Sound Military Decision
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Title: Sound Military Decision
Author: Naval War College
Commentator: Edward C. Kalbfus
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SOUND MILITARY DECISION
U.S. Naval War College
Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland
This book is the 1942 edition of a book originally published in 1936
by the U.S. Naval War College.
CONTENTS
_Sound Military Decision_ 1
Index 227
Sound Military Decision
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rhode Island
November 30, 1941
SOUND MILITARY DECISION was first published at the Naval War College
in 1936. It included the essential features of THE ESTIMATE OF THE
SITUATION which, since 1910, had been issued at intervals in a series
of revised editions. The new material that was added in 1936 was
intended to assist in enlarging the viewpoint and in broadening the
basis of professional judgment.
Primarily intended for the purposes of the Naval War College, this
work is the cumulative result of years of untiring and loyal effort on
the part of the College staff and student body. Equally important have
been the advice and assistance contributed by other officers of wide
professional experience and attainment.
The objective has been a brief but inclusive treatment of the
fundamentals of the military profession, i.e., the profession of arms.
The emphasis, naturally, is on the exercise of mental effort in the
solution of military problems, more especially in our Navy. An
enormous literature has been consulted, and research has included all
available and pertinent military writings. Care has also been taken to
include, from civil sources, the findings of those authoritative works
which deal with related matters and with the applicable underlying
truths.
In a work of this type and scope, it is manifestly not possible to
illustrate the abstract text by historical examples and analogies.
These are complementary features of the War College resident and
correspondence courses; provision for the necessary historical
background is otherwise the concern of the individual student.
In this edition of SOUND MILITARY DECISION no radical changes have
been made; the revision has been confined to rearrangement and
amplification of the subject matter.
E.C. KALBFUS,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
President.
[Illustration: SOUND MILITARY DECISION
THE SOLUTION OF MILITARY PROBLEMS
Through the studied employment of the Natural Mental Processes
(Foreword) The Scientific Approach to the Solution of Military
Problems
PART I
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
in its relation to the successful Conduct of War
(Chapter I) Command and its Problems
(Chapter II) Mental Processes and Human Tendencies
THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE
(Ch. III) leading to SOUND MILITARY DECISION
(Ch. IV) THE APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE
The Two Major Applications, i.e.,--
THE SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES
THE DETERMINATION OF OPERATIONS
(Ch. V) THE FOUR STEPS IN THE SOLUTION OF A MILITARY PROBLEM
Part II--PLANNING
(Ch. VI) THE FIRST STEP The Estimate of the Situation The Decision
(Ch. VII) THE SECOND STEP The Detailed Plan
Part III--EXECUTION
(Ch. VIII) THE THIRD STEP The Directives
(Ch. IX) THE FOURTH STEP The Supervision of the Planned Action]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(See Chart on page XXXX)
Page
FOREWORD 1
Science of War--Scientific Investigation--Fundamental
Considerations--Art of War--Scientific Method--Leadership
and Training--Sound Decision--Judgment--The Approach to
the Solution of Military Problems--Fundamental
Philosophy--Technique of Solution--Process of
Education--Outline of the Discussion.
PART I. PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN ITS RELATION TO THE SUCCESSFUL
CONDUCT OF WAR.
Chapter
I Command and its Problems 7
The Implementation of National Policy--The Primary Function
of the Armed Forces--Military Strategy and Tactics--Command
of the Armed Forces--Unity of Effort--The Chain of
Command--Mutual Understanding--Indoctrination.
II Mental Processes and Human Tendencies 19
Natural Mental Processes--The Necessity for Logical
Thought--Principles in their Relation to Logical
Thought--Value and Limitations of Lists of Principles
of War--Formulation and Use of Principles--Summary of
Fundamental Considerations.
III Basic Principles Applicable to Military Problems (The
Fundamental Military Principle) 29
Review of Conclusions--Procedure--Suitability,
Feasibility, and Acceptability--Fundamental Principle for
Attainment of an End--Interdependency of Factors--Special
Nature of War--Factors in War--The Objective in
War--Military Operations--Salient Features--The Fundamental
Military Principle--Corollaries.
IV The Application of the Fundamental Military Principle
(Objectives--Their Selection and Attainment) 43
The Basis for Solution of a Military Problem--The Major
Components of a Military Problem--Essential
Elements--Selection of Correct Military Objectives--
Determination of Effective Military Operations--Physical
Objectives--Relative Positions--Apportionment of Fighting
Strength--Freedom of Action--Summary.
V The Four Steps in the Solution of a Military Problem 79
A Situation--The Incentive--The Assigned Objective--The
Motivating Task--The Natural Mental Processes--The Approach
to the Solution--The First Step--The Basic Problem--Tasks--
The Mission--Survey of Factors of Fighting Strength--Courses
of Action--Reflective Thinking--Naval Operations--Analysis
and Selection of Courses of Action--The Decision--The Second
Step--The Third Step--The Fourth Step--Sequence of Events in
the Four Steps--The Use of a Form in the Solution of
Problems--Conclusion.
*PART II. THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN PLANNING.
VI The Selection of a Correct Objective (Including the
Determination, in Proper Detail, of the Action Required
for its Attainment) The First Step--The Solution of a
Basic Problem (The Estimate of the Situation) 117
Process of solving a Problem--Sections of the Estimate
Form--Establishment of the Basis for Solution of the
Problem--Determination of Suitable, Feasible, and
Acceptable Courses of Action--Examination into the
Capabilities of the Enemy--Selection of the Best Course
of Action--The Decision.
VII The Resolution of the Required Action into Detailed
Operations (The Second Step--The Solution of Subsidiary
Problems) 155
Assumptions--Alternative Plans--Application of the
Essential Elements of a Favorable Military Operation--
Testing for Suitability, Feasibility, and Acceptability--
Formulation of Tasks--Organization of Task Groups--
Application of the Fundamental Military Principle to the
Determination of Objectives embodied in Tasks--Assembly
of Measures for Freedom of Action--Preparation of
Subsidiary Plans.
*PART III. THE EXERCISE OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN THE
EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
VIII The Inauguration of the Planned Action (The Third
Step--The Formulation and Issue of Directives) 183
Scope of the Third Step--Military Plans and Military
Directives--Essentials of Military Directives--
Restatement of the Decision--Standard Forms for Plans
and Directives--The Order Form--Types of Naval
Directives.
IX The Supervision of the Planned Action (The Fourth Step) 197
Nature of the Discussion--Goal of Planning--Importance
of Execution--The Incentive--Conditions in War--
Recognition of New Problems--Nature of Readjustments
Required--Importance of the Will of the Commander--
Problems Involving Modification of the Basic Plan--
Problems Challenging Integrity of Basic Plan--Further
Procedure Applicable to such Problems of the Fourth
Step--The Running Estimate of the Situation--Journal
and Work Sheet--Special Remarks as to Entries--Summary.
*CONCLUSION 217
*APPENDIX
Outline Form of an Operation Plan 219
Tabular Form of the Estimate of the Situation 222
*INDEX 227
* Not included in the limited issue for use in Part I of the
Correspondence Course.
FOREWORD
From the earliest days of recorded history, the facts associated with
military operations of the past have been constantly studied. The
result has been the accumulation of a mass of information from which
conclusions have been drawn as to the causes of success and failure.
Although scattered through countless volumes, and nowhere completely
systematized and classified, this accepted body of knowledge
constitutes the basis for the science of war.
Scientific investigation--that is, the collection, verification, and
classification of facts--follows the recurrent procedure of successive
analysis, hypothesis, theory, and test. The application of this
process to the campaigns of history reveals fundamentals common to
all, irrespective of whether the sphere of action has been land, sea,
or air. In the ceaseless struggle for supremacy between the offense
and the defense, great technological changes have taken place. The
successful conduct of war, however, has always depended on effective
operations for the creation or maintenance of favorable military
situations, whose essential elements have remained unchanged
throughout the years (see page 46).
These fundamental considerations (see page 28), whatever the detailed
form of their presentation, are the basis for the successful conduct
of war. The need of such a basis has been felt from very early times.
It was not, however, until the early part of the Nineteenth Century
that students of warfare appear to have recorded the view that the
conduct of war is susceptible of reduction to scientific analysis, and
that only through a reasoned theory can the true causes of success and
failure be explained.
Such a scientific analysis of any subject has for its chief practical
aim the improvement of the art, or practice, of that subject. Forming
an important part of the science of war are those new developments in
weapons and in other technological fields which, with the passage of
time, have brought about great changes in methods of waging war. It is
only through founding the art of war--the application of the science
of war to actual military situations--on the fundamental truths
discovered through the science of war, that changes in method, due to
technological evolution, can be made most effective.
In preparing for war, the only practicable peacetime tests are usually
restricted to those afforded by examples of the past, by problems such
as chart (map) and board maneuvers, and by fleet and field exercises.
While the military profession can afford to neglect none of them,
such tests can never be conclusive. This fact, however, far from
justifying resort to any other procedure, emphasizes the necessity for
utilization of the scientific method in order to arrive at conclusions
which are as exact as possible.
An exact result is, of course, the aim of all scientific research, but
exactitude necessarily depends on the establishment of correct
relationships among facts which have so far come to light.
Consequently, there is great variation in the degree of accuracy which
actually characterizes the several sciences. If it be maintained that
only those studies which have resulted in exact conclusions may
properly be regarded as sciences, then it can hardly be said that many
sciences, now regarded as such, exist; for the findings of medicine,
biology, chemistry, and even physics are continually being revised in
the light of new data.
The science of war necessarily includes knowledge gained in other
fields. In war, as in medicine or any other practical activity, the
more inclusive and dependable the body of knowledge available as a
basis for action, the more probable it is that the application of this
knowledge, the art (page 1), will be effective.
Realization of these facts has led to renewed emphasis on the
scientific approach to the solution of military problems. The fallacy
of staking the future upon the possible availability of a military
genius in time of need became clear when it was appreciated that more
than one nation, hitherto victorious in arms, had been defeated and
humiliated when genius no longer led its forces.
There followed in the military profession a conviction that, although
extraordinary inherent capacity can be recognized and utilized when
known to exist, it is safer and wiser to develop by training the
highest average of ability in leadership than to trust to untrained
"common sense" or to the possible advent of a genius. History has
abundantly proved the folly of attempting, on any other basis, to cope
with the unpredictable occurrence of genius in the hostile leadership.
With the actual exercise of leadership in war restricted to the
reality of war, there is emphasized the need of peacetime
training--training of subordinates in efficient performance, and, more
important, training of those who will be placed by the State in
positions of responsibility and command.
Campaigns of the Twentieth Century reflect the intensity of mental
training among the armed forces of the greater powers; the planning
and conduct of war have acquired a precision, a swiftness, and a
thoroughness before unknown. The study and analysis of past campaigns,
the sifting of technical details from fundamental truths, and the
shrewd combination of the theoretical and the practical form the basis
of this training.
The proper solution of military problems requires the reaching of
sound decision as to what is to be done. Upon the soundness of the
decision depends, in great part, the effectiveness of the resulting
action. Both are dependent on the possession of a high order of
professional judgment, fortified by knowledge and founded on
experience. Theoretical knowledge supplements experience, and is the
best substitute in its absence. Judgment, the ability to understand
the correct relationship between cause and effect, and to apply that
knowledge under varying circumstances, is essential to good
leadership. Professional judgment is inherently strengthened by mental
exercise in the application of logical processes to the solution of
military problems.
The approach, presented herein, to the solution of military problems
is intended to assist the military profession in reaching sound
decisions as to (1) the selection of its correct objectives, the ends
toward which its action is to be directed under varying circumstances;
(2) planning the detailed operations required; (3) transmitting the
intent so clearly as to ensure inauguration of well-coordinated
action; and (4) the effective supervision of such action.
The student of war will find in these pages a fundamental military
philosophy whose roots go down to very ancient times. In the technique
described for the solution of military problems, experienced officers
will recognize a system with which they are already familiar. This
system, constantly under study to improve its details, has been in use
in our military Services for many years.
The foundation of this philosophy and of the system for its practical
utilization rests on the concept of relative or proportional values.
In the military environment, change, rather than stability, is
especially to be expected, and the relationships existing among the
essential elements of a military situation are, in fact, the
significant values. Such values, themselves, vary with the viewpoint
of the person concerned. Accordingly, because of the difference in
objectives (defined above), what is strategy as viewed by a commander
on a higher echelon may have more of a tactical aspect to those on a
lower (page 10). Immediate objectives and ultimate objectives (page
54) can scarcely be understood in their true proportions unless the
point of reference is clear. The point of view of the commander, as
established by the position he occupies in the chain of command, is,
therefore, to be taken into consideration in every phase of the
solution of a problem,--in the determination of the appropriate effect
desired (page 43), of relative fighting strength (page 35), and of
courses of action and the detailed operations pertaining thereto (page
88).
On the basis of these facts, instantaneous and easy understanding of
all the elements involved is not to be expected. Were such
understanding possible, the expert conduct of war would be one of the
easiest, instead of one of the most difficult, of human activities. It
is only through a gradual assimilation of its fundamentals that the
profession of arms is to be mastered. A process of true education is
involved,--that of enlarging the viewpoint and broadening the basis of
professional judgment (see page i),--and its essentials are the proper
foundation for any system of self-improvement in the exercise of
mental power. There is no easy road to the goal of military effort.
Part I, hereafter, discusses professional judgment in its basic
relation to the successful conduct of war. This treatment examines the
responsibilities of the armed forces, discusses the role of the
commander, indicates the natural mental processes employed in the
solution of military problems, formulates and explains the Fundamental
Military Principle, and concludes with an outline of the procedure for
its further application in Parts II and III.
Part II is concerned with the solution of the problems encountered
during the planning stage.
Part III discusses the execution of the plan,--the directives and the
supervision of the action,--but the treatment as to details is chiefly
from the standpoint of the mental effort. During hostilities the vital
issues which hinge on alert supervision create an accentuated demand
for the intelligent exercise of professional judgment. Its possession
to a highly developed degree and its exercise on a foundation of
knowledge and experience, are prerequisite to attainment of the
highest standards in the conduct of war.
The following pages are intended, therefore, to provide a fundamental
basis upon which the commander, by thoughtful study and reflection,
may develop his professional judgment to the end that its exercise
result in sound military decision, essential alike to wise planning
and to consistently effective action.
PART I
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IN ITS RELATION TO
THE SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF WAR
CHAPTER I
COMMAND AND ITS PROBLEMS
The Foreword, preceding, has explained the scientific
approach to the solution of military problems. It has been
brought to notice that the science of war can be utilized to
further sound military decision and, so, to improve the
practice of war, i.e., the art of war, whether under assumed
or actual conditions. The Foreword has also stressed the
importance of education for the development of judgment in
the application of mental power to the solution of military
problems.
Chapter I, which now follows, deals with the armed forces in
their relation to national policy, and discusses,
specifically, the role of the commander with respect to the
use of mental power as a recognized component of fighting
strength. Emphasis is placed on the important subjects of
military strategy and tactics, unity of effort, the chain of
command, authority and responsibility, organization, mutual
understanding, loyalty, and indoctrination.
The Implementation of National Policy. Organized government exists for
the purpose of bringing into systematic union the individuals of a
State for the attainment of common ends. The primary national
objective (page 3) is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of
essential security for the social system which is the fundamental
basis of the community. Whatever the form of government, the power and
authority of the State are vested in an individual, or in a grouping
of individuals, whose voice is the voice of the State. In the
prosecution of the chief aim of organized government, the State
crystallizes the many conflicting desires and views of its people into
policies, internal and external. Each policy is a method of procedure
for attaining one or more national objectives.
Internal policies are rendered effective by enforcement of the laws of
the State.
External policies, to become effective, require recognition by other
States, tacitly or by agreement. When there is conflict between the
policies of one State and those of another, peaceful means of
settlement are usually sought.
If peaceful (diplomatic) means fail to settle the point at issue, the
State abandons the policy in question, defers action to enforce it, or
adopts stronger measures. Such measures may take the form of
psychological, political, or economic pressure. They may even include
the threat to employ armed force before actually resorting to the
imposition of physical violence. During actual hostilities, also,
every means of pressure known to man, in addition to physical
violence, may be employed.
