Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics
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Title: Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics
Author: William Thomas Thornton
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Language: English
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OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS
With Some of Their Applications
by
WILLIAM THOMAS THORNTON
Author of a Treatise 'On Labour'
London
Macmillan and Co.
1873
_All rights reserved_
'I entirely agree with you as to the ill tendency of the affected
doubts of some philosophers and the fantastical conceits of others.
I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have
quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools
for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word, that since this
revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature
and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so
that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before
were all mystery and riddle.'--BERKELEY'S HYLAS AND PHILONOUS.
PREFACE.
The book was all but finished, and only the Preface remained, over which
I was hesitating, apprehensive equally of putting into it too much and
too little, when one of the most frequent 'companions of my solitude'
came to my aid, shewing me, in fragments, a preface already nearly
written, and needing only a little piecing to become forthwith
presentable. Here it is.
'In these sick days, in a world such as ours, richer than usual in
Truths grown obsolete, what can the fool think but that it is all a Den
of Lies wherein whoso will not speak and act Lies must stand idle and
despair?' Whereby it happens that for the artist who would fain minister
medicinally to the relief of folly, 'the publishing of a Work of Art,'
designed, like this, to redeem Truth from premature obsolescence,
'becomes almost a necessity.' For, albeit, 'in the heart of the speaker
there ought to be some kind of gospel tidings burning until it be
uttered, so that otherwise it were better for him that he altogether
held his peace,' still, than to have fire burning within, and not to put
it forth, not many worse things are readily imaginable.
'Has the word Duty no meaning? Is what we call Duty no divine messenger
and guide, but a false, earthly fantasm, made up of Desire and Fear?' In
that' Logic-mill of thine' hast thou 'an earthly mechanism for the
Godlike itself, and for grinding out Virtue from the husks of Pleasure?
I tell thee, Nay! Otherwise, not on Morality, but on Cookery, let us
build our stronghold. There, brandishing our frying-pan as censer, let
us offer up sweet incense to the Devil, and live at ease on the fat
things _he_ has provided for his elect,' seeing that 'with stupidity and
sound digestion, man may front much.'
Or, 'is there no God? or, at best, an absentee God, sitting idle ever
since the first Sabbath, at the outside of His universe, and _seeing_ it
go?' Know that for man's well-being, whatever else be needed, 'Faith is
one thing needful.' Mark, 'how, with it, Martyrs, otherwise weak, can
cheerfully endure the shame and the cross; how, without it, worldlings
puke up their sick existence, by suicide, in the midst of luxury.' Of
how much else, 'for a pure moral nature, is not the loss of Religious
Belief the loss?' 'All wounds, the crush of long-continued Destitution,
the stab of false Friendship and of false Love, all wounds in the so
genial heart would have healed again had not the life-warmth of Faith
been withdrawn.' But this once lost, how recoverable? how, rather, ever
acquirable? 'First must the dead Letter of Religion own itself dead, and
drop piecemeal into dust, if the living Spirit of Religion, freed from
this, its charnel house, is to arise on us, new born of Heaven, and with
new healing under its wings.'
Beside these burning words of Mr. Carlyle any additional words of mine
would stand only as superfluous foils, and are, therefore, considerately
pretermitted.
CADOGAN PLACE: _December 1872._
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER PAGE
I. ANTI-UTILITARIANISM 1
II. HISTORY'S SCIENTIFIC PRETENSIONS 84
III. DAVID HUME AS A METAPHYSICIAN 113
IV. HUXLEYISM 158
V. RECENT PHASES OF SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM 199
VI. LIMITS OF DEMONSTRABLE THEISM 266
EPILOGUE 298
OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS
AND
COMMON-SENSE METAPHYSICS
CHAPTER I.
_ANTI-UTILITARIANISM._
I.
Having, by the heading of this essay, announced that it is intended to
be partly controversial, I can scarcely begin better than by furnishing
the reader with the means of judging whether I myself correctly
apprehend the doctrine which I am about to criticise. If, then, I were
myself an Utilitarian, and, for the sake either of vindicating my own
belief, or of making converts of other people, had undertaken to explain
what Utilitarianism is, I should set about the task somewhat in this
wise:--
The sole use and sole object of existence is enjoyment or pleasure,
which two words will here be treated as synonymous; happiness, also,
though not quite identical in meaning, being occasionally substituted
for them. Enjoyment, it must be observed, is of very various kinds,
measures, and degrees. It may be sensual, or emotional, or imaginative,
or intellectual, or moral. It may be momentary or eternal; intoxicating
delight or sober satisfaction. It may be unmixed and undisturbed, in
which case, however short of duration or coarse in quality, it may in
strictness be called happiness; or it may be troubled and alloyed,
although of a flavour which would be exquisite if pure, and if there
were nothing to interfere with the perception of it. Understood,
however, in a sufficiently comprehensive sense, enjoyment or pleasure
may be clearly perceived to be the sole object of existence. The whole
value of life plainly consists of the enjoyment, present or future,
which life affords, or is capable of affording or securing. Now, the
excellence of all rules depends on their conduciveness to the object
they have in view. The excellence of all rules of life must, therefore,
depend on their conduciveness to the sole object which life has in view,
viz., enjoyment. But the excellence of rules of life, or of conduct or
modes of acting, would seem to be but another name for their morality,
and the morality of actions obviously depends on their conformity to
moral rules. Whence, if so much be admitted, it necessarily follows that
the test of the morality of actions is their conduciveness to enjoyment.
But the enjoyment thus referred to is not that of the agent alone, for
if it were, no action whatever could possibly be immoral. Whatever any
one does, he does either because to do it gives him or promises him
pleasure, or because he believes that the not doing it would subject him
to more pain than he will suffer from doing it. Besides, one person's
enjoyment may be obtained at the expense of other people's suffering, so
that an act in which the actor takes pleasure may destroy or prevent
more pleasure altogether than it creates. The enjoyment or happiness,
therefore, which Utilitarianism regards, is not individual, but general
happiness; not that of one or of a few, but of the many, nor even of the
many only. It is often declared to be the greatest happiness of the
greatest number, but it may with more accuracy be described as the
largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by all
concerned.[1] Again, an action which, in some particular instance,
causes more pleasure than pain to those affected by it, may yet belong
to a class of actions which, in the generality of cases, causes more
pain than pleasure, and may thus involve a violation of a moral rule,
and, consequently, be itself immoral. Wherefore the enjoyment which
Utilitarianism adopts as its moral test is not simply the greatest sum
of enjoyment for all concerned, but that greatest sum in the greatest
number of cases. In its widest signification it is the greatest
happiness of society at large and in the long run. From these premises a
decisive criterion of right and wrong may be deduced. Every action
belonging to a class calculated to promote the permanent happiness of
society is right. Every action belonging to a class opposed to the
permanent happiness of society is wrong.
In the foregoing exposition I have, I trust, evinced a sincere desire to
give Utilitarianism its full due, and I shall at least be admitted to
have shown myself entirely free from most of those more vulgar
misconceptions of its nature which have given its professors such just
offence. Many of its assailants have not scrupled to stigmatise as
worthy only of swine a doctrine which represents life as having no
better and nobler object of desire and pursuit than pleasure. To these,
however, it has, by the great apostle of Utilitarianism, been
triumphantly replied that it is really they themselves who insult human
nature by using language that assumes human beings to be capable of no
higher pleasures than those of which swine are capable; and that,
moreover, if the assumption were correct, and if the capacities of men
and of swine were identical, whatever rule of life were good enough for
the latter would likewise be good enough for the former. But I am not an
assailant of this description. Inasmuch as there undeniably are very
many and very various kinds of pleasure, I of course allow
Utilitarianism credit for common sense enough to acknowledge that those
kinds are most worthy of pursuit which, from whatever cause, possess
most value--that those which are most precious are those most to be
prized. But whoever allows thus much will have no alternative but to
concede a great deal more. The most precious of pleasures is that which
arises from the practice of virtue, as may be proved conclusively in the
only way of which the case admits, viz., by reference to the fact that,
whoever is equally acquainted with that and with other pleasures,
deliberately prefers it to all the rest, will, if necessary, forego all
others for its sake, and values no others obtainable only at its
expense. By necessary implication it follows that, as being more
valuable than any other, the pleasure arising from the practice of
virtue must be that which Utilitarianism recommends above all others as
an object of pursuit. But the pursuit of this particular pleasure and
the practice of virtue are synonymous terms. What, therefore,
Utilitarianism above all other things recommends and insists upon is the
practice of virtue. Now, the practice of virtue commonly involves
subordination of one's own interest to that of other people; indeed,
virtue would not be virtue in the utilitarian sense of the word unless
it did involve such subordination. Wherefore the pleasure arising from
the practice of virtue, the pleasure which occupies the highest place on
the utilitarian scale, and that which Utilitarianism exhorts its
disciples chiefly to seek after, is nothing else than the pleasure
derived from attending to other people's pleasure instead of to our own.
Nor is this all. In order adequately to appreciate the loftiness of
utilitarian teaching, and its utter exemption from the sordidness with
which it is ignorantly charged, we must devote a few moments to
examination of those distinctive peculiarities of different kinds of
pleasure which entitle them to different places in our esteem.
All pleasures may be arranged under five heads, and in regularly
ascending series, as follows:--
1. Sensual pleasures:--To wit, those of eating and drinking, and
whatever others are altogether of the flesh, fleshly.
2. Emotional, by which are to be understood agreeable moods of the mind,
such as, irrespectively of any agreeable idea brought forward
simultaneously by association, are produced by music ('for,' as Milton
says, 'eloquence the soul, song charms the sense'), by beauty of form or
colour, by genial sunshine, by balmy or invigorating air.
3. Imaginative, or pleasures derived from the contemplation of mental
pictures.
4. Intellectual, or those consequent on exercise of the reasoning
powers.
5. Moral, or those which are alluded to when virtue is spoken of as
being its own reward.[2]
That of these several kinds, each of the last four is preferable to any
preceding it on the list will, it is to be hoped, be allowed to pass as
an unquestioned truth, for to any one perverse enough to deny it, the
only answer that can be made is an appeal to observation in proof that
all persons who are equally acquainted with the several kinds do exhibit
the preferences indicated. Neither, so far as the two kinds first-named
alone are concerned, is it possible to go much more deeply into the
reasons why emotional pleasures are to be preferred to sensual, than by
pointing to the fact that all competent judges of both are observed to
like the former best. If all those who are endowed with equal
sensitiveness of ear and of palate prefer music to feasting, and would
any day give up a dinner at Francatelli's for the sake of hearing a
rejuvenescent Persiani as Zerlina, or Patti as Dinorah, the one thing
presumable is, that all such persons derive more enjoyment from perfect
melody than from perfect cookery, and little else remains to be said on
the subject. The same ultimate fact need not, however, limit our inquiry
as to the preferableness of imaginative or intellectual to emotional
pleasures, and of moral to any of the other three. This admits of, and
demands, a more subtle explanation, from which we may learn, not merely
that certain preferences are shown, but also why they are shown. The
preferences in question are demonstrably not due to the greater
poignancy of the pleasures preferred. It is simply not true that the
keenest of imaginative pleasures is keener than the keenest of
emotional, and still less that the keenest of intellectual is so. The
very reverse is the truth. The supremest delight attainable in fancy's
most romantic flight is, I suspect, faint in comparison with the sort of
ecstasy into which a child of freshly-strung nerves is sometimes thrown
by the mere brilliance or balminess of a summer's day, and with which
even we, dulled adults, provided we be in the right humour, and that all
things are in a concatenation accordingly, are now and then momentarily
affected while listening to the wood-notes wild of a nightingale, or a
Jenny Lind, or while gazing on star-lit sky or moon-lit sea, or on the
snowy or dolomite peaks of a mountain range fulgent with the violet and
purple glories of the setting sun. And yet the choicest snatches of such
beatitude with which--at least, after the fine edge of our
susceptibilities has been worn away by the world's friction--we
creatures of coarse human mould are ever indulged, are but poor in
comparison with the rich abundance of the same in which some more
delicately-constituted organisms habitually revel. If we would
understand of what development emotional delight is capable, we should
watch the skylark. As that 'blithe spirit' now at heaven's gate 'poureth
its full heart,' and anon can
Scarce get out his notes for joy,
But shakes his song together as he nears
His happy home, the ground,
what poet but must needs confess with Shelley, that in his most
rapturous dream, his transport never came nigh the bird's? And yet what
poet would change conditions with the lark? Nay, what student or
philosopher would? albeit the utmost gratification ever earned by either
of these in the prosecution of his special calling--in acquiring
knowledge, in solving knotty problems, or in scaling the heights of
abstract contemplation--is probably as inferior in keenness of zest to
that which the poet knows, as the best prose is inferior in charm to the
best poetry. It may even be that both poet and philosopher owe, on the
whole, more unhappiness than happiness--the one to his superior
sensibility, the other to his superior enlightenment, and yet neither
would exchange his own lesser happiness for the greater happiness of the
lark. Why would he not? It is no sufficient answer to say that in the
lark's happiness there are few, if any, imaginative or intellectual
ingredients; that it is almost utterly unideal, almost purely emotional,
exactly the same in kind, and only higher in degree, than the glee of
puppies or kittens at play. The question recurs as forcibly as ever,
why--seeing that enjoyment is the one thing desirable, the only thing
either valuable in itself, or that gives value to other things--why is
it that no intelligent man would accept, in lieu of his own, another
mode of existence, in which, although debarred from the joys of thought
and fancy, he nevertheless has reason to believe that the share of
enjoyment falling to his lot would be greater, both in quantity and
sapidity, than it is at present? The following seems to me to be the
explanation of the mystery.
It might be too much to say that nothing can please a person who is not
pleased with himself, but it is at any rate clear that nothing can
greatly please him which interferes with his self-satisfaction. Now
imaginative and intellectual enjoyment, each of them, involves the
exercise of a special and superior faculty, mere consciousness of the
possession of which helps to make the possessor satisfied with himself.
It exalts what Mr. Mill aptly terms his sense of dignity, a sense
possessed in some form or other by every human being, and one so
essential to that self-satisfaction without which all pleasure would be
tasteless, that nothing which conflicts with it can be an object of
serious desire. In virtue of this special faculty, the most wretched of
men holds himself to be superior to the most joyous of larks. To divest
himself of it would be to lower himself towards the level of the bird,
and to commit such an act of self-degradation would occasion to him an
amount of pain which he is not disposed to incur for the sake of any
amount of pleasure obtainable at its expense. It is, then, the fear of
pain which prevents his wishing to be turned into a lark. He is not
ignorant that he would be happier for the metamorphosis, but he dreads
the pain that must precede the increase of happiness, more than he
desires the increase of happiness that would follow the pain.
The force of these considerations will be equally, or more apparent, on
their being applied to analysis of moral pleasures. That these are the
most truly precious of all pleasures, is proved by their being
habitually more highly prized than any others by all who are qualified
to make the comparison. But why are they so prized? Not, as I am
constrained, however reluctantly, to admit, on account of their greater
keenness as pleasures. It would be at best but well-meaning cant to
pretend that the self-approval, the sympathetic participation in other
people's augmented welfare, the grateful consciousness of having done
that which is pleasing in our Heavenly Father's sight, together with
whatever else helps to compose the internal reward of virtue, constitute
a sum total of delight nearly as exquisite as that which may be obtained
in a variety of other ways. The mere circumstance of there being
invariably included in a just or generous action more or less of
self-denial, self-restraint, or self-sacrifice, must always sober down
the gratification by which virtue is rewarded, and make it appear tame
beside the delirium of gladness caused by many things with which virtue
has nothing to do. We will charitably suppose that the occupant of a
dukedom, who should secretly light upon conclusive proof that it was not
his by right, would at once abandon it to the legal heir, and we need
not doubt that he would subsequently be, on the whole, well content to
have so acted, but we cannot suppose that he would make the surrender
with anything like the elation with which he entered on the estate and
title. If there were really no pleasure equal to that with which virtue
recompenses its votaries, the performance of a virtuous act would always
make a man happier than previously; moreover, the greater the virtue,
the greater would be the consequent pleasure. But any one may see that
an act of the most exalted virtue, far from increasing, often utterly
destroys the agent's happiness. Imagine an affectionate father, some
second Brutus or second Fitzstephen of Galway, constrained by
overwhelming sense of duty to sentence a beloved son to death, or a
bankrupt beggaring himself and his family by honestly making over to his
creditors property with which he might have safely absconded. Plainly,
such virtuous achievement, far from adding to the happiness of its
author, has plunged him in an abyss of misery, his only comfort being
that in the lowest deep there is, as we shall presently see, a lower
deep still. Far from being happier than he was before acting as he has
done, he would be much happier if, being vicious instead of virtuous, he
had not felt bound so to act. Unquestionably, what either upright judge
or honest bankrupt has incurred--the one by becoming a saticide, the
other by making himself a beggar--is pure and simple pain, unmitigated
by one particle of positive pleasure. Yet it is at the same time certain
that the virtue of each has in some form or other given full
compensation for the pain it has occasioned, for not only was that pain
deliberately incurred in lieu of the pleasure which it has supplanted,
but restoration of the pleasure would now be refused, if reversal of the
virtuous conduct were made a condition of the restoration. In what,
then, does the compensation consist? In nothing else than this, in judge
or bankrupt having been saved from pain still greater than that which he
is actually suffering. Wretched as he is, infinitely more wretched than
he was before there was any call upon him to act as he has done, he is
less wretched than he would be if, recognising the obligation so to act,
he had not so acted. He has escaped the stings of conscience, the sense
of having wronged his neighbour and offended his God; he has escaped, in
short, self-condemnation--a torment so intolerable to those so
constituted as to be susceptible of it, that hell itself has been known
to be, in imagination at least, preferred to it. Mr. Mill's splendid
outburst that, rather than worship a fiend that could send him to hell
for refusing, he would go to hell as he was bid, will doubtless occur to
every reader.
This, however, is all. In both the supposed cases, as in every one in
which virtue consists of compliance with a painful duty, the pleasure
arising from the practice of virtue cannot in strictness be called
pleasure at all. At best it is but a partial negation of pain; more
properly, indeed, the substitution of one pain for another more acute.
Yet this mere negation, this ethereal inanity, is pronounced by
Utilitarianism to be preferable to aught that can come into competition
with it. Truly it is somewhat hard upon those who attend to such
teaching, to be reproached with their grossness of taste and likened to
hogs, for no better reason than their predilection for the lightest of
all conceivable diets. Still harder will this seem, when we recollect
that Utilitarians are exhorted to be virtuous, less for their own than
for other people's sakes. If, indeed, virtue were practised by all
mankind, the utilitarian idea of the greatest possible happiness, or, at
least, of the greatest possible exemption from unhappiness, would be
universally realised. Still, it is in order that they may afford
pleasure to the community at large, rather than that they may obtain it
for themselves; it is that they may save, not so much themselves, as the
community, from pain, that individual Utilitarians are charged to be
virtuous. Among those pleasures, whether positive or negative, which it
is allowable to them to seek for themselves, the first place is assigned
to the pleasure arising from the sense of giving pleasure to others.
