conscientious study in most cases of the
original sources of information may save me from literary mistakes, yet
there is a danger lest the size of the subject should preclude the
possibility of constant clearness; or lest the very analysis of the errors
of the systems named, may produce a painful, if not an injurious,
impression. In an age too of controversy, those who speak on difficult
questions incur a new danger, of being misunderstood from the
sensitiveness with which earnest men not unreasonably watch them. The
attitude of suspicion may cause impartiality to be regarded as
indifference to truth, fairness as sympathy with error. I am not ashamed
therefore to confess, that under the oppressive sense of these various
feelings I have been wont to go for help to the only source where the
burdened heart can find consolation; and have sought, in the communion
with the Father of spirits which prayer opens to the humblest, a temper of
candour, of reverence, and of the love of truth. In this spirit I have
made my studies; and what I have thus learned I shall teach.
LECTURE II. THE LITERARY OPPOSITION OF HEATHENS AGAINST CHRISTIANITY IN
THE EARLY AGES.
1 COR. i. 22-24.
_The Greeks seek after wisdom; but we preach Christ crucified;
unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called,
Christ the wisdom of God._
It has been already stated(120), that in the first great struggle of the
human mind against the Christian religion the action of reason in
criticising its claims assumed two forms, Gnosticism or rationalism within
the church, and unbelief without.
The origin and history of the former of these two lines of thought were
once discussed in an elaborate course of Bampton Lectures;(121) and though
subsequent investigation has added new sources of information,(122) and it
would be consonant to our general object to trace briefly the speculations
of the various schools of Gnostics,—Greek, Oriental, or Egyptian,—the want
of space necessitates the omission of these topics. In the present lecture
we shall accordingly restrict ourselves to the history of the other line
of thought, and trace the grounds alleged by the intelligent heathens who
examined Christianity, for declining to admit its claims, from the time of
its rise to the final downfall of heathenism.
The truest modern resemblance to this struggle is obviously to be found in
the disbelief shown by educated heathens in pagan countries to whom
Christianity is proclaimed in the present day. It was not until the
establishment of Christianity as the state religion by Constantine had
given it political and moral victory, that it was possible for unbelief to
assume its modern aspect, of being the attempt of reason to break away
from a creed which is an acknowledged part of the national life. The first
opponents accordingly whose views we shall study, Lucian, Celsus,
Porphyry, Hierocles, are heathen unbelievers. Julian is the earliest that
we encounter who rejected Christianity after having been educated in it.
The resemblance however to this struggle is not wholly restricted to
heathen lands. There have been moments in the history of nations, or of
individuals, when a Christian standard of feeling or of thought has been
so far obliterated that a state of public disbelief and philosophical
attack similar to the ancient heathen has reappeared, and the tone of the
early unbelievers, and sometimes even their specific doubts, have been
either borrowed or reproduced.(123)
In this portion of the history we encounter a difficulty peculiar to it,
in being compelled to form an estimate of the opinions described, from
indirect information. The treatises of the more noted writers that opposed
Christianity have perished; some through natural causes, but those of
Porphyry and Julian through the special order of a Christian emperor,
Theodosius II., in A.D. 435.
In the absence accordingly of the original writings, we must discover the
grounds for the rejection of Christianity by the aid of the particular
treatises of evidence written by Christian fathers expressly in refutation
of them, which occasionally contain quotations of the lost works; and also
by means of the general apologies written on behalf of the Christian
religion, together with slight notices of it occurring in heathen
literature. The latter will inform us concerning the miscellaneous
objections current, the former concerning the definite arguments of the
writers who expressly gave reasons for disbelieving Christianity.(124)
We possess a large treatise of Origen against Celsus; passages, directed
against Porphyry, of Eusebius, Jerome, and Augustin; a tract of Eusebius
against Hierocles; and a work of Cyril of Alexandria against Julian. Yet
it is never perfectly satisfactory to be obliged to read an opinion
through the statement of an opponent of it. The history of philosophical
controversy shows that intellectual causes, such as the natural tendency
to answer an argument on principles that its author would not concede, to
reply to conclusions instead of premises, or to impute the corollaries
which are supposed to be deducible from an opinion, may lead to
unintentional misrepresentation of a doctrine refuted, even where no moral
causes such as bias or sarcasm contribute to the result. Aristotle’s
well-known criticism of Plato’s theory of archetypes is a pertinent
illustration.(125)
The slight difficulty thus encountered, in extracting the real opinions of
the early unbelievers out of the replies of their Christian opponents, may
for the most part be avoided by first realising the state of belief which
existed in reference to the heathen religion, which for our present
purpose may be treated as homogeneous throughout the whole Roman world. We
shall thus be enabled as it were to foresee the line of opinion which
would be likely to be adopted in reference to a new religion coming with
the claims and character of Christianity. This prefatory inquiry will also
coincide with our general purpose of analysing the influence of
intellectual causes in the production of unbelief.
Four separate tendencies may be distinguished among heathens in the early
centuries in reference to religion:(126) viz. the tendency, (1) to
absolute unbelief, (2) to a bigoted attachment to a national creed, (3) to
a philosophical, and (4) a mystical theory of religion.
