The Story of the Great War, Volume 4
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Title: The Story of the Great War, Volume 4
Editor: Francis J. Reynolds
Allen L. Churchill
Francis Trevelyan Miller
Release date: July 7, 2009 [eBook #29340]
Language: English
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THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
History of the European War from Official Sources
Complete Historical Records of Events to Date,
Illustrated with Drawings, Maps, and Photographs
Prefaced by
What the War Means to America
Major General Leonard Wood, U.S.A.
Naval Lessons of the War
Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S.N.
The World's War
Frederick Palmer
Theatres of the War's Campaigns
Frank H. Simonds
The War Correspondent
Arthur Ruhl
Edited by
Francis J. Reynolds
Former Reference Librarian of Congress
Allen L. Churchill
Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia
Francis Trevelyan Miller
Editor in Chieft, Photographic History of the Civil War
P. F. Collier & Son Company
New York
[Illustration: _Kaiser Wilhelm II, German Emperor, inspecting
Austro-Hungarian troops on the East Galician front, New Year's Day,
1916. At the Kaiser's left is General Count von Bothmer_]
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Champagne · Artois · Grodno
Fall of Nish · Caucasus
Mesopotamia · Development
of Air Strategy · United
States and the War
VOLUME IV
P · F · Collier & Son · New York
Copyright 1916
By P. F. Collier & Son
CONTENTS
PART I.--WAR IN SYRIA AND EGYPT
CHAPTER Page
I. Renewed Turkish Attempts 9
PART II.--WAR IN THE AIR
II. Raids of the Airmen 16
III. Zeppelins Attack London--Battles in the Air 29
IV. Venice Attacked--Other Raids 34
PART III.--THE WESTERN FRONT
V. Summary of First Year's Operations 39
VI. Fighting in Artois and the Vosges 46
VII. Political Crisis in France--Aeroplane Warfare--Fierce
Combats in the Vosges--Preparations for Allied
Offense 52
VIII. The Great Champagne Offensive 61
IX. The British Front in Artois 81
X. The Battle of Loos 90
XI. The Cavell Case--Accident to King George 98
XII. Operations in Champagne And Artois--Preparations for
Winter Campaign 104
XIII. Events in the Winter Campaign 117
XIV. The Battle of Verdun--The German Attack 131
PART IV.--THE WAR AT SEA
XV. Naval Situation at the Beginning of the Second
Year--Submarine Exploits 143
XVI. The Sinking of the Arabic--British Submarine Successes 150
XVII. Cruise of the Moewe--Loss of British Battleships 156
XVIII. Continuation of War on Merchant Shipping--Italian
and Russian Naval Movements--Sinking of La
Provence 165
PART V.--THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT
XIX. Summary of First Year's Operations 174
XX. The Fall of the Niemen and Nareff Fortresses 178
XXI. The Conquest of Grodno and Vilna 185
XXII. The Capture of Brest-Litovsk 193
XXIII. The Struggle in East Galicia and Volhynia and the
Capture of Pinsk 200
XXIV. In the Pripet Marshes 209
XXV. Fighting on the Dvina and in the Dvina-Vilna Sector 212
XXVI. Winter Battles on the Styr and Strypa Rivers 223
XXVII. On the Tracks of the Russian Retreat 229
XXVIII. Sidelights on the Russian Retreat and German
Advance 240
XXIX. Winter on the Eastern Front 250
PART VI.--THE BALKANS
XXX. Battle Clouds Gather Again 255
XXXI. The Invasion Begins 263
XXXII. Bulgaria Enters the War 269
XXXIII. The Teutonic Invasion Rolls on 273
XXXIV. The Fall of Nish--Defense of Babuna Pass 282
XXXV. Bulgarian Advance--Serbian Resistance 290
XXXVI. End of German Operations--Flight of Serb People--Greece 300
XXXVII. Allies Withdraw into Greece--Attitude of Greek
Government 308
XXXVIII. Bulgarian Attacks--Allies Concentrate at Saloniki 316
XXXIX. Italian Movements in Albania--Conquest of Montenegro 327
XL. Conditions in Serbia, Greece, and Rumania 339
PART VII.--THE DARDANELLES AND RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN
XLI. Conditions in Gallipoli--Attack at Suvla Bay 344
PART VIII.--AGGRESSIVE TURKISH CAMPAIGN AT DARDANELLES
XLII. Sari Bair--Partial Withdrawal of Allies 353
XLIII. Aggressive Turkish Movements--Opinion in England--Change
in Command 357
XLIV. Abandonment of Dardanelles--Armenian Atrocities 369
XLV. Campaign in Caucasus--Fall of Erzerum 380
PART IX.--ITALY IN THE WAR
XLVI. Review OF Preceding Operations--Italian Movements 393
XLVII. Italy's Relations to the Other Warring Nations 399
XLVIII. Problems of Strategy 404
XLIX. Move Against Germany 410
L. Renewed Attacks--Italy's Situation At the Beginning
of March, 1916 413
PART X.--CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
LI. Operations Against Bagdad and Around the Tigris 419
LII. Advance Toward Bagdad--Battle of Kut-el-Amara 426
LIII. Battle of Ctesiphon 437
LIV. Stand at Kut-el-Amara--Attempts at Relief 444
PART XI.--THE WAR IN THE AIR
LV. Development of the Strategy and Tactics of Air
Fighting 454
LVI. Zeppelin Raids--Attacks on German Arms Factories--German
Over-Sea Raids 459
LVII. Attacks on London--Bombardment of Italian Ports--Aeroplane
as Commerce Destroyer 466
LVIII. Air Fighting on all Fronts--Losses 473
PART XII.--THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS
LIX. Sinking of the Arabic--Another Crisis--Germany's
Defense and Concessions 480
LX. Issue with Austria-Hungary Over the Ancona--Surrender
to American Demands 490
LXI. The Lusitania Deadlock--Agreement Blocked by Armed
Merchantmen Issue--Crisis in Congress 496
LXII. Developments of Pro-German Propaganda--Munitions
Crusade Defended--New Aspects of American Policy 505
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Kaiser Wilhelm Inspecting His Troops _Frontispiece_
Opposite Page
Zigzag Trenches in the Champagne 62
German Infantry Storming a Hill 94
General Joffre and General Pétain 142
Austrian Infantry in Russia 238
Constructing a Bridge Over the Danube 270
British Hydroplane on Guard at Saloniki 318
Aeroplane Guns on Turntable 462
Firing a Torpedo from the Deck of a Destroyer 494
LIST OF MAPS
Page
Middle Europe--The German Vision of an Empire from the Baltic
to the Persian Gulf (_Colored Map_) _Front Insert_
Champagne District, The 63
Battle in Champagne, September, 1915, Detail Map of 69
Artois Region, September, 1915, The French Gains in 86
Battle at Loos, The 95
Verdun, The Forts at 134
Verdun, Fighting at, up to March 1, 1916 141
Verdun (_Colored Map_) _Opposite_ 142
Kiel Canal 167
Russia, The Battle Front in, January 1, 1916 228
Balkan (Serbian) Operations, General Map of 262
German-Austro-Bulgar Campaign Against Serbia, The Beginning
of the 268
Retreat of Serbians 304
Saloniki, The Allies at 324
Montenegro, The Austrian Campaign in 335
Dardanelles, Operations at the 368
Turkish Empire, The 381
Turkey in Armenia, The Russian Advance on 390
Bagdad Railroad, The 420
Russian Advance Through Persia, The 438
Mesopotamia, The British Campaign in 451
PART I--WAR IN SYRIA AND EGYPT
CHAPTER I
RENEWED TURKISH ATTEMPTS
The leaders of the Turkish troops had been hard at work arousing the
fanaticism of the Turkish soldiery against the British foe before the
next day's battle began. It is due these noisy "Holy Warriors" that
sentries of the Fifth Egyptian Field Battery were warned of the near
presence of the enemy.
The Indian troops now took the offensive, supported by the warships
and mountain and field artillery. The Serapeum garrison, consisting of
Ninety-second Punjabis and Rajputs, now cleared its front of the enemy
who had been stopped three-quarters of a mile away. A counterattack
made by the Sixty-second Punjabis of the Tussum garrison drove the
Turks back. Two battalions of the Turkish Twenty-eighth Regiment now
joined the fight, but the British artillery threw them into disorder,
and by 3 p. m. of February 3, 1915, the Moslems were in retreat,
leaving behind them a rear guard of a few hundred men hidden in the
gaps among the brush along the eastern bank.
The warships on Lake Timsah had been in action since morning, and the
sand hills near Ismailia were at first crowded by civilians and
soldiers eager to witness the fight, until the Turkish guns to the
east and southeast of the Ferry post drove them in cover.
About 11 a. m. an old unprotected Indian Marine transport, H. M. S.
_Hardinge_, was struck by two 6-inch shells. One carried away the
funnel and the other burst inboard doing much damage. Two of the crew
were killed and nine wounded. George Carew, the pilot, lost a leg, but
continued on duty and helped to bring the injured vessel into
Ismailia. The French coast guard battleship _Requin_ came now under
the Turkish fire, but her 10.8-inch guns soon silenced the enemy's
batteries.
The morning of February 3, 1915, the Turks advanced on the Ismailia
Ferry, then held by Sikhs, Punjabi Rifles, a battery of Indian
mountain artillery and Australian engineers, digging shelter pits as
they moved forward, covered by two field batteries. Their advance was
stopped by the British guns when they had come within 1,000 yards of
the outpost line. During the afternoon the Turks kept up some
desultory firing that was ineffective; they also engaged in some
reconnoitering of British positions during the dark night that
followed, but when morning broke they had all disappeared.
Meanwhile, at El Kantara the struggle had reached much the same
conclusion. The Indian troops had repelled an advance from the south,
in which two Turkish regiments, the Eightieth and Eighty-first of the
Twenty-seventh Division, were engaged. H.M.S. _Swiftsure_, which had
taken the place of the disabled _Hardinge_, aided by Indian and
Territorial artillery, did effective work in covering the British
positions. The nature of the ground here was so marshy that in places
the Turks sank to their waists in muddy ooze, and foredoomed their
attack to failure. Again it was demonstrated that they are poor
strategists and fail to make careful observations of the terrain
before advancing to attack. At El Ferdan, where some Turks made a
demonstration with a battery about this time, there were no losses,
though the gunboat _Clio_ was hit several times. At El Kantara, where
a part of General Cox's brigade of Gurkhas, Sikhs, and Punjabis were
engaged, there were thirty casualties.
Between Tussum and Serapeum there was some sniping during the late
afternoon of February 3 from the east bank of the canal, during which
a British sailor was killed on H.M.S. _Swiftsure_. The desultory
firing continued during the night and through the early morning of
February 4. A deplorable incident occurred this day in which a brave
British officer and several of his men were the victims of Turkish
treachery. Several hundred Turks had been discovered by half a
battalion of Ninety-second Punjabis sent out from Serapeum. In the
encounter that followed, some of the Turks held up their hands as a
sign of surrender, while others continued to fire. Captain Cochran of
the Ninety-second company, who was advancing with his men to take the
surrender, was killed. A few of his soldiers also fell, and some
others were wounded. The British took a prompt and complete revenge
for the loss of these men. After being reenforced by Indian troops
they overpowered the enemy in a hand-to-hand struggle, in which a
Turkish officer was killed by a British officer in a sword combat. The
Turks had lost in this brisk engagement about 120 killed and wounded,
and 6 officers and 25 men were captured with 3 Maxim guns.
The Turkish attempts at Suez on February 2, 1915, were insignificant,
and did not cost the British the loss of a single man. By nightfall,
just as their compatriots had done along other parts of the canal, the
Turks fled in the direction of Nakhl, Djebel, Habeite, and Katia. On
the afternoon of the 4th, when the fighting between Serapeum and
Tussum was concluded, Indian cavalry and various patrols captured some
men and war materials. At Ismailia preparations were under way to
pursue the retreating Turks across the canal. This plan, for some
reason, was subsequently abandoned.
During these various fights along the canal, the British had lost 115
killed and wounded, a small number considering the character of the
ground and the very numerous attacks and skirmishes. Nine hundred
Turks were buried or found drowned in the canal, 650 were taken
prisoners, while it is estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 must
have been wounded. The brunt of the struggle fell on the Indian
troops, who, in general, fought with great bravery. There were some
Australian and Egyptian troops engaged who proved themselves valuable
auxiliaries.
In these engagements along the canal the Syrian Moslems displayed even
greater bravery than the Turks, who were not lacking in intrepidity,
though they showed poor judgment. They had much to learn in the way of
taking cover, and would often blindly advance over difficult ground
that placed them at a disadvantage.
Djemal Pasha had evidently counted on an Egyptian rising, and perhaps
a mutiny of the Indian Moslem troops, but he showed that he entirely
misjudged their sentiments, as they displayed great bitterness toward
the Turks during the fighting, and attacked them in a thoroughly
vindictive spirit. If Djemal had not counted on help from these
quarters he would probably not have attempted to break through the
British positions covering a ninety-mile front with such a small
force. It was estimated that he had about 25,000 men, but not more
than half of these were brought into action at any given point where
they might have achieved some success. The Turks had burned up some
war material and left a few deserters behind them, but they had
retreated in good order, and the British commanders had reason to
believe that they should soon be heard from again, and that a main
attack was contemplated.
On February 6, 1915, British aeroplane observers discovered that the
Turks in front of the Tussum-Deversoir section had gathered at Djebel,
Habeite, and were strongly reenforced. It appeared that Djemal was now
preparing to attack in force. The British were quite ready for them,
having been reenforced on February 3 and 4 by the Seventh and Eighth
Australian battalions, a squadron of the Duke of Lancaster's Own
Yeomanry, and the Herts, and Second County of London Yeomanry. But the
British hopes of a decisive engagement were blighted by the general
retirement of the Turkish army with their reenforcements.
They crossed the desert successfully, thanks to the organizing skill
of Kress von Kressenstein and Roshan Bey, and set off for the Turkish
base at Beersheba, spreading the news along the road that they had won
a victory and would soon return to Egypt and achieve another, this by
way of keeping the Syrians reassured that success was on the Moslem
side.
In January, 1915, the commander of Turkish troops at Fort Nakhl,
hearing that the Government quarantine station at Tor was undefended,
sent a body of men under two German officers to occupy the place. The
raiders found on their arrival at Tor that about 200 Egyptian soldiers
were in occupation and waited there until they received
reenforcements, which brought their force up to 400 men. For the time
they occupied a small village about five miles north of Tor,
occasionally firing a shot at long range and sending arrogant messages
to the Egyptians. On February 11 a detachment of Ghurkas embarked
secretly from Suez, and advancing over the hills in the rear of the
Turks, surprised their position on the following morning. In the
encounter that followed the Turks were annihilated. Sixty lay dead on
the field, and over a hundred, including a Turkish officer, were made
prisoners. On the British side one Ghurka was killed and another
wounded. It was a disappointment that the German officers and a few
men had left the camp some days before for Abu Zenaima on the coast,
where there was a British-owned manganese mine, which the raiders
damaged as best they could, and then stealing some camels, departed
for the fort at Nakhl.
The failure of the Turks to win any success at that canal, and their
subsequent retreat, had a discouraging influence on the Bedouin
levies, who had joined Djemal Pasha and Hilmi Bey, and they now chose
the first opportunity to vanish with the new rifles that had been
given to them.
For a month the Turks did nothing but keep the British troops occupied
by petty raids and feint attacks, which were worrisome, but better
than utter stagnation.
On March 22, 1915, a Turkish column with guns and cavalry appeared
near the canal near El Kubri, and their advance guard of about 400
encountered a patrol of nine men under Havildar Subha Singh of the
Fifty-sixth Punjab Rifles. The Havildar retired fighting courageously,
holding the enemy back until he had got his men to safety, with a loss
of two killed and three wounded. The Havildar, who was badly wounded
himself, received the Indian Order of Merit and was promoted to
Jemadar. He had inflicted on the enemy a loss of twelve men and
fifteen wounded.
On March 23, 1915, General Sir G. J. Younghusband set out to attack
the Turks who had been under the command of Colonel van Trommer, but
owing to delays they had had time to retreat toward Nakhl. In the
pursuit that followed, their rear guard lost about forty men and some
were taken prisoners. There were about a dozen British casualties.
On April 29, 1915, a raiding party with Maxims attacked a detachment
of Bikanir Camel Corps and Egyptian sappers near Bir Mahadet, which
resulted in the wounding of a British officer, and five killed and
three wounded among the Egyptians and Bikaniris. A punitive expedition
sent out to attack the raiders marched through the night to Bir
Mahadet only to find that the Turks had fled. The British aeroplane
soon after "spotted" the enemy near a well six miles north. The
Patiala cavalry, who were leading, came up with the Turkish rear guard
in the afternoon and charged. The Turks stampeded, except for a small
group of Turkish soldiers led by a plucky Albanian officer, who held
their ground and attacked from the flank the advancing British
officers and Patiala cavalry. Two British officers and a native
officer were killed or badly wounded in the subsequent charge. The
Albanian, who had displayed such courage, proved to be a son of Djemal
Pasha. He fell with seven lance thrusts, none of which however proved
fatal, while all his men were killed or captured. The British had four
or five times as many men as the escaping enemy, but they did not
pursue.
In June, 1915, Colonel von Laufer and a mixed force attempted a feeble
raid on the canal near El Kantara, but were driven off with some loss
by the Yeomanry, who had done effective work in keeping the enemy away
from the British lines. A mine having been found near the canal about
this time, the Porte informed the neutral powers that the canal must
be closed to navigation owing to the arbitrary conduct of the British
in Egypt. But the Turks were not in a position to carry out their
threats, owing to the vigorous attack on the Dardanelles. Troops were
hurried from Syria to Constantinople, and by June 6 less than 25,000
Turkish troops remained in central and southern Syria and the Sinai
Peninsula. At Nakhl and El Arish there were left about 7,000 veteran
desert fighters, but the British air scouts kept a watchful eye on the
desert roads, and used bombs with such effect that the Turks were
kept in a constant state of apprehension by their attacks.
At Sharkieh, the eastern province of the Delta, there had been some
uneasiness when the Turks made their unsuccessful strikes at the
canal, but the population gave no trouble. At Alexandria and Cairo
some few fanatics and ignorant people of the lower classes displayed
some opposition to the Government. The sultan was fired on April 8,
1915, by a degenerate, Mohammed Khalil, a haberdasher of Masoura, the
bullet missing the victim by only a few inches. Khalil was tried by
court-martial and executed April 24. The attempt on Sultan Hussein's
life had the effect of making him friends from among the disaffected
in the higher classes who found it wise policy to express their horror
of the attempted crime, and to proclaim their allegiance to the
Government. On April 9 the sultan received a popular ovation while on
his way to the mosque.
As a base for the allied Mediterranean expeditionary force, and as a
training ground for Australian, Indian, and British troops, Egypt in
1915 was of the utmost military importance to the British Empire. From
the great camps around Cairo and the canal, forces could be dispatched
for service in Europe, Mesopotamia, and at the Dardanelles, while
fresh contingents of soldiers were constantly arriving to take their
places.
On July 5, 1915, a body of Turks and Arabs from Yemen in southwest
Arabia made a threatening demonstration against Aden, the "Gibraltar
of the East," on the Strait of Perim at the entrance to the Red Sea.
They were equipped with some field guns and light artillery, and
crossing the Aden hinterland near Lahej, forced the British to retire
on Aden.
On July 29, 1915, Sheikh Othman, which had been abandoned by the
British on their retreat on the 5th, was again occupied by them, and
the Turks and Arabs were expelled. The British troops drove the enemy
for five miles across the country, causing some casualties, when the
Turks and their allies scattered and disappeared.