Thus, not only is it the purest of pleasures that Utilitarianism chiefly
recommends for pursuit: even that pleasure is to be pursued only from
the purest and most disinterested motives.
All this I frankly acknowledge; and I own, too, that, far from deserving
to be stigmatised as irreligious, Utilitarianism is literally nothing
else than an amplification of one moiety of Christianity; that it not
adopts merely, but expands, 'the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth,'
exhorting us to love our neighbour, not simply as well, but better than
ourselves; to do for others, not simply what we would have them do for
us, but much more than we could have the face to ask them to do; not
merely not to pursue our interests at the expense of theirs, but to
regard as our own chief interest the promotion of theirs. That on
account of these exhortations Utilitarianism is godless can be supposed
by those only who suppose that love to one's neighbour is contrary to
the will of God. By those who believe that works are the best signs of
faith, and that love to God is best evinced by doing good to man,
Utilitarianism might rather seem to be but another name for practical
religion.
So I say in all sincerity, though not without some misgiving, as while
so speaking I involuntarily bethink myself of Balaam, son of Beor, who
having been called forth to curse, caught himself blessing altogether.
Mine eyes, too, have been opened to the good of that which I was
purposed to condemn, and behold I have as yet done nothing but eulogise.
No warmest partisan of Utilitarianism, not Mr. Mill himself, ever spoke
more highly of it than I have just been doing. What censures, then, can
I have in reserve to countervail such praises? What grounds of quarrel
can I have with a system of ethics which I have described as ever
seeking the noblest ends from the purest motives; whose precepts I own
to be as elevating as its aims are exalted? On reflection, I am
reassured by recollecting several, which I proceed to bring forward one
at a time, beginning with a sin enormous enough to cover any multitude
of merits.
My first charge against Utilitarianism is that it is not true. I do not
say that there is no truth in it. That I have found much to admire in
its premises has been frankly avowed; and in one, at least, of the
leading deductions from those premises I partially concur. I admit that
acts utterly without utility must likewise be utterly without worth;
that conduct which subserves the enjoyment neither of oneself nor of any
one else, cannot, except in a very restricted sense, be termed right;
that conduct which interferes with the enjoyment both of oneself and of
all others, which injuring oneself injures others also, and benefits no
one, cannot be otherwise than wrong; that purely objectless asceticism
which has not even self-discipline in view, is not virtue, but folly;
that misdirected charity which, engendering improvidence, creates more
distress than it relieves, is not virtue, but criminal weakness. But
though admitting that there can be no virtue without utility, I do not
admit either that virtue must be absent unless utility preponderate, or
that if utility preponderate virtue must be present. I deny that any
amount of utility can of itself constitute virtue. I deny that whatever
adds to the general happiness must be right. Equally do I deny that
whatever diminishes the general happiness or prevents its increasing
must be wrong. An action, be it observed, may be right in three
different senses. It may be right as being meritorious, and deserving of
commendation. It may be right as being that which one is bound to do,
for the doing of which, therefore, one deserves no praise, and for
neglecting to do which one would justly incur blame. It may be right
simply as not being wrong--as being allowable--something which one has a
right to do, though to refrain from doing it might perhaps be
praiseworthy. There will be little difficulty in adducing examples of
conduct which, though calculated to diminish the sum total of happiness,
would be right in the first of these senses. Nothing can be easier than
to multiply examples of such conduct that would be right in the third
sense. I proceed to cite cases which will answer both these purposes,
and likewise the converse one of showing that conduct calculated to
increase the general happiness may nevertheless be wrong.
When the Grecian chiefs, assembled at Aulis, were waiting for a fair
wind to convey them to Ilium, they were, we are told, warned by what was
to them as a voice from heaven, that their enterprise would make no
progress unless Agamemnon's daughter were sacrificed to Diana. In order
to place the details of the story in a light as little favourable as
possible to my argument, we will deviate somewhat from the accepted
version, and will suppose that the arrested enterprise was one of even
greater pith and moment than tradition ascribes to it. We will suppose
that upon its successful prosecution depended the national existence of
Greece; that its failure would have involved the extermination of
one-half of the people, and the slavery of the other half. We will
suppose, too, that of all this Iphigenia was as firmly persuaded as
every one else. In these circumstances, had her countrymen a right to
insist on her immolation? If so, on what was that right founded? Is it
sufficient to say in reply that her death was essential to the national
happiness, to the extent even of being indispensable to prevent that
happiness from being converted into national woe? Manifestly, according
to the hypothesis, it was expedient for all concerned, with the single
exception of herself, that she should die; but were the others thereby
entitled to take her life? Did the fact of its being for their advantage
to do this warrant their doing it? Simply because it was their interest,
was it also their right? Right, we must recollect, invariably implies
corresponding duty. Right, it is clear, can never be rightfully
resisted. If it be the right of certain persons to do a certain thing,
it must be the duty of all other persons to let that thing be done.
Where there is no such duty, there can be no such right. Wherefore, if
the 'stern, black-bearded kings, with wolfish eyes,' who sate 'waiting
to see her die,' had a right to kill Iphigenia, it must have been
Iphigenia's duty to let herself be killed. Was this then her duty?
'Duty,' as I have elsewhere observed,[3] 'signifies something due, a
debt, indebtedness, and a debt cannot have been incurred for nothing, or
without some antecedent step on the part either of debtor or creditor.'
But it is not pretended that in any way whatever, by any antecedent act
of hers or theirs, Iphigenia had incurred or had been subjected to a
debt to her countrymen which could be paid off only with her life. It
could not, then, be incumbent on her to let her life be taken in
payment. If it had been in her power to burst her bonds, and break
through the wolves in human shape that girdled her in, she would have
been guilty of no wrong by escaping. But if not, then, however
meritorious it might have been on her part to consent to die for her
countrymen, it was not her duty so to die, nor, consequently, had they a
right to put her to death. She would have been at least negatively right
in refusing to die, while they were guilty of a very positive and a very
grievous wrong in killing her, notwithstanding that both she and they
were perfectly agreed that for her to be killed would be for the
incalculably greater happiness of a greater number, exceeding the lesser
number in the proportion of several hundreds of thousands to one.
It is true that throughout this affair every one concerned was labouring
under a gross delusion--that there was no real use in putting Iphigenia
to death, and that nothing but superstition made anybody suppose there
was. I do not think the case is one less to our purpose on that account,
for Utilitarians, like other fallible mortals, are liable to deceive
themselves. They never can be quite secure of the genuineness of the
utility on which they rely, and in default of positive knowledge they
will always be reduced to act, as the Grecian chiefs did, according to
the best of their convictions. Nevertheless, for the satisfaction of
those who distrust romance and insist upon reality, we will leave fable
for fact, and take as our next illustration an incident that may any day
occur.
Imagine three shipwrecked mariners to have leapt from their sinking
vessel into a cockboat scarce big enough to hold them, and the two
slimmer of the three to have presently discovered that there was little
or no chance of either of them reaching land unless their over-weighted
craft were lightened of their comparatively corpulent companion. Next,
imagine yourself in the fat sailor's place, and then consider whether
you would feel it incumbent on you to submit quietly to be drowned in
order that the residuum of happiness might be greater than if either you
all three went to the bottom, or than if you alone were saved. Would you
not, far from recognising any such moral obligation, hold yourself
morally justified in throwing the other two overboard, if you were
strong enough, and if need were, to prevent their similarly ousting you?
But if it were not your duty to allow yourself to be cast into the sea,
the others could have no right to cast you out; so that, if they did
cast you out, they would clearly be doing not right but wrong. And yet,
as clearly, their wrong-doing would have conduced to the greater
happiness of the greater number, inasmuch as, while only one life could
otherwise have been saved, it would save two, and inasmuch as,
_coeteris paribus_, two persons would necessarily derive twice as much
enjoyment from continued existence as one would. Moreover, their
wrong-doing would be of a kind calculated always to produce similarly
useful results. It cannot, I suppose, be denied that a rule to the
effect that whenever forfeiture of one life would save two, one life
should be sacrificed, would--not exceptionally only, but at large and in
the long run--conduce to the saving of life, and therefore to the
conservation of happiness connected with life.
The foregoing cases are no doubt both of them extreme, involving
exaction of the largest possible private sacrifice for the general good;
but in all cases of the kind, whether the exaction be small or great,
the same governing principle equally applies. If you, a foot-sore,
homeward-bound pedestrian, on a sweltering July day, were to see your
next-door neighbour driving in the same direction in solitary state,
would you have a right to stop his carriage and force yourself in? Nay,
even though you had just before fallen down and broken your leg, would
the compassionating by-standers be justified in forcing him to take you
in? Or, again, if you were outside a coach during a pelting shower, and
saw a fellow-passenger with a spare umbrella between his legs, while an
unprotected female close beside was being drenched with the rain, would
you have a right to wrest the second umbrella from him, and hold it over
her? That, very likely, is what you would do in the circumstances, and
few would be disposed greatly to blame the indignant ebullition. Still,
unless you are a disciple of Proudhon, you will scarcely pretend that
you can have a right to take possession of another's carriage or
umbrella against the owner's will. You can scarcely suppose that it is
not for him but for you to decide what use shall be made of articles
belonging not to you but to him. Yet there can be no doubt that the
happiness of society would be vastly promoted if everyone felt himself
under an irresistible obligation to assist his neighbour whenever he
could do so with little or no inconvenience to himself, or,
consequently, if external force were always at hand to constrain anyone
so to assist who was unwilling to do so of his own accord.
So much in proof that among things of the highest and most extensive
utility there are several which it would be decidedly the reverse of
right to do, and several others which it would be perfectly right to
leave undone. I proceed to show that there are many other things not
simply not of preponderating utility, but calculated, on the contrary,
to do more harm than good, to destroy more happiness than they are
capable of creating, which, nevertheless, it would be not simply
allowable to do, but the doing of which would be highly meritorious,
acts possibly of the most exalted virtue.
Let no one distrust the doctrine of development by reason of its
supposed extravagance of pretension who has not duly considered to what
a sublime of moral beauty the united hideousness and absurdity of
Calvinism may give birth. In that Puritan society of New England of
which Mrs. Beecher Stowe has given so singularly interesting an account
in her 'Minister's Wooing,' and among whose members it was an universal
article of belief that the bulk of mankind are created for the express
purpose of being consigned to everlasting flames, there are said to have
been not a few enthusiasts in whom a self-concentrating creed begat the
very quintessence of self-devotion. 'As a gallant soldier renounces life
and personal aims in the cause of his king and country, and holds
himself ready to be drafted for a forlorn hope, to be shot down, or help
to make a bridge of his mangled body, over which the more fortunate
shall pass to victory and glory,' so among the early descendants of the
Pilgrim Fathers many an one 'regarded himself as devoted to the King
Eternal, ready in his hands to be used to illustrate and build up an
eternal commonwealth, either by being sacrificed as a lost spirit, or
glorified as a redeemed one; ready to throw, not merely his mortal life,
but his immortality even, into the forlorn hope, to bridge, with a
never-dying soul, the chasm over which white-robed victors should pass
to a commonwealth of glory and splendour, whose vastness should dwarf
the misery of all the lost to an infinitesimal.' And while by many the
idea of suffering everlasting pains for the glory of God, and the good
of being in general, was thus contemplated with equanimity, there were
some few for whom the idea of so suffering for the good of others dearer
than themselves would have been greeted with positive exultation. 'And
don't I care for your soul, James?' exclaims Mary Scudder to her lover.
'If I could take my hopes of heaven out of my own heart and give them to
you, I would. Dr. H. preached last Sunday on the text, "I could wish
myself accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen," and he went on
to show how we must be willing to give up even our own salvation, if
necessary, for the good of others. People said it was a hard doctrine,
but I could feel my way through it. Yes, I would give my soul for yours.
I wish I could.' Now we must on no account permit admiration of Miss
Scudder's transcendent generosity in desiring to make this exchange
blind us to the fatal effect on social happiness which, if such
exchange were possible, the prevalence of a disposition to make it could
not fail to have. If Calvinism were true instead of blasphemous, if God
were really the Moloch it represents Him, and if, moreover, Moloch were
indifferent as to which of his offspring were cast into the fire, caring
only that the prescribed number of victims should be forthcoming in full
tale, nothing can be conceived more likely to prove an encouragement to
evil-doers, and a terror to them that did well, than observation that
well-doing not infrequently led to eternal misery, and evil-doing to
eternal bliss. Again, if in China, where criminals under sentence of
death are permitted, if they can, by purchase or otherwise, to procure
substitutes to die in their stead, a son were to propose to die for a
parent base enough to take advantage of the offer, could any arrangement
be more plainly repugnant to the common-weal than that by which society
would thus lose one of its noblest, instead of getting rid of one of its
vilest members? Or, when in England, a thrifty son, by consenting to cut
the entail of an estate to which he is heir-apparent, enables a prodigal
father to consume in riotous living substance which would otherwise have
eventually become his, is he not clearly taking the worse course for the
public by permitting the property to be wasted, instead of causing it to
be husbanded?
Beyond all question, American Puritan, Chinese or English devotee to
filial affection, would thus, each in her or his degree, have, in the
circumstances supposed, acted in a manner opposed to the general
interest, and would therefore be condemned by Utilitarianism as having
acted immorally. Nor could this verdict be gainsaid if utility and
morality were, as Utilitarianism assumes them to be, one and the same
thing. Clearly, that the just should suffer for the unjust, the innocent
for the guilty, is diametrically opposed to the welfare of society;
wherefore, according to utilitarian principles, by consenting so to
suffer, the just becomes unjust, the innocent renders himself guilty.
But can there be a better proof that utilitarian principles are unsound
than that this should be a legitimate deduction from them? Can there be
better proof that utility and morality are not identical, but two
absolutely distinct things? Plainly, there can be no meritorious or
commendable immorality; neither can there be any virtue which is not
meritorious and commendable. Is there, then, no merit, nothing
commendable, in accepting ruin or in volunteering to die temporarily, or
to perish everlastingly, in order to save a fellow-creature from ruin,
or death, or perdition? Does not such conduct, considered independently
and without reference either to its utility or its hurtfulness, command
our instantaneous and enthusiastic admiration? But how, being so
admirable, can it be immoral? how other than virtuous? What else is it,
indeed, but the very perfection of that purest virtue which, content to
be its own reward, deliberately cuts itself off from all other
recompense? Without changing the immemorial meaning of the most familiar
words, there is no avoiding the obvious answers to these questions. If
virtue and morality, right and wrong, are to continue to mean anything
like that which, except by Utilitarians, has always been considered to
be their only meaning, it is not simply not wrong, it is not simply
right, it is among the highest achievements of virtue and morality to
sacrifice your own in order to secure another's happiness, and the
disinterestedness, and therefore the virtue, is surely the greater,
rather than less, if you sacrifice more happiness of your own than you
secure to another. So much follows necessarily from what has been said,
and something more besides. It follows further that Utilitarianism is
not less in error in declaring that actions calculated to diminish the
total sum of happiness must necessarily be wrong, cannot possibly be
allowable, still less meritorious, than it had previously been shown to
be in declaring that actions calculated to augment the sum total of
happiness must necessarily be meritorious.
There is but one way in which Utilitarianism can even temporarily rebut
the charge of fallacy, of which otherwise it must here stand convicted,
and that is by renouncing all claim to be a new system of ethics, and
not pretending to be more than a new system of nomenclature. And even
so, it could not help contradicting, and thereby refuting itself. That
nothing is right but what is of preponderating utility; that whatever is
of preponderating utility is right; these are propositions perfectly
intelligible, indeed, but which will be found to be tenable only on
condition that the very same things may be both right and wrong. The
confusion, thrice confounded, inseparable from the substitution of such
novel definitions for those which had previously been universally in
vogue, is but the smaller of two evils which must thence arise. It would
be bad enough that the word 'right' could not be used without raising
doubt whether what people had previously understood by the 'just' or the
'generous,' or only the 'expedient' were meant; but a still worse
consequence would be that, even if no doubt of the sort were
entertained, and if all men were agreed to take the word in none but its
utilitarian sense, the landmarks of right and wrong would thereby be
well nigh obliterated. Due credit has already been given to
Utilitarianism for its exemplary zeal in inculcating the practice of
virtue, but its merit in that respect is more than neutralised by its
equally zealous inculcation of principles, according to which it is
impossible to decide beforehand whether any particular practice will be
virtuous or not.
This is my second charge against Utilitarianism. I maintain it to be a
doctrine in most of its essentials erroneous; but I maintain, further,
that, even if it were correct, instead of furnishing us with an
infallible criterion of right and wrong, it would deprive us of the
means of clearly distinguishing between right and wrong at all times at
which the power of so distinguishing is of practical value. Bluntly
enough, I have pronounced it to be false. With equal bluntness, I now
add that, even if it were true, it would, all the same, be practically
mischievous, and directly opposed to the very utility from which it
takes its name. The argument in support of this charge shall now be
stated.
According to utilitarian ethics, the morality of actions depends wholly
and solely on their consequences. On this point the language of
authority is distinct, emphatic, unanimous, and self-contradictory.
'Utilitarian moralists,' says the chief amongst them, 'have gone beyond
all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the
morality of an action.... He who saves a fellow-creature from drowning
does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of
being paid for his trouble.' Upon which I would observe, in passing,
that to save a fellow-creature from drowning can be deemed to be
necessarily right by none but uncompromising opponents of capital
punishment. Most others will be disposed to doubt its having been a
sufficient reason for commuting the sentence of death passed upon the
murderer of Dhuleep Sing's gamekeeper, that, owing to physical
malformation, hanging might perhaps have given him more than ordinary
pain in the neck, or perhaps have prolonged the pleasure which,
according to the select few qualified to speak from experience, is
attendant on that mode of strangulation. Neither, without sacrificing
his judgment to his feelings, could one of these doubters, if Rutherford
had been sentenced to be drowned instead of hanged, have stretched out a
hand to save the miscreant from the watery grave he so richly deserved.
That there are no actions which by reason of their beneficial
consequences are always and invariably moral, might be too much to
affirm; but I have no hesitation in saying that there are thousands, the
morality or immorality of which--their results remaining the
same--depends absolutely on their motives. Thus, if two doctors--of
whom, for distinction's sake, we will call one Smethurst and the other
Smith--in attendance on patients afflicted with precisely the same
disease, were by the administration of overdoses of strychnine each to
kill his man, the only difference between them being that whereas one
intended and expected to kill, the other hoped to cure--would the act of
killing be equally immoral in both cases? Would it not in the one case
be murder, in the other mere error of judgment; and would both be
equally crimes, or would the latter be in any degree criminal? And if it
had been Smethurst instead of Smith who committed the error of
judgment--if the overdoses by which he had meant to kill had happened to
cure--would his error of judgment have thereby been rendered moral,
notwithstanding that his motive was murder?
The same great teacher, who so strenuously insists that the motive has
nothing to do with the morality of an action, does indeed go on to say
that it has 'much to do with the worth of the agent.' Here, however, I
confess myself unable to follow him. That an act may possess morality
independent of the agent, may be intelligible on the assumption that
morality means simply utility, and nothing more; but how, even then,
worth can be evinced by the performance of an immoral action, is beyond
my comprehension, except upon the further assumption that there may be
worth in immorality.