The tendency to total disbelief of the supernatural prevailed in the
Epicurean school. A type of the more earnest spirits of this class is seen
at a period a little earlier than the Christian era in Lucretius, living
mournfully in the moral desert which his doubts had scorched into
barrenness.(127) The world is to him a scene unguided by a Providence:
death is uncheered by the hope of a future life. An example of the
flippant sceptic is found in Lucian in the second century, A.D. The great
knowledge of life which travel had afforded him created a universal
ridicule for religion; but his unbelief evinced no seriousness, no
sadness. His humour itself is a type of the man. Lacking the bitter
earnestness which gave sting to the wit of Aristophanes, and the courteous
playfulness exhibited in the many-sided genius of Plato, he was a
caricaturist rather than a painter: his dialogues are farces of life
rather than satires. It has been well remarked, that human society has no
worse foe than a universal scoffer. Lacking aspirations sufficiently lofty
to appreciate religion, and wisdom to understand the great crises that
give birth to it, such a man destroys not superstition only but the very
faculty of belief.(128) It is easy to perceive that to such minds
Christianity would be a mark for the same jests as other creeds.
A second tendency, most widely opposed in appearance to the sceptical, but
which was too often its natural product, showed itself in a bigoted
attachment to the national religion.(129) Among the masses such faith was
real though unintelligent, but in educated men it had become artificial.
When an ethnic religion is young, faith is fresh and gives inspiration to
its art and its poetry. In a more critical age, the historic spirit
rationalizes the legends, while the philosophic allegorizes the myths; and
thoughtful men attempt to rise to a spiritual worship of which rites are
symbols.(130) But in the decay of a religion, the supernatural loses its
hold of the class of educated minds, and is regarded as imposture, and the
support which they lend to worship is political. They fall back on
tradition to escape their doubts, or they think it politically expedient
to enforce on the masses a creed which they contemn in heart. Such a
ground of attachment to paganism is described in the dialogue of the
Christian apologist, Minucius Felix.(131) It would not only coincide with
the first-named tendency in denying the importance of Christianity, but
would join in active opposition. In truth, it marks the commencement of
the strong reaction which took place in favour of heathenism at the close
of the second century,—twofold in its nature; a popular reaction of
prejudice or of mysticism on the part of the lower classes, and a
political or philosophical one of the educated.(132) Both were in a great
degree produced by Eastern influences. The substitution which was
gradually taking place of naturalism for humanism, the adoration of
cosmical and mystical powers instead of the human attributes of the
deities of the older creed, was the means of re-awakening popular
superstition, while at the same time the Alexandrian speculations of
Neo-Platonism gave a religious aspect to philosophy.
Accordingly the third, or philosophical tendency in reference to religion,
distinct from the two already named, of positive unbelief in the
supernatural on the one hand, and devotion sincere or artificial to
heathen worship on the other, comprises, in addition to the older schools
of Stoics and Platonists, the new eclectic school just spoken of. The
three schools agreed in extracting a philosophy out of the popular
religion, by searching for historic or moral truth veiled in its symbols.
The Stoic, as being the least speculative, employed itself less with
religion than the others. Its doctrine, ethical rather than metaphysical,
concerned with the will rather than the intellect, juridical and formal
rather than speculative, seemed especially to give expression to the Roman
character, as the Platonic to the Greek, or as the eclectic to the hybrid,
half Oriental half European, which marked Alexandria. In the writings of
M. Aurelius, one of the emperors most noted for the persecution of the
church, it manifests itself rather as a rule of life than a subject for
belief, as morality rather than religion.(133) The Stoic opposition to
Christianity was the contempt of the Gaul or Roman for what was foreign,
or of ethical philosophy for religion.
The Platonic doctrine, so far as it is represented in an impure form in
the early centuries, sought, as of old, to explore the connexion between
the visible and invisible worlds, and to rise above the phenomenon into
the spiritual. Hence in its view of heathen religion it strove to rescue
the ideal religion from the actual, and to discover the one revelation of
the Divine ideal amid the great variety of religious traditions and modes
of worship. But its invincible dualism, separating by an impassable chasm
God from the world, and mind from matter, identifying goodness with the
one, evil with the other, prevented belief in a religion like
Christianity, which was penetrated by the Hebrew conceptions of the
universe, so alien both to dualism and pantheism.
The line is not very marked which separates this philosophy from the
professed revival of Plato’s teaching, which received the name of
Neo-Platonism, which was the philosophy with which Christianity came most
frequently into conflict or contact during the third and two following
centuries (10). Fastening on the more mystical parts of Plato, to the
neglect of the more practical, it probably borrowed something also from
Eastern mysticism. The object of the school was to find an explanation of
the problem of existence, by tracing the evolution of the absolute cause
in the universe through a trinal manifestation, as being, thought, and
action. The agency by which the human mind apprehended this process lay in
the attainment of a kind of insight wherein the organ of knowledge is one
with the object known, a state of mind and feeling whereby the mind gazes
on a sphere of being which is closed to the ordinary faculties.