PART II--WAR IN THE AIR
CHAPTER II
RAIDS OF THE AIRMEN
The war in the air developed into a reign of terror during the second
half of the first year of the world catastrophe. While the armies on
the land were locked in terrific conflict, and the navies were
sweeping the seas, the huge ships of the air were hovering over cities
with a desperate resolve to win on all sides. By degrees the pilots of
the various nations learned to work in squadrons. The tactics of the
air began to be developed and opposing aerial fleets maneuvered much
as did the warships. Long raids by fifty or more machines were
reported, tons of bombs being released upon cities hundreds of miles
from the battle line.
The German ambition to shell London was realized, and the east coast
of England grew accustomed to raids. The spirit of the British never
faltered. Perhaps it was best typified in the admonition of a Yarmouth
minister following a disastrous Zeppelin visit, who said: "It is our
privilege, we who live on the east coast, to be on the firing line,
and we should steel ourselves to face the position with brave hearts."
Casualties grew in all quarters. French cities were the greatest
sufferers, although French airmen performed prodigies of valor in
defending the capital and in attacks upon German defensive positions.
But the stealthy Zeppelin took heavy toll on many occasions. It was
shown that there was no really adequate defense against sudden attack
from the air. Constant watchfulness and patrolling machines might be
eluded at night and death rained upon the sleeping city beneath.
The spring of 1915 found the air service of every army primed for a
dash. The cold months were spent in repairing, reorganizing and
extending aerial squadrons. Everything awaited the advent of good
weather conditions.
During February, 1915, the hand of tragedy fell upon the German air
service. Two Zeppelins and another large aircraft were wrecked within
a couple of days.
In a storm over the North Sea on February 16, 1915, a Zeppelin fought
heroically. Contrary air currents compelled the Zeppelin commander to
maneuver over a wide zone in an effort to reach land. Caught in the
gale the big dirigible was at the mercy of the elements. Snow, sleet,
and fog enveloped it and added to its peril. The craft caught in the
February storm, fought a losing battle for twenty-four hours and
finally made a landing on Fanoe Island, in Danish territory. The
officers and men were interned, several of whom were suffering from
exposure in an acute form and nearly all of them with frostbitten
hands and feet.
Another Zeppelin was lost in this same February storm. It is presumed
that the two started on a raiding trip against England and were caught
in the storm before reaching their destination. Details of the second
Zeppelin's fate never have been told. It fell into the sea, where
parts of the wreckage were found by Dutch fishermen. All on board lost
their lives. The third airship wrecked that month was of another type
than the Zeppelin. It foundered off the west coast of Jutland and four
of its crew were killed. The others escaped, but the airship was a
total loss.
This trio of accidents shocked the German official world to its depths
and had a chilling effect upon the aerial branch of its military
organization for some weeks. The Zeppelins remained at home until the
return of better weather. England, for a time, was practically freed
from the new menace.
It was not accident alone, nor an adverse fortune, which caused the
loss of the three airships. The position of the British Isles, on the
edge of the Atlantic, enabled British weather forecasters to tell with
almost unfailing exactness when a storm was to be expected. The French
also had an excellent service in this direction. Realizing that bad
weather was the worst foe of the Zeppelin, aside from its own inherent
clumsiness, the two governments agreed to suppress publication of
weather reports, thereby keeping from the Germans information of a
vital character. The German Government maintained a skilled weather
department, but the geographical location of the country is such that
its forecasters could not foretell with the same accuracy the
conditions on the Atlantic. The shrewd step of the French and British
therefore resulted in the destruction of three dirigibles in a single
month, a much higher average than all the efforts of land guns and
aviators had been able to achieve.
February, 1915, was a bleak, drear month. Aviators of all the armies
made daily scouting trips, but wasted little time in attacking each
other. Few raids of importance took place on any of the fronts. But
British airmen descended upon German positions in Belgium on several
occasions. Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Blankenberghe received their
attention in a half dozen visits between February 5 and 20.
On February 16, 1915, a large fleet of aeroplanes, mostly British,
swept along the Flanders coast, attacking defensive positions wherever
sighted. At the same time, French airmen shelled the aeroplane center
at Ghistelles, preventing the Germans from sending a squadron against
the other flotilla.
Paris, Dunkirk, and Calais glimpsed an occasional enemy aeroplane, but
they were bent on watching troop movements and only a few stray bombs
were dropped. The inactivity of the armies, burrowed in their winter
quarters, was reflected in the air.
It was announced by the French Foreign Office that from the beginning
of hostilities up to February 1, 1915, French aircraft had made 10,000
reconnaissances, covering a total of more than 1,250,000 miles. This
represented 18,000 hours spent in the air.
Antwerp, which had surrendered to the Germans, was visited by British
flyers on March 7, 1915. They bombarded the submarine plant at
Hoboken, a suburb. The plant at this point had been quickly developed
by the conquerors and the harbor served as a refuge for many undersea
boats. Numerous attacks on ships off the Dutch mainland persuaded the
British authorities that a blow at Hoboken would be a telling stroke
against German submarines, and so the event proved. Several craft were
sunk or badly damaged. Bombs set fire to the submarine works and much
havoc was wrought among the material stored there. A number of
employees were injured. The Antwerp populace cheered the airmen on
their trip across the city and back to the British lines, for which a
fine was imposed upon the city.
During March, 1915, there was some activity in the East, where
Zeppelins shelled Warsaw in Poland, killing fifty persons and causing
many fires. One of the raiders was brought down on March 18, and her
crew captured. The Russian service suffered losses, Berlin announcing
the capture of six aeroplanes in a single week. One of these was of
the Sikorsky type, a giant battle plane carrying a half dozen men.
Shortly after one o'clock on the morning of March 21, 1915, two
Zeppelins appeared above Paris. Four of the raiders started from the
German lines originally, but two were forced to turn back. They were
first seen above Compiègne, north of which the German lines came
nearest to Paris. The news was flashed ahead. The French airmen rose
to meet them. Two of the Zeppelins eluded the patrol. Their coming was
expected and when they approached the city searchlights picked them up
and kept the raiders in view as they maneuvered above the French
capital. The French defenders and the Zeppelin commanders met in a
bold battle in the air. The Zeppelins kept up a running fight with
pursuing aeroplanes while dropping bombs. They sailed across Mt.
Valérien, one of the most powerful Paris forts, dropping missiles
which did little harm. A searchlight from the Eiffel Tower kept them
in full view. They were forced to move rapidly. Finally they swung in
a big arc toward Versailles, and then turned suddenly and sailed for
the heart of the city. Twenty-five bombs were dropped. Eight persons
were struck and a number of fires started.
The Parisians flocked to the streets and watched the strange combat
with rapt interest. Although the raiders had come before, the
spectacle had not lost its fascination. Even though the authorities
issued strict orders and troops tried to drive the throngs indoors,
Parisians persisted in risking life and limb to see the Zeppelins
battle in the night skies. Upon this occasion the battle aloft lasted
until after four o'clock in the morning, or more than three hours.
On the same night, March 21, 1915, three bombs were thrown upon
Villers-Cotterets, fifteen miles southwest of Soissons. There was
small damage and no casualties. But the two raids emphasized that a
few weeks more would see intensive resumption of war in the air.
French aviators shelled Bazincourt, Briey, Brimont, and Vailly on
March 22, 1915. At Briey, the station was damaged and the railway line
cut, two of the birdmen descending to within a few hundred yards of
the track. Enemy batteries at Brimont suffered damage. The next day a
German machine was shot down near Colmar, in Alsace, and its two
occupants captured.
With the return of spring, 1915, came renewed activity among airmen on
all fronts. The first day of April was marked by the loss of two
German machines, one near Soissons and the other near Rheims. The
first fell a victim to gunfire, both occupants being killed. The
second, an Albatross model, was discovered prowling above Rheims.
French pilots immediately gave chase and after a circuitous flight
back and forth across the city, compelled the enemy machine to land.
The pilot and observer were overpowered before they had time to set it
afire, the usual procedure when captured.
A typical day of this season with the birdmen of France was April 2,
1915. A War Office report of that day tells of forty-three
reconnoitering flights and twenty others for the purpose of attacking
enemy positions or ascertaining the direction of gunfire. Bombs were
dropped upon the hangars and aviation camp at Habsheim. The munition
factories at Dietweiler, and the railway station in Walheim. The
station at Bensdorf and the barracks at the same place were shelled
from the air. Much damage was done.
Seven French aeroplanes flew over the Woevre region on this day,
penetrating as far as Vigneulles, where the aerial observers
discovered barracks covered with heavy corrugated iron. The machines
descended in long spirals and dropped a number of bombs, setting the
barracks afire. Troops were seen rushing in all directions from the
burning structures.
The aviation camp at Coucu-le-Château, north of Soissons, and the
station at Comines, Belgium, were under fire from the air. In
Champagne a quantity of shells were unloosed upon the station at
Somme-Py and Dontrein, near Eacille and St. Etienne-sur-Suippe enemy
bivouacs were bombarded. Other bivouacs at Basancourt and Pont
Faverger were struck by arrows dropped from the skies.
These numerous raids and reconnaissances were repeated every day at
many points. German airmen were not less active than those of the
Allies. Neither side allowed a fine day to pass without watching the
enemy from the air and striking him at such places and times as they
could.
Early on the morning of April 13, 1915, a Zeppelin was discovered
surveying allied gun positions near Ypres, in Belgium. The batteries
immediately opened fire and several shells found their target, judging
from the heavy list which the airship developed. It was seen to be in
serious trouble as it made its escape. Amsterdam reported the
following day that the craft fell near Thielt, a complete wreck. What
became of the crew never was learned.
The raids on England were now resumed. On April 13, 1915, a Zeppelin
visited Newcastle-on-Tyne and several near-by towns. Newcastle, a
great naval station and manufacturing city, had been the objective of
previous air attacks that brought forth little result. The Zeppelin
commander, who directed the bombardment of the thirteenth, was well
informed and proceeded straight to the arsenal and naval workshops.
More than a dozen bombs fell. Strangely enough none of these caused
material loss, and there were no casualties. Dwellings were set afire
in other quarters of the city. The stir that followed brought England
to the realization that better weather was dawning and with it an
imminent peril. Efforts were redoubled to ward off aerial raiders.
A flotilla of Zeppelins shelled Blyth, Wallsend, and South Shields, on
the northeastern coast of England on the night of April 14, 1915. This
attack was directed primarily at the industrial and shipping centers
of Tyneside. Berlin claimed a distinct success, but the British denied
that extensive harm had been done.
French airmen drove home an attack on April 15, 1915, that had
important results. The station at Saint-Quentin was shelled from the
air and upward of 150 freight cars and extensive freight sheds
destroyed. Some of the cars contained benzol, the explosion of which
spread burning liquid in every direction. Adjacent buildings were
consumed by the spreading fire and it seemed that Saint-Quentin itself
might go. Twenty-four German soldiers were killed and the fire burned
from four o'clock in the afternoon until six the next morning, the
explosion of shells being frequently heard. These facts were
communicated to the French by spies and prisoners and thus written
into the war's record.
Lowestoft and Maldon, only thirty miles from London, were the mark of
bombs on the morning of April 16, 1915. The raiders arrived at
Lowestoft about midnight and released three bombs, one of which killed
two horses. A half hour later they appeared over Maldon, where six
bombs were dropped. Several fires broke out. There was a panic when
searchlights revealed one of the raiders still hovering above the
city. But he apparently was merely bent on learning the extent of his
success, as he passed on to Hebridge, two miles away, where a building
was fired by a bursting shell.
Another German squadron of six craft was sighted at Ipswich,
approaching from the direction of the channel. A few fires in Ipswich
and two persons hurt at Southwold were the only evidences of the
visit. This raid was made significant by the fact that the squadron
paid small attention to towns in its route, proceeding to Henham Hall,
residence of the Countess Stradbroke, near Southwold. It then was used
as a hospital for wounded soldiers. A half dozen bombs fell in close
proximity to the main building, but fortunately none of them struck
their mark.
The evening of that day, April 26, 1915, the third raid on England in
less than twenty-four hours took place. Canterbury, Sittingbourne, and
Faversham were shelled, all three towns being within thirty miles of
London. British machines drove the invaders off. About half past one
of the next morning a Zeppelin dropped seven bombs in the
neighborhood of Colchester. It was evident from these frequent
visitations that the German authorities were bent on reaching London
itself. Nearly every raid brought the enemy craft nearer. The gain of
almost a mile was made on each raid. The Germans were wary and
evidently suspected that London's air defenses were adequate. The
small towns which they shelled were of no importance whatever from a
military standpoint, and such casualties as resulted were
insignificant as compared to the death roll that London might be
expected to yield.
A French squadron engaged in a raid of some consequence on April 16,
1915. Leopoldshoehe, east of Rurigue, fell a victim. Workshops, where
shells were made, came in for a heavy aerial bombardment. Fire started
which swept away several buildings. Equipment and supplies were
smashed. Other bombs dropped on a powder magazine at Rothwell caused a
second fire. The electric plant at Maixienes-les-Metz, ten miles north
of Metz, which supplied the city with light and power, was rendered
useless. Munition plants and the station in Metz itself suffered, and
three German aeroplanes guarding the city were compelled to land under
the guns of the fortress when the French squadron turned about. This
dash was a profitable one for the French and showed a new organization
that promised well for the future. Just how many machines took part
was not learned, but there probably were forty or fifty. North of
Ypres French gunners brought down a German aeroplane which fell behind
the enemy's trenches, ablaze from end to end.
The Germans took similar toll. Several of their flyers shelled Amiens
on April 17, 1915, dropping bombs which killed or wounded ten persons
in the vicinity of the cathedral. The invaders sailed up in the night
and descended to a point just above the city before dropping the first
bomb. They were off in a couple of minutes, before pursuing machines
could engage them.
All of these raids were more or less effective. At the time they
attracted wide attention, but as the war wore on the world became
accustomed to aerial attacks. The total of lives lost and the
destruction caused never will be accurately known.
On April 21, 1915, came news of another trip to Warsaw by Zeppelins, a
dozen persons being killed. Bombs fell in the center of the city and
the post-office building was struck. A resumption of activity in that
quarter was productive of raids, clashes in the air and Zeppelin
alarms, such as were common in the western theatre, but on a lesser
scale, as the Russians and Austrians possessed only a limited air
equipment and the Germans were compelled to concentrate the bulk of
their machines elsewhere.
In the southern war zone the aerial operations recommenced with April,
1915. The Austrians made several more or less futile attacks on
Venice. Italian cities, especially Venice, Verona, and others near the
border removed many of their art works to safe places, including
stained-glass windows from cathedrals, canvases, and statuary. The
base of the Campanile, Venice, and other historic edifices were
protected with thousands of sandbags. The famous horses brought from
Constantinople were taken down. This denuding process robbed the
ancient seat of Venetian power of its many splendors, but assured
their preservation and future restoration.
The Austrian bombs started numerous fires, tore up a few streets, and
caused some casualties. In turn, the Italians dashed across the
Austrian lines and attacked supply bases, railway stations, and other
vantage points in the same way that the Allies were harrowing the
Germans on the western front. In this work the Italians made use to
some extent of their dirigibles, a type smaller than the Zeppelin but
highly efficient.
Thirty persons were killed or wounded in Calais on April 26, 1915,
when a Zeppelin succeeded in reaching a point above one of the thickly
populated sections of the city. The raid took place before midnight.
The visitor was quickly driven away by a French machine, but not until
the damage had been done. An orphanage was among the buildings struck,
many of the victims being children. A fleet of aeroplanes visited
Amiens at about the same hour, their efforts being directed to the
bombardment of ammunition depots near that city. The invaders were
driven off with small results to show for their work.
In a raid on April 28, 1915, upon Friedrichshafen, so often the mark
of airmen, several airship sheds and a Zeppelin were damaged. A nearly
simultaneous bombardment of Leopoldshoehe, Lörrach, and the station at
Haltinge resulted in the destruction of train sheds and two
locomotives. Forty-two members of the Landsturm were killed or wounded
at Lörrach and two aeroplanes put out of commission, service being cut
on the railway line. This was the official French version. Geneva gave
a different and more vivid account. According to the Swiss, the French
airmen visited Friedrichshafen twice within thirty-six hours,
destroying five airships, setting fire to several buildings, and
causing at least $1,000,000 damage. The report said that they returned
by way of Metz, dropping arrows and bombs, and wrecking the station at
Lörrach.
The east coast of England was the victim of an air raid on April 30,
1915. Hostile aircraft were sighted over Ipswich, about sixty-five
miles from London, shortly after midnight. The alarm was spread
westward, whence the craft were bound. Five bombs fell upon Ipswich,
but no one was killed. A few dwellings and commercial buildings were
struck, fires starting which the local department soon controlled.
Only a few minutes after the machines shelled Ipswich, they were seen
to approach Bury St. Edmunds, fourteen miles to the northwest of
Ipswich. Three bombs failed to produce casualties, but fires were
started. Little damage resulted.
On the first day of May, 1915, announcement was made in Paris that
experiments conducted at Issy les Molineaux over several months had
brought about successful tests in firing a three-inch gun from an
aeroplane. This had never been accomplished before, and had seemed a
well-nigh impossible task. An entirely new piece was developed, firing
a shell of about the same size as the regular 75-millimeter field gun.
It was made lighter by half, with an effective range of 2,500 meters,
considerably less than the standard gun.
French skill in designing weapons, always a trait of the race, was
evidenced here. The heavy steel breechblock of the seventy-five was
replaced by a wooden block. When fired the explosion of the powder
charge automatically blew the wooden breechblock backward, thus
neutralizing the shock. But owing to the open breech much of the
powder's driving force was lost. Nothing to equal the new arm had
there been up to that time. The wooden breechblock completely did away
with the heavy hydraulic recoil cylinders which were one of the
distinguishing features of the seventy-five. These cylinders were
esteemed by many authorities to be the finest in the world, absorbing
maximum shock with a minimum of effort.
The coming of this new gun marked a big step forward in aerial war and
gave the French machines so equipped a decided advantage. Its effect
was to make the German flyers more wary, avoiding combat except when
impossible to avoid the issue. But its use was confined to the larger
machines as a rule, particularly the Voisin biplane, the machine gun
being favored by many airmen because of its lightness and the ease
with which it could be handled.
The beginning of May, 1915, found aerial warfare in full progress again.
The British defense squadrons showed somewhat better generalship and it
was not until the tenth of the month that Zeppelins obtained any
appreciable advantage in that quarter. But two of the raiders evaded the
patrols on the night of May 10, 1915, and dropped bombs upon
Westcliff-on-Sea, near Southend, at the mouth of the Thames, a bare
twenty-five miles from London. There were no fatalities, but a man and
his wife were badly burned when their home caught fire from a bursting
bomb. At Leigh, near Southend, several shops were burned. It was
reported that four Zeppelins had been seen at Leigh, whereas
Westcliff-on-Sea saw but two. If the larger number were correct it would
indicate that the Germans were becoming more determined to reach London.
One feature of the raid at Westcliff-on-Sea was that of sixty bombs
dropped only a few struck in the town. Most of them fell on the beach
and the sand neutralized any effects that the missiles might have had.
The Bull and George Hotel at Ramsgate was completely wrecked by bombs
which struck it on the night of May 17, 1915. An instance of the
vagaries of explosives was furnished by this raid. One of the bombs
which struck the hotel penetrated the roof and fell upon a bed on
which a woman was sleeping. It wrecked the room and tore a great hole
in the floor through which the bed and occupant fell to the cellar.
The sleeper was badly hurt and the bed practically uninjured. Fires
started by other bombs in Ramsgate soon were extinguished.
Advices from Rotterdam stated that during this raid a Zeppelin fell
into the Gierlesche Woods, Belgium, two men being hurt. The cause of
the airship's plight was unknown, but the damage made it necessary
that the frame be taken apart and sent to Germany for repairs.