Waiving, however, these and all other objections, let us for the moment,
and for the sake of argument, assume that morality and utility are
really one and the same thing, that the right or wrong of an act depends
entirely on its results, and then let us observe how utterly without
rudder or compass to assist him in steering correctly will be the
best-intentioned navigator of the ocean of life.
We can seldom, if ever, be quite sure what will be the result of our
conduct. Meaning to cure, we may only too probably kill; meaning to
kill, we may not impossibly cure. Until a thing is done, we cannot
determine as to its utility; nor, consequently, in an utilitarian sense,
as to the morality of doing it. We must trust implicitly to our skill in
calculating events, and if that skill happen to fail us, our conduct may
become culpable. With the most earnest desire to act righteously, we can
only guess beforehand whether what we propose doing will turn out to be
righteous, and can never be sure, therefore, that we are not going to do
something wicked.
Here I shall, of course, and very properly, be reminded that what
Utilitarianism requires to be taken into account, are not merely the
probable consequences of some proposed act, but the usual consequences
of all acts of the same description; so that its disciples, instead of
being left to their conjectures about the future, may be said to have
all past experience to refer to. And undeniably Utilitarianism does
require this; thereby, however, contradicting itself as, I just now
hinted, it would presently be found doing. It does indeed declare those
actions only to be moral which in the long run are conducive to, or at
least not opposed to, the general happiness; but it also says that the
morality of each particular action depends on its own particular
consequences. So that the docile disciple who should do something which,
though useful in the long run, happened to be otherwise in his
particular case--who, for instance, should save the life of a
fellow-creature of whom it would have been well for the world to be rid,
would, to his disgust and bewilderment, find that while, with no desire
but that of acting rightly, he had been obeying one utilitarian law, he
had nevertheless been infringing another law of the same code, and
thereby acting wrongly.
Overlooking, however, this incongruity of two equally authoritative
rules, let us proceed to consider what dangerous latitude of
interpretation is allowed to the followers of either of them. Those who
believe that the merit or demerit of each separate action depends on
that action's separate consequences, need seldom be at a loss for a
pretext for committing the most heinous of crimes. A husband who, hating
his wife, had his hate returned, and loving another woman, had his love
returned, might plausibly reason thus within himself: The prescribed
objects of life are the multiplication of happiness and the diminution
of misery; here are three of us, all doomed to be miserable as long as
we all three live; but the wretchedness of two of us might be at once
converted into happiness, if the third were put out of the way. By some
such logical process, Queen Mary and Bothwell may have satisfied
themselves of the propriety of blowing up Darnley: Mr. and Mrs. Manning,
as they sate at meat with their destined victim over his ready-made
grave, may have argued themselves into self-approval of the crowning
rite with which their hospitalities were to terminate: any scampish
apprentice with designs upon his master's till, any burglar plotting an
entry into a goldsmith's shop, may become convinced of his rectitude of
purpose, and even take credit for public-spirited zeal, in seeking to
appropriate to his own use part of another's wealth, which he may fairly
suppose would be productive of more enjoyment if divided between two or
more than if left in the hands of one, and that one already perhaps the
possessor of more than he knows what to do with.
Precisely the same sophistry will not indeed suffice for those disciples
who, adopting the alternative law of the utilitarian code, feel bound to
attend to the consequences not of individual actions, but of classes of
actions. The cleverest self-deceiver can scarcely bring himself to
believe that, because it might suit his personal convenience to kill or
steal, killing and stealing would not be prejudicial to society if
generally practised. Still, it is only necessary to have, or to fancy
one has, public instead of private objects in view, in order to be able
to look with approbation, from an utilitarian point of view, on any
amount of homicide or robbery. It was the very same Robespierre that,
while as yet diocesan judge at Arras, felt constrained to abdicate
because, 'behold, one day comes a culprit whose crime merits hanging,
and strict-minded, strait-laced Max's conscience will not permit the
dooming of any son of Adam to die,' who, shortly after, when
sufficiently imbued with the utilitarian spirit, was fully prepared to
wade through floods of slaughter towards the enthronisation of his
principles--one of those principles evidently being that, if the
decimation of mankind would conduce to the greater happiness of the
residue, adding more to the happiness of the nine-tenths whom it spared
than it took from the tenth whom it destroyed, the said decimation would
be a duty incumbent on any one possessed of power to perpetrate it.
Nor are principles like these appealed to only by those who have
recourse to them for the vindication of their own procedure. At those
_petits-soupers_--bachelors' dinners is their modern English name,
_noctes coenæque deûm_ their ancient classical--for which some of our
London clubs are deservedly celebrated, and with which the Garrick in
especial is, in my mind, gratefully associated--at those choice
gatherings of congenial spirits, conversation, changing from gay to
grave, turns not unfrequently, among other lofty topics, on that which
we are here discussing. Then, even at such divine symposium, one at
least of the guests is pretty sure to take the part of devil's advocate,
and to exercise his forensic skill in showing how easily interchangeable
are the names of virtue and iniquity, crime and well-doing. September
massacres then find, not their apologist, but their eulogist. _Noyades_
of Carrier, _fusilades_ of Collot d'Herbois, are cited as examples very
suitable for imitation in adequate emergencies. Prussia's seizure, on
behalf of Germany, of Schleswig and Holstein, on pretence of their being
not Danish, but German, and her subsequent retention of them for herself
on the plea of their having always been not German, but Danish, are
applauded as acts perfectly consistent with each other and with the
eternal fitness of things. And all this is urged in the best possible
faith. Of the recited enormities, were not some, steps to the
regeneration of France--others, to the unifaction of Germany? And what
are myriads of lives in comparison with a regenerate--what violation of
the most solemn engagements in comparison with a united, people? Did not
the millions of Frenchmen who survived the Reign of Terror gain more
than was lost by the thousands who were guillotined at Paris, or drowned
at Nantes, or shot down at Lyons? Is not Germany likely to turn Kiel to
far better account than Denmark ever did or could have done? and will
not German ascendency be abundant compensation for Danish decadence? How
culpably misplaced, then, were conscientious scruples that would have
impeded the march of events in such directions! Ends need but to be
great enough to justify any means. Let but the good promise to exceed
the evil, and there is no evil which ought not to be done in order that
good may come of it. Thus slightly qualified, the Satanic adage, 'Evil,
be thou my good,' is, without more ado, accepted as the utilitarian
watchword.
And what though it be only the most thorough-paced Utilitarians who go
these extreme lengths? These lengths, extreme as they are, are
legitimate deductions from tenets held in common by the most moderate
and cautious as well as by the most reckless of the sect. Crime in the
abstract is condemned not less vehemently by the latter than by the
former; but by both equally it is condemned on account, not of its
inherent vileness, but solely of its observed results. If the results
were different, the agency to which they are due would be fitted with a
different epithet. If a world could be conceived to be so organised, or,
if this world of ours could be conceived to be so changed as that the
practice of killing, stealing, or telling lies would be conducive to the
general good, the practice in question would obtain a new name in the
Utilitarian vocabulary. Crime would become beneficence; and to kill, to
steal, or to tell lies would be not wrong, but right. These are
propositions which, without abjuring the prime articles of his creed,
the most timid Utilitarian has no alternative but to endorse; but how,
then, can he shut his eyes to their obvious application? How presume to
rebuke those earnest philanthropists, who, to judge from their habitual
language, are firmly of opinion that annihilation of one half of mankind
would be a small price to pay for conversion of the other moiety into
citizens of a world-wide Red Republic; or those admirers of Prince
Bismarck, who, holding national aggrandisement to be the national
_summum bonum_, deem the most solemn treaties that might impede it to be
obstacles which it is obligatory on a patriot to set aside? Will not the
effects of any given cause vary with the changes in the circumstances in
which the cause acts? May it not easily happen that the direct effect of
some private crime shall be to augment, instead of to diminish the total
happiness of all the persons affected by it? And is it not, then,
conceivable that a public crime, provided it be of sufficient magnitude,
may more than counterpoise, by the good it is calculated to do, all the
harm that all crimes of the same description either have done or are
likely to do hereafter? It is idle to reply that such a comparison
between public good and evil must needs be mistaken: that the harm, for
instance, which violation of treaties does to mankind by sapping the
foundations of international confidence, rendering impossible
international co-operation, and bringing the very name of international
morality into contempt, is infinitely beyond any good it can do in the
shape of national aggrandisement. Whether this be so or not is matter of
opinion, on which every one may fairly insist on forming his own, and if
that opinion be in the negative, a utilitarian agent, in Prince
Bismarck's circumstances, would be bound in duty to imitate Prince
Bismarck's high-handed policy. In all circumstances of international
import, in all cases bearing upon the general interests of society, a
Utilitarian, after deciding according to his lights which of the various
courses open to him would best promote the general welfare, either
immediately by its direct effects, or subsequently and indirectly by the
example it would set, would be bound in duty to adopt that course. That
course, however wrong it might have appeared in all previous cases,
would now become right, as being apparently the one most conducive to
the future welfare of mankind. Utilitarianism's standard of morality
thus turns out to be, not any fixed and definite notion of expediency,
but one liable to change with every change in individual judgment. Its
boasted criterion of the right or wrong of an action is the best
conjecture which the agent, with or without extrinsic advice, is able to
form of the future consequences of the action. Utilitarian law, in
short, resolves itself into this--that every man shall be a law unto
himself. Of course no Utilitarians will acknowledge this to be their
law, not even those who shape their conduct in exact conformity to it.
Nevertheless, that such is the law follows necessarily from their own
premises. For does not Utilitarianism sometimes--a little heedlessly,
perhaps, but not the less positively--declare that the morality of an
action depends not at all upon its motives, but exclusively upon its
consequences? Does it not, when most guarded in its language, affirm the
morality of actions to depend upon their tendencies, that is to say, on
their consequences at large, and in the long run? But there can never be
perfect certainty as to consequences. With regard to the future,
plausible conjecture is the utmost possible; and by differing judgments
different conjectures will needs be made. So that the value of the rule
of conduct furnished by Utilitarianism to any individual depends upon
the latter's ability, supplemented by that of any counsellors whom he
may consult, to forecast events. He cannot proceed correctly, except in
so far as he or they have the gift of prophecy. However dull his vision
may be, he must content himself with his own blind guidance, unless he
prefer as guide some one who, for aught he can tell, may be as blind as
himself. And it is always for himself to judge whether he will follow
advice: so that in effect every Utilitarian is his own moral law-giver;
and, certainly, a worse assignment of legislative functions cannot be
imagined.
But the mischievousness of Utilitarianism does not stop here. We have
seen how one of its principles destroys the landmarks between right and
wrong, between virtue and vice, causing each to take continually the
place of its opposite. We have now to see how another of its principles
obliterates all distinctions between different kinds of virtue,
confounding them in one indiscriminate mass, and imparting to them a
sort of general oneness not more lucid than that which, according to
Mr. Curdle, is the essence of the dramatic unities.
The object which it insists upon as conduct's end and aim is the general
good--the greatest possible aggregate of good or happiness for all. As
the Scriptures enjoin us, whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do,
to do all to the glory of God, so Utilitarianism exhorts us to do all
for the welfare of mankind. Now, far be it from me to caricature this
soul-inspiring rule by forcing it, under a strained construction, to an
unnatural extreme. Fairly examined, it will be seen to make no
extravagant demands on our self-denial. As Christianity, even while
bidding us to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness,
promises that all other things shall be added unto us, so
Utilitarianism, even while insisting on our seeking first to please
others, permits, nay, directs, us to take as much pleasure for ourselves
as we can lay hold of without depriving others, since the aggregate of
happiness which it is incumbent upon us to augment to the best of our
ability would otherwise be less. Nay, for the same reason, it
disapproves of our foregoing any pleasure of our own, the full
equivalent of which is not transferred to others. The happiness which it
requires us to attend to is that of a society of which each of us is a
component member, and no member of which can deny himself any pleasure
within his reach, and beyond the reach of others, without diminishing
the total of happiness which the whole society might enjoy. 'As between
his own happiness and that of others,' says Mr. Mill, 'Utilitarianism
requires an agent to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and
benevolent spectator.' Thus qualified, the prescribed subordination of
one's own to the general good is no such extravagantly self-denying
ordinance. If for anything, it might rather be reproached for its cold,
calculating equity. With reference quite as much to individual as to
communal happiness it is an excellent rule of conduct, against which not
a word could be said, provided only it were left to be adopted
voluntarily, and were not authoritatively imposed.
Unfortunately, however, Utilitarianism allows no option in the matter.
Unless we do our very utmost to promote the general weal, at whatever
sacrifice to ourselves, it charges us with sin of omission. In the words
of one of the ablest among able Editors, 'justice is the social idea in
its highest, widest, and most binding expression.... It signifies the
moral principle which obliges each so to shape his conduct and
relations, his claims and his achievements, that they harmonise with the
highest good of all.'[4] To which doctrine of Mr. Morley's, if other
Utilitarians do not subscribe, it can only be because they are less
resolutely logical. Mr. Mill, indeed, though dissenting in appearance on
this point from Mr. Morley, agrees with him in substance. Even when on
one occasion, distinguishing between duty and virtue, he says that there
are innumerable acts and forbearances of human beings which, though
either causes or hindrances of good to their fellow-creatures, lie
beyond the domain of duty, and within that of virtue or merit, he goes
on to assign as the sole reason for placing them in the domain of the
latter that, in respect to them, it is, on the whole, for the general
interest that people should be left free, thereby plainly intimating
that society would be equitably entitled to insist on them if it thought
proper. But conduct that can be equitably insisted on is clearly, in the
strictest sense, duty; and it would be preposterous to claim merit for
doing that which it would be a breach of duty to leave undone. Duties do
not cease to be duties because he on whom they are incumbent is not
compelled under penalty to perform them, any more than debts cease to be
debts because creditors do not choose to ask for payment. All consistent
utilitarian teaching points inflexibly towards Mr. Morley's conclusion,
according to which justice and social virtue are absolutely identical,
and according to which, also, whoever does not shape his 'conduct, &c.,
in harmony with the highest good of all,' does less than is due from
him, while it is impossible for him to do more. For whatever he propose
to do must either be or not be in the prescribed harmony. If it be, he
is bound to do it. If not, he is bound not to do it. The very utmost he
can do is no more than is incumbent upon him. Less than his very utmost
is less than is incumbent. No action of his, therefore, can possess any
merit; for mere fulfilment of obligations is reckoned not of grace, but
of debt. Having done everything, he is still but an unprofitable
servant; he has but done that which was his duty to do. Where, then, is
the boast of virtue? It is excluded. By what law? By that of
Utilitarianism, set forth in its full amplitude. Honesty and generosity,
faith, truth, charity, patient endurance, and chivalrous self-devotion,
all are mingled together under the name of justice, and justice itself
only remains just as long as it remains identical with the largest
expediency.
At this rate we cannot possibly have any virtue to plume ourselves upon.
The best we can do being no more than our duly, the only reward we can
claim is exemption from the punishment we should have deserved if we had
not done it. Whether it be that we have abstained from killing or
robbing our fellow-citizens for our own advantage, or have impoverished
or half-killed ourselves in the service of the State, our meed is the
same. _Loris non ureris. Non pasces in cruce corvos_, is what we are
told. We may congratulate ourselves on having escaped the
cat-o'-nine-tails and the gallows. Well, we have, most of us, so much
self-sufficiency, that to deprive us of all ground for it might be a
fault on the right side. But now comes a second and more awkward
reflection. If you will not of your own accord do your duty, those to
whom performance of the duty is owing have a right to use means to make
you--foul means if fair means will not avail. If, then, you hesitate to
do your utmost for the interests of society, society is warranted in
taking measures to accelerate your movement. If you are not, or what is
practically the same thing, if a numerical majority of your
fellow-citizens think you are not, making the most beneficial use of
your property; if it be generally considered that it would be for the
greater good of the greater number to divide your park and garden into
peasant properties and cottage allotments, to double the wages of the
workmen in your employment, or to subject you and the likes of you to a
graduated income tax for the purpose of setting up national workshops to
compete with you in your own trade; and, if you do not readily enter
into the same views, then the said numerical majority are not simply
warranted in taking the law into their own hands and doing, in spite of
you, what they think ought to be done with your property, but would be
culpably remiss if they neglected so to act.
Now it is needless to dwell on the extent to which that large numerical
majority of our fellow-citizens which consists of the working classes is
imbued with this notion, nor, except to those who are similarly imbued,
can it be necessary to insist that there is no notion of which it is
more indispensable to disabuse the working-class mind. This,
accordingly, I strove to do throughout a recent work of mine, 'On
Labour,' particularly in the chapter which treats of the claims and
rights thereof. I there earnestly pleaded that there may be, and are,
private rights independent of utility which no public needs can cancel;
that all which any man, or set of men, is entitled to exact from another
is payment or fulfilment of what is due to him or them from that other;
that unless the poverty of the many has been caused by the few, the many
are not warranted in extorting relief of their wants from the few; that
the mere circumstance of their being without food or work does not
entitle the poor to be fed or employed by the rich, for that there is
likewise a justice independent of and superior to utility, consisting
simply of respect for rights, while injustice consists simply of
violation of rights.
In so arguing, I ran directly counter to Utilitarianism, provoking
thereby a retaliatory assault from Utilitarianism's tutelary champion,
who, as readers of the 'Fortnightly Review'[5] are aware, bore down upon
me with an energy no whit the less effective for being tempered with all
knightly courtesy. Yet, not to say it vaingloriously, I am not conscious
of having been shaken in the saddle, and I now return to the encounter
with modest assurance, firmly believing mine to be the better cause, and
recollecting too that in a contest with Mr. Mill, let the issue be what
it may, I may at least comfort myself with the reflection
Minus turpe vinci quam contendisse decorum.
I must at the outset be permitted to remark that one or two of Mr.
Mill's objections to my statements are based upon misconception of their
meaning. I never questioned, but, on the contrary, have always in the
distinctest terms admitted that society is perfectly at liberty to put
an end to the institution of property in land. No extremest Socialist
ever went beyond me in proclaiming that the 'earth was bestowed by the
Creator, not on any privileged class or classes, but on all mankind and
on all successive generations of men, so that no one generation can have
more than a life interest in the soil, or be entitled to alienate the
birthright of succeeding generations.'[6] No one more fully recognises
that property in land exists only on sufferance and by concession, and
that society, which made the concession, may at any moment take it back
on giving full compensation to the concessioners.