Schelling’s theory of “intellectual intuition” is the modern parallel to
this Neo-Platonic State of ἔκστασις or ἐνθουσιασμός. This philosophy,
though frequently described in modern times as bearing a resemblance to
Christianity in method, as being the knowledge of the one absolute Being
by means of faith, is really most widely opposed in its interior spirit.
It is essentially pantheism. Its monotheistic aspect, caught by contact
with Semitic thought, is exterior only. Its deity, which seems personal,
is really only the personification of an abstraction, a mere instance of
mental realism. Man’s personality, which Christianity states clearly, was
lost in the universe; religious facts in metaphysical ideas.(134) Religion
accordingly would be exclusive, confined to an aristocracy of education;
and the existing national cultus would be appropriated as a sensuous
religion suited for the masses, a visible type of the invisible. The
analogy which this philosophy bore to Christianity in aim and office, as
well as the rivalry of other schools which is implied in its eclectic
aspect, caused it to take up an attitude of opposition to the Christian
system to which it claimed to bear affinity.
The mystical element in this philosophy enabled some minds to find a home
for the theurgy which had been increased by the importation of eastern
ideas.(135) They form as it were the connecting link with the fourth
religious tendency, which manifested itself in the craving for a
communication from the world invisible, which found its satisfaction in
magic and in a spirit of fanaticism. Some of these fanatics were doubtless
also impostors;(136) but some were high-minded men struggling after truth,
of whom possibly an example is seen at an early period in Apollonius of
Tyana; deceived rather than deceivers. This tendency operated in some
minds to cause them to reduce Christianity to ordinary magic and
prodigies; while among a few it created yearnings for a nobler
satisfaction, which drew them toward Christianity, as in the case of the
Clemens, whose autobiography professes to be given in the well-known work
of the early ages, the Clementines. (11)
Such seem to have been the chief forms of religious thought existing among
the heathen to whom Christianity presented itself, on which were founded
the preparation of heart which led to the acceptance of its message, or
the prejudices which rejected its claims;—viz. among the masses, a
sensuous unintelligent belief in polytheism;—among the educated,
disorganization of belief; either materialism, the total rejection of the
supernatural, and a political attachment on the principle of expedience to
existing creeds; or philosophy, ethical, dualistic, pantheistic, despising
religions as mere organic products of national thought, and trying to
seize the central truths of which they were the expression; or a mystical
craving after the supernatural, degrading its victims into fanatics. The
further analysis of these tendencies would show their connexion with the
threefold classification before given of the tests of truth into sense,
reason, and feeling.
We have thus prepared the way for interpreting the lines of argument used
in opposition to Christianity, and shall now proceed to sketch in
chronological succession the history of the chief intellectual attacks
made by unbelievers.
It is not until the middle of the second century that we find Christianity
becoming the subject of literary investigation. Incidental expressions
either of scorn or of misapprehension form the sole allusions in the
heathen writers of earlier date (12); but in the reigns of the Antonines,
the Christians began to attract notice and to meet with criticism. We read
of a work written against Christianity by a Cynic, Crescens, in the reign
of Antoninus Pius;(137) and of another by the tutor of Marcus Aurelius,
Fronto of Cirta,(138) in which probably the imperial persecution was
justified.
It is at this time too that we meet with an attempt to hold the Christians
up to ridicule in a satire of Lucian,(139) which well exemplifies the
views belonging to the sceptical of the four classes into which we have
divided the religious opinions of the heathens. His tract, the Peregrinus
Proteus, it can hardly be doubted, is intended as a satire on Christian
martyrdom (13). Peregrinus(140) is a Cynic philosopher, who after a life
of early villainy is made by Lucian to play the hypocrite at Antioch and
join himself to the Christians, “miserable men” (as he calls them), “who,
hoping for immortality in soul and body, had a foolish contempt of death,
and suffered themselves to be persuaded that they were brethren, because,
having abandoned the Greek gods, they worshipped the crucified sophist,
living according to his laws.”(141) Peregrinus, when a Christian, soon
rises to the dignity of bishop, and is worshipped as a god; and when
imprisoned for his religion is visited by Christians from all quarters.
Afterwards, expelled the church, he travels over the world; and at last
for the sake of glory burns himself publicly at Olympia about A.D. 165.
His end is described in a tragico-comic manner, and a legend is recounted
that at his death he was seen in white, and that a hawk ascended from his
pyre.
Lucian has here used a real name to describe a class, not a person. He has
given a caricature painting from historic elements. There seems internal
evidence to show that he was slightly acquainted with the books of the
early Christians.(142) It has even been conjectured that he might have
read and designed to parody the epistles of Ignatius.(143) With more
probability we may believe that he had heard of and misunderstood the
heroic bearing of the Christian martyrs in the moment of their last
suffering. Pope Alexander VII. in 1664 placed this tract in the index of
prohibited books: yet even beneath the satire we rather hail Lucian as an
unconscious witness to several beautiful features in the character of the
Christians of his time:(144) viz. their worship of “the crucified
sophist,” who was their adorable Lord; their guilelessness; their
brotherly love; their strict discipline; their common meals; their union;
their benevolence; their joy in death. The points which he depicts in his
satire are, their credulity in giving way to Peregrinus; their
unintelligent belief in Christ and in immortality; their factiousness in
aiding Peregrinus when in prison; their pompous vanity in martyrdom, and
possibly their tendency to believe legends respecting a martyr’s death.