Whether the use of armed force to impose or to resist the imposition
of policy constitutes a legal state of war is a political question
which does not affect the tasks the armed forces may be called on to
perform. War, therefore, is to be understood herein as any condition
in which one State employs physical violence against another, or
against an organized part of itself which may be in rebellion.
By agreement among nations, effort has been made to discountenance
aggressive warfare. The distinction between aggression and
self-defense is, however, not a matter of agreement. War is still
employed as an instrument of national policy. No nation has, as yet,
manifested willingness to relinquish the right to employ armed force
in resisting aggression, nor the right to decide what constitutes
self-defense. States still maintain and employ armed forces as a means
of promoting and expanding, as well as of defending, their welfare and
interests.
The Primary Function of the Armed Forces. Whether war is an ethical
institution is not a matter within the purview of the armed forces.
Their primary function is, when called upon to do so, to support and,
within the sphere of military effort, to enforce the policy of the
State. The performance of this function constitutes the chief reason
for their existence.
The fundamental objective of the armed forces is, therefore, the
reduction of the opposing will to resist. It is attained through the
use of actual physical violence or the threat thereof (page 7). This
fact constitutes the underlying motive of every military plan, whether
for the conduct of a minor or contributory operation, or for the
prosecution of a major campaign. The final outcome is dependent on
ability to isolate, occupy, or otherwise control the territory of the
enemy, for land is the natural habitat of man (page 46). Since
opposition is to be expected, the military problem is primarily
concerned with the application of power--mental, moral, and
physical--in overcoming resistance, or in exerting effort to resist.
The application of power implies effort, i.e., the exertion of
strength. The mental, moral, and physical power at the disposal of the
armed forces depends on the effort which can be exerted by the human
and material components of their fighting strength.
The skillful employment of fighting strength, as a weapon more
effective than the enemy's under a given set of circumstances, is the
goal toward which the armed forces direct their effort. The elements
of the material component--arms, ammunition, and other equipment--are
indispensable. They are impotent, however, without the direction and
energy supplied by the human component, its moral and mental elements
nicely balanced and judiciously compounded with physical fitness. A
true concept of the art of war will insist that the necessity for the
achievement of a high standard of technical and administrative skill
not be permitted to outweigh the need for maximum development of other
mental attainments, and of the moral components of fighting strength.
The moral elements include all the essential attributes of personal
character, and more especially those qualities of courage, loyalty,
decisiveness, modesty, patience, tolerance of the opinions of others,
and fearlessness of responsibility which are characteristics of true
military leadership. The maintenance of a high ethical standard is
essential to the establishment and continuance of mutual confidence.
The qualifications essential to the proper application of the mental
elements include a creative imagination and the ability to think and
to reason logically, fortified by practical experience and by a
knowledge of the science of war. An unmistakable mark of mental
maturity is the ability to distinguish between preconceived ideas and
fundamental knowledge. Intellectual honesty, unimpaired by the
influence of tradition, prejudice, or emotion, is the essential basis
for the effective employment of mental power.
The numerical size of the armed forces, in their correct perspective
as an instrument of the State, as well as the extent to which they are
supplied with material components of fighting strength, are matters to
be determined by the State after consultation with the responsible
military authorities. The development of the essential military
qualities of the instrument is the special charge of the armed forces.
It is their task to weld the assemblage of men, armed and maintained
by the State, into an harmonious whole, skilled in technique and
imbued with a psychological and mental attitude which will not admit
that any obstacle is insuperable.
The Advisory Function. Understanding between the civil representatives
of the State and the leaders of the armed forces is manifestly
essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to
enforce it. Therefore, if serious omissions and the adoption of
ill-advised measures are to be avoided, it is necessary that wise
professional counsel be available to the State. While military
strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of
attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or
failure of military strategy. It behooves policy to ensure not only
that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of
strategy be allotted adequate means, and be undertaken under the most
favorable conditions.
These considerations require that the military profession be
qualified, through the possession of mental power, clear vision, and
capacity for expression, to advise the State in military matters.
There is thus accentuated the need for mental training, as set forth
previously in the Foreword.
Military Strategy and Tactics. Military strategy as distinguished by
objectives (page 3) representing a larger, further, or more
fundamental goal, is differentiated from tactics in that the latter is
concerned with a more immediate or local aim, which should in turn
permit strategy to accomplish its further objective.
Consequently, every military situation has both strategical and
tactical aspects. The nature of the objectives to be attained at a
particular time, and the action to be taken to that end, may be
governed chiefly by strategical, or chiefly by tactical,
considerations. Whether an operation is distinctively strategical or
tactical will depend, from the standpoint of the commander concerned,
on the end which he has in view.
To attain its objective, strategy uses force (or threatens such use)
(see page 8) as applied by tactics; tactics employed for a purpose
other than that of contributing to the aims of strategy is unsound.
Proper tactics, therefore, has a strategic background. Definition of
tactics as the art of handling troops or ships in battle, or in the
immediate presence of the enemy, is not all-inclusive. Such a view
infers that the field of battle is the only province of tactics, or
that strategy abdicates when tactics comes to the fore.
Actually, while tactical considerations may predominate during battle,
their influence is not confined to the immediate presence of the
enemy. Tactical dispositions are frequently adopted for convenience,
for time saving, or for other reasons, long before entry into the
immediate presence of the enemy. Nor do strategical considerations end
when battle is joined. Tactics, unguided by strategy, might blindly
make sacrifices merely to remain victor on a field of struggle. But
strategy looks beyond, in order to make the gains of tactics accord
with the strategic aim. Strategy and tactics are inseparable.
It is thus the duty of tactics to ensure that its results are
appropriate to the strategic aim, and the duty of strategy to place at
the disposal of tactics the power appropriate to the results demanded.
The latter consideration imposes upon strategy the requirement that
the prescribed aim be possible of attainment with the power that can
be made available.
Consequently, while the attainment of the aims of strategy, generally
depends upon the results gained by tactics, strategy is initially
responsible for the success of tactics. It is therefore in the
province of strategy to ensure that the attainment of tactical
objectives furthers, exclusively, the aims of strategy, and also that
the tactical struggle be initiated under conditions favorable for the
attainment of the designated objectives.
Command of the Armed Forces. The initial requisite to the effective
use of the armed forces is an agency authorized to direct them.
Command directs the armed forces. It is vitalized and personified in
the commander, the human directing head, both of the whole and of
organized groupings in descending scale of importance. Its
responsibility, during peace, is the perfection of the armed forces to
the point of readiness for war and, during the conflict, their
effective employment.
Training for command, to be effective, is necessarily dependent upon
an understanding of the position occupied by the commander, and of the
role which he plays. Accordingly, this understanding is an essential
in the study of that aspect of command training which has as its
purpose the development of ability to reach sound decision.
The ideal of military command combines the best of human qualities
with sound knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the armed
forces. It recognizes in war a form of human activity whose conduct,
like that of all other human activities, is subject to natural law. It
applies to the mastery of the problems of war, therefore, the natural
mental processes of human thought (see Chapter II); it adapts these
natural processes to a specific purpose, and consciously develops
their use to the maximum degree for the attainment of this end. As
command ascends the scale, its viewpoint broadens. Experience and
added knowledge, with increasing authority and responsibility, lead to
a concept of war more and more comprehensive, with the resultant
growth in ability to evolve and put into effect a general plan for
the effective control of collective effort.
Unity of Effort. An objective is best attained by effective
application of properly directed effort, exerted by a single
individual or by groups of individuals. Where individuals are
collectively concerned, unity of effort is the most important single
factor contributory to the common success. The basic condition to be
sought by the armed forces is an harmonious whole, capable of putting
forth combined effort, intensified in strength because of the
collective feature, and rendered effective by its unity.
The Chain of Command. Within the limits of human capacity, an
organization can exert its combined effort with greater effect the
more closely the exercise of command represents the act of a single
competent commander. To divide the supreme command in any locality, or
to vest it in a body rather than in an individual, is necessarily to
diffuse responsibility. In that degree there is then incurred the
danger, through confusion of wills and ideas, of delaying decision and
of creating corresponding diffusion of effort.
Realization of this danger has led the military profession to entrust
command, subject to justifiable exceptions (see page 71), to a single
head, while ensuring, by careful selection and training of personnel,
that competent individuals are available for this duty. Although this
method is in seeming conflict with the restriction imposed by
recognized limitations of human capacity, the difficulty is
effectively met through the chain of command, whereby responsibility
is assigned and authority is transmitted without lessening of ultimate
responsibility. Responsibility and authority, the latter properly
apportioned to the former, are inseparably inherent in command, and
may not justifiably be severed from one another.
In the abstract, the chain of command consists of a series of links,
through which responsibility and authority are transmitted. The
supreme commander is thus linked with his successively subordinate
commanders, and all are disposed on, so to speak, a vertical series of
levels, each constituting an echelon of command.
By means of the chain of command, a commander is enabled to require of
his immediate subordinates an expenditure of effort which, in the
aggregate, will ensure the attainment of his own objective (page 3).
He thus assigns tasks to his immediate subordinates, whom he holds
directly responsible for their execution without, however, divesting
himself of any part of his initial responsibility. The accomplishment
of each of these assigned tasks will involve the attainment of an
objective, necessarily less in scope than that of the immediate
superior but a contribution to the attainment of the latter.
The character and magnitude of the objective of the highest echelon
involved will have considerable bearing upon the number of echelons
required for its attainment. Whatever the number, a commander on a
particular echelon occupies the position of an immediate subordinate
to a commander on the next higher echelon, and that of an immediate
superior with relation to a commander on the next lower echelon.
Within these confines, authority is exercised and accomplishment
exacted, both to the extent calculated to ensure unity of effort.
There may frequently be found two or more commanders occupying
coordinate positions on the same echelon, all with the same immediate
superior, and all charged with loyalty to him and to each other in the
attainment of a common objective. In no case, however, will a
commander be directly answerable to more than one immediate superior
for the performance of the same duty. Thus is fulfilled the
requirement that the command, although relatively narrower in scope as
the scale is descended, be reposed in a single head.
The experience gained and the knowledge acquired during early service
on the lower echelons provide a basis for later expansion of
viewpoint, a better understanding of the position occupied by the
subordinate and of the obligations of higher command, including its
dependence on subordinates. As the echelons of command are ascended,
the details involved become more and more numerous, because of the
increased scope of the problems. On the higher echelons, therefore,
staff assistance is provided so that the commander may be left free to
consider matters in their major aspects. The staff of a commander is
not, however, a part of the chain of command; its members, as such,
exercise no independent authority.
A chain of command is not created by the subdivision of the officer
corps into grades on a basis of relative rank. Such subdivision is for
the purpose of classification from the standpoint of potential
competency and capacity for responsibility, and carries no authority
to command by virtue of rank alone. Organization, systematized
connection for a specific purpose, is first necessary.
The armed forces, during peace, are usually subdivided into permanent
major organizations for the purpose of attaining and maintaining
readiness for action. From the several grades of the officer corps, a
permanent chain of command is instituted by the process of organization,
the supreme command being reposed in a commander-in-chief. The basis of
the permanent organization is that chosen as best suited to attain and
maintain readiness. Its choice requires consideration of many factors,
such as the types of weapons and vessels, their intended uses, and their
capabilities, severally and in combination. Further specific demands are
met by temporary arrangements effected through "task organization".
Whether the organization be permanent or temporary, its establishment
places in effect a chain of command applicable to that organization
throughout its continuance.
Habitual and studied adherence to the chain of command in
administrative matters, in consultation, in the exchange of
information, and in the issue of directives is essential to mutual
understanding, and therefore to unity of effort. The right of a
commander, however, because of the responsibility he shoulders, to
deal directly with subordinates more than one echelon removed is not
relinquished because of the existence of the chain of command.
Circumstances may arise which require him to issue orders directly to
any person under his command. Fully aware, however, of the value of
unity of effort, and recognizing that failure to deal through his
immediate subordinate, no matter what the exigency, cannot but tend to
weaken the chain of command, he will, as soon as the state of the
emergency permits, inform intervening commanders of the action he has
been compelled to take.
Mutual Understanding. The chain of command, though providing the
necessary linkage, does not of itself ensure that the command
organization will be adequate, nor can it ensure that unity of effort
will result. To meet the requirement of adequacy, there is needed in
the person of each commander not only the ability to arrive at sound
military decision, to plan, and to direct the operations of his
command, but also an appreciation of the position which he occupies in
his relationship to his immediate superior, on the one hand, and to
his own immediate subordinates on the other. To meet the requirement
of unity of effort, it is also essential that there exist a state of
mutual understanding throughout the chain of command.
Loyalty is not merely a moral virtue; it is a great military
necessity. To establish and to cultivate a state of mutual
understanding from which will flow mutual loyalty born of mutual
confidence (page 9) are prime obligations of command. Within the
limits of responsibility and resultant authority, individual
initiative will follow. On a foundation of intelligent cooperation and
resolute determination, the acts of the lowest commander will be in
accordance with the desires of the highest. This, in effect, will
constitute unity of effort, accomplished through the vesting of
command in a single head.
The final aim of mutual understanding is attained when, in the absence
of specific instructions, each subordinate commander in the chain acts
instinctively as his immediate superior, if present, would have him
act, and also cooperates intelligently with commanders occupying
coordinate positions on the same echelon. For this reason there is
need, on all echelons, of a complete grasp of the significance of the
relationship between immediate superior and immediate subordinate, and
of the obligations of each to the other.
The proper relationship is such that a subordinate, even though
separated from his commander, can confidently take action as if the
latter were present. To this end, the competent commander will earlier
have cultivated the personal relationship between his immediate
superior and himself, and between himself and his subordinates. It is
through such close relationship that mutual understanding is best
developed and harmony promoted, so that intelligent and cordial unity
of effort may exist among the personnel of a command.
The commander, however competent, necessarily relies on his
subordinates. Recognizing the psychological factors involved, he will
therefore manifest confidence in their abilities, display sympathetic
interest in their efforts, and evince pride in their achievements. He
will also exercise patience with the mistakes which will inevitably
occur, without condonement, however, of disaffection, neglect, or
carelessness. The commander may reasonably expect, by the same token,
that this attitude will characterize his immediate superior.
In the absence of his superior, and faced with a changing situation, a
commander may be forced to the conclusion that his assigned task
requires modification or alteration. Conditions permitting, he will of
course communicate with proper authority, and will make constructive
representations. If he is without adequate communications facilities,
or if circumstances have imposed restrictions on communications
facilities otherwise available, he takes action according to the
dictates of his own judgment, guided by the known views of his
superior. On occasions when he believes that the immediate situation
so requires, he may even depart from his instructions. He realizes
that in so doing he accepts the gravest of military responsibilities.
At the same time, however, he recognizes that to fail to take the
indicated action may disclose a lack of the higher qualities of
courage, judgment, initiative, and loyalty (page 9). He will, of
course inform his superior of his action at the first available
opportunity. In the meantime, he has been enabled to act intelligently
and fearlessly because of the existence of a state of mutual
understanding.
Indoctrination. Both the necessary process and the final result of
establishing a state of mutual understanding are sometimes known as
indoctrination.
The word carries the dual meaning of "the act of indoctrinating" and
"the state of being indoctrinated". In common with the word doctrine,
it has its root in the Latin verb which means "to teach". A doctrine,
in its pure meaning, is that which is taught, or set forth for
acceptance or belief.
It does not follow that every doctrine is necessarily sound, nor that
it is founded on conviction reached as the result of intelligent
thought. Nor is the encouragement of a belief, by means of the spread
of a doctrine, necessarily inspired by good motives. The preaching of
doctrine known to be false is frequently encountered in many human
activities. The deliberate spread of false propaganda is an example.
But, whatever the motive and whether the doctrine be sound or false,
the act of indoctrination is intended to shape opinion and thus
influence action.