Again, when asserting the inviolability of moveable, as distinguished
from landed, property, I was careful to limit the assertion to property
honestly acquired. I never supposed it possible to acquire by
prescription 'a fee simple in an injustice.' Only, if in any particular
instance it be suspected that property has been acquired by force,
fraud, or robbery, I contend that the _onus probandi_ lies on him who
raises the question. It is for him to show, if he can, that a commercial
fortune has, as Mr. Mill suggests, been built up by 'jobbing contracts,
profligate loans, or other reprehensible practices.' But if this cannot
be shown, the validity of the actual possessor's title must not be
impugned. Property must be treated as of innocent acquisition and
derivation until proved to be of guilty. And that not merely because
there could otherwise be no rights of property at all, since it must
always be impossible for any owner to demonstrate that neither he nor
any one of those from whom he derives ever either overreached in a
bargain or failed in a contract; but also, and much more, because
whether a person be or be not the rightful owner of the wealth in his
possession, no one can possibly be entitled to despoil him unless the
wealth can be shown to have been ill-gotten. That right must be held to
be complete with which no one can show a right to interfere.
The gravest, however, of Mr. Mill's criticisms is that mine is 'a
doctrine _à priori_, claiming to command assent by its own light, and to
be evident by simple intuition.' This is an imputation to which I am so
unaware of having laid myself open that I can account for its having
been made only on the supposition that Mr. Mill, in common with most
other Utilitarians, imagines that their only opponents are
Intuitionists, and that it is only necessary to set aside the tenets of
these in order to get their own established instead. If this were really
the case, utilitarian advocacy would be a comparatively easy task.
Intuitionism, whether capable or not of being disproved, is by its
nature unsusceptible of decisive proof. If I, in support of the
proposition that there is in the human mind an intuitive sense of any
sort, were to assert that I had such a sense while you denied that you
had, it would be impossible for me to prove you to be mistaken, while,
unless you were mistaken as to your individual experience, I should
clearly be mistaken as to the generalisation which I had based upon
mine. But I never said a word about an intuitive sense of right and
wrong. How could I, seeing, as no one who chooses to look can fail to
see, that the instincts of untutored children prompt them to disregard
all rights but their own, to spit cockchafers, rob birds' nests, and
confiscate younger children's cakes and apples? All I say is that there
may be and are rights independent of and even opposed to utility, and
these, for reasons which shall immediately be stated, I call natural
rights; but I do not say that they are intuitively perceived. As for
sense of justice or of duty, or moral sense or faculty, what I
understand by that is not recognition of certain rights or duties as
such, but recognition of the obligation to respect whatever rights
and to fulfil whatever duties are recognised, according to which
definition it is mere tautology to add that the sense or faculty in
question originates simultaneously with the recognition of any rights
or duties. For inasmuch as rights invariably imply corresponding
obligations--inasmuch as if a thing be rightfully claimed, that same
thing must needs be due or owing, it is of course impossible to perceive
that a thing is _owing_ without perceiving at the same moment that it
_ought_ to be paid. On this account, and with this explanation, I should
not scruple to speak of the moral sense as intuitive; but if for that
reason I am to be called an Intuitionist, so equally must Mr. Mill, for
he has said precisely the same thing. He likewise has said that 'the
moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural out-growth from
it, capable, in a certain small degree, of springing up spontaneously.'
II.
By my avowal of a belief in 'Natural Rights,' I feel that I must have
incurred in philosophic quarters a sort of civil contempt, which I am
very desirous of removing, and which will, I trust, be somewhat
diminished on my proceeding to explain how few and elementary are the
rights that I propose for naturalisation. They are but two in number,
and they are these:--(1) Absolute right, except in so far as the same
may have been forfeited by misconduct or modified by consent, to deal in
any way one pleases, not noxious to other people, with one's own self or
person; (2) right equally absolute to dispose similarly of the produce
either of one's own honest industry, or of that of others whose rights
in connection with it have been honestly acquired by oneself. I call
these 'rights,' because there cannot possibly anywhere exist either the
right to prevent their being exercised, or any rights with which they
can clash, and because, therefore, by their freest exercise, no one can
possibly be wronged, while to interfere with their exercise would be to
wrong their possessor. And I call them 'natural,' because they are not
artificially created, and have no need of external ratification. Whoever
thinks proper to deny this--whoever, as all Utilitarians do, contends
that society is entitled to interfere with the rights which I have
called natural, is bound to attempt to show how society became so
entitled; when for the claim he puts forward on society's behalf he will
find it impossible to produce any plausible pretext, without crediting
society with possession of a right belonging to that same 'natural'
class, the existence of which he denies. For, as there can be no rights
without corresponding obligations or duties, if it be really the right
of society to deal at its discretion with the persons or effects of
individuals, it must be incumbent on individuals to permit themselves
and whatever is theirs to be so dealt with. Have, then, individuals
incurred any such obligation? No obligation, be it remembered, can
arise, except through some antecedent act of one or other or both of the
parties concerned. Either a pledge of some sort must have been given or
a benefit of some sort must have been received. Now undoubtedly there
are no limits to the extent to which society and its individual members
might have reciprocally pledged themselves. It might have been
stipulated by their articles of association that society at large should
do its utmost for the welfare of each of its members, and that each of
its members should do his utmost for the welfare of society at large.
But it is certain, either that no such compact ever was made, or that,
if made, it has always been systematically set at nought. Society has
never made much pretence of troubling itself about the welfare of
individuals, except in certain specified particulars; so that, even if
individuals had, on condition of being treated with reciprocal
solicitude, accepted the obligation of attending to the welfare of
society in other than the same particulars, that conditional obligation
would from the commencement have been null and void. The one thing which
society invariably pledges itself to do is to protect person and
property, and by implication to enforce performance of contracts; and
the two things which individual associates in turn pledge themselves to
do are to abstain from molesting each other's persons and property, and
to assist society in protecting both. In so abstaining and so assisting
consist all those 'many acts and the still greater number of
forbearances, the perpetual practice of which by all is,' as Mr. Mill
says, 'universally deemed to be so necessary to the general well-being,
that people must be held to it compulsorily, either by law or by social
pressure.'[7] Under one or other of these two heads may be ranged
everything that individuals owe to society in return for the mere
protection which they receive from it.
True, there is an universal understanding that individuals shall be
subject to any laws, whether wise or foolish, provided only they be of
equal and impartial operation, which may be enacted by a numerical
majority of the community to which the individuals belong; and in this
manner individuals may become bound by any number of miscellaneous
pledges, society acquiring simultaneously the right to hold individuals
to the performance of those pledges. Thus, if by the vote of an
unimpeachably representative House of Commons it were declared to be for
the general good, and agreed to accordingly, that every one should be
vaccinated or circumcised, it would be incumbent on every one to submit
quietly to vaccination or circumcision, however deleterious the
operation might be deemed by some. Or if, improving upon a hypothetical
suggestion of Mr. Mill, a parliament elected by constituencies in which
the labouring-class element greatly predominated, should prospectively
forbid the accumulation by any individual of property beyond a specified
amount, then, though the almost certain consequence would be that the
prescribed limit of accumulation would not be exceeded, still if it were
exceeded, the accumulator could not justly complain when the surplus was
forfeited according to law. Yet even thus the obligations or duties
created will correspond exactly with the pledges given; none will be
incurred except such as have been imposed by special legislation--nor
even those, unless the legislation have been impartial. A law requiring
people to pay poor's-rates would not suffice as a pretext for requiring
them to pay education rates likewise. Neither if, instead of passing the
prospective law just now supposed, a governing majority which had
previously always permitted the indefinite accumulation of wealth, were
retrospectively to decree the forfeiture of all past accumulations
beyond a defined amount, would individuals be morally bound to submit to
such a decree if they could contrive to evade it, any more than
sexquipedalians would be bound to lay their heads on the block in
obedience to a law directing everybody six feet high to be decapitated.
All such partial legislation would be tyrannical, and circumstances must
be very peculiar indeed to make submission to tyranny a duty. But of all
conceivable legislation, none could possibly be more partial, or
therefore more tyrannical, than such as should give to society a general
power of dealing at its pleasure with its associates, and of arbitrarily
subjecting separate classes or individuals to exceptional treatment.
Even, therefore, if a law to such monstrous effect were enacted, it
could have no morally binding force. It would be no one's duty to
acquiesce in it.
I will not here stop to dispute, though I am not sure that I could
without some slight reservation admit, that the receipt of unasked-for
benefits places the recipient under precisely the same obligation to
benefit his benefactor, as if the good received by him had been
conferred on express condition of his availing himself of the first
opportunity to render equal good. I will not stop to dispute, for
instance, that a person saved from drowning at the risk of his own
rescuer's life, would be bound, on occasion arising, to risk his own
life in order to save his former rescuer's. For my immediate purpose, it
may suffice to remark that society has never been in the habit of
showing such parental solicitude for its component members as would
warrant its claiming filial devotion from them. In the matter of
philanthropy its practice has never been in advance of its very moderate
professions. It has invariably contented itself with rendering certain
specific services, never failing to exact in return fully equivalent
services of each species.
In candour, however, there must be admitted to be innumerable blessings
not yet adverted to, including indeed most of those by the possession of
which man is distinguished from brutes, for which he is in so far
indebted to society that, but for the instrumentality of society, they
would never have been his. Unless individuals had formed themselves into
communities, civilization could have made no sensible progress: there
could have been no considerable advances, material, intellectual, moral,
or æsthetic. Not only should we have been destitute of all the comforts
and luxuries that now surround us, we should have lacked also whatever
cerebral development we have attained, together with all its
concomitants and consequences; whatever of intelligence, or moral
perceptiveness, or artistic taste we have to boast of. Still, though
none of these faculties could have made much approach to maturity except
under the shelter of society, they are not gifts of society. Without the
help of a plough, land cannot be ploughed; but we do not therefore
credit the ploughmaker with the achievements of the ploughman. Neither
is society to take to itself praise because its members have made good
use of the protection which, in consideration of stipulated services on
their part, it has afforded them. Besides, whatever we inherit from
society, we inherit from a society of members no longer in being. Let
the dead come to life again, and it may then become us to examine their
claims upon our gratitude, but we need not meanwhile confound past and
present generations, nor our forefathers with our contemporaries. To the
mass of these latter, at any rate, we are none of us indebted for our
brains or our aptitudes of thought and feeling, and the circumstance of
our being joint sharers with them in patrimony bequeathed by a common
ancestry, affords no very obvious reason why our share of the
inheritance, together with whatever else we possess, should be at their
absolute disposal.
Thus it appears that in no one of the ways in which alone can
originate the obligations which must always precede or accompany
artificially-created rights, has that particular obligation arisen
without which it is impossible for society to obtain artificially the
right of preventing individuals from doing as they will with their own.
No sufficient pledge has been given by one side, no sufficient benefit
conferred by the other. Individuals never agreed to place their all at
the disposal of society; society never rendered to individuals any
services entitling it to claim such boundless gratitude. One service
which it invariably undertakes is that of protecting person and
property. This is its chief and primary duty, the fulfilment of which is
always the first object of its institution, often the only one it
acknowledges. But clearly it cannot by performance of a duty acquire the
right of doing the exact reverse of that duty. It cannot by protecting
acquire the right of molesting. It cannot by preventing person and
property from being meddled with, acquire in its corporate capacity the
right of itself meddling. Since then this right of meddling, this right
of disposing of what is exclusively some individual's own, otherwise
than the owner wishes, has not been acquired by society artificially, it
must, if it do actually belong to society, have been come by naturally;
and this accordingly is what Utilitarians really, though perhaps
unconsciously, assume, treating moreover this gratuitous assumption of
theirs as a self-evident truth.
For, as Utilitarians themselves cannot fail on reflection to perceive,
they offer no shadow of argument in support of that 'greatest happiness
principle' on which their whole system rests. Commencing with the
undeniable postulate that happiness is the sole object of existence, and
perceiving that individual happiness alone would be a very misleading
object, they proceed to take quietly for granted that the only happiness
at which life ought to aim is social happiness. Now, undoubtedly social
happiness is of more importance than individual happiness--the happiness
of many than that of one or a few; neither can there be any worthier
object of pursuit than the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
All this is seen without being said, but what is by no means so easily
seen is how it can be incumbent on any one to pursue that object to his
own detriment--how it can be imperative on one or on a few to sacrifice
his or their happiness in order to promote that of the many. Plainly
such self-devotion cannot be for their personal advantage, and
Utilitarianism does not even attempt to show how it can have become
their duty. Meritorious, magnanimous, heroic in the highest degree it
would certainly be, but does not that very circumstance prove
conclusively that it cannot be due, inasmuch as there is nothing
meritorious in merely doing one's duty and paying one's debts? But of
that which is not due, how can payment be rightfully insisted upon? What
the few are under no obligation to yield, how can the many be entitled
to extort, or how can the worthiness of the latter's object excuse their
doing that which they have no right to do? Is any object, however
worthy, to be pursued regardless of all collateral considerations? To
these objections Utilitarians have no answer to make. All they can do is
tacitly to take for granted the disputed duty and right. That the less
ought to give way to the greater, and the few to the many, and that the
many may rightfully therefore, if need be, use force to compel the less
or the few to give way--these are treated by them as incontestable
propositions, even as 'doctrines _à priori_, claiming assent by their
own light, evident by simple intuition.' And although thus from their
own inner consciousness evolving the very first principles of their own
philosophy, the premises of their deduction that social happiness is the
proper aim in life, and that conduciveness to such happiness is the test
of morality--'Intuitionists,' strange to say, is the distinctive
appellation which they propose to affix to all those who hesitate to
accept as ethical foundation stones the results of their intuitional
evolution.
Scarcely by a taunt so readily rebuttable will anti-Utilitarians be
excited to speedier apprehension of the nature of the lien which
corporate self-interest is presumed to have upon individual
self-devotion. Not the less tenaciously may they cling to their belief
in the right of every one to do as he will with whatever has come by
fair means into his exclusive and complete possession. Neither, I
venture to think, need less store be set by that right in consequence of
an objection very adroitly taken to it by Mr. Mill, which, on account
both of its inherent ingenuity and of its having been addressed more
immediately to myself, it would be inexcusable in me to leave
unexamined. In Mr. Mill's opinion, the right in question, even if valid,
would be valueless, because it would be neutralised by precisely similar
rights belonging to society. If, he argues, individuals are at liberty
to do as they will with their own, so likewise must society be. But
'existing social arrangements and law itself exist in virtue not only of
the forbearance, but of the active support of the labouring classes' who
in every community constitute a numerical majority. This working-class
majority might then if they pleased withdraw their support from existing
arrangements, thereby depriving person and property of social
protection; and by merely threatening such withdrawal they could compel
individuals to acquiesce in their most extravagant demands. 'They might
bind the rich to take the whole burden of taxation upon themselves. They
might bind them to give employment, at liberal wages, to a number of
labourers in a direct ratio to the amount of their incomes. They might
enforce on them a total abolition of inheritance and bequest.' Mr. Mill
maintains that these things, although exceedingly foolish, might
according to my principles, with perfect equity be done; nay, if I
understand him correctly, that according neither to mine nor to any one
else's principles can any adequate reason be assigned why they should
not be done, except that their practical results would be baneful
instead of beneficial. And taking this view, he is fully warranted in
asking what it can matter that according to my theory 'an employer does
no wrong in making the use he does of his capital, if the same theory
would justify the employed in compelling him by law to make a different
use--if the labourers would in no way infringe the definition of justice
by taking the matter into their own hands and establishing by law any
modification of the rights of property which in their opinion would
increase the remuneration of their labour.'[8]
My reply to this and to the whole argument is the following. So long as
society continues to exist, society cannot divest itself of the primary
function for the discharge of which it was originally constituted.
Society, having come together in the first instance, tacitly pledged to
extend protection to each individual associate, cannot, without breach
of contract, withdraw that protection. It may, indeed, make any
impartial laws it pleases, and attach any penalty it pleases to
violation of any impartial law, but it cannot in equity, whatever it may
in practice, place any of its members outside the law; neither, most
certainly, even if its competence did extend thus far, could it go the
farther length of conferring on any one the right of doing wrong to an
outlaw. It may even be doubted whether, if an outlaw were to injure any
one still belonging to the society, any but the injured person himself
would be warranted in retaliating. The sole reason that I can perceive
why even he would is, that his rights had been infringed, and that
reparation was due to him for any damage sustained by him in
consequence, while, on the other hand, the aggressor had forfeited those
rights of his which might otherwise have forbidden the injured person
from taking the reparation due. But society had had none of its rights
infringed. By society no injury had been sustained. To society,
therefore, no reparation was due; and society, it seems to me, would
have no right to insist on exacting reparation not due to itself from
one whom it had forcibly extruded from its communion, and who,
therefore, was no longer amenable to its jurisdiction. Society might,
indeed, dissolve itself, proclaiming that 'every man for himself, and
God for all,' should thenceforward be the rule. But although it might
thus leave individual rights without other defence than that of the
owner, it could not annihilate individual rights. It might cancel the
right to mutual protection, but it could not, in place of that, create a
right of mutual molestation. One's own person and property would still
be as much one's own as before, and whoever outraged either would not be
the less a wrong doer because society permitted his wrong doing to
remain unpunished. In all ethical investigations it is impossible to
guard too watchfully against the smallest approach to confusion of might
with right.
Instead of being valueless, the particular rights of which Mr. Mill
speaks so disparagingly, appear to me to possess a value which can
scarcely be exaggerated. They are, as may be readily perceived,
identical with the two which I have termed 'natural,' and of which I
began by saying that they are exceedingly elementary, but of which I
have now to add that they are also all-comprehensive, for that there are
no genuine rights whatever, however numerous or complex, which neither
are included within, nor branch out from, them. This will be manifest on
comparison of them with the items enumerated in any other catalogue of
rights; as, for instance, with the one drawn up by Mr. Mill, according
to whom all rights may be classified as follows:--(1) Legal rights; (2)
moral rights; (3) the right of every one to that which he deserves; (4)
the right to fulfilment of engagements; (5) right to impartiality of
treatment; (6) right to equality of treatment.[9] Each of these
varieties will repay a brief examination.
Under the head of 'legal' rights are commonly placed, not those only
which are conferred, but those also which are confirmed, by law. Such as
law has merely confirmed, however, are of course not the creatures of
law. But it is admitted on all hands that a law may be unjust--that is
to say, it may without consent from the parties concerned, infringe some
previously existing right--and as the right so violated cannot have been
created by law, inasmuch as what law had been competent to create, law
would be equally competent to cancel--it is clear that there must be
rights other than those created by law, rights whose origin was
independent of, and anterior to, law. It is apparently to rights of this
description that Mr. Mill applies the name of 'moral' rights. Examples
of them are a man's rights to personal liberty and to property in
whatever belongs to him as having become his by honest means, to both of
which, unless he had forfeited them by misconduct, he would be equally
entitled, whether his title to them were or were not recognised by law.
The only genuine rights which law can create, or consequently can have
to confer, are privileges in respect of person or property other than
one's own. But such legalised privileges are not necessarily rights.
Whether they are so actually or not depends mainly on the character of
the legislative authority. A right to interfere with rights not based
upon law cannot be conferred without the consent of the parties in whom
the independent rights are vested, given either directly by themselves
or indirectly through their representatives. If a legislative body be
truly and thoroughly representative of the community which it controls,
then every one of its enactments, however bad or foolish, is virtually
an engagement to which every member of the community is a party, and any
privilege arising out of it becomes to all intents and purposes a right.