His satire is contempt, not anger, nor dread. It is the humour of a
thorough sceptic, which discharged itself on all religions alike; and
indicates one type of opposition to Christianity; viz. the contempt of
those who thought it folly.
Very unlike to him was his well-known contemporary Celsus. If the one
represents the scoffer, the other represents the philosopher. Not
despising Christianity with scorn like Tacitus, nor jeering at it with
humour like Lucian, Celsus had the wisdom to apprehend danger to
heathenism, measuring Christianity in its mental and not its material
relations; and about the reign of Marcus Aurelius wrote against it a work
entitled Λόγος ἀληθής, which was considered of such importance, that
Origen towards the close of his own life(145) wrote a large and elaborate
reply to it.
We know nothing of Celsus’s life.(146) There is even an uncertainty as to
the school of philosophy to which he belonged. External evidence seems to
testify that he was an Epicurean; but internal would lead us to classify
him with the Platonic. Unscrupulous in argument, confounding canonical
gospels with apocryphal, and Christians with heretical sects, delighting
in searching for contradictions, incapable of understanding the deeper
aspects of Christianity, he has united in his attack all known objections,
making use of minute criticism, philosophical theory, piquant sarcasm, and
eloquent invective, as the vehicle of his passionate assault.
It is impossible to recover a continuous account of the work of Celsus
from the treatise of his respondent; but a careful study of the fragments
embedded in the text of Origen will perhaps restore the framework of the
original sufficiently to enable us to perceive the points of his
opposition to Christianity, and the manner in which his philosophy stood
in the way of the reception of it. (14)
Celsus commences by introducing a Jewish rabbi to attack Christianity from
the monotheistic stand-point of the earlier faith.(147) The Jew is first
made to direct his criticism against the documents of Christianity, and
then the facts narrated.(148) He points out inconsistencies in the gospel
narratives of the genealogy of Christ;(149) utters the most blasphemous
calumnies concerning the incarnation;(150) turns the narrative of the
infancy into ridicule;(151) imputes our Saviour’s miracles to magic;(152)
attacks his divinity;(153) and concentrates the bitterest raillery on the
affecting narrative of our blessed Lord’s most holy passion. Each fact of
deepening sorrow in that divine tragedy, the betrayal,(154) the mental
anguish, the sacred agony,(155) is made the subject of remarks
characterized no less by coarseness of taste and unfairness, than to the
Christian mind by irreverence. Instead of his heart being touched by the
majesty of our Saviour’s sorrow, Celsus only finds an argument against the
divine character of the adorable sufferer.(156) The wonders accompanying
Christ’s death are treated as legends;(157) the resurrection regarded as
an invention or an optical delusion.(158)
After Celsus has thus made the Jew the means of a ruthless attack on
Christianity, he himself directs a similar one against the Jewish religion
itself.(159) He goes to the origin of their history; describes the Jews as
having left Egypt in a sedition;(160) as being true types of the
Christians in their ancient factiousness;(161) considers Moses to be only
on a level with the early Greek legislators;(162) regards Jewish rites
like circumcision to be borrowed from Egypt; charges anthropomorphism on
Jewish theology,(163) and declines allowing the allegorical interpretation
in explanation of it;(164) examines Jewish prophecy, parallels it with
heathen oracles,(165) and claims that the goodness not the truth of a
prophecy ought to be considered;(166) points to the ancient idolatry of
the Jews as proof that they were not better than other nations;(167) and
to the destruction of Jerusalem as proof that they were not special
favourites of heaven. At last he arrives at their idea of creation,(168)
and here reveals the real ground of his antipathy. While he objects to
details in the narrative, such as the mention of days before the existence
of the sun,(169) his real hatred is against the idea of the unity of God,
and the freedom of Deity in the act of creation. It is the struggle of
pantheism against theism.
When Celsus has thus made use of the Jew to refute Christianity from the
Jewish stand-point, and afterwards refuted the Jew from his own, he
proceeds to make his own attack on Christianity; in doing which, he first
examines the lives of Christians,(170) and afterwards the Christian
doctrine;(171) thus skilfully prejudicing the mind of his readers against
the persons before attacking the doctrines. He alludes to the
quarrelsomeness shown in the various sects of Christians,(172) and repeats
the calumnious suspicion of disloyalty,(173) want of patriotism,(174) and
political uselessness;(175) and hence defends the public persecution of
them.(176) Filled with the esoteric pride of ancient philosophy, he
reproaches the Christians with their carefulness to proselytize the
poor,(177) and to convert the vicious;(178) thus unconsciously giving a
noble testimony to one of the most divine features in our religion, and
testifying to the preaching of the doctrine of a Saviour for sinners.