One of the oddest combats of the war was staged on this day--May 17,
1915. A Zeppelin, flying from the direction of the English coast, was
sighted in the channel by a French torpedo boat. The craft was at a
comparatively low altitude and furnished an excellent mark. Only a few
shots had been fired when it was seen to be in distress. The Zeppelin
made several frantic efforts to rise, then fell into the sea within
four miles of Gravelines. It sank before aid could be given the crew.
May 17, 1915, was a bad day for Zeppelins. One of the dirigibles
supposed to have attacked Ramsgate early that morning was discovered
off Nieuport, Belgium, by a squadron of eight British naval machines
which had made a sortie from Dunkirk. They surrounded the enemy craft
and three of the pilots succeeded in approaching close to the
Zeppelin. Four bombs were dropped upon the airship from a height of
200 feet. A column of smoke arose. The Zeppelin looked as though it
would fall for a moment, but righted itself and mounted to an altitude
of some 11,000 feet, finally eluding its pursuers.
Two Zeppelins and two Taubes were caught by daylight after a
frustrated raid upon Calais on May 18, 1915. They were fired upon from
many points. A battery at Gris Nez succeeded in hitting one of the
dirigibles. The other craft of the flotilla stood by their injured
fellow as long as they dared, but made off after a few minutes, as
French machines were closing in from all sides. The injured Zeppelin
dropped on the beach near Fort Mardick, about two miles from Dunkirk.
Forty men aboard were taken prisoners, including several officers.
Two women in Southend, England, met death on May 27, 1915, when
Zeppelins visited that city. A child was badly injured. The lighting
plant and several industrial establishments suffered damage. Repeated
attacks on Southend had resulted in the installation of searchlights
and the detailing of more aviators to guard its citizens. Neither
availed to prevent the loss of life, but they did succeed in driving
away the raiders after their first appearance.
Of all the raids carried out during the spring and summer of 1915, one
of the most important was that upon Ludwigshafen, in Bavaria. Here the
laboratories of the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik were located. This
plant was said to produce two-thirds of the nitrates used in the
production of ammunition for the German armies. Since the start of the
war it had been the object of several attacks, none of which had
noteworthy results.
But on the morning of May 26, 1915, eighteen French aeroplanes started
at daybreak from a border stronghold and headed straight for
Ludwigshafen. They had a supply of gasoline to last seven hours and
rose to a height of 6,500 feet in order to escape detection. In this
they did not succeed, but ran into several lively cannonades before
reaching their destination. Once there, they circled above the big
chemical works, dropping bomb after bomb. More than a ton of
explosives were hurled upon the buildings in a quarter of an hour.
Columns of smoke rose from the burning structures. Loud explosions
issued from the smokestacks, sounding like the report of heavy guns.
Workmen fled in all directions and the whole plant soon was wrapped in
flames. The airmen lingered about for a short time, watching the
results of their work. It became evident that the plant would be a
total loss, and the flames spread to near-by buildings, for a time
threatening a good part of the city.
Swiss reports of a few days later said that upward of a hundred
workmen lost their lives, that scores were hurt and the property loss
ran well into the millions. The blow was severe, the heaviest up to
that time which German industries, far from the battle front, had
sustained. It revealed a new chapter of war in the air to communities
which would be snugly secure under any other condition. On the return
trip, ill fortune overtook the French flotilla. The machine of its
commander found it necessary to make a landing. Chief of Squadron, De
Goys, and Adjutant Bunau-Varilla were captured. They burned their
aeroplane before being taken prisoners.
CHAPTER III
ZEPPELINS ATTACK LONDON--BATTLES IN THE AIR
England's insularity disappeared on the night of May 31, 1915. The
isolation by sea which had kept her immune from attack since the days
of the Normans failed to save London from the Zeppelin. After ten
months of war the British capital looked upon its dead for the first
time. Four children, one woman, and one man were killed. An old apple
woman died of fright. There were numerous fires, only three of which
assumed serious proportions and these were extinguished by the fire
department after a few hours.
London's initial glimpse of a Zeppelin was obtained about 11.30 p. m.,
when the theatre section was filled with homeward bound throngs. The
lights attracted the raiders to this district, where a half dozen
bombs were dropped. No sooner had the first of the missiles fallen
than antiaircraft guns began to open a bombardment from many
directions. Searchlights mounted at advantageous points threw their
narrow pencils of light into the skies. The people in different
sections of the city caught a fleeting glance of a huge airship that
floated sullenly along, like some bird of prey from out of the past--a
new pterodactyl that instead of seizing its victims dropped death upon
them.
One shell fell in Trafalgar Square. The Zeppelins passed over the
Houses of Parliament, Westminster, and other famous buildings, but
apparently did not have their location well in mind as these noted
monuments escaped harm.
But the Zeppelins had come. And they left scars which greeted
Londoners the following morning to prove that the raid was not a bad
dream which would disappear with the morning mists. In addition to the
four persons killed, seventy others were injured, some of whom
suffered the loss of limbs and other injuries that incapacitated them.
Immediately there was a cry for revenge. Some of the newspapers
advocated reprisals upon German cities. This the government refused to
do and steadfastly adhered to a policy of war upon fortified places
and armed men alone. Rioting took place in many districts where
Germans were numerous. Shops and homes were looted. Every German who
appeared in the streets, or any person who looked like one, was liable
to attack. A number of aliens were badly handled. The public declared
a spontaneous boycott upon every person having a name that seemed to
be of German origin. There was a united movement to obtain some
reparation for the Zeppelin raids. But the results were only trifling
and the indignation died down with the passing days, British calmness
soon succeeding the excitement of a moment.
Italian frontier towns became the goal of Austrian airmen on June 1,
1915. A half dozen persons were killed or injured and there was some
property damaged. With warm weather and good flying conditions raids
were in order every day.
On June 3, 1915, British aviators made a successful attack upon German
airship sheds at Evere, Belgium. The same day French machines
bombarded the headquarters of the crown prince in the Argonne, with
what results never was definitely established, although there were
reports that several high officers had been killed.
It was made known in London on June 3, 1915, that Great Britain and
Germany had agreed to a plan for the protection of public buildings
from air raids. According to this agreement hospitals, churches,
museums, and similar buildings were to have large white crosses marked
upon their roofs. Both governments pledged themselves to respect these
crosses. Much importance was attached to the idea at the time, but
its effects were disappointing. The marks either were not readily
perceivable from an aeroplane or the pilots did not trouble themselves
too much about the crosses. Public buildings continued to suffer.
On the night of June 4, 1915, German dirigibles attacked towns at the
mouth of the Humber, the port and shipping of Hardwich, in England.
There were some casualties and considerable property loss, but the
British Government would not make public the extent of the damage as
the places attacked were of naval importance. Calais, on the French
coast was raided the next day by two German airmen. There was one
casualty. England's east coast was visited by Zeppelins on the night
of June 6, 1915, twenty-four persons being killed and forty hurt.
There was much damage, all details of which were suppressed.
Just after the break of day on June 7, 1915, a British monoplane was
returning from a scouting trip over Belgium. At the same hour a
Zeppelin flew homeward from the English coast. The two met between
Ghent and Brussels. Four persons had been killed and forty injured
during the night at Yarmouth and other near-by towns on the East
channel coast. Raids had been frequent of late and the British pilot
sensed the fact that this Zeppelin was one of the dreaded visitors. He
was several miles away when the big aircraft hove into view. Uncertain
for a few minutes how to proceed, he rose until he was two thousand
feet above the Zeppelin. His maneuver was not appreciated at first, or
the Zeppelin crew did not see him. There was no attempt either to flee
or give battle.
But as the monoplane drew nearer it was sighted and a combat followed
such as never was seen before. Sub-Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, a
young Canadian who had not reached twenty-one years of age, matched
his pygmy machine against the great aerial dreadnought. The fight
started at a height of 6,000 feet. Lieutenant Warneford released his
first bomb when about 1,000 feet above the Zeppelin. He saw it strike
the airbag and disappear, followed by a puff of smoke. Because of the
sectional arrangement this did not disable the airship. The
Lieutenant circled off and again approached the Zeppelin. Every gun
was trained upon him that could be brought to bear. The wings of his
machine were shattered many times, but he kept on fighting. When once
more above the enemy craft, he released another bomb. It also struck
the Zeppelin, but appeared to glance off.
The antagonists resorted to every conceivable ruse, one to escape, the
other to bring down its quarry. All efforts of the Zeppelin commander
to reach the height of his antagonist were defeated. His lone enemy
kept above him. The battle varied from an altitude of 6,000 to 10,000
feet. Three other bombs struck the airship, and each time there was
the telltale wisp of smoke.
The Zeppelin was mortally injured. Her commander turned to earth for
refuge. Seeing this, Lieutenant Warneford came nearer. He had but one
bomb left. Descending to within a few hundred feet of the airship,
while its machine guns played upon him, he released this remaining
bomb. It struck the Zeppelin amidship. There was a flash, a roar, and
a great burst of smoke as the vanquished craft exploded and plunged
nose downward. The rush of air caused by the explosion upset the
equilibrium of the victorious machine, which dropped toward the ground
and turned completely over before its pilot could regain control. The
presence of mind which he showed at this juncture, was one of the most
remarkable features of this remarkable conflict.
The young Canadian pilot righted his machine in time to see the
Zeppelin end its career. Like a flaming comet it fell upon the convent
of Le Grand Beguinage de Sainte Elizabeth, located in Mont Saint
Amand, a suburb of Ghent. This convent was used as an orphanage. The
burning airship set fire to several buildings, causing the death of
two sisters and two children. The twenty-eight men aboard were killed.
Accounts from Amsterdam a day or two later gave a vivid description of
the charred remnants of the machine, the burned convent buildings, and
the victims all piled together.
Lieutenant Warneford saw the Zeppelin fall and knew that its raiding
days were over. Then he discovered that his own machine was in
trouble. In another moment he realized the impossibility of returning
to the British lines, and was compelled to volplane toward earth,
cutting off his driving power. Descending in a soft field, he found
that his motor was out of order. Thirty precious minutes were spent
repairing the damage. It took him as long again to get his machine
started, a task not often accomplished by one man. But he sailed
serenely home and brought the news of his strange victory.
Within twenty-four hours Lieutenant Warneford was the hero of the
world. His name and achievement had been flashed to the four corners
of the earth. Every newspaper rang with acclaim for the boyish aviator
who had shown that one man of skill and daring was a match for the
huge Zeppelin. It was the old story of David and Goliath, of the Roman
youth who bested the Gaul, of Drake's improvised fleet against the
Armada. The lieutenant was called to London and presented with the
Victoria Cross by King George, who thanked him in the name of the
British Empire for adding another laurel to the long list of its
honors. A day or two later President Poincaré received him in Paris
and pinned the Legion of Honor cross upon his breast.
But this same week saw the climax of this war romance--a tragic ending
to a war epic. Lieutenant Warneford was practicing with a new French
machine at Versailles. He either lost control or the motor failed him.
It dropped to earth, killing the pilot and an American newspaper
correspondent who was in the observer's seat. This sudden end to a
career so brilliant, the cutting off of a future so promising, cast a
pall over the minds of both the French and British airmen. The body of
Lieutenant Warneford lay in state at the French capital and afterward
in London, where every honor was shown his memory.
CHAPTER IV
VENICE ATTACKED--OTHER RAIDS
British airmen visited Ghent on June 8, 1915, where several ammunition
depots were fired. The railway station was hit and a number of German
troops in a train standing there killed or hurt.
On June 9, 1915, Venice was shelled by Austrian aviators, bombs
falling near St. Mark's and setting a number of fires. There were no
casualties as far as known.
An Italian airship squadron raided Pola, the principal Austrian naval
base, on June 14, 1915. Pola has one of the best harbors on the
Adriatic and is an exceptionally strong position. It was from there
that Austrian warships and aircraft made their attacks upon Italian
and other allied shipping. The city had a big arsenal and
miscellaneous war plants. The arsenal was struck by some of the bombs
dropped during this raid, shipping in the harbor was bombarded, and
one warship badly damaged. This was perhaps the most valuable
accomplishment of the Italian air service in offensive actions up to
that time. Contrary to what might be expected from the Latin
temperament, Italy had confined herself to the use of aircraft for
scouting purposes almost exclusively. The campaign in Tripoli had
taught her their value, and she had not shown a disposition to bombard
Austrian cities in reply to attacks upon her own people.
The visit of the Zeppelins to London had aroused not only the ire of
Britain, but that of her French allies. It was decided to take
reprisals. Forty-five French machines left the eastern border during
the night of June 15, 1915, and set their journey toward Karlsruhe.
Some of the craft were large battle planes; all of them had speed and
carrying capacity. Approaching Karlsruhe they at first were taken for
German machines, by reason of the location of Karlsruhe far from the
front.
The squadron divided and approached the city from a half dozen
different directions, dripping bombs as they came. One of the largest
chemical plants in Germany was set afire and burned to the ground.
Both wings of the Margrave's Palace were struck and one of them
practically ruined. In the opposite wing, which escaped with only
slight damage, the Queen of Sweden, who is a German by birth, was
sleeping. She was said to have missed death only by a few inches.
Other titled persons in the palace had narrow escapes. A collection of
art works was ruined. Despite the fire of antiaircraft guns the French
machines hovered above the city and dropped bombs at will, again
proving that there was no sufficient protection against air attacks
except by flotillas of equal force.
Within a half hour flames started in many sections of the city. The
chemical and other plants were burned. Karlsruhe's citizens were made
to realize the losses which German airmen had inflicted upon the
noncombatants of other countries. According to the best advices 112
persons were killed and upward of 300 wounded. The maximum number
admitted by the Germans to have been injured was 19 killed and 14
wounded. But persons arriving in Geneva, for weeks after the raid,
told of the wholesale destruction and large casualties. The victims
were buried with honors, and the German Government issued a statement
deploring the "senseless" attack. This was one of the few raids made
by aviators of the allied powers in which the lives of noncombatants
were lost. That it was a warning and not an adopted policy is
indicated by the fact that it was not followed up with other raids.
Zeppelins were seen off the east coast of England about midnight on
June 16, 1915. They left in their wake one of the longest casualty
lists resulting from aerial raids upon England up to that time. South
Shields was the principal sufferer. Sixteen persons were killed and
forty injured. The Zeppelins devoted their attention to the big
Armstrong works principally. Guns and munitions of almost every
description were being made there, and the raid was planned to wreck
the establishment. This attempt was partially successful, but the
buildings destroyed soon were replaced and operations at the plant
never ceased. The extent of the damage was kept secret, but the number
of victims again caused indignation throughout the British Empire.
One result of this raid was a demand in the House of Commons on June
24, 1915, that the public be informed as to defense measures against
air raids. The Government had evaded the question at every
opportunity, and up to that time kept discussion of the subject down
to the minimum. But on this occasion the Commons were not to be easily
disposed of, and insisted upon an answer. This was promised for a
future day, but Home Secretary Brace announced that 24 men, 21 women,
and 11 children had died as a result of attacks from the air since the
war began. He said that 86 men, 35 women, and 17 children had been
wounded. Of these a percentage died later. The secretary intimated
that the Government was keeping a record of every pound's worth of
damage and every person injured, with the expectation of making
Germany reimburse.
The South Shields attack led to further expansion of the air service
and redoubled measures to check the raiders. It seems likely that not
a few aircraft have been captured about which the British Government
made no report. What the motives for this secrecy are it would be hard
to decide. But a guess may be hazarded that, as in the case of certain
submarine crews, it is intended to charge some aviators and Zeppelin
crews with murder after the war is over, and try them by due process
of law. For a time the Government kept a number of men taken from
submarines, known to have caused the loss of noncombatant lives, in
close confinement. Germany retaliated upon army officers, and the
British were compelled to retire from their position. It has been
hinted that in the case of the Zeppelin raiders she had quietly locked
up a number of them without announcing her purpose to the world.
The closing days of June, 1915, brought two raids on Paris. Taubes in
one instance, and Zeppelins in another were held up by the air patrol
and driven back, a few bombs being dropped on Saint Cloud. The work of
the Paris defense forces was notably good during the summer of 1915,
countless incursions being halted before the capital was reached.
What may have been intended as a raid equal to the Cuxhaven attack was
attempted on July 4, 1915, but was foiled by the watchfulness of the
Germans. Cruisers and destroyers approached German positions on an
unnamed bay of the North Sea, and a squadron of British seaplanes rose
from the vessels. German airmen promptly went aloft and drove off the
invaders. The set-to took place near the island of Terschelling off
the Netherlands. When convinced that the Germans were fully ready to
meet them the British turned back and put out to the open sea. It was
intimated from Berlin that a considerable naval force had been engaged
on the British side. There was a good deal of mystery about the
incident.
Perhaps the most important accomplishment of the British flying men
during July, 1915, as concerns actual fighting, was the destruction of
three Taubes at the mouth of the Thames. The invaders were sighted
while still at sea and the word wirelessed ahead. Four British
machines mounted to give battle, and after a stirring contest above
the city brought down two of the Taubes. They were hit in midair, and
one of them caught fire. The burning machine dropping headlong to
earth furnished a spectacle that the watchers are not likely to
forget. The third Taube was winged after a long flight seaward and
sank beneath the waves, carrying down both occupants. This contest
took place July 20, 1915, and followed several visits to England by
Zeppelins, none of which had important results.
On July 21, 1915, French aviators made three conspicuous raids. A
squadron of six machines descended upon Colmar in Alsace, dropping
ninety-one shells upon the passenger and freight stations. Both broke
into flames, and the former was almost wholly destroyed, tying up
traffic on the line, the object of all attacks upon railroad stations,
except at such times as troops were concentrated there or trains were
standing on the tracks ready to load or unload soldiers.
The second raid of this day was especially interesting, because a
dirigible and not an aeroplane was employed, the French seldom using
the big craft so much favored by the Germans. Vigneulles and the
Hatton Chattel in the St. Mihiel salient were the objectives of the
dirigible. A munition depot and the Vigneulles station were shelled
successfully. The third air attack was made upon Challerange, near
Vouziers, by four French aeroplanes. Forty-eight bombs were dropped on
the station there, a junction point and one of the German lesser
supply bases. The damage was reported to have halted reenforcements
for a position near-by where the French took a trench section on this
same day. Accepting the report as true, it exemplifies the unison of
army units striving for the same purpose by remarkably different
methods and weapons.
The French kept busy during this month of July, 1915, with raids upon
Metz and intermediate positions. Metz is the first objective of what
the French hope will be a march to the Rhine, and since the start of
the war the Germans there have had no rest.
On July 28, 1915, Nancy was visited by a flock of Zeppelins and a
number of bombs dropped which did considerable damage in that
war-scarred city. Eleven or twelve persons were killed.
During the night of July 29-30, 1915, a French aviator shelled a plant
in Dornach, Alsace, where asphyxiating gas was being made. Several of
his bombs went home and a tremendous explosion took place that almost
wrecked the machine. But the driver returned safely. An air squadron
also visited Freiburg, so often the target of airmen, and released
bombs upon the railway station.
French airmen were extremely active on July 29, 1915. One flotilla
bombarded the railroad between Ypres and Roulers, near Passchendaele,
tearing up the track for several hundred yards. German bivouacs in the
region of Longueval, west of Combles, also were shelled from the air,
and German organizations on the Brimont Hill, near Rheims, served as
targets for French birdmen. A military station on the railway at
Chattel was shelled, and the station at Burthecourt in Lorraine
damaged. Forty-five French machines dropped 103 bombs on munition
factories and adjoining buildings at Pechelbronn, near Wissemburg.
PART III--THE WESTERN FRONT
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS
The first anniversary of the war on the western front fell on August
2, 1915. It was on Tuesday, July 28, of the previous year that Count
Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, had pressed the
button in "the powder magazine of Europe"--the Balkans--by declaring
war on Serbia.
