Submarine Warfare of To-day
by Charles W. Domville-Fife · English · Gutenberg #29685 · 432,816 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: Submarine Warfare of To-day
Author: Charles W. Domville-Fife
Release date: August 13, 2009 [eBook #29685]
Language: English
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SUBMARINE WARFARE OF TO-DAY
[Illustration: THE SURRENDER OF THE GERMAN SUBMARINE FLEET
The White Ensign is hoisted over the German Eagle.
_British Official Photograph_]
SUBMARINE WARFARE OF TO-DAY
HOW THE SUBMARINE MENACE WAS MET AND VANQUISHED,
WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF THE INVENTIONS AND DEVICES
USED, FAST BOATS, MYSTERY SHIPS, NETS, AIRCRAFT,
&c. &c., ALSO DESCRIBING THE SELECTION
AND TRAINING OF THE ENORMOUS
PERSONNEL USED IN THIS NEW
BRANCH OF THE NAVY
BY
CHARLES W. DOMVILLE-FIFE
_Lieut. R.N.V.R., late of the Staff of H.M. School of Submarine Mining_
AUTHOR OF
"SUBMARINES & SEA POWER" "SUBMARINES OF THE WORLD'S NAVIES"
"SUBMARINE ENGINEERING OF TO-DAY" _&c._ _&c._ _&c._
WITH 53 ILLUSTRATIONS
LONDON
SEELEY, SERVICE & CO. LIMITED
38 GREAT RUSSELL STREET
1920
Science of To-Day Series
NEW VOLUME
13. Submarine Warfare of To-Day.
By C. W. DOMVILLE-FIFE, Lieut., R.N.V.R., late of the Staff of H.M.
School of Submarine Mining. Author of "Submarines and Sea Power,"
"Submarines of the World's Navies," "Submarine Engineering of To-Day,"
_&c._ _&c._ With many Illustrations and Diagrams. Extra Crown 8vo. 7s.
6d. nett.
ALREADY PUBLISHED
1. ELECTRICITY OF TO-DAY.
By C. R. GIBSON, F.R.S.E.
2. ASTRONOMY OF TO-DAY.
By CECIL G. DOLMAGE, M.A., D.C.L., LL.D., F.R.A.S.
3. SCIENTIFIC IDEAS OF TO-DAY.
By C. R. GIBSON.
4. BOTANY OF TO-DAY.
By Professor G. F. SCOTT ELLIOT, M.A., B.SC.
6. ENGINEERING OF TO-DAY.
By T. W. CORBIN.
7. MEDICAL SCIENCE OF TO-DAY.
By WILLMOTT EVANS, M.D.
8. MECHANICAL INVENTIONS OF TO-DAY.
By T. W. CORBIN.
9. PHOTOGRAPHY OF TO-DAY.
By H. CHAPMAN JONES, F.I.C., F.C.S., F.R.P.S.
10. SUBMARINE ENGINEERING OF TO-DAY.
By C. W. DOMVILLE-FIFE.
11. GEOLOGY OF TO-DAY.
By Professor J. W. GREGORY, F.R.S.
12. AIRCRAFT OF TO-DAY.
By CHARLES C. TURNER, Lieut., R.N.V.R.
SEELEY, SERVICE & CO., LTD., 38 Great Russell St.
=Dedicated=
TO THE MEMORY OF
THE LATE LIEUT. WALTER PRICE, R.N.V.R.
A TRUE FRIEND AND A
GALLANT OFFICER
AUTHOR'S NOTE
I DESIRE simply to say that I commenced taking an active interest in
submarines in 1904. I wrote my first book on the subject, _Submarines of
the World's Navies_, in 1910, and I have watched and written of the rise
of these and kindred weapons for the past fifteen years of rapid
development in peace and war, finally taking a humble part in the defeat
of the great German submarine armada during the years 1914-1918.
C. D.-F.
1919.
INTRODUCTION
WHILE Great Britain remains an island, with dominion over palm and pine,
it is to the sea that her four hundred millions of people must look for
the key to all that has been achieved in the past and all that the
future promises in the quickening dawn of a new era.
Not only over Great Britain alone, however, does the ocean cast its
spell, for it is the free highway of the world, sailed by the ships of
all nations, without other hindrances than those of stormy nature, and
navigated without restriction from pole to pole by the seamen of all
races. It was the international meeting-place, where ensigns were
"dipped" in friendly greeting, and since the dawn of history there has
been a freemasonry of the sea which knew no distinction of nation or
creed.
When the call of humanity boomed across the dark, storm-tossed waters
the answer came readily from beneath whatever flag the sound was heard.
But in August, 1914, there came a change, so dramatic, so sudden, that
maritime nations were stunned. Germany, in an excess of war fever, broke
the sea laws, and laughed while women and children drowned. Crime
followed crime, and the great voice of the Republican West protested in
unison with that of the Imperial East. Still the Black Eagle laughed as
it flew far and wide, carrying death to whomsoever came within its
shadow, regardless of race and sex.
But there was an avenger upon the seas, one who had been rocked in its
cradle from time immemorial, and to whom the world appealed to save the
lives of their seamen. It sailed beneath the White Ensign and the Blue,
and with aid from France, Italy and Japan it fought by day and by night,
in winter gale and snow, and in summer heat and fog, in torrid zone and
regions of perpetual ice to free the seas of the traitorous monster who
had, in the twentieth century, hoisted the black flag of piracy and
murder. For three years this ceaseless war was waged, and then, with her
wonderful patience exhausted, the great sister nation of the mother
tongue joined her fleets and armies with those of the battle-worn Allies
and peace came to a long-suffering world.
In that abyss of war there was romance sufficient for many generations
of novelists and historians. Many were the epic fights, unimportant in
themselves, but which need only a Kingsley or a Stevenson to make them
famous for all time. So with the happenings to be described in this
book, many of them historically unimportant compared with the
epoch-making events of which they formed a decimal part, but told in
plain words; just records of romance on England's sea frontier in the
years 1914-1918.
Although jealous of any encroachment on the space available for the
description of guerrilla war at sea, there are many things which must
first be said regarding the organisation and training of what may
appropriately be termed the "New Navy," which took the sea to combat the
submarine and the mine; also of the novel weapons devised amid the whirl
of war for their use, protection and offensive power. Into this brief
recital of the events leading to the real thing an endeavour will be
made to infuse the life and local colour, which, however, would be more
appropriate in a personal narrative than in a general description of
anti-submarine warfare of to-day, but without which much that is
essential could not be written without dire risk of tiring the reader
before the first few chapters had been passed.
The names of places and ships have necessarily been changed to avoid
anything of a personal character, and all references to existing or dead
officers and men have been rigidly excluded as objectionable and
unnecessary in a book dealing entirely with events.
Many of the incidents described--written while the events stood out in
clear, mental perspective--could no doubt be duplicated and easily
surpassed by many whose fortunes took them into zones of sea war during
the historic years just past. If such is found to be the case, then the
object of this book has been accomplished, for it sets out to tell, not
of great epoch-making events, but of the organisation, men, ships,
weapons and ordinary incidents of life in what, for lack of a better
term, has been called the "New Navy"--a production of the World War.
It may be that an apology is due for placing yet another war book before
a war-weary public, but an effort has been made to make of the following
chapters _a record of British maritime achievement_, more than a
narrative of sea fighting, although to do this without introducing the
human element, the arduous nature of the work, the monotony, the danger
and, finally, the compensating moments of excitement would have been to
falsify the account and belittle the achievement.
There are many books available, full of exciting stories of sea and land
war, but no other, so far as the Author knows, which describes in detail
and in plain phraseology those important "little things"--liable to be
overlooked amid the whirl of war--which go to make an anti-submarine
personnel, fleet and base, together with an account of "how it was
done."
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE TASK OF THE ALLIED NAVIES 17
II. THE NEW NAVY--TRAINING AN ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCE 36
III. A NAVAL UNIVERSITY IN TIME OF WAR 47
IV. THE NEW FLEETS IN BEING 50
V. THE HYDROPHONE AND THE DEPTH CHARGE 70
VI. SOME CURIOUS WEAPONS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 85
VII. MYSTERY SHIPS 96
VIII. A TYPICAL WAR BASE 102
IX. THE CONVOY SYSTEM 116
X. THE MYSTERIES OF SUBMARINE HUNTING EXPLAINED 126
XI. THE MYSTERIES OF GERMAN MINE-LAYING EXPLAINED 143
XII. THE MYSTERIES OF MINESWEEPING EXPLAINED 157
XIII. THE MINE BARRAGE 179
XIV. OFF TO THE ZONES OF WAR 187
XV. A MEMORABLE CHRISTMAS 192
XVI. THE DERELICT 202
XVII. MINED-IN 209
XVIII. THE CASUALTY 220
XIX. HOW H.M. TRAWLER NO. 6 LOST HER REFIT 226
XX. THE RAIDER 233
XXI. THE S.O.S. 238
XXII. IN THE SHADOW OF A BIG SEA FIGHT 248
XXIII. A NIGHT ATTACK 258
XXIV. MYSTERIES OF THE GREAT SEA WASTES 264
XXV. FROM OUT THE CLOUDS AND THE UNDER-SEAS 273
XXVI. ON THE SEA FLANK OF THE ALLIED ARMIES 286
INDEX 301
List of Illustrations
SURRENDER OF THE GERMAN SUBMARINE FLEET _Frontispiece_
FACING
PAGE
PLAN OF A 55 FEET COASTAL MOTOR BOAT 16
LARGE HEAVILY ARMED GERMAN SUBMARINE 32
MOTOR LAUNCH HULLS BEING CONSTRUCTED 56
A 40 FEET COASTAL MOTOR BOAT AT FULL SPEED 64
ANOTHER VIEW OF THE SAME BOAT AT FULL SPEED 64
DROPPING DEPTH CHARGES 80
INNOCENT-LOOKING BUT DEADLY 96
HIDDEN TORPEDO TUBES OF H.M.S. _HYDERABAD_ 96
AFTER-DECK OF THE _HYDERABAD_ (BEFORE ACTION) 104
AFTER-DECK OF THE _HYDERABAD_ (PREPARED FOR ACTION) 104
MOCK WHEEL AND COMPASS PEDESTAL OF THE _HYDERABAD_ 112
MOCK WHEEL AND COMPASS PEDESTAL OF THE _HYDERABAD_ (COLLAPSED) 112
MOTOR LAUNCH CLEARED FOR ACTION 120
A WRECKED COASTAL MOTOR BOAT 136
CAPTIVE MINE-LAYING SUBMARINE 144
A MINESWEEPER 160
A PARAVANE 176
MORSE SIGNALLING 184
MOTOR LAUNCH OF THE NAVAL PATROL 216
A MONITOR 280
[Illustration: PLAN OF 55 FEET COASTAL BOAT, CARRYING TWO 18-INCH
TORPEDOES]
SUBMARINE WARFARE
OF TO-DAY
CHAPTER I
THE TASK OF THE ALLIED NAVIES
THE hour was that of the Allies' greatest need--the last months of the
year 1914. On that fateful 4th August the British navy was concentrated
in the North Sea, and the chance for a surprise attack by the German
fleet, or an invasion of England by the Kaiser's armies, vanished for
ever, and with this one chance went also all reasonable possibility of a
crushing German victory.
Although during the years of bitter warfare which followed this silent
_coup de main_ the German fleet many times showed signs of awakening
ambition, it did not, after Jutland, dare to thrust even its vanguard
far into the open sea. Behind its forts, mines and submarines it waited,
growing weaker with the dry-rot of inaction, for the chance that fickle
Fortune might place a single unit of the Allied fleet within easy reach
of its whole mailed-fist.
With a great and modern fleet--the second strongest in the
world--awaiting its chance less than twenty hours' steam from the coast
of Great Britain, it quickly became evident that the old Mistress of
the Seas would have to call upon her islanders to supply a "new navy" to
scour the oceans while her main battle squadrons waited and watched for
the second Trafalgar.
Faced, then, with the problem of a long blockade, a powerful fleet in
readiness to strike at any weak or unduly exposed point of land or
squadron, and with similar problems on a decreasing scale imposed by
Austria in the Adriatic and by Turkey behind the Dardanelles, the work
of the main battle fleets became well defined by the commonest laws of
naval strategy.
All this without taking into account the widespread menace of submarines
and mines, and, in the earlier stages of the war, the rounding-up of
detached enemy squadrons, such as that under Von Spee in South American
waters, and the protection of the transport and food ships from raiders
like the _Wolfe_ and the _Moewe_.
The German High Command realised this as quickly as that of the Allies.
Their oversea commerce was strangled within a few days of the
Declaration of War with Great Britain, and their fleet was confined to
harbour, with the exception of occasional operations against Russia in
the Baltic. From the German standpoint the naval problem resolved itself
into one of how best to strike at the lines of communication of the
Allies, paying special attention, first, to the transport of troops,
and, second, to England's food supply. As they alone knew to what extent
they would violate the laws of war and of humanity, it became apparent
that the submarine and the mine were the only possible weapons which
could be used for this purpose in face of the superior fleets of the
Allies. But the number of these weapons was strictly limited compared
with the immense shipping resources at the command of the Western
Powers, so one submarine must do the work of many, and an effort was
made to accomplish this by a reign of sea terrorism and inhuman conduct
unparalleled in the history of the world. It opened with the sinking of
the _Lusitania_.
The Allies had secured and maintained the command of the sea, and _all
that it implies_, but to do this with the certainty of correct strategy
they had to dedicate almost their entire battle fleet to the purpose for
which battle fleets have always been intended--the checkmating or
annihilation of the opposing navy.
There came a second problem, however, one entirely new to sea warfare,
and unconsidered or provided against in its strategic and tactical
entirety because hitherto deemed too inhuman for modern war. This was
the ruthless use of armed submarines against unarmed passenger and
merchant ships, and the scattering broadcast over the seas, regardless
of the lives and property of neutrals, of thousands of explosive mines.
The type of ship constructed exclusively for open sea warfare against
surface adversaries was not the best answer to the submarine. The
blockading of the hostile surface fleet did not prevent, or even greatly
hinder, the free passage of submarine flotillas, and the building by
Germany of under-water mine-layers enabled fields of these weapons to be
laid anywhere within the carrier's radius of action.
In this way the second, or submarine, phase of the naval war opened, and
it was to supplement the comparatively few fast destroyers and other
suitable ships which could be spared from the main fleets that the "new
navy" was formed.
THE SHIPS
The area of the North Sea alone exceeds 140,000 square miles, and when
the whole vast stretch of water encompassed by what was known as the
radius of action of hostile submarines, from their bases on the German,
Belgian, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian coasts, had to be considered as
a possible zone of operations for German and Austrian under-water
flotillas, much of the water surface of the world was included. Likewise
the network of sea communications on which the Allies depended for the
maintenance of essential transport and communication comprised the
pathways of the seven seas. To patrol all these routes adequately, and
to guard the food and troop ships, hastening in large numbers to the aid
of the Motherland from the most distant corners of the earth; to protect
the 1500 miles sea frontier of the British Isles; to give timely aid to
sinking or hard-pressed units of the mercantile fleet; to hound the
submarine from the under-seas and to sweep clear, almost weekly, several
thousand square miles of sea, from Belle Isle to Cape Town and the
Orkneys to Colombo, required ships, not in tens, but in thousands. To
find these in an incredibly short space of time became the primary naval
need of the moment.
Who that lived through those days will forget the struggle to supply
ships and guns? The searching of every harbour for craft, from motor
boats to old-time sailing-ships, and from fishing craft to liners. The
scouring of the Dominions and Colonies. How blessed was their aid! Help,
generous and spontaneous, came from all quarters, including the most
unexpected. Over five hundred fast patrol boats, or motor launches, in
less than twelve months from Canada and America. Guns from Japan.
Coasting steamers from India, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
Seaplanes from the Crown Colonies. Rifles from Canada. Machine guns from
the United States. Ambulances from English and Colonial women's leagues.
In fact, contributions to the "new navy" from all corners of the earth.
To patrol the coasts of Britain alone, and to keep its harbours and
coastal trade routes clear of mines, needed over 3500 ships, with at
least an equal number of guns, 30,000 rifles and revolvers, and millions
of shells.
In addition to this huge fleet other smaller squadrons were required for
the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and Red Sea, the East and West
Indies, the coasts of the Dominions and Colonies, and for the Russian
lines of communication in the White Sea. For these oversea bases just
under 1000 ships were required, exclusive of those locally supplied by
the Dominions and Colonies themselves.
All this without considering the main battle fleets or, in fact, any
portion of the regular navy, and the ships required for the transport of
food, troops and munitions of war, together with their escorts. Some
idea of the numbers engaged in keeping the Allies supplied with the
diverse necessities of life and war may be gathered from the fact that
the average sailings in and out of the harbours of the United Kingdom
alone during the four years of war amounted to over 1200 a week.
The immense fleet forming the new navy was not homogeneous in design,
power, appearance or, in fact, in anything except the spirit of the
personnel and the flag beneath which they fought--and alas! nearly 4000
died. The squadrons, or units, as they were called, consisted of fine
steam yachts, liners from the ocean trade routes, sturdy sea tramps,
deep-sea trawlers, oilers, colliers, drifters, paddle steamers, and the
more uniform and specially built fighting sloops, whalers, motor
launches and coastal motor boats. The latter type of craft was aided by
its great speed, nearly fifty miles an hour; but more about these ships
and their curious armament later.
WAR BASES
The great auxiliary navy had to be built or obtained without depleting
the ordinary mercantile fleets, and the shipbuilding and repairing
yards, even in the smallest sea and river ports, worked day and night.
The triumph was as wonderful as it was speedy. In less than fifteen
months from August, 1914, the new navy was a gigantic force, and its
operations extended from the Arctic Sea to the Equator. All units were
armed, manned and linked up by wireless and a common cause.
Before this could be accomplished, however, the problem of maintaining
this vast fleet and adequately controlling its operations had to be
faced and overcome. The seas adjacent to the coasts of the United
Kingdom, the Mediterranean Littoral and Colonial waters were divided
into "patrol areas" on special secret charts, and each "area" had its
own naval base, with harbour, stores, repairing and docking facilities,
intelligence centre, wireless and signal stations, reserve of officers
and men, social headquarters, workshops and medical department.
Each base was under the command of an admiral and staff, many of the
former returning to duty, after several years of well-earned rest, as
captains and commodores, with salaries commensurate with their reduced
rank. Their staffs consisted of some six to twelve officers of the new
navy, with possibly one or two from the "pukka service," and their
command often extended over many hundreds of square miles of submarine
and mine infested sea.
Of these bases, which will be fully described in later chapters, there
were about fifty, excluding the great dockyards and fleet headquarters,
but inclusive of those situated overseas. When it is considered what a
war base needs to make it an efficient rendezvous for some hundreds of
ships and thousands of men, some idea of the gigantic task of
organisation which their establishment, often in poorly equipped
harbours and distant islands, required, not only in the first instance,
but also with regard to maintenance and supplies, will be realised,
perhaps, however, more fully when it is stated that the average ship
needs a month spent in docking and overhauling at least once a year, and
that the delicate and more speedy units of such a fleet need nearly four
times that amount of attention.
HEADQUARTERS STAFF
One of the first requisites of the auxiliary navy was the creation of a
headquarters staff at the Admiralty, London. This was formed from naval
officers of experience both in the regular service and in the two
reserves (R.N.R. and R.N.V.R.).
Forming an integral part of the great British or Allied armada, all
operations were under the control of the Naval War Staff, but for
purposes of more detailed organisation and administration additional
departments were created which exercised direct jurisdiction over their
respective fleets. The principal of these was known as the "Auxiliary
Patrol Office," under the Fourth Sea Lord and the Department of the
Director of Minesweeping. These formed a part of the General Staff--if a
military term is permissible--and both issued official publications
periodically throughout the war, which served to keep the staffs of all
the different war bases and the commanding officers of the thousands of
ships informed as to current movements and ruses of the enemy.
It is unnecessary to detail more closely the work of these departments,
especially as much has yet to be said before plunging into the maelstrom
of war. A sufficient indication of the colossal nature of the work they
were called upon to perform will be found in a moment's reflection of
what the administration and control of such a large and nondescript
fleet, spread over the world--from the White Sea to the East
Indies--must have meant to the small staff allowed by the exigencies of
an unparalleled war.