Manifestly, to be along permanently useful lines, indoctrination flows
from sound philosophy, i.e., is rooted in truth. All teachings, all
opinions that may be advanced, all expressions of viewpoint, i.e., all
doctrine, is therefore to be scrutinized, first from the standpoint of
validity, and then from that of usefulness of application. It is the
responsibility of command to ensure that these conditions are met
before doctrine is pronounced.
Military doctrine, in its broad sense, is a digest of the accepted
beliefs of the military profession. In a narrower sense a military
doctrine may be confined to the views of a single commander on a
specific subject. The object of military doctrine, however, is always
to furnish a basis for mutual understanding to the end that prompt and
harmonious action by subordinate commanders may ensue without the
necessity for referring every problem to superior authority before
taking action (page 15). Doctrine thus provides a basis for action in
possible situations when, for whatever reason, precise instructions
have not been issued.
The term "doctrine" is inappropriate as a description of the content
of orders or instructions prescribing specific methods of action for a
particular tactical operation in a situation existent or assumed under
circumstances of the moment. The precise instructions thus issued,
though they may be the result of doctrine, and may themselves
constitute a basis for development of doctrine, are manifestly of the
nature of something ordered rather than presented as authoritative
opinion.
In the broad field of the conduct of war, with its diversified
demands, a common viewpoint as to the application of fundamentals is
an essential to unity of effort. If the members of the military
profession have this common viewpoint, their reasoned beliefs as to
the best general methods of waging a particular war may be expected
more nearly to approach unanimity. The attainment of unity of effort
therefore calls for an understanding of fundamentals (page i), a basic
indoctrination which is not only sound but also common to all
commanders of the chain of command.
Wars come and go. Their effects are painful, but when their wounds are
healed mankind is prone to forget and to hope, even to assume, that
peace will henceforth be unbroken. Psychological and economic forces
then not infrequently impel the State to subordinate the national
defense in favor of other interests. During such periods the burdens
of command are enlarged. Its responsibility is not lessened, but the
means for effective discharge thereof are withheld.
The effective conduct of war thus requires that understanding exist
(see pages 9 and 10) between the civil representatives of the State
and the leaders of the armed forces in the coordination of policy with
the preparation and the use of power to enforce it. Of the leaders of
the armed forces, as a whole or in combinations, such conduct of war
demands the expression of the highest of human qualities, coupled with
intimate knowledge of fundamentals, an appreciation of the capacities
and limitations of the technique, and the ability to fit the
practical details into the general plan in their true relation
thereto.
The need for these qualities is manifestly not restricted to the hour
of supreme test, when the weapon of the State, the armed forces, is
wielded with hostile purpose. The forging of the weapon, and its
adequate preparation for use, are not matters susceptible of deferment
until the crucial hour. The exacting requirements of war are
essentially such as to preclude the readiness of the requisite
intricate instrument and its skillful use without previous studied
effort during peace.
It follows that where the peacetime effort of the armed forces is
directed toward the attainment of a war time objective of a specific,
rather than of a vaguely general character, and the necessary
components of fighting strength are provided accordingly, the
readiness of the instrument is more likely to be adequate, and the
application of power more likely to be successful. History records, as
facts, that certain States have given their armed forces great
stimulus by early clear definition of policy while, in other cases,
failures and disappointments have resulted from a lack thereof.
Military problems are not confined to those presented after war is
begun.
Mental power (see pages 8 and 9), which includes the ability to solve
military problems in peace and in war and to arrive at sound
decisions, is a recognized essential component of fighting strength
because it is the source of professional judgment. The development of
such ability in those who may be charged with the successful conduct
of war (page 4) may not safely be postponed.
CHAPTER II
MENTAL PROCESSES AND HUMAN TENDENCIES
The discussion in Chapter II deals, first, with the natural
mental processes employed by the normal mature human being
before taking deliberate action.
With the necessity for logical thought thus established, there
arises a need for valid statements of cause and effect, i.e.,
of relationships resulting from the operation of natural laws,
for use as reliable rules of action. The discussion of this
subject explains the dangers inherent in the use of faulty
rules, emphasizes the role played by the various factors
applicable in particular cases, and describes the method of
formulating reliable rules, i.e., principles.
All living beings and their surroundings are understood, on the basis
of informed authority, to be governed in their characteristic
activities by natural law (page 11). The natural forces inherent in
living things and in their environment are continually reacting upon
each other, either maintaining the existing condition or creating a
new one, each of which is a situation or state of affairs. There is
thus always a relationship (page 3) existing between such natural
forces and the resultant condition which they produce. The natural
forces are causes; the resultant conditions are effects.
It is a recognized natural phenomenon that every effect is the result
of a certain cause, or of a combination of causes, and that each
effect is itself, in turn, the cause of additional effects. Action and
reaction are the basis of natural law. Cause and effect, the latter
being the cause of further effects, follow each other in ceaseless
succession in the world of human affairs.
Except by putting proper natural causes into action, it is impossible
to produce the effect desired. It follows that specific knowledge of
causes is necessary for the planned production of specific effects.
Toward the accumulation of such knowledge the methods of science
(pages 1 and 2) are constantly directed.
The uncertainties of war are largely the outgrowth of the fact that
the minds of men are pitted against one other. Because of this, a
knowledge of the manner in which the human mind seeks its way out of
difficulties is a great military asset. Consideration is next given,
therefore, to the natural mental processes employed (page 11) and to
certain human tendencies which have been known to militate against
their successful employment.
The mental processes employed by the normal mature human being before
taking deliberate action, or in making studied provision for possible
future action, are natural procedures, in that they employ the
intellectual powers bestowed by nature, without artificial
modification or embellishment.
When the individual concerned has a background of adequate knowledge
and experience, his ability to solve problems is limited only by his
native intellectual endowment. That he falls short does not
necessarily indicate, however, that the limit of native endowment has
been reached. It happens frequently that latent powers have not been
cultivated, or have not been utilized.
A problem is, by definition, a perplexing question. In any human
activity, a problem appears when a perplexity arises as to a way out
of a difficulty inherent in a situation. The question involved then
is, what is a way, more especially the best way, out of the seeming
difficulty?
To determine the best way out of the difficulty, i.e., the best
solution of the problem, involves:
(1) The establishment of the proper basis for the
solution of the problem,
(2) The actual solution of the problem through the
employment of the reasoning power in the consideration of
various possible solutions and the selection of the best
solution, and
(3) The conclusion, i.e., the decision, embodying the best
solution.
Considered in greater detail, the process has its inception in a
combination of circumstances, existent or assumed, which, constitutes
a situation. No problem will result however, unless the situation
involves an apparent difficulty. Even in such a case, a problem will
result only if such involvement exists and gives rise to a perplexity
as to a way, more especially as to the best way, out of the seeming
difficulty.
The problem will require solution only when accompanied by an
incentive which demands a changed situation or resistance against a
threatened change. A recognition of the incentive thus necessarily
involves realization of a desire or need to maintain the existing
situation or to change it into a new one.
Such realization may come on the initiative of the person confronted
with the situation, or because he has received instructions from
someone in authority. In either case, the effect so indicated is the
outcome of a desire for change or for resisting change, and may
therefore be regarded properly as an effect desired (page 19).
As so far outlined, therefore, the establishment of the correct basis
for the solution of the problem involves (1) a grasp of the salient
features of the situation, (2) a recognition of the incentive, and (3)
an appreciation of the effect desired.
The "appropriate" effect desired will necessarily be suitable to the
further effects (page 19) which are inherent in the situation. An
effect to be attained is accepted as appropriate when, after due
examination, its relationship with the further effects involved, in
all their pertinent implications, has been found to be in accordance
with the dictates of sound judgment.
The establishment of the basis for the solution of the problem will
also require an understanding of the resources involved, as influenced
by the conditions obtaining, for the maintenance of the existing
situation or for the creation of a new one.
The resources available, as influenced by the conditions obtaining,
are correctly considered on a relative basis as compared to those of
any persons who may oppose the effort.
With the basis for the solution of the problem established in this
manner, the actual solution involves the consideration of one or more
plans, i.e., proposed methods of procedure, and the selection of the
one considered to be the best.
The person concerned, taking cognizance of the present condition,
i.e., the existing situation, first considers whether this situation,
if maintained, will be suitable to the appropriate effect desired.
Then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates one or
more images of future conditions, i.e., mental pictures of new
situations, which will also be suitable to this end. The maintenance
of the existing situation, or the creation of a new one, will in each
case involve a plan.
Necessarily, each such plan includes provision for (1) an effect to be
produced by the person solving the problem, which effect will be the
maintenance of the existing situation or the creation of a new one as
visualized by himself, and (2) the action required to produce this
effect and so to attain the appropriate effect desired, already
established as an essential part of the basis of his problem.
After systematic examination of such plans, those retained for further
consideration can be subjected to a comparison as to their relative
merits.
The best plan, selected accordingly, is then incorporated into a
decision as to the procedure to be adopted.
This decision is then available as a general plan, or may be developed
into one, to serve as a basis if necessary for a more detailed plan
for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired.
Later development, herein, of the details of this procedure will
disclose many ramifications. The treatment, so far, points to the fact
that the best method of reaching sound decision is through systematic
thought which employs logic, i.e., sound reasoning, as its machinery.
The Necessity for Logical Thought. Logical thought separates the
rational from the irrational. Its use avoids the wastefulness of the
trial-and-error method. By its insistent employment, dormant powers of
reasoning are awakened, and the danger that attends instinctive,
spontaneous, impulsive, or emotional acceptance of conclusions (page
9) is lessened. The evil effects of an inclination to dodge the issue
or of a disinclination to face the facts are thus also avoided. The
fallacy of employing the reasoning power to justify conclusions
already reached, whether on the basis of tradition or habit, or
because of the bias or bent of a school of thought, or because of the
tendency of human nature to accept plausible suggestions, is also made
apparent. Through the deliberate practice of testing and weighing, the
faculty of arriving swiftly at accurate decisions is strengthened and
is brought more quickly into play when time is a matter of immediate
concern.
Principles in their Relation to Logical Thought. Because of the
necessity for the exercise of judgment (page 3) in the systematic
arrangement of thought, the relationship between cause and effect, as
expressed in principles, is of great assistance in applying logical
processes to the problems of human life.
A principle establishes a correct relation between cause and effect.
The word, derived from the Latin "principium", meaning a foundation,
beginning, source, origin, or cause, has, because a cause implies an
effect, acquired in correct usage the significance of a true statement
of relationship between cause and effect. A principle, so formulated,
is a natural law (page 19) because it expresses a fact of nature; it
thus becomes a reliable rule of action and may be confidently adopted
as a governing law of conduct. If basic in its field, such a rule or
law becomes a general or fundamental principle with respect thereto;
each such basic truth may be the basis for the determination of many
corollary or subordinate principles dealing with the details of the
particular subject.
The formulation of a principle, therefore, requires the determination
of the causes that generate a particular effect (or effects), and the
accurate expression of the resultant relationship. Such expression
frequently takes the form of a proportion. In the mathematical
sciences the proportion may represent a precise balance; its statement
may be an exact formula. In other sciences, a definite relationship
between cause and effect has likewise been established in many cases,
though not always with mathematical precision. Comparable exactitude
has not been attained, in some cases, because the field has not been
so thoroughly explored; moreover, greater difficulty is experienced,
at times, in isolating the cause, or causes. The balance represented
by such equations, therefore, is based on quantities whose weights
vary within wide ranges. (See page 3.)
Human conduct does not lend itself to analysis as readily as do
mathematical and physical phenomena. The advance in the psychological
and sociological sciences is not so marked as in the physical, and the
actions and reactions of the mind of man have not yet proved to be
susceptible of reduction to exact formulae. Nevertheless, man, in his
intuitive search for valid guides for his own action, has been able,
with the advance of time, greatly to improve his own lot through the
medium of the scientific approach to human problems.
The insistent search of the human mind for reliable rules of action is
a recognized natural phenomenon. As understood on the basis of expert
investigation of the subject, this trait results from the recognition,
conscious or otherwise, by countless generations of mankind, of the
relationships between cause and effect as evidenced in the workings of
the laws of nature (page 22). A logical outcome, therefore, of
experience, this instinctive demand of the mind constitutes a force
which defies opposition. Properly utilized, this force affords a
powerful and natural aid in the solution of problems.
Inasmuch as a valid rule, or principle, is of great assistance in
arriving at sound decisions and in formulating effective plans (see
page 22), this demand for reliable guides is logical, as well as
natural. In any event, the demand for such guidance, if not met by
provision for reliable rules of action, may result in the adoption of
faulty rules, with frequent unfortunate consequences.
The formulation of principles, already referred to in this connection,
constitutes in itself a recognized problem (see also page 27) of great
difficulty; for it is a human failing to avoid the mental effort
involved in thinking through such a problem, and to rely on rules
whose plausibility and seeming simplicity are frequently a measure of
their incompleteness and inaccuracy.
Since the earliest days, man has attempted to formulate the
relationships between causes and effects without, however, always
possessing the specific knowledge essential to accuracy. Pithy
statements have always had great appeal to man, as evidenced by the
existence of proverbs, maxims, and adages preserved from times of
great antiquity. Frequently, however, such statements are not
expressive of the truth. Sometimes, again, they state facts, without,
nevertheless, expressing the whole truth.
Only when the relationship between cause and effect has been
demonstrated to be always true can the trained, inquiring mind receive
its statement as a valid guide, acceptable as a principle in the light
of the knowledge of the day.
To rely upon rules of action which do not express the whole truth is
to court the danger of encountering exceptions which may entail
serious consequences. The value of those rules known to be
inexpressive of the whole truth lies in the fact that they may invite
attention to circumstances which are sometimes encountered, or may
suggest methods of action which are sometimes appropriate. Danger lies
in the fact that such rules may fail to give proper emphasis to other
circumstances or other methods which are encountered or are more
appropriate in other cases.
Such a rule may fail to consider the entire problem. Its use,
therefore, implies the necessity of recognizing cases to which it is
not applicable. This may frequently be difficult in the active
operations of war, when nervous strain and the urgency of events are
handicaps to quick and accurate thinking (see page 22).
To express the whole truth, a rule of action calls to attention all
circumstances, or causes, which may ever influence the result. The
saying that "the exception proves the rule" is properly interpreted
only in the older sense that an exception "tests" the rule, indicating
by the mere fact of exception that the rule is to such extent
incomplete.
Subject to variations of phraseology, the old adage "circumstances
alter cases" is the sole reliable and fundamental rule of action. A
corresponding maxim of the military profession, "It depends on the
situation", has its root in recognition of the same fact, i.e., that
the action taken in any situation depends, properly, on the
circumstances of the case, and that the relationship between cause and
effect (page 22) is always the governing consideration. The principles
deduced hereafter (Chapter III) have these irrefutable findings as
their foundation.
Factors. A situation is by definition (page 20) a combination of
circumstances, which are the effects of certain causes. To these
causes, the term "factors", long in use in the military profession, is
customarily applied in many other activities. Through their influence
as causes, these factors operate to produce, as their effects, the
circumstances which, in combination, constitute the situation. A
combination of factors, therefore, gives to each situation its
distinctive character, differentiating it from other situations.
To maintain an existing situation, it is necessary to preserve, in
total effect, the influence of factors already present, or to
introduce new factors to offset the influence of any which tend to
cause a change. To change the situation, it is necessary to introduce
factors which will exert the desired influence; or, change may be
effected by altering the influence of factors already present. To say,
therefore, that "It depends on the situation", as in the maxim cited
(above), is to state that under all circumstances, the proper action
depends on, or is determined by, the influence of the factors
involved. Any valid rule, or principle, will accordingly take into
account the factors applicable to the case.
The application of any rule will similarly take into account the
influence of the particular factors involved. The danger of the
application of such factors to all circumstances, without due
circumspection as to their value in the existing situation, lies in
the fact that, in any particular combination of circumstances, they do
not necessarily carry equal weight.
If this view be accepted, it follows that in many situations certain
factors may, after mature deliberation, be rejected, or relegated to a
relatively inferior status, without detracting from their potential
value as fundamental considerations (page 1) in all situations.