If, on the other hand, the legislative authority be autocratic, or if it
represent only certain favoured sections of the community, then none of
its enactments, however wise and good, of which a majority of the public
disapprove, and which interfere with the rights termed by Mr. Mill
'moral,' are morally binding, except on the legislators themselves and
their immediate constituents. Any one else may quite blamelessly break
the law, and resist any privilege thereby created, though he must, of
course, be prepared, in case of detection, to take the legal
consequences of his disobedience. For example, protective duties,
however impolitic, if imposed because a majority of the nation were of
opinion that a certain branch of domestic industry had better be
fostered by protection, could not be evaded without injustice to those
engaged in the protected industry, though there would be no injustice in
smuggling, if they had been imposed in opposition to the general sense
of the public by a packed Parliament or an absolute monarch. The same
legal monopoly, which in the one case could not be justly evaded, could
not in the other be justly enforced. A legal privilege, in short,
becomes a right only when a majority of those at whose expense it is to
be exercised, have formally consented either directly or indirectly to
its being exercised; and it then becomes a right solely because an
engagement has been entered into, in virtue of which, whatever is
requisite for its satisfaction has become due. Thus it appears that,
whatever legal rights are genuine, and are not at the same time 'moral'
rights also, resolve themselves into specimens of the right to
fulfilment of engagements, and belong not more to the first than to the
fourth of Mr. Mill's categories, to which latter, therefore, we may at
once transfer our attention.
Why is it, then, that every one has a right to fulfilment of
engagements, to have faith kept with him, to have promises observed?
Solely, as it seems to me, because whatever has been promised to any one
becomes eventually his due, and because whatever is due or owing ought
to be paid. A promise is nothing less than a prospective transfer of
property in some thing, or in the advantage derivable from some action,
and when the time appointed for making the transfer arrives, whatever
has been promised, whether actually transferred or not, becomes the
complete property of, and in the fullest sense of the word belongs to
him to whom it has been promised; so that the right to fulfilment of
engagements resolves itself into the moral right of every one to have
that which belongs to him, and we have already seen that every legal
right which cannot on other grounds be shown to be a moral right
resolves itself into a right to fulfilment of an engagement. Whence it
follows that there are no legal rights whatever which are not likewise
moral rights, and which might not therefore be equally rights, even
though they had never been legalised. Whence, and from what has just
been observed with respect to the right to fulfilment of engagements, it
further follows that of the five branches of Mr. Mill's classification,
the first and fourth may without inconvenience be dispensed with, and
that the second will suffice to do duty for itself and for the other
two.
We have next to consider a person's right to that which he deserves,
with reference to which, and to my assertion that there is no necessary
correspondence between the remuneration which a labourer ought to
receive and either his merits or his needs, Mr. Mill inquires as
follows:--'If justice be an affair of intuition, if we are guided to it
by the immediate and spontaneous perceptions of the moral sense, what
doctrines of justice are there on which the human race would more
instantaneously and with one accord put the stamp of its recognition
than these--that it is just that each should have what he deserves, and
that, in the dispensation of good things, those whose wants are the most
urgent should have the preference?' But surely however just it be that
each should have what he deserves, it is so only on condition that he
have it from those from whom it is due, and do not take it from those
from whom it is not due. The latter, surely, at least as much deserve to
be allowed to keep what they have already by honest means got, as others
to get what they have not yet got. But if so, then that these should be
deprived of their deserts, in order that those may get theirs, is surely
about the very last doctrine that ought to be put forward as
self-evident and intuitive. 'But,' Mr. Mill proceeds to ask, 'if there
be in the natural constitution of things something patently unjust,
something contrary to sentiments of justice, which sentiments, being
intuitive, are supposed to have been implanted in us by the same Creator
who made the order of things that they protest against--do not these
sentiments impose upon us the duty of striving by all human means to
repair the injustice? And if, on the contrary, we avail ourselves of it
for our own personal advantage, do we not make ourselves participators
in injustice, allies and auxiliaries of the Evil Principle?'[10] Now, as
I have already said, I am myself no intuitionist, but if I were, I
should not the less feel warranted in here replying that by no theory of
justice, intuitive or other, can the passive spectator of an injustice
to which he is no party be bound to assist in repairing the injustice,
simply because he has the means. A creditor denied payment of his fair
debts does not get what he deserves; but upon whom, except the
defaulting debtor, does it therefore become incumbent to repair the
latter's injustice by paying his debts? And if there be in the general
order of mundane affairs, as--provided I may attribute the existence of
it, as of all other evil, not to God, but to the devil--I don't mind
admitting there may be--something which prevents many of our
fellow-creatures from getting their desserts, something contrary,
therefore, to our sentiments of justice whether those sentiments have
been implanted in us by the Creator or not, I still maintain that those
sentiments do not impose upon us the duty of striving to correct the
injustice. They necessarily stimulate us more or less powerfully,
according to their own intrinsic strength, to undertake that noblest of
all tasks, but they do not render it imperative upon us. Whether, if we
actively avail ourselves of the injustice for our own profit--though
this, by the way, is no more than every one of us does who takes
advantage of competition among labourers to obtain labour for a less
price than he perceives it to be worth--we are not making ourselves
auxiliaries of the Evil Principle, may be matter of opinion; but, at all
events, we do not even then become participators in an injustice which
we did not create, and do not uphold or help to perpetuate, but merely
accommodate ourselves to. At worst, we are but accessories to it after
the fact. In simply accepting the situation and striving to make the
best of it for ourselves, without trying to make it better and only
abstaining from making it worse for others, our conduct may be
contemptible, mean, base, disgusting, or what you will, only not
iniquitous; for whatever, short of their deserts, may, from the cause
supposed, be received by our fellow-creatures, although in one sense
plainly due to them, is as plainly not due from us, and we cannot,
without palpable injustice, as well as palpable abuse of words, be
charged with injustice for merely declining to pay debts that we do not
owe.
The rights to impartial and to equal treatment need not detain us long.
There is no right to impartiality except where impartiality is due, and
it is only in a small minority of cases that impartiality is due. There
is nothing iniquitous in showing favour to the extent of giving one
person more than his due, provided no other person be prevented from
having as much as his due. The lord of the vineyard who gave unto all
his labourers alike, the same to those who had wrought for him but one
hour as to those with whom he had agreed that for a penny they should
bear the burden and heat of the day, did the latter no wrong; his eye
was not the less good because theirs was evil. A judge, or an
arbitrator, or the conductor of a competitive examination, is bound to
make his award without respect of persons, because he cannot favour one
without withholding from some other what that other ought to have. On
every distributor of Government patronage, likewise, it is morally
incumbent to select for the public for whom he is trustee, the best
servants he can find. An English Prime Minister has no right to make his
son a Lord of the Treasury or of the Admiralty, if he know of any one
better fitted for the post and willing to accept it; and if he name any
but the fittest candidate, he fails in his duty to the community on
whose behalf he acts. But a private employer, acting for himself alone,
is under no similar obligation, and may take whom he pleases into his
service, and assign to him whatever position therein he pleases, without
affording any cause for reasonable complaint to those more capable
members of his establishment whom he places under one less capable. In
short, except in those rare cases in which impartiality means rendering
what is due, in which cases it is but another name for justice, there is
nothing unjust in disregarding it.
As for equality, although its 'idea,' as Mr. Mill says, 'often enters as
a component part both into the conception and into the practice of
justice, and in the eyes of many persons constitutes its essence,'[11] I
can think of no single case in which, unless by reason of some special
agreement, it can possibly be due, or in which, consequently, there can
be any right to it. Even that equal protection for whatever is
indisputably one's own, the claim of all to which is commonly admitted
almost as a matter of course, is really due from those only by whom the
obligation to afford it has been tacitly or formally accepted. On this
ground it is due from the public at large, and from those individuals to
whom the public has delegated certain of its tutelary functions, but
from no other individuals whatever. No one else is bound to take, for
the protection of all other people, whatever pains or trouble he takes
for his own security--to watch, for instance, as vigilantly that his
neighbour's house as that his own is not broken into. And while the one
solitary claim of any plausibility to universal equality of treatment
requires to be largely qualified before it can be conceded, there is no
other claim of the kind which does not carry with it its own refutation;
there is no other which does not partake of the absurdity patent in the
communistic notion that all the members of a society are entitled to
share equally in the aggregate produce of the society's labour. How is
it possible that an equal share can be everybody's due, if different
persons may have different deserts, and everyone's deserts be likewise
his due?
We have now gone completely through the list of artificially created
rights, without finding one that does not derive all its validity from
connection with some pre-existing right. We have seen that among
so-called rights none whatever are genuine by reason merely of any
extrinsic sanction they may have received, but that all real rights
either are such intrinsically, or are based upon, or embody within them,
some right purely intrinsic. We have seen that there are two rights
endued with this intrinsic character--viz., that of absolute control
over one's own self or person, and that of similar control over whatever
else has by honest means come into one's exclusive possession, or become
due or owing to him exclusively; and, because these rights, wherever the
conditions necessary for their exercise occur, of necessity exist,
springing up at once and full grown, in the necessary absence of any
antagonistic rights that could prevent their existing, I have not
scrupled to call them 'natural;' nor do I think that further apology can
be needed for such application of the epithet. To maintain, moreover,
that these natural rights constitute the essence of all artificial
rights, was simply equivalent to saying that no so-called right can be
genuine unless requiring for its satisfaction no more than already
actually belongs or is due to its claimant; while every right which does
require no more must be genuine, because there can nowhere exist the
right to withdraw or to withhold from any one anything that is
exclusively his. These seeming truisms are indeed diametrically opposed
to a theory which enters on its list of friends names no less
illustrious than those of Plato, Sir Thomas More, Bentham, and Mill.
Still, whoever, undeterred by so formidable an array of adverse
authorities, is prepared to accept the description of rights of which
they form part, will have no difficulty in framing a theory of justice
perfectly conformable thereunto.
The justice of an action consists in its being one, abstinence from
which is due to nobody. The justice of inaction--for just or unjust
behaviour may be either active or passive--consists in there being
nobody to whom action, the reverse of the inaction, is due. 'Justice,
like many other moral attributes, may be best defined by its opposite,'
and all examples of injustice have this one point in common, that they
withhold or withdraw from some person something belonging or due to him,
or in some other way infringe his rights, and consequently wrong him.
Conversely, a point common to and characteristic of all just acts and
omissions, is that they neither prevent anybody from having that which
is due to him, nor in any other way infringe any one's rights, and that
they consequently do no one any wrong. It is not essential to the
justice of conduct that anything due be thereby rendered. It suffices
that nothing due be withheld. All conduct is just by which nobody is
wronged.
It is further to be noted that all just conduct is of one of three
kinds--that which justice peremptorily exacts; that which she merely
permits, and may even be said barely to tolerate; and that which she
approves of and applauds, without, however, presuming to enjoin it.
Conduct of this last sort is just in that it leaves nothing undone which
justice requires, but it is also more than just in that it does more
than justice requires. To speak of it as simply just, is therefore
somewhat disparaging. It is just in the sense in which the less is
comprehended by the greater. He who faithfully fulfils an engagement
that has provided for his making a reasonable return for whatever
advantage he might obtain under it, shows himself simply just in the
matter, and nothing either more or less. He who, having driven a hard
bargain, insists rigorously upon it, giving nothing less, and taking
nothing more than had been mutually stipulated, is likewise strictly
just, but is also shabby, and deserves to be told so plainly. He who,
besides making full return, according to contract, for value received,
does something more, at some inconvenience to himself, out of regard for
another's need, is not a whit more just than either of the other two,
but he is generous into the bargain, and deserves thanks in proportion.
Rising out of these considerations are two others equally meriting
attention.
In the first place, we may see additional cause for distrusting the
testimony which etymology has been supposed to record in favour of 'an
origin of justice connected with the ordinances of law.'[12] That
'_justum_ is a form of _jussum_, that which has been ordered:' that
'[Greek: dikaion] comes directly from [Greek: dikê], a suit of law:'
that '_recht_, from which came right and righteous, is synonymous with
law,' is obvious enough; and it may not be out of place to add that in
French the word _droit_ has, with almost savage irony, been selected as
the technical name, not of law simply, but of legal procedure with all
its crookedness.[13] Still it seems more in the ordinary course of
things to explain this linguistic identification of law with justice, by
supposing conformity to justice to have been the primitive element in
the formation of the notion of law, than by supposing 'conformity to law
to have been the primitive element in the formation of the notion of
justice.' It seems more probable that certain things were commanded
because they were deemed just, than that they were deemed just because
they were commanded. Even the ancient Hebrews, who 'believed their laws
to be a direct emanation from the Supreme Being,' although, if asked why
it was wrong to kill or steal, they might very likely have replied,
'Because theft and murder have been forbidden by God,' would still have
acknowledged that it would be wrong to kill or steal, even if there had
been no divine prohibition of the practices. And when we recollect that
among 'other nations, and in particular the Greeks and Romans, who,
knowing that their laws had been made by men, were not afraid to admit
that men might make bad laws, ... the sentiment of justice came to be
attached, not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such
laws as ought to exist,' what had previously appeared probable is
converted into certainty. Principles of justice to which law ought to
conform cannot but have been anterior to law, and cannot have originated
in law. And certainty on this point grows still more certain, assurance
becomes doubly sure, when we reflect that, as was pointed out above,
many things are just which, not only does not law command, but which
justice barely tolerates, permitting them, indeed, to be done, but
permitting them also to be reprobated.
Secondly, we may perceive that in mere justice there can be nothing
praiseworthy. Justice is nothing more than abstinence from injustice,
and no commendation can be due for not doing that the doing of which
would deserve censure. Justice, if entitled to be ranked among the
virtues at all, is at best only a negative virtue, as being the reverse
of a vice. It is distinguished from all other moral qualities, as being
the single and solitary one, compliance with whose behests is a duty
which we owe to others. Of meekness, patience, temperance, fortitude,
courtesy, whatever display it may for any reason be our duty to make,
precisely that display justice requires us to make. Whatever of any one
of these qualities justice does not exact from us, we may, without
wronging any one, omit. We must not, indeed, incapacitate ourselves by
tippling for our proper work, nor offend the eyes or ears of decenter
folk by reeling obstreperously through the streets; but, if we take the
precaution of retiring during an interval of leisure to our privy
chamber, our making beasts of ourselves then and there to our heart's
content, is our own concern, and nobody else's. No doubt, in doing this
we should be doing very wrong, but still there is no contradiction in
saying that we should have perfect right to do it, inasmuch as we should
thereby be wronging no one but ourselves. Of another class of
virtues--of all those which admit of being directly contrasted with
justice, and which may for shortness' sake be without much inaccuracy
comprehended under the general designation of generosity--it may, with
literal truth, be said that the practice of them is no part of our duty
to our neighbour. Provided we are careful to let every one have what,
between him and us, are his bare dues, we may be selfish, mean, sordid
to excess, without infringing any one else's rights, without the
smallest dereliction of our duty to others. True, ethical writers are in
the habit of speaking of 'duties of perfect and imperfect obligation,'
but of these 'ill-chosen expressions,' as Mr. Mill,[14] with abundant
reason, styles them, the latter, more particularly, is of a slovenliness
which ought to have prevented its being used by any 'philosophic
jurists.' What some of these mean by it is stated to be 'duties in
which, though the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of
performing it are left to our choice; as in the case of charity or
beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practise, but not towards any
defined person, or at any prescribed time.' But, according to this
explanation, there are duties of which performance may not only be
indefinitely postponed, even until a morrow that may never come, but of
which performance at one time will warrant non-performance of them
subsequently; so that, for instance, he who has behaved charitably on
past occasions, may be uncharitable afterwards. 'In the more precise
language' of other writers, we are told that while 'duties of perfect
obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right
resides in some person or persons, duties of imperfect obligation are
those which do not give birth to any right.' But, as where there is no
right nothing can be due, it would seem from this that by duties of
imperfect obligation are to be understood duties performance of which is
not due. I hope to be pardoned for declining to accept these illusive
distinctions as the boundaries which separate justice from the other
components of morality. I neither understand how any obligation can be
otherwise than perfect, nor do I recognise any duties whatever except
those of justice. The main distinction between justice and all positive
virtues I take to be that, whereas compliance with its behests is always
imperative, compliance with theirs never is, but is always optional and
discretionary. Of whatsoever is, for whatsoever reason, due, it is
invariably justice, and justice alone, that demands payment or
performance. Justice claims, and claims peremptorily, whatever is owing,
but never puts forward the smallest pretension to anything that is not
owing. But since whatever is _owing_ plainly _ought_ to be paid, and
since justice never claims anything but what is owing, it is clear that
there cannot be any merit in satisfying the claims of justice. Merit is
possible only in actions which justice does not enjoin, but to which
some other virtue exhorts.
From the main difference here pointed out, a minor collateral difference
ramifies. Of whatever ought to be paid or done, payment or performance
may be righteously enforced. Here I have the satisfaction of proceeding
for a few steps side by side with Mr. Mill, although only, I am sorry to
say, to part company again immediately. 'It is a part,' he says, 'of the
notion of duty in every one of its forms that a person may rightfully
be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing which may be _exacted_ from a
person as one exacts a debt. Unless we think it may be exacted from him,
we do not call it his duty.'[15] Now, since justice never asks for
anything but what is due, never makes a requisition compliance with
which is not a duty, it follows that all those persons to whom its
requisitions are addressed may be rightfully compelled to comply with
them, whereas, since what every other virtue requires is always
something not due, compliance with its requisitions is never a duty, and
cannot, except unrighteously, be enforced. This--viz., the rightfulness
of using compulsion in aid of justice, as contrasted with the
wrongfulness of resorting to it in aid of generosity, rather than the
rightfulness of punishing breaches of the one and not of the other,
seems to me the 'real turning-point of the distinction' between the two.
For gross disregard of generosity, and indeed of any other virtue, may
rightfully be punished, justice fully sanctioning the punishment
although indicating also the nature of the penalty to be inflicted in
each case, and restricting it within certain limits. Whoever plays the
dog in the manger in a manger of his own, or makes an exclusively
selfish use of his wealth or other advantages, refusing to do good to
his neighbour at however little sacrifice on his own part it might be
done, is not thereby infringing anybody else's rights, or thereby
wronging any one else. He is only exercising his own undoubted rights.
Still he is exercising them in a manner deserving of severe reprobation,
and which witnesses of his conduct may justly punish by testifying to
him the scorn, disgust, or indignation he has excited. It is no more
than just that he should have his deserts and receive the punishment
which has become his due. But justice, although permitting him to be
punished for acting ungenerously, does not sanction his being compelled
to make a show of acting generously. If his conduct had been unjust
instead of simply ungenerous, no punishment would be adequate that did
not force him to repair the evil he had done, or to do the good he had
left undone. But the most flagrant breach of generosity, neither keeping
nor taking away anything to which any one has a right, does nothing for
which reparation can be due. It consists simply in a man's making an
exclusively selfish use of what is exclusively his, and to make such use
is one of the rights of property. Whoever exercises that odious right is
justly punished by being shown how hateful we think him, but we must
not, on pretence of justice, commit the injustice of depriving him of a
right which is confessedly his.