OFFICERS AND MEN
The greatest problem in modern naval war is, undoubtedly, the supply of
trained men. For this reason it has been left to the last to describe
how the difficulty was faced and overcome by England and her oversea
Dominions in 1914.
Before doing so, however, it may be of interest to give here a few
extracts from an excellent little official publication, showing how the
British fleet was manned and expanded in bygone days of national
peril[1]:
"In time of war there has always been an intimate
connection between the Royal Navy and the Merchant
Service. Latterly, and more especially since the
Russian War of 1854 to 1856, this fact tended to
be forgotten, partly because men-of-war developed
on particular lines and became far more unlike
merchantmen than they had ever been before, and
also because, by the introduction of continuous
service, the personnel of the Navy seemed to have
developed into a separate caste, distinguished by
its associations, traditions and _esprit de
corps_, as much by its special training and
qualifications, from other seafaring men. This war
has proved once again, to such as needed proof,
that the two services cannot exist without each
other, and that the Sea Power of the Empire is not
its naval strength alone, but its maritime
strength. Even at the risk of insisting on the
obvious, it is necessary to repeat that, for an
Island Empire, a war at sea cannot be won merely
by the naval action which defeats the enemy; naval
successes are of value for the fruit they bear,
the chief of which is the power that they give to
the victor to maintain his own sea-borne trade and
to interrupt that of the enemy.
"An elementary way of looking at the problems of
manning the Royal Navy and the Merchant Service
is to consider that there is in the country a
common stock of seamen, on which both can draw.
But this theory, like many others equally obvious
and tempting, has the disadvantage that it leaves
important factors out of account and, if worked
out, results in an absurdity. Thus, shortly before
war began there were in the country some 420,000
seamen, of whom one-third were in the Navy and
two-thirds engaged in merchant ships and fishing
vessels. There was no considerable body of
unemployed seamen. During the war the personnel of
the Navy was expanded to something like the
420,000 which represents the common stock of
seamen. Therefore, if the theory met the case,
there would have been no men left for the Merchant
Service. But the merchant ships, in spite of
difficulty and danger, continued to run, employing
great numbers of men. And we must not forget to
take into account the number of men, amounting to
48,000 killed and 4500 prisoners of war, who have
been lost in the two services during the war. So
it comes to this, that the common stock of seamen,
or at least of men fit to man ships, has expanded
during the war by more than 50 per cent. Whence
came these extra men? Clearly for the most part
from the non-seafaring classes.
"The Navy in November, 1918, employed some 80,000
officers and men from the Merchant Service--viz.
20,000 R.N.R. ratings, 36,000 Trawler Reserve, and
20,000 mercantile seamen and firemen on Transport
agreements, plus the officers. If the supposition,
made in the absence of statistics, is correct
that at this time the number of men in the
Merchant Service itself had decreased
proportionately to the loss of tonnage, it would
seem that the Merchant Service needed no
considerable inflow of men during the war. In
other words, most of those added to the stock of
seamen during the war must have gone into the
Navy. This corresponds with known fact: the Navy
has, in addition to the Reserve men already
mentioned, nearly 200,000 men to demobilise in
order to put its personnel on the footing on which
it stood when war broke out.
"It will be of interest to see how the personnel
of the Navy expanded in former wars, and how at
the peace it was invariably reduced to something
like its pre-war figures. This can readily be done
in tabular form:
NAVAL PERSONNEL (_Numbers Voted_)
Year Name of War Before War Maximum After the
during War Peace
1689} 7,040 -- --
1697}League of Augsburg -- 40,000 --
1700} -- -- 7,000
1700} 7,000 -- --
1712}Spanish Succession -- 40,000 --
1713} -- -- 10,000
1738}Austrian 10,000 -- --
1748}Succession -- 40,000 --
1759} -- -- 10,000
1754} 10,000 -- --
1762}Seven Years' War -- 70,000 --
1764} -- -- 16,000
1775}American 18,000 -- --
1783}Independence -- 110,000 --
1785} -- -- 18,000
1793}French 16,000 -- --
1801}Revolution -- 135,000 --
1803} -- -- 50,000
1803} 50,000 -- --
1812}Napoleonic War -- 145,000 --
1817} -- -- 19,000
1853} 45,500 -- --
1856}Russian War -- 76,000 --
1857} -- -- 53,000
1914}The Present War 146,000 -- --
1918} -- 450,000 --
"It appears at once from these figures that the
naval expansion during earlier wars was in most
cases much greater proportionately than it has
been in this. Roughly the personnel in this war
has been multiplied by three; in earlier wars it
was increased six, seven, eight, or even nine
fold, if we take the difference between the
figures for 1792 and 1812.
"It is a common error to suppose that our ships in
the old wars were manned entirely by seamen. A
knowledge of how the men were raised shows that
this cannot have been so; and confirmation can be
had from a very brief study of ships' muster
books. Only about a third of the crew of a
line-of-battle ship were, in the seaman's phrase,
'prime seamen.' The rest were either only partly
trained or were frankly not sailor men. The
_Victory_ at Trafalgar was not an ill-manned
ship--here is an analysis of her crew: officers,
commissioned and warrant, 28; petty officers,
including marines, 63; able seamen, 213; ordinary
seamen and boys, 225; landsmen, 86; marines, 137;
artificers, 18; quarter gunners, 12;
supernumeraries and domestics, 37.
"During the whole of our naval history down to
1815 it was the invariable rule that in peace time
the battle fleets were laid up unmanned, and only
enough ships were kept in commission to 'show the
flag' and to police the sea. This accounts for the
very large increase of the naval personnel which
immediately became necessary when there was a
threat of war; and it accounts also for the
difficulty which was always experienced in raising
the men. This difficulty was even greater than we
are apt to suppose, for the Merchant Service has
never been able to give the navy more than a
fraction of the total number of men needed, and
the machinery for raising extra men has, until
this war, always been of a most primitive nature.
"When war came the ships were commissioned,
without crews. This could be done because from the
latter part of the seventeenth century there was a
permanent force of officers. Then the officers had
to find their own crews. They began by drawing
their proportion of marines, and then proceeded
to invite seamen to volunteer. In this way they
got a number of skilled seamen, men who had been
in the navy before, and came back to it either as
petty officers or in the hope of becoming so. Then
warrants to impress seamen would be issued.
Theoretically the impress was merely a form of
conscription, the Crown claiming by prerogative
the right to the services of its seafaring
subjects. Practically a good deal of violence was
at times necessary, as many of the men, preferring
to sail in merchant ships, or wishing to wait for
a proclamation of bounty, tried to avoid arrest.
The scuffles that took place on these occasions
gave the impress service a bad name, not
altogether deserved, for real efforts were made to
avoid hardship, and in any case the number of men
raised in this way was greatly exaggerated by
popular report."
There was no compulsion during the Great War to join any unit of the
British fleet. Therefore all were either in the regular service,
reservists or volunteers. The need was made known not only throughout
the British Isles, but also from Vancouver to Cape Town, Sydney and
Wellington, and men in all walks of life, but with either the
_Wander-Lust_ or true love of the wide open sea in their blood, rallied
from all parts of the far-flung Empire to the call of the White Ensign.
In order to obtain some 6000 officers and nearly 200,000 trained or
semi-trained men, new sources of supply had to be tapped. Already the
great battle fleets, brought up to full war strength and with adequate
reserves, had absorbed nearly all the Reserve officers who could be
spared from the food and troop transports.[2]
First came the great sea-training establishment of the Empire--the
Mercantile Marine and its retired officers and men--already heavily
depleted. Then the yacht clubs from the Fraser to the Thames and Clyde.
Thousands of professionals and amateurs came overseas to the training
cruisers and the "naval university," Canada alone supplying several
hundred officers.
Doctors came from the hospitals and from lucrative private practices.
The engineering professions and trades supplied the technical staffs and
skilled mechanics. The great banks and city offices yielded the
accountants, and the fishing and pleasure-boating communities, not only
of Great Britain, but also of the Dominions and Colonies, yielded the
men in tens of thousands. In this way the personnel of the new navy was
completed in a very few months.
Before passing on to describe, in the detail of personal acquaintance,
the severe training of this naval force, a general knowledge of its
heterogeneous character is necessary to enable the reader to understand
this great assemblage of the sons of the Empire.
[Illustration: A LARGE AND HEAVILY ARMED GERMAN SUBMARINE OF THE CRUISER
TYPE
_British Official Photograph_]
In the smoke-filled wardroom and gunroom of the training cruiser, H.M.S.
_Hermione_ one windy March evening in 1916 there were some eighty
officers of the auxiliary fleet, and of this number one hailed from
distant Rhodesia, where he was the owner of thousands of acres of land
and a goodly herd of cattle, but who, some time in the past, had rounded
the Horn in a _wind-jammer_ and taken _sights_ in the "Roaring Forties."
Another was a seascape painter of renown both in England and the United
States. A third was a member of a Pacific coast yacht club. A fourth was
the son of an Irish peer, the owner of a steam yacht. Then came a London
journalist, a barrister, a solicitor and a New Zealand yachtsman, while
sitting at the table was a famous traveller and a _pukka_ commander.
In the neighbouring gunroom, among the crowd of sub-lieutenants--all of
the same great force, the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve--was a
grey-haired veteran from the Canadian Lakes, a youngster from the Clyde,
the son of a shipowner from Australia and a bronzed mine manager from
the Witwatersrand.
Among the engineers and mechanics the same diversity. Men from several
of the great engineering establishments, a student from a North Country
university, electrical engineers from the power stations and mechanics
from the bench, with here and there one or two with sea-going
experience.
In the forecastle and elsewhere about the old cruiser--now merely a
training establishment--were sailors with years of experience in both
sail and steam. Fishermen from the Hebrides and Newfoundland rubbing
shoulders with yacht hands from the Solent and Clyde.
From this curiously mixed but excellent raw material a naval personnel,
with its essential knowledge and discipline, had to be fashioned in
record time by an incredibly small staff of commissioned and warrant
officers of the permanent service, aided by the more experienced
amateurs.
It must, however, not be thought from this that the amateur was
converted into a professional seaman in the space of a week or two.
Three months of specialised training enabled them to take their place in
the new fleet, but with some it required a much longer period to enable
them to feel that perfect self-confidence when _alone_ in the face of
difficulties and dangers which is the true heritage of the sea.
To describe here the training of officers and men would be to repeat
what will be more fully and personally described in succeeding chapters.
It is sufficient to say that the aim was to bring them all to a
predetermined standard of efficiency, which would enable the officers to
command ships of specific types at sea and in action, and the men to
form efficient engineers and deck hands for almost any ship in the Navy.
The medical branches naturally required no special training and the
accountants merely a knowledge of naval systems of financial and general
administration. These two branches had their own training
establishments.
When the period of preliminary training in the cruiser _Hermione_ was
over the officers were passed on to the Royal Naval College at
Greenwich, and from there to one or other of the fifty war bases in the
United Kingdom, the Mediterranean or farther afield. Their appointments
were to ships forming the fleets attached to each of these bases and
generally operating in the surrounding seas.
In this way the whole zone of war was covered by an anti-submarine and
minesweeping organisation and general naval patrol, which operated in
conjunction with, but separate from, the battle fleets, squadrons and
flotillas, which were thus left free to perform their true functions in
big naval engagements.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Extract from _Naval Demobilisation_--issued by the Ministry of
Reconstruction.
[2] The personnel of the new navy consisted of R.N., R.N.R. and R.N.V.R.
officers. The former came mostly from the retired list. The R.N.R.
needed training only in such subjects as gunnery, tactics, etc. The
training of the R.N.V.R. is here described.
CHAPTER II
THE NEW NAVY--TRAINING AN ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCE
HAVING described the _raison d'être_ of the new navy, and how it became
a fleet in being, with its own admirals, captains, staffs, bases and all
the paraphernalia of war, I can pass on to a more intimate description
of the training of the officers and men, preparatory to their being
drafted to the scattered units of this great anti-submarine force.
Lying in the spacious docks at Southampton was the old 4000-ton cruiser
_Hermione_, which had been brought round from her natural base in
Portsmouth dockyard to act as the depot ship and training establishment
for a large section of this new force. Not all the officers and men of
the auxiliary fleet were, however, destined to pass across its decks.
This vessel was reserved for the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, from
which a very considerable proportion of the entire personnel of the new
fleet was drawn. Nor was H.M.S. _Hermione_ the first depot ship of the
war-time R.N.V.R. at Southampton, for the Admiralty yacht _Resource II._
had been used for the first few drafts, but was unfortunately burned to
the water's edge. There were also other vessels and establishments at
Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham. These were, however, mainly for the
reception and brief training of the more experienced Merchant Service
officers, entered in the Royal Naval Reserve for the duration of the
war, and for the surgeons and accountants.
The men of the new force were mostly trained in the naval barracks and
depot ships situated at the big naval centres, such as Portsmouth and
Chatham. After a few weeks all these establishments were drafting, in a
constant stream, the trained human element to the vessels awaiting full
complements at the different war bases, or being constructed in the
hundreds of shipyards of the Empire.
About H.M.S. _Hermione_, which has been selected as being representative
of the training depots of a large section of the auxiliary service,
little need be said, beyond the fact that she was commanded, first, by a
distinguished officer from the Dardanelles, and subsequently by an
equally capable officer, who, by the irony of fate, had in pre-war times
been a member of the British Naval Mission to the Turkish navy--both of
them men whose experience and unfailing tact contributed largely to the
success of the thousands of embryo officers trained under their command.
The ship herself was a rambling old cruiser, but very little of the
actual training was carried out on board. Spacious buildings on the
quayside provided the training grounds for gunnery, drill, signalling,
engineering and all the complicated curricula, of which more anon.
Lying in the still waters of the dock, alongside the comparatively big
grey cruiser, were the trim little hulls of a numerous flotilla of
20-knot motor launches, newly arrived from Canada, with wicked-looking
13-pounder high-angle guns, stumpy torpedo-boat masts and brand-new
White Ensigns and brass-bound decks. These were the advance guard of a
fleet of over 500 similar craft, to the command of which many of the
officers being trained would, after a period of practical experience at
sea, eventually succeed.
There were besides numerous other mosquito craft, which throbbed in and
out of the dock from that vast sheltered arm of the sea called
_Southampton Water_ on mysterious errands, soon to be solved by new
recruits in the chilly winds of winter nights and early mornings.
This, then, was the mother ship and her children. When once the aft
gangway leading up from the dockside to the clean-scrubbed decks had
been crossed, and the sentry's challenge answered, the embryo officer
left civilian life behind and commenced his training for the stern work
of war.
It may not be out of place to give here a closer description of the
training of the officers and men of the new navy, drawn from personal
experience. To do this without the irritating egoism of the personal
narrative it will be necessary, as often in future pages, to adopt the
convenient "third person."
* * * * *
The night was fine, but a keen March wind blew from off the sea. The
dock lights were reflected in the still waters of the harbour. Tall
cranes stood out black and clearly defined against the cold night sky.
The shadows were deep around the warehouses, stores and other buildings
of the busy dockside.
Lying in the south-western basin was the big grey hull of the cruiser,
newly painted, and looking very formidable, with its tall masts and
fighting-tops towering into the blue void, and its massive bow rising
high above the dock wall.
Coming from the darkness on board were the tinkling notes of a banjo and
the subdued hum of voices. Then the loud call of the quartermaster and
the ringing of eight bells.
A group of newly appointed officers picked their way carefully among the
tangled mooring ropes on the quayside and as they approached the warship
were duly challenged by the sentries. Two of them had only just arrived
from distant New Zealand. They were all "for training," and on mounting
the quarterdeck gangway were politely requested by the smiling
quartermaster to report at the ship's office.
In order to get from the deck to this abode of paymasters and writers,
except by the tabooed "captain's hatchway," there had to be negotiated a
long passage leading past the wardroom and the gunroom. In normal times
at such an hour this passage would probably have been almost deserted,
with the exception of a sentry, but the training was being speeded up to
meet the demands of war, and with nearly 200 officers, many of whom
fortunately lived ashore, constantly moving to and fro, it became either
a semi-dark, congested thoroughfare, in which everyone was curtly
apologising for knocking against someone else, or else it contained the
steady pressure of a gunroom overflow meeting, with a tobacco-scented
atmosphere peculiarly its own.
When the formality of reporting arrival had been completed, the embryo
officers were taken in tow by the "Officer of the Day," whose duty it
was to introduce them to the gunroom and make them familiar in a general
way with the routine of the ship. The officer who performed this
ceremony on the night in question has since held a highly responsible
post at the Admiralty--such is the fortune of war.
The first shock came when the work for the following day was explained.
It commenced with physical drill on the quayside at 7 A.M. and ended
with instruction in signalling at 6 P.M.!
. . . . . . . .
The early morning was bitterly cold but fine. Physical "jerks" was not a
dress parade; in fact, some of the early risers on the surrounding
transports and ocean mail boats must have wondered what particular form
of mania the crowd of running, leaping and arm-swinging men, in all
stages of undress on the quayside, really suffered from.
Breakfast and Divisions were the next items on the programme, and the
new-comers looked forward to the day's work with the keen interest of
freshness.
_Morning Divisions_ and _Evening Quarters_ are events of some importance
in the daily routine of his Majesty's ships. They are parades of the
entire ship's company, with the exception of those on important duty,
marking the beginning and end of the day's work. The crew, or men under
training, are mustered in "Watches," under their respective officers,
and stand to attention at the bugle call. The senior officer taking
divisions then enters, a roll is called and the names of those absent
reported. The chaplain stands between the lines of men; the order "Off
caps!" is given and prayers commence. When these are finished certain
orders of the day are read out to the assembled ship's company and the
parade is over.
At evening quarters, on certain days in the week, the names were read
out of the officers and men detailed for special duties or for draft to
a zone of war.
When morning divisions were over the day's work began. The embryo
officers were attached to the seamanship class, consisting of about
twenty men of all ages. Oilskins were donned, for the sky was overcast
and the wind keen. They climbed down the steel sides of the cruiser on
to the small deck of a tender, which was to convey them out on to the
broad but sheltered waters where much of the preliminary practical
training was to take place during the following weeks.
The instructor, an officer attached for the purpose, then divided his
class into two "watches," one being directed to work out the proposed
course of the ship on the charts in the cabin and to give the necessary
orders to the other watch on deck, who were to carry them into effect as
the ship steamed along, with the aid of sextant, compass, wheel,
engine-room telegraph, lead and log-line. As all possessed some
knowledge of the sea, and had experience in navigating, this work did
not prove as difficult as it undoubtedly would to anyone entirely devoid
of nautical knowledge.
Those in the cabin with the charts worked out the compass courses from
one point to another, making the necessary allowances for tide,
deviation, etc. Others of the same watch received reports from the
"bridge" and made the correct entries in the log-book. All elementary
work, but which needed practice to make perfect, and on the accuracy of
which men's lives would depend in the very near future.
The watch on deck was engaged in the more practical work of coastal
navigation and could see the effect of any mistake made theoretically by
their companions below. At midday the watches were reversed. Those
working at the charts and courses came on deck and the seamen of the
morning became the navigating officers of the afternoon.
On this particular day the second or port watch had the worst of it. A
squally wind and rain had set in, making the work on deck thoroughly wet
and uncomfortable. An hour or so later the small ship was rolling and
pitching and everyone was drenched. The lead was kept going by hands
numb with cold--a foretaste of the long and bitter days and nights to be
afterwards spent in wintry seas.
The training cruises were continued for many days and were interspersed
with lectures on the elements of good seamanship, the more advanced
theory and practice of navigation being left for a later course at the
Royal Naval College, Greenwich.
After seamanship came gunnery. Each of the different types of heavy but
finely made weapons had to be learned in detail--a feat of memory when
it came to the watch-like mechanism of the Maxim. Guns were disabled and
had to be put right. They missed fire and were made by the
instructors--old naval gunners--to play every dastardly trick
conceivable. The final test which had to be successfully passed was the
dismantling of each type of gun used in the auxiliary fleet and the
reassembling of it.