Value and Limitations of Lists of Principles of War. The human
preference for catchwords has, by many writers on the science and art
of war, been extended to the attempted condensation of a principle or
of several principles into a single all-inclusive word or phrase. As
a result, varying lists of abstract nouns and phrases have been
advanced to constitute epitomes of the principles of war. Subject to
minor differences in number and in designation, the list most
frequently encountered comprises The Objective, Superiority, The
Offensive, Economy of Force, Movement, Cooperation, Surprise,
Security, and Simplicity.
To rely on a list of this nature, as a condensation of the
fundamentals of war, has been known to cause confusion and to result
in failure to recognize the principles which are intended to be
brought to mind.
For example, misunderstanding has resulted from the designation of the
single word, surprise, as a "principle of war". On the one hand, it
has been denied that surprise embodies a principle, the reason being
advanced that it is neither always necessary, nor feasible, nor even
desirable to attempt to obtain surprise. On the other hand, the
acceptance of the word surprise (see page 73), as itself expressing a
universal truth (which it of course does not except by inference), has
been known to result in the incorrect belief that surprise is always
essential to success. Action based on such a viewpoint is the
equivalent of applying general treatment to specific cases, regardless
of circumstances.
Thus there have resulted distortions of the simple fact that a
relationship exists between the employment of the unexpected, and the
creation of a disadvantage which will hamper an opponent. The correct
formulation of a principle, or of several principles, governing the
employment of surprise, will result in a definite statement that its
appropriate employment is dependent upon the various factors (page 25)
that make up the situation, the influence of each of which requires
evaluation in each separate situation.
Analysis, in like manner, of the so-called "principle of the
objective" as a "principle of war" will show that the objective of a
military force is, in itself, no more a principle of war than the
direction of a physical force is, in itself, a principle of mechanics.
Both concepts, however, involve certain matters of fact which can best
be explained by principles. Such principles take note of the factors
pertaining to the subjects, and indicate the underlying relationships
in a manner to be later shown herein.
Certainly the preceding list (above) of isolated expressions includes
no item which, in the abstract, may not properly be considered as
possibly vital from the strategical and tactical standpoints. But
that these expressions are always vital, and that there are no other
considerations, can scarcely be accepted as final. Even if this
objection could be removed by the inclusion of all factors well known
to be vital, the fact would still remain that these expressions,
standing alone, fail to satisfy the real need; i.e., they fail to
indicate any practical application of the concepts which they are
intended to imply. They do no more than provide a useful point of
origin for further inquiry. When understood on this basis, they
possess a certain value.
* * * * *
The concept underlying the application of principles is correct with
respect to military problems, as well as for all others (page 22).
This purpose, however, cannot be served by a mere collection of nouns
or noun-phrases. Such expressions make no statements of cause and
effect. Their meaning is therefore left to inference and to the
idiosyncrasy of individual interpretation. The formulation, moreover,
of useful principles cannot be satisfactorily established by the
more-or-less random selection of matters, however important,
pertaining to the subject at hand. What is required is a systematic
analysis of the essentials of the subject, with resultant emphasis on
the fundamental causes and effects whose relationships are to be
expressed.
Formulation and Use of Principles. The formulation of a principle,
referred to previously (page 24) as itself a difficult problem,
requires a citation of the factors pertaining to the subject. On the
basis of these factors as causes, the principles, when properly
formulated, also state the effects which may properly be expected.
(See page 22.)
The relationship between causes and effects, or between effects and
their causes, may be expressed in various ways. The requirement is
that the expression be one of fact and that, if the principle purport
to cover the entire subject, all of the pertinent facts (page 24) be
stated, though not necessarily all the details involved.
* * * * *
In addition to the principles of general application (Chapter III),
the later discussion herein includes numerous other principles, with
reference to matters of detail (pages 22-23). To some of these
principles the treatment invites special attention. All principles
included have been phrased with due care, to ensure conformity with
the requirements above stated. The preferred form, herein, for the
usual statement of cause and effect is through the use of phraseology
such as that certain effects "depend on" or are "dependent on" certain
causes, or that certain causes "determine" certain effects, or that
the latter "are determined by" certain causes.
From the standpoint of the exercise of judgment, it is a principle
that the due determination of effects to be produced depends on the
proper consideration of pertinent factors. Once the principles
applicable to any subject have been formulated in necessary detail,
the evaluation of the cited factors with respect to a particular
situation becomes the vital procedure as to any problem where that
subject is involved. In the course of this evaluation, corollary or
subordinate principles may be of assistance (page 22). In military
problems, however, the evaluation usually involves many factors not
susceptible of reasonably exact determination by the use of formulae
(see page 23). In such cases, experience, education, and training
afford the only secure basis for judgment which will produce reliable
conclusions. The principles, therefore, provide reliable guides by
citing the factors to be evaluated in order to arrive at desired
results, but the principles cannot replace logical thought in the
evaluation of the factors.
In formulating principles (see also page 23) as practical guides for
action, as well as in using them when formulated, failure to give
consideration to all pertinent factors may result in vitiating the
effort based on their application. Danger also lies in the fact that
any particular factor will infrequently have the same value--the same
influence on the situation--in any two problems (page 25). Therefore,
in each situation, each factor requires to be weighed in connection
with the others. The soundness of the resulting conclusion will depend
on the extent of the knowledge available (page 2) and on its useful
employment.
Summary of Fundamental Considerations. The factors (page 25) involved
in determining the nature of an effect and of the action to attain it
become fundamental considerations (page 25) when it is desired to
arrive at such a result under a particular set of circumstances.
The relationships obtaining between the desired effect and the action
to attain it, on the one hand, and the factors involved, on the other,
are best expressed in the form of principles. The next chapter is
therefore devoted to the development of basic principles applicable to
military problems.
CHAPTER III
BASIC PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO MILITARY PROBLEMS
(The Fundamental Military Principle)
On the basis of the previous discussion as to the natural
mental processes and as to principles useful in their
employment, Chapter III discusses the requirements for the
attainment of an end in human affairs.
The fundamental principle thus derived is then applied to the
needs of the military profession, so as to develop the
Fundamental Military Principle. This Principle indicates the
requirements of a correct military objective and of the action
for its attainment.
Review of Conclusions as to Principles. On the premise that all human
activities and their environment are governed by natural laws (page
22), the preceding chapter has been devoted to an analysis of the
natural mental processes employed in meeting the problems of human
life. This analysis has stressed four fundamental truths:
(1) That a valid rule, or principle, when complete, embraces
all known phenomena pertinent to the relationship
established.
(2) That the logical application of principles to particular
incidents will take account of all the factors of the
principles, and of all known conditions of the incidents.
(3) That such principles afford great assistance in arriving
at sound conclusions, and that the human mind, if without
access to such valid guides, tends to adopt faulty rules
in the effort to serve the same purpose.
(4) That rules of action, however, even though they be valid,
cannot be depended upon to replace the employment of
logical thought.
Procedure for Developing Military Principles. Logically, the next
stage in the treatment of this subject is to develop certain basic
principles applicable, more especially, to the solution of military
problems.
The development of such principles starts, on the basis already
established in this discussion, with a reference to the natural mental
processes used by the normal mature human being before taking
deliberate action (page 19). Under such circumstances, the person who
is to solve the problem has first to establish a basis for his
solution.
To arrive at this basis, which involves an understanding of the
appropriate effect desired, the person concerned requires a grasp of
the salient features of the situation, a recognition of the incentive,
and an appreciation of the effect which he has been directed to
produce or has adopted on his own initiative. To complete the basis
for his solution, he also requires an understanding of comparative
resources as influenced by the conditions obtaining at the time.
During the actual solution of the problem, the person concerned takes
cognizance first, of the existing situation, picturing it in his mind.
Then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates for
himself mental images of future situations. The pictured condition
decided upon after consideration of the pertinent factors involved, be
it the situation to be maintained or a new situation to be created,
constitutes an effect he may produce for the further attainment of the
appropriate effect desired, already established as an essential part
of the basis of his problem. (See page 25.)
With the existing situation and a new situation now clear, what action
is he to take to change the one into the other? Or, if no change is
desired, what action is he to take to maintain the existing situation?
What acts or series of acts should he decide upon, plan in detail,
inaugurate, and supervise (page 3), to attain the effect which he has
envisaged for the further attainment of the appropriate effect
desired?
The correct solution of problems therefore hinges on the requirements
involved in the effects to be produced and in the action to produce
them. If these requirements are ascertained, a principle can be
formulated as a valid guide for the solution of human problems.
Requirements for the Attainment of an End. The discussion to this
point has established the fact that an end in view, a result to be
produced, an effect desired, is very closely connected with a further
effect which the attainment of the former is intended to produce.
Human motives spring from deep-seated incentives often derived from
distant sources, so that, even when the person concerned is acting
wholly on his own initiative, he will rarely, if ever, be uninfluenced
by some further effect desired, inherent in his situation (see page
19).
An end in view, therefore, from the viewpoint of the person who is
endeavoring to visualize its accomplishment as a method for attainment
of a further aim, will necessarily achieve such further aim, or at
least contribute to its achievement. The first requirement,
accordingly, of such an end in view is that it be suitable to any
further aim, whatever that aim may be. It may be said, therefore, that
a correct end in view satisfies the requirement of suitability as to
the appropriate effect desired, whatever this further effect may be.
Important as suitability is, however, a reasonably responsible person
will recognize that this consideration, alone, does not satisfy all
requirements. An end in view remains a mere desire, without
possibility of attainment, unless such a result is practicable of
accomplishment. A correct end in view, therefore, satisfies also the
requirements of feasibility.
Consideration of feasibility calls for a survey of comparative
resources (page 30). Such a survey will cover the extent of the
resources (means available) of those making the effort, as compared to
the resources (means opposed) of those who may oppose it. Full account
is also to be taken, as to feasibility, of the natural and artificial
conditions which the effort will encounter before it can produce the
contemplated result. The responsible person will ask himself where the
effort is most likely to be successful, and what obstacles, in
addition to those represented by opponents, he will be required to
surmount. The effects of such conditions may alter the ratio otherwise
presented by comparative resources.
Consideration of the characteristics of the field of action may thus
disclose features which will greatly influence the possibility of
accomplishment, as well as the character of the effort to be made,
from the standpoint of feasibility. The second requirement, therefore,
is that of feasibility with respect to comparative resources, i.e.,
the means available and opposed, as influenced by the physical
conditions prevailing in the field of action.
Although believed to be both suitable and feasible, the requirements
for the attainment of an end are not yet completely established. There
is still required a reckoning of a profit-and-loss account of the
whole undertaking, to estimate whether it will be advantageous. What
will be the cost, and what will be the gain? Is the effort worth
while? Or should one be content with venturing less and gaining less?
What is the bearing on possible future action? The consequences as to
costs, always important considerations in dealing with human problems,
are frequently the paramount determinant. The third requirement,
therefore, is acceptability with respect to the consequences as to
costs.
These requirements invite attention to the factors, already
discussed, whose influence (see page 25 as to factors) determines the
character of the effort required to attain an end.
The Fundamental Principle for the Attainment of an End. Here, then,
are the broad fundamental considerations which affect the solution of
every human problem. In a narrower field, the considerations may fall
within more specific limits, but a principle sufficiently broad to be
applicable to all cases appears to comprehend those inclusive factors
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.
A review of these paragraphs will disclose that the factors pertaining
to the several requirements may be so grouped as to constitute a
single fundamental principle governing the attainment of an end in
human affairs,--as follows:
In any human activity, the attainment of a correct end in view depends
on fulfillment of the requirements of
Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor
of the appropriate effect desired,
Feasibility of the effort required, on the basis of
comparative resources, as determined by the means
available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the
physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and
Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs,
which factors are in turn dependent on each other.
The Interdependency of the Factors. As previously observed (page 28),
the factors cited in the foregoing principle are themselves
interdependent. This fact results from working of natural law (page
22), for it is a recognized phenomenon that every effect is the result
of certain causes, and that every effect is itself, in turn, the cause
of further effects (page 19).
Accordingly, when the evaluation of any factor is under consideration,
its value as an unknown quantity can be determined to the extent that
the values of the other pertinent factors are known. (See page 23, as
to the discussion of the quantities in an equation.) The significance
of each, in any situation, is therefore determined by the influence of
the other factors. The relationships existing among them can best be
expressed in the terms of four corollary principles (page 27), next to
be discussed.
* * * * *
For example, questions frequently arise as to what is the appropriate
effect to be desired in a particular situation. Whether a desired
effect is feasible of attainment, and whether certain consequences,
though undesirable, will be acceptable, in view of the gains, can be
determined by evaluation of the means available and opposed,
influenced by the physical conditions prevailing in the field of
action, and of the consequences as to costs. If a desired effect is
thereby found to be not feasible of attainment, or to be unacceptable
as to consequences, deferment of such effort is indicated. A proper
solution in such case would adopt some lesser effect, in conformity
with the further aim, feasible of accomplishment, and acceptable as to
its consequences.
If (with respect to the further aim, mentioned above) the person
concerned is acting under the instructions of another, there will
frequently be injected into the equation, in addition to the factors
already noted, a further effect desired, indicated by higher
authority. Such an indication will often operate to narrow the limits
of the problem. This is true even if the person concerned is acting
wholly on his own initiative and responsibility (pages 29-30).
These considerations lead to the formulation of what may be called the
corollary principle for determination of the appropriate effect to be
desired in human affairs,--as follows:
In any human activity, the appropriate effect to be desired
(i.e., an end in view, a result to be accomplished) depends on
fulfillment of the requirements of
Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor of
the further effect desired (if such further effect is
indicated),
Feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the
basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the
field of action, and
Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.
* * * * *
If, to take a further example, the known factors include the
appropriate effect desired, the means opposed, the physical conditions
prevailing in the field of action, and the consequences as to costs,
the only unknown remains the means available. The question then is,
what means need be made available for the accomplishment of the
contemplated effort? The answer to this question may be found in the
application of what may be called the principle for the determination
of the proper means to be made available in human affairs,--as
follows:
In any human activity, the proper means to be made available
depend on fulfillment of the requirements of
Suitability of the means (in kind and amount) to accomplish
the end in view, as determined by the factor of the
appropriate effect desired,
Feasibility of the effort to make such means available on the
basis of comparative resources as determined by the factor
of the means opposed, influenced by the factor of the
physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and
Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.
* * * * *
The influence of physical conditions in the field of action may be
illustrated by any case where ends otherwise feasible of attainment
cannot be achieved without effecting changes in such conditions. The
resolution of the uncertainty then requires study to determine what
suitable changes can be made. Changes for such a purpose may take
various forms, such as the construction of physical features in the
area involved, or the destruction of such features already existing;
or, again, both methods may be employed. Examples of such changes have
existed and still exist in profusion, some of them, military and
non-military, being on such a scale as radically to alter the previous
status with respect to entire nations. The question as to what changes
ought to be effected in the prevailing physical conditions, in order
to attain a certain objective, can be answered by the application of
what may be called the principle for the determination of the proper
physical conditions to be established in the field of action,--as
follows:
In any human activity, the proper physical conditions to be
established in the field of action depend on fulfillment of the
requirements of
Suitability of such conditions to the end in view, as
determined by the factor of the appropriate effect
desired,
Feasibility of effort to establish such conditions, on the
basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
the factor of the physical conditions existing in the
field of action, and
Acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as
determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs.
* * * * *
The factor of consequences as to costs also calls for special notice.
The influence of this factor frequently justifies abandonment of
suitable ends in view, even though their attainment has been
determined to be feasible, because the loss involved would out-weigh
the gain. Immediate success may be attained at such cost as to prevent
the attainment of larger ends (see the discussion, pages 9 and 10, of
the relationship of strategy and tactics).
On the other hand, the circumstances of the case may well justify
loss, however great, because the alternative is unacceptable, even
though the consequences involve complete destruction. Moreover, the
need for swift and aggressive action in many activities (notably in
war), for resolute prosecution of the plan, for timely seizure of
opportunity, and for acceptance of justified risks, requires that
consideration of consequences as to costs never be emphasized beyond
its proper weight. To determine such proper weight calls, frequently,
for judgment of the highest order, and is, in the military profession,
a direct responsibility of command. This responsibility can be
discharged by the application of what may be called the corollary
principle for the determination of acceptable consequences as to
costs,--as follows:
In any human activity, the acceptable consequences as to costs
depend on fulfillment of the requirements of
Suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor
of the appropriate effect desired, and
Feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the
basis of comparative resources, as determined by the
factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by
the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the
field of action.