It is not, then, by being rightfully liable to punishment that unjust
differs from ungenerous conduct. The latter also ofttimes deserves and
incurs punishment. But since there can be no merit in doing that the not
doing of which would merit punishment, it may seem that, as in justice
so likewise in generosity there cannot be anything positively
meritorious. Neither in truth would there be if conduct were entitled to
be styled generous simply as being the reverse of ungenerous. Generosity
would then, like justice, be a virtue in no higher sense than that of
not being a vice--a negative virtue if a virtue at all. But an action
does not really deserve to be called generous unless what justice
requires be exceeded by it in a degree more than sufficient to prevent
the agent from deserving the imputation of meanness, nor even then
unless the excess have been done from a purer motive than that of the
hope of praise or other reward. An action is generous only in the
proportion in which it involves self-sacrifice, voluntarily undergone
for the benefit of others, without any view on the agent's part to
further compensation than that derivable from the consciousness of
making other people happy. In such voluntary and disinterested
self-sacrifice consists the merit which is one chief characteristic of
generosity as of most positive virtue, distinguishing it from justice,
in which there is never a surrender of anything which one would be
warranted in keeping, but merely a rendering of what belongs or is due
to others. All conduct, not immoral, admits, as already more than once
intimated, of a tripartite division, into that which may be rightfully
enforced; that of which, though it be not due nor rightfully enforcible,
neglect deserves to be and may justly be punished by reproaches; that
which is neither due nor reasonably to be looked for, but which involves
a voluntary surrender for the good of others of some good which one
might without reproach keep for oneself. Of this last description is the
only conduct in which there is any proper or positive virtue.
So much and such complex argumentation may not impossibly be deemed a
good deal in excess of what is requisite to establish the conclusion to
which it points, and which may be summed up in the following very simple
propositions:--That, by a person's rights being understood the privilege
of having or doing whatever no other person has a right to prevent his
having or doing, justice consists of abstinence from conduct that would
interfere with that privilege; that justice, therefore, is not dependent
on extrinsic sanction, but arises spontaneously from the nature of
things, and may almost indeed be said to spring necessarily from the
meaning of words; and that its sole merit is exemption from the demerit
that would attach to the withholding or withdrawing from any person
anything belonging or due to that person. With all possible confidence,
however, in the innate vigour of these propositions, I cannot suppose
that they do not require all possible adventitious strengthening to be
qualified to displace the doctrine to which they are opposed. I proceed,
therefore, to test somewhat further the adequacy of the description of
justice which they involve by confronting it with certain intricate
problems, in presence of which the rival utilitarian definition will be
found to be hopelessly at fault.
There are few subjects on which casuists have differed more widely than
those of the legitimacy, and the proper measure of punishment. One
thinks it unjust that anybody should be punished for the sake of example
to others, or for any purpose except his own amelioration. A second
replies that it is only for the sake of other people's good that an
offender ought to be punished; for that, as for his own good, he himself
should be left to decide what that is, and he is pretty sure not to
decide that it is punishment. A third pronounces all punishment unjust,
seeing that a man does not make himself criminal, but is made so by
circumstances beyond his control--by his birth, parentage, education,
and the temptations he meets with. Then, for the apportionment of
punishment, some persons think there is no principle like that of the
_lex talionis_--an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Others that
the penalty should be accurately proportioned to the immorality of the
offence, by whatever standard that immorality be measured. Others,
again, that punishment should be limited to the minimum necessary to
deter from crime, quite irrespectively of the heinousness of the
particular crime punished. Of the first three of these opinions, Mr.
Mill observes that 'they are all extremely plausible, and that so long
as the question is argued as one of justice simply, without going down
to the principles that lie under justice, and are the source of its
authority, he is unable to see how any one of the reasoners can be
refuted. For every one of them builds upon rules of justice confessedly
true--each is triumphant so long as he is not obliged to take into
consideration any other maxims of justice than those he has selected,
but that as soon as their several maxims are brought face to face, each
disputant seems to have as much to say for himself as the others. No one
can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another
equally binding.'[16] This view of the matter, however, can scarcely be
regarded as satisfactory. If utilitarian notions of justice cannot be
carried out without trampling each other down, they plainly should not
be suffered to go at large, but should be relegated forthwith to the
limbo of oblivion. But right cannot really be opposed to right; justice
cannot really be inconsistent with itself: it never can be unjust to do
what is just. Anti-utilitarian justice tolerates no such intestine
disorder. The sole ground on which she sanctions punishment is the
indispensableness of punishment for the reparation of injury. Whoever
has suffered wrong has been subjected to invasion of some right,
personal or proprietary, and is entitled to amends for the outrage;
while the aggressor from whom the amends are due, ought to render them
because he owes them, and because he ought, may, if necessary, be
compelled, to render them. By the breach of right which he has
committed, he has forfeited his own corresponding right, which may now
be equitably set aside to whatever extent may be requisite for
reparation of the evil he has done, one essential part of such
reparation being adequate security against repetition of the wrong. So
far as may be necessary for this purpose, punishment may equitably go,
but no further. Genuine justice does not permit penal laws of human
enactment to take into account the abstract turpitude of crime. That she
reserves for divine cognisance, recollecting that 'Vengeance is mine, I
will repay,' saith the Lord. Nor does she permit the smallest
aggravation of punishment for the sake either of the offender's own
mental improvement, or to discourage others from evil doing; neither, on
the other hand, does she recognise any claim to abatement on the plea of
an offender not having been able to help acting as he did. She would
not, indeed, punish with death or with stripes an outrage committed by a
lunatic or an idiot, partly because an outrage may be really less
offensive for being committed unwittingly, inasmuch as it does not, at
any rate, add insult to injury, and also because the corporal
chastisement of a lunatic or an idiot could afford no reparation to the
wounded feelings of a healthy mind. But so far as even an idiot or a
lunatic was capable of making good the evil he had done by rendering
what had in consequence become due, Anti-utilitarianism would require
him equally with an erring saint or sage to make it, and equally, too,
would subject him to whatever restraint might be deemed not more than
sufficient to prevent his doing the same evil again. And of course she
does not treat an offender of ordinary intelligence with indulgence
which she would not show even to a lunatic, but exacts inexorably full
reparation for what he has done, requiring him commonly to pay in kind
so far as he can, and to make up with his person for any deficiency.
Within the limits thus marked out she is well content that, with the one
object which alone justifies punishment, other secondary objects with
which justice has no concern, should be combined. She is well content
that the same penal measures as are called for in order to compensate
the injured party, should also subserve the reform of the criminal, and
serve as general deterrents from crime. But she protests against the
notion that these, or any other objects, can ever excuse the
infringement of any ordinance of justice, or of any of even a criminal's
rights which the criminal has not forfeited by crime. Justice, in short,
in her penal, as in all her other arrangements, has but to adhere
closely to the anti-utilitarian principles of rendering what is due, and
of taking nothing that is not due, in order to steer clear of all the
difficulties by which the ablest and most accomplished Utilitarians
confess themselves staggered.
A second greatly vexed question is, 'whether, in a co-operative
industrial association, it is just or not that talent or skill should
give a title to superior remuneration? On the one side it is argued that
all who do the best they can deserve equally well; ... that superior
abilities have already advantages more than enough in the admiration
they excite, the personal influence they command, and the internal
satisfaction attending them; and that society is bound in justice rather
to make compensation to the less favoured for this unmerited inequality
of advantages, than to aggravate it. On the contrary side, that society,
receiving more from the more efficient labourer, owes him a larger
return; that a larger share of the joint result being actually his work,
not to allow his claim to it is a sort of robbery; that if he is only
to receive as much as others he can only be required to produce as
much.'[17] 'Between these appeals to conflicting principles of justice,'
Mr. Mill considers it impossible to decide. 'Justice,' he says, 'has in
this case two sides to it, which it is impossible to bring into harmony,
and the two disputants have chosen opposite sides; the one looks to what
it is just that the individual should receive, the other to what it is
just that the community should give. Each from his own point of view is
unanswerable, and any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must
be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide the
preference.'[18] The form of justice depicted with this Janus-like
aspect can scarcely be the utilitarian, since, whoever, on utilitarian
grounds, selects one of its sides, must perforce, on the same grounds,
reject the other. Still, it is spoken of as genuine justice, wherefore
that there is a justice independent of utility, would seem, after all,
to be admitted by Utilitarians themselves. It is for them, however, to
deal with the dilemma which their own ingenuity has thus devised. My
only concern with the two-headed monster they have imagined is to
protest against its being mistaken for the one sole species of justice
which Anti-utilitarianism recognises, and which never presents any such
double-faced appearance. In the case before us anti-utilitarian justice
would decide with her accustomed ease between the two appellants. What
she would look to would simply be that each co-operator should have his
due. But how much soever she might declare an inferior workman to
deserve for doing his best, she certainly would not allow his deserts to
extend to participation in the fruits of the toil of those of his
fellows who had done better than he. His having produced as much as he
was able could not render due to him a share in the larger produce of
others of superior capacity. Very possibly the superior workmen might
agree that all should participate equally in the aggregate results of
their joint labour. If so, well and good. For so liberal a concession
they would deserve credit, and thanks would be due to them from those in
whose favour it was made; but this of itself would be a conclusive
proof, if any were wanting, that the concession was an act, not of
justice, but of generosity, not of debt, but of grace.
Again, what discordance is there not as to the most equitable
repartition of taxation! That all should be taxed in equal proportion to
their pecuniary means; that taxation should be a graduated percentage on
income, rising as income rose; that all, whether rich or poor, should be
taxed alike; that all should pay equal capitation, but unequal
property-tax--these are some out of many divergencies of opinion, and
'from these confusions' there is, Mr. Mill considers, 'no other mode of
extrication than the utilitarian.'[19] But if there were really no
other, there would, in fact, be none at all. For opinions differ
scarcely less as to the utility, than as to the justice of each
specified mode of taxation. There are quite as many persons who think it
expedient as who think it equitable that people should be taxed either
equally, or according to any of the suggested schemes of inequality. All
the help that Utilitarianism here affords is, as usual, to leave every
one to judge for himself which plan is the most advisable, and then to
pronounce that to be the only moral plan. Anti-utilitarianism offers
guidance of a very different sort. It wastes no time in seeking for an
escape from confusion, for it allows no confusion to exist. It spurns
equally the idea of different persons being required to pay different
prices for equal quantities of the same thing, merely because some of
them can afford to pay more, and that of their being all required to pay
the same price for different quantities, merely because all are equally
in need of the quantities they respectively obtain. It recognises only
an imperfect analogy between a club or a mess to which no one need
subscribe unless he likes, and a national community to whose funds every
resident within its territory has no choice but to contribute; and while
quite content that members of the one should be assessed at any rates to
which they have spontaneously consented, it protests against the
imposition on members of the other of burdens disproportioned to their
several abilities. It denies that the shilling of a man who has but one
in the world is of the same value to him because it is his all, as is to
another an estate bringing him in 100,000_l._ a year, seeing that, if
the former had his pocket picked, he might presently beg, borrow, or
earn a second coin, whereas if the latter were dispossessed of his
estate he might live to the age of Methusaleh without acquiring its
equivalent. It perceives that a rich man, by receiving public protection
for his property as well as his person, is relieved from an expense in
maintaining private watchmen, which a poor man, with nothing but his
carcass to defend, would have as little occasion as ability to incur;
and it concludes that more being thus in effect given to the rich, more
is due from him in return, and more, consequently, may be rightfully
exacted.
We come, now, to a case that may well give to both Utilitarians and
Anti-utilitarians pause--with this difference, however, that whereas it
brings the former to an everlasting standstill, the latter may, after a
while, go on complacently meditative, at least, if not rejoicing.
There are certain situations in which justice loses its authority.
'Thus, to save a life, it may be allowable ... to steal or take by force
the necessary food or medicine, or kidnap and compel to officiate the
only qualified medical practitioner.'[20] Wherefore, since to steal or
to kidnap is essentially wrong, it may sometimes be allowable to do
wrong. Mr. Mill's explanation of the paradox is, that 'there are
particular cases in which some other social duty is so important as to
overrule any one of the general maxims of justice; but that in such
cases we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral
principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that
other principle, not just in the particular case.'[21] I submit,
however, that there is no real occasion to resort to any such 'useful
accommodation of language,' in order to be 'saved from the necessity of
admitting that there may be laudable injustice.' Let us never shrink
from looking error in the face, for fear that, after she has slunk away
abashed, some insoluble mystery may remain behind. It is better, at any
rate, to be puzzled than deceived. There can be no doubt about theft
being essentially unjust, and no skill in the arrangement of words can
convert injustice into justice, or prevent injustice from being wrong.
But when, as occasionally happens, the only choice open to us is between
two immoral courses, it is morally incumbent on us to select the less
immoral of the two. The wrong we decide upon does not, however, itself
become smaller because it prevents a larger. A sworn bravo, who had
taken in advance the wages of assassination, would sin less by breaking
than by keeping faith with his employer; but, in either case, would sin.
Abstinence from murder would not absolve him from the guilt of perjury.
If, unless a loaf were stolen, a life would be lost, Anti-utilitarianism
might pardon, but would scarcely applaud the theft. At all events it
would not, like the rival doctrine in a similar strait, be reduced to
double on itself, declaring that wrong had become right and black white,
that the Ethiopian had changed his skin and the leopard his spots. It
would still insist as positively as ever that to steal another man's
bread cannot be just, however benevolent the purpose for which it is
stolen.
One more illustration and I have done. Whoever believes as I do in the
indefeasible sanctity of honestly acquired _moveable_ property, is
logically bound to hold equally sacred the rights of bequest and
inheritance. With whatever is exclusively your own, you may surely do
anything you please except harm; nor need even harm be excepted if it be
done to yourself alone. If, indeed, you go the length of playing ducks
and drakes with gold pieces, or of lighting cigars with bank-notes, you
are likely enough to be stopped and placed under restraint as a lunatic,
but it is clear that this will be done solely because you are presumed
not to understand what you are doing, and not from any question as to
your right to do it if you do understand, for there are plenty of things
far more objectionable in themselves, only not implying a want of
sanity, which you will be left perfectly at liberty to do. If you
choose, in imitation of Cleopatra, to spoil your fish-sauce by mixing
powdered pearls with it, or, in imitation of a certain Peruvian
viceroy, to shoe your carriage horses with silver, no one will dream of
interfering with you; any more than of preventing courtesans and other
fine ladies from befouling their nether limbs by sweeping the dusty road
with flounces of Brussels lace; or of preventing members of the Cobden
Club from gorging themselves annually, at a cost of five guineas per
paunch, in honour of the prince of practical economists. But property,
which, however great the good it is capable of doing, you are at liberty
to employ solely for your own hurt, you are, of course, at liberty to
destroy, thereby preventing it, at least, from doing any more harm. The
lesser right of abuse is plainly comprehended in the larger. And of that
which is so absolutely your own that you may, if you please, wantonly
waste or destroy it, you may, of course, transfer the ownership, thereby
conveying to another person all your rights in it, and rendering it as
unjust to interfere with the new owner's disposal of the property, as it
would previously have been to interfere with yours. Moreover, since the
gift is a purely voluntary act, you may, if you please, without
impairing its validity, arrange that it shall begin to take effect from
some future date instead of immediately; so that, by naming some date
subsequent to your own decease, you will be converting the gift into an
equally valid bequest. This, I submit, is decisive as to the iniquity of
any legal limitation of testamentary power. The right of bequest is
comprehended within and rests upon the same basis as the right of
possession, so that, unless it would be just to pass a law depriving all
persons of any property possessed by them in excess of a given amount,
it would not be just to deprive them by law of the power of bequeathing
the surplus.
The rights of inheritance obviously coincide precisely with those of
bequest. Just so much as the testator parts with the legatee obtains.
When the bequest is unconditional, the new owner whom it creates steps
into the precise position which the previous owner has vacated. Often,
however, a legacy is qualified by conditions, and, among others, by
this, that the property bequeathed shall be held in trust for certain
purposes. Now, if these purposes be socially noxious, society need not
hesitate to set aside the will that has provided for them. Quite
justifiably, society might annul the testamentary endowment of a
hospital for fleas and lice, such as Bishop Heber, in his Indian tour,
found existing at Baroach and at Surat, because those particular insect
pests could scarcely be retained within the walls of their infirmary.
Perhaps, too, society might be justified in similarly preventing the
endowment of a hospital for superannuated dogs and cats; whether it
would or not depending mainly on the awkward question whether such
inferior animals have any rights inconsistent with human interests. Be
this as it may, however, where human interests alone are concerned, the
rights of conditional heirship present no ethical difficulty. When it is
for purposes socially innocuous and affecting human beings alone that
property is left in trust, it cannot be equitably diverted from those
purposes without the consent of all the individuals whom the
testamentary arrangements were intended to affect. It matters not how
whimsical or preposterous the object enjoined may be; not even though it
be a periodical dinner, cooked after the manner of the ancients, like
the nauseous one at which Peregrine Pickle assisted; or instruction in
alchemy or in Hindoo astronomy, or in the art of walking on one's head.
Not until there remain no persons at once entitled under the will, and
also wishing to partake of the banquet or the instruction, can one or
the other be equitably discontinued? As long as there are any such
persons left, to stop, without their consent and without adequately
compensating them, arrangements, rights in which have been vested in
them by bequest, would be as palpable a violation of justice as to pick
their pockets of sums equivalent to their several interests, real or
supposed, in the arrangements.
If scrupulous adherence to the principle thus laid down would heavily
shackle the activity and seriously impair the immediate usefulness of
Mr. Forster and his coadjutors in the Endowed School Commission, I am
exceedingly sorry, but not in the least shaken in my conviction that the
principle ought to be rigidly adhered to. If parochial or other
communities are too stupid or too selfish to consent that school
endowments under their charge shall be applied to purposes of more
extensive utility than the founders contemplated, every effort should be
made to persuade or to shame them into consenting, but without their
consent the thing should on no account be done. On this point
Utilitarianism and Anti-utilitarianism would, I apprehend, give
identical counsel, the former condemning as impolitic what the latter
denounced as unjust. The cause of national education would be ill served
by any course calculated to discourage its future endowment by private
testators, and nothing would be more likely to have that effect than
arbitrary interference with the endowments of former testators.