With gunnery came also the marks and uses of the different kinds of
ammunition, the systems of "spotting" and "range-finding." Every gun had
its officer crew and the rapidity of fire was recorded. Each man in turn
was chosen to give the necessary orders and to judge the ranges and
deflections. In this way not only was the practical work learned by
heart, but also the theory of naval gunnery, so far as it related to the
smaller types of weapon.
The use of the depth charge, both mechanically and tactically, was
expounded and practically demonstrated, together with that of the
torpedo, the mine, mine laying and sweeping, and the peculiarities of
various explosives. Rifle and revolver practice was encouraged, and
morse and semaphore signalling formed part of the daily routine.
The training was not entirely preparatory for work afloat. Squad and
company drill, rifle and bayonet exercise, and manoeuvring in extended
order formed a part of the comprehensive training. One day, not many
weeks after their arrival, the officers whose fortunes have been
followed found themselves shouting orders and directing by arm and
whistle lines of dusty _camarades_ advancing over a common in the most
approved military fashion.
The training was not all hard work. The gathering of so many men from
all quarters of the world, with a wealth of experience and adventure
behind them, was in itself a source of mutual interest--and incidentally
an education in modern British Imperialism. Scarcely any part of the
world went for long unrepresented in either the wardroom or gunroom of
the old cruiser _Hermione_ in those days of war, and many were the yarns
told of Alaska days, hunting in Africa, experiences in remote corners of
North America, pearling in the Pacific and life on the Indian frontier,
to say nothing of wild nights on the seven seas. Grey heads and round,
boyish faces, the university and the frontier, with a camaraderie seldom
equalled.
The period of training in the old cruiser was drawing to a close when
each officer was appointed to "Boat Duty." There were five launches on
duty at a time, and their crews had to be instantly ready day and night.
The most coveted were the two 21-knot boats, used almost exclusively for
the conveyance of pilots to and from the hospital ships and transports.
Then came the patrol boat, a slow old tub with a comfortable cabin, and
work out on Southampton Water at night. The three "duty boats" were for
emergency use and were held at the disposal of the naval transport
officer.
The duties on each boat varied and were in the nature of training. The
pilot boat was required to lie alongside the cutter, out beyond the
harbour, and to convey the pilots at high speed to and from the stream
of shipping. It was a pleasant duty which entailed alternate nights in
the generous, breezy company of the old sea-dogs of the cutter, with
occasional races at half-a-mile a minute through the darkness and spray
to the moving leviathans of the ocean.
The patrol ambled up and down the sheltered waterways during the day and
night, examining the "permits" of fishermen and preventing the movement
of small craft during the hours of darkness, when the long lines of
troop-ships were leaving for France.
The work of the duty boats varied from day to day, but there was always
the morning and evening mail to be collected from and delivered to the
ships of the auxiliary fleet lying out in the fair-way.
When this spell of water-police work was over there came a few days'
practice in the handling of the fast sea-going patrol launches, or
"M.L.'s," about which so much has since been written in the daily
papers.
After the cramming received in the lecture-rooms, the arduous drill and
the somewhat monotonous work on the slow-moving tenders, the runs
seaward on these new and trim little vessels, the manoeuvring at
nineteen knots, the breeze of passage and the feeling of controlled
power acted as an elixir on both mind and body. Then came firing
practice in the open sea. The sharp crack of cordite, the tongues of
livid flame, the scream of the shells, the white splashes of the
ricochet and the salt sea breezes.
Two days later the preliminary training was over and there loomed ahead
a period of hard study at the Royal Naval College.
CHAPTER III
A NAVAL UNIVERSITY IN TIME OF WAR
BUILT by King Charles I. for the Stuart navy, and used for over two and
a half centuries as the university of the Senior Service, the Royal
Naval College, Greenwich, is a building with an historic past. It has
housed, fed and taught many of England's most illustrious sailors.
It was to cabin and lecture hall in this fine old building that officers
of the new navy went to complete their knowledge of navigation and
kindred subjects when their preliminary sea training came to a close.
There is but little romance in a highly specialised course of study
designed to enable the recipients to find their way with safety, both in
sunshine and storm, over the vast water surface of the world. To
describe here the subjects taught would only be wearisome and
uninteresting. Sufficient to say that the course was a most
comprehensive one and admirably arranged by masters of the mariner's
art. If any fault can be found it is certainly not one of paucity of
information, and the proof of its efficacy can be found in the fact
that, so far as the author knows, there was not a single ship,
afterwards commanded by officers who underwent this training, lost
through insufficient knowledge of the art of navigation.
The days spent in the Naval College were fully occupied by attendance at
lectures and the evenings in private study and the preparation of
elaborate notes and sketches for the final passing-out examination.
There was one moment of each day which was rendered historic by old
custom. It came at the conclusion of dinner in the big white hall, when
the officer whose turn it happened to be rose to his feet and gave the
toast of the navy--"Gentlemen, the King!"
It was in the grounds of this college that many officers saw their first
zeppelin raid. On one occasion it occurred late in the fourth week of
the course. Nearly all were in their respective studies, surrounded by a
mass of papers, charts, drawing instruments and books, making the last
determined attack on various knotty problems previous to the final
examination.
Ten P.M. had just been registered by the electric clocks in the famous
observatory overlooking the college, when the sound of running feet came
down the long corridors. A stentorian voice shouted: "All lights out!"
In a moment the whole building, with its labyrinth of corridors, was
plunged into Ethiopian darkness. Doors were opened and a jostling crowd
of men groped their way down passages and stone staircases into the
grounds. Here the Admiral and his staff were making sure that no lights
were visible. Traffic in the near-by thoroughfare had been stopped, and
all around lay the Great Metropolis, oppressively dark and still.
A searchlight flashed heavenwards and was followed by other beams. All
of these suddenly concentrated on the gleaming white hull of a zeppelin,
high in the indigo sky. The ground trembled under the fire of the
anti-aircraft batteries. Shells whistled and moaned over the College and
bright flashes came from little puffs of white smoke high in the central
blue.
Dull-sounding but earth-shaking booms came from different points as the
airship dropped her deadly cargo. Shrapnel fell on the congested
house-tops with a peculiar hiss and thud and ambulances rumbled over the
stone-paved high-road.
It was a small incident and scarcely worth the space required for its
recording, but it served a purpose--to steel the heart and steady the
hand for the time to come.
CHAPTER IV
THE NEW FLEETS IN BEING
BACK once again on the old cruiser with training completed and awaiting
draft to the zones of war. Then came the sailing orders. The name of
each officer was called in turn and he disappeared into the ship's
office, to return a few minutes later carrying a sheaf of white and blue
Admiralty orders, his face grave or gay according to destination.
Some were for the Spanish Main and bemoaned their fate at being ordered
to a station so remote from the principal zone of war. Others were
destined for the Mediterranean and comforted themselves with hopes that
trouble was brewing elsewhere than in the Adriatic, to which a lucky few
were appointed. The Suez Canal and Egypt claimed their share, but by far
the greater number were bound for the misty northern seas.
About the training given to the 200,000 men little can be said here
because of its diversity. They came as volunteers from all quarters of
the globe, were collected at the great depots in Portsmouth, Chatham and
Devonport, were trained in the art of signalling, squad drill, gunnery,
seamanship and the hundred and one things required by the "handy man,"
then belched forth into the ships.
Some had sailed the sea for years before in vessels of all kinds and
needed little more than the sense of cohesion and unquestioning
obedience imparted by discipline and drill. Others knew more of the
working of a loom, or the extraction of coal, than of seamanship, and
spent a cheerful but arduous few months in training depots and on
special ships completing their education. Cooks there were who could
make little else besides Scotch broth, while others, the engineers--or
motor mechanics, as they were called when appointed to some of the
petrol-driven patrol boats--knew their profession or trade better than
they could be taught, and proved themselves untiring and indomitable
when it came to the real thing--as will be seen later.
Having now described the training of both officers and men, we come to
the ships they were called upon to navigate down to the seas of
adventure.
ARMED LINERS
To set on record the formation of the ships of the new navy in
divisions, squadrons or units, and to classify them here under separate
headings--an easy enough matter with regular fleets constructed for
definite duties--is a task of considerable difficulty with a
heterogeneous fleet composed of several thousand vessels with seldom two
alike.
Beginning with the ocean liners, as the largest and most powerfully
armed of the new fleet: these were mostly grouped for administrative
purposes in one large formation, known as the "Tenth Cruiser Squadron."
But when at sea they operated in smaller units and frequently as single
ship patrols. Their principal zone of activity was the vast stretch of
Arctic sea extending from Norway and North Russia to Iceland, the
Hebrides and Labrador. Their work was arduous in the extreme, as will
easily be realised from the nature of the seas in which they primarily
operated.
Strictly speaking, were distinct divisions possible, the Tenth Cruiser
Squadron did not form part of the auxiliary navy in its true sense,
although many of the officers and men were drawn from newly raised
corps. It acted rather as a distinct patrol fleet, filling the wide gap
of sea between Scotland and the Arctic ice.
FIGHTING SLOOPS
Next in order of importance came the newly built screw sloops, with
powerful guns and engines. Their numbers varied and they were
continually being added to. Some of these vessels were used for patrol
duties and others for minesweeping. The sloop flotillas had many zones
of activity. One was the North Atlantic, with special care for the coast
of Ireland. Another was the North Sea, with a marked preference for the
east coast of Scotland and the Straits of Dover.
These flotillas also were frequently assigned duties independent of the
auxiliary patrol organisation, but nevertheless formed an important part
of the vast anti-submarine and anti-mine navy.
In the Mediterranean also there were a number of patrol gunboats and
minesweepers similar to the fighting sloops. Their principal base in
this region was on Italian soil.
ARMED YACHTS
We now come to that portion of the auxiliary fleet whose special care
was the seas around the United Kingdom and the Colonies. First came the
armed yachts, over 50 in number, with tonnages varying from one to five
hundred. These were obtained from the owners, armed as heavily as their
size and strength permitted, and mostly became the flag-ships of patrol
flotillas. They were nearly always equipped with wireless, hydrophone
listening apparatus, depth charges and all the appliances for
anti-submarine warfare.
Their losses were not heavy considering the dangerous nature of their
work and could almost be counted on the fingers of both hands. This was
due mainly to their good speed and manoeuvring qualities. They made
wonderfully efficient auxiliary warships, maintaining the sea in almost
all weathers and accounting for quite a number of U-boats. These vessels
were, of course, never used for the rougher work of minesweeping.
WHALERS
The whalers were few in number and resembled small destroyers. They were
powerful craft and well armed, but their sea-keeping qualities left
much to be desired. In fact, to use a naval term, they were dirty boats
even in a "lop." It was said that if an officer or man had been for long
in one of these ships he was proof against all forms of sea-sickness. A
big assertion, as even old sailors will admit--but they call it "liver."
MINESWEEPERS
About the screw and paddle minesweepers little can be said beyond the
fact that they numbered about 200 and performed some of the most
dangerous work in the war. Many of them were old passenger steamers from
the Clyde, Bristol Channel, Thames and south and east coast resorts, the
famous _Brighton Queen_ being, until her untimely end on a mine off the
Belgian coast, one of their number. The loss among this class of ship
was about 10 per cent.
TRAWLERS
By far the largest portion of the auxiliary patrol units consisted of
armed and commissioned trawlers. Their numbers far exceeded 1000, and
nearly half were used for the dangerous work of minesweeping. About a
trawler little need be said, for beyond what can be seen in the
accompanying illustrations there is little of interest until we come to
the question of their curious arms and appliances, fit subjects for a
special chapter.
A large number of these units were fitted with wireless and carried
masked batteries of quick-firing guns. To give here their zones of
operation would be to set out in detail not only the seas around the
British Isles, but distant waters such as the Mediterranean and the
White Sea. They had distinct duties to perform, which may be summed up
as follows:--(1) minesweeping; (2) night and day patrols alone or in
company over immense areas of sea; (3) convoy duty; and (4) fishery
guard.
Their losses were heavy, both in ships and men, amounting to about 30
per cent. Many were the lonely sea fights engaged in by these vessels. A
few will receive the praise they deserve and the remainder will rest
content with the knowledge of duty done.
DRIFTERS
If numbers or losses were the dominant factors the armed drifters should
be high in the list. There were engaged considerably over 1000 of these
craft, and the losses amounted to about 20 per cent.
It may be necessary to inform some of my readers that a drifter is not
necessarily a vessel that is content to start out on a voyage and rely
on _drifting_ to its destination, as its name implies. The term is
derived from the drift nets used by these vessels for fishing in time of
peace. They are, in almost all respects, small editions of the deep-sea
trawler--_minus_ the powerful steam-driven winch for hauling in the
trawl nets.
[Illustration: SOME OF THE 550 MOTOR LAUNCH HULLS BEING CONSTRUCTED ON
THE BANKS OF THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER, CANADA
_Yachting Monthly_]
For war purposes the holds of these, and many other types of auxiliary
warships, were converted into officers' cabins, or gun platforms for
masked batteries. A few carried special nets in which to entangle the
wily "Fritz." Others had aboard special types of submarine mines, and
one, commanded by the author, was used for the transport of wounded from
Admiral Sir David Beatty's flag-ship, H.M.S. _Lion_, after the Jutland
fight.
These were, as might be expected, good sea boats, and carried out duties
of great danger and value. Several hundred were fitted with wireless.
Their zone of operations was far flung, extending from the Arctic Circle
to the Equator. It was, however, in the unequal fights with German
destroyers in the Straits of Dover and with Austrian torpedo boat
destroyers in the Adriatic that they made a name for valour. In two of
these engagements no less than six and fourteen drifters were sunk in a
few minutes.
MOTOR LAUNCHES
About the now famous motor launches, or "movies," as they are called in
the Service, much will be said in later pages. They numbered over 500,
and, with but few exceptions, were a homogeneous flotilla of fast
sea-going patrol boats, heavily armed for their size. Some idea of their
appearance under varying conditions will be gained from a study of the
illustrations.
They were all commanded by R.N.V.R. officers, whose training on H.M.S.
_Hermione_ and elsewhere has been described in an earlier chapter. They
carried a crew of nine men and two officers, and their zones of
operations extended from the icy seas which wash the Orkneys and
Shetlands to the West Indies and the Suez Canal.
It may be of interest to give here an extract from the American journal,
_Rudder_, showing how these vessels came into being.[3] Although the
hulls were constructed in Canada, and much of the assembling was also
carried out on the banks of the St Lawrence, the engines came from the
United States. It was to the organising ability of Mr Henry R. Sutphen,
of the Electric Boat Company, New York, that the delivery of over 500 of
these wonderful little craft in less than a year was due. Here is that
gentleman's story of the "M.L." contract:
"It was in February, 1915, that we had our initial
negotiations with the British Naval authorities. A
well-known English shipbuilder and ordnance expert
was in this country, presumably on secret business
for the Admiralty, and I met him one afternoon at
his hotel. Naturally the menace of the German
submarine warfare came into discussion; we both
agreed that the danger was a real one, and that
steps should be taken to meet it.
"I suggested the use of a number of small, speedy
gasolene boats for use in attacking and destroying
submarines. My idea was to have a mosquito fleet
big enough to thoroughly patrol the coastal waters
of Great Britain, each of them carrying a 13-lb.
rapid-fire gun.
[Illustration: FIG. 1.--Diagram showing principal characteristics of an
armed motor launch. _A._ Wheel-house. _B._ Searchlight. _C._ Chart-room.
_D._ Navigation lights. _E._ 3 or 13 pounder quick-firing gun. _F._
Wheel and indicators in wheel-house. _H._ Hand pumps supplementing power
pumps in engine-room. _I._ Hatchway leading to engine-room. _J._
Hatchway leading to wardroom. _K._ Life-boat. _L._ Officers' cabins.
_M._ Hatchway leading to officers' cabins. _N._ Depth charges (2 or 4).
_O._ Deck box containing life-belts. _P._ Stern petrol tanks (2). _Q._
Officers' sleeping cabin. _R._ Officers' mess-room. _S._ Galley. _T._
Engine-room. _U._ Main petrol engines (2). _V._ Reservoirs of compressed
air for starting main engines. _W._ Foreward petrol tanks. _X._
Forecastle and men's quarters. _Y._ Men's lavatory. _Z._ Forepeak.]
"I explained that I had in mind two distinct
types. The first would have an over-all length of
about 50 feet, and would be fitted with high-speed
engines; such a boat would show a maximum of 25
knots. The alternative would be something around
80 feet in length, with slow turning engines and
a speed of 19 knots. I added that my preference
was for the larger and slower type.
"He asked how many units of that class we could
build in a year's time, and I told him that I
could guarantee fifty. He said that he would think
the matter over, and we parted.
"A few days later I had another interview and was
told that the British Government was ready to give
us a contract for fifty vessels of the larger
type, the whole lot to be delivered within a
year's time.
"On April 9th, 1915, the contract for fifty
'chasers' was signed.
. . . . . . . .
"The _Lusitania_ sailed on her last voyage May
1st, 1915, and a week later her torpedoing by a
German U-boat was reported. My English friend was
sailing that same day from New York, and we were
giving him a farewell luncheon at Delmonico's.
When the appalling news was communicated to him he
appeared much depressed, as indeed was natural
enough, and also very thoughtful. Before he said
good-bye he intimated to me that he intended
advising the Admiralty to increase the number of
'Chasers'; he asked me if I thought I could take
care of a bigger order. I told him that I could
guarantee to build a boat a day for so long a
period as the Admiralty might care to name.
"After he reached England we shortly received a
cablegram ordering five hundred additional
'Sutphens,' our code word for submarine 'Chaser';
in other words we were now asked to build five
hundred and fifty of these boats and deliver them
in complete running order by November 15th, 1915."
[Illustration: FIG. 2.--Plan of armed motor launch, showing internal
arrangements. _A._ Officers' sleeping cabin. _B.B._ Bunks. _C._
Cupboard. _D._ Lavatory. _E.E._ Stern petrol tanks. _F._ Wardroom. _G._
Table. _H._ Settee. _I._ Galley. _J._ Petrol stove. _K._ Engine-room.
_L.L._ Main engines. _M._ Compressed air reservoirs. _N._ Auxiliary
petrol engine driving dynamo, bilge pumps, fire pumps and air
compressor. _O._ Electric storage batteries, switchboard and electrical
starting arrangements for auxiliary engine. _P._ Chart-room with petrol
tanks below. _Q._ Magazine. _R._ Fresh-water tanks. _S._ Forecastle.
_T._ Bunks for crew. _U._ Forecastle lavatory. _V._ Watertight
forepeak.]
The armament of a motor launch consisted of a 13-pounder quick-firing
high-angle gun, capable of throwing a lyddite shell for over four miles,
and was as useful against aircraft as it was against submarines. In
addition to this heavy gun for small craft they carried about 1200 lb.
of high explosive in the form of depth charges for bombing under-water
craft, a Lewis machine gun, rifles and revolvers.
These vessels were driven by twin screws connected to twin engines of
about 500 h.p. They possessed, in addition, an auxiliary petrol engine
of about 60 h.p. for compressing the air required to start the main
engines, for working the fire and bilge pumps, and for driving a dynamo
to recharge the electric storage batteries. The triple tanks carried
over 3000 gallons of petrol, and the consumption, when travelling at
full speed, was a gallon a minute.
Many were fitted with wireless, and all of them had on board the most
approved pattern of hydrophone, with which to listen below the surface
for the movements of hostile submarines. They had electric light in the
cabins and for navigation, fighting and mast-head signalling purposes. A
moderately powerful searchlight, fitted with a Morse signalling shutter,
was also part of their equipment.
These little miniature warships possessed a small wardroom and sleeping
cabin for the officers, a galley with petrol range for cooking, an
engine-room, magazine for the ammunition, chart-room, and ample
forecastle accommodation for the crew of nine men. All parts of the ship
were connected with the bridge by speaking-tubes and electric bells, and
the aft deck accommodated a steel life-boat.