Special Nature of War as a Human Activity. A principle found, by
careful analysis, to be governing as to human activities of any
nature, is also applicable to the problems of war. This is true
because war is a human activity, differing from other human activities
only in the specialized character of the factors that enter.
The effect desired in war has a character distinctly military and,
ultimately, through the reestablishment of a favorable peace, a
political character (see pages 7-9).
The means available (or opposed) in war are the human and material
components of fighting strength (page 8). The physical conditions
prevailing in the field of action are, in war, the characteristics of
the theater of operations. Fighting strength is thus derived from the
means available (or opposed) in war, as influenced by the
characteristics of the theater. Relative fighting strength
(comparative resources in war) involves a comparison of means
available with means opposed, due account being taken of the influence
exerted on both by the characteristics of the theater. In war,
relatively large masses of human beings oppose each other with hostile
intent, while the means available and opposed, and the physical
conditions established by the operations of war in the theater of
action, tend more and more to acquire a highly specialized character.
The consequences as to costs, in war, also assume a special
significance, inasmuch as they may materially influence the
development of entire nations or of the world situation.
Factors as Universal Determinants in War. Tabulated for convenient
reference and expressed in terms in general use in the military
profession, the factors governing the attainment of an end in war are
therefore:
(a) The Nature of the appropriate Effect Desired,
(b) The Means Available and Opposed,
(c) The Characteristics of the Theater of Operations,
and
(d) The Consequences as to Costs.
These factors, thus expressed in abstract form, are the universal
determinants of the nature of the objective and of the character of
the action to attain it. Their further resolution into factors of more
concrete form is indicated hereinafter (see Chapter VI, in the
discussion of Section II of the Estimate Form).
The Objective in War. The objective (page 3), a term long in use in
the military profession in connection with the "objective point", has
acquired by extension the significance of something more than the
physical object of action. The latter, as explained later (page 37),
is properly denominated the "physical objective".
In the abstract, an "objective", in present general usage as well as
in the military vocabulary, is an end toward which action is being
directed, or is to be directed; in brief, an end in view, a result to
be attained, an effect desired (pages 19 and 30). An objective is an
effect to be produced for the attainment of a further objective,
itself a further effect. As already demonstrated (page 30 and
following), the attainment of an end, in any human activity, requires
action to maintain the existing situation or to create a new one.
Therefore, in war, a special form of human activity, the attainment of
an objective requires that action be actual imposition of an outside
agency. The attainment of a correct military objective (discussed in
detail in Chapter IV) requires, accordingly, the creation or
maintenance of a favorable military situation.
An objective, in the sense of an end in view, a result to be
accomplished, is manifestly an objective in mind. As already indicated
(page 36), however, military usage also assigns to the term
"objective" an additional meaning, a meaning exclusively concrete.
Results in war are attained through the actual or threatened use of
physical force (pages 8 and 9) directed with relation to something
tangible, such as, for example, some physical element of the enemy's
strength.
Action as to this tangible feature (e.g., if it is destroyed,
occupied, neutralized, or otherwise dealt with) will result in, or
further the attainment of, an effect desired. Thus the physical
objective occupies a sharply defined position in warfare, in that it
establishes the physical basis of the objective and indicates the
geographical direction of the effort. Since the physical objective is
always an object--be it only a geographical point--, it is more than a
mental concept; it is an objective in space.
For example, the objective being "the destruction of the enemy
battleship", the physical objective is the enemy battleship.
As used herein the expression "the objective" or "the military
objective" (page 55), when unqualified, ordinarily indicates the
mental objective. The term is properly applicable to a physical
objective when the context makes the meaning clear. Ordinarily, and
always when clarity demands, a tangible focus of effort is herein
denoted a "physical objective".
Military Operations. Appropriate action to create or maintain a
situation will take the form of a military operation. An operation, in
the basic sense, is merely an act, or a series of acts. The word is
derived from the Latin opus, meaning "work". A military operation is
therefore an act, or a series of included acts (i.e., work), of a
military character. A military operation may consist of an entire
campaign, or even of several such, constituting a clearly defined
major stage in a war; or such an operation may consist of portions
thereof. The term is also applied, properly, to entire series of acts
on the part of successive commands, from the higher to the lower
echelons, to and including distinctive military actions which relate
to the merest routine.
A plan of action to attain a military objective is, therefore, a plan
of military operations, including supporting measures (see page 167),
considered or adopted as a method of procedure for the achievement of
that end (see page 21). Such a plan or method of procedure requires
action with relation to correct physical objectives in such a manner
as to attain the objective, i.e., to maintain the existing situation
or to create a new one, conformably to the appropriate effect desired.
A plan of military operations may be regarded as reasonably effective
if the direction or geographical trend of the effort provides for
proper action with relation to the correct physical objectives; if the
force concerned utilizes positions advantageous in relation to those
of the opponent; if the fighting strength is so apportioned as to
provide for requisite power at points likely to be decisive, without
undue weakening at other points; and if future actions, in seeking the
effect desired, will be unhampered by obstacles with which the force
cannot cope. These essentials apply to all of the various combinations
of circumstances, i.e., situations (page 20), which may materialize as
action progresses and the original situation unfolds.
A properly conceived plan of military operations therefore makes
provision, necessarily, for certain salient features of such
operations, as follows:
The physical objectives involved,
The relative positions utilized,
The apportionment of fighting strength, and
The provisions for freedom of action.
As will later be observed (Chapters VII and VIII), the content of
plans for naval operations may be classified under the headings listed
above. In such plans the salient features noted will be observed,
also, to occur, subject to certain exceptions, in the sequence above
indicated. Similar observations are applicable as to plans
systematically prepared for direction of forces operating on land and
in the air.
A military operation which is progressing favorably, whatever the
medium of action, may therefore be justifiably stated to include
provision for the following salient features:
Effective action with relation to correct physical
objectives,
Projection of military action from advantageous relative
positions,
Proper apportionment of fighting strength, and
Ensurance of adequate freedom of action.
Since, at any moment of its successful prosecution, a military
operation presents, inherently (page 38), a favorable military
situation, the salient features of such an operation constitute, also,
the salient features of a favorable military situation. Manifestly,
any deficiencies in these respects will indicate that in certain
particulars the situation is not entirely favorable, if not actually
unfavorable.
Determination of the Salient Features. Because the form which a
military operation takes, in the effort to attain a military
objective, depends upon the factors which are the universal
determinants (page 36) of the character of the effort, the salient
features of such an operation are determined by the same factors. A
valid guide as to determination of the salient features of a favorably
progressing military operation, seen (above) to be identical with
those of a favorable military situation, may therefore be formulated
as a principle for determining these salient features, as follows:
The determination of
} { Suitability, as determined by
} { the factor of the appropriate
Correct physical objectives, } { effect desired.
} {
Advantageous relative } { Feasibility, by reason of
positions, } { relative fighting strength,
} depends { as determined by the factors
Proper apportionment of } on { of the means available and
fighting strength, and } their { opposed, influenced by the
} { factor of the characteristics
Provision for adequate } { of the theater of operations,
freedom of action } { and
} {
} { Acceptability, as determined
} { by the factor of the
} { consequences as to costs.
Since the particular character of each salient feature of a situation,
or of an operation, is determined by the influence, exerted by the
identical factors (as noted), there is a resulting interdependency,
important though indirect, among the several features. This
interdependency is explained hereafter. (Chapter IV).
The Fundamental Military Principle. The Fundamental Principle for the
Attainment of an End in human affairs (page 32) has invited
attention to the factors, pertinent to suitability, feasibility, and
acceptability, seen to be applicable, as well, to any military effort
(page 35). As also noted, a military effort will necessarily consist
of military operations, whose salient features depend upon the same
factors. The factors, in turn, have been observed (page 32 and
following) to be interdependent.
[Illustration: THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE (diagram)]
These considerations lead to the formulation of a derivative of the
Fundamental Principle for the Attainment of an End in human affairs,
in the form of
The Fundamental Military Principle
The attainment of a military objective (the creation or maintenance of
a favorable military situation) depends on effective operations
involving the salient features of
Effective action with relation to correct physical
objectives,
Projection of action from advantageous relative positions,
Proper apportionment of fighting strength, and
Ensurance of adequate freedom of action,
each fulfilling the requirements of
Suitability, as determined by the factor of the appropriate
effect desired,
Feasibility, by reason of relative fighting strength as
determined by the factors of the means available and
opposed, influenced by the factor of the characteristics
of the theater of operations, and
Acceptability, as determined by the factor of the consequences
as to costs,
which factors are in turn dependent on each other.
* * * * *
The Fundamental Military Principle, as a valid guide, encounters no
exception in the field it purports to cover. As a practical guide, it
brings to attention, in broad outline, all the causes and effects
which are involved. The principle affords a proper basis for the
formulation of corollary principles for the determination, in any
particular situation, of any element noted therein whose value may be
unknown but may be ascertained by reference to other pertinent
elements which constitute known quantities. (See pages 21-27.)
As later explained (Chapter IV), the two major applications of the
Principle relate to the selection of a correct military objective and
to the determination of effective military operations to attain an
objective (see page 28).
A corollary Principle of the Correct Military Objective will
accordingly state that the selection of a correct military objective
depends on the due consideration of the salient features and the
factors cited in the Fundamental Military Principle. The application
of this corollary is discussed in Section II of Chapter IV.
A corollary Principle of Effective Military Operations will similarly
state that the determination of effective operations for the
attainment of a military objective depends on the due consideration of
the salient features and the factors cited in the Fundamental Military
Principle. The application of this corollary is explained in Section
III of Chapter IV.
These principles can be used as a basis for formulating the plans of
the commander concerned, and, accordingly, for determining his own
action. They can also be used as a basis for rendering sound opinions,
when requested of the commander, as to plans and actions contemplated
by higher authority. The principles are in like manner applicable for
purposes of historical study involving analysis of operations of the
past.
CHAPTER IV
THE APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE
(Objectives--Their Selection and Attainment)
Section I of Chapter IV discusses the major components of all
military problems.
Section II deals with the fundamental considerations having to
do, generally, with the first of these components, i.e., the
selection of correct military objectives; the application,
more specifically, is reserved for Chapter VI.
Section III deals with the fundamental considerations having
to do, generally, with the second of the two major components,
i.e., the determination of effective military operations for
the attainment of such objectives; the application, more
specifically, is reserved for Chapter VII.
The selection of objectives has a secondary application, also,
to the discussion in Chapter VII, while the determination of
operations has a similar application to that in Chapter VI.
Both subjects, i.e., as to objectives and as to operations,
have application also to Chapter IX.
The chart on page ii shows these relationships.
I. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF MILITARY PROBLEMS.
In the two preceding chapters, the study of the natural mental
processes has brought to notice that, to meet the requirements of
suitability, feasibility, and acceptability as to consequences in the
proper solution of a military problem, it is first necessary to
establish a sound basis for that solution. Such a basis involves an
understanding of the appropriate effect desired and of relative
fighting strength (see pages 29 and 30).
In each situation an understanding of the appropriate effect desired,
from the standpoint of suitability, requires:
(1) A grasp of the salient features of the situation,
favorable and unfavorable, including the perplexity inherent
therein,
(2) A recognition of the incentive to solution of the
problem, i.e., a realization of the desire or need for
attaining a certain effect, an objective (page 36) which will
be the maintenance or creation of a favorable military
situation, and
(3) An appreciation of this objective in its relationship
to the next further result to be accomplished by its
attainment.
An understanding of relative fighting strength involves consideration
of the means available and opposed, as influenced by the
characteristics of the theater of operations. With this understanding
there is provided a sound basis for the determination, later, of the
feasibility of courses of action and of their acceptability with
respect to consequences as to costs.
In the premises, the ability to understand the nature of a military
problem is dependent on the knowledge, experience, character, and
professional judgment of the commander. These qualities enable him to
grasp the significance of the salient features of the situation. The
same personal characteristics are instrumental in the recognition of
the incentive. Analysis indicates that an incentive may arise (1) by
reason of a directive issued by higher authority, or (2) from the fact
that a decision already reached by the commander has introduced
further problems, or (3) because of the demands of the situation.
However, the primary consideration in understanding the nature of the
problem is the appreciation of the objective from which the problem
originates, i.e., the just estimation or accurate evaluation of this
objective. Such consideration is primary because appreciation of this
objective involves, as necessary concomitants, a grasp of the salient
features of the existing situation (to be maintained or changed) and a
recognition of the incentive.
Correct appreciation of this objective, in its relationship to the
further effect to be produced, is thus the principal consideration in
reaching an understanding of the appropriate effect desired. It is, to
repeat, through an understanding of this factor and of the factors of
relative fighting strength that the commander establishes the basis
for the solution of his problem. (See Section I of Chapter VI, page
118).
The Solution of a Military Problem. When the commander has thus
obtained an understanding of the basis of his problem, the actual
procedure of solution is undertaken through the consideration of the
factors involved in their influence on the various plans for the
attainment of the appropriate effect desired, as thus established. The
best plan, selected and embodied in outline in the decision, can then
be further developed, if necessary, into a general plan for the
commander's force and, finally, into a detailed plan, as the solution
of the problem. (See page 22.)
The Major Components of a Military Problem. Each plan considered by
the commander will involve (page 21) two major considerations:
namely--an effect to be produced and the action required to produce
it; or, in military terms, a correct military objective (or
objectives) and effective operations for its attainment. The selection
of correct military objectives and the determination of effective
operations for their attainment are therefore the two major components
of a military problem, because they are the principal considerations
on which depends the soundness of military decision. To meet these
requirements is a prime function of command, one which demands
professional judgment of the highest order.
The major components of a military problem are of course intimately
connected, because a purposeful action, accomplished, is equivalent to
an objective, attained. Furthermore, the attainment of an objective
involves the accomplishment of effective operations.
Because of the importance of the subject, the relationship between
these two major components deserves very careful analysis. As has been
observed (page 30), the action to be taken depends, in the first
instance, on the effect to be produced. Therefore, the objective is,
as compared to the action to attain it, the paramount matter.
Moreover, there is necessarily included, in the procedure of selecting
a correct objective, a consideration as to whether the action to that
end will be feasible and as to whether the consequences involved will
be acceptable on the basis of the costs which will be exacted. If,
then, the objective has been correctly selected in any situation, this
procedure will have included, as a necessary incidental, the
determination also, in the proper detail, of the operations required
for its attainment.
Of the two major components involved in the selection of the best
plan, the primary relates, therefore, to correct objectives.
Accordingly, this consideration is most aptly expressed in terms of
the "selection" of objectives. The "determination" of necessary
operations is a proper expression of the procedure therein involved,
because this procedure, though also involving a major component of the
problem is dependent on the primary consideration of objectives.
A valid guide for practical use during the process of solving military
problems will therefore provide a basis, primarily, for the selection
of correct objectives. However, the procedure for such selection,
though requiring consideration of the action involved in attaining
objectives, will seldom call for a complete analysis of such
operations. Therefore, it is also desirable, for the solution of
military problems, to provide a valid guide for the determination of
effective operations, in detail. This guide may be used on occasions
when, the correct objective having been selected, the only remaining
problem is to work out the detailed operations involved.
The Fundamental Military Principle, developed in the preceding
chapter, has been formulated to fulfill the requirements described in
the preceding paragraph. Through the exhaustive analysis of the
elements involved, there has been provided, in the form of a single
fundamental principle, a valid guide for the selection of correct
military objectives and for the due determination of effective
operations for their attainment.
In the present chapter, the abstract application of the Principle is
discussed in terms of fundamental considerations. Section II of the
chapter deals with the selection of objectives; this subject, in more
specific terms, is later expanded in Chapter VI. Section III of the
present chapter deals with the determination of operations; this
subject, in more specific terms, is expanded in Chapter VII. The
present chapter affords a treatment applicable to military problems of
any nature. Later expansion is applicable, more especially, to naval
problems.