For two days the world looked on in breathless, wondering suspense.
Then, like a series of titanic thunderbolts hurled in quick
succession, mighty events shaped themselves with a violence and a
rapidity that staggered the imagination.
On July 31, 1914, "a state of war" was proclaimed in Germany; the next
day (August 1) that country declared war on Russia; on August 2, 1914,
Germany delivered her ultimatum to Belgium and invaded both France and
Luxemburg, following up these acts with a declaration of war against
France on the 3d of the same month.
Before the sun had risen and set again there came the climax to that
most sensational week: Great Britain had thrown her weight into the
scales against the Teutonic Powers. This occurred on August 4, 1914,
the same day that the German frontier force under General von Emmich
came into contact with the Belgian pickets before Liege.
After thirty-six hours of fighting the southern forts were captured
and the city fell into German hands on August 7, 1914. It was not
until the 15th, however, that General Leman, the Belgian commander,
was conquered in his last stronghold, the northern fort of Loncin.
When that fell, the railway system of the Belgian plains lay open to
the invaders. Leman's determined stand had delayed the German advance
for at least a week, and afforded an extremely valuable respite for
the unprepared French and British armies.
The first drafts of the British Expeditionary Force landed in France
on August 16, 1914. On August 7, 1914, a French brigade from Belfort
had crossed the frontier into Alsace and taken the towns of Altkirch
and Mülhausen, which, however, they were unable to hold for more than
three days. Between August 7 and August 15, 1914, large bodies of
German cavalry with infantry supports crossed the Meuse between Liege
and the Dutch frontier, acting as a screen for the main advance. The
Belgian army, concentrated on the Dyle, scored some successes against
the Germans at Haelen, Tirlemont, and Engherzee on the 12th and 13th,
but after the fall of Fort Loncin the German advance guards fell back
and the main German right under Von Kluck advanced toward Brussels. On
the 19th the Belgians began to withdraw to the fortress of Antwerp.
Brussels fell to the Germans on the 20th. Von Kluck turned toward the
Sambre and Von Bülow advanced along the Meuse to Namur. On the
opposite bank (the right) of the Meuse the Saxon army of Von Hausen
moved against Namur and Dinant, while farther south the German Crown
Prince and the Duke of Württemberg pushed their forces toward the
French frontier. Meanwhile, General de Castelnau, commanding the
French right, had seized most of the passes of the Vosges, overrun
upper Alsace almost to the Rhine, and had reached Saarburg on the
Metz-Strassburg railway. On August 20, 1914, the Germans attacked
Namur, captured it on the 23d, and demolished the last forts on the
24th. This unexpected event placed the Allies in an extremely critical
situation, which led to serious reverses. The British force on the
left was in danger of being enveloped in Von Kluck's wheeling
movement; the fall of Namur had turned the flank of the Fourth and
Fifth French armies; the latter was defeated by Von Bülow at Charleroi
on the 22d; the pressure exerted by the armies of the Duke of
Württemberg and the crown prince also contributed to render inevitable
an immediate retirement of the allied right and center. The French
army that had invaded Lorraine--a grave strategical blunder--had also
come to grief. The Bavarians from Metz had broken its left wing on the
20th and driven it back over the frontier. De Castelnau was fighting
desperately for Nancy on a long front from Pont-à-Mousson down to St.
Dié. On the 24th the British line fell back to the vicinity of
Maubeuge, where Von Kluck attempted to close it in. Sir John French
frustrated the plan by further retiring to a line running through Le
Cateau and Landrecies, August 25, 1914. After a violent holding battle
during two days the whole British front had fallen back to St. Quentin
and the upper valley of the Oise.
It was General Joffre's plan to retreat to a position south of the
Marne, where his reserves would be available, a movement which was
successfully carried out by all parts of the allied line during the
following week. By September 5, 1914, this line extended from the
southeast of Paris, along the southern tributaries of the Marne,
across the Champagne to a point south of Verdun. Beyond that, De
Castelnau was still holding the heights in front of Nancy. The
powerful German advance had forced the Allies back some hundred and
thirty miles, almost to the shelter of the Paris fortifications. It
seemed only a matter of hours to the fall of Paris when General Joffre
began his counteroffensive on September 6, 1914. Attempting to pierce
and envelop the allied left center, Von Kluck marched across the front
of the British to strike at the Fifth French Army commanded by General
d'Espérey, who had replaced Lanrezac after the Charleroi defeat. But
the turn of the tide was at hand. The Sixth French Army from Paris,
under General Manoury, fiercely attacked Von Kluck's rear guards on
the Ourcq; Sir John French drove against the right of the main German
advance; the Fifth and Ninth French armies held the front of Von Kluck
and Von Bülow; the Fourth French Army south of Vitry resisted the
piercing movement of the Duke of Württemberg, and the Third French
Army (General Sarrail) checked the crown prince at Verdun, while De
Castelnau at Nancy entered upon the final stage of the battle of
Lorraine. The first great German offensive had failed in its purpose.
By September 12, 1914, the whole German front was retreating
northward. The Aisne plateau, where the Germans came to a halt, is
considered one of the strongest defensive positions in Europe, and
General Joffre soon realized that it could not be taken by direct
assault. He therefore attempted to envelop the German right and
extended his left wing--with a new army--up the valley of the Oise.
Some desperate German counterattacks were met at Rheims and south of
Verdun, but they achieved small success beyond creating a sharp
salient in their line at St. Mihiel, where the invaders managed to
cross the Meuse, General Sarrail defended Verdun with a field army in
a wide circle of intrenchments, with the result that the crown prince
was unable to bring the great howitzers within range of the fortress,
and his army suffered a severe defeat in the Argonne.
The allied stand on the Marne and the resultant battle not only
checked the German avalanche and saved Paris, but dislocated the
fundamental principle of the whole German plan of campaign--to crush
France speedily with one mighty blow and then deal with Russia.
On September 3, 1914, the Russians had already captured Lemberg--two
days before the allied retreat from Mons came to a sudden halt on the
Marne. On that same day, too, the French Government had been removed
from Paris to Bordeaux in anticipation of the worst. Having secured
the capital against immediate danger, General Joffre now began to
extend his line for a great enveloping movement against the German
right. He placed the new Tenth Army under Maud'huy north of De
Castelnau's force, reaching almost to the Belgian frontier. The small
British army under Sir John French moved north of that, and the new
Eighth French Army, under General d'Urbal, was intended to fill the
gap to the Channel. With remarkable flexibility the Germans initiated
the movement with their right as fast as the French extended their
left, and the whole strategy of both sides developed into a feverish
race for the northern shore. Before General d'Urbal could reach his
appointed sector, however, that "gap" had been filled by the remnants
of the Belgian army, liberated after the fall of Antwerp on October
9, 1914. By a narrow margin the Allies had won the race, but were
unable to carry out the intended offensive. Desperate conflicts raged
for a month, but they succeeded in holding the gate to the Channel
ports. The first battle of Ypres-Armentières opened on October 11,
1914, when the Germans attacked simultaneously at Ypres, Armentières,
Arras, and La Bassée. As a victory at either of the two last-named
places would have amply sufficed for the German purpose, this fourfold
attack appears to be a rather curious division of energy. The passages
at Arras and La Bassée were held by General Maud'huy and General
Smith-Dorrien respectively. The former defended his position for the
first three weeks in October when the German attacks weakened; the
latter, with the British Second Corps, had reached the farthest point
in the La Bassée position by October 19, 1914. Violent fighting
occurred round this sector during the latter part of October, and,
though compelled to yield ground occasionally, the British force
prevented any serious German advance. In the early stage of the
struggle the Belgian army and a brigade of French marines held the
Yser line. A British squadron, operating from the Channel, broke the
attack of the German right, and during the last week of October the
Belgians held the middle crossings, with the assistance of part of the
French Eighth Army. All immediate danger was removed from this section
by October 31, 1914, after the Belgians had flooded the country and
driven the Württembergers back at Ramscapelle.
Returning to Ypres, we have stated that the Germans attacked four
different points in this region, on October 11, 1914. By the 20th,
however, it became apparent that their main objective was the Ypres
salient--neither the best nor the easiest route to the sea. What,
then, was the motive underlying this particular phase of the German
strategic plan? It would be pure presumption--taking that word at its
worst meaning--to criticize the deep, long-headed calculations of the
German war staff. A reason--and a good reason--there must have been.
What the historian cannot explain he may, perhaps, be permitted to
speculate upon in order to arrive at some working hypothesis. Hence,
would it be considered an extravagant flight of fancy to assume that
the German decision was influenced by the very simple fact that the
British Expeditionary Force was concentrated in and around Ypres?
Skillful stage management is useful even in the grim drama of war, and
the defeat or elimination of the British forces in the first great
battle of the war would indeed have produced a most sensational effect
with almost incalculable results. Be that as it may, the first battle
of Ypres has already been accorded its position in the British
calendar as "the greatest fight in the history of our army." There is
yet another distinction that battle can claim: it was the first mighty
collision between Anglo-Saxon and Teuton in the history of mankind.
They had fought shoulder to shoulder in the past--never face to face.
French troops also took part in the battle; they consisted of
territorials, some cavalry, and Dubois's Ninth Corps; but the heaviest
blows were delivered with whole-hearted force and energy upon the
British line. This remarkable fight lasted nearly a month. During its
progress the Allies withstood some half a million German troops with a
force that never exceeded 150,000 in number.
Before the last thunderous echoes of Ypres had melted away in space,
dreary winter spread its mantle over the combatants with impartial
severity. During the next three months the opposing forces settled
down and heavily intrenched themselves and then began that warfare at
present familiar to the world, resembling huge siege operations. The
Allies were fighting for time--the Germans against it. The allied
commanders aimed at wearing down the man-power of the enemy by a
series of indecisive actions in which his losses should be
disproportionally greater than their own.
The most important events of the winter campaign were the fight near
La Bassée in December, 1914, where the British Indian Corps
distinguished itself; the fighting at Givenchy in January and
February, 1915; the battle at Soissons in January, 1915, where the
French lost some ground; the long struggle in northern Champagne
during February and March, 1915, where the French first made use of
artillery on a grand scale; and some considerable actions in the
neighborhood of Pont-à-Mousson and the southeast valleys of the
Vosges.
In March, 1915, the Allies began what has been described as a
tentative offensive. Between March 10 and March 12, 1915, the British
advanced about a mile on a front of three miles at Neuve Chapelle, but
the aim of the operations, which were directed against Lille, could
not be achieved. Early in April the French carried the heights of Les
Eparges, which commanded the main communications of the Woevre, an
action that led to a general belief that the Allies' summer offensive
would be aimed at Metz. But the plan--if it ever was entertained--was
abandoned toward the end of April, 1915, when the critical situation
of the Russians in Galicia made it imperative to create a diversion in
another area, where the effects would be more quickly felt. Before the
French attack could mature, however, the second battle of Ypres was
developing.
The Germans began shelling Ypres on April 20, 1915, to prevent
reenforcements from entering the salient, and in the evening of April
22, 1915, they made their first attack with poisonous gas. A French
division lying between the canal and the Pilken road had the first
experience of this new horror added to the methods of warfare. Much
has been written in condemnation of employing poisonous gas, and the
practice has been widely discussed from the "moral" and "humane" point
of view. The Germans claim that the French used it first--a contention
not supported by evidence. "On the general moral question," says Mr.
John Buchan, the well-known English writer on military subjects, "it
is foolish to dogmatize." He points out that all war is barbarous in
essence, and that a man who died in torture from the effects of poison
gas might have suffered equal agony from a shrapnel wound. Hence he
draws the conclusion that the German innovation, if not particularly
more barbarous than other weapons, was at least impolitic, since its
employment raised a storm of indignation and exasperated the feelings
of Germany's enemies. Be that as it may, the poison clouds proved very
effective at Ypres during April and May, 1915. The French line was
driven in and the left brigade of the Canadians on their right was
forced back in a sharp angle. For the first five days the northern
side of the salient was steadily pressed in by gas and artillery
attacks. This, the second battle of Ypres, ended about May 24, 1915;
it had lasted practically as long as the first battle, though the
fighting had been less continuous. The Germans were meanwhile striving
desperately to force a decision in Galicia and Poland, simultaneously
fighting a long-range holding battle in the west with fewer men and
more guns.
On May 10, 1915, began the great attack by the French in the Artois,
aimed at securing Lens and the communications of the Scheldt valley.
After violent artillery-fire preparations, the French center south of
Carency was pushed forward a distance of three miles. In a few days
they took the towns of Albain, Carency, Neuville St. Vaast, and most
of Souchez, besides the whole plateau of Lorette. But the Germans had
prepared a number of fortins, which had to be captured before any
general advance could be made. This mode of warfare enables a
numerically inferior force well supplied with ammunition to resist for
a considerable time the most resolute attacks. The French army was
still engaged in this operation when the first anniversary of the war
dawned. The situation at the moment is summarized in a French official
communiqué as follows: "There has been no great change on the western
front for many months. Great battles have been fought, the casualties
have been heavy on both sides, but territorial gains have been
insignificant."
CHAPTER VI
FIGHTING IN ARTOIS AND THE VOSGES
On the first of August, 1915, the situation on the western front was
as follows: The position of the Belgian troops has been described; the
British held the line from the north of Ypres to the south of La
Bassée. The Germans had closed in to some extent round Ypres during
the two big battles, and the trenches now ran in a semicircle about
the city at a distance of from two and one-half to three miles. The
line turned south at St. Eloi, skirted the west of the Messines ridge,
turned east again at Ploegstreet Wood, and south to the east of
Armentières. Hence the trenches extended southwestward to Neuve
Chapelle and Festhubert to La Bassée. The remainder of the front--down
to the Swiss frontier--was defended by the French, along by Lille,
Rheims, and the fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort.
After the battles of May and June, 1915, in Artois, activity on the
western front became concentrated in the Vosges, where the French by a
series of comparatively successful engagements had managed to secure
possession of more favorable positions and to retain them in spite of
incessant and violent counterattacks. The supreme object of the allied
commanders at this stage was to wear down their opponents through vain
and costly counteroffensives, and to absorb the German local resources
in that sector. It had been decided by the Allies to begin a fresh
offensive on the western front in August, 1915, but owing to
incomplete preparations, the attempt was of necessity postponed till
the third week in September. It was extremely urgent that some
determined move should be made as speedily as possible; the Russians
were suffering defeat and disaster in the east, and were already
retreating from Warsaw in the first days of August, 1915. The British
and the French meanwhile could do little more than engage in local
actions until their arrangements for offensive operations on a vast
scale should be completed. On the other side, the Germans were also
busily making preparations to provide against every possibility in
case of retreat. New lines of defenses were constructed across
Belgium; formidable complex trenches guarded by barbed-wire
entanglements; concrete bases for heavy guns connected by railways;
and a large fortified station was erected. These preparations rendered
possible a very rapid transportation of troops and munitions to
Brabant and Antwerp.
The fighting on the western front during August, 1915, may be
described as a fierce, continuous battle, a lively seesaw of capturing
and recapturing positions, followed at regular intervals by the
publication of the most contradictory "official" reports from the
German, French, and British headquarters. Many of them gave
diametrically opposite accounts of the same events. In the first week
of the month the Germans made furious attacks against the French
positions at Lingekopf and Barrenkopf. All through the Argonne forest
the combatants pelted each other with bombs, hand grenades, and other
newly invented missiles. Several determined attempts were made by the
Germans to recapture the positions lost at Schratzmannele and
Reichsackerkopf, but the French artillery fire proved too strong.
Soissons was again bombarded; desperate night attacks were delivered
around Souchez, on the plateau of Quennevières, and in the valley of
the Aisne; local engagements were fought in Belgium and along parts of
the British front; trenches were mined and shattered, while aeroplanes
scattered bombs and fought thrilling duels in the air. The Belgians
were forced partly to evacuate their advanced positions over the river
Yser, near Hernisse, south of Dixmude. In the Argonne the Germans, by
a strong infantry charge, penetrated the first line of the French
trenches, but were unable to hold their ground.
On August 9, 1915, a squadron of thirty-two large French aeroplanes
carrying explosives, and accompanied by a number of lighter machines
to act as scouts, set out to bombard the important mining and
manufacturing town of Saarbrücken, on the river Saar, in Rhenish
Prussia. This was where the first engagement in the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870 was fought. Owing to mist and heavy clouds, only
twenty-eight of the aeroplanes succeeded in locating the town, where
they dropped one hundred and sixty bombs of large caliber. A number of
German aviators ascended as soon as the flotilla's arrival had been
signaled, and a lively skirmish ensued between them and the French
scouts. The results and casualties of the raid have not leaked out.
The German General Staff was evidently not unacquainted with the fact
that the Allies had a big "drive" in contemplation. Most of the
fighting had been forced by the Germans with ever-increasing violence
and energy. Toward the middle of August, 1915, their attacks became
fiercer still. After a deadly bombardment that literally flattened the
countryside, and in which shells of all calibers as well as
asphyxiating gas bombs were hurled against the French positions
between the Binarville-Vienne-le-Chateau road and the Houyette ravine
in the Argonne, the German infantry dashed from their trenches in
great numbers and close formation and charged across the intervening
ground. So furious was the onslaught that the French were driven well
back out of their shattered defenses. Within a few hours strong
reenforcements hurried to the spot enabled the French to deliver a
counterattack and recover some of the lost ground. Simultaneously, the
Germans attempted to storm the French position in the neighborhood of
La Fontaine-aux-Charmes, but with less success. During the last week
of July and the first half of August, 1915, large bodies of German
troops were detached from the armies operating on the eastern front
and poured into France and Flanders. Different estimates fix the
numbers at from 140,000 to 200,000.
On August 18, 1915, violent fighting broke out in the region north of
Arras, in the course of which the French took an important field
position. In a desperate bayonet charge the following night the
Germans vainly endeavored to recover the ground. The French also
captured a trench in a long battle spread over a wide section of the
Alsatian front. In the Artois they seized the junction of the
highroads between Bethune and Arras and between Ablain and Angres.
North of Carleul they held the Germans in check against a heavy
artillery, infantry, and bomb attack, but were driven out of some
trenches they had previously won on Lingekopf. By the 20th the Germans
had regained some of the trenches on the Ablain-Angres road, but lost
them again in a French bayonet charge two days later. French aviators
bombarded the railway stations at Lens, Hénin-Liétard and Loos, in the
Department of Pas de Calais. Arras, the scene of some of the severest
conflicts in the war, was subjected to another prolonged bombardment
by the heavy German artillery. Thus the pendulum swung to and fro; the
main strength of Germany and Austria-Hungary was strenuously being
exerted in the Polish salient, while on the western front the Germans
also conducted a harassing and exhausting defensive. Meanwhile the
Allies were gradually completing their preparations for the great coup
from which so much was expected.
On August 31, 1915, the science of aviation lost one of its most
daring and brilliant exponents by the death of Alphonse Pégoud. No man
before him ever took such liberties with the law of gravitation or
performed such dare-devil pranks at dizzy altitudes up in the sky. He
was the first to demonstrate the possibility of "looping the loop"
thousands of feet from the earth; many have done the trick since, but
for the pioneer it was a pure gamble with almost certain death. Even
into the serious business of war Pégoud carried his freak aeronautics,
though it must be added that his remarkable skill in that direction
had enabled him to escape from many a perilous situation. A few days
before he fell Pégoud carried out a flight of 186 miles over German
territory. He returned unscathed, while the planes of his machine were
riddled with bullet holes. On the occasion of decorating Pégoud with
the Military Medal in March, 1915, the French Minister for War said:
"Time and again he has pursued the enemy's aeroplanes successfully. On
one day he brought down a monoplane and a biplane and compelled
another biplane to land while he was all the time within range of
fire." The following two of his innumerable thrilling exploits deserve
to be recorded: "At one time Pégoud caught sight of a German
ammunition depot and dropped nine bombs on it. The air concussion was
so great from the explosion of the ammunition that his machine was all
but wrecked, and he regained his equilibrium only after performing
more than exhibition acrobatics. On another occasion, having located a
captive German balloon, he ascended to a great height behind the
clouds and then literally fell out of the sky toward his target. At a
distance of only fifty yards he dropped a bomb which struck the
balloon squarely. The vibration waves caused his aeroplane to bounce
about like a toy boat on a rough pond. But Pégoud still carried his
good luck and, managing to steady the craft, sailed away amid a hail
of German bullets."[1]
[Footnote 1: New York "Sun."]