The duties of these craft varied considerably. For over three years they
maintained a constant patrol in the North Sea, Atlantic, English
Channel, Irish Sea, Mediterranean, Adriatic, Suez Canal, Straits of
Gibraltar, and in West Indian waters. Only one who knows by experience
can fully appreciate what work in these northern seas, with their winter
snows and Arctic winds, and their chilly summer fogs, really means to a
mere thirty tons of nautical humanity in as many square leagues of
storm-swept sea infested with mines and hostile submarines. But when
this book has been finished the reader will be in a position to judge
for himself.
The losses of motor launches were not heavy considering the dangerous
nature of their cargoes (3000 gallons of petrol within a few feet of
1500 lb. of high explosive in a wooden hull) and the duties they were
called upon to perform in all weathers short of heavy gales. Several
were blown up with terrible results to those aboard. Others caught fire
and were burned--allowing only just sufficient time to sink the
explosives aboard. A few were smashed to pieces on exposed coasts after
struggling for hours amid heavy seas. One struck a mine off Ostend.
Another was destroyed by shell-fire in the Mediterranean, and the part
they played in the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend, in which two were lost
and a V.C. gained, is now world famous.
COASTAL MOTOR BOATS
There was, besides M.L.'s, another smaller but faster type of submarine
chaser. These little vessels, of which there were about 80 actually in
commission, possessed no cabin or other accommodation for long cruises.
They were simply thin grey hulls with powerful high-speed engines. They
were known as C.M.B.'s, or, to give them their full title, Coastal Motor
Boats. The purpose for which they were constructed was to operate from
coastal bases, and to be launched from ocean-going ships to chase a
hostile submarine which had been located by seaplanes and reported by
wireless in a given locality. This, however, was what they were
_intended_ for, but bore little relation to the work they actually
accomplished. Their nickname was "Scooters," and they certainly did
"scoot" over the sea.
[Illustration: FIG. 3.--Diagram showing principal characteristics of a
coastal motor boat (C.M.B.). Speed 50 miles per hour. _A._ Hydroplane
hull, so constructed as to rise on to surface when travelling at full
speed. _B._ Covered wheel-house. _C._ Navigating well. _D._ Wireless
aerials. _E._ Depth charges (2 small size). _F._ Manhole to
engine-room.]
There were three types of C.M.B.'s. One had a length of only 44 feet,
and was intended for carriage on the decks of light cruisers or other
moderate-sized surface ships. The armament was a Lewis machine gun and
two depth charges for anti-submarine warfare. The next class were 55
feet in length and operated from coast bases. These were fitted with one
or more Whitehead torpedoes, launched by an ingenious contrivance from
the stern. Class III. were 70 feet in length, and were commissioned just
before the signing of the Armistice. They were fitted for mine-laying
close up to enemy harbours.
[Illustration: FIG. 4.--Plan of coastal motor boat, showing torpedo in
cleft stern. _A._ Whale-back or arched deck. _B._ Wheel-house. _C._
Navigating well. _D._ Engine-room. _E._ Foreward petrol tanks. _F._
Forepeak. _G._ Depth charges. _H._ Cleft stern with torpedo ready for
launching. _I._ Whitehead torpedo, launched stern first.]
The maximum speed of the 55-feet C.M.B.'s, which were the most numerous,
was 40 knots, or nearly a mile a minute. They were driven by twin screws
coupled to twin engines of 350 h.p. each--working at 1350 revolutions
per minute. Being of very shallow draught, some 26 inches, these little
vessels could skim, hydroplane fashion, over any ordinary mine-field,
and a torpedo fired at them would merely pass under their keel. The risk
of destruction from shell-fire was also reduced to a minimum by their
small size and great speed. Their principal enemies were, however,
seaplanes armed with machine guns.
[Illustration: A 40-FT. COASTAL MOTOR BOAT TRAVELLING AT FULL SPEED
_Thornycroft & Co., Ltd._]
[Illustration: A 40-FT. COASTAL MOTOR BOAT TRAVELLING AT FULL SPEED
_Thornycroft & Co., Ltd._]
It is not difficult to imagine a fight between a C.M.B. travelling at 40
knots, firing with its little Lewis gun at a big seaplane swooping down
from the clouds at the rate of 70 miles an hour, and splashing the water
around the frail little grey-hulled scooter with bullets from its
machine gun. This actually occurred many times off the Belgian coast,
and is a typical picture of guerrilla war at sea in the twentieth
century.
[Illustration: FIG. 5.--Diagram illustrating method of attack by C.M.B.
on surface ship (or submarine on surface). _A._ Object of attack
travelling in direction indicated by arrow _E._ _B._ The position of the
C.M.B. after delivering the attack. _C._ The torpedo, released by the
C.M.B. at point _D_, travelling on course ending at _F_, which, allowing
for movement of ship _A_, is the place where the torpedo should strike
its object of attack. From this it will be seen that the torpedo, when
released, actually follows the ship from which it is fired until the
latter swerves from the straight course, when the torpedo continues
until it strikes or misses the object of attack, the speed of the
torpedo being about the same or a little less than that of the C.M.B.
The total time occupied in such an attack over a course of two miles
would be about 2 1/2 minutes before the torpedo struck its object.]
The C.M.B. was a purely British design, and the firm largely responsible
for the success achieved was Messrs John J. Thornycroft & Company
Limited. There were bases for these sea-gnats at Portsmouth, Dover,
Dunkirk, and in the Thames Estuary at Osea Island. From all of these
points mid-Channel could be reached in less than thirty minutes.
Although useless in rough weather, a trip in a C.M.B., even on a calm
day, was sufficiently exciting. The roar of the engines made speech
impossible, and vision when sitting in the little glass-screened well,
or conning-tower, was limited by the great waves of greenish-white water
which curved upwards from either bow, and rolled astern in a welter of
foam. There was an awe-inspiring fury in the thunder of the 700 h.p.
engines revolving at 1350 per minute, and a feeling of ecstasy in the
stiff breeze of passage and the atomised spray. When waves came the
slap-slap-slap of the water as the sharp bows cleft through the crest
and the little vessel was for a brief moment poised dizzily on the bosom
of the swell caused tremors to pass through the thin grey hull, and, to
complete the review of sensation, there may be added the human thrill of
battle and the indescribable feeling of controlled power beneath one's
feet.
The C.M.B.'s record of service, although short, is nevertheless a
brilliant one. Towards the close of the year 1916 four of these little
vessels coming from the base at Dunkirk intercepted five German
destroyers returning from a Channel raid. The scooters raced towards the
enemy in a smother of foam. Every quick-firing gun on the German ships
spouted shells at the mysterious white streaks approaching them with the
speed of lightning. So close did these plucky little ships go to their
giant adversaries that the blast of the German guns was felt aboard, but
no shells struck them. Then the line of C.M.B.'s swerved and their
torpedoes were launched at close range. One of the enemy destroyers was
hit and badly damaged, while two others had narrow shaves.
There was no time for German retaliation. For a brief few minutes the
sea around the scooters was ploughed up by the shells from the Hun
artillery, then the four little attacking craft were five miles distant
from the scene of their victory, and presented almost invisible white
specks to the enemy gunners.
At Zeebrugge these craft ran close in under the guns of the shore
fortifications, and covered the approach of the landing parties and
block-ships with a screen of artificial smoke. At Ostend they entered
the harbour under heavy fire and ignited flares to enable the
block-ships to navigate in the darkness. Others, in the same operations,
torpedoed the piers and silenced the guns mounted thereon.
Their exploits savour of old-time sea romance, as, for example, when the
little _Condor_ ran in under the guns of the fortress of Alexandria, or
further back in our naval history, when sail and round shot took the
place of petrol and torpedoes.
For anti-submarine work these wonderfully fast little chasers were used
in small flotillas. They were fitted with short-range wireless sets, and
when the message came stating that a vessel was being attacked in a
certain position, perhaps twenty miles from the coast, a number were
instantly released from the leash, and in a fraction of the time taken
by larger vessels they were on the scene with torpedoes and Lewis guns
for surface attack and depth charges for submerged bombing.
They were commanded, in many instances, by R.N.V.R. officers of the
auxiliary service, and carried two engineers. No crew was necessary, nor
was space available for them. The plucky dash of these vessels into the
harbours of Zeebrugge and Ostend, their subsequent operations on the
Belgian coast, and their losses in the action at the entrance to the
Heligoland Bight in 1918, when they were launched from a big ship, have
earned for them high renown in naval history.
BOOM DEFENCE SHIPS
In addition to all these types of anti-submarine craft there were,
forming part of the auxiliary fleet, over 300 ships, mostly trawlers and
drifters, engaged in maintaining the great lines of boom defences,
closing vast stretches of sheltered waters frequented by the battle
fleets, and a considerable number of examination ships, staffed by
interpreter officers, whose duty it was to examine all neutral shipping
passing through the 10,000 miles of the blockade.
* * * * *
These, then, were the ships of the new navy, and their formation into
flotillas, or units, was usually accomplished by grouping four or five
vessels of similar type together under the command of the senior officer
afloat--mostly a lieutenant R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. In the case of
minesweepers the unit nearly always consisted of an even number of
ships, because their work was carried out in pairs, and with M.L.'s it
usually consisted of five boats, as this was the number required for the
intricate tactical work of submarine chasing.
There were, of course, units from the United States, French, Japanese,
Italian and Brazilian navies, in addition to the formidable British
armada.
The auxiliary units were all based on one or other of the fifty odd war
stations which encompassed not only the coasts of Great Britain and
Ireland, but also the littoral of every land in our world-wide Empire.
The numbers given here do not include the local fleets of purely
colonial naval bases, nor the large flotillas of destroyers and "P"
boats operating in home and foreign waters in conjunction with the
auxiliary navy. If these were incorporated the anti-submarine fleets
would be almost doubled.
Now that the reader is familiar with the _raison d'être_ of the new
navy, the personnel, the ships and their formation into fleets, the
scope and limitations of their activity, and of the losses they
sustained, the way is clear for a description of the curious weapons
used, the mysteries of anti-submarine warfare, and the bases themselves
before entering the zone of war and seeing something of the actual work
of the auxiliary navy.
FOOTNOTE:
[3] _Yachting Monthly_ and _R.N.V.R. Magazine_, August, 1917.
CHAPTER V
THE HYDROPHONE AND THE DEPTH CHARGE
OF all the weapons used in the anti-submarine war the two most important
were the _hydrophone_ and the _depth charge_. They were employed in
conjunction with each other and comprised the surface warship's
principal means of offence against submarines operating beneath the
surface.
The hydrophone resembles a delicate telephone. It is so constructed that
when the instrument is lowered over the side of a ship into the sea any
noise, such as the movement of a submarine's propellers, can be heard on
deck by an operator listening at an ordinary telephone receiver
connected to the submerged microphone by an electrified wire.
There were many different types of hydrophone in use during the Great
War. So important was this instrument for the work of submarine hunting
that money was spent in millions, and a corps of naval and civil experts
were engaged for several years, bringing it to a state of efficiency.
Each type introduced into the Service was an improvement on its
predecessor, and there were different patterns for the use of almost
each class of vessel. The fast destroyer required a different
instrument to the slow-moving trawler. The motor launch could only
employ successfully a totally different type to the submarine, and, to
add to the difficulties, the German submarines themselves were
generously supplied with similar instruments. The games of
"hide-and-seek" played on and under the seas with the aid of this
wonderful little instrument would have been distinctly amusing had men's
lives--and often those of women and children--not been dependent upon
the issue.
The portable hydrophone, used by some of the smaller and slower vessels
of the auxiliary fleet, consisted of a microphone, or delicate
mechanical ear, carefully guarded by metal discs from accidental damage,
and connected to ear-pieces or ordinary telephone receivers by an
electric wire which passed through a battery. Where the wire came in
contact with the sea water it was heavily insulated and lightly
armoured.
When it was required to use this instrument the vessel was stopped and
the microphone lowered overboard to a depth of about 20 feet. This was
the distance down from the surface at which submarine noises could be
heard most distinctly. The operator on deck or in the cabin then
adjusted the ear-pieces and sat listening for any noises coming through
the water. Although the sea is a far better conductor than air, the
range at which sounds could be heard varied considerably. On a calm day
or night the noise of a ship's propellers could frequently be
distinguished at from five to seven miles; whereas on a rough day, with
the sea splashing and the wind roaring, it was often difficult to hear
anything beyond half-a-mile.
[Illustration: FIG. 6.--Diagram showing essential parts of a portable
hydrophone. _A._ Head and ear pieces, by means of which a trained
listener hears submarine sounds. _B._ Flexible leads to enable an
officer to verify reports from listener. _C._ Battery box, containing
spare set of cells. _D._ Terminals. _E._ Terminals of spare cells. _F._
Flexible armoured electric cable which is lowered over side of ship.
_G._ Metal case protecting the microphone _H_. _H._ Microphone or
delicate receiver of submarine sounds, which is submerged (when
required, but not when ship is moving) to a depth of about 18 feet, as
in small diagram. The sound is detected by the microphone and
transmitted up the cable _F_ and wires _B_ to the ear-pieces _A_.]
In fine weather a submarine could usually be heard at a distance of
about two or three miles. There were, however, many microscopic noises
of the under-seas which were picked up and magnified by this type of
hydrophone. They were called "water noises," and often made it extremely
difficult to differentiate between them and the sound of a moving
submarine at a great distance. Later types were not so prone to these
disturbing influences.
To describe here the different natural and artificial noises heard on a
portable hydrophone is extremely difficult. One general statement can,
however, be made. It is the noise caused by the rapidly revolving
propellers of both surface ships and submarines that is the guiding
factor in the work of detection by submarine sound. A destroyer
travelling at full speed on a calm sea, when heard on a hydrophone
resembles the roar of a gigantic dynamo. The sound does not alter as the
distance between the _stationary_ listening ship and the _fast-moving_
warship increases or decreases; it continues to be a roar or low hum,
according to distance, until it fades out of hearing altogether. The
same statement applies also to a slow-moving cargo steamer, only in this
case the _single_ propeller is revolving very much slower, and, when
listening on a hydrophone about two or three miles distant, each
successive beat of the engines can be distinctly heard.
The simple movement of a vessel's hull through the water cannot be heard
on a hydrophone. Therefore for detecting the presence in the vicinity of
a _sailing_ ship at night or in a thick fog this instrument is quite
useless. The same drawback applies also to the location of a floating
derelict or iceberg, and restricts the use of the hydrophone to
faithfully reporting the presence of power-driven ships or special sound
signals at a range of a few miles.
[Illustration: FIG. 7.--An improved directional hydrophone fitted
through keel of motor launch. The tube _B_, at the lower extremity of
which is the microphone, can be raised or lowered from _C_, the cabin of
the M.L. This instrument is so arranged that the direction from which
the submarine sound is coming can be simply and quickly ascertained.]
A German submarine heard at a range of about a mile on a calm night
presents a curious sound which almost defies description. Its principal
constituent consists of a "clankety clank! clankety clank!" at first
barely distinguishable from the low swish of the water past the face of
the submerged microphone, then louder when the sound has been
distinguished and the human ear is on the alert. But when this sound was
heard in war there was little time for analysing or noting. It was the
call to action. The microphone was hauled to the surface and the chase
began, a halt being made every half-mile or so for a further period of
listening on the hydrophone. If the sound was louder the commander of
the pursuing vessel knew that he was on the right track, and if the
sound came up from the sea more indistinct the course was changed and a
run of a mile made in the opposite direction, when the vessel was again
stopped and the instrument dropped overboard.
Should this manoeuvre have placed the surface ship in close proximity
to the submarine, one or more _depth charges_ were released, and if the
explosion of these damaged the comparatively delicate hull or machinery
of the under-water craft, she had either to rise to the surface and
fight for her life with her two powerful deck guns, or, if badly
damaged, sink helplessly to the bottom, emitting oil in large quantities
from her crushed tanks.
Before entering upon a description of the depth charge, however, there
is more to say of the hydrophone, which has played such an important
part in the defeat of the U-boats.
When the advantages of this instrument had been fully demonstrated in
the stern trial of war, successful efforts were made to improve upon the
original crude appliances. The "water noises" were reduced and, greatest
improvement of all, the hydrophone was made "directional." By this is
meant that when a sound was heard its approximate direction north,
south, east or west of the listening ship could be more or less
accurately determined. What this improvement meant to a vessel hunting a
submarine in a vast stretch of sea will be easily realised. When the
sound came up the wires from the submerged microphone the operator had
simply to turn a small handle in order to determine from which direction
the noise was coming.
If, for example, the sound was first heard away to the east, the
instrument was turned to another quarter of the compass. Then, if the
noise was plainer, the instrument was turned again until the sound
decreased in intensity. In this way the line of maximum sound was
obtained, and this showed the direction from the listening ship in which
the U-boat was operating.
[Illustration: FIG. 8.--Plan showing how microphones or ears _B_ are
fitted in a submarine _A_ to enable it to detect the approach of surface
craft.]
With the perfection of this invention the hydrophone section of the
naval service came into being. Special courses in the detection of
submarine sounds were instituted for officers and also for seamen
listeners. The actual movements of a submarine under water at varying
distances from a hydrophone were recorded by a phonograph, and records
made so that the sounds might be reproduced at will for the education of
the ear. Surgeons with aural experience estimated the physical
efficiency in this respect of would-be volunteers for the
hydrophone-listening service, and vessels were formed into special
hydrophone flotillas, whose duties consisted of listening in long lines
for submarines and when a discovery was made attacking them in the most
approved tactical formation, with the aid of depth charges and guns.
A considerable measure of success attended these arrangements, and the
author spent many cold hours listening at night for the sound of the
wily submarine. On more than one occasion an exciting chase resulted.
It must, however, be pointed out that there is one great drawback to the
successful use of the hydrophone. It exists in the necessity for the
listening ship to stop before the hydrophone is hoisted outboard, it
being quite impossible to hear anything beyond the roar of the engines
of the carrying ship so long as they are in motion. Furthermore, all
progress through the water must have ceased and the listening ship have
become stationary before artificial sounds, such as the propellers of a
submarine, can be distinguished from the natural noises of the sea
water.
Now it will at once be apparent that not only does a stationary ship
offer a splendid target for under-water attack, but also it allows a
somewhat humorous game of hide-and-seek to be played between a hunting
vessel and a hunted submarine.
Nearly all U-boats were fitted with a number of hydrophones and
therefore were as well able to receive timely warning of an approaching
surface ship as the surface ship was of the presence of the submarine.
But the surface ship had the advantage of speed.
The result of all this was that when a German submarine heard a surface
vessel approaching she dived to the bottom, if the water was not too
deep or the sea-bed too rocky. Then shutting off her engines she
listened. The surface ship, mystified by the sudden cessation of the
noise she had been pursuing, also waited, and this stagnation sometimes
lasted for hours. Then if the surface ship moved, as she was often
compelled to do in order to avoid drifting with the tide away from the
locality, the submarine moved also, and the one that stopped her engines
first detected the other, but could not catch up to her again without
deafening her own listening appliance. In which case the next move would
probably be in favour of her opponent.
All of this is, perhaps, a little complicated, but a moment's pause for
reflection will make this curious situation clear to the reader. And so
the game went on, with decisive advantage to neither the surface ship
nor the submarine. Darkness usually intervened and put an end to further
manoeuvring, frequently allowing the submarine to escape.
A case of this kind occurred to a vessel, of a certain hydrophone
flotilla, commanded by the author. For over four hours the U-boat eluded
the pursuing surface ships by moving only when they moved and stopping
when they too had stopped, darkness and a rising sea eventually
favouring the escape of the submarine, which, a few hours later, was
able to attack (unsuccessfully) a big surface ship less than thirty
miles distant from the scene.
Nevertheless the hydrophone is a submarine instrument with a brilliant
future. It has already been improved out of all resemblance to its
original self, and more will undoubtedly follow. It is, however, purely
an appliance for the detection of submarines when cruising beneath the
surface, and not a weapon for their destruction. It should also be
remembered that any improvement made in the efficiency of the hydrophone
will benefit not only the surface ship, but also the submarine, for it
cannot be supposed that under-water craft will be left without these
wonderful submarine ears when their surface destroyers are equipped with
them.