Having thus defamed the Christians, he passes to the examination of the
Christian doctrine, in its form, its method, and its substance. His
æsthetic sense, ruined with the idolatry of form, and unable to appreciate
the thought, regards the Gospels as defective and rude through
simplicity.(179) The method of Christian teaching also seems to him to be
defective, as lacking philosophy and dialectic, and as denouncing the use
of reason.(180) Lastly, he turns to the substance of the dogmas
themselves. He distinguishes two elements in them, the one of which, as
bearing resemblance to philosophy or to heathen religion, he regards as
incontestably true, but denies its originality, and endeavours to derive
it from Persia or from Platonism;(181) resolving, for example, the worship
of a human being into the ordinary phenomenon of apotheosis.(182) The
other class of doctrines which he attacks as false, consists of those
which relate to creation,(183) the incarnation,(184) the fall,(185)
redemption,(186) man’s place in creation,(187) moral conversions,(188) and
the resurrection of the dead.(189) His point of view for criticising them
is derived from the fundamental dualism of the Platonic system; the
eternal severance of matter and mind, of God and the world; and the
reference of good to the region of mind, evil to that of matter. Thus, not
content with his former attack on the idea of creation in discussion with
the Jew, he returns to the discussion from the philosophical side. His
Platonism will not allow him to admit that the absolute God, the first
Cause, can have any contact with matter. It leads him also to give
importance to the idea of δαίμονες, or divine mediators, by which the
chasm is filled between the ideal god and the world;(190) not being able
otherwise to imagine the action of the pure ἰδέα of God on a world of
matter. Hence he blames Christians for attributing an evil nature to
demons, and finds a reasonable interpretation of the heathen worship.(191)
The same dualist theory extinguishes the idea of the incarnation, as a
degradation of God; and also the doctrine of the fall, inasmuch as
psychological deterioration is impossible if the soul be pure, and if evil
be a necessary attribute of matter.(192) With the fall, redemption also
disappears, because the perfect cannot admit of change; Christ’s coming
could only be to correct what God already knew, or rectify what ought to
have been corrected before.(193) Further, Celsus argues, if Divinity did
descend, that it would not assume so lowly a form as Jesus. The same
rigorous logic charges on Christianity the undue elevation of man, as well
as the abasement of God. Celsus can neither admit man more than the brutes
to be the final cause of the universe; nor allow the possibility of man’s
nearness to God.(194) His pantheism, destroying the barrier which
separates the material from the moral, obliterates the perception of the
fact that a single free responsible being may be of more dignity than the
universe.
Such is the type of a philosophical objector against Christianity, a
little later than the middle of the second century. We meet here for the
first time a remarkable effort of pagan thought, endeavouring to
extinguish the new religion; the definite statements of a mind that
investigated its claims and rejected it. Most of the objections of Celsus
are sophistical; a few are admitted difficulties; but the philosophical
class of them will be seen to be the corollary from his general principle
before explained.
A century intervenes before we meet with the next literary assailant,
Porphyry. In the interval the new reactionary philosophy has fully taken
root, and the fresh attack accordingly bears the impress of the new
system.
The chief objections made in the intervening period, as we collect them
from the apologies, were such as belongs fitly to a transitional time,
when Christianity was exciting attention but was not understood;(195) and
are chiefly the result of the second of the tendencies before named, viz.,
either of popular prejudice, or of the political alarm in reference to the
social disorganization likely to arise out of a large defection from the
religion of the empire, which expressed itself in overt acts of
persecution on the part of the state. (15) Both equally lie beyond our
field of investigation; the one because it does not belong to the
examination of Christianity made by intelligent thought; the other because
it is the struggle of deeds, not of ideas, which only have an interest for
us, if, as in Julian’s case hereafter, the acts were dictated by the
deliberate advice of persons who had attentively examined Christianity.
The apprehensions of prejudice gradually subsided, and objections began to
be based on grounds less absurd in character. The political opposition
also was henceforth founded on a more subtle policy, and on an
appreciation of the nature of Christianity. Soon after the middle of the
third century we meet with the next attack of a purely literary kind,
viz., by Porphyry, the most distinguished opponent that Christianity has
yet encountered.(196) The pupil of Longinus, perhaps of Origen,(197) and
the biographer and interpreter of Plotinus, he is best known for his
logical writings, and for the development of the theory of predication in
his introduction to the Categories, which formed the text on which hung
the mediæval speculations of scholasticism.(198) His Syrian origin and
oriental culture perhaps prepared him for a fusion of East and West, and
for admitting a deeper admixture of mysticism into the Neo-Platonic
philosophy, of which he was a disciple. The points of his approximation to
Christianity are the result of those elements in which heathen philosophy
most nearly approached to Christian truth, the development of which was
stimulated in minds essentially anti-christian by the effort to find a
rival to it. Admirably prepared by his serious and spiritual tone to
embrace Christianity, he nevertheless lived a disciple of paganism. His
feelings rather than his reason led him to defend national creeds. His
philosophy and the Christian, which seemed to be aspirations after the
same end, being designed to elevate the spirit above the world of sense,
were really radically opposed. Understanding therefore the power of the
Christian religion, he felt the necessity for supplanting it; and hoped to
do so by spiritualizing the old creeds, which he harmonized with
philosophy by means of regarding them as symbolic.(199)
His opposition to Christianity was not however based wholly on a prejudice
of feeling. He was a man cultivated in all the learning of his age, and of
a more generous temper than Celsus, and seems to have exercised much
critical sagacity in the investigation of the claims of Christianity.