Of all the fighting on the western front during the month of August,
1915, the main interest attaches to that carried on in the struggle for
the important mountain peaks in the Vosges which dominated German
positions in the Alsatian valleys and plain. According to the French
official reports, these operations resulted in the capture of the peaks
named Lingekopf, Schratzmannele and Barrenkopf. The German official
statement of September 2, 1915, however, claimed that the first and last
of these had been recaptured. The French preparations for the attack on
Lingekopf included the building of a mountain road eight miles long with
communication trenches extending even farther, and also the construction
of innumerable camps, sheds, ammunition and repair depots, as well as
ambulance stations. The mountain road proved to be a triumph of
engineering, as more than a hundred tons of war material passed over it
daily without a single breakdown. The slopes which had to be stormed
were thickly wooded, which greatly facilitated their defense, while the
main French approach trenches were exposed to a double enfilade fire,
rendering their use impossible in daytime. Between Schratzmannele and
Barrenkopf there was a German blockhouse with cement walls ten feet
thick. This was surrounded with barbed-wire entanglements and
chevaux-de-frise. The French delivered their first attack on July 20,
1915. After a violent bombardment of ten hours, chasseur battalions
stormed the German positions, capturing the Linge summit to the left and
the Barren to the right. The Germans, however, firmly retained their
hold on Schratzmannele. They caught the exposed French flanks with a
stream of machine-gun fire and forced the chasseurs to retire to
sheltered positions lower down the slopes. Two days later the French
made another attack, and for quite a month, judging from the
contradictory "official" reports, these peaks changed hands about twice
a week. The French claim that they obtained "complete possession" on
August 22, 1915, and that "the enemy, who had employed seven brigades
against us, had to accept defeat." The German version, on the other
hand, ran: "The battle line of Lingekopf-Barrenkopf thus passed again
into our possession. All counterattacks have been repulsed."
CHAPTER VII
POLITICAL CRISIS IN FRANCE--AEROPLANE WARFARE--FIERCE COMBATS IN THE
VOSGES--PREPARATIONS FOR ALLIED OFFENSE
It was also during the month of August, 1915, that the political horizon
in France was temporarily overcast by one of those peculiar "crises"
which seem to happen chiefly in countries enjoying the most liberal
institutions and the greatest freedom of speech and press. On the 6th it
was announced from Paris that the Government had decided to replace
General H. J. E. Gouraud, Commander of the French Expeditionary Force at
the Dardanelles, by General Sarrail, who had been designated Commander
in Chief of the Army in the Orient. That Gouraud would have to be
relieved of his command was painfully obvious, for that gallant officer
had been struck by a shell while visiting a base hospital on July 8,
hopelessly shattering his right arm, which had to be amputated. As,
however, the French military contingent in the ill-starred Gallipoli
adventure was but a small affair, the appointment of General Sarrail to
the command thereof could only be regarded as the reverse of a
promotion. In the first great German offensive toward Paris it was
General Sarrail who had successfully defended the fortress of Verdun
against the attacks of the German Crown Prince. Gradually the story came
out that the general was the victim of a political intrigue--a plot to
displace him as well as M. Millerand, the Minister for War. An
acrimonious discussion developed in the French Chamber on August 14,
1915, in which some of the members nearly came to blows. The political
truce, arranged between the conflicting parties at the beginning of the
war, hung in the balance. Faithful to the old tradition that the duty of
the Opposition is to oppose anything and everything, the
Radical-Socialists and the Socialist party were loud in their
denunciation of the conduct of the war, and desired to allocate
responsibility for the military failures of the previous year. A number
of high officers had already been "retired" in connection with those
failures, which were serious enough. But the charge alleged against
Sarrail was that he had omitted to supply his men adequately with
antipoison gas masks. In one of the German attacks in which gas was
used, Sarrail's front was pierced and a thousand men were forced to
surrender. Some accounts gave the number as 5,000. For this the general
was at first suspended, and then offered the other command, which he
refused on the ground that if he was guilty he deserved punishment; if
not, he was entitled to reinstatement. The real motive underlying the
prosecution, however, was generally believed to have been one of a
purely political nature. Sarrail, a "Republican," as opposed to a
"Reactionary," which latter signifies a conservative in politics and,
frequently also, a professed churchman--in short, General Sarrail had
attracted the animosity of both the clerical and radical parties. When,
finally, the Government promised to increase the Dardanelles force to
80,000 men, he accepted the appointment.
The first week in September, 1915, saw considerable artillery activity
along the whole front. Except in the Vosges, where French and German
bayonets clashed on mountain peaks and in underground tunnels,
infantry action had been suspended for nearly two weeks. Heavy
bombardments had been maintained by both sides--those of the Allies
being especially deliberate and persistent. As a fireman would sway
the nozzle of his streaming hose from side to side, so the Allies
poured a continuous, sweeping torrent of shot and shell over the
German positions in certain well-defined zones along the line. It
began from the extreme left on the Belgian front, thence swung into
the region of Souchez, then around Arras, farther on along the Aisne,
particularly at the two extremities of the Aisne plateau, turned to
the right in Champagne, spread to the Argonne, next in the Woevre and
finally in Lorraine. Beneath the cyclone and out of sight trench
mortar actions were fought, mining operations carried on, bombs and
hand grenades thrown.
On September 1, 1915, four German aeroplanes had dropped bombs on the
open town of Lunéville, killing many civilians. As a measure of
reprisal forty French aeroplanes returned the compliment by making
another air raid on Saarbrücken, where they bombarded the station,
factories, and military establishments. A squadron of thirty or forty
vessels of the British Fleet bombarded the whole of the Belgian coast
in German possession as far as Ostend. French artillery stationed in
the vicinity of Nieuport cooperated to shell the German coast
batteries at Westende. In retaliation for the bombardment of the open
towns of St. Dié and Gérardmer by German aeroplanes, a French
aeroplane squadron assailed the railroad and military establishments
of Freiburg in Breisgau. Aerial operations had by this time become a
powerful auxiliary to the combatants on each side. The aeroplane
attained a definite position as a weapon even in trench and field
warfare. Machines hovered over the lines every day, reconnoitering and
dropping bombs on positions, stores, transports, moving troops,
trenches, and munition depots. Bombardment by aeroplane was, in fact,
quite as serious and formidable a business as any artillery attack.
The bombs carried by these machines were exactly of the same caliber
as those used by heavy guns. Constant practice afforded by daily
opportunities had enormously increased the skill of the aviators, many
of whom could hit a small house from high altitudes without much
trouble. Duels and pitched battles in the air were of daily occurrence
on the western front. As soon as an "enemy flyer" hove in sight on
either side of the lines, locally attached aviators rose and attacked
the intruder. This, the most "modern" method of fighting, has produced
a crop of thrilling incidents and stirring examples of bravery
exhibited by the German, French, and British flying men. A code of
what might be called "aerial chivalry" has spontaneously grown up
among the flying fraternity. Two pretty incidents will suffice to
demonstrate: A German aviator had been attacked and brought to earth
by a French airman. The German was killed in the contest. In the dead
man's pocket was found a diary of his adventures in the war, and other
happenings, from day to day. It was written in conversational style
addressed throughout to his wife, together with a letter to her of the
same day's date. The next morning a French aeroplane flew over the
German line. Descending to within a few hundred yards of the ground,
despite the hail of bullets that whistled around him, the aviator
dropped a neatly wrapped parcel, rose suddenly to a great height and
was gone. That parcel contained all the dead German aviator's private
property, his papers, medals, etc., with a note of sympathy from the
victor. A few days after the death of Pégoud, who was killed in midair
before he fell, a German aviator flew at great height over an Alsatian
commune on the old frontier and dropped a wreath bearing the
inscription: "In memory of Pégoud, who died a hero's death, from his
adversary."
The French method of aerial maneuvering is interesting as well as
effective. Their air squadrons operate in the following manner: ten
machines rise 6,000 feet along the enemy's line; ten others rise 9,000
feet. If an enemy machine attempts to pass the Frenchmen attack
simultaneously from above and below, while, if necessary, two other
machines come to their aid. Thus the intruder is always at a
disadvantage. On several occasions the Germans attempted to fly across
the French lines in force, but always with disastrous consequences.
When the French set out in squadrons to make a raid or bombard a
position they pursue the same tactics and achieve very important
results.
Early in September, 1915, General Joffre paid a visit to Rome, was
received in audience by King Victor Emmanuel, and decorated with the
highest Italian military distinction--the Grand Cross of the Military
Order of Savoy--as proof of his majesty's esteem for the French army.
General Joffre afterward made a tour of the Italian battle front and
conferred with General Cadorna.
About September 8, 1915, the Germans recommenced to attack in the
Argonne, where the German Crown Prince had failed to break the French
line in June and July. After a violent artillery preparation,
including the use of a large number of asphyxiating shells, two
infantry divisions were flung against the French. The Germans rushed
the first-line trenches at several points. Strong attacks were
launched against them and prevented any further advance.
French and British airmen raided the aviation sheds at Ostend; another
air squadron dropped sixty shells on the aviation ground at Saint
Medard and on the railway station at Dieuze, in Lorraine, twenty-five
miles northeast of Nancy. A bombardment of Zeebrugge by the British
fleet caused much damage, the Germans losing forty dead and some
hundred wounded. Here the submarine port, with two submersibles and
two guns on the harbor wall were destroyed, while the central airship
shed, containing at the time two dirigibles, was also severely
damaged. The semaphore tower was shot to pieces and some sluices
crippled. Perhaps the most exciting incident at this period was the
great allied air raid on the Forest of Houlthulst, about halfway
between Ypres and Dixmude. The forest was quite sheltered from the
ravages of the allied guns, and had been converted into a regular
garrison district, with comfortable barracks full of soldiers,
provision stores, and large munition depots. The whole camp was
brilliantly illuminated with electric light.
At ten o'clock on the night of September 9, 1915, sixty French,
British and Belgian aeroplanes started out in clear moonlight.
Immediately the aerial flotilla had announced its approach by the
well-known buzzing of sixty industrious propellers, the whole
neighborhood was plunged in sudden darkness. The moon, however,
supplied the necessary light to guide the sky raiders to their goal.
Besides, French flyers had already photographed the region in broad
daylight, so that the situation of the main buildings was thoroughly
known to all the pilots. It is stated that four tons of high
explosives and incendiary bombs were scattered with deadly effect;
some of the aircraft whose stock became exhausted flew back to their
base, landed, refilled, and returned to the scene of action--two and
three times. The greatest consternation naturally prevailed among the
soldiers below, running in panic-stricken groups to escape from the
blasting shower let loose over their heads. Indescribable confusion
prevailed; frequent explosions were heard as some aerial missile found
a piled-up accumulation of its own kind. By 11.30, an hour and a half
after the squadron had set sail, the entire forest and the buildings
it contained were in flames. The next morning a German aeroplane,
"adorned with sixteen Iron Crosses," was forced to descend near Calais
owing to engine trouble and was captured by the French.
By way of reprisals for the continued attacks on Lunéville and
Compiègne by German aviators, a squadron of French aeroplanes flew
over the German town of Trier (Trèves) on September 13, 1915, and
deposited one hundred bombs. After returning to the base and taking on
board further supplies, they set out again in the afternoon and
dropped fifty-eight shells on the station of Dommary Baroncourt. Other
aeros bombarded the railway stations at Donaueschingen on the Danube
and at Marbach, where movements of troops had been reported. Activity
grew in intensity all along the front. Artillery fighting on the Yser,
the north and south of Arras, in the sectors of Neuville, Roclincourt
and Mailly. To the north of the Oise the French artillery carried out
a destructive fire on the German defenses and the works of
Beuvraignes. Infantry attacks occurred in front of Andrechy. On the
canal from the Aisne to the Marne the French bombarded the trenches,
batteries and cantonments of the Germans in the environs of Sapigneul
and of Neuville, near Berry-au-Bac. Grenade engagements took place
near the Bethune-Arras road and north of Souchez. South of the Somme,
before Fay, there were constant and stubborn mine duels, while fierce
bombardments in the sectors of Armancourt (southwest of Compiègne),
Beuvraignes (south of Roye), as well as on the plateau of.
Quennevières (northeast of Compiègne) and Nouvron (northwest of
Soissons), continued uninterruptedly. In Champagne and in the Argonne
also, long range artillery fighting rent the air.
On the Lorraine front, in the environs of Embermenil, Leintrey, and
Ancerviller, near Lunéville, the German trenches and works were
subjected to heavy fire. Poison shells and liquid fire played an
important part in the furious fighting that was gradually developing
in the Vosges, and assisted the Germans to gain some initial
successes. On the Lingekopf-Barrenkopf front the French were driven
out of a first-line trench on the Schratzmannele, but they recovered
most of the ground by a counterattack. Similarly on the summit of the
Hartmannsweilerkopf, where the Germans had also obtained a footing in
the French trenches, they were subsequently ejected again. These
trenches had been captured with the aid of blazing liquids. Our first
knowledge of this "blazing liquid" (outside of Germany) was derived
from a document which fell into French hands early in the war. It was
Note 32 of the Second Army, dated October 16, 1914, at St. Quentin. In
it were published the following instructions under the heading of
"Arms at the disposal of Pioneers (Sappers) for fighting at close
quarters":
"The flame projectors (Flammenwerfer), which are very similar to
portable fire extinguishers, are worked by specially trained pioneers
and throw a liquid which at once catches fire spontaneously. The jet
of fire has an effective range of 30 meters. The effect is immediate
and deadly, and the great heat developed forces the enemy back a long
way. As they burn from one and a half to two minutes, and can be
stopped whenever necessary, short and isolated jets of flame are
advisable, so that one charge is sufficient to spray several
objectives. Flame projectors will be mainly employed in street and
house-to-house fighting, and will be kept in readiness at the place
from which an attack starts."
There is no doubt that some engines of this nature were employed by
the Germans during August and September, 1914, to destroy portions of
the towns and villages destroyed by them. One captured apparatus,
actually examined, comprised a portable reservoir for holding the
inflammable liquid and the means of spraying it. The former, which is
carried strapped on to a man's back, is a steel cylinder containing
oil and compressed air in separate chambers. The latter consists of a
suitable length of metal pipe fitted with universal joints and a
nozzle capable of rotation in any direction. When a valve is turned
on, the air pressure forces the oil out of the nozzle in a fine spray
for a distance of over twenty yards. The oil is ignited automatically
at the nozzle and continues to issue in a sheet of flame until the air
pressure falls too low or the oil is exhausted. The heat given out is
terrific in its intensity. A similar method employed by the German
troops consists of a liquid substance which is squirted into the
trenches. Bombs are then thrown which on explosion ignite the fluid.
Yet another sort of projectile took the form of an incendiary bomb or
shell which was discharged noiselessly, possibly from a catapult. It
bursts on impact, tearing a hole and burning a circle of ground about
eight feet in diameter.
By the middle of the month, September, 1915, the liveliest activity
obtained everywhere in the west--each side apparently doing its utmost
to harass the other. Nothing of a definite nature was achieved by
either. The Germans were merely sitting tight along most of the line
while taking the offensive only in those sectors where they had reason
to believe the Allies would attempt to strike the great blow. The
Allies, on the other hand, endeavored to weaken their opponents as
much as possible in order to create an easier passage for the great
"drive" they contemplated. The innumerable engagements about this time
throughout the western theatre of the war form a bewildering conflict
of unconnected and minor battles and skirmishes. When, years hence,
the "official" histories are written and published, the student may be
able to read the riddle and trace some thread of continuity and
intention through the labyrinth of these operations. For the present
they must be regarded as mere incidents in the overture leading to a
great battle. The actions were described from day to day with some
detail by the Allies, and as "unimportant attempts" by the German
official communiqués. The latter generally consisted of few words that
gave little or no indication of what had happened, and frequently
wound up with the phrase: "There was no change on the front." The
following translation may be given as a typical example; "The French
attempted an attack but were repulsed by our fire. An enemy aeroplane
was shot down. We successfully attacked in the Argonne. The situation
is unchanged."
On September 18, 1915, the British fleet again bombarded the German
defenses on the Belgian coast, in conjunction with the British
artillery in the Nieuport district. Unabated fighting raged along the
whole front, and it was all summed up in the German official
communiqué of September 20, 1915, with commendable brevity:
"The hostile vessels which unsuccessfully bombarded Westende and
Middelkerke, southwest of Ostend, withdrew before our fire. Several
hits were observed. Along the land front there were no important
events."
Nevertheless, important events were shaping themselves about this
time. German artillery attacks increased in violence against the
British front. Aeroplanes were particularly busy observing all moves
on the board. In Champagne the Germans kept the French occupied with
heavy shells and "lachrymatory projectiles." These projectiles have
been described as "tearful and wonderful engines of war." They are
ordinary hand grenades with a charge that rips open the grenade and
liberates a liquid chemical. When that happens, the effect of the
fumes brings water to the eyes of the men in such quantities that they
are quite unable to defend themselves in the event of an attack.
Shooting is entirely out of the question. The stinging sensation
produced in the eyes is not pleasant, but it is not painful, and the
effect wears off in a few minutes. The troops humorously refer to
these grenades as "onions."
On September 21, 1915, a party of French airmen carried out the most
daring of the many raids on German towns and positions they had
hitherto accomplished. An aero squadron flew to Stuttgart, which is
about 140 miles due east from Nancy, and dropped thirty shells on the
palace of the King of Württemberg and the railway station of the town.
They were fired at from many points, but safely completed their double
journey of nearly 300 miles. Before this exploit, which was undertaken
as a reprisal, the longest distances traveled by raiding squadrons of
French aeroplanes were those to the Friedrichshafen Zeppelin
factories on June 28, 1915, involving a double journey of 240 miles
from Belfort; and to the explosives factory at Ludwigshafen, on the
Rhine, which represented a distance of 230 miles from Nancy and back.
The Berlin official report thus describes the event:
"At 8.15 this morning enemy airmen with German marks on their aeros
attacked Stuttgart and dropped several bombs on the town, killing four
persons and wounding a number of soldiers and civilians. The material
damage was quite unimportant."
CHAPTER VIII
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE
The day fixed for the opening of the Allies' long-projected offensive
dawned on September 22, 1915. Gigantic preparations had been in the
making. Large drafts of fresh British troops had been poured into
France, which enabled Sir John French to take over the defense of a
portion of the lines hitherto held by General Joffre's men. Defensive
organizations had been improved all round; immense supplies of
munitions had been accumulated; units had been carefully regrouped and
new ones created; all that skill, foresight and arduous toil could
accomplish had been attained. The spirit of the human fighting
material was all that could be desired. In order not to interrupt the
course of the narrative later, we insert here the interesting general
order that the French commander in chief issued to his troops on
September 23, 1915, when it was read to the regiments by their
officers:
"_Soldiers of the Republic:_
"After months of waiting, which have enabled us to increase our forces
and our resources, while the adversary has been using up his own, the
hour has come to attack and conquer and to add fresh glorious pages
to those of the Marne and Flanders, the Vosges and Arras.
"Behind the whirlwind of iron and fire let loose, thanks to the
factories of France, where your brothers have, night and day, worked
for us, you will proceed to the attack, all together, on the whole
front, in close union with the armies of our allies.