The alliance between the hydrophone and the depth charge is a natural
one. The former instrument enables the surface ship to discover, first,
the presence of a submarine in the vicinity, and, secondly, its
approximate position. At this point its utility _temporarily_ ceases and
that of the depth charge begins. When a surface ship is hot on the track
of a moving submarine she endeavours to attain a position directly over
the top of her quarry, or even a little ahead, and then releases one or
more depth charges according to whether the chance of a hit is good or
only poor.
From this it will be apparent that whereas the hydrophone is the
instrument used for the initial detection of the submarine, and
afterwards for enabling the surface ship to get to close quarters with
her submerged adversary, it is the depth charge with which the attack is
actually made.
This weapon is really a powerful submarine bomb. It consists of several
hundred pounds of very high explosive encased in a steel shell, with a
special firing device which can quickly be set so that the charge
explodes at almost any depth below the surface after being released from
the above-water vessel.
The methods in use during the war for its release from the decks of
surface ships were very diverse, the most usual being for a number of
these weapons to be fitted on slides and held in place by wire slings
which could be released by simply pulling out a greased pin or bolt.
When the depth charge rolled off the stern of the surface ship it sank
to the "set depth" and then exploded like a submarine mine. The result
was a shattering effect exerted through the water for several hundred
feet around. If the submarine was close to the explosion her
comparatively thin plates were nearly always stove-in. When she was over
a hundred feet away, however, the rivets holding her plates together
were often loosened, and the resulting leak frequently compelled her to
come to the surface, where she could be destroyed by gun-fire.
[Illustration: DROPPING DEPTH CHARGES
_British Official Photograph_]
It often happened, however, that neither one nor the other of these
things occurred, but that the submarine's delicate electrical machinery
was thrown out of order by the violence of a depth-charge explosion,
even when a considerable distance away. With the electric engines
used for submerged propulsion no longer available, and possibly the
interior of the vessel in darkness, there were only two courses open.
She could either rise to the surface and endeavour to fight it out with
the aid of her powerful deck guns, or else sink to the bottom and trust
to luck that other depth charges would not be dropped close enough to
seriously damage her hull. In the open sea, however, the latter chance
was denied because of the depth of water. Three hundred feet may be
taken as the greatest depth to which an ordinarily constructed fighting
submarine can safely descend without running a grave risk of having her
plates crushed in by the great water pressure. Even at this depth the
weight on every square foot of hull surface exceeds 8 3/4 tons.
If the damaged submarine rose to the surface the guns of her pursuers
were ready and could generally be relied upon to place her at least
_hors de combat_ before the hatches of the under-water vessel could be
opened and her own guns brought into action.
[Illustration: FIG. 9.--Diagram showing how depth charges are carried on
the stern of a motor launch. _AA._ Depth charges, each containing 300
lb. of high explosive. _B._ Hydrostatic device by means of which the
charge can be made to explode when it has sunk from the surface to a
depth of 40 or 80 feet, and by which it is rendered comparatively safe
while on deck. _C._ Slings holding charges in place on inclined
platform. _D._ Greased bolts which, on being pulled out, allow wire
slings to fly free and depth charge to roll into the sea. Depth charges
can only be released from vessels under way, otherwise the explosion
which occurs a few seconds after release damages surface vessel.]
In shallow water where there was a fairly smooth bottom it generally
happened that a submarine damaged by depth charges elected to sink to
the sea-bed and trust to luck. This was also frequently resorted to as a
means of eluding pursuit even when the U-boat was not damaged by the
first few charges dropped. It was then that the hydrophones carried by
the surface ships were again brought into use to ascertain if the
submarine was still under way. When no sound was heard those on the
surface knew that "Fritz" was lying doggo, or else that he had escaped.
If a number of ships were available a few waited over the spot where it
was considered the U-boat was lying, while the others scoured the
surrounding seas in circles trying to pick up the sound of the runaway's
engines if she had escaped in the mêlée. When nothing further was heard
they returned to the scene and set about the work of systematically
bombing the surrounding sea-bed.
[Illustration: FIG. 10.--Diagram illustrating a depth charge attack on a
submerged submarine. _A._ Motor launch, which has dropped a depth charge
to destroy a submarine _B_ travelling at a depth of 90 feet below the
surface. _C_ is the depth charge sinking as the M.L. steams away from
the danger area. _D_ is the point (80 feet below the surface) at which
it will explode, and _E_ indicates the danger area for the submarine
_B_.]
As many as one hundred depth charges were dropped in quite a small area
of sea and yet a submarine known to have been lying "doggo" in the
locality was not damaged. In cases such as this other means, which will
be described in a succeeding chapter, were then resorted to.
All the foregoing sounds very thorough and hopeful, but in fairness it
must be said that submarine hunting is a heart-breaking task. The
reader may have noticed that the method of depth-charge attack
presupposes the surface vessel to have attained a position almost
directly over the top of her enemy, a manoeuvre extremely difficult of
achievement even with the most efficient hydrophone. Heavy seas, snow
and fog have also to be taken into consideration, to say nothing of
darkness, the presence of a second submarine, a surf-beaten rock or
sandbank and the confusing sounds of passing merchant ships, making a
difficult task more difficult, as will be seen when we come to the
actual fighting.
CHAPTER VI
SOME CURIOUS WEAPONS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
ALTHOUGH modern war has shown that there exists no certain antidote for
the submarine, it nevertheless brought into being many curious weapons
of attack and defence. It is the purpose of this chapter to describe
some of the anti-submarine devices used with more or less successful
results during the protracted naval operations against the Central
Powers.
INDICATOR NETS
Among the most important of these were the immense meshes of wire known
as "indicator nets," which were used to entangle a submarine and then to
proclaim her movements to surface ships waiting to attack with guns and
depth charges.
[Illustration: FIG. 11.--Diagram showing principal features of a line of
submerged indicator nets. _AA._ Two sections (100 feet in breadth) of
thin wire-netting with a very wide mesh. _B._ Framework of wire rope
holding each section of net in place by means of metal clips _C_. _C._
Metal clips which expand and release netting from rope frame when a pull
of more than 100 lb. is exerted upon them. _D._ Line of invisible glass
balls, or hollow floats, attached to a surface wire _E_, supporting by
wires _F_, the nets which hang down from the surface vertically in long
lines (1/2 to 1 mile in length and 50 feet deep). _G._ Heavy iron
weights or sinkers holding down the nets by their weight when hanging in
water. _H._ Wooden floats, attached to each section of net by wires _I_.
_J._ Canisters of chemical which give off flame and smoke when exposed
to sea-water. _K._ Lanyard attached to surface wire _E_. When a section
of net is pulled out of its wire frame by a submarine passing through
the line the float is dragged along the surface by the wire _I_. The
lanyard is held back by being attached to surface wire _E_, and pulls a
plug out of the canister _J_, exposing the chemical inside to the
sea-water (see Fig. 12).]
These nets were made of specially light but strong wire, with a mesh of
several feet. They were joined together in lengths of 100 feet by metal
clips which opened when a certain strain was exerted on any particular
section. Their depth was usually about 50 feet, and they were laid in
lengths varying from a few hundred yards to two miles. Weights at the
lower end and invisible glass floats along the top held them suspended
vertically from the surface. The floats were kept in place by a wire
hawser running along the top of the nets, and to this were attached, at
intervals, wooden buoys containing tin cases filled with a chemical
compound which, when brought into contact with sea-water, emitted dense
smoke by day and flame by night.
The 100-feet sections were linked together, and to the top and bottom
ropes, by the metal clips. These clips opened when a submarine headed
into that part of the line. The result was that a section of net
enveloped the bow of the under-water craft, was detached from the line
and carried along, dragging its _indicator float_ on the surface behind.
The indicator float, containing the chemical, was attached (1) to the
section of net by a short wire and (2) to the top rope of the whole line
by a lanyard, which, when pulled free, exposed the chemical contents of
the canisters in the float to the sea-water. The float was then dragged
along the surface burning furiously.
As there was nothing to materially impede her progress, a submarine
would consequently be unaware that she had passed through a line of nets
and was actually towing a flaming buoy. Even if she became aware of the
tell-tale appendage it would be extremely difficult to clear herself,
owing to the forward hydroplanes becoming entangled in the wire-netting,
before the fast surface ships, waiting in readiness, had spotted the
flaming buoy being towed along and were hot in pursuit.
Once entangled in such a net, the submarine's chance of avoiding
destruction was small. Not only did the indicator buoy proclaim her
every movement to the pursuing surface ships, so that she could not
avoid them by turning, sinking to the bottom or doubling in her tracks,
but it also enabled depth charges to be literally dropped on her decks.
[Illustration: FIG. 12.--Diagram showing a submarine entangled in a
submerged net. The submarine _A_ after passing through a line of nets
emerges with her bows enveloped by one section _B_ which she has carried
out of its wire-rope frame. The flaming buoy _C_, betraying her
movements, is being towed along the surface.]
A considerable measure of success attended the use of this ingenious
device until "Fritz" became shy of waters close inshore, and kept a
careful look-out for possible lines of indicator nets when forced to
pass through narrow channels and waterways. One of the main
disadvantages attending the use of these nets was the impossibility of
laying them--or, when laid, of hauling them inboard again, during even
moderately rough seas. Another difficulty which presented itself when
indicator nets were required to be laid in the open sea was the
screening of the waiting surface ships from observation. Submarines
could not be used on account of their slow speed, and when fast patrol
craft cruised about openly within easy range of the nets "Fritz"
suspected a trap and steered clear. Even this, however, had its uses.
MINE NETS
It was sought to overcome this difficulty by attaching small explosive
mines to the nets instead of indicator floats, so that when a submarine
passed through a line she unavoidably struck one or other of the
attached mines, which instantly exploded.
This device also proved fairly successful, but the dangers of handling
mined nets were considerable and disasters resulted. Furthermore, as
such obstructions could not be securely moored in one spot for very
long, owing to the action of gales and strong tides, it became necessary
for the sake of neutral and allied shipping to maintain a vessel in the
vicinity from which warnings could be issued and repairs to the nets
effected. This partly defeated the object of mined nets, except for the
closing of narrow fair-ways, and their scope as a weapon of attack
became strictly limited.
THE MODIFIED SWEEP
This elaborate and costly anti-submarine device was very widely, but not
altogether successfully, employed by the auxiliary fleet during the
first two years of war. It was nothing more than a long explosive tail
towed submerged by a surface ship, the object being to either drag it
over a submarine resting on the sea-bed, or else, if the under-water
craft was moving, to so manoeuvre the towing surface ship as to swing
the tail close to the U-boat, when the heavy charges of T.N.T. attached
to the armoured electric cable, forming the tail, would be exploded
either by actual contact with the hull of the enemy, or, when
sufficiently close to be effective, by the closing of a firing circuit
on board the surface ship.
[Illustration: FIG. 13.--Diagram showing a vessel towing a modified
sweep. This appliance consists of an armoured electric cable _G_ towed
in vertical loop under the surface. The floats _D_ support the 100-lb.
charges _E_, which have strikers attached. If a submarine _B_ is lying
"doggo" on the sea-bed one or other of these charges may strike her hull
and the whole line then blows up, shattering everything in the
surrounding sea. If the strikers fitted on the charges do not touch the
submarine the whole line can be exploded at will from the surface ship
by closing an electric circuit.]
Excellent in theory but very difficult of accomplishment in actual
practice. The diagram given will explain the details of this elaborate
contrivance, which, however, was soon discarded for more practical
methods, although at least one German submarine is known to have been
destroyed by it.
LANCE BOMBS
These little engines of destruction were intended for fighting at close
quarters, and can be described here in a few lines because of their
guileless simplicity. They consisted of conical explosive bombs on the
ends of broom handles! A strong man could whirl one of them round his
head, like a two-handed sword or battle-axe, and, when the momentum was
sufficient, hurl it over the water for about seventy-five feet. On
nose-diving into the sea and hitting the hull of a submarine in the act
of rising or plunging, the little bomb, containing about 7 lb. of
amatol, was exploded by contact.
[Illustration: FIG. 14.--A lance bomb. The wooden handle _A_ enables the
charge _B_ (7 lb. of high explosive) to be whirled round the head and
hurled a distance of about twenty yards.]
The damage inflicted on one of the earlier types of submarines by an
under-water hand-grenade or lance bomb depended entirely upon what part
of the vessel happened to be struck. Their sphere of usefulness was,
from the first, very limited, and the advent of the big cruiser
submarine, with armoured conning-tower and 5-inch guns, rendered them
obsolete.
SMOKE SCREENS
We now come to a more useful device of the purely defensive type
employed to screen surface ships from submarine attack. The very simple
mechanical and chemical apparatus needed for making the heavy clouds of
smoke needs no description beyond that given in the text, but something
must be said here regarding the methods of use.
It was not until the third year of the Great War had been ushered in by
the unprecedented sinking of Allied merchantmen by German U-boats that
the value of the smoke screen as a means of baffling an under-water
attack was fully realised. Convoy guards were supplied with the
necessary appliances for emitting the fumes with which to cover the
movements of the ships under their protection, and so successful was
this method of blinding attacking submarines that within a few months
thousands of transports, food-ships and warships had been equipped.
When a submarine proclaimed her presence in the vicinity of a convoy
either by showing too much of her periscope or by a misdirected torpedo,
the guard-ships on the flank attacked immediately dropped their smoke
buoys as they continued moving at full speed. By this means an
impenetrable optical barrier was interposed between the attacking
submarine and the fleet of merchantmen under convoy. When thus shielded
from attack--a submarine values her small stock of torpedoes (six to
ten) too highly to risk the loss of one or more on something she cannot
even see--the mercantile fleet altered course so as to present their
sterns to the attacking U-boat, while certain prearranged warships
belonging to the escort proceeded to the attack with guns and depth
charges.
This means of masking the movements of ships--by no means new in naval
warfare--was employed with conspicuous success in the operations of
Allied squadrons off Zeebrugge. Individual merchantmen, when attacked by
one or more submarines, often threw out a smoke screen to avoid
destruction by the big surface guns of the more modern German craft, and
its use to cover the movements of transports was very frequently
resorted to.
CAMOUFLAGE
The use of camouflage, or the deceptive painting and rigging of ships,
came first into being owing to the method employed by submarines for
judging the speed of passing surface ships by the white wave thrown off
from their bows. It is of the utmost importance for the commander of an
under-water warship to correctly judge the speed of the vessel he is
about to attack before discharging a torpedo at her. If the estimated
speed is too high the torpedo will, in all probability, pass ahead of
the moving target, and if it is too low it will run harmlessly astern.
To cause this to happen as frequently as possible, and valuable
torpedoes to be wasted--even if the attacking submarine herself could
not then be discovered and destroyed--it became advisable to paint
imitation white waves on the bows of slow-moving ships in order to give
the appearance of speed.
[Illustration: FIG. 15.--A camouflaged ship. It will be observed that a
vessel so painted would, from a distance of several miles, give the
appearance of a ship sinking while headed in the opposite direction.]
So successful was this simple form of deceptive paint-work that a
special camouflage section of the naval service, with an eminent artist
as its director, was formed, and all kinds of grotesque designs were
painted on the broadsides and superstructures of almost every British
merchantman operating in the submarine danger zone.
There was method and meaning in the seemingly haphazard streaks of
black, green, blue and white. When looked at from close range only a
jumble of colours could at first be seen, but if the distance was
increased the effect became instantly apparent. In some cases the
deceptive decoration caused big ocean liners to appear small and
insignificant. In others it gave the appearance that the vessel was
sinking; while quite a favourite ruse was to cause the vessel to appear
as if she was travelling in the opposite direction to that which she
really was. Two-funnelled ships became single-funnelled, when viewed
from a distance or in a dim light, by the simple expedient of painting
one funnel black and the other light grey. Liners with tiers of
passenger decks had the latter obscured by contrasts of colouring which
were really masterpieces of deceptive art. In fact so deceptive became
almost every ship in the dim light of dawn and dusk that collisions were
often narrowly averted.
It frequently occurred that paint alone was not sufficient to disguise a
ship, and woodwork and canvas were resorted to. Big guns were made of
drain-pipes and shields of the wood from packing-cases. Cargo boats were
given the appearance of cruisers, and cruisers reduced to the appearance
of cargo boats. In this way hostile submarines were induced to attack
ships, thinking them unarmed and helpless, when in reality they were
small floating forts. But at this point simple camouflage ceases and the
famous _Mystery Ship_ begins. Before closing this chapter, however, it
must be pointed out that camouflage only came into being when the German
U-boats commenced their ruthless submarine warfare.
CHAPTER VII
MYSTERY SHIPS
THE "Q" boat, or mystery ship, has been surrounded by so much secrecy
that to most people its very being is an unknown quantity. Yet it is to
these curious vessels of all sizes and types that the destruction of
many hostile submarines was due, and the dangerous work performed by
their intrepid crews equalled anything described in sea romance.
The mystery ship was not a specially constructed war vessel, such as a
destroyer or cruiser, but merely a merchantman converted into a
powerfully armed patrol ship, camouflaged to give the appearance of
genuine innocence, but with masked batteries, hulls stuffed with wood to
render them almost unsinkable, hidden torpedo tubes, picked gunners, a
roving commission and a daring commander and crew. Their work was
performed on the broad highways of the sea, and they hunted singly or in
pairs, often fighting against overwhelming odds with certain death as
the price of failure.
[Illustration: INNOCENT LOOKING BUT DEADLY, H.M.S. "HYDERABAD"
The famous "Mystery Ship," powerfully built to resemble a helpless
merchantman. Sitting almost flat on the surface of the sea the torpedoes
from U-boats ran harmlessly beneath her keel.
_Thornycroft & Co., Ltd._]
[Illustration: THE HIDDEN TORPEDO TUBES OF H.M.S. "HYDERABAD"
_Thornycroft & Co., Ltd._]
The number of these vessels was not large, possibly 180, but their
operations extended far and wide. They roamed the North Sea, the
Atlantic, the English Channel, the Mediterranean, the Arctic Ocean
and even the Baltic, but until challenged were quite unknown to all
other vessels of the Allied navies. Theirs was a secret service,
performed amidst great hardships, with no popular applause to spur them
on.
As all "Q" boats--as they were officially called--differed from each
other in size and armament, any description given here can only be taken
as applying to one or more vessels with which the writer was personally
familiar. Some of these so-called mystery ships were old sailing
schooners, others fine steamships, while quite a number were converted
fishing smacks, drifters and trawlers, the method being to give the
prospective commander a free hand in the conversion of his ship from a
peaceable merchantman to a camouflaged man-of-war, and many were the
ingenious devices used.
One vessel fitted out for this desperate duty at a Scottish base was a
steamer of about 400 tons burden. She was armed with a 4.7 quick-firing
gun hidden in a deck-house with imitation glass windows, the sides of
which could be dropped flat on to the deck for the gun to be trained
outboard by simply pressing an electric button on the steamer's bridge.
Two life-boats, one on each side of the aft deck, were bottomless, and
formed covers for two additional 12-pounder guns. A false deck in the
bow shielded a pair of wicked-looking torpedo tubes, each containing an
18-inch Whitehead ready for launching; and the crew for each gun were
able to reach their respective weapons, without appearing on deck, by
means of specially constructed gangways and hatches. The very act of
dropping the sides of the aft gun-house hoisted the White Ensign, and
technically converted this unsuspicious-looking merchantman, which asked
only to be allowed to pursue its lawful vocation on the high seas, into
a heavily armed warship.
This "Q" boat had, when met and challenged by the writer's ship, already
accounted for no less than three German submarines which had opened the
attack from close range, thinking her defenceless.
Another smaller mystery ship was a converted fishing drifter with a
single 12-pounder gun on a specially strengthened platform fitted in the
fish-hold, which had been cleaned, matchboarded and painted to provide
accommodation for the crew of picked gunners. This little ship had no
torpedo tubes and the muzzle of her gun was hidden beneath fishing nets.
There were, however, some very large and elaborately fitted "Q" boats.
These had specially constructed torpedo tubes low down in the hull,
masked 4.7-inch guns in more than one position, special chutes for depth
charges, coal bunkers arranged round the vital machinery to protect it
from shell-fire, and, moreover, were filled with wood to make them
almost unsinkable even if torpedoed.
Each such vessel was provided with a "panic party," whose duty was to
rush to the life-boats when the ship was attacked by a submarine. This
gave the final touch to the disguise, and often induced the submarine to
save further torpedoes by coming to the surface and continuing the
assault with gun-fire.