About the year 270, while in retirement in Sicily, he wrote a book against
the Christians.(200) This work having been destroyed, we are left to
gather its contents and the opinions of its authors from a few criticisms
in Eusebius and Jerome. The entire work consisted of fifteen books; and
concerning only five of these is information afforded by them. Their
remarks lead us to conjecture that it was an assault on Christianity in
many relations. The books however of which we know the purpose, seem to
have been critical rather than philosophical, directed against the grounds
of the religion rather than its character; being in fact an assault on the
Bible. The existence of such a line of argument, of which a trace was
already observable in Celsus, is explained by the circumstance that the
faith of Christendom was already fixed on the authority of the sacred
books. The church had always acknowledged the authority of the Jewish
scriptures; and by the middle or close of the second century at the
latest, it had come to acknowledge explicitly the co-ordinate authority of
a body of Christian literature, historic, and epistolary.(201) Hence, when
once the idea of a rule of faith had grown common, the investigation of
the contents of the scriptures became necessary on the part of heathen
opponents. The growingly critical character of Porphyry’s statements,
though partly attributable to the literary culture of his mind, is a
slight undesigned evidence corroborative of the authoritative nature
already attributed to the scriptures in doctrine and truthfulness.
Porphyry seems accordingly to have directed his critical powers to show
such traces of mistakes and incorrectness as might invalidate the idea of
a supernatural origin for the Jewish and Christian scriptures, and shake
confidence in their truth as an authority.
The first book of his work(202) dragged to light some of the
discrepancies, real or supposed, in scripture; and the examination of the
dispute between St. Peter and St. Paul was quoted as an instance of the
admixture of human ingredients in the body of apostolic teaching. His
third book(203) was directed to the subject of scripture interpretation,
especially, with some inconsistency, against the allegorical or mystical
tendency which at that time marked the whole church, and especially the
Alexandrian fathers. The allegorical method coincided with, if it did not
arise from, the oriental instinct of symbolism, the natural poetry of the
human mind. But in the minds of Jews and Christians it had been sanctified
by its use in the Hebrew religion, and had become associated with the
apocryphal literature of the Jewish church. It is traceable to a more
limited extent in the inspired writers of the New Testament, and in most
of the fathers; but in the school of Alexandria(204) it was adopted as a
formal system of interpretation. It is this allegorical system which
Porphyry attacked. He assaulted the writings of those who had fancifully
allegorised the Old Testament in the pious desire of finding Christianity
in every part of it, in spite of historic conditions; and he hastily drew
the inference, with something like the feeling of doubt which rash
interpretations of prophecy are in danger of producing at this day, that
no consistent sense can be put upon the Old Testament. His fourth
book(205) was a criticism on the Mosaic history, and on Jewish
antiquities. But the most important books in his work were the
twelfth(206) and thirteenth,(207) which were devoted to an examination of
the prophecies of Daniel, in which he detected some of those peculiarities
on which modern criticism has employed itself, and arrived at the
conclusions in reference to its date, revived by the English deist Collins
in the last century, and by many German critics in the present.
It is well known that half of the book of Daniel(208) is historic, half
prophetic. Each of these parts is distinguished from similar portions of
the Old Testament by some peculiarities. Porphyry is not recorded as
noticing any of those which belong to the historic part, unless we may
conjecture, from his theory of the book being originally written in Greek,
that he detected the presence of those Greek words in Nebuchadnezzar’s
edicts, which many modern critics have contended could not be introduced
into Chaldæa antecedently to the Macedonian conquest.(209) The peculiarity
alleged to belong to the prophetical part is its apocalyptic tone. It
looks, it has been said, historical rather than prophetical. Definite
events, and a chain of definite events, are predicted with the precision
of historical narrative;(210) whereas most prophecy is a moral sermon, in
which general moral predictions are given, with specific historic ones
interspersed. Nor is this, which is shared in a less degree by occasional
prophecies elsewhere, the only peculiarity alleged, but it is affirmed
also that the definite character ceases at a particular period of the
reign of Antiochus Epiphanes,(211) down to which the very campaigns of the
Seleucid and Ptolemaic dynasties are noted, but subsequently to which the
prophetic tone becomes more vague and indefinite. Hence the conjecture has
been hazarded that it was written in the reign of Antiochus by a
Palestinian Jew, who gathered up the traditions of Daniel’s life, and
wrote the recent history of his country in eloquent language, in an
apocalyptic form; which, after the literary fashion of his age, he imputed
to an ancient seer, Daniel; definite up to the period at which he composed
it, indefinite as he gazed on the future. (16) It was this peculiarity,
the supposed ceasing of the prophecies in the book of Daniel at a definite
date, which was noticed by Porphyry, and led him to suggest the theory of
its authorship just named.(212) These remarks will give an idea of the
critical acuteness of Porphyry. His objections are not, it will be
observed, founded on quibbles like those of Celsus, but on instructive
literary characteristics, many of which are greatly exaggerated or grossly
misinterpreted, but still are real, and suggest difficulties or inquiries
which the best modern theological critics have honourably felt to demand
candid examination and explanation.(213)
A period of about thirty years brings us to the date of the Diocletian
persecution, A.D. 303; during the progress of which another noted attack
was made. It was by Hierocles, then president of Bithynia, and afterwards
præfect of Alexandria, himself one of the instigators of the persecution
and an agent in effecting it.(214) His line of argument was more specific
than those previously named, being directed against the evidence which was
derived by Christians for the truth of their religion from the character
and miraculous works of Christ; and his aim accordingly was to develope
the character of Apollonius of Tyana,(215) as a rival to our Saviour in
piety and miraculous power.