"Your _élan_ will be irresistible. It will carry you at a bound up to
the batteries of the adversary, beyond the fortified lines which he
has placed before you.
"You will give him neither pause nor rest until victory has been
achieved.
"Set to with all your might for the deliverance of the soil of la
Patrie, for the triumph of justice and liberty.
"J. JOFFRE."
The general outlines of the plan of campaign may be briefly described:
The British were to deliver a main attack on the German trenches
between Lens and La Bassée, in close cooperation with the French on
their immediate right in Artois, and to hold the enemy by secondary
attacks and demonstrations on the rest of the (British) front, about
eighty miles. The French, for their part, took in hand the two
principal operations--to batter through in Artois and to exert their
mightiest efforts in Champagne.
[Illustration: Zigzag trenches in Champagne. The strip on which the
armies are clinched varies in width and winds over dunes, marshes,
woods and mountains.]
To a proper understanding of a campaign or a battle, some knowledge of
the topographical conditions is essential. The chief scene in the
act--where the grand attack falls--is the beautiful vineyard region of
Champagne. Here the German front is the same as they established and
fortified it after the Battle of the Marne. It rests on the west side
on the Massif de Moronvillers; to the east it stretches as far as the
Argonne. It was intended to cover the railroad from Challerange to
Bazancourt, a line indispensable for the concentration movements of
the German troops. The offensive front, which extends from Auberive to
the east of Ville-sur-Tourbe, presents a varied aspect. From east to
west may be seen, firstly, a glacis or sloping bank about five miles
wide and covered with little woods. The road from Saint-Hilaire to
Saint-Souplet, with the Baraque de l'Épine de Vedegrange, marks
approximately its axis.
[Illustration: The Champagne District.]
(2) The hollow, in which lies the pretty village of Souain and where
the first German line follows its edge. The road from Souain to
Pomme-Py describes the radius of this semicircle. The farm of Navarin
stands on the top of the hills two miles north of Souain.
(3) To the north of Perthes, a comparatively tranquil region of
uniform aspect, forming between the wooded hills of the Trou Bricot
and those of the Butte du Mesnil a passage two miles wide, barred by
several lines of trenches and ending at a series of heights--the Butte
de Souain, Hills 195 and 201 and the Butte de Tahure, surmounted by
the second German line.
(4) To the north of Mesnil, a very strong position, bastioned on the
west by two twin heights (Mamelle Nord and Trapèze), on the east by
the Butte du Mesnil. The German trenches form a powerful curtain
between these two bastions, behind which a thickly wooded undulating
region extends as far as Tahure.
(5) To the north of Beauséjour, a bare terrain easily traversable,
with a gentle rise in the direction of Ripon to the farms of Maisons
de Champagne.
(6) To the north of Massiges, hills numbered 191 and 199, describing
on the map the figure of a hand, very strongly fortified and forming
the eastern flank of the whole German line. This table-land slopes
down gently in the direction of Ville-sur-Tourbe.
As to the German defenses, the French were intimately acquainted with
every detail. They had maps showing every defensive work, trench,
alley of communication, and clump of trees in the landscape. Each of
these features had been given a special name or number preceded by a
certain letter, according to the sector of attack wherein it was
situated. These details had been laboriously collected by aviators and
spies, and applied with minute precision.
On the morning of September 22, 1915, the French accelerated their
long-sustained bombardment of the German positions with intense fury,
continuing day and night without a break until the 25th. The direct
object of this preparatory cannonade was to destroy the wire
entanglements, bury the defenders in their dugouts, raze the trenches,
smash the embrasures, and stop up the alleys of communication. The
range included not only the first trench line, but also the supporting
trench and the second position, though the last was so far distant as
to make accurate observation difficult. The heavy long-range guns
shelled the headquarters, the cantonments and the railroad stations.
They speedily demolished the permanent way, thereby stopping all
traffic in reenforcements, munitions and commissariat. From letters
and notes afterwards found upon German prisoners who came out alive
from that inferno, one may gather an approximate idea of what the
bombardment was like:
"September 23.
"The French artillery fired without intermission from the morning of
the 21st to the evening of the 23rd, and we all took refuge in our
dugouts. On the evening of the 22d we were to have gone to get some
food, but the French continued to fire on our trenches. In the evening
we had heavy losses, and we had nothing to eat."
"September 24.
"For the last two days the French have been firing like mad. To-day,
for instance, a dugout has been destroyed. There were sixteen men in
it. Not one of them managed to save his skin. They are all dead.
Besides that, a number of individual men have been killed and there
are a great mass of wounded. The artillery fires almost as rapidly as
the infantry. A mist of smoke hangs over the whole battle front, so
that it is impossible to see anything. Men are dropping like flies.
The trenches are no longer anything but a mound of ruins."
"September 24.
"A rain of shells is pouring down upon us. The kitchen and everything
that is sent to us is bombarded at night. The field kitchens no longer
come to us. Oh, if only the end were near! That is the cry everyone is
repeating."
"September 25.
"I have received no news, and probably shall not receive any for some
days. The whole postal service has been stopped; all places have been
bombarded to such an extent that no human being could stand against
it. The railway line is so seriously damaged that the train service
for some time has been completely stopped. We have been for three days
in the first line; during those three days the French have fired so
heavily that our trenches are no longer visible."
"September 25.
"We have passed through some terrible hours. It was as though the
whole world were in a state of collapse. We have had heavy losses. One
company of 250 men had sixty killed last night. A neighboring battery
had sixteen killed yesterday. The following instance will show you the
frightful destructiveness of the French shells: A dugout five meters
deep, surrounded by two meters fifty centimeters of earth and two
thicknesses of heavy timber, was broken like a match."
Report made on September 24, 1915, in the morning, by the captain
commanding the Third Company of the 135th Regiment of Reserves:
"The French are firing on us with great bombs and machine guns. We
must have reenforcements at once. Many men are no longer fit for
anything. It is not that they are wounded, but they are Landsturmers.
Moreover the wastage is greater than the losses announced. Send
rations immediately; no food has reached us to-day. Urgently want
illuminating cartridges and hand grenades. Is the hospital corps never
coming to fetch the wounded? I urgently beg for reenforcements; the
men are dying from fatigue and want of sleep. I have no news of the
battalion."
The time fixed for all the attacks on the Champagne front was 9.15 a.
m., September 25, 1915. Just before the assault General Joffre issued
the following brief order:
"The offensive will be carried on without truce and without respite.
"Remember the Marne--Victory or death."
Punctual to the moment the troops climbed out of their trenches with
the aid of steps or scaling ladders and drew up in line before making
a rush at the German trenches. The operation was rapidly effected. The
German position was at an average distance of 220 yards; at the word
of command the troops broke into a steady trot and covered that ground
without any serious loss. The honor of the first assault was granted
to the dare-devil Colonial Corps, men hardened in the building up of
France's African Empire, and to the Moroccan troops, famous for fierce
and obstinate fighting. The men tore across the ground to the assault,
led by their commander, General Marchand, of Fashoda fame, who left
the army at the age of forty-four but volunteered immediately on the
outbreak of the war, and was given command of the Colonial Brigade.
General Marchand fell in the charge with a dangerous shell wound in
the abdomen. The men dashed on to the German trench line, stirring the
rain-drenched, chalky soil to foam beneath their feet. Under the
leadership of General Baratier, Marchand's right-hand man in his
colonial conquests, the French Colonial Cavalry played an important
part in the charge. This was the first time for many months that
cavalry really came into action on the western front. They lost
heavily, but their activities probably explain the great number of
prisoners captured in so short a time.
At nearly every point the Germans were taken completely by surprise,
for their defensive fire was not opened until after the flowing tide
of the invaders had passed by. This was due neither to lack of courage
nor of vigilance, but to the demoralizing effect on the nerves of the
defenders by the terrific cannonade, which in all such cases induces a
sort of helpless apathy.
The French actually penetrated into the first German trench over the
whole attacking front at one rush; after that their progress met with
fiercer resistance and varying checks. While certain units continued
their advance with remarkable rapidity, others encountered machine
guns still in action and either stopped or advanced with extreme
difficulty. Some centers of the German resistance maintained their
position for several hours; some even for days. A line showing the
different stages of the French advance in Champagne would assume a
curiously winding shape, and would reveal on one hand the defensive
power of an adversary resolved to hold his ground at all costs, and
on the other the mathematically successful continuity of the French
efforts in this hand-to-hand struggle.
The Battle of Champagne must be considered in the light of a series of
assaults, executed at the same moment, in parallel or convergent
directions and having for their object either the capture or the
hemming in of the first German position, the units being instructed to
re-form in a continuous line before the second position. In order to
follow the development clearly, the terrain must be divided into
several sectors, in each of which the operations, although closely
coordinated, assumed, as a consequence either of the nature of the
ground or of the peculiarities of the German defenses, a different
character. The unity of the action was nevertheless insured by the
simultaneity of the rush, which carried all the troops beyond the
first position, past the batteries, to the defenses established by the
Germans on the heights to the south of Py. At the two extremities of
the French attacking front, where the advance was subjected to
converging fires and to counterattacks on the flanks, the offensive
practically failed--or at least made no progress. The fighting that
took place in Auberive and round about Servon was marked by several
heroic features, but it led to no further result than to hold and
immobilize the German forces on the wings while the attack was
progressing in the center.
[Illustration: Detail Map of Battle in Champagne, September, 1915.]
In accordance with the proposed arrangement of divisions into sectors,
we will take as Number--
(1) The sector of the Épine de Vedegrange: Here the first German line
was established at the base of a wide glacis covered with clumps of
trees, and formed a series of salients running into each other. At
certain points it ran along the edge of the woods where the
supplementary defenses were completed by abatis. The position as a
whole between Auberive and Souain described a vast triangle. To the
west of the road from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Souplet, the troops
traversed the first German line and rushed forward for a distance of
about 1,200 yards as far as a supporting trench, in front of which
they were stopped by wire entanglements. A counterattack debouching
from the west and supported by the artillery of Moronvillers caused a
slight retirement of the French left. The troops on the right, on
the contrary, held their gains and succeeded on the following days in
increasing and extending them, remaining in touch with the units which
were attacking on the east of the road. The latter had succeeded in a
brilliant manner in overcoming the difficulties that faced them. The
German position which they captured, with its triple and quadruple
lines of trenches, its small forts armed with machine guns, its woods
adapted for the defensive purpose in view, constituted one of the most
complete schemes of defense on the Champagne front and afforded cover
to a numerous artillery concealed in the woods of the glacis. On this
front, about three miles wide, the attack on September 25, 1915,
achieved a mixed success. The troops on the left, after having
penetrated into the first trench, had their progress arrested by
machine guns. On the right, however, in spite of obstacles presented
by four successive trenches, each of which was covered by a network of
wire entanglements and was concealed in the woods, where the French
artillery had difficulty in reaching them, the attacking troops gained
about one and one-half miles, took 700 prisoners and captured seven
guns.
The advance here recommenced on September 27, 1915. The left took
possession of the woods lining the road from Saint-Hilaire to
Saint-Souplet as far as the Épine de Vedegrange. Along the whole
extent of the wooded heights as far as the western side of the hollow
at Souain the success was identical. Notwithstanding the losses they
sustained and the fatigue involved in the incessant fighting, the
troops pushed forward, leaving behind them only a sufficient force to
clear the woods of isolated groups of Germans still remaining there.
Between four and six in the afternoon they arrived immediately in
front of the second German position. On the same day they penetrated
this position at two points, and captured a trench over a thousand
yards wide, called the "Parallel of the Épine de Vedegrange," which
was duplicated almost throughout by another trench (the parallel of
the wood of Chevron). A little farther east the French also penetrated
the German trench to a depth of about 450 yards. But it was impossible
to take advantage of this breach owing to a concentration of the
heavy German artillery, a rapidly continued defense of the surrounding
woods, and the fire of machine guns which could not be approached.
These guns were planted in the trenches on the right and left of the
entry and exit of the breach. The results attained by the French in
this sector alone amounted to fifteen square miles of territory
organized for defenses throughout nearly the whole of its extent. On
September 28, 1915, they also took over 3,000 prisoners and forty-four
cannon.
(2) Sector of Souain: The German lines round about Souain described a
wide curve. Close to the French trenches, to the west at the Mill and
to the east at the wood of Sabot, they swerved to the extent of about
a mile to the north of the village and of the source of the Ain.
When the offensive was decided upon it was necessary, in order to
extend the French lines forward to striking distance, to undertake
sapping operations in parallel lines, and at times to make dashes by
night over the intervening ground. The men working underground got
into communication with the trenches by digging alleys of
communication. Under the eyes and the fire of the Germans this
difficult undertaking was carried out with very slight loss. These
parallel lines approached to within a distance of 150 yards of the
German trenches. The assault was made in three different directions:
on the west in the direction of Hills 167 and 174; in the center along
a line running parallel with the road from Souain to Pomme-Py, in the
direction of the farm of Navarin; on the east in the direction of the
woods intersected by the road from Souain to Tahure, and in the
direction of the Butte de Souain. The advance was extremely rapid--on
the left over 2,000 yards in less than an hour, in the center over
3,000 yards in forty-five minutes. At 10 a. m. the French had reached
the farm of Navarin. Toward the east the forward march was more
difficult. Some German machine guns stood their ground in the wood of
Sabot and enormously strengthened the German resistance. This defense
was eventually overcome by surrounding them. Arriving at the wooded
region in that part where it is intersected by the road mentioned
above, the assailants joined up on the 27th with those of their
comrades who were attacking to the north of Perthes. They left behind
them here, also, only sufficient men to clear the woods of stragglers.
Parlementaires were sent to the Germans, who received them with a
volley of rifle shots and endeavored to escape during the night. The
majority were killed and the survivors surrendered. Several batteries
and a large quantity of war material remained to the French. On the
28th, along the entire length of the sector, they were immediately in
front of the second German line.
(3) Sector of Perthes: Between Souain and Perthes stretches a wooded
region in which heavy fighting had already taken place in February and
March. At that time the French had contrived to take possession of the
German defenses of the wood of Sabot on the eastern extremity of this
region. They had also made some progress to the northwest of Perthes,
on the summit of Hill 200. But between these two positions the Germans
had retained a strong system of trenches forming a salient almost
triangular in shape, which the French nicknamed "la Poche" (the
Pocket). During the whole year a war of mining had been going on, and
the region, which was broken up by concave constructions and
intersected in all directions by trenches and alleys of communication,
constituted an attacking ground all the more difficult because to the
north of la Poche the rather thickly-wooded Trou Bricot, the edges of
which had been put in a state of defense, obstructed a rapid advance.
This wooded region extends over a width of more than a mile. The
arrangements made for the attack contemplated, after the capture of la
Poche, the surrounding of the woods of the Trou Bricot. The junction
was to be made at the road from Souain to Tahure, with the troops
assigned for the attack on the eastern border of the hollow at Souain.
The ground to the east of the Trou Bricot was less difficult. Open and
comparatively flat it was defended on the north of Perthes by a triple
line of trenches distant 100 yards from each other. At a distance of
1,000 to 1,200 yards a supporting trench, called the "York trench,"
was almost unique in its entire construction. The open country beyond
stretched for a distance of two and one-half miles up to the second
German position (Hill 195, Butte de Tahure). The principal effort was
directed against this passage, the left flank of attack being secured
by a subsidiary action confined to the capture of la Poche.
At 9 a. m. the French artillery directed their fire successively
against the first-line trenches and the supporting trenches. The
attack took place in perfect order. The infantry were already swarming
into the German trenches when the German artillery opened its
defensive fire. The French counterbatteries hampered the German pieces
and the reserves in the rear suffered little from their fire. At 9.45
a. m. the two columns which were attacking the extremities of the
salient of la Poche joined hands. The position was surrounded. Those
Germans who remained alive inside it surrendered. At the same time a
battalion was setting foot in the defenses of the southern edges of
the wood of Trou Bricot. The battalion that followed, marching to the
outside of the eastern edges, executed with perfect regularity a "left
turn" and came and formed up alongside the communication alleys as far
as the supporting trench. At the same moment, in the open country to
the north of Perthes, the French troops surmounted the three
first-line trenches and, preceded by artillery, made a quick march to
the York trench and occupied it almost without striking a blow.
Farther to the east, along the road from Perthes to Tahure, the French
advance encountered greater difficulties. Some centers of the German
resistance could not be overcome. A sheltered machine gun continued
its fire. An infantry officer, with a petty officer of artillery,
succeeded in getting a gun into action at a distance of over 300 yards
from the machine gun and firing at it at close quarters. Of the troops
that were advancing to the north of Perthes, some made for the eastern
border of the wood of Bricot, where they penetrated into the camps,
ousting the defenders and surprising several officers in bed. Late in
the afternoon a French regiment had reached the road from Souain to
Tahure. Other units were marching straight toward the north, clearing
out the little woods on the way. They there captured batteries of
which the artillerymen were "riveted to their guns by means of
bayonets." The same work of clearance was meanwhile being performed in
the woods extending east of the road from Perthes to Souain and
Tahure, where batteries were charged and captured while in action. At
this spot a regiment covered three miles in two hours and captured ten
guns. From midday onward the rate of progress slackened, the bad
weather making it impossible for the French artillery to see what was
going on, and rendering the joining up movements extremely difficult.
From the Buttes de Souain and Tahure the Germans directed converging
fires on the French, who were advancing there along very open ground.
Nevertheless, they continued their advance as far as the slopes of
Hill 193 and the Butte de Tahure and there dug themselves in.
The night passed without any German counterattack. In the darkness the
French artillery brought forward their heavy pieces and several field
batteries which had arrived immediately after the attack beyond the
York trench. At dawn the reconstituted regiments made another forward
rush which enabled them to establish themselves in immediate contact
with the second German position from the Butte de Souain to the Butte
de Tahure, and even to seize several advanced posts in the
neighborhood. But on the lower slopes some of the wire entanglements
remained intact; a successful assault on them would have been possible
only after a fresh artillery preparation. Up to October 6, 1915, the
troops remained where they were, digging trenches and organizing a
defensive system which had to be constructed all over again on ground
devastated by German fire.
(4) Sector of Le Mesnil: It was to the north of Le Mesnil that the
French encountered the greatest German resistance. In the course of
the engagements of the preceding winter the French had succeeded in
securing a foothold on top of the hill numbered 196. The Germans
remained a little to the east, in the "Ravin des Cuisines" (Ravine of
the Kitchens). This the French now took by assault, but could get no
farther. The German trenches, constructed on the northern slopes of
Hill 196, were so concealed from field observation that it was
difficult for the artillery to reach them. They were furthermore
flanked on one side by the twin heights of the Mamelles, and on the
other by the Butte du Mesnil. Some French units managed to penetrate
into the trenches to the eastward on the 25th, but a counterattack and
flank fires dislodged them again. To the west they did not capture the
northern Mamelle till the night of October 1-2, 1915, thereby
surrounding the trapeze works that surmounted the southern Mamelle.
(5) Sector of Beauséjour: The French attacks launched north of
Beauséjour met with more conspicuous success. Throwing themselves on
the first German lines the swarming invaders rapidly captured the
defense works in the woods of Fer de Lance and Demi-Lune, and
afterwards all the works known as the Bastion. Certain units won the
top of Maisons de Champagne in one rush and darted past several
batteries, killing the gunners as they served their pieces. The same
movement took them across the intricate region of the mine "funnels"
of Beauséjour up to the wood intersected by the road to Maisons de
Champagne. There they encountered German artillerymen in the act of
unlimbering their guns. They killed the drivers and the horses; the
survivors surrendered.
Farther westward the left wing of the attacking force advanced with
greater difficulty, being hampered by the small forts and covered
works with which the trenches were everywhere protected. At this
moment the cavalry unexpectedly came to the support of the infantry.