[Illustration: FIG. 16.--Method of masking a 3, 6, 12 or 13 pounder gun.
_A._ Stern of ship. _B._ Shield constructed to resemble a life-boat
which can be raised or lowered over gun _C_.]
The story of the sinking of the last German submarine in the war by the
"Q 19" will give some idea of how these vessels worked. It occurred in
the Straits of Gibraltar, about twenty-four hours before the signing of
the Armistice. The Q 19 was waiting in the Straits expecting to
intercept three big U-boats on their way back to Heligoland. About
midnight the first of these craft came along, and sighting the
innocent-looking "Q" boat prepared to attack her with gun-fire. For
nearly an hour the mystery ship "played" the submarine by pretending to
make frantic efforts to escape, but all the time allowing the
under-water craft to draw closer and closer.
The "Q" boat was under a heavy fire from the submarine, one shell
wounding eleven out of the crew of sixty, another carrying away the mast
and a portion of the funnel, but no sign of a gun was yet displayed on
board the surface ship. This withholding of fire until the last moment,
when the range has become short and the effect certain, is one of the
great nerve tests imposed on the crews of all mystery ships. It is an
essential of success, for a few wild shots at long range would disclose
the fact that the vessel was heavily armed, and the attacking submarine
would either sheer off or else submerge and use her torpedoes.
When the chase had been on for about fifty minutes, and the submarine
was only 200 yards astern, the "panic party" in the "Q" boat rushed for
the life-boats. The shells were now doing serious damage to both hull
and upper works, and the submarine was creeping close to give the _coup
de grâce_.
At this, the psychological moment, the order to open fire was given. The
collapsible deck-house, shielding the 4.7 gun, fell away on its hinges.
Eleven shots were fired in quick succession, all of which struck the
submarine. One blew the commander off the conning-tower and another rent
a gaping hole in the vessel's hull. In less than fifteen minutes the
fight was over and the last U-boat to be sunk in the Great War of
civilisation had disappeared beneath the waters of the Straits of
Gibraltar.[4]
FOOTNOTE:
[4] One of the remaining U-boats afterwards succeeded in torpedoing the
battleship _Britannia_.
CHAPTER VIII
A TYPICAL WAR BASE
THE last few chapters have dealt mainly with the weapons used in
anti-submarine warfare. We now come to the naval bases on which the
fleets armed with these curious devices were stationed for active
operations.
Around the coasts of the British Isles there were about forty of these
war bases, each with its own patrol flotillas, minesweeping units and
hunting squadrons. The harbours, breakwaters and docks had to be
furnished with stores, workshops, wireless stations, quarters for
officers and men, searchlights, oil-storage tanks, coal bunkers,
magazines, fire equipment, guard-rooms, signal stations, hospitals, pay
offices, dry docks, intelligence centres and all the vitally necessary
stores, machinery and equipment of small dockyards.
To do this in the shortest possible time, and to maintain the supplies
of such rapidly consumed materials as oil fuel, coal, food, paint, rope
and shells for perhaps a hundred ships for an indefinite number of
years, it was often necessary to lay down metals and sidings to connect
the base with the nearest railway system. At many bases secure moorings
had also to be laid by divers, and the channels and fair-ways dredged.
The larger bases also required temporary shore defences, and booms
arranged across the harbour entrances to prevent hostile under-water
attacks.
Then came the problem of finding the personnel. The ships had already
been provided for, but to keep them in fighting condition, and for the
work of administration, it was necessary to have a shore navy behind the
sea-going units. An admiral from the active or retired list was
appointed to each base as the "Senior Naval Officer." Then came
additions to his staff in the persons of executive and engineer
commanders, officers of the Reserve, chaplains, surgeons and paymasters.
With these departmental chiefs came their respective staffs of warrant
officers, petty officers, wireless operators, engine-room artificers,
motor mechanics, shipwrights, carpenters, smiths, naval police,
signalmen, storekeepers, sick berth attendants and parties of seamen.
Finally, a generous supply of printed forms and train-loads of stores.
This then, in brief outline, was the material which went to form the war
bases of the auxiliary, or anti-submarine, fleets. In many cases much
more was required, especially at such important depôts as Dover, Granton
and Queenstown. About the permanent dockyards, like Portsmouth,
Devonport and Rosyth, or the Grand Fleet bases, nothing need be said
here, because they do not come within the scope of this book. The same
may also be said of that desolate but wonderful natural anchorage,
_Scapa Flow_, the headquarters of the Grand Fleet in the misty north.
Each of these mammoth naval bases had an auxiliary base for
anti-submarine and minesweeping divisions.
With a knowledge of these essentials a more detailed description of a
typical war base and the work of its staff may prove of interest. Taking
as an example a large depôt, supplying all the needs of over a hundred
erstwhile warships, and situated in the centre of the danger zone, we
find a central stone pier on which has been erected a perfect maze of
wood and corrugated iron buildings, with the tall antennæ of a wireless
station, a little look-out tower and a gigantic signal mast from which a
line of coloured flags is aflutter in the sea breeze. The shore end of
the pier is shut off from prying eyes by a lofty wooden palisade with
big gates, in one of which is a small wicket. Outside a sentry with
fixed bayonet paces to and fro.
[Illustration: AFTER-DECK OF THE "HYDERABAD"
Showing quick-firing gun on disappearing platform.
_Thornycroft & Co., Ltd._]
[Illustration: AFTER-DECK OF THE "HYDERABAD"
Showing gun raised to firing position.
_Thornycroft & Co., Ltd._]
The first person inside the sacred precincts to greet the stranger is a
keen-eyed "Petty Officer of the Guard." When the credentials have been
examined the visitor is sent under the guidance of a bluejacket to the
"Officer of the Day," whose "cabin" is inside the maze of corrugated
iron and weather-board. The doors flanking the passages traversed
display cryptic lettering, such as I.O. (Intelligence Office), S.R.
(Signal Room), S.N.O. (Senior Naval Officer), "Commander" (usually the
second in command of the base), P.M.S.O. (Port Minesweeping Officer),
C.B.O. (Confidential Book Office), M.L.Com. (Motor Launch Commander),
O.O.W. (Officer of the Watch), "Officers only" (the wardroom and
gunroom combined), and, finally, the O.O.D., or the abode of that
much-worried individual, the Officer of the Day, whose duties happily
terminate when his twenty-four hours of administrative responsibility
are over, only, however, to return in strict rotation.
[Illustration: FIG. 17.--The central pier of a typical anti-submarine
naval base. 1. Wardroom. 2. Sec. to senior naval officer. 3. Admiral's
cabin (S.N.O.). 4. Flag commander (or lieutenant). 5. Base intelligence
office. 6. Base commander. 7. Chaplain and gift store. 8. Drafting
officer. 9. Store officer. 10. Chart-issuing office. 11. Cabin of the
officer of the day. 12. Telephone exchange. 13. Warrant officers. 14.
Pay office. 15. Fleet paymaster. 16. Paymasters and asst.-paymasters.
17. Writers and W.R.N.S. 18. Engineer-commander's office. 19. Men's
quarters (for base duties and reserve). 20. Men's recreation room. 21.
Petty officers. 22. Men's mess-room and adjoining galley. 23. Sick-bay.
24. Fleet surgeon. 25. Baths. 26. Baths. 27. Stores. 28. Boom defence
office. 29. King's harbour master. 30. Hull defects office. 31. Police
and cells. 32. Coaling office. 33. Wireless cabin. 34. Guard room. 35.
Railway platform. 36. Sentry box. 37. Cranes. 38. Berths for armed
yachts in harbour. 39. Motor launches in harbour. 40. Drifters. 41.
Patrol trawlers. 42. Minesweepers. 43. Whalers. 44. Coastal motor boats.
Larger ships, such as sloops, destroyers, "P" boats, coaling and
ammunition hulks, lying out in basin.]
Again comes an apologetic examination of credentials, possibly followed
by a few minutes with the admiral commanding, and then the grand tour
commences. First come the ships lying alongside the stone pier, with
their short funnels belching black and very sooty smoke. These are the
"stand-off" units, whose crews are enjoying a brief few hours ashore
after days or weeks out on the dangerous seas beyond. Big drums of oil
are being lowered by ropes on to their decks. The sound of hammering
comes from more than one engine-room, where machinery is being
overhauled. On the decks of several, men with little or no resemblance
to the clean "Jacks" of the naval review are fondly polishing, painting
or greasing the long grey barrels, steel breech mechanism, or the yellow
metal training wheels of guns. Others are cleaning rifles, which have
recently been used with special bullets for sinking floating mines. One
ship is washing down decks after coming in late from night patrol;
another is receiving its three-monthly coat of grey paint; while on to
the deck of a whaler--black and ominous-looking--hundredweights of
provisions in boxes and bags are being lowered from the quay.
Astern of these lie two tiers of light grey spick and span motor
launches, their decks spotlessly white, and their small canvas and glass
screened wheel-houses ill concealing polished brass indicators, Morse
signalling key, electric switches, binnacles and other paraphernalia.
Behind these lie the 40-knot coastal motor boats, like miniature
submarines, with torpedoes in cavities in their aft decks, and little
glass-sheltered steering-wells. Further towards the head of the pier is
a line of big flat Scotch motor drifters, built for rough weather with
9-inch timbers, their decks a maze of wire nets, glass floats and
brick-red chemical canisters.
On the opposite side of the pier, in front of the S.N.O.'s cabin, lies a
big grey yacht with four 12-pounder guns and an anti-aircraft weapon
pointing over the sky-reflecting water. Lying out in the basin are big
minesweepers, looking more like pre-war third-class cruisers, two
slim-looking dark grey destroyers, a dredger and a few nondescript
craft.
Inside the first row of iron sheds are stores, with barrels of tar,
drums of paint, immense coils of rope and a naval "William
Whiteley's"--in which anything from a looking-glass to a ball of string,
or a razor to a dish-cloth, can be obtained in exchange for a signed
form from the Naval Store Officer, whose cabin near by is a maze of
similar forms of all colours.
Then a worried-looking man hurries by and the O.O.D. smiles. "He's the
coaling officer, and there's some twenty ships waiting to get alongside
to take the beastly stuff aboard," is the laconic explanation.
A cabin marked I.O. is entered--every room is a cabin in a naval base.
Here the walls are decorated with innumerable charts with mysterious red
lines. A curious device, with the names of all the ships belonging to
the base painted on wooden slides, reaches across one side. It is the
indicator which shows at a glance the ships at sea and those in harbour,
the names of those under repair, the unit to which each vessel belongs
and when she goes out or comes in for "stand-off."
This is the Intelligence Office, and signals and wireless messages from
the patrols and battle fleets are being almost continuously brought in
and carried out by messengers. The Commanding Officer (C.O.) of a
minesweeper is making inquiries about tides and the exact position on
the chart of a newly located mine-field. Another officer is locking a
black patent-leather dispatch-case--he is the King's Messenger or, more
correctly, the "Admiralty Dispatch Bearer," who carries to and from
London and the fleets all the secret correspondence and memoranda of the
Naval War Staff and other important departments. A big safe in the
corner of the cabin contains the secret codes and ciphers used when
transmitting messages, and two overworked officers are busy at near-by
desks translating signals to and from "plain English."
The next cabin contains the admiral's secretary and his staff of
writers. Here a flotilla commander is receiving his "sailing orders,"
without which no ship proceeds on a voyage. Adjoining this is the Pay
Office, in which, with the exception of a newly joined recruit
mortgaging his pay for two weeks ahead--he knows that he will be at sea
for that time--there is a decided air of quietude. The rush in this
abode of paymasters comes at the end of each month, when all the
officers arrive in a body to demand the meagre fruits of their labours.
Sandwiched between the clean and varnished cabin of the Base Commander,
who is "taking" defaulters, and the camp-bedded apartment of the O.O.W.
is a most interesting little combined cabin and store, presided over by
the Chaplain. Here are piles of woollen socks, cardigans, balaclavas,
mitts and other clothes knitted by the thoughtful women of the Empire
for their sailor sons. Here seamen are estimating the cold-resisting
qualities of different garments--for winter in the North Sea is the next
thing to Arctic exploration. Officers are popping in and out to borrow a
pile of books--thrice blessed were the senders of these donations. The
corner of the cabin is piled with fresh vegetables, but alas! the cry is
apples! No exhortations to righteousness adorn the walls, and the
chaplain is joking with a big stoker who is distractedly turning over
the cardigans in search for one large enough to encompass his massive
frame. A signal boy slips in, gets chocolate, gives a breathless thanks
and slips out just in time to avoid the playfully raised hand of the
P.O. of his ship. Two deck hands, covered in coal dust, put their heads
round the door to ask if they can have a bath, and the indefatigable
chaplain hands them the keys of the room provided for the purpose by the
generous.
Religion here is more practical than theoretical. If a man swears when
the "Padre" is present he pays a small fine, which goes to the
recreation or other needy fund. The Commander is not immune from this
law at the base under review, and has more than once been "heavily
fined" for giving his true opinion of German sailors and winter weather.
The next cabin is that of the O.O.W., a seething mass of officers
demanding "duty boats" and pinnaces to convey them to and from their
ships lying out in the fair-way. Others are expostulating about being
ordered to sea during their "stand-off," informing everyone what a
rotten service the navy is, crossing-sweeping is a sinecure compared
with it. Then a few pass on to the cabin near the men's quarters. Here
the "Drafting Officer" is trying to palm off a deck hand on the C.O. of
a trawler, who is vainly explaining that he must have a signalman. A
telephone rings and news comes from the "Sick Bay" that an engineer has
been badly burned and will be unable to go to sea with his ship. The
distracted drafting officer searches through his lists of reserves for
some competent man to take the place of the casualty.
Peace reigns in the adjoining department, where a grey-haired veteran is
issuing charts, "Sailing Directions," "Tide Tables" and "Warnings to
Mariners." In the near-by engineer-commander's office worried experts
are wrestling with innumerable problems relating to M.L. motors, steam
capstans, steam steering gear, electric dynamos, damaged propellers,
broken shafts, boiler cleaning and the numerous imperfections of
overworked ships' engines.
The Boom Defence staff is placidly serene. The turn of this department
comes after a heavy gale has damaged the submarine nets, chains and
buoys. The torpedo officers and their "parties" are discussing the best
way of moving four of these steel monsters from a neighbouring depôt
ship to a new "Q" boat with only a rowing-boat at their disposal--soon
the O.O.W. will be called upon to supply a drifter for the purpose.
In the ordnance store a veteran P.O. is trying to make his list of
returned brass shell-cases correspond with the number of shells supplied
to various ships six months before. He knows the sailors' fondness for
shell-cases as ornaments in their little far-away homes, and, failing to
make all the figures agree, decides that some _must_ have been "washed
overboard."
The Port Minesweeping Officer is discussing with his sea commanders the
clearing of a new mine-field laid by U-C-boats within the past few days,
when a sudden stir is caused by the arrival of a signal from the
wireless room to the effect that one of his vessels has struck a mine in
lat. ---- long. ---- and is sinking. He appeals by telephone to the M.L.
commander and in less than ten minutes a flotilla of fast launches is
racing at 19 knots to the rescue.
[Illustration: MOCK-WHEEL AND COMPASS-PEDESTAL OF THE "HYDERABAD"
_Thornycroft & Co., Ltd._]
[Illustration: WHICH COLLAPSE AND LEAVE A CLEAR RANGE FOR THE GUNS
_Thornycroft & Co., Ltd._]
In the Admiral's cabin there is to be a conference of senior officers
later in the day to decide on the best means of ridding the seas within
that area--and each base has its own area of sea--of a hostile submarine
which has been inflicting undue loss upon shipping, its latest victim
being a Danish barque.
The combined wardroom and gunroom has some twenty occupants, reading the
newspapers and magazines, warming themselves before the two big fires,
or talking in little groups. This base has suffered some heavy losses
lately, but reference to those "gone aloft" is seldom made, except
quietly and a little awkwardly. The talk is of theatres in neighbouring
towns, the respective merits of certain types of ships and weapons, the
prospects of early leave, the dirty warfare of "Fritz" or the "beauties"
of the North Sea in winter.
In this room all questions of rank and precedence are more or less
waived. There are, of course, differences, especially when the wardroom,
or abode of senior officers, does duty also as a gunroom for the
juniors. But here there is camaraderie and an absence of iron
discipline, although a sub-lieutenant would be extremely ill advised
either to drop the prefix "Sir" or to slap the Commander on the back in
an excess of joviality, relying on "neutral territory" to save him from
rebuke. It is, however, no uncommon event to see all ranks of officers
engaged in a heated debate, or groups of juniors laughing round the fire
while their elders are vainly trying to concentrate their minds on
the latest Press dispatches. Games are played and glasses clink merrily,
but in a gunroom there is a very strict limit as to both time and
quantity, though none regarding volume or discordance of sound.
* * * * *
Passing on to the organisation of the flotillas for sea, we find in this
large base six minesweeping units, two being composed of fast paddle
sweepers and four of trawlers. The former are used for distant
operations and comprise nine vessels. They work in pairs, but the extra
ship is available to sink mines cut up by the sweeps of the others, and
to be immediately ready to beat off submarine attacks.
The trawlers are engaged in sweeping _daily_ the approaches to the
harbour and a recognised channel up and down the coast. Their work
overlaps with that done by the ships belonging to the neighbouring
bases. In this way the "war channel," about which more will be said
later, was kept free of mines, and afforded a safe route for ships from
the Thames to the Tyne, and in reality to the northernmost limit of
Scotland.
This important duty was seldom left unperformed even for a day, except
during fierce gales. Often the discovery of a distant mine-field caused
many ships to be concentrated on clearing it, and the number available
for the "routine sweeps" was consequently reduced, but longer hours of
this arduous and dangerous work made up the difference, and the work
went on in summer fog and winter snow for over four years.
The anti-submarine patrols were composed of five ships each, under the
command of the senior officer of the unit--frequently a lieutenant with
the responsibility of a captain. Their work lay out on the wastes of sea
lying between England and Germany. It was seldom that the whole five
vessels of each unit cruised together, the usual method being to scatter
over the different "beats" and rendezvous in a given latitude and
longitude at a specified time and date. They were usually able to
communicate with each other and with the base on important matters by
wireless. Their periods at sea varied from ten days to three weeks, with
a four days' "stand off" when they came into harbour. But of this time
one day at least was spent in coaling and provisioning the ship ready
for the next patrol. This ceaseless vigilance on the grey-green seas of
England's frontier was seldom interrupted for more than a few days in
the year by impossible gales. Anything short of literally mountainous
seas did not prevent the trawler patrols from riding out the storm
carefully battened down and with just sufficient speed to keep head to
sea.
The drifters were divided into patrol units, boom defence flotillas and
under-water or mine-net units. Their work was thus more varied but
equally as arduous and risky, as the loss of 30 per cent. of the entire
fleet of over 1000 ships affords undeniable proof. The periods of sea
duty were similar to those of the trawlers.
The motor launches at each base had some hundred square miles of sea to
guard, and hunted in fives. The rough weather these plucky little ships
endured in the open sea in mid-winter, the intense cold--for there was
no proper heating appliance--and the state of perpetual wetness made
their duties among the most arduous in the sea war. Later pages of true
narrative will show to the full the work of these gnats of the sea.
In addition to all these flotillas there were convoy ships, whaler
patrols, "Q" boats and a number of special duty ships. The work of the
former was of the most exacting character, and left the crews of these
vessels but little time ashore. In the base under review so arduous were
the duties of the convoy ships that it became a matter of
self-congratulation for patrol and sweeper officers and men that their
ships were not so employed, and this by men who sailed submarine and
mine infested seas for an average of 270 days in each year!
It must not be assumed that when in harbour there were no duties to be
performed by either officers or men of sea-going ships. They had, on the
contrary, to furnish anchor watches, shore sentries, duty crews for
emergency pickets, prisoner guards, working and church parties, to
attend drills, rifle practice, gun practice and instructional parades.
The officers had similar shore duties to perform, which left them little
time to rest from the strain of keeping watch and ward on the
death-strewn seas.