This arrangement of the subject matter has been adopted for two
reasons. First, discussion of fundamental considerations, thus taken
up at the present point, immediately follows the formulation of the
principle (in Chapter III). Furthermore, a fundamental treatment,
prior to Chapters VI and VII, permits maximum brevity in the
discussion, therein. The commander, having mastered the fundamentals
dealt with here, can later follow the detailed procedure with minimum
distraction due to reference to the preceding discussion.
Essential Elements Involved. As previously stated, the problems of war
differ from those of other human activities with respect, only (page
35), to the specialized character of the factors that enter.
The final outcome is dependent (page 8) on ability to isolate, occupy,
or otherwise control the territory of the enemy. The sea, though it
supplements the resources of land areas, is destitute of many
essential requirements of man, and affords no basis, alone, for the
secure development of human activities. Land is the natural habitat of
man. The sea provides routes of communication between land areas. The
air affords routes of communication over both land and sea.
These facts inject into military operations certain factors peculiar
to movement of military forces by land, sea, and air (page 60). There
are also involved the specialized demands of a technique for the
imposition of and the resistance to physical violence. In addition
there appear those factors related to the psychology of human
reactions to armed conflict.
In any situation involving opposing armed forces, the problem, as in
any human activity (page 30), is, from the standpoint of each
opponent, a matter of maintaining existing conditions or of bringing
about a change. The method employed, if the action is to be effective,
will follow lines calculated to shape the ensuing progressive changes
in circumstances toward the attainment of the end in view. The action
to be taken will be ineffective if it does not support the calculated
line of endeavor, i.e., if it is not suitable or adequate forcibly to
shape the course of events either toward the creation of a desired new
and more favorable situation, or the maintenance of the original
conditions.
The analysis of the principal components of a military problem--i.e.,
the military objectives and the military operations appropriate to the
effort for their attainment--therefore requires a study of such
objectives and operations in terms, respectively, of a favorable
military situation (page 37) and of a favorably progressing military
operation (page 38). As has been observed, the salient features of
such a situation or operation are, from the abstract viewpoint,
identical, as are also the factors which determine the character of
such features (page 39). As a covering word for such features and
factors, alike, the term "elements" appears especially suitable,
inasmuch as it properly comprises the constituent parts of any
subject, as well as the factors which may pertain thereto.
Accordingly, the analysis, following, of the procedure for selection
of correct military objectives is made in terms of the essential
elements of a favorable military situation. For like reasons, the
analysis of the procedure for determining the character of the
detailed operations required is made in terms of the essential
elements of a favorably progressing military operation. (For these
elements, see the salient features and the factors cited in the
Fundamental Military Principle, page 41.)
II. SELECTION OF CORRECT MILITARY OBJECTIVES
Nature of Military Objectives. In the previous discussion (page 36),
the military objective has been defined as the end toward which action
is being, or is to be, directed. As such it has been noted as an
objective in mind. The tangible focus of effort, the physical
objective toward which the action is directed, has been observed to be
an objective in space. The physical objective is always an object, be
it only a geographical point, while the objective, being a mental
concept, is a situation to be created or maintained.
The term "objective" requires circumspection, not only in the manner
of its expression (see page 53), but in its use. The latter is true
because the purport of the objective under consideration will vary
with the viewpoint of the echelon concerned. For instance, the proper
visualization of an objective, as an "effect desired" (page 19), calls
for a correct answer to the question, "Who desires this effect to be
produced?" (See page 4).
A variety of viewpoints is thus a natural characteristic of the chain
of command (pages 11-13), whose functioning creates what may be called
a "chain of objectives".
Necessary exceptions aside, the commander expects to receive, from his
immediate superior, an assigned objective, which that superior thus
enjoins the commander to attain. The commander, in turn, through the
use of the natural mental processes already explained, decides on an
objective, for the general effort of his own force, to attain the
objective assigned by his immediate superior.
As a subordinate, a commander to whom an objective has been assigned
is responsible to his immediate superior for its attainment. The
commander may, however, also occupy the position of an immediate
superior to one or more commanders on the next lower echelon. In such
capacity, he may assign objectives to these immediate subordinates. By
attaining such an assigned objective, each of these subordinates thus
contributes to the success of the complete effort planned by his
immediate superior, to the extent represented by his own assigned
share of the effort.
A commander can scarcely expect to receive in full the intelligent
support of his subordinate commanders, unless he makes clear to them
the character of his own planned effort. It is customary, therefore,
when assigning an objective to a subordinate, also to inform him of
the purpose which its attainment is intended to further. Stated
differently, a commander, when imposing upon an immediate subordinate
an effect which he is to produce, informs him, at the same time, of
the nature of the military result which he, the immediate superior,
has determined to bring about.
This is the part of wisdom, not merely of choice. It acquaints the
immediate subordinate with the objective of the immediate superior and
thus enables the former to comprehend wherein the attainment of his
own assigned objective is expected to contribute to the attainment of
the effect desired by his superior.
Since the attainment of the assigned objectives will represent the
consummation of the general plan of the immediate superior, the
purpose of each of these assignments is to assist in the attainment of
the objective announced, for his entire force, by the immediate
superior (see also page 12).
From the viewpoint of the subordinate, the objective thus assigned by
the immediate superior becomes the appropriate effect desired,
essential to the determination of the accomplishment which the former
is to effect by his own effort. On occasion, also, the full scope of
the appropriate effect desired may require consideration of the
objectives of higher echelons in the chain of command, so far as such
objectives may be known or deduced.
The responsibility of the immediate superior, in the matter of
ensuring that his immediate subordinates understand the purpose of
their assigned objectives, is in no respect less than that which falls
upon these subordinates in the execution of their own assignments. By
failing to provide subordinate commanders, through whatever methods,
with a knowledge not only of the details of his plan but of the
general objective which their integrated effort is calculated to
attain, the superior may actually subject his undertaking to the risk
of failure.
The decision as to the general plan (page 44) for the attainment of
his assigned objective provides the commander with an objective which
he himself has originated. With the plan for the attainment of his
general objective clearly fixed in mind, the commander may now proceed
to the selection of one or more objectives of a specific nature, the
integrated attainment of which will ensure the attainment of his
assigned objective. The instructions which he may then give,
severally, to his immediate subordinates in a detailed plan of
operations, thus indicate to the latter their assigned objectives.
(See also page 22.)
The source of the incentive (page 44) has an intimate connection with
the assigned objective. Furthermore, whatever the origin of the
incentive, the ability to select correct objectives is an essential
element in the mental equipment of the commander.
For example, if the incentive arises by reason of a directive received
from higher authority, such directive will presumably assign an
objective, specific or inferred. The commander to whom such an
objective is assigned is responsible for a correct understanding of
all the implications involved, including the relationship between the
assigned objective and the general objective of the next higher
commander, which represents the purpose of the assigned objective. On
occasion it will also be necessary for the commander to consider the
relationships involved with the further objectives of the higher
command (page 49). Again, without any suggestion of cavilling at
orders received, the commander may also find occasion to examine, with
care, the implications of his assigned objective, because of his
responsibility for taking correct action in the premises (page 15).
If the incentive arises from a decision previously made by the
commander, it follows that such decision will have embodied an
objective, selected by the commander himself.
If the incentive arises because of the demands of the situation, the
commander is responsible for recognition of the necessity for action
and for the correct selection of an appropriate objective, to be
adopted by him as a basis for his own action as if it were assigned by
higher authority.
An assigned objective having been established with respect to the
basis for his problem, the commander is always responsible for the
correct selection of an objective to serve as the end in view for the
general, integrated action of his subordinate commanders.
Once such an objective has been selected, the commander is further
responsible for selecting, on the basis provided thereby, correct
objectives to be assigned to his subordinate commanders.
For various practical reasons, therefore, the responsibility of the
commander requires of him the ability to select correct objectives. On
the basis of classification with respect to the authority making the
selection, analysis will demonstrate the existence of two types of
objectives.
These two types of objectives are (see page 30 as to effects and
further effects), namely, (1) the assigned objective (page 48)
ordinarily indicated by higher authority, exceptionally determined by
the commander for himself, and (2) the objective typically selected by
the commander, himself, as the end in view for the integrated effort
of his subordinates. It will be noted that in the latter category
there will fall, not only the general objective referred to
immediately above, but numerous other objectives for whose attainment
provision may be needed during the actual prosecution of the effort or
in anticipation thereof.
Procedure for Selection of Correct Military Objectives. The
Fundamental Military Principle (page 41), properly applied, is the
basis for the selection of any or all of such objectives. The
procedure involves the direct application of the corollary Principle
of the Correct Military Objective.
According to this principle, the selection of a correct military
objective depends on due consideration of the salient features noted,
i.e., correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions,
proper apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for adequate
freedom of action. These features, discussed in greater detail
hereafter (in this chapter), are determined by factors cited in the
Principle (pages 41-42).
The first factor being the appropriate effect desired, a correct
military objective is selected, in the first instance, by reference to
the requirement of suitability as to this factor. This appropriate
effect desired may be indicated by the higher command (page 44), or
may be determined by the commander himself as hereinafter explained
(page 52).
When the appropriate effect desired has been established, the next
consideration is, "What physical objective (or objectives) can be
found, action with relation to which will, if successful, attain this
effect?"
For example, if the appropriate effect desired were the "reduction of
enemy battleship strength" in a certain area, then an enemy battleship
appearing therein would manifestly be a correct physical objective. A
suitable action with relation thereto would be "to destroy the enemy
battleship", in which case the objective involved in the action would
be "the destruction of the enemy battleship".
Any lesser accomplishment, such as infliction of damage on the enemy
battleship, or its repulse, or its diversion elsewhere, would also be
suitable to the appropriate effect desired, though not in the same
degree. Each such visualized accomplishment, suitable to the
appropriate effect desired, may properly be considered as a
tentatively selected objective.
An objective having been tentatively selected on the basis of the
appropriate effect desired, its final selection will naturally depend,
as indicated in the Principle, on the feasibility of the effort
involved in the attainment of each such objective, and on the
acceptability of the consequences as to costs.
In investigating such feasibility, account is taken of the relative
fighting strength. With relation to the enemy battleship, for example
(see above), the commander would consider the means available to him
and the means opposed (including the enemy battleship and any
supporting forces), as influenced by the characteristics of the
theater.
This investigation will include, necessarily, a sufficient analysis of
the salient features of the operation required to attain each
objective. Such features include the nature of the physical objectives
(the battleship and any other forces, for instance), the possibilities
of relative position, the problems involved in apportioning the forces
on either side, and the proper considerations as to freedom of action.
A similar study with respect to the acceptability of the consequences
to be expected, as to the costs involved in the operation, will
provide a basis for a conclusion as to that factor.
If the attainment of an objective is found to be infeasible, or
feasible only at the expense of unacceptable consequences, the
proposed objective will naturally be rejected, and some other
objective will be considered (page 33).
The objective finally adopted as the best will be that which, all
things considered, is best adapted to the requirements of suitability,
feasibility, and acceptability, as outlined in the Fundamental
Military Principle.
The Appropriate Effect Desired, as the Basis for the Objective. As
will be appreciated from the foregoing discussion, the first factor in
the selection of a correct objective is the "appropriate effect
desired". The evaluation of this factor is not always easy, for
reasons which will be explained.
The procedure (as indicated by the Principle of the Appropriate Effect
to be Desired--page 33) is the same as for the selection of an
objective. This identity of procedure is natural, because the
appropriate effect desired, used as a basis for selecting the
commander's general objective, itself involves the appreciation of an
objective. The latter is, in fact, one of the "chain of objectives"
previously mentioned (page 48).
Under conventional conditions this objective is selected by higher
authority, and is assigned to the commander in his instructions from
the next higher echelon (page 48). The objective so indicated will of
course, under sound procedure, have been selected by higher authority
on the basis embodied in the Fundamental Military Principle.
When an established chain of command (page 11) is in effective
operation, the path to the appropriate effect desired will therefore
normally be indicated through an assigned objective, by the immediate
superior. This assignment, however, or the failure to receive such an
indication, does not relieve the commander from the responsibility for
taking correct action on his own initiative. Such necessity may arise
should he find, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that his
instructions need modification or alteration, or even that it is
necessary for him to depart from his instructions under circumstances
of great emergency (page 15-16).
Furthermore, the objective may be adopted by (rather than assigned to)
the commander concerned, on his own initiative, in order to meet the
demands of a situation (page 50) as to which the higher command has
not yet had time or opportunity to act.
Moreover, even when an objective is assigned by higher authority in
the usual course, it may be expressed in such terms as to require
examination in order to enable the commander to appreciate it (page
43), as to its bearing on his operations. In fact, studious analysis
may be necessary for this purpose.
For example, if the objective so indicated does not specify a
clearly-defined goal, the commander will need to make a thorough study
in order to appreciate the full implications intended. He may find it
necessary to analyze his immediate superior's instructions pertaining
to the entire force of which his command is a part, and to consider,
also, the objectives indicated for other commanders, on his own
echelon, who also belong to that force.
On occasion, also, higher authority may acquaint the commander with
the general plan adopted by the superior, and may order action--such
as movement in a certain direction or to a certain locality--without
assigning a more definite objective. Should it happen in emergency
that later developments prevent higher authority from making such an
assignment, the commander may find himself under the necessity of
selecting, for himself, an appropriate objective, to be adopted by him
as if it were assigned.
Should the commander find that his instructions do not clearly
indicate an objective, or should he find that the one indicated is not
applicable under the circumstances of the case, he will select an
appropriate objective for his own guidance as if it were assigned by
higher authority. He will make such selection through use of the same
procedure already described herein as applicable to the selection of
an objective of any sort. In such case he puts himself in his
superior's place, in order to arrive at a reasoned conclusion such as
the higher commander, if apprised of the circumstances, would desire
to adopt. Circumstances permitting, the commander will of course
communicate with higher authority, and will make constructive
representations. (See page 15.)
The appropriate effect desired, as the first factor to be applied in
selecting such an objective, will naturally involve the objective
indicated in the general plan for the immediate superior's entire
force. This general plan is normally announced by the superior for the
guidance of the commander and of other commanders on the same echelon.
If, however, this further objective is not known to the commander, he
will endeavor to obtain a proper point of reference. To this end, he
will use his knowledge of the objective assigned to his immediate
superior, or of the further intentions of the higher command with
respect to the conduct of the operations, or of the campaign, or of
the war.
The provisions for the formulation of plans and orders (Chapters VII
and VIII) take account of the fact that the commander may require
definite information as to the objectives of higher echelons. In
organizations where a state of mutual understanding has been well
established, the commander will rarely be without some guidance in the
premises (see also page 33), by reason of the chain of objectives
indicated in plans and orders of the higher command (page 48).
From the viewpoint of the commander, this relationship among
objectives presents to him a series, from the present or immediate
objective to others more distant in time. Thus there may be one or
more intermediate objectives, leading away from the immediate one to
the ultimate objective, so far as the concern of the moment is
involved.
This relationship of immediate, intermediate, and ultimate objectives
may also exist in situations where the commander, operating on his own
initiative and responsibility, determines such a chain of objectives
for himself.
Such a situation frequently arises in a campaign or a major operation,
and is normal, also, as to minor operations (see page 56, as to
physical objectives).
As already observed, the relationship of objective and further
objective is the criterion for distinguishing between strategical and
tactical considerations, from the viewpoint of the commander concerned
(pages 9 and 10).
What has been noted in the foregoing as to the objective (singular) is
also applicable to situations where such an objective involves two or
more objectives collectively considered.
III. DETERMINATION OF EFFECTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS
As noted with respect to the Fundamental Military Principle (page 41),
the effort required for the attainment of a military objective
involves military operations (page 37), whose salient features are
listed in the Principle. These features, including physical
objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength,
and freedom of action, will now be discussed to indicate how they are
correctly determined by the factors, also cited in the Principle,
pertaining to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Such
determination is accomplished through application of the corollary
Principle of Effective Military Operations (page 42).