Two squadrons of hussars galloped against the German batteries north
of Maisons de Champagne in the teeth of a fierce artillery fire. They
nevertheless reached that part of the lines where the Germans still
held their ground. Machine guns rattled against the cavalry, dropping
many of their horses. The hussars dismounted and, with drawn sabers,
made a rush for the trenches. Favored by this diversion the infantry
simultaneously resumed their forward movement. The German resistance
broke down, and more than 600 were taken prisoners. Later in the day
of the 25th some German counterattacks were made from the direction of
Ripon, but failed to drive the French from the Maisons de Champagne
summit. During the next few days a desperate struggle ensued north of
the summit in the vicinity of a defensive work called the "Ouvrage de
la Défaite," which the French took by storm, lost it again, then
recovered it, and finally were driven out by a severe bombardment.
(6) Sector of Massiges: The safety of the French troops which had
advanced to the wood and the Maisons de Champagne was assured by the
capture of the heights of Massiges. This sharply undulating upland
(199 on the north and 191 on the south) formed a German stronghold
that was believed to be impregnable. From the top they commanded the
French positions in several directions. The two first attacking
parties marched out in columns at 9.15 a. m., preceded by
field-artillery fire. In fifteen minutes they had reached the summit.
Then their difficulties began. In the face of a withering rifle and
machine-gun fire they could proceed but slowly along the summits by
the communication alleys, blasting their way through with hand
grenades, and supported by the artillery, which was constantly kept
informed of their movements by means of flag signals. The Germans
surrendered in large numbers as the grenadiers advanced. The French
formed an uninterrupted, ever-lengthening chain of grenade-bearers in
the communication alleys, just as buckets of water were passed from
hand to hand at fires in former times. This chain started from
Massiges and each fresh arrival of grenades at the other end was
accompanied by a further advance.
The fight continued in this manner from September 25, 1915, to October
3, 1915, with fierce perseverance against stubborn opposition. The
Germans poured a continuous stream of reenforcements into the section
and offered a resistance that has rarely been equaled for obstinacy
and courage. According to French reports, they stood up to be shot
down--the machine-gun men at their guns, the grenadiers on their
grenade chests. Every attempt at counterattacking failed them. Having
the heights of Massiges in their possession enabled the French to
extend their gains toward Ville-sur-Tourbe, while taking in flank
those trenches they had failed to capture by a frontal attack. The
loss of these heights seemed to have particularly disturbed the German
General Staff. It was at first denied in the official reports, and
then explained that the ground had been abandoned owing to artillery
fire, whereas the French Headquarters Staff claimed that they had
captured the ground mainly by hand-grenade fighting at close quarters.
The Battle of Champagne presents a number of curious aspects. How came
the Germans to be so overwhelmingly surprised? Beyond all doubt, they
expected a great French offensive. In the orders of the day issued by
General von Ditfurth on August 15, 1915--five weeks before the French
attack began--we read, "The possibility of a great French offensive
must be considered." General von Fleck was rather late: on September
26, 1915, when the French had already taken nearly the whole
first-line trenches, he expressed the opinion that "The French Higher
Command appears to be disposed to make another desperate effort." What
is tolerably certain is that the German General Staff did not foresee
the strength of the blow nor suspect the vigor with which it would be
delivered. Even the command on the battle field itself apparently
failed to recognize what was happening before their eyes. Inside the
shelters of the second line two German officers were placidly enjoying
the delights of morning in bed, when they were disturbed by noises
which it was beyond their wits to account for. The door of their
little house was rudely thrust open and excited voices said rude
things in French. Then bayonets made their appearance, and soldiers,
hot and breathing hard after their steeplechase across the German
trenches, pulled the officers from their beds with scant respect,
informing them briefly that they were prisoners. This was the first
intimation which the stupefied officers received that the enemy had
broken through their lines.
They seemed to have had an excessive confidence in the strength of
their first line, and the interruption of telephonic communications
had prevented their being informed of the rapid French advance. Then
as to the disposition and employment of reserves: Here it looks as
though that perfect organization and semi-infallible precision which
characterize the German army had, for the nonce, gone awry in the
Champagne conflict. In order to make up for the insufficiency of the
local reserves the German military authorities had to put in line not
only the important units which they held at their disposal behind the
front (Tenth Corps brought back from Russia), but the local reserves
from other sectors (Soissons, Argonne, the Woevre, Alsace), which were
dispatched to Champagne one battalion after another, and even in
groups of double companies. Ill provided with food and munitions, the
reenforcements were pushed to battle on an unknown terrain without
indication as to the direction they had to take and without their
junction with neighboring units having been arranged. Through the
haste with which the reserves were thrown under the fire of the French
artillery and infantry--already in possession of the positions--the
German losses must have been increased enormously. A letter taken from
a soldier of the 118th Regiment may be cited as corroborative
evidence: "We were put in a motor car and proceeded at a headlong pace
to Tahure, by way of Vouziers. Two hours' rest in the open air with
rain falling, and then we had a six hours' march to take up our
positions. On our way we were greeted by the fire of the enemy shells,
so that, for instance, out of 280 men of the second company only 224
arrived safe and sound inside the trenches. These trenches, freshly
dug, were barely thirty-five to fifty centimeters (12 to 17 in.) deep.
Continually surrounded by mines and bursting shells, we had to remain
in them and do the best we could with them for 118 hours without
getting anything hot to eat. Hell itself could not be more terrible.
To-day, at about 12 noon, 600 men, fresh troops, joined the regiment.
In five days we had lost as many and more."
The disorder in which the reenforcements were engaged appears strongly
from this fact: On only that part of the front included between
Maisons de Champagne and Hill 189 there were on October 2, 1915, no
fewer than thirty-two different battalions belonging to twenty-one
different regiments. During the days following the French rush
through the first line, the Germans seemed to have but one idea, to
strengthen their second line to stem the advance. Their counterattacks
were concentrated on a comparatively unimportant part of the battle
front in certain places, the loss of which appeared to them to be
particularly dangerous. Therefore on the heights of Massiges the
German military authorities hurled in succession isolated battalions
of the 123d, 124th and 120th regiments; of the Thirtieth Regular
Regiment and of the Second Regiment Ersatz Reserve (Sixteenth Corps),
which were in turn decimated, for these counterattacks, hastily and
crudely prepared, all ended in sanguinary failures. It was not the men
who failed their leaders, for they fought like tigers when reasonable
opportunities were offered them.
That strong offensive capacity of the Germans seemed also, on the
occasion, to have broken down. General von Ditfurth's order of the day
bears witness to this: "It seemed to me that the infantry at certain
points was confining its action to a mere defensive.... I cannot
protest too strongly against such an idea, which necessarily results
in destroying the spirit of offensive in our own troops and in
arousing and strengthening in the mind of the enemy a feeling of his
superiority. The enemy is left full liberty of action and our action
is subjected to the will of the enemy."
It is of course impossible to estimate precisely what the German
losses were. There are certain known details, however, which may serve
to indicate their extent. One underofficer declared that he was the
only man remaining out of his company. A soldier of the third
battalion of the 123d Regiment, engaged on the 26th, stated that his
regiment was withdrawn from the front after only two days' fighting
because its losses were too great. The 118th Regiment relieved the
158th Regiment in the trenches after it had been reduced to fifteen or
twenty men per company. Certain units disappeared completely, as for
instance the Twenty-seventh Reserve Regiment and the Fifty-second
Regular Regiment, which, by the evening of the 25th, had left in
French hands the first 13 officers and 933 men, and the other 21
officers and 927 men. Certain figures may help to arrive at the total
losses. At the beginning of September, 1915, the German strength on
the Champagne front amounted to seventy battalions. In anticipation of
a French attack they brought there, before the 25th, another
twenty-nine battalions, making a total of ninety-nine battalions.
Reckoning the corresponding artillery and pioneer formations, this
would represent 115,000 men directly engaged. The losses due to the
artillery preparation and the first attacks were such that from
September 25 to October 15, 1915, the German General Staff was
compelled to renew its effectives almost in their entirety by sending
out ninety-three fresh battalions. It is assumed that the units
engaged on September 25-26, 1915, suffered losses amounting to from
sixty to eighty per cent (even more for certain corps which had
entirely disappeared). The new units brought into line for the
counterattacks, and subjected in connection with these to an incessant
bombardment, lost fifty per cent of their effectives, if not more.
Hence it would be hardly overstating the case to set down 140,000 men
as the sum of the German losses in Champagne. It must also be taken
into account that of this number the proportion of slightly wounded
men able to recuperate quickly and return to the front was, in the
case of the Germans, very much below the average proportion of other
engagements, for they were unable to collect their wounded. Thus
nearly the whole of the troops defending the first position fell into
French hands.
After recounting the losses of one side, let us turn to analyze the
gains of the other. The French had penetrated the German lines on a
front of over fifteen miles, and to a depth of two and a half miles in
some places, between Auberive and Ville-sur-Tourbe. The territorial
gains may be thus summarized: The troops of the Republic had scaled
the whole of the glacis of the Épine de Vedegrange; they occupied the
ridge of the hollow at Souain; debouched in the opening to the north
of Perthes to the slopes of Hill 195 and as far as the Butte de
Tahure; carried the western bastions of the curtain of le Mesnil;
advanced as far as Maisons de Champagne and took by assault the "hand"
of Massiges. The territory they had reconquered from the invaders
represented an area of about forty square kilometers. On and from
October 7, 1915, they beat back the furious efforts of the Germans to
regain the lost ground. Nevertheless, in spite of the utmost
resolution on the part of commanders, and of valor on the part of the
French troops, the Germans were not completely overthrown, and the
annihilating results expected from the action of the mass of troops
and guns employed were not attained. It was a victory, but an
indecisive one.
On October 5, 1915, General Joffre issued the following manifesto from
Grand Headquarters:
"The Commander in Chief addresses to the troops under his orders the
expression of his profound satisfaction at the results obtained up to
the present day by the attacks. Twenty-five thousand prisoners, three
hundred and fifty guns, a quantity of material which it has not yet
been possible to gauge, are the trophies of a victory the echo of
which throughout Europe indicates its importance.
"The sacrifices willingly made have not been in vain. All have been
able to take part in the common task. The present is a sure guarantee
to us of the future.
"The Commander in Chief is proud to command the finest troops France
has ever known."
CHAPTER IX
THE BRITISH FRONT IN ARTOIS
Ever since August 16, 1915, a persistent and almost continuous
bombardment of the German lines had been carried out by the French
and, to a less extent, by the British and Belgian artillery. The
allied gunners appear to have distributed their favors quite
impartially. There was nothing in the action taken to direct attention
to one sector more than to another. The Vosges, the Meurthe and
Moselle, Lorraine and the Woevre, the Argonne, Champagne, the Aisne,
the Somme, the Arras sector, Ypres and the Yser, and the Belgian coast
where the British navy had joined in, all were subjected to a heavy,
deliberate and effective fire from guns of all calibers. As in
Champagne, the rate of fire quickened up on September 22, 1915. Great
concentrations of guns had been made at various points, and enormous
quantities of shells had been collected in readiness for the attack.
But the artillery preparation which immediately preceded that attack
in the west was of a most terrific description. Shortly after midnight
and in the early hours of Saturday morning, September 25, 1915, the
German positions were treated to a bombardment that had rarely been
equaled in violence. From the Yser Canal down to the end of the French
line the Allies' guns took up the note, and soon the whole of the
allied line was thundering and reechoing with the infernal racket. The
German lines became smothered in dust and smoke, their parapets simply
melted away, their barbed-wire entanglements disappeared. Those
sleeping thirty or forty miles away were awakened in the night by the
dull rumbling. The whole atmosphere was choked with the noise, and so
it continued throughout the day with hardly an interval. As if in
anticipation of the coming onslaught the German artillery had also
raised the key of its fire to a higher pitch several days before.
Simultaneously with the attack in Champagne, Sir John French assumed
the offensive on the British front. The main British attack was
directed in the neighborhood of Lens, against Prince Rupprecht of
Bavaria. While the French troops were rushing the German first line in
Champagne, the British troops executed a precisely similar movement
south of La Bassée Canal to the east of Grenay and Vermelles. With the
first rush they captured the German trenches on a front of five miles,
penetrating the lines in some places to a distance of 4,000 yards.
They conquered the western outskirts of Hulluch, the village of Loos,
with the mining works around it, and Hill 70. They lost the quarries
northwest of Hulluch again, but retook them on the following day.
Other attacks were made north of the La Bassée Canal, which drew
strong German reserves toward these points of the lines, where hard
fighting occurred throughout the day with fluctuating success. The
British also made another attack on Hooge on either side of the Menin
road. The assault north of the road yielded the Bellewaarde Farm and
ridge, but the Germans subsequently recaptured this part. South of the
road the attack gained about 600 yards of German trench. The British
took 2,600 prisoners, eighteen guns and thirty machine guns in the
first day. The Fourth British Army Corps, under Sir Henry Rawlinson,
had thus taken Loos and overrun Hill 70, a mile to the east, and even
penetrated to Cité St. Auguste. The Fifth Corps, under Sir Hubert
Gough, on the left, had stormed the quarries, taken Cité St. Elie, and
occupied a portion of the village of Haisnes. But the First Army, in
its attack, had not kept adequate reserves on hand; and those at first
at the disposal of the general in chief, which had to serve the whole
front and to be kept in hand in case of unexpected events, came up too
late to enable the British to hold and consolidate all the ground they
had won. The Ypres-Arras sector had been more formidably fortified
than any other portion of the German front. It is an extremely thickly
populated neighborhood, and the terrain is full of difficulties. It
could not be expected that an advance here, at least from the outset,
could be as rapid as that in Champagne. Whereas in the latter it was a
fight for rivers, ridges and woods, in the close country north of
Arras the struggle raged in and around villages, houses, and for some
particular trench that had to be taken before the French and British
could enter the great plain that stretches down to Lille. Every house
along that part had been converted into a fortress. When the
superstructure had been blown to pieces by shell fire, pioneers
burrowed thirty or fifty feet below the cellars and thus held on to
the position.
To the right of the British in Artois, the French infantry attack was
directed toward the forest of Hache. Only eighty or ninety yards
separated the French from the German trenches, and the French
infantry, which attained its objective in a few minutes, found the
trenches a mass of ruins and almost deserted, and the Germans
retreating into the wood. The first wave of attackers followed in
pursuit, but they reached the second line of trenches, situated in the
middle of the wood, without meeting any Germans in considerable force.
They pushed on to the eastern edge of the wood, but the Germans again
put up no defense, and their third-line trenches, on the fringe of the
wood, were likewise taken. Then came a halt in the advance. The German
commander pulled his men together and, with the reserves which had
come up in the meantime, launched a counterattack against the French,
who had quickly established themselves in their newly captured
positions. Heavy shells, high explosives and shrapnel were raining in
the trenches occupied by the French, and but for the new steel helmets
which had recently been supplied, the casualties would have been
enormous. One man's helmet was split clean across the crown by a shell
splinter, but the man escaped with merely a scratch. The Germans came
on in close formations, hurling grenades as they marched. The
atmosphere of the wood became almost insupportable with the smoke.
Finally, the French hurled a veritable torrent of grenades, which
drove the Germans back and compelled them to withdraw across the River
Souchez. Boise Hache was entirely won.
The British attack between La Bassée and Lens and the French attack on
the Souchez side were admirably coordinated, and were directed mainly
to assist the French to gain the heights west of Vimy, which were the
unattained object of their efforts during May and June. By September
27, 1915, the French had all Souchez in their hands, and were
advancing upon Givenchy. The capture of the Vimy heights was an item
of the highest importance, for to the eastward of them all the ground
was commanded by their fire, and the chances were that the Germans
would fall back on Douai and on the line of the Lille-Douai Canal,
once they were pushed off the high ground. In the Argonne the German
Crown Prince carried out desperate attacks against the French
first-line trenches at La Fille Morte and Bolante. These the French
repulsed with heavy losses to the Germans, whose dead lay piled in
heaps in front of the positions.
One result of the British attack was the hurried recall of the active
Corps of Prussian Guards from the eastern front--an important relief
to the hard-pressed Russians. This famous corps was at the time split
up into three groups; the active corps was with Mackensen in Galicia
and in the advance upon Brest-Litovsk. It was transferred to the Dvina
after the fall of Brest, and had since been engaged before Dvinsk. The
Reserve Guard Corps was in the central group of the German armies, and
the other, the Third Division, was still in Galicia. The British and
the Prussian Guards had made each other's acquaintance in the Battle
of Ypres.
[Illustration: The French Gains in the Artois Region, September,
1915.]
At the end of the month Haisnes, on the northern flank of the new
British line, was still for the greater part in German possession; on
the right flank the British were across the Lens-La Bassée road. The
British had captured not only the first position of their enemy, but
also a second or supporting line which ran west of Loos. They were now
up against the third line. Sir John French reported having taken so
far over 3,000 prisoners, twenty-one guns, and forty machine guns. The
French in Artois had taken a matter of 15,000 prisoners and a number
of guns. After obstinate day and night fighting they had reached Hill
140, the culminating point of the crests of Vimy, and the orchards to
the south. The crown prince still plugged away on this front with
heavy artillery and aerial torpedoes. Columns of flames began to issue
from his trenches on September 27, 1915--the inflammable liquid
appeared to be a composition of tar and petrol--and the smoke and
flames, carried by the wind blowing from the German trenches, soon
reached the French line and made the atmosphere intolerably hot and
suffocating for the French troops. Then suddenly out of the thick
fumes began to appear German infantry with fixed bayonets, sent
forward to the attack. They were literally mown down by the fire from
the French machine guns and rifles, but the wave of attackers seemed
unending, and by dint of overwhelming numbers it poured into the
French trenches. A terrible hand-to-hand fight then ensued in an
atmosphere so thick that it was difficult to distinguish friend from
foe. These clouds were not poisonous, for the Germans had themselves
to fight in them; they were let loose to cover the infantry charge.
The French were compelled to retire, which they did, contesting every
foot of ground. Meanwhile, reenforcements had arrived and these were
at once thrown into the fighting line. The French, however, were soon
brought to a halt. Asphyxiating and lachrymatory bombs, which emitted
bluish smoke as they exploded, began to fall in their midst. Spurred
on by their leaders the men dashed on, passing through yet another of
these barriers of smoke until they came to grips with the attackers,
who were now coming on like a torrent, in close formation, shouting
wildly. Altogether, the scene was one that vividly brings to the
imagination the truth of Sherman's dictum that "war is hell." A mad
potpourri of dimly visible forms, struggling like demons, shooting,
stabbing, hacking and roaring in an infernal caldron of tar, poison,
sulphur, tears and blood. Truly a worthy theme for another Dante and a
Gustave Doré. For some time it looked as if the French would be
crumpled up, but reserves were steadily streaming in, and eventually
the attackers began to waver and fall back. The French 75-millimeter
Creusots came into play again, and after a battle that lasted in all
twenty-four hours, the Germans were driven back to their own trenches.
In the morning of October 2, 1915, the Germans made a demonstration in
front of the Belgian trenches at Dixmude, consisting of a bombardment
and a violent discharge of bombs. On one small section alone 400 bombs
were dropped. The German infantry broke into the Belgian trenches, but
were dislodged again in a few minutes.
The position which the British had captured was exceptionally strong,
consisting of a double line, including some large redoubts and a
network of trenches and bomb-proof shelters. Dugouts were constructed
at short intervals all along the line, some of them being large caves
thirty feet below the ground. The French capture of Souchez was an
event of considerable importance, for the German High Command had
issued orders for this section to hold on to the last, that it was to
be retained at all costs. The road to the Douai plain was to be barred
to the French, who had to be held back behind the advanced works of
the Artois plateau. In May, 1915, the problem was to prevent the
French setting foot on the summits of Notre Dame de Lorette and of the
Topart Mill. The Germans sacrificed many thousands of men with this
object, but the French nevertheless made themselves masters of the
heights which the Germans considered of capital importance, and
dislodged them from Carency and Ablain-St. Nazaire. There remained
only one stage to cover--the Souchez Valley--to reach the last crest
which dominated the whole country to the east, and beyond which the
ground is flat. This task had been accomplished during the last few
days of September and the beginning of October. Souchez and its
advanced bastion, the Château Carleul, had been made into a formidable
fortification by the changing of the course of the Carency streams.