Apollonius was a Pythagorean philosopher, born in Cappadocia about four
years before the Christian era. After being early educated in the circle
of philosophy, and in the practice of the ascetic discipline of his
predecessor Pythagoras, he imitated that philosopher in spending the next
portion of his life in travel. Attracted by his mysticism to the farthest
East as the source of knowledge, he set out for Persia and India; and in
Nineveh on his route met Damis, the future chronicler of his actions.
Returning from the East instructed in Brahminic lore, he travelled over
the Roman world. The remainder of his days was spent in Asia Minor.
Statues and temples were erected to his honour. He obtained vast
influence, and died with the reputation of sanctity late in the century.
Such is the outline of his life, if we omit the numerous legends and
prodigies which attach themselves to his name. He was partly a
philosopher, partly a magician; half mystic, half impostor.(216) At the
distance of a century and a quarter from his death, in the reign of
Septimius Severus, at the request of the wife of that emperor, the second
of the three Philostrati dressed up Damis’s narrative of his life, in a
work still remaining, and paved a way for the general reception of the
story among the cultivated classes of Rome and Greece.(217) It has been
thought that Philostratus had a polemical aim against the Christian
faith,(218) as the memoir of Apollonius is in so many points a parody on
the life of Christ. The annunciation of his birth to his mother, the
chorus of swans which sang for joy on occasion of it, the casting out
devils, the raising the dead, the healing the sick, the sudden
disappearance and reappearance of Apollonius, the sacred voice which
called him at his death, and his claim to be a teacher with authority to
reform the world, form some of the points of similarity.
If such was the intention of Philostratus, he was really a
controversialist under the form of a writer of romance; employed by those
who at that time were labouring (as already named) to introduce an
eclecticism largely borrowed from the East into the region both of
philosophy and religion. Without settling this question, it is at least
certain that about the beginning of the next century the heathen writers
adopted this line of argument, and sought to exhibit a rival ideal.(219)
One instance is the life of Pythagoras by Iamblichus; another that which
Hierocles wrote, in part of which he used Philostratus’s untrustworthy
memoir for the purpose of instituting a comparison between Apollonius and
Christ. The sceptic who referred religious phenomena to fanaticism would
hence avail himself of the comparison as a satisfactory account of the
origin of Christianity; while others would adopt the same view as
Hierocles, and deprive the Christian miracles of the force of evidence,—a
line of argument which was reproduced by an English deist(220) who
translated the work of Philostratus at the end of the seventeenth century.
The work of Hierocles is lost, but an outline of its argument, with
extracts, remains in a reply which Eusebius wrote to a portion of it (17).
Though couched in a seeming spirit of fairness, the tone was such as would
be expected from one who ungenerously availed himself of the very moment
of a cruel persecution as the occasion of this literary attack.
But the time of the church’s sorrow was nearly past. The hour of
deliverance was at hand. The emperor Constantine proclaimed
toleration,(221) and subsequently established Christianity as the
state-religion. Only one moment more of peril was permitted to befall it.
After an interval in which Christian emperors reigned, Julian ascended the
throne, and employed his short reign of two years(222) in trying to
restore heathenism; and during the last winter of his life, while halting
at Antioch in the course of his Eastern war, wrote an elaborate work
against Christianity.(223) The book itself has been destroyed, but the
reply remains which Cyril of Alexandria thought it necessary to write more
than half a century afterwards; and by this means we can gather Julian’s
opinions, just as from his own letters and the contemporary history we can
gather his plans. The material struggle of deeds belongs in this instance
to our subject, inasmuch as it is the overt expression of the struggle of
ideas.
Julian, as already observed, differed from previous opponents of
Christianity, in having been educated a Christian.(224) Associating when a
student at the schools of Athens with Gregory of Nazianzum and Basil, he
had every opportunity for understanding the Christian religion and
measuring its claims. The first cause of his apostasy from it remains
uncertain. One tradition states that the shock to his creed arose from
some early injury received through the fraud of a professing Christian.
Something is probably due to exasperation at the severity endured from
Constantius; and perhaps still more is due to the natural peculiarity of
his character. He was swayed by the imagination rather than the reason,
and was kindled with an enthusiastic admiration of the old heathen
literature and the historic glories of the heathen world. His very style
exhibits traces of imitation of the old models after which he formed
himself.(225) With a spirit which the Italian writers of the Renaissance
enable us to understand, his sympathies clung round heathens until they
entwined in their embrace heathenism itself. To a mind of this natural
bias sufficient grounds unhappily would easily be found to produce
aversion to Christianity, in the quarrels among sections of the church,
and in the ambition and inconsistency of the numbers of nominal converts
who embraced the religion when its public establishment had rendered it
their interest to do so; and prejudice would add arguments for rejecting
it.