Physical Objectives
Fundamental Considerations. An operation, however splendidly conceived
and faultlessly executed, involves waste of effort if directed with
relation to wrong physical objectives.
Since a physical objective constitutes the tangible focus of effort
(page 47) toward the attainment of the effect desired, its correct
determination is of paramount importance both before and during the
prosecution of operations.
As has been demonstrated (page 51), the consideration of possible
physical objectives (in space) is essential to the selection of
suitable objectives (in mind). Moreover, action with reference to one
or more physical objectives is the necessary basis for determining the
feasibility and acceptability of a plan.
Military objectives can be achieved only through the application of
power, actually or by threat (page 8), with reference to physical
objectives.
The determination of correct physical objectives is followed, if more
than one such objective is found, by the selection of the one or more
which are best adapted to the requirements of the situation. The
procedure for determination and for selection is a matter for
painstaking mental effort, based on the considerations now to be
presented.
The term "military objective" is frequently used in military
literature to distinguish physical objectives which are combatant in
character from those which are noncombatant. The considerations which
follow are applicable to physical objectives of all categories.
Procedure for Determination and Selection of Correct Physical
Objectives. In a particular set of circumstances, the field wherein
correct physical objectives may be found and the best selected, is
that of an existent or probable theater of action.
The determination of a physical objective, when correct, initially
satisfies the requirement of suitability with respect to the nature of
the objective,--this being, in such case, the appropriate effect
desired (page 31). Physical objectives not suitable, with relation to
the objective to be attained, are manifestly incorrect physical points
of orientation with respect to the operations involved in the effort
to attain such an objective.
It may be found, however, that the selection of a single physical
objective will not fulfill this requirement. A commander may find it
necessary to direct his effort simultaneously, or in succession, with
relation to more than one physical objective.
When a succession of physical objectives has to be dealt with, the
selection will necessarily include such a series. Such a case might
occur where a campaign has been found necessary in the form of
successive stages as essential features. The visualized termination of
each successive stage may be marked by the successful application of
effort with respect to one or more physical objectives. Such a series
of physical objectives may frequently also occur in operations on a
smaller scale; even in very minor actions such a succession of efforts
is normal. (See page 54, as to objectives.)
The choice as to the specific nature of physical objectives will
extend, for example, from the enemy's organized forces as a whole to
the physical body of an individual combatant. Within this range will
be included all manner of physical elements of enemy fighting
strength, singly and in combination, such as troops, ships,
geographical points, lines and areas, fortifications, bases, and
supplies.
The physical objective may take the form of a fixed geographical
position, the occupation of which, because of its inherent
advantages, may be, for example, an essential preliminary to further
progress. The position may, for instance, be merely a point in the
ocean (page 47), a rendezvous beyond which, although its occupation
may be uncontested, it has been deemed unwise to proceed without
further information or additional strength.
The physical objective, therefore, does not always take the form of
some element of the enemy fighting strength; not infrequently, the
occupation of a correct physical objective may be uncontested by the
enemy. However, intervening armed forces of the enemy may constitute
the physical objective for application of successful effort before a
further physical objective may be dealt with. The possibility of enemy
opposition may, therefore, place the selection of one or more physical
objectives on an indeterminable basis at the time of the original
solution of the problem. This may require a commander to defer his
choice until the situation has become more fully developed.
For example, his objective may be the occupation of a certain harbor,
preliminary to the establishment of a base. The harbor is then a
correct physical objective, perhaps the only physical objective which
need be dealt with, if there are no other obstacles to prevent or
interrupt the operation. Armed forces of the enemy may, however, stand
as an obstacle to the undisputed occupation of the harbor and,
therefore, to the attainment of the objective. In such case they
become, for the time being, the correct physical objective.
While the armed forces of the enemy may frequently present appropriate
physical objectives, this is not always the case (see above). It is
true that, in war, the armed forces of the enemy, until they can no
longer offer effective resistance, prevent the full attainment of the
objective of the State. Accordingly, from the broad viewpoint, they
may constitute the legitimate and proper physical objective of the
opposing armed forces. Armed forces of the enemy which are present in
opposition to any projected operations are likely to offer proper
physical objectives.
These facts, however, do not restrict a commander, in his choice of a
physical objective, to the armed forces of the enemy. Nor do these
considerations require him to search for and destroy the enemy forces
before directing his effort toward the attainment of an objective
under circumstances where the enemy is seen to be incapable of
presenting effective opposition.
The correct physical objective may change several times during the
course of an operation. This is particularly to be expected in a naval
tactical engagement of considerable scope. While the enemy fleet, as a
whole, may properly be considered in such a case to be the physical
objective, the component parts of each fleet, the types of vessels and
their combinations, may, from time to time, find in their opponents a
variety of physical objectives, the particular identity of which can
scarcely be predicted with assurance. It is here that the importance
of the correct selection of physical objectives stands out in bold
relief.
Infliction of loss on enemy forces, or support of own forces hard
pressed, may always seem tempting immediate objectives in war.
However, there may be occasions when disengagement or refusal to
engage an enemy force, even though it be of manifestly inferior
strength, may be appropriate to the attainment of the end in view.
Necessity for speed or secrecy, or other demands, may make the
required operations unacceptable. (See page 75 as to the offensive and
the defensive.)
Land, as the natural habitat of man (page 46), is always the principal
store-house of his indispensable resources, as well as the primary
scene of his activities. Naval operations, therefore, have always in
view the eventual maintenance or creation of a favorable military
situation in critical land areas. From this fundamental viewpoint, the
eventual physical objective of military operations is always a land
objective.
* * * * *
The suitability of a physical objective having been determined, the
next consideration is the feasibility (page 31) of taking such action,
with relation thereto, as will, if successful, attain the objective in
mind. Feasibility is determined by evaluation of the factors of means
available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the
theater, in order to assess relative fighting strength (see page 52).
In connection with the effort involved with relation to any physical
objective, questions of feasibility may make it desirable or necessary
to visualize the detailed operations which arise from considerations
of relative position, of apportionment of fighting strength, and of
provision for freedom of action.
Of particular interest with respect to such operations, it is noted
that the premature disclosure of a selected physical objective is a
military error. By appearing, however, to operate against more than
one physical objective, a commander may lead the enemy to overstrain
his resources in the effort to protect them all. Thus the commander
may reduce the resistance to be encountered in dealing with what have
already, or may finally, become the selected physical objectives.
Feints in several directions may even divert all of the enemy's
effective defense from the vital points (see also page 68).
* * * * *
After the suitability of a physical objective has been established, as
well as the feasibility of the contemplated action with relation
thereto, such action is next considered from the standpoint of
acceptability with reference to the consequences as to costs. The
specific factors involved in acceptability as to consequences have
previously been mentioned (page 31).
* * * * *
When the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability
have been satisfied, the locality, the opposing force, or other
subject of consideration may be regarded as a correct physical
objective.
When more than one correct physical objective has been determined and
a choice is indicated, such selection will also be founded on the
foregoing requirements.
No doctrine, no advance instructions, can replace the responsible
judgment of a commander as to his correct physical objectives. On
occasion, higher authority may request recommendations (see page 42,
as to opinions) with respect to such objectives. The duty of a
commander to depart from his instructions under certain conditions,
and the grave responsibility which he thereby assumes, have also been
referred to (page 16).
Relative Positions
Fundamental Considerations. The relative positions occupied or
susceptible of occupancy by armed forces are matters which demand
constant and intelligent attention before and during hostilities.
Being fruitful sources of advantage or disadvantage, such relative
positions assume primary importance where enemy forces are concerned,
and are scarcely of less importance from the standpoint of the correct
apportionment of the subdivisions of one's own forces, and from the
viewpoint of their freedom of action.
During periods of actual tactical contact, the successful delivery of
the decisive thrust against selected physical objectives is greatly
furthered by the occupancy and maintenance of advantageous relative
positions.
The fundamental significance of relative position lies in the fact
that position is the basis of movement, for movement is merely a
change of position. Speed is the rate at which movement takes place.
The particular factors to be reckoned with are, therefore, time and
space. In skillful utilization of these elements lies the successful
employment of relative position in the creation or maintenance of a
favorable military situation, whether the movement be by land, sea, or
air (page 46).
The necessity for movement may be an important consideration in
determining possible or likely theaters of operations. Where
transportation between two or more positions within a certain area is
essential to the successful conduct of a war, the area which includes
the routes between these positions, or a portion of such routes,
becomes at once a possible or likely theater. Such an area may be
normally within the control of one or the other of the belligerents,
or the control may be in dispute. Certain of the positions themselves
may belong to neither of the belligerents. The area itself may be a
land area, or a sea area, or a combination of the two. It may be an
area which borders upon the sea, or an island area. In any case, the
air is a common characteristic.
The movement of a force is properly regarded, not as an even flow, but
as a series of steps from one position to another. The movement may or
may not be continuous. Pauses are usual, their occurrence and duration
being a matter dependent upon circumstances and calling for the
exercise of sound professional judgment. Intermediate positions may be
utilized, successively, so as to facilitate occupancy of the final
position which is the goal of that phase of operations (page 56). This
procedure often effects an ultimate saving of time. In many cases,
other advantages also may accrue.
The foregoing considerations are applicable to changes of position
whether in the direction of the enemy, toward a flank, or to the rear.
Flanking maneuvers and retrograde movements, both sometimes profitably
employed to decoy the enemy, may frequently be utilized to gain
advantageous relative position. The proper objective of each is the
maintenance of a favorable situation, or the alteration of an
unfavorable one, either locally or with reference to the larger phases
of operations, through measures involving apportionment of fighting
strength, or obtaining advantages of position, or retaining or gaining
freedom of action. Combinations of forward, flanking, or retrograde
movements are frequent in war, the skillful combination of the
offensive and the defensive (see page 75) being no less applicable to
the problem of relative position than to the other elements of a
favorable military operation.
Procedure for Determination and Selection of Advantageous Relative
Positions. Since the various positions to be occupied become physical
objectives for the time being, their proper determination and
selection are governed by the same considerations which apply to
physical objectives (see page 55 and following).
Thus, it becomes necessary to consider, first, as to suitability,
whether the position, once gained, will permit the attainment of the
appropriate effect desired.
Secondly, consideration is required as to feasibility. Are the
available means adequate to gain or to maintain such position? In
answering this question, due regard is paid to opposing means and to
the characteristics of the theater.
Finally, there is to be considered, as to acceptability, whether the
consequences as to costs, in terms of relative fighting strength, will
be such, if the position is gained or maintained, as to permit the
attainment of the objective. The possible effect of these consequences
on future action, whether the attempt succeeds or fails, may be
vitally significant.
* * * * *
With regard to suitability, the factor of the appropriate effect
desired calls for special consideration of the requirements with a
view to future action. This is true because of the relationship which
naturally exists between successive positions (page 60) if changes of
location from one to another are to be integrated into movement
calculated to accomplish the effect desired. Each position, itself for
the time being a physical objective, offers certain advantages or
involves certain disadvantages with relation to a further physical
objective. The position of the latter, in turn, presents possibilities
(or denies them) with respect to future movement. The influence of
considerations with respect to time (in addition to those noted above
with regard to space) is also a factor whose importance increases when
urgency is a matter of immediate concern.
With regard to feasibility, the technical capabilities and
limitations of the armed forces (page 67) are, of course, among the
principal factors. These capabilities and limitations are respectively
promoted and imposed primarily by considerations peculiar to the
particular medium of movement involved.
With specific regard to the areas within which military operations may
suitably be undertaken, the fundamental distinctions created by
recognized political sovereignty require attention. That part of the
surface of the earth which comprises its land area is recognized as
the property or the charge of one or another of the sovereign states,
although in certain cases the title may be in dispute. The air above a
nation's territorial domain is generally understood to be part of that
domain. The point to be observed is that there are no land areas which
belong equally to all nations. Accordingly; because of the factor of
neutral sovereignty, both land and air forces of belligerent States
may be under the necessity of following indirect routes to their
physical objectives.
In the case of the sea, however, all those portions of the earth's
surface which are covered by water (exclusive only of the recognized
territorial waters of the several nations), i.e., the high seas, are
presumably common property. The same applies to the air above the sea.
These considerations, and the fact that the surface of the sea is a
broad plane, permit open sea areas to be traversed by a variety of
routes to an extent not applicable in the case of land areas and the
air above them. In addition, the fact that technological developments
have been such as to permit movement, not only on the surface of the
sea and through the air above but also beneath the surface, gives
distinctive characteristics to the sea when considered as a theater of
operations.
The surface of the sea has, from the earliest days to the present,
provided roads over which human beings in greatest numbers and the
resources of the world in greatest weight and volume can be
transported in single carriers. From the standpoint of any belligerent
it is imperative that, during war, these roads be kept open to the
extent demanded by the needs of the State. It is equally imperative
that an enemy be deprived of the advantage which their use might
otherwise afford. In both cases localized (even though temporary)
control, not only of the surface but of the water beneath and the air
above, may be essential. It is pertinent, also, to note at this point
the interest of neutrals, or of unneutral nonbelligerent Powers, in
keeping open the trade routes via the high seas. Such interest may
constitute an important factor in the calculations of a belligerent
State.
Considerations of maximum capacity for speed represent the utmost
possibilities with respect to movements (i.e., change of positions)
(page 60) in a given medium within a given time limit. A knowledge of
maximum speed potentialities, one's own and those of the enemy, is
required if changes in position are intelligently to be made. A
knowledge of the variety of conditions, controllable and otherwise,
which affect or preclude the employment of maximum speed, is likewise
a requisite. Poor material condition, inadequate training, and
incorrect methods of operation are preventable or correctable. The
limitations on speed which are imposed by logistics, and by natural
obstacles such as the hydrography, the climate, the wind, the weather,
and the state of the sea, are susceptible of greatest possible
adjustment to circumstances only by the exercise of foresight and
judgment. All these conditions indicate the close relationship that
exists between relative position and freedom of action (page 70).
The same observations apply to considerations of maximum capacity for
endurance, the ability to operate without necessity for replenishment
from an outside source. Radius of action is decreased or increased
accordingly with resultant restrictions, or otherwise, on freedom of
action.
With respect to the freedom of action of armed forces, also a
consideration in relation to feasibility, the logistics of a military
operation, of whatever scope, constitutes a problem which begins when
the plan is in process of formulation. This problem ends only when the
necessity for sustaining the movement, and for retaining the position
gained, no longer exists.
Ships and other means of conveyance, surface, subsurface, and air, are
incapable of providing the necessities of life and the implements of
warfare beyond the capacity built into them. Operations which extend
beyond the limits of such capacity must cease unless replenishment and
support, possible only from other sources, are provided. The logistics
problem may be so difficult as to cause rejection of a course of
action involving distant operations. From the standpoint of supply,
military movements by land, sea, and air are, therefore, vitally
associated with positions on land and with their relation to the area
of operations (see also page 58).
The same observations apply in larger scope to the State itself,
which, because of economic vulnerability with respect to certain
essential raw materials, may be compelled to seek support from outside
sources lest supplies on hand become exhausted. In all cases, great
importance attaches to the geographical location of sources of supply
in their relation to a required point of delivery and to the routes
which lie between.
It follows that enemy sources of supply may be suitable physical
objectives (see page 56). Their destruction or capture, or the
severance of the enemy's lines of communication with them, may
seriously restrict his freedom of action.
From the standpoint of the relative position of its features, and
apart from their inherent military value, the characteristics of the
theater of military operations may exert an important influence upon
the shaping of events. Each characteristic merits consideration as a
potential means of facilitating or obstructing movement. Some
localities may have been developed as repair, supply, or air bases.
Others may be sources of essential raw materials. Certain points may
be heavily fortified. Island formations may be valuable to either
opponent, or to both, because of the capacity and security of their
harbors, the character of their terrain, or their positions relative
to each other. The inherent military value of the several features of
the theater may be enhanced or vitiated by the relative position which
each occupies with respect to other features, and with reference to
the location of the armed forces involved.