The courteous reader may now be temporarily released, with fitting
acknowledgment of his exemplary patience. It would be cruel to detain
him with a recapitulation, without which he may readily trace for
himself, in what has gone before, the outlines of a consistent body of
anti-utilitarian ethics. In these there is little new, little that has
not been anticipated by many an old-fashioned saw and antiquated
apothegm--such as, _Fiat justitia ruat cælum_, 'Be just before you are
generous,' and, I would fain add, 'Honesty is the best policy'--save
that to that Utilitarianism may fairly lay equal claim. My modest
ambition throughout this essay has been to vindicate some of the most
momentous of primeval truths from the slights to which philosophy--not
modern, indeed, but modernised and refurbished--is continually
subjecting them, and I will not deny that I have modest assurance enough
to believe that I have at least partially succeeded. I think I have
shown that there are such things as abstract right and wrong, resting
not on fancied intuition, but on a solidly rational basis, and
supporting in turn abstract justice, whose guidance, whoever accepts it,
will find to be as sure and as adequate as any that unassisted reason is
capable of supplying. Anti-utilitarian justice never tries to look
half-a-dozen different ways at once, never points at the same time in
opposite directions, never issues contradictory mandates, never halts
between two opinions. Her votaries, like other mortals, may often be in
doubt as to accomplished facts; but, provided these be clear, their
course is in general equally clear; there seldom remains aught to
embarrass them. If they sincerely desire to ascertain what is due from
them, they can seldom err, except on the right side, and they will never
dream of disputing that whatever is due from them it must be their duty
to do, without respect of consequences. These they will leave to the
supreme controller of events, if they believe in one, and will leave to
take their chance, if they do not so believe, feeling all the more
certain in the latter case that to control events cannot, at any rate,
be within their power. They never stop to calculate how much good may
perhaps ensue if evil be done. Simple arithmetic, apart from faith,
satisfies them that to add wrong to wrong cannot possibly augment the
sum total of right. The prime article of their creed is the absolute
obligation of paying debts--a piece of unworldly wisdom more than ever
now to Jews a stumbling-block, and to Greeks foolishness, but not the
less to all, whether Jews or Gentiles, who will accept it, a light to
show through the mazes of life, a path so plainly marked that the
foolishest of wayfaring men cannot greatly err therein.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The distinction here drawn is not merely verbal. The greatest
happiness of the greatest number may mean either the largest total of
happiness in which the largest possible number of those concerned can
participate, or a still larger total, which, if some of the possible
participants were excluded, would be divisible among the remainder. The
largest aggregate of happiness attainable by any or by all concerned,
means the largest sum total absolutely, without reference to the number
of participants. Writers on Utilitarianism seem to have sometimes the
first, sometimes the second of these totals in view, but more frequently
the second than the first.
[2] I do not form a separate class of pleasures of the affections,
because these seem to me not to be elementary, but to be always
compounded of two or more of the other five kinds.
[3] 'On Labour,' p. 135.
[4] 'Fortnightly Review,' June, 1868.
[5] See the No. for June, 1869.
[6] 'On Labour,' p. 93.
[7] 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, p. 683.
[8] See 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, pp. 687-8.
[9] 'Utilitarianism,' by J. S. Mill, pp. 64-8.
[10] 'Fortnightly Review' for June, 1869, pp. 684-5.
[11] 'Utilitarianism,' p. 267.
[12] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 69, 70.
[13] 'Les légistes leur fournirent au besoin l'appui du droit contre le
droit même.'--De Tocqueville, 'L'Ancien Régime,' p. 567.
[14] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 72, 73.
[15] 'Utilitarianism,' p. 71.
[16] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 81, 82.
[17] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 84, 85.
[18] Ibid. p. 85.
[19] 'Utilitarianism,' pp. 86, 87.
[20] 'Utilitarianism,' p. 94.
[21] Ibid. pp. 94, 95.
CHAPTER II.
_HISTORY'S SCIENTIFIC PRETENSIONS_.
_Warwick._ There is a history in all men's lives,
Figuring the nature of the times deceased;
The which observed, a man may prophesy,
With a near aim, of the main chance of things
As yet not come to life, which in their seeds,
And weak beginnings, lie intreasured.
Such things become the hatch and brood of time;
And, by the necessary form of this,
King Richard might create a perfect guess,
That great Northumberland, then false to him,
Would, of that seed, grow to a greater falseness,
Which should not find a ground to root upon,
Unless on you.
_King Henry._ Are these things, then, necessities?
_King Henry IV._ Part II. Act. 3, Sc. I.
When equally competent thinkers appear to take directly opposite views
of a matter of purely speculative interest, it will commonly be found
that their differences arise from their using the same words in
different senses, or from their being, by some other cause, prevented
from thoroughly apprehending each other's meaning. An illustration is
afforded by the controversy regarding the possibility of constructing a
Science of History, which could scarcely have been so much prolonged if
all who have taken part in it had begun by defining their terms, had
agreed to and adhered to the same definitions, and had always kept
steadily in view the points really in debate. If the word 'science' had
been used only in the restricted, though rather inaccurate sense in
which it is sometimes employed by some of the most distinguished of the
disputants, there would have been less question as to its applicability
to history. No one doubts that from an extensive historical survey may
be drawn large general deductions on which reasonable expectations may
be founded. No one denies that the experience of the past may teach
lessons of political wisdom for the guidance of the future. If it were
not so, history would be as uninstructive as fairy lore; its chief use
would be to amuse the fancy; and little more practical advantage could
result from investigating the causes of the failure of James II.'s
designs on civil and religious liberty, than from an inquiry into the
artifices by which Jack-the-Giant-killer contrived to escape the maw of
the monsters against whom he had pitted himself. What is commonly
understood, however, by a Science of History is something far beyond the
idea entertained of it by such temperate reasoners as Mr. John Stuart
Mill and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen. The science, for the reality of which M.
Comte in France and Mr. Buckle in England have been the foremost
champions, would bear the same relation to political events as Optics
and Astronomy do to the phenomena of light and of the solar and sidereal
systems. It would deal less with the conjectural and probable than with
the predicable and positive. 'In the moral as in the physical world,'
say its leading advocates, 'are invariable rule, inevitable sequence,
undeviating regularity,' constituting 'one vast scheme of universal
order.' 'The actions of men, and therefore of societies, are governed by
fixed eternal laws,' which 'assign to every man his place in the
necessary chain of being,' and 'allow him no choice as to what that
place shall be.' One such law is that, 'in a given state of society, a
certain number of persons must put an end to their own lives:' another,
that a certain number of persons must commit murder; a third, that when
wages and prices are at certain points, a certain number of marriages
must annually take place, 'the number being determined not by the temper
and wishes of individuals, but by large general facts, over which
individuals can exercise no authority.' These are general laws; but the
special question as to who shall commit the crimes or the indiscretion
enjoined by them, 'depends upon special laws, which, however, in their
total action must obey the large social law to which they are all
subordinate.' A Science of History would consist of a collection of
'social laws,' duly systematised and codified, by the application of
which to given states of society the historical student might predict
the future course of political events, with a confidence similar to that
with which he could foretell the results of familiar chemical
combinations, or the movement of the planets.[22]
This is the theory which a few years ago was so much discussed, and
against which, notwithstanding the singular fascination it evidently
possesses for some minds, the moral sense of a much larger number
indignantly revolts, rightly apprehending that its establishment would
be subversive of all morality. For, if the actions of men are governed
by 'eternal and immutable laws,' men cannot be free agents; and where
there is not free agency there cannot be moral responsibility. Nor are
the apprehensions entertained on this score to be allayed by the answer,
ingenious as it is, which has been given to them[23] by one of the
ablest and most judicious apologists for the new creed. It is true that
human actions can be said to be 'governed' only in the same metaphorical
sense as that in which we speak of the laws of nature, which do not
really govern anything, but merely describe the invariable order in
which natural phenomena have been observed to occur. It is true that the
discovery of invariable regularity in human affairs, supposing such a
discovery to have been made, would not prove that there was any
necessity for such regularity. It is conceivable that the orbs of heaven
may be intelligent beings, possessing full power to change or to arrest
their own course, and moving constantly in the same orbits merely
because it pleases them to do so. Invariable regularity, therefore,
would be perfectly consistent with free agency. All this is perfectly
just, but it is also altogether beside the question. The offence given
by the writers on whose behalf the apology is set up consists not so
much in their asserting that there are, as in their insisting that there
must be, uniformity and regularity in human affairs; or, as Mr. Buckle
expresses it, that social phenomena 'are the results of large and
general causes which, working on the aggregate of society, _must_
produce certain consequences, without regard to the volition of the
particular men of whom the society is composed.' Now, though free agency
may co-exist with _invariable_ regularity, it obviously cannot co-exist
with _necessary_ regularity, which, consequently, is incompatible
likewise with moral responsibility. If men are compelled by the force of
circumstances, or by any force, to move only in one direction, they
cannot be responsible for not moving in a different direction. Nor is it
more to the purpose to undertake a subtle analysis of the nature of
causation, and to explain that it does not, properly speaking, involve
compulsion, but simply means invariable antecedence. Let it be that a
cannon-ball does not really knock down the wall against which it
strikes, and that it would be more correct to say that the ball
impinges and the wall falls; though, seeing that the wall would not have
fallen unless the ball had impinged, the distinction is too nice for
ordinary apprehension. As understood, at any rate, by the joint
headmasters of the new school, causation does involve compulsion. 'Men's
actions,' say they, 'are the product not of their volition, but of their
antecedents,' and 'result from large and general causes which must
produce certain consequences.' Neither, if this be so, is it of any
avail to suggest that, possibly, the large and general causes in
question may be of only temporary operation. 'It may be that the rules,'
in accordance with which the sun has hitherto risen every morning since
the creation of the world, 'will hold good only for a time.' It may be
that the springs, whatever they are, by which the universe is kept in
motion, may require to be periodically wound up like the works of a
clock, and that, unless this be done, 'on some particular day out of
many billions,' the sun may fail to rise, just as the clock, if suffered
to run down, would stop on the eighth day. The conjecture would, of
course, be not less applicable to social than to natural laws. It is
conceivable that the large general causes assumed to regulate human
actions might lose their efficacy at the end of a certain cycle, when
mankind might either have to recommence a social revolution similar to
the one just completed, or might have to begin an entirely different
revolution under entirely different laws. Be it so. Still, if the
causes, as long as they remained in operation, possessed a compulsory
character--if, during the continuance of the supposed cycle, men were
bound to act in a certain way in accordance with certain laws, and
irrespectively of their own volition--what would it matter that those
laws were not eternal and immutable? For the time being men would no
more be free agents than the hands of a clock, while the clock was wound
up. Both would be constrained to move in a prescribed direction, whether
they would or no. Men in such circumstances might well be likened, as by
Mr. Buckle they are likened, to links in a chain, but few would be
prevented from joining in Mr. Goldwin Smith's eloquent protest against
the comparison, by being told that the chain perhaps was not an endless
one.
It is clear, then, that the principles to which we have been adverting
would, if established, be really subversive of morality, inasmuch as
they are incompatible with free agency, without which there can be no
responsibility. The soundness of a doctrine does not, however, depend
upon its tendencies; and Mr. Buckle was fully warranted in demanding
that his views should be examined with reference, not at all to their
consequences, but solely and exclusively to their truth. They certainly
ought to be so examined, if examined at all; but morality is so
indispensable to the happiness of mankind, that if there were reason for
apprehending it to be based upon error, there would be equal reason for
avoiding an enquiry which might demonstrate the weakness of its
foundations, by bringing forward an antagonistic truth. The only
adequate excuse, therefore, for enquiring, as I now proceed to do, into
the validity of Mr. Buckle's theory, is the confidence I feel that it
will be found to contain not recondite, newly-discovered truth, but, at
best, only skilfully and curiously-compounded fallacies, which, being
dispelled, will leave the foundations of morality as firm and
unimpeachable as before.
In order that he might be able to prove the possibility of a Science of
History, Mr. Buckle asked no more than the following concessions:
'That, when we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of some
motive or motives; that those motives are the results of some
antecedents, and that therefore, if we were acquainted with the whole of
the antecedents and with all the laws of their movements, we could with
unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results.' Now,
there is certainly nothing in these demands which may not be
unhesitatingly conceded. As there can be no effect without a cause, so
there can be no action without a motive: the motive or motives of an
action are the product of all the conditions and circumstances among
which the agent is placed--which conditions and circumstances, again,
must have been brought about by antecedent events. The same
circumstances would indeed differently affect persons of different
mental constitutions and characters; but the original constitution of a
man's mind is itself the product of antecedent events, as is also any
subsequent modification of character which it may have undergone. It
cannot be denied, then, that men's motives are the results of
antecedents. Equally undeniable is it that a knowledge of all the
antecedents and of all the laws of their movements would enable us to
foresee their results, for this, supposing the laws referred to to have
any real existence, is merely equivalent to the self-evident
proposition, that if we perceived certain causes and knew exactly how
they would act, we should know beforehand what would be their effects.
But what if there be no such laws? What if, on the showing of Mr. Buckle
himself and of his associates, there neither are nor can be?
The true nature of a scientific law has never been better explained than
by the writer already quoted as Mr. Buckle's dexterous apologist. A
scientific law is not an ordinance, but a record. It simply professes
to describe the order in which certain phenomena have been observed
uniformly to recur. It differs from a legislative enactment, in that the
one would be a law although it were never obeyed, whereas the other
would cease to be a law if one single exception to its statement could
be pointed out. Thus the Act of Parliament enjoining the registration of
births, would be equally a law although no births were ever registered;
whereas the law, that in a body moving in consequence of pressure the
momentum generated is in proportion to the pressure, would entirely
forfeit its legal character if, on any one occasion or in any
circumstances, momentum were generated in any other proportion. It is
essential, then, to the existence of a scientific law that there should
be uniformity of phenomena. But in human affairs uniformity is
impossible. No doubt, in exactly the same circumstances exactly the same
events must happen; but exactly the same aggregation of circumstances
cannot possibly be repeated. Such repetition is inconsistent with the
very theory, which is based on the assumption that the repetition is
continually happening.
'In the moral as well as the physical world' there are, say the
exponents of the new theory, not only 'invariable rule' and 'inevitable
sequence,' but 'irresistible growth' and 'continual advance.' In other
words, things can never be twice in precisely the same condition--never,
at least, within the same cycle. It has, indeed, been suggested that
there may be in human affairs the same sort of regularity as is observed
by the hands of a clock; and that, as the latter, at the end of every
twenty-four hours, recommence the movement which they have just
concluded, so at the end of, say 'every ten thousand years,' all the
same events which have been happening throughout the period may begin
to happen over again in the same order as before. Such a succession,
however, would involve quite as much of retrogression as of progression,
and the continual advance so boastfully spoken of would be nothing else
than a tendency of society to return to the condition from which it had
originally emerged. But, even on this uncomfortable hypothesis, there
could be no regularity of occurrences within the same cycle; no clue as
to the future could be obtained from investigation of the past. On the
contrary, the only certainty would then, as now, be that no combination
of events which had happened once could happen again, as long as the
existing order of things continued. The inference here follows
necessarily from the premises. If there be continual advance--if things
are constantly moving forward--they cannot remain in the same state; and
if not in the same state, they cannot produce the same effects. For, if
it be obvious, on the one hand, that precisely the same causes must
invariably produce the same results, it is equally evident, on the
other, that the same results cannot be reproduced except by the same
causes. If causes calculated to bring about certain phenomena undergo
either augmentation or diminution, there must be a corresponding change
in the phenomena. Now, effects cannot be identical with their causes,
and, in the moral world, effects once produced become in turn causes,
acting either independently or in conjunction with pre-existing causes.
They become in turn the antecedents spoken of by Mr. Buckle, from which
spring the motives of human conduct. But, as all such antecedents must
necessarily differ from all former antecedents, they must also give rise
to motives, must be followed by actions, and must bring about
combinations of circumstances, differing from any previously
experienced. Thus, in human affairs, there can be no recurrence either
of antecedents or of consequences; and, as a scientific law is simply a
record of the uniform recurrence of consequences, it follows that in
human affairs there can be no scientific laws.
It will be understood that human conduct, and the circumstances or
causes which influence it, are here spoken of in the aggregate. It is
not pretended that particular causes or circumstances may not continue
permanently in operation, though with an influence modified by the
concomitance of fresh circumstances; or that they may not continue to
produce consequences differing from their former consequences not more
than in proportion to the modification undergone by the causes. Still
less is it pretended that certain human phenomena, with which human
motives have little or nothing to do, may not be repeated once and
again, notwithstanding the important changes constantly going on in
every human society. It is not denied that marriages may continue for
years together to bear much the same annual proportion to the
population, provided that during those years there be no material change
in the amount of the economical obstacles which commonly interfere, more
than anything else, with men's natural inclination to marry. Still less
is it denied that, in a given number of births, the number of girls may
always preserve nearly the same superiority over that of boys, or that
the proportion between red-haired and flaxen-haired children may
generally be about the same, or that the percentage of letters
misdirected in a given country may vary little during long periods. But,
in the first of these cases, men do not get married, as Mr. Buckle
imagined, irrespectively of their volition. If, for several years
together, marriages continue to bear about the same proportion to
population, it is because during that period circumstances continue to
present a certain amount, and no more, of opposition to men's connubial
proclivities. In the other cases, it is not at all because the parents
wish it that a girl is born instead of a boy, or with flaxen hair
instead of carrots; neither is it from any motive or intention that
letters are often misdirected, but, on the contrary, from want of
thought, and from the carelessness and haste with which letter-writing,
like most other human actions, is unfortunately too often performed.
But, before assuming that this carelessness and haste bear an invariable
proportion to numbers, we should inquire whether the proportion of
misdirected letters is the same in all human societies--the same, for
instance, in France and Spain as in England. If not--if varying
circumstances produce different results in this respect in different
countries--it may be inferred that a variation of circumstances may
produce a difference of result in the same country. It will, at any
rate, be clear that there is no 'necessary and invariable order' in
which letters are misdirected. In one sense, indeed, it may be said that
the proportion of misdirected letters depends upon 'the state of
society,' if by that expression be meant, among other things, the
numerical proportion which individuals of different characters and
habits bear to each other. In that sense, we may accept some far more
startling propositions. We may partly admit that the state of society
determines the number of murders and suicides, if by this be simply
meant that the number of murders and suicides committed will depend upon
the number of persons whose characters have been so moulded by
circumstances as to dispose them to put an end to their own or other
people's lives. But Mr. Buckle, by whom the assertion was made, was
careful to explain that his meaning was the very reverse of what is here
supposed. Speaking of suicide, he declares it to be 'a general law that,
in a given state of society, a certain number of persons must put an end
to their own lives;' adding that 'the question as to who shall commit
the crime depends upon special laws,' and that 'the individual felon
only carries into effect what is a necessary consequence of preceding
circumstances.' In other words, it is not the amount of crime that
depends upon the number of persons prepared to commit it; it is the
number of criminals which depends upon the amount of crime that must
needs be committed. 'Murder,' he elsewhere says, 'is committed with as
much regularity, and bears as uniform a relation to certain known
circumstances, as do the movements of the tides and the relations of the
seasons.' 'The uniform reproduction of crime is more clearly marked, and
more capable of being predicted, than are the physical laws connected
with the disease and destruction of our bodies. The offences of men are
the result not so much of the vices of individual offenders, as of the
state of society into which the individuals are thrown.'