CHAPTER IX
THE CONVOY SYSTEM
ALTHOUGH the convoy system was employed at the beginning of the war for
the transport of the Imperial armies to France, and subsequently for all
the Allied troop movements overseas, it was some three years later
before it was extended to the entire British Mercantile navy, on which
the United Kingdom depended for too many of the necessities of civilised
life.
The rapid development of submarine piracy, however, compelled the
Admiralty, early in the year 1917, to resort to what was merely a new
form of the old system of protecting sea-borne trade. This comprised the
collection of all merchant ships passing through the danger zones into
nondescript fleets, and the provision of light cruisers, destroyers,
torpedo-boats, trawlers and occasionally (for coastal convoys) of patrol
launches to escort them. Certain types of aircraft were also frequently
used for observation and scouting purposes.
Previous to the adoption of the convoy system a merchantman, whether it
was a fast-moving liner or a sturdy but slow ocean tramp, _zigzagged_
through the danger zones with lights out and life-boats ready. Many were
the exciting runs made in this way, with shells ploughing up the water
around and torpedoes avoided only by the quick use of the helm; but the
courage of our merchant seamen was of that indomitable character
exhibited now for over three centuries, since the days of Drake,
Hawkins, Raleigh and the other sea-dogs of old.
But the danger zones grew wider as the radius of action of newer and
larger German submarines increased. At last no waters were immune, from
the Arctic circle to the Equator, or from Heligoland to New York.
The hour was one of extreme peril for the sea-divided Empire. To lose
several hundred ships, with many thousands of lives and much-needed
cargoes of food and munitions, when the valiant armies of civilisation
were battling with the Teuton hordes, was bad enough; but if the enemy
had been able, by casting aside the laws of humanity and sea war, to
compel British ships to remain in harbour or meet certain destruction on
the high seas, the result could only have been the complete failure of
the Allied cause, the conquest of Europe and the fall of the greatest
political edifice since Imperial Rome.
Between the world and these catastrophes, however, stood the undefeated
Mercantile Marine and the Allied navies. Councils were held in the
historic rooms of Whitehall and the old convoy system emerged from the
archives of Nelson's day. The commerce raiders were no longer the
canvas-pressed privateers of the sixteenth, seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, who fought a clean fight, often against great
odds, but were submarine pirates of the mechanical age, who only
appeared from the sea depths when their victims had been placed _hors de
combat_.
It is an old axiom of war that new weapons of attack are invariably met
by new methods of defence. So it was with the convoy system which gave
the death-blow to German hopes of a submarine victory. In order to
understand this _new_ method it is necessary to study the accompanying
diagram, which, however simple it may appear on paper, is extremely
difficult to carry out in practice.
At each great port there was a convoy officer, who assembled the
merchant ships when they had been loaded and explained to their captains
the exact position each ship was to occupy when the fleet was at sea.
Printed instructions were handed round urging each vessel to keep its
correct station, stating the procedure to be adopted in the event of an
engine breakdown, giving the manoeuvres which were instantly to be
carried into effect when an attack was threatened, and finally the
special signals arranged for communication between the merchantmen and
their escort by day and by night.
The number of vessels composing a convoy varied, but often exceeded
twenty big cargo ships, carrying some 120,000 tons of merchandise, or
six liners, with 20,000 troops on board, while the escorting flotilla
consisted of a light cruiser, acting as flag-ship, six destroyers, two
special vessels ("P" boats) towing observation airships, and some eight
or ten trawlers, with possibly one or more seaplanes and several M.L.'s
for the first few miles of the voyage. The destroyers were spread out
ahead and on the flanks of the fleet, and by using their greatly
superior speed were able to zigzag and circle round the whole convoy.
[Illustration: FIG. 18.--Diagram showing the disposition of a convoy of
troops, munitions or food.]
In the event of an attack the whole fleet turned off from the course
they were steering at a sharp angle, showing only their sterns to the
U-boat. A destroyer acted as rearguard to prevent any of the convoyed
ships from straggling. When the fleet had arrived at a rendezvous far
out in the open sea, where the danger of a submarine attack was much
less, the escort handed over their charges to one or two ocean-going
cruisers, which stayed with the merchant ships throughout the remainder
of their voyage.
[Illustration: A MOTOR LAUNCH CLEARED FOR ACTION
_Yachting Monthly_]
The escorting flotilla then cruised about in the vicinity of the
rendezvous until an incoming convoy appeared. These ships were then
taken over from their mid-ocean cruiser guard and escorted back through
the danger zone to port, and so the game of war continued until months
became years.
All this may sound straightforward and quite simple, but there were
difficulties, to say nothing of dangers, which made it a most arduous
operation. First came the speed problem. Every merchant ship differed in
this important respect, so the speed of the slowest unit became the
speed of the entire fleet, and this reduction made an attack by
under-water craft much easier of accomplishment. Hence the call for
"standard ships," which is a point that should be borne in mind by
future generations as a safeguard against blockade. Then came the
question of destination, which increased the number of escorting
flotillas, and especially ocean cruiser guards, required for a given
number of cargo ships. Next there was the loading and unloading to be
considered, involving long hours and hard work by the men on the
quaysides. This great difficulty was one of the reasons for the
formation of docker battalions. Coaling such big fleets by given times
caused many grey hairs to appear where otherwise they would not have
been. Finally there was the danger of mines having been laid in the
fair-ways leading to the port, which necessitated every convoy being met
by special vessels to sweep the seas in front of each incoming and
outgoing fleet.
[Illustration: FIG. 19.--Diagram showing the convoy system.]
All this and more had to be contended with and overcome before each
convoy was able to sail. Then danger and difficulty came hand-in-hand.
On a bright morning, with probably a fresh breeze blowing and a choppy
sea, the work of the escorting flotilla was easy, but with such climatic
conditions the risk of attack was so great in the waters around the
coasts that troopships usually left harbour under cover of night. No
lights were then allowed, and it will not be difficult for readers to
imagine what it meant to be pounding through a black void in a
fast-moving destroyer, against, possibly, a heavy head sea, with some
twenty or thirty big ships in the darkness and spray around. Thick
sea-mists were the cause of endless trouble, for the safety of an
invisible fleet depended on the vigilance of a half-blind escort. Winter
gales scattered the ships and rendered signals invisible. Attacks came
from the most unexpected quarters and often from more than one point of
the compass at the same time. However, relief came at last, on that
never-to-be-forgotten morning when Sir David Beatty and his admirals
accepted the unconditional surrender of the German fleet and its unsunk
submarines.
Were this chapter to end with the foregoing description of the convoy
system the reader would not be in possession of the full facts from
which to gauge the importance of the work. Something must be said of
what was accomplished. First in order of importance came the transport
of many millions of soldiers not only from England to France, but also
to and from every colony and dominion of the world-wide Empire. By
August, 1915, the British navy had transported, across seas infested
with submarines and mines, a million men without the loss of a single
life or a single troopship.[5] The first Canadian army of 33,000 men
crossed the Atlantic in one big fleet of forty liners, under the escort
of four cruisers and a battleship, in October, 1914, without accident.
Transports to the number of 60 were required to convey the first
Australian army over the 14,000 miles of sea to Europe, and it was while
convoying this huge fleet that the cruiser _Sydney_ chased and destroyed
the German raider _Emden_. The Russian force which rendered valuable
service in France was safely convoyed over the 9000 miles of sea from
Dalny to Marseilles. Never once during the four and a half years of war
was the supply of food, munitions and reinforcements, or the return of
the wounded--to and from the many theatres of land operations--seriously
hindered by the German, Austrian or Turkish navies.
Turning to the gigantic task of guarding England's food supply, we find,
in one notable case, an example of the good work performed almost daily
for nearly five years. Over 4500 merchant ships had been escorted across
the North Sea to Scandinavian ports alone before the disaster of 14th
October 1917 befell the convoy on that route. On that occasion the
anti-submarine escort of three destroyers were intercepted, midway
between the Shetland Islands and Norway, by two heavily armed German
cruisers. The destroyers fought to the last to save their charges, but
unfortunately only three merchant ships succeeded in getting safely
away. Five Norwegian ships, three Swedish and one Danish ship were sunk.
From this it will be observed that not only British merchantmen were
protected by escorts.
The second attack on the Scandinavian convoy occurred on 12th December.
The escort consisted of two destroyers, the _Partridge_ and _Pellew_,
with four armed trawlers. Fortunately the convoy was comparatively a
small one, for it was attacked and almost totally destroyed in the North
Sea by four of the largest German destroyers. H.M.S. _Pellew_, although
badly damaged, succeeded in returning to England.
It may be rightly thought that in both these cases the escorting
flotilla was not strong enough, but it should be remembered that if
heavier ships had been employed they would have been much less able to
cope with a submarine attack. The escort in both cases was purely an
anti-submarine defence, and only on the Scandinavian and Netherlands
routes was a surface attack at all possible, because all exits from the
North Sea were securely closed by the strategic positions occupied by
the Grand Fleet and the battle cruiser squadrons, in conjunction with
subsidiary fleets at Harwich and extensive mine-fields.
When it became apparent that surface as well as submarine attacks on the
North Sea convoys had to be provided against, other means were promptly
adopted, and no further disasters occurred.
The strong escort accompanying the transports bringing to Europe the
first American army were attacked at night by a submarine, but succeeded
in avoiding the torpedoes fired. This was due to the smartness with
which the United States warships were manoeuvred. Three subsequent
attacks on the same convoy route also failed.
The Report of the War Cabinet for the year 1917 gives some remarkable
figures in support of the convoy system. On the Atlantic routes about 90
per cent. of the ships were formed into fleets and escorted. From the
inauguration of this system the loss on these routes from all causes was
0.82 per cent., and if all the trade routes to and from the United
Kingdom are included, the loss was only 0.58 per cent. With these
figures in mind, who will deny that the navy is the surest form of
national as well as Imperial insurance?
FOOTNOTE:
[5] When writing of the navy in this connection due praise should be
given to the Mercantile Marine, which this war has proved to be a very
important part of the _true_ sea power of Great Britain.
CHAPTER X
THE MYSTERIES OF SUBMARINE HUNTING EXPLAINED
WHEN all is said and done, anti-submarine warfare is very like big-game
hunting. Success depends entirely on the initiative, skill and resource
of the individual hunter. Contrary to general belief, there is, at
present, no sovereign remedy for the depredations of under-water craft
with their torpedoes and mines. There are, however, several recognised
methods of attack and defence employed by surface ships in this newest
form of naval warfare.
When the new navy took the seas in 1914-1915, bases were established not
only round the coasts of the British Isles, but also in the more distant
seas. The principal danger zones were, however, the North Sea, the
English Channel, the Irish Sea, the Mediterranean and the eastern
portion of the North Atlantic. It was through these waters that every
hostile submarine must pass on its voyage out and home.
This geographical factor restricted the theatre of major operations to
some 180,000 square miles of sea. Minor offensive measures might have to
be adopted against individual U-boats cruising at long distances from
their bases, as actually occurred off the United States coast, but the
fact of Germany possessing large submarine bases only along her own
North Sea coast, and temporary ones on the Flanders littoral, enabled a
concentration of Allied anti-submarine craft to be made in the narrow
seas which afforded the only means of entry and exit to and from those
bases.
The same may be said of Austria in the Adriatic and of Turkey behind the
Dardanelles.
This favourable combination of circumstances would not occur if (however
unthinkable) England, France or the United States were ever to wage a
rigorous war against shipping. The large number of oversea naval bases
possessed by these Powers would cause every sea to become a danger zone
within a few hours of the commencement of hostilities. No effective
concentration of hostile surface craft would be possible with the zone
of operations spread over the water surface of the entire globe, and if
the bases themselves were secured by predominant battle fleets, or
numbers of heavily armed monitors, the seas would quickly become
impossible for purposes of hostile transport.
This geographical restriction of the German and Austrian danger zones
made effective concentration of the Allied anti-submarine fleets and
their devices possible. The 180,000 square miles of sea, forming the
theatre of major operations, was, on special charts, divided into areas,
comprising a few hundred square miles of sea. Each area was given a
distinctive number, and a base was established for its own patrol and
minesweeping fleet.
The areas themselves were again subdivided on special charts into
squares or sections. Each square covered a few leagues of sea and was
known by an alphabetical sign. In this way the waters of the submarine
danger zone were divided into areas, with their bases and protective
fleets, and squares with their respective squadrons or ships.
[Illustration: FIG. 20.--Diagram showing division of sea into
anti-submarine patrol areas.]
Each square of sea was covered once or twice daily by its own patrol
ship or flotilla. Where the danger was less the patrol was not so
frequent and the squares were almost indefinite in size, but where the
chances of successful operations were exceptional, as in the Straits of
Dover, additional offensive measures were employed (see under _Mine
Barrages_).
This, then, was the chess-board on which the game of submarine warfare
was played. To facilitate communication between the different patrols
spread over the squares of sea, wireless was fitted in many ships, and
war signal stations were erected on prominent points of land. Each base
was able to communicate by wireless with any of its ships out on patrol
duty, and was also connected by land-line telegraph, telephone and
wireless with _naval centres_.
These latter were head intelligence offices, usually situated at the
great bases of the battle fleets. In this way any concentration of
hostile surface warships noticed by the patrols (sometimes submarines
were employed, especially in the Heligoland Bight) could be communicated
in a few minutes to the admirals commanding the Grand Fleet, the Battle
Cruiser Squadron or other large fighting organisations.
At the naval centres the movements of hostile submarines were recorded
on charts. If, for example, it was reported from a patrol boat that the
U16 had torpedoed a ship in square "C," area 41, at 10 A.M. (G.M.T.[6])
on 4th August, and the patrol had arrived on the scene too late to be of
any service, a warning could be wirelessed to hundreds of vessels on the
seas surrounding the scene of outrage to keep a careful look-out for
the U16.
[Illustration: FIG. 21.--Diagram showing how an area is covered by
patrols. _A_. Unit or flotilla of ships may proceed out from the base on
course indicated by arrows _B_, which would be called the "Northern
Inner Beat," and return to harbour on course _A_, "Northern Outer Beat."
Other units of ships would simultaneously follow the course _E_. These
and adjacent squares of sea would be covered daily by one or more ships
of each unit. The southern half of the area would be patrolled in the
same way. The "Outer Beat" is shown by the arrows _C_, and the "Inner
Beat" by the arrows _D_. The points _+F_ show the possible positions of
armed patrols acting independently of any unit or flotilla.]
Subsequently a further message might come to the naval centre that the
same submarine had been chasing a merchantman in square "D," "E" or "F"
in the adjoining area. A concentration of fast ships, such as
destroyers, M.L.'s or coastal motor boats, could then be made so as to
intercept the raider or enclose her in a circle while other vessels
hunted her down.
In a like manner important convoys coming down the coast, or entering a
danger zone from the open sea, could be met by a local flotilla and
escorted to a _rendezvous_ with a flotilla from the adjoining area. In
this way they were passed through the submarine and mine infested seas
to and from their harbour terminus.
Almost the same methods were employed in dealing with the thousands of
German mines. But to describe that part of anti-submarine warfare here
would be to encroach on the subject of a succeeding chapter.
PATROLS
The _method_ of patrolling the areas and squares of sea was
comparatively simple, though the same cannot be said of the actual work.
The lines of patrol were called "beats," and there was usually an
"inner" and an "outer" beat for each unit or flotilla of ships. If when
a ship (or a unit) reached her allotted square, from which the line of
patrol extended, she elected to proceed on the _inner beat_, she would
generally accomplish the return journey to the point of departure on the
_outer beat_, thus covering her respective zone of patrol, but leaving
the exact route to the discretion of the commanding officer. In this way
no hostile submarine with a knowledge of the system could be sure of
when or where a patrol ship would be met. In the same way it was left to
the commander of a flotilla to either divide his ships into pairs,
single units, or to maintain them as a homogeneous fleet, so that any
combination of hostile submarines could not be made which would be sure
of being able to attack a _single_ patrol. Such an enemy combination
might encounter a single ship, but it might also walk into the arms of a
whole flotilla; or it might attack a single ship only to find itself
surrounded by a following fleet.
[Illustration: FIG. 22.--Diagram illustrating the operations of a
hydrophone flotilla composed of armed motor launches. Each vessel is
given a number, and the flotilla proceeds in line-abreast along the
course shown by the dotted lines. Each vessel is one mile from the
other, and the whole line stops by signal at the point marked with a
cross. Hydrophones are put in operation, and after a period of listening
the flotilla continues on its course, as no submarine sounds are heard.
The flotilla turns to head south, and a stop is again made to listen on
the hydrophones. This time the sound of a hostile submarine is heard by
vessel No. 1, bearing S.W. This report is confirmed by vessel No. 2
hearing the same sound, bearing a few degrees farther W. The two
bearings _A_ and _B_ are then drawn on a chart, and the point where the
two lines cross is the approximate position of the invisible submarine.
The attack with depth charges is then ordered.]
The beats which were most distant from the base were given to the
largest ships. This was done because it was often impossible for the
more distant patrols to reach a place of shelter before one of the
fierce gales which swept the northern seas was upon them. Trawlers,
large steam yachts and converted merchantmen were usually employed on
squares more than one hundred miles distant from a harbour of refuge,
while motor launches kept watch and ward on the seas closer inshore.
The duration of patrols varied according to their position. Some lasted
three weeks and others only a few days or hours. When the ships returned
to their base after a spell at sea they were given a corresponding
"rest" in harbour. A three weeks' patrol meant several days'
"stand-off," while a two or three days' patrol entitled the ship to
twenty-four hours in the comparative comfort of a harbour.
It must not be imagined, however, that a stand-off meant entire idleness
or thorough rest. There were duties to perform which robbed it of much
that it was intended to give. Ships had to be coaled, provisioned,
painted or repaired. Engines had to be overhauled, sentries posted
ashore, a guard to be furnished, and every day one ship in each unit
that was in harbour had to be manned and in readiness for emergencies.
HYDROPHONE FLOTILLAS
We now come to the actual methods employed by surface craft when
attacking submarines. Although, as previously stated, much was left to
individual initiative, there were, nevertheless, certain recognised
methods.
Taking as an example the operations of a hydrophone flotilla of armed
motor launches, the number of vessels forming the unit was usually five.
When out scouting for the enemy they proceeded in line-abreast for about
one sea mile, then stopped their engines and listened on their
hydrophones for the noise of a submarine cruising in the vicinity. If
nothing was heard the mile-long line of miniature warships advanced
another mile and again stopped to listen. This manoeuvre was repeated
until one or other of the ships heard the familiar sound of a U-boat.
Nothing might be visible on the surface of the sea, but if this was the
case and the noise came up from the ocean depths over the electrified
wires of the detector, it was conclusive proof that a submarine was in
the near vicinity.
The M.L. first detecting the noise hoisted a signal (flag by day and
coloured electric light by night), giving the direction from which the
sound came (see Fig. 22). The next ship in the line to receive the
sound on its instruments then hoisted a signal, also giving the
bearing--_i.e._ N.N.W., E.S.E., etc. If the two coincided in regard to
direction, the attack commenced. If, however, they did not agree in this
important respect, the line of patrol ships advanced another mile and
listened again.
The flag-ship of the unit on receiving the direction from one or more
ships marked the lines of sound on a chart (as in Fig. 22), and when
this was substantiated by another ship the point where the two lines
crossed was known to be the position of the hostile submarine, and the
attack was ordered.
As to the exact method of an anti-submarine attack little need be said
here beyond the fact that the ships advanced at full speed,
manoeuvring into a special formation which enabled them to cover about
half a square mile of sea with the explosive force of their collective
depth charges.
When the attack had been completed all vessels engaged resumed their
stations and waited with quick-firing guns ready in case the monster
should rise from the deep to make a dying effort to destroy her
pursuers.
The tactical methods of anti-submarine attack were, of course, numerous,
and they varied according to the speed of the surface ships engaged.
What was possible of accomplishment by fast-moving coastal motor boats
or the larger-sized M.L.'s proved impracticable for the more heavily
armed but slow-moving trawlers and drifters. The tactics of these
latter craft were often of the simplest character, and consisted
principally of either independent attacks with the aid of hydrophones
and depth charges, or, more frequently, the assumption of an innocent
air in order to induce the submarine to open the attack at close range.