The Germans had transformed the marshy ground to the southeast of this
front into a perfect swamp, which was regarded as impassable. The
German batteries posted at Angres were able to enfilade the valley on
the north. From behind the crest of Hill 119 to Hill 140, which were
covered with trenches connected by a network of communication
trenches, many batteries were engaged against the French in the
district of Notre Dame de Lorette, Ablain-St. Nazaire and Carency. To
the north of Souchez the German trenches were still clinging to the
Notre Dame de Lorette slope.
The attack of September 25, 1915, was to overcome all these obstacles.
The artillery preparation, which lasted five days, was so skillfully
handled that, even before it was finished, many German deserters came
into the French lines declaring that they had had enough. The infantry
attack was delivered at noon on September 25, 1915, and with one rush
the French troops reached the objectives which had been marked out for
them--the château and grounds of Carleul and the islet south of
Souchez. Meanwhile, other detachments carried the cemetery and forced
their way to the first slopes of Hill 119. On the left the French
troops advanced down the slopes of Notre Dame de Lorette and made a
dash at the Hache Wood, the western outskirts of which they reached
twenty minutes after the attack began. The capture of the wood has
already been described. The French attack on the right, being held up
by machine-gun fire, could not be maintained in the cemetery, and it
was decided to approach Souchez by the main road so that they might
pour in their forces on the east, while, to the north, the French
force that had bitten its way into the Hache Wood was to continue its
advance. This maneuver decided the day. The Germans, who were in
danger of being cut off in Souchez, abandoned their positions, and
those who had retaken the cemetery, being in the same perilous
circumstances, regained by their communication trenches their second
line on the slopes of Hill 119. Thus fell Souchez to the French in two
days. The allied offensive was a short and sharp affair, skillfully
planned and bravely executed, but disappointing in result. At the
great price of 50,000 casualties the British had overthrown the
Germans on a front of five miles, and in some places to a depth of
4,000 yards, and had captured many prisoners and guns; but they had
not definitely broken the German lines. At a heavy cost the Allies on
the western front had captured about 160 German guns and disposed of
150,000 Germans, including some 27,000 prisoners, and the result of
their efforts was to shake the Germans in the west very severely and
to call back to France many troops from the eastern front. That the
blow was regarded by the kaiser as a serious one was shown by an Order
of the Day in which he declared that every important success obtained
by the Allies on the western front "will be considered as due to the
culpable negligence of the German commanders, who will lay themselves
open to being punished for incompetence." But if the Allies' successes
were due to hard fighting and brilliant dash, the fact that they did
not break right through the enemy's lines is an eloquent testimony to
the wonderful strength of the German resistance. The marvel was that
any were left alive in the first line after the preliminary
bombardment to face the bayonets and grenades of the attackers. In a
report from German General Headquarters, dated September 29, 1915, Max
Osborn, special correspondent of the "Vossische Zeitung," described
how the French artillery swept the hinterland of the German positions
in Champagne and then concentrated upon these. "The violence of the
fire then reached its zenith. Hitherto it had been a raging, searching
fire; now it became a mad drumming, beyond all power of imagination.
It is impossible to convey any idea of the savagery of this
bombardment. Never has this old planet heard such an uproar. An
officer who had witnessed during the summer the horrors of Arras, of
Souchez, and of the Lorette Heights, told me that those were not in
any way to be compared with the present, beyond all conception,
appalling artillery onslaught. Day and night for fifty hours, at some
points for seventy hours, the guns vomited destruction and murder
against the Germans, the German trenches and against the German
batteries. Strongly built trenches were covered in and ground to
powder; their edges and platforms were shorn off and converted into
dust heaps; men were buried, crushed, and inevitably suffocated--but
the survivors stood fast." A German soldier told how, in the fierce
hand-to-hand fighting which followed, a Frenchman and a German flew at
each other's throat, and how they fell, both pierced by the same
bullet, still locked in each other's grip. And so, too, they were
buried. Courage is not the monopoly of any race or nation.
CHAPTER X
THE BATTLE OF LOOS
At 5.50 a. m. on September 25, 1915, a dense, heavy cloud arose slowly
from the earth--a whitish, yellowish, all-enveloping cloud that rolled
slowly toward the German trenches--a little too much to the north.
Thousands of German bullets whistled through that cloud, but it passed
on, unheeding. The attack began at 6.30.
A Scottish division had been ordered to take Loos and Hill 70. It
therefore played the first rôle in the battle, since it was on Loos,
of which Hill 70 is the gateway, that the efforts of all converged
from the north as well as the south. Brigade "X" of the Scottish
division was to execute an enveloping movement to the north around
Loos and to carry Hill 70 by storm. Brigade "Y" meanwhile was to
attack the Loos front, Brigade "Z" remaining in reserve. By 7.05 a. m.
the whole of the first line was captured. The second line, covering
Loos, was carried with the same ease. The Germans, taken by surprise,
were fleeing toward Loos, where they put up a stern rear-guard fight,
and toward Lens, which was strongly fortified.
After the capture of the second line in front of Loos, "X" and "Y"
Brigades separated, "Y" surrounding the village with two battalions,
while the rest captured the village and cleaned it up. It was stiff
street fighting, the Germans being hidden away in all sorts of corners
with plenty of machine guns. The Scots made a quick job of it, not
stopping for trifles. It is related that a sergeant, to whom two
Germans had surrendered, pulled a few pieces of string from his
pocket, tied their hands together, and passed them to the rear with
the request, "Please forward." Brigade "X" had meanwhile thrown its
enveloping net around Loos without meeting much resistance. The
British had reached the top of Hill 70 by nine o'clock. The climb was
a hard and rough accomplishment, with the right flank under
mitrailleuse fire from Loos, and with the left exposed to fire from
Pit 14A; but it was accomplished far too quickly. Serious disasters
frequently occur in war through tardiness; in this case a possible
great victory was missed through being too quick and arriving too
early. When the brigadier got up to Loos he saw his men vanishing in
the distance. A strong German redoubt, over the other side of the hill
crest, was not even defended. The brigade crossed the Lens-La Bassée
road, which runs along the height, carried the third German line on
the opposite slope, and at 9.20 it was outside St. Auguste.
Unfortunately for the British, the corps commander, who arrived at
this moment with his staff in hot haste, was unable to get his unit in
hand again. Overflowing with offensive ardor, he had thrown his men
forward with a most impetuous movement, and they got out of hand. The
brigade turned at right angles and got into the suburbs of Lens. It
seemed as though the gates of the northern plain were about to be
smashed in. Then the great danger appeared. There was still no great
converging movement from the south, where a British division and
French troops were engaged. Touch was also lost to the north. The
neighboring division in this direction was held up until the afternoon
by wire entanglements. The left flank of the brigade was at the mercy
of a German counterattack, but the Germans did not launch it, for they
had not the men. What they did, however, was to concentrate on the
brigade a murderous fire from Loos in the south, Lens in the east, St.
Auguste in the north, and Pit 14A and two or three neighboring houses
in the west. They were even seen hastily installing machine guns along
the railway embankment northeast of Lens.
Shattered by fire, uncertain of its direction, shaken by the very
quickness of its previous advance, the brigade hesitated, sowed the
ground with its dead, and retired in good order on Hill 70, where it
intrenched slightly below the redoubt abandoned by the Germans during
the attack and which was now reoccupied by them. As a matter of fact,
the screening gas clouds hindered rather than helped the attack. The
Scottish division was exhausted, but if fresh troops had come up and a
fresh attack had been delivered against the Germans, who were
gathering all their men in the Douai region, the German front would
undoubtedly have been pierced like cardboard. Brigade "X" had made a
path, and if only reenforcements had arrived without delay the path
would have become a highroad--would have become the whole of Douai
plain. Not until nightfall were the reserves forthcoming. It is
evident that, in this first day, advantage was not taken of the
results achieved.
Though long-range fighting was incessantly kept up around Loos,
nothing of importance happened till October 8, 1915, when the Germans,
after an intense bombardment with shells of all calibers, launched a
violent attack on Loos and made desperate efforts to recapture their
lost positions. The main efforts were directed against the chalk pit
north of Hill 70, and between Hulluch and the Hohenzollern redoubt. In
the chalk pit attack, the Germans assembled behind some woods which
lay from 300 to 500 yards from the British trenches. Between these
woods and the British line the attacking force was mown down by
combined rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, not a man getting
within forty yards of the trenches.
Farther to the south, between Hulluch and the quarries, the attack was
also repelled, the British securing a German trench west of Cité St.
Elie. The Germans did succeed in penetrating the British front in the
southern communication trench of the Hohenzollern redoubt, but were
shortly after expelled again by British bombers.
British flying men played an important part in the Battle of Loos and
in the preparations that preceded it. Troops and guns had to be moved
at night so that the German aeroplanes might not note the
concentration. Hence it was decided that British aeros should warn off
the German flyers by day. They probably outnumbered the German
machines by eight to one. As the attack proceeded a flock of
aeroplanes was cutting circles and dipping and turning over the battle
field as if in an exhibition of airmanship. They appeared to be
disconnected from the battle, but no participants were more busy or
intent than they. All the panorama of action was beneath them; they
alone could really "see" the battle if they chose. But each aviator
stole only passing glimpses of the whole, for each one was intent on
his part, which was to keep watch of whether the shells of the battery
to which he reported were on the target or not. To distinguish whose
shell-burst was whose in the midst of that cloud of dust and smoke
over the German positions seemed as difficult as to separate the spout
of steam of one pipe from another when a hundred were making a wall of
vapor. Yet so skilled is the well-trained airman that he can tell at a
glance. It is not difficult to spot shells when only a few batteries
are firing, but when perhaps a hundred guns are dropping shells on a
half-mile front of trench, a highly trained eye is required.
Occasionally a plane was observed to sweep down like a hawk that had
located a fish in the water. At all hazards that intrepid aviator was
going to identify the shell-bursts of the batteries which he
represented. The enemy might have him in rifle range, but they were
too busy trying to hold up the British infantry to fire at him. Other
aeroplanes were dropping shells on railway trains and bridges, to
hinder the Germans, once they had learned where the force of the
attack was to be exerted, from rushing reenforcements to the spot. For
that kind of work, as for all reconnaissances, the aviators like
low-lying clouds. They slip down out of these to have a look around
and drop a bomb--thus killing two birds with one stone--and then rise
to cover before the enemy can bring his antiaircraft guns to bear.
[Illustration: German infantry storming a hill in the Argonne. The men
bend low for safety, though pressing eagerly forward toward the
enemy's lines.]
A German description of the Battle of Loos says that during the
preliminary gas attack the British artillery was hurling gas bombs
upon the Germans. The latter coughed and held their ground as long as
they could, but many fell, unable to resist the fumes. In the midst of
all this the Germans were preparing for the expected infantry attack.
Finally the British appeared, emerging suddenly as if from nowhere,
behind a cloud of gas, and wearing masks. They came on in thick lines
and storming columns. The first line of the attackers were quickly
shot down by the hail of rifle and machine-gun bullets that rained
upon them from the shattered German trenches. The dead and wounded
soon lay like a wall before the German position. The second and third
lines of the British suffered the same fate. It was estimated that the
number of British killed before this German division alone amounted to
8,000 to 10,000. The fourth line of attackers, however, finally
succeeded in overrunning the decimated front line of Germans, who
stood by their guns to the very last; those of them who had not fallen
were made prisoners. Not one of them returned to tell what happened in
this terrific fighting. The British are stated to have attacked in an
old-fashioned, out-of-date manner that made the German staff officers
stare in open-mouthed wonder. "Eight ranks of infantry, mounted
artillery, cavalry in the background--that was too much! A veritable
battle plan of a past age, the product of a mind in its dotage, and
half a century behind the times! Splendidly, with admirable courage,
the English troops came forward to the attack. They were young, wore
no decorations; they carried out with blind courage what their senile
commanders ordered--and this in a period of mortars, machine guns
and the telephone. Their behavior was splendid, but all the more
pitiable was the breakdown of their attack."
[Illustration: The Battle at Loos.]
Connected with the Battle of Loos there was one little person who
deserves a chapter in history--all to herself--and that is Mlle.
Émilienne Moreau, a young French girl who lived--and probably still
lives--with her parents in the storm-battered village of Loos. She was
seventeen years of age at the time she became famous, and was studying
to be a school-teacher. She was "mentioned in dispatches" in the
French Official Journal in these terms:
"On September 25, 1915, when the British troops entered the village of
Loos, she organized a first-aid station in her house and worked day
and night to bring in the wounded, to whom she gave all assistance,
while refusing to accept any reward. Armed with a revolver she went
out and succeeded in overcoming two German soldiers who, hidden in a
near-by house, were firing at the first-aid station."
This, however, was not a complete list of the exploits of la petite
Moreau. She shot two Germans when their bayonets were very close to
her, and later, snatching some hand bombs from a British grenadier's
stock, she accounted for three more who were busy at the same
occupation. Furthermore, "when the British line was wavering under the
most terrible cyclone of shells ever let loose upon earth, Émilienne
Moreau sprang forward with a bit of tricolored bunting in her hand and
the glorious words of the 'Marseillaise' on her lips, and by her
fearless example averted a retreat that might have meant disaster
along the whole front. Only the men who were in that fight can fully
understand why Sir Douglas Haig was right in christening her the Joan
of Arc of Loos."
A more mature French Amazon is Madame Louise Arnaud, the widow of an
officer killed in the war. She commanded a corps of French and Belgian
women who were permitted by the War Minister to don uniforms. The
corps was intended for general service at the front, one-third of them
being combatants, all able to ride, shoot and swim.
After the great allied offensive in the west had spent its force--or
rather the force of its initial momentum--quite an interesting battle
broke out, this time on paper. It consisted on the one side of an
attempt to estimate the results of success and to attach to them the
highest possible value. The energy of the other side was devoted to
belittling these results and proclaiming the alleged futility of the
venture. Thus, King George telegraphed to Sir John French on September
30, 1915:
"I heartily congratulate you and all ranks of my army under your
command upon the success which has attended their gallant efforts
since the commencement of the combined attack."
Lord Kitchener sent this message:
"My warmest congratulations to you and all serving under you on the
substantial success you have achieved...."
In his report of October 3, 1915, General French stated that "The
enemy has suffered heavy losses, particularly in the many
counterattacks by which he has vainly endeavored to wrest back the
captured positions, but which have all been gallantly repulsed by our
troops.... I feel the utmost confidence and assurance that the same
glorious spirit which has been so marked a feature throughout the
first phase of this great battle will continue until our efforts are
crowned by final and complete victory."
The following sentence is culled from the French official report on
the fighting in Champagne:
"... Germans surrendered in groups, even though not surrounded, so
tired were they of the fight, and so depressed by hunger and convinced
of our determination to continue our effort to the end...."
Rather contradictory in tone and substance were the German dispatches:
"The German General Staff recently invited a number of newspaper men
from neutral countries--the United States, South America, Holland, and
Rumania--to inspect the fighting line in the west during time of
battle.... They are thus enabled to verify the reports from the German
headquarters concerning this greatest and most fearful battle fought
on the western front since the beginning of the war. They are,
accordingly, in a position to state that exaggerated statements are
made in the reports from French headquarters, and to confirm the facts
that the Germans were outnumbered several times by the French; that
the French suffered terrific and unheard-of losses, in spite of
several days of artillery preparation; that the French attacks failed
altogether, as none of them attained the expected result, and that the
encircling movement of General Joffre is without tangible result."
"The world presently shall see the pompously advertised grand
offensive broken by the iron will of our people in arms.... They are
welcome to try it again if they like." "French and English storming
columns in unbroken succession roll up against the iron wall
constituted by our heroic troops. As all hostile attacks have hitherto
been repulsed with gigantic losses, particularly for the English, the
whole result of the enemy's attack, lasting for days, is merely a
denting in of our front in two places...." Who shall decide when
doctors disagree?
CHAPTER XI
THE CAVELL CASE--ACCIDENT TO KING GEORGE
On October 15, 1915, the United States Ambassador in London informed
the British Foreign Office that Miss Edith Cavell, lately the head of
a large training school for nurses in Brussels, had been executed by
the German military authorities of that city after sentence of death
had been passed on her. It was understood that the charge against Miss
Cavell was that she had harbored fugitive British and French soldiers
and Belgians of military age, and had assisted them to escape from
Belgium in order to join the colors. Miss Cavell was the daughter of a
Church of England clergyman, and was trained as a nurse at the London
Hospital. On the opening of the École Beige d'Infirmières Diplomées,
Brussels, in 1907, she was appointed matron of the school. She went
there with a view to introduce into Belgium British methods of
nursing and of training nurses. Those who knew Miss Cavell were
impressed by her strength of character and unflinching devotion. She
could have returned to England in September, 1914, shortly after the
outbreak of the war, when seventy English nurses were able to leave
Belgium through the influence of the United States Minister, but she
chose to remain at her post. The "execution," which was accompanied by
several unpleasant features, raised a great outcry of public
indignation not only throughout the British Empire, but also in most
neutral countries. That indignation rose to a still higher pitch when,
on October 22, 1915, the report on the case, by Mr. Brand Whitlock,
United States Minister in Belgium, was published in the press. From
the report it appeared, what the world had hitherto been ignorant of,
that Mr. Whitlock had made the most strenuous efforts to save the
unfortunate lady from death. His humanitarian labors in that direction
were strongly seconded by the Spanish Minister in Brussels.
Miss Cavell's mother, a widow, residing at Norwich, received the
following letter of sympathy from the king and queen:
"Buckingham Palace,
"October 23, 1915.
"Dear Madam:
"By command of the King and Queen I write to assure you that the
hearts of their Majesties go out to you in your bitter sorrow, and to
express their horror at the appalling deed which has robbed you of
your child. Men and women throughout the civilized world, while
sympathizing with you, are moved with admiration and awe at her faith
and courage in death.
"Believe me, dear Madam,
"Yours very truly,
"STAMFORDHAM."
The report described how Mr. Hugh S. Gibson, the Secretary of the
American Legation, sought out the German Governor, Baron von der
Lancken, late at night before the execution, and, with the Spanish
Minister pleaded with him and the other German officers for the
Englishwoman's life. There was a reference to an apparent lack of
good faith on the part of the German authorities in failing to keep
their promise to inform the American Minister fully of the trial and
sentence. Mr. Whitlock's final appeal was a note sent to Von Lancken
late on the night of October 11, 1915, which read as follows:
"My dear Baron: I am too sick to present my request myself, but I
appeal to your generosity of heart to support it and save from death
this unhappy woman. Have pity on her.
"Yours truly,
"BRAND WHITLOCK."
The next day Mr. Whitlock telegraphed to our Ambassador in London:
"Miss Cavell sentenced yesterday and executed at 2 o'clock this
morning, despite our best efforts, continued until the last moment."
The sentence had been confirmed and the execution ordered to be
carried out by General von Bissing, the German Governor General of
Belgium.
The British press drew an apposite parallel between the summary
execution of Miss Cavell in Belgium and the course taken in England in
the case of Mrs. Louise Herbert, a German, and the wife of an English
curate in Darlington. She had been sentenced to six months'
imprisonment as a spy. According to English criminal law every
condemned person is entitled to appeal against the sentence inflicted.
Mrs. Herbert availed herself of this indisputable right, and her
appeal was heard at Durham on October 20, 1915--eight day
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