Accordingly he devoted his short reign to restore the ancient heathenism.
Like Constantine, having arrived at the throne through a troublous war, he
found the religion of the state opposed to his own convictions, and
determined to substitute that which he himself professed. The difference
however was great. The religion of Constantine was young and progressive;
that of Julian was effete. It is in this respect that Julian has been
compared,(226) in his character and acts, to those who in modern times,
both in literature and in politics, have devoted their lives to roll back
the progress of public opinion, and reproduce the spirit of the past by
giving new life to the relics of bygone ages. If Julian had succeeded in
his attempt, the victory could not have been permanent.
The steps by which he strove to carry out his views were not unlike those
of Constantine.(227) He first proclaimed the establishment of the
emperor’s religion as the religion of the state, permitting toleration for
all others. He next transferred the Christian endowments to heathens,
acting on the principle previously established by Constantine. But beyond
this point he proceeded to measures which had the nature of persecution.
He declared the Christian laity disqualified for office in the state,—a
measure which could only be sophistically maintained on the plea of
self-defence; and, afraid of the engine of education, forbade Christian
professors to lecture in the public schools of science and literature: and
probably he at last imposed a tax on those who did not perform sacrifice.
At the same time he saw the necessity of a total reformation in paganism,
if it was to revive as the rival of Christianity; and planned, as Pontifex
Maximus, a scheme for effecting it, which involved the concealment of the
absurdity of its origin by allegorical interpretation, together with the
establishment of a discipline and organisation similar to the Christian,
and special attention on the part of the priesthood to morality and to
public works of mercy.(228) His bitter contempt for Christianity
manifested itself in a public edict, which commanded that Christians
should be denominated by the opprobrious epithet “Galilæans;” and in some
of his extant letters(229) he evinces a bitterness against it which finds
its parallel in Voltaire and Shelley.
A work remains, the Philopatris, (18) usually falsely assigned to Lucian,
but which internal evidence proves to belong to the reign of Julian, in
which the unknown author, imitating the manner but wanting the power of
Lucian, holds up to ridicule the sermons and teaching of some Christian
preachers. This work probably conveys the creed of the imperial party,
which is simply Deism. This however is not the only source for
ascertaining the creed of Julian, and the nature of his objections to
Christianity. In his letters, and in the reply of Cyril to his now lost
work, we possess more exact means for determining his position and
sentiments. (19)
He omitted, as we might expect, the grosser and more frivolous charges
against Christianity which had been formerly expressed by those who were
ignorant of its real character. Indeed he seems to have been willing to
recognise it as one form of religion, but declined to admit its monopoly
of claim to be regarded as the only true form. Though himself a
Theist,(230)—his view of Deity being more simply monotheistic than that of
his predecessors, derived furtively from the Hebrew idea transmitted
through Christianity; he nevertheless considered that discrepancy of
national character required corresponding differences in religion.(231) In
his work he seems to have repeated some of the objections of the older
assailants, Celsus and Porphyry; attacking the credibility of scripture
and of the Christian scheme in its doctrines and evidences. He offered in
it a criticism on primæval and Hebrew history;(232) attacking the
probability of many portions of the book of Genesis;(233) objecting to the
Hebrew view of Deity as too appropriating in its character, and as making
the divine Being appear cruel.(234) He denied the originality of the
Hebrew moral law,(235) and pointed out the supposed defectiveness of the
Hebrew polity; comparing unfavourably the type of the Hebrew lawgiver as
seen in Moses, and of the king as seen in David, with the great heroes of
Greek history.(236) The Hebrew prophecy he tried to weaken by putting it
in comparison with oracles. In estimating the character of Christ, he
depreciated the importance of his miracles;(237) and noticing the
different tone of the fourth Gospel from those of the Synoptists, he
asserted that it was St. John who first taught Christ’s divinity.(238) He
regarded Christianity as composed of borrowed ingredients; considered it
to have assumed its shape gradually; and regarded its progress to have
been unforeseen by its founder and by St. Paul;(239) attacked its relation
to Judaism in superseding it while depending on it;(240) regarded
proselytism as absurd; and directed some few charges, which may have been
more deserved, against practices of his day, such as Staurolatry(241) and
Martyrolatry.(242)
With the death of Julian the hopes of heathenism departed; and two
eloquent orations of Gregory Nazianzen(243) still convey to us the
Christian words of triumph. Christianity progressed, protected by the
favour of the sovereigns. Heathenism no longer expressed itself in free
examination of Christianity, and lingered only in the prejudices of the
people. In the West it is merely seen as it pleads for toleration,(244) or
makes itself heard in the murmurs which attributed the woes of the
Teutonic invasions to the displeasure of the heathen gods at the neglect
of their worship.(245) In the East it disappears altogether. Doubt there
expires, because speculation ceases and Christian thought becomes fixed;
nor will it be necessary in future to recur to the history of the eastern
church.
In this survey we have tried to understand the objections alleged by
unbelievers during the first four centuries, successively c
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