[Illustration: THE RESULT OF A DIRECT HIT
A photograph left by the Germans in Ostend showing a coastal motor boat
washed ashore after the great raid.
_Thornycroft & Co., Ltd._]
In many respects this proved the most effective method of anti-submarine
warfare. Not only did it frequently cause the under-water craft to rise
to the surface and commence the attack by gun-fire, in order not to
expend a valuable torpedo on what appeared to be an unarmed and helpless
ship, but it also produced a _moral_ effect throughout the German
submarine flotillas.
When a few U-boats had been either sunk or damaged in this way the news
that every Allied ship was heavily armed circulated among the enemy
personnel, and they became very nervous of attacking in any position
except totally submerged. This meant the loss of at least one torpedo,
out of from five to ten carried, for every attack made, whether
successful or unsuccessful, and the latter were predominant.
It soon became apparent that either they must risk surface attacks and
so save their torpedoes, or else curtail their cruises to meet the rapid
expenditure of their only submarine weapon. This does not, of course,
cover the activities of under-water mine-layers, whose nefarious purpose
consisted simply of laying their mines wherever they appeared most
likely to catch Allied shipping. These craft were usually armed with
torpedoes as well as mines, to enable them to continue the work of
destruction when the cargo of the latter had been safely laid. In this
way the problem of combating the German submarine offensive resolved
itself into two parts, one being to checkmate the commerce raider and
the other the mine-layer. With the second of these difficulties we shall
deal in a later chapter.
Many merchantmen, both Allied and neutral, owed their escape to this
camouflage warfare, which was brought to a high pitch of perfection and
daring in the now famous mystery ships.
What may be said to form the second method of anti-submarine warfare was
the decoy or camouflage system. Of primary importance in this category
were the mystery ships already described, but there were also
innumerable other _ruses de guerre_ which increased its efficiency.
To describe one of these will enable the reader to draw on his own
imagination for the remainder. A vessel was steaming in from the
Atlantic and was about a hundred miles from the Cornish coast when she
was attacked by a submarine above water. The surface ship was heavily
armed, but instead of using her weapons at once she sent out frantic
wireless signals for assistance. Every few minutes the call went far and
wide in plain Morse.
The shells from the submarine splashed into the sea around, but none
struck the target for some minutes. Had the surface ship desired, she
could in all probability have avoided the under-water craft by using her
superior speed, but instead she dropped back, allowing the submarine to
catch up to her, and the shells began to burst unpleasantly close.
Still the frantic wireless calls went forth. First the simple message:
"I am being attacked by a large German submarine." Then the vehemence
increased to: "I am being heavily shelled." A few minutes elapsed and
then the call: "Help. Submarine gaining on me." And finally: "Abandoning
ship."
At this point the submarine was close astern and the liner slowing down
preparatory to lowering her life-boats. The shells were damaging her
superstructure, but a heavy swell interfered with the German
marksmanship. Then came the surprise. A life-boat on the liner's poop
was hoisted clear of the deck and from under its cover there appeared
the lean grey muzzle of a 4.7-inch gun. A few sharp blasts of cordite
and the submarine sagged and disappeared.
The captain of the liner had noticed when first attacked that the
submarine was fitted with wireless and the calls sent out by him were in
_plain Morse code_. On the strength of these the German commander had
saved his torpedoes but lost his ship.
* * * * *
Another form of anti-submarine tactics was the employment of indicator
and mined nets around an apparently disabled ship, or in lines across
narrow channels known to be used by German submarines on their way to
and from their bases. This method has, however, received full mention
in other chapters.
* * * * *
What may be termed the third system of anti-submarine warfare was the
use of extensive mine barriers, specially laid to catch submarines
attempting to pass through them under water. The surface of the sea was
patrolled by shallow-draft vessels and the under-seas guarded by mines.
If a submarine was sighted in the vicinity of one of the mine barriers
already described she was attacked and forced to submerge herself in
order to escape destruction from the guns of the pursuing surface
flotilla. From that moment her fate was sealed. By cautious
manoeuvring and using to full advantage their great superiority of
speed (20-40 knots against 6-10 knots) the surface ships were able to
head their quarry into the mine-field. Usually the submarine dived deep
in order to throw her pursuers off the track, and all unconscious of the
deep-laid mines in thousands she plunged to her doom--a heavy rumble,
followed by an upheaval of the surface, and the chase was over.
This method, when carried out on the vast and scientifically sound
principle described in a previous chapter, offers the best possible
antidote to the submarine. Its employment in the Great European War
placed the seal of complete success on the Allied anti-submarine
offensive. It should, however, be remembered that comparatively narrow
seas and a restricted zone of major operations made possible of
accomplishment with some hundreds of thousands of mines (average cost,
£400) what would in many cases and in many seas have been quite
impracticable with as many millions of these difficult weapons.
* * * * *
The employment of submarines against submarines also forms a method of
under-sea warfare which gives considerable scope for both daring and
resource. It is of course quite impossible for one of these vessels when
totally submerged to fight another in the same blind condition. But with
just the small periscopic tube--or eye of the submarine--projecting
above the surface, one craft can scout and watch for another to rise to
the surface, thinking no enemy is near, in order to replenish her air
supply for breathing or for recharging the electric storage batteries
which supply the current for submerged propulsion.
When such a position obtains the submarine which comes unknowingly to
the surface stands a grave danger of being torpedoed by her opponent.
This actually occurred to at least one German U-boat during the Great
War.
One or more submarines can also be employed around a slow-moving decoy
ship. In this case they would have the advantage of being invisible
until the actual moment of attack. The result of such a manoeuvre
would be either a gun duel on the surface or the torpedoing of the
attacking submarine by one or other vessel of the decoy's submerged
escort.
It was a ruse of this kind which achieved success in the North Sea
during the early stages of the war. A trawler was employed to tow a
submarine by a submerged hawser. This mode of progress was adopted to
enable the submarine to economise the strictly limited supply of
electricity carried for under-water propulsion.
The trawler then cruised very slowly about, dragging the submarine under
the surface behind her. In order to divert any suspicion which might
have been aroused by her slow speed she was rigged so as to give the
impression that a net was being towed, and the area of operations chosen
was well-known fishing-ground.
In this curious way days were spent before the desired consummation was
reached. Then a large U-boat came boldly to the surface and opened fire.
Instantly the submarine astern of the trawler was released from the tow
rope and forged ahead under her own electric engines. The commander of
the surface decoy stopped his ship and commenced lowering the small
life-boat carried. This was done in order to distract the attention of
the Germans from the tiny periscope which was planing through the water
to the attack.
A shell struck the trawler, carrying away her funnel, but did no other
damage, and a few seconds later the water around the U-boat rose up in a
vast upheaval of white. The plan had succeeded, and when the air cleared
of the smoke from the trawler's damaged stack there was nothing afloat
on the surface of the sea around--except an ever-widening patch of oil
and bubbles.
A few minutes later the thin grey line of the British submarine rose
above the swell some five hundred yards distant from the scene of her
triumph.
Another means by which one subaqueous fleet can attack another is by
laying mines in the seas around the enemy base.
* * * * *
These simple methods formed what may be termed the backbone of the
widespread anti-submarine operations during the Great War, but with the
experience gained and the brains of almost every nation focussed on the
problem of providing an effective counterblast to the under-water
warship, there can be little doubt that in the next great naval conflict
new and more scientific means of attacking these pests of the sea will
have been perfected, though what degree of success they will attain in
the stern trial of war the future alone can tell.[7]
FOOTNOTES:
[6] Greenwich mean time.
[7] For a careful study of the effect of the submarine on the old
theories of sea power see _Submarines and Sea Power_, by Charles
Domville-Fife (Messrs George Bell & Sons, Ltd., London, and Messrs
Lippincotts, New York.).
CHAPTER XI
THE MYSTERIES OF GERMAN MINE-LAYING EXPLAINED
TO those unversed in modern war it may have appeared strange that,
although the Allied navies held command of the sea from the opening of
the Great War in 1914 to the signature of Peace in 1919, the Germans
were nevertheless able to lay several thousand mines every year off the
coasts of England, France and even the most distant colonies and
dominions. It often occurred that harbour entrances and narrow fair-ways
were repeatedly mined, notwithstanding a vigilant day-and-night watch
from the bridges, look-outs and decks of many patrol ships cruising or
listening in the vicinity.
The explanation is that the mines were laid by large submarines capable
of approaching the coast, laying their deadly cargo from specially
constructed stern tubes and retreating to comparative safety far out in
the broad ocean, without rising more than momentarily to the surface for
the purpose of observation.
[Illustration: A CAPTIVE MINE-LAYING SUBMARINE
U.C. 5 off Temple Pier, London.
_Sport and General_]
This, it may be said, did not absolve the ships listening on their
hydrophones, who should have been able to detect the approach of a
submarine from the sound of her engines. During the first year of war
the hydrophone was a very imperfect instrument, and although the sound
might be heard it was quite impossible to tell from what direction it
was coming. Later on, when the listening appliances had been greatly
improved, there still remained two detrimental factors. The noise of
breakers beating against rocks, sands or other obstructions destroyed
much of the value of these instruments when used close inshore. On dark
and rough nights the roar of wind and sea and the lurching of the vessel
rendered subaqueous sounds extremely difficult to detect; and in a
fair-way or channel used by surface shipping it was frequently
impossible, even in fine but dark weather, to tell if the sound coming
up from the sea emanated from a surface ship or a submarine.
If, in the latter case, the patrol ship started her own engines and
moved forward in the darkness to ascertain from whence the noise came,
she gave away her presence to the hostile submarine, _also fitted with
listening appliances_. Whereas if she remained still and waited for the
enemy to approach, mines might be laid in the meantime across important
fair-ways which it was her duty to guard.
German mine-laying submarines were designated U-C boats, and often these
vessels would employ a ruse in order to lay their mines in safety.
Sometimes a decoy would draw the patrols away on a fruitless chase while
the mines were being launched from the tubes of another U-C boat. In one
case a big armed steamer was attacked with torpedoes while mines were
being laid across the line of advance by which a flotilla of warships
would be likely to come out to her aid from a near-by base.
In these and other ways over 3000 mines were laid off the British coast
in one year. There were also several raids by surface mine-layers, which
succeeded in eluding the network of patrols in the fogs and snows which
prevail in the North Sea during several months out of every twelve. The
two most important of these were the cruises of the _Wolfe_ and the
_Moewe_. The former vessel left Germany during the November fogs of
1916, and, by skirting the Norwegian coast, succeeded in passing the
British patrol flotillas. She carried 500 mines, and after crossing the
North Sea in high latitudes, proceeded down the mid-Atlantic until off
the Cape of Good Hope, where the first mine-field was laid. She then
crossed the Indian Ocean, laying fields off Bombay and Colombo.
It was in these seas that she succeeded in capturing a British
merchantman. Placing a German crew and a cargo of mines aboard, she sent
the prize to lay a field off Aden, while she herself proceeded to New
Zealand. In these far-distant waters another field was laid, and a few
months later the last of her cargo was discharged off Singapore. From
this time onward she became a commerce raider.
[Illustration: FIG. 23.--A typical German mine and sinker. _A._ The
mine-casing containing about 300 lb. of high explosive, and the electric
firing device which is put in force when the horns _B_ are struck and
bent by a passing ship. _B._ Horns, made of lead and easily bent if
touched by a surface ship, but sufficiently rigid to resist blows by
sea-water. _C._ Hydrostatic device, operated by the pressure of the
water at a given depth, rendering the mine safe until submerged. _D._
Slings holding mine to mooring rope _F_. _F._ Mooring rope to reel in
sinker. _G._ Reel of mooring wire, which unwinds when the mine floats to
the surface. _H._ Iron supports held together (as in small left-hand
diagram) by a band round the mine-casing. The mine goes overboard and
sinks like this to the bottom. The band is then released by a special
device, and the supports drop away, leaving the mine free to float to
the surface (as in small right-hand diagram). _I._ A heavy iron sinker
which acts as an anchor, holding the mine in one position.]
The _Moewe_ left Germany in December, 1916, and crossed the North Sea
amid heavy snow squalls. Proceeding into the North Atlantic, she awaited
a favourable opportunity to approach the British coast. This came one
wild January night with a rising gale and a haze of snow. All her
mines, about 400 in number, were laid off the Scottish coast in the
teeth of a nor'wester. Then, with the "jolly Roger at the fore," she
steamed out on to the wastes of sea lying between the New World and the
Old.
[Illustration: FIG. 24.--Diagram illustrating the effect of tide on a
moored mine. A vessel is approaching a mine _D_, moored to the bottom by
a sinker _H_. The distance from the top of the horns of the mine to the
surface of the sea is approximately 5 feet at low tide, and as the
vessel's draught is 7 feet she would strike the mine. If, however, the
same vessel passed over the same mine a few hours later, at high tide,
the level of the sea would have risen 5 feet, and the mine would then be
10 feet below the surface; in which case the ship would just pass over
in safety. This is known as the "tide difficulty." There is, in
addition, the "dip" of the mine due to the strength of the tidal
current. _E_ and _F_ show what is meant by the dip of a mine. It is the
deflection from the vertical caused by the ebb and flow of the tide. It
frequently causes a mine-field to be quite harmless to passing surface
craft except during the period of slack water between tides.]
* * * * *
We now come to the mines themselves and the method of laying them both
above and below the surface.
A good idea of the shape, size and general characteristics of these
weapons will be obtained from the accompanying diagrams. On being
discharged into the sea they automatically adjust themselves to float
about ten feet below the surface (according to tide) and are anchored to
the bottom by means of a wire mooring rope attached to a heavy sinker.
To describe here the mechanical details of all the different types of
German submarine mines would occupy many pages with uninteresting
technical formulæ. It is sufficient to say that they carried an
explosive charge (200 to 400 lb. of T.N.T.) sufficient to blow to pieces
vessels of several hundred tons and to seriously damage the largest
warship. They were intended to float a few feet below the surface--being
held down by the mooring rope--but, as there was no means of
compensating for the rise and fall of the tide, many of them often
showed their horns above the surface at low water and were immersed too
deep to be of much use against any but the deepest draught ships at high
tide. A reference to Fig. 24 will make this difficulty clear.
There was scarcely a ship afloat in the zone of operations which did
not, during those years of storm, sight one or more of these hateful
weapons with their horns showing above the surface. Motor launches were
employed to scout for them during the hour before and the hour after low
water. In this way many hundreds were discovered and destroyed almost
as soon as they had been laid. One badly laid mine, which shows on the
surface when the tide ebbs, will often give away a whole field of these
otherwise invisible weapons, and the work of sweeping them up and
destroying them is then rendered comparatively easy.
The effect of strong tides on a moored mine is considerable, and will
render a field quite harmless for several hours out of every
twenty-four. The reason for this is best described with the aid of a
diagram.
It will be seen from the above that the mine will not remain vertically
above its sinker when there is a tide, but will incline at an angle
determined by the strength of the current, which, if considerable, will
press the weapon down much deeper than the keel of any ship (see Fig.
24). When the tide turns the mine will first regain its true
perpendicular position and then incline in the opposite direction,
accommodating itself to the ebb and flow. From this it will be apparent
that in places where there is a strong current or tide a mine-field is
only dangerous to passing ships of shallow or medium draft for a few
hours (during slack water) out of the twenty-four. Between the ebb and
the flow of a tide there is a short period when the water is almost
still. Then the movement begins to set in from the opposite direction
and gradually gains in speed until about one hour before high or low
tide. This period of what is known as "slack water" varies considerably
in different places and different weather conditions, but plays an
important part in all minesweeping operations.
In this way many a ship has passed over a mine-field all unconscious of
the fate which would have befallen her had she traversed the same area
of sea an hour or so earlier or later.
Mines which break adrift, or are laid without moorings of any kind, are
called _floating mines_. The latter are a direct violation of
International Law, as they cannot be recovered when once they have been
laid, and become a danger to neutral as well as to enemy shipping. The
laws of civilised warfare also require even a moored mine to be fitted
with some mechanical device which renders it safe when once it has
broken adrift from the wire and heavy sinker which holds it in a stated
position. The reason for this humanitarian rule is that neutrals can be
warned not to approach a given area of sea in which there are moored
mines, but if these weapons break adrift--as they frequently do in heavy
weather--and float all over the oceans, they would seriously endanger
the lives and property of neutral states unless something were done to
render them innocuous.
The total disregard of all the laws and customs of civilised warfare by
the Germans in 1914-1919 has now been so well established that it seems
almost unnecessary to give yet another instance of this callousness. In
the case about to be quoted, however, there is, as the reader will
observe, an almost superlative cunning.
Any cursory examination of a German moored mine will show that there is
a device fitted ostensibly to ensure the weapon becoming safe when it
breaks adrift from its moorings and thus complying with The Hague
Convention. For several months after the outbreak of war it puzzled many
minesweeping officers and men why, with this device fitted, every German
_floating_ or _drifting_ mine was dangerous. A few, relying on these
weapons being safe when adrift, had endeavoured to salve one and had
paid for the experiment with the lives of themselves and their comrades.
This caused every mine, whether moored or adrift, to be regarded by
seamen as dangerous, notwithstanding the oft-repeated assurances that
German mines fulfilled all International requirements in this respect.
Then a mine which had broken away from its moorings was successfully
salved, in face of the great danger involved, and the truth came out.
A device _was_ fitted to render it safe, but, with truly Hunnish
ingenuity, the metal out of which an essential part of this appliance
was made was quite unable to bear the strain imposed by its work, and,
to make doubly sure, another part was half filed through. The result was
that, instead of rendering the mine safe when torn from its moorings by
rough seas, the essential parts broke and left the mine fully _alive_.
Any discovery such as this--_only made at the great risk of salving a
live mine_--could be easily explained away by German diplomacy as faulty
workmanship in a particular weapon, reliance being placed on the fact
that not many mines could be salved in this way without heavy loss of
life; but numbers were recovered in spite of the dangers and
extraordinary difficulties of such operations, and the guilt was for
ever established in the minds of those who sail the seas.
Little need be said here regarding the method of laying mines from
surface ships like the _Wolfe_ and _Moewe_. The weapons were arranged to
run along the decks on railway lines and roll off the stern, or through
a large port-hole, into the sea as the vessel steamed along.
With submarine mine-layers or U-C boats the method was, however, much
more complicated and needs full description. Each vessel was fitted with
large expulsion tubes in the stern and carried some eighteen to twenty
mines. These weapons, although similar in their internal mechanism to
the ordinary mine, were specially designed for expulsion from submerged
tubes or chambers.
The mines were stored in the stern compartment of the submarine, between
guide-rails fitted with rollers. They were in two rows and moved easily
on the well-greased wheels. The loading was accomplished through
water-tight hatchways in the deck above. In order to expel these mines
from the interior of the submarine when travelling under the surface
each weapon had to be moved into a short expulsion tube or chamber, the
inner cap of which was closed when a mine was inside, and the outer or
sea-cap opened. A supply of compressed air was then admitted into the
back of the tube and the mine forced out into the open sea, in the same
way as a torpedo is now expelled from a submerged tube.
Before another mine could be launched the sea-cap had to be closed, the
water blown from the tube, the inner cap opened and a second mine placed
ready in the chamber. This, however, did not end the difficulty of
laying mines from submarines. The increase in the buoyancy of the boat,
due to the loss of weight as each mine was discharged into the sea, had
to be instantly and automatically compensated by the admission of
quantities of sea-water of equal weight into special tanks, hitherto
empty, situated below the mine-tubes. If this had been neglected the
submarine would have come quickly to the surface, stern uppermost, owing
to the lightening of the hull by the expulsion therefrom of some fifteen
weapons weighing many hundreds of pounds each.
When the mine was clear of the submarine it sank to the bottom, owing to
the weight of the sinker or anchor. After a short immersion, however, a
special device enabled the top half, containing the charge of explosive
and the contact firing horns, to part company with the heavy lower half,
composed of the iron sinker and the reel of mooring wire. The explosive
section then floated up towards the surface, unwinding the wire from the
sinker.
Each mine being set, before discharge, to a certain prearranged depth
(obtained by the captain of the
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