There is here so much looseness and inconsistency of language, that what
is most offensive in it may easily bear more than one interpretation:
and the shocking dogma that, in a given state of society, the force of
circumstances constrains the commission of a certain amount of crime,
may possibly admit of being explained away and softened down into the
comparatively harmless proposition that, where all the circumstances,
conditions or causes required for the commission of a certain amount of
crime are present, that amount of crime will certainly be committed. But
what is most provoking in Mr. Buckle is the heedlessness or wantonness
with which he is constantly insisting that the causes in question are
necessarily present and uniformly acting. What he calls the uniform
reproduction of crime is likened by him to the uniform recurrence of the
tides. According to him, it is a law that a certain number of suicides
shall take place annually, just as it is a law that there shall be high
and low water twice in every twenty-four hours. Now a law, as the word
is here used, means a record of invariable repetitions of phenomena. Has
it been observed, then, that suicides bear, we will not say an
invariable, but anything like a definite proportion to population? Mr.
Buckle thinks it has, and he adduces some facts in support of the
opinion; but his facts, properly understood, disprove instead of proving
what he asserts; and, even if they proved it, they would yet afford no
support to his main theory.
In London, for some years past--how many is not stated--about 240
persons annually have made away with themselves--sometimes a few more,
sometimes a few less--the highest number having been 266 in 1846, and
the lowest 213 in 1849. But, while the number of suicides has thus been
nearly stationary, population has been anything but stationary in the
metropolitan district, but has advanced with vast and unremitting
strides at an average rate of nearly 43,000 a year. In 1841 it was
1,948,369; in 1851, 2,361,640; and in 1861, 2,803,989. The proportion of
suicide to population has consequently been by no means uniform, but has
varied exceedingly, and on the whole has shown a constant tendency to
decrease. But even if it had continued uniform, it would simply have
shown that, during a certain number of years, the general character of
Londoners had, in certain particulars, undergone no material change. It
would not have proved that the regularity of suicide observable among
Londoners was in accordance with any general law. To prove this it would
have been necessary to show that the proportion had been uniform, not
only in the same but in all societies; in Paris as well as in London,
among the Esquimaux of Labrador, and among the Negroes of Soudan. For,
if the proportion were found to vary by reason of the differing
circumstances of different societies, it would plainly be seen to be at
least susceptible of variation in the same society, inasmuch as in no
society do circumstances remain the same from generation to generation.
So equally with murders. Even if there were no doubt that the percentage
of such crimes in England had long continued the same, still that fact
would prove nothing as to the uniform reproduction of crime, if it could
be shown that the percentage had ever varied anywhere else--in France or
Italy, for example, or in Dahomey. For it would be mere childishness to
point to the different conditions of England and Dahomey, and to plead
that no more was intended to be said than that, with uniformity of
circumstances there would also be uniformity of results. So much no one,
in the least competent to discuss the subject, would for a moment dream
of disputing. But in political affairs there cannot be uniformity of
circumstances. The aggregate of circumstances from which spring human
motives cannot, from the nature of things, ever be repeated; and, though
a few general causes may continue permanently in operation, they cannot
continue to produce the same identical results; for even though they
could themselves remain stationary, it would be impossible that their
operation should not be affected by the constant change going on around,
or should not partake of an otherwise universal forward movement. In
political affairs there cannot possibly be any recurrence of identical
phenomena; nor can there, except within a very limited period, be any
occurrence of very similar phenomena. But recurrence (and not merely
recurrence, but complete and invariable recurrence) is the very
foundation of science. Without it there can be no scientific laws, and
without such laws--_i.e._, without records of past recurrences--there
can be no sure predictions as to the future. It is only because certain
motions of certain bodies have hitherto been observed to take place with
invariable regularity, that they are expected to continue to do so, and
it is upon that assumption only that we venture to predict that the sun
will rise to-morrow morning, or that an eclipse will take place next
year. But if no event recorded in history has ever yet been known to
occur twice under precisely the same conditions, and as a consequence of
the same causes, what ground can there be for predicting whether or when
any such event will occur again? What possibility is there of
constructing a science of history, when history supplies no materials
for either foundation or superstructure?
There is nothing in this conclusion in the slightest degree opposed to
the most approved doctrine of causation. No effect can be without a
cause. No doubt, then, the regency of invariable causation holds good of
human volitions. No doubt the volitions and consequently the actions of
men are the joint results of the external circumstances amid which men
are placed, and of their own characters; which again are the results of
circumstances, natural and artificial. So much must needs be admitted,
and something more besides. Certain causes will infallibly be succeeded
by certain effects. From any particular combination of circumstances,
certain determinate consequences and no others will result; those again
will give rise to consequences equally determinate, and those in turn to
others, and so on in an infinite series. It follows, then, from the
regency of causation, that there is a determinate course already, as it
were, traced out, which human events will certainly follow to the end of
time; every step of which course, however remote, might now be foreseen
and predicted by adequate, that is to say by infinite, intelligence.
Infinite intelligence would do this, however, not by the aid of law, but
by virtue of its own intrinsic and unassisted strength, wherewith it
would perceive how each succeeding combination of causes would operate.
For, as cannot be too often repeated, a law is merely a record of
recurrences; and in human affairs there can be no recurrences of the
same aggregate either of causes or results. There being then no historic
laws, there can be no Science of History, for science cannot exist
without laws. The historic prescience, which is an attribute of Infinite
Intelligence, not being regulated by law, or at any rate not by any law
except that of causation, is not, technically speaking, a science, and
even if it were, would be utterly beyond the reach of human intellect
and attainable only by Infinite Wisdom.
The admission made in the last paragraph has cleared the way for the
introduction of a question, from which the subject under discussion
derives its principal interest, and which it is indispensable therefore
carefully, though briefly, to examine. If there be certain determinate
lines of conduct which men will infallibly pursue throughout all
succeeding generations, how can men be free agents? How--for it is
merely the old puzzle over again--how can foreknowledge be reconciled
with freewill? The difficulty is not to be got rid of by discrediting
the reality of freewill, and treating it as a thing for which there is
no evidence. When Johnson silenced Boswell's chatter with the words,
'Sir, we know our will is free and there's an end on't,' he expressed a
great truth in language not the less philosophically accurate on account
of its colloquial curtness. The consciousness possessed by an agent
about to perform an act, that he is at liberty to perform it or not, is
really conclusive evidence that the act is free. For it matters not a
jot whether consciousness be 'an independent faculty,' or whether--as,
Mr. Buckle reminds us, 'is the opinion of some of the ablest
thinkers'--it be not merely 'a state or condition of the mind.' If
consciousness be a condition of the mind, so also is perception; but
perception, whatever else it be, is also that which makes us acquainted
with external phenomena, just as consciousness is that which makes us
acquainted with internal emotions. The two informants, it is true, are
not equally trustworthy. Perception often deceives us, but
consciousness, never. We often fancy we perceive what we do not
perceive. We may fancy we see a ghost, when we are merely mocked by an
optical illusion, or we may mistake the impalpable imagery of the Fata
Morgana for solid objects, or the rumbling of a cart for thunder. But
consciousness is infallible. We cannot fancy we experience an emotion
which we do not experience. We cannot fancy we are glad when we are not
glad, or sorry when we are not sorry, or hopeful when in despair; and to
pretend that we can possibly be conscious of willing when we are not
willing, would be as absurd as to meet the _cogito, ergo sum_ of
Descartes, with the reply that, perhaps, we do not really think, but
only think we think.
Freewill, then, being an indisputable reality, how can it be reconciled
with foreknowledge? There can be no more conclusive way of showing that
the two things are capable of co-existing than to point to an example of
their actual co-existence, and such an example is afforded by the idea
of Infinite Power. Omnipotence, which by its nature implies freewill,
comprehends also Omniscience. Omnipotence can do anything whatsoever
which does not involve a contradiction; but even Omnipotence can do
nothing which Omniscience does not foresee. It can, indeed, do
whatsoever it pleases; but Omniscience foresees precisely what it will
be pleased to do. With unbounded liberty to choose any course of action,
it can yet choose no course which has not been foreseen; but its freedom
of choice is evidently not affected by the fact that the choice which it
will make is known before hand. Neither is that of man. An eager
aspirant to ecclesiastical preferment is not the less at liberty to
refuse a proffered mitre, because all his acquaintances have a well
founded assurance that he will accept. A wayfarer, with a yawning
precipice before his eyes, may or may not, as he pleases, cast himself
down headlong. Whether he will do so or not must always have been
positively foreknown to Omniscience; but that fact in no degree affects
his power of deciding for himself. If arguing on the notion that what is
to be must be, he decide on moving forward to his destruction, then what
has been foreseen is simply that he will so argue and be self-deceived,
and will consequently perish. But the foreknowledge which simply
perceives what direction will be taken by the will is a very different
thing from an over-ruling destiny, which should compel the will to take
some special direction. Still it is obvious that, in this instance also,
foreknowledge is based entirely on causation. It is solely because human
volitions take place as inevitable effects of antecedent causes that
Omniscience itself can be conceived as capable of foreseeing them.
But on such conditions, how can human volitions really be free? How can
man be really at liberty to will of his good pleasure, if what he is
prompted to will depends on the influence which the circumstances that
happen to surround him may exercise on the constitution and character,
which he has derived from pre-existing circumstances? How can his will
be free, if that will be moulded and shaped by circumstances over which
he has no control? I have, I am aware, by the mode I have adopted of
reconciling free-will with foreknowledge, incurred the obligation of
reconciling it with another co-existence of yet greater apparent
incompatibility. By admitting that 'human volitions take place as
inevitable effects of antecedent causes,' that they must be such, and
cannot be other than such, as antecedent causes make them, I have
admitted that the will, though independent of law, is absolutely subject
to, and _must_ implicitly obey, causes. Freewill, then, must be shown to
be compatible not with foreknowledge only, but with necessity also. For
there is no use in attempting to ignore necessity; no use in exclaiming
with Professor Huxley: 'Fact I know, and Law I know; but what is
Necessity but an empty shadow of the mind's own throwing?'[24] A shadow
it most certainly is not, though it is a bugbear, and the veriest that
was ever suffered to torment a morbid imagination. It is an indisputable
reality, a substantial, but at the same time perfectly harmless, or
rather salutary reality, whose terrors need only to be boldly confronted
in order to disappear and to transform themselves into highly attractive
recommendations. For what, after all, does it imply? What but that
effects must follow their causes, and causes precede their effects, as
plainly they must, unless cause and effect be utterly unmeaning
expletives. Of course we must on all occasions be affected by
surrounding circumstances, in modes exactly accordant with our
idiosyncracies, moral and physical. Of course, too, our volitions must
exactly correspond with our contemporaneous affections. When we are
empty, we must, if in health, feel hungry, and desire to eat; when full,
we must, unless we are hogs, be satisfied, and prefer to ruminate. Most
men are so organised that when tickled they must laugh; when wronged,
must frown or sigh. The sight of distress makes them pity, and desire to
see it relieved. That of virtue makes them admire, and desire to see it
rewarded. That of vice makes them angry, and desire to see it punished.
Would we have all these things reversed? Would it be well for us that
our being starved or surfeited should make no difference in our wish to
feed, or our willingness to fast? Should we like the chances to be equal
whether we should desire distress to be alleviated or aggravated? If
not, what is the bondage under which we groan? What the liberty
wherewith we long to be made free? Our sole grievance is that, according
to actual arrangements, there must be reasons for our wishes, and that
on those reasons our wishes must depend. Should we then prefer that
there were no such reasons? Would we have our wishes to be independent
of reason, and adrift before irrational caprice? Probably we may, on
second thoughts, be content to forego an enfranchisement like this; but,
if not, we may at least console ourselves for its indefinite
postponement, by reflecting that Omnipotence itself is, equally with
ourselves, subject to the sort of necessity under which we are groaning;
equally destitute of the sort of free-will to which we aspire. It is
manifest that, since there cannot be omnipotence without boundless
liberty, omnipotence must possess completest freedom of will. Yet even
the Will of Omnipotence is subject to the despotism of causation. Divine
perfection cannot but be at all times affected in modes as exactly
corresponding with its own excellence as human imperfection is in modes
corresponding with its deficiencies, and the movements of the Divine
Mind cannot but correspond with the affections of the Divine Mind. Those
movements are not unmeaning, purposeless, wayward. They, too, have their
appropriate springs, and proceed by regular process from legitimate
causes, the chief of those causes being the infinite perfection of the
Divine Nature. Divine Power cannot then, any more than human, be
directed by its owner's will to purposes against which its owner's
nature revolts. But is this inability a matter to lament over? Those
must be greatly at a loss for a grievance who make one of its being
impossible for them to will things which they have over-ruling reasons
for not willing. Besides, does man, in order to believe himself free,
require more freedom than his Maker? The disciple is not above his
master, nor the servant above his lord. Surely it is sufficient that
the disciple be as his master, and the servant as his lord.[25]
The fact, then, that human conduct is subject to causation, and may by
adequate intelligence be predicted in its minutest details until the end
of time, no more proves that it is governed by invariable laws, which
act irrespectively of human volitions, than the corresponding fact with
reference to Divine conduct impairs the freedom of the Divine Will.
There is no one living to whom such a doctrine--degrading man, as it
does, into a helpless puppet, robbing him of all moral responsibility
and of every motive for either exertion or self-control--can be more
utterly repugnant than to Mr. Mill, who nevertheless, although
dissenting from Mr. Buckle's more extreme opinions, makes use of some
expressions which may be construed into a qualified approval of his
general views. Even Mr. Mill speaks of 'human volitions as depending on
scientific laws,' thereby implying that the circumstances from which
human motives and, consequently, human actions result are continually
recurring with a certain regularity. He speaks of 'general laws
affecting communities, which are indeed modified in their action by
special causes affecting individuals, but which, if their effects could
be observed over a field sufficiently wide and for a period sufficiently
long to embrace all possible combinations of the special causes, would
be found to produce constant results.'[26] This proposition seems to
proceed on the assumption that general causes are either of uniform
operation, or that, if they vary in their effects, their variations, and
also those of special causes, occur with a certain regularity, and
constantly recur within a certain definite period. But this is precisely
what cannot possibly happen. Among the general causes referred to, some
few are continuous--those, namely, which are inherent in human nature;
but even these are continually modified in their action by changes
continually taking place in those other general causes which constitute
the existing state of society, and which are not merely continually
changing, but are continually becoming more and more different from what
they were originally. So much is fully admitted by Mr. Mill himself, and
indeed can be scarcely more strongly enforced than by his own words.
'There is a progressive change,' he says, 'both in the character of the
human race, and in their outward circumstances, so far as moulded by
themselves; in each successive age the principal phenomena of society
are different from what they were in the age preceding, and still more
different from any previous age.'[27] It is admitted, then, that there
can be no recurrence of social phenomena; and it is obvious that, the
longer the period of observation, the less possibility can there be of
their recurring, since the greater is the certainty that new causes
will come into operation. But, even though it were possible that all the
external circumstances which have once influenced either communities or
individuals could be repeated, the same circumstances could not a second
time produce the same effects. Men of different characters are affected
in very different ways by the same influences, and the characters of any
particular generation of men are always very different from those of
every preceding generation. Let it be supposed, for the sake of
argument, that the French of the present day could be placed in
precisely the same social condition in which their fathers were towards
the close of the last century; still they would act very differently
from their fathers. Nay, even though they should, with one single
exception, have inherited the dispositions of their fathers, the
difference of character in one single individual might suffice to give
an entirely new turn to the course of events. If every other antecedent
of the first French Revolution were again present, still there might be
no second revolution, provided only that, instead of another Louis the
Sixteenth, a Leopold of Belgium, or a Frederick the Great were king.[28]
With the last mentioned on the throne, there would assuredly be no
repetition of that vacillation of purpose which rocked the cradle and
fostered the growth of popular fury till it culminated in a Reign of
Terror. Since, then, there cannot be either a repetition of the same
circumstances to act upon men, or a reproduction of the same sort of
men to be acted upon by circumstances, human conduct can never exhibit a
repetition of the same phenomena; experience of the past can never, in
social or political affairs, furnish a formula for predictions as to the
future. Accordingly Mr. Mill, in common with Mr. Stephen, disclaims the
idea of positive, and pleads only for conditional, predictions. But the
very term 'conditional predictions' involves a contradiction, since it
is obviously impossible to see beforehand what perhaps may never come to
pass. What is meant by the phrase is really nothing more than
conjectures; and conjectures, however ingenious and reasonable, cannot
be admitted within the pale of science. They cannot be accepted as
fruits of a tree which has by the quality of its fruits proved its right
to be entitled the Science of History.
With the view of enhancing the value of conditional predictions, it has
been urged that they are of precisely the same description as those
which we are in the habit of hazarding with respect to our familiar
acquaintance. There are, it is said, 'general maxims regarding human
conduct, by the application of which to given states of fact,
predictions may be made as to what will happen;' and all that is
necessary for the construction of historical science, is the employment
of these maxims on a larger scale. If the premiss here be sound, the
inference may be owned to be sufficiently legitimate. If there be any
formula with which the actions of individuals are observed to
correspond, there is every likelihood that the same formula may, by
extension and amplification, be adapted to the actions of communities.
But, although there are plenty of maxims telling men what they _ought_
to do, there is not one--except that which declares that they must all
die--which affords any positive information as to what they _will_ do.
'Thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt not kill,' 'thou shalt not commit
adultery;'--all these and many more are moral laws; but of not one of
them--the more's the pity--is the observance sufficiently regular, to
give it the smallest pretension to be styled a scientific law. General
propositions, too, there are in abundance, representing with more or
less accuracy the probable results of particular lines of conduct. Such
are the proverbial sayings, that 'Honesty is the best policy,' that 'A
rolling stone gathers no moss,' that 'The racecourse is the road to
ruin.' But adages like these were never supposed to afford any basis for
prophecy. It may be that an honest man more commonly gets on in the
world than a knave, though there is also much to be said on behalf of
the counter-proposition, that 'The children of darkness are wiser in
their generation than the children of light;' but, at any rate, there is
no doubt that a man may be honest without being prosperous, and that he
is often all the poorer for his probity. But, indeed, is there any one
conceivable situation in life in which a positive rule can be laid down
as to the course which men will follow? Can it even--to make use of an
illustration which has been very effectively employed on the other
side--can it even be said that a man will certainly marry a woman with
whom he is deeply in love, who returns his affection, whom he can marry
if he likes, and whom he has the means of maintaining in a suitable
manner? Nine times out of ten he probably will; but in the tenth
instance a Brahmin's passion may be checked by fear of contamination
with a Pariah, or a King Cophetua's pride may prevent his wedding a
beggar-maid, or the titled owner of an entailed estate may decline to
illegitimatise his offspring by espousing his deceased wife's sister, or
betrothed lovers may be parted by some such mysterious barrier as
sprang up between Talbot Bulstrode and Aurora Floyd, or an Adam Bede, in
spite of the example set by George Eliot's hero, may refrain from
marrying Dinah for fear of breaking his brother Seth's heart.
Equally vain would be the search for any rule invariably applicable to
political affairs. Even general propositions which sound like truisms
are not universally true. It cannot even be said that misgovernment
always produces discontent, or that the combination of superior strength
and superior strategy is always successful in war; for examples might be
cited of nations remaining patient under an iron despotism, and perhaps
also of campaigns lost by armies with every advantage of skill, numbers,
and discipline on their side. No better specimen can be given of what
are popularly spoken of as historical laws than one propounded by Mr. C.
Merivale, whose careful study of Roman annals has taught him to regard
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