So-called "strategic points", historically significant in connection
with military operations, derive their importance by reason of their
relative position with reference to routes of movement.
The possibilities of utilizing or of changing the characteristics of a
theater of operations, to assist, hamper, or deny movement, are
governed by considerations previously discussed (see the Principle of
the Proper Physical Conditions to be established in the Field of
Action--page 34).
In planning the creation or maintenance of a favorable military
situation from the standpoint of relative position, there may,
therefore, profitably be included an examination into:
(a) The relation which may exist between the geographical location of
the subdivisions of one's own forces and
(1) Those of the enemy,
(2) Geographical areas under one's own control, and
positions within those areas,
(3) Geographical areas not under one's own control, and
positions within those areas,
(4) Areas coveted or in dispute,
(5) Fixed actual and potential repair and operating bases
and sources of supply and replenishment, own and enemy,
controlled or otherwise.
(b) The relation existing among the geographical locations listed
immediately above, including the effect of possible changes in
control.
(c) The bearing of the sun and moon, and the direction of the wind and
sea.
(d) The length and vulnerability of possible lines of communication.
(e) The time and distance, and resulting relative speeds, involved in
movements necessary to change or to maintain an existing relation.
(f) The measures incident to adequate freedom of action.
A more detailed analysis of the factors influencing relative position
is made in Section I-B of the Estimate Form (Chapter VI).
* * * * *
In connection with the factor of consequences as to costs, the
requirement as to acceptability is a weighing of expected gains and of
reasonably anticipated losses, a balancing of the one against the
other, with due attention to the demands of future action, (see page
61).
Military movement normally involves an inescapable expenditure of
military resources. The characteristics of the theater, alone, will
exact their due toll, even if no enemy be present. In the presence of
the enemy, such expenditures may increase with great rapidity. The
fundamental consideration here is whether the resultant losses are
disproportionate to the gains.
Avoidance of movement is frequently the correct decision, because
movement, if it offers no advantages, is scarcely justifiable even if
it entails no material loss. Movement, merely for the sake of moving,
is not a profitable military operation. However, the conduct of
military operations without major movement is a concept inherently
defensive (page 75), even apathetic, whose outcome, against an
energetic enemy, can rarely be other than defeat. In the execution of
advantageous movement to achieve correct military objectives, the
competent commander is always ready to accept the losses which are
inseparable from his gains.
* * * * *
The foregoing considerations as to advantageous relative positions are
applicable, not only in the realm of the commander's decisions as to
his own action, but also to his judgments rendered when higher
authority calls for recommendations (see page 42).
Apportionment of Fighting Strength
Fundamental Considerations. The assignment of a task may be expected
to carry with it availability of fighting strength deemed adequate by
higher authority for accomplishment of the operation involved.
In appropriate instances, the higher command may call for
recommendations as to the amount and character of the means deemed
adequate by the subordinate for performance of the task with which he
is, or is to be, charged (page 42).
In any case, means having been made available, it remains for a
commander to whom an objective has been assigned to apportion these
available resources in such manner as to provide the requisite
strength at points likely to be decisive, without unduly weakening
other points. In effect, he is charged with a practical adjustment of
means to ends. This responsibility is discharged by the effective
utilization of means and prevention of waste nicely balanced through
full consideration of all essential elements of a favorable military
operation. The procedure involved has been indicated (see the
corollary Principle for the determination of the Proper Means to be
Made Available--page 34).
The relation between the strength to be brought to bear in dealing
with a selected physical objective, the tactical concern of the
moment, and that necessary to the attainment of the strategical aim
(see pages 9 and 10), constitutes a fundamental consideration in
effecting such a balance.
In making a correct apportionment, there will be involved not only the
physical elements of fighting strength, but the mental and moral as
well. With respect to mental and moral factors, the capabilities of
particular commanders and organizations may be an important factor in
apportioning forces to tasks. In the physical field, numbers and types
occupy a prominent position, each however, requiring consideration
from the standpoint of the existing situation.
Thus, forces composed of appropriate types and suitably equipped and
trained may exercise greater effect than numerically larger forces not
so well adjusted to the requirements of the situation. On the other
hand, numerical considerations become predominant under conditions
otherwise substantially equal.
These considerations, viewed in the light of the relationship of naval
operations to land areas (page 63), indicate the importance which may
attach to immediate availability, with a naval force, in addition to
its own air strength, of a proper complement of land forces (with
appropriate air strength) which are organized, equipped, and trained
for amphibious operations.
The same considerations point also to the vital importance of due
provision, with respect to the armed forces of a State, for joint
operations involving concerted action on land, by sea, or in the air.
In connection with the capabilities of particular commanders (page
66), it will be appreciated how important it is, more especially in
amphibious or joint operations, for responsible officers to have a
correct understanding of the powers and limitations of the several
types of military forces involved, be their primary medium of movement
the land, the sea, or the air.
Factors of dispersion and concentration are also involved in
apportionment of fighting strength.
While undue dispersion may result in lack of adequate fighting
strength where required, a certain degree of dispersion may be
necessary to meet the demands of movement and of freedom of action.
Serious errors in this regard, however, may result in inability to
furnish support where needed, and in consequent punishment or
isolation of one or more valuable detachments.
In distant operations some dispersion is required to safeguard long
lines of communication. The requirements for this purpose may
sometimes be so great that, unless the total available strength is
adequate, a due apportionment to the guarding of long lines of
communication may so weaken the main force as to prevent the
attainment of the objective. (See also page 63.)
Proper dispersion is, therefore, a requirement to be met, while undue
dispersion is to be avoided. But realization is also necessary, in
this connection, that there is an equal danger in over-concentration.
An undue concentration of means at any point may subject such a force
to unnecessary loss. Another disadvantage may be lack of adequate
fighting strength elsewhere.
Accordingly, axiomatic advice that it is unwise to divide a total
force, while containing a sound element of caution, is misleading and
inadequate, for division is often necessary or desirable. To be
adequate, a maxim or rule relating to division of force should
indicate when, and in what measure, such division may or may not be
necessary or desirable. (See also page 25.)
Similarly inadequate, however true as a generality, is the statement
that the requirements of effective warfare are met by bringing
superiority to bear at the decisive time and place. Such an injunction
is of little assistance in solving practical problems as to the
appropriate degree of superiority, and as to the proper time and
place.
In like manner, any rule is faulty which advises a commander to seek
the solution of his problems by always bringing to bear his elements
of strength against the hostile elements of weakness. It may be found,
on occasion, that it is necessary or desirable to act with strength
against strength.
But it is equally faulty to maintain that action, to be effective,
seeks always to deal with the enemy by first destroying his elements
of strength. Even when the strongest opposition cannot be defeated by
direct action of this nature, success may still be possible by first
disposing of elements of weakness. When the stronger elements of a
hostile combination cannot be defeated without undue loss, yet cannot
stand without the weaker, consideration may well be given to an
apportionment of fighting strength on the basis of seeking a decision
against the latter. The defeat of a relatively small force at a
distance from the area where the main forces are concentrated in
opposition, may hasten the attainment of the ultimate objective.
The main effort, where the greater force is employed, may be identical
with the effort contributing most directly to the final result. This
identity, however, does not always exist, and the decisive influence
is frequently exerted by a relatively small force, sometimes at a
distance from the principal area of action.
Diversions (see also as to feints, page 59) are not likely to be
profitable unless constituting a sufficient threat, or unless offering
apparent advantages to the enemy which he feels that he cannot forego.
Success will attend justified diversions if they lead the enemy to
reapportion his fighting strength to meet the threat, either because
he expects repetitions (see page 73, as to raids), or because the area
involved may become a new theater of action, or for other pertinent
reasons.
Means which are inadequate for the attainment of an objective if used
in one effort may sometimes be rendered adequate by utilizing them in
a series of successive impulses. Similarly, the effect of employing
means otherwise adequate may be intensified by the delivery of attacks
in waves.
Procedure for Determining Proper Apportionment. The fundamental
considerations outlined above as to apportionment of fighting strength
have application both to the offensive and the defensive (see also
discussion on page 75). As to all of these considerations, the
solution for the particular situation is to be found only through an
analysis of the factors applying to the particular problem.
Thus, the first consideration relates to suitability, and requires
that the apportionment of means be suitable both as to type and as to
amount, in order to produce the appropriate effect desired in view of
the means opposed and of the influence of the characteristics of the
theater. The fundamentals involved, applicable in all human activities
(see the Principle of the Proper Means to be Made Available--page 34),
are the factors cited above. These are also, of course, indicated in
the Fundamental Military Principle.
The correct apportionment may also be influenced by any military
changes to be effected in the characteristics of the theater (as
indicated in the Principle of Proper Physical Conditions to be
Established--page 34). Thus, the establishment of a well defended base
may operate, properly, to reduce the requirements for apportionment of
a force for a particular duty in that locality. Similarly, the proper
use of fortifications, obstacles, demolitions, and routes by land,
sea, and air, as well as facilities for exchange of information and
orders, all operate to increase fighting strength relative to that of
the enemy.
The next consideration, that of feasibility, takes account of the type
and of the amount of means that can be apportioned in view of the
means available.
In connection with the foregoing there will be appropriate
requirements for the operation as a whole and for its component
operations. All of these requirements may call for analysis of the
relative positions to be utilized, with reference to the selected
physical objectives, and of the requirements for adequate freedom of
action.
Finally, the requirement of acceptability as to the factor of
consequences will call for consideration of the results of the
allotments of forces to particular tasks. This is necessary in order
to arrive at reasonable conclusions as to the military costs involved
either in event of the success of the effort or in event of its
failure, and with respect, more especially, to the effects on future
action.
The attainment of the objective, however suitable as to the effect
desired, may be found, on the basis of due study, to be infeasible or
to involve unacceptable consequences. The inescapable conclusion is
then that an increase in relative fighting strength is required or
that another objective, feasible of attainment and acceptable with
respect to consequences, is necessarily to be adopted (see page
52-53).
Freedom of Action
Fundamental Considerations. In providing for proper apportionment of
fighting strength, a commander may attain the end in view by
increasing the physical, mental, or moral elements of his own
strength, relative to the enemy's, or by decreasing the enemy's
strength through imposing restrictions on hostile freedom of action.
Freedom of action will enable a commander to prosecute his plan in
spite of restrictive influences. That enemy interference will, to a
greater or less extent, impose restrictions on freedom of action is to
be expected. Restrictions may also be imposed by physical conditions
existing in the theater of operations, and by deficiencies and
omissions which are within the field of responsibility of the
commander to correct.
Even with fighting strength adequate to overcome enemy opposition and
physical handicaps, deficiencies and omissions within a commander's
own field may become effective checks to further progress unless
avoided through the exercise of foresight. To this end, it is
desirable to consider certain possibilities which are likely to
promote freedom of action if properly exploited, and to restrict it if
neglected.
To a considerable extent, a commander has within his own control the
degree of influence which his force will exert in the creation or the
maintenance of a favorable military situation. The power applied by a
military force is determined not only by the fighting strength of its
component commands, but also by the degree of coordination of their
several efforts in the attainment of the objective (see also page 12).
Whatever the inability of the commander to influence the other aspects
of a situation, the ability of his command to act unitedly is a matter
largely in his hands.
When time permits, subordinate commanders, apprised of contemplated
tasks in general terms, may be called upon to submit recommendations
as to the detailed instructions to be issued them, as well (page 66)
as to the means to be allotted for the purpose. By this procedure,
individual initiative (page 15) is fostered and the higher command
enabled to utilize the first-hand knowledge and experience gained on
lower echelons without, however, divesting the higher command of any
of its responsibility.
The command system may provide for unified action through unity of
command or through cooperation resulting from mutual understanding. On
the assumption that commanders are competent and that communications
are adequate, unity of command is the more reliable method. However,
it cannot be obtained everywhere and at all times, because of the
necessary decentralization of the command system in areas distant from
the commander. In such areas, unity of effort may sometimes be assured
by provision for local unity of command. At other times, unity of
effort may depend entirely on cooperation between adjacent commands
within the same area. (See page 12.)
Organization (see page 13), the mechanism of command, is most
effective when, through the establishment of authority commensurate
with responsibility (page 12) and through the assignment of tasks to
commanders with appropriate capabilities (see also page 66), the
highest possible degree of unity of command is attained. The command
organization and mutual understanding are of primary importance as
methods of ensuring maximum power with available fighting strength,
and of affording consequent maximum contribution to freedom of action.
Deficiencies in technical training are capable of imposing grave
restrictions upon freedom of action. Material equipment, even though
it may represent the acme of perfection in design and construction,
will not surely function unless skillfully operated and maintained.
Even though mobility and endurance be otherwise assured, the capacity
which they represent is not susceptible of effective employment unless
the methods of movement, i.e., of effecting change in relative
position (page 59), are intelligently planned and are developed to a
point which assures facility of operation when in the hands of skilled
personnel.
Tactical training, not omitting that required for joint operations
(page 67), is one of the vital factors of fighting strength, with
respect, more especially, to its contributions to freedom of action.
A state of high and stable morale (page 9), founded upon sound
discipline, is an invaluable characteristic of fighting strength. An
understanding of the human being is therefore an important feature of
the science of war.
Discipline, in its basic meaning, is the treatment suitable to a
disciple. The objective of discipline is therefore the creation and
maintenance of the spirit of willingness to follow where the commander
leads. The exercise of leadership is not restricted, however, to those
occasions when the commander can be physically present. The exigencies
of war and the requirements of control prevent the commander from
being always, personally, in the forefront of action. These
restrictions as to considerations of space however, impose no
limitations on leadership in terms of time.
The influence of the competent commander is a factor always acting to
shape the situation according to his will (page 47), though the
necessities of the moment may compel his presence elsewhere. The
ability to create and maintain a faithful following who will execute
the commander's will wherever he may be (page 15) is, accordingly, a
primary attribute of command.
With this objective in mind, the true disciplinarian runs no risk of
confusing harshness with the exercise of justice. He understands the
difference between an overbearing arrogance, arising from unconscious
ignorance, and the pride which springs from a justified self-respect.
He appreciates the distinction between mere stubbornness, which would
alienate his followers, and the necessary firmness which binds the
bonds between the leader and the led. He realizes that comradeship,
without presumptuous familiarity, is the firmest foundation for mutual
loyalty (page 14). He knows that kindness and consideration, without
suggestion of pampering, will not be mistaken for weakness by any
subordinate worthy of the name.
Military subordination, which implies a proud obedience without trace
of servility, is the essential basis for the development of the
qualities of command. It is an old adage that, to know how to command,
one must know how to obey. In the profession of arms, every man is at
once a leader and a follower; the uncertainties of war may suddenly
confront any individual, even on the lowest echelon, with the call to
exercise command.
The requirements of sound discipline are thus the correct basis for
all training. By proper training of his command, by instilling in it a
spirit of resolute determination and by otherwise fostering its
morale, and by weakening the morale of the enemy, a commander may
increase his own fighting strength and reduce that of the opposition.
When a command is inured to the ill effects of fear, despondency, lack
of confidence, and other weakening influences, it may more effectually
employ measures calculated to upset the morale of the enemy.
In connection with these measures, surprise, when judiciously
conceived and successfully employed, may be a most potent factor.
Surprise (see page 26) is the injection of the unexpected for the
purpose of creating an unfavorable military situation for the enemy.
Its effect is particularly telling when it results in disruption of
enemy plans, and thus promotes the execution of one's own.
The raid, an offensive measure swiftly executed, often by surprise,
and followed by a withdrawal, may be a valuable operation when
employed to attain objectives within its capacity. The collection of
information, the destruction of important enemy equipment or supplies,
the neutralization of enemy positions, the severing of physical means
of communication and transport, and the like, are suitable objectives.
The attritional effect of repeated raids may be very great. Skillfully
executed raids frequently produce panic among the populace and thus,
by political pressure, cause a change in the existing apportionment of
fighting strength to the extent of upsetting military plans in other
theaters. This is particularly likely to occur when there is fear,
justified or otherwise, of repetition (see page 69).
However, because a raid necessarily includes a withdrawal and cannot,
therefore, accomplish the occupation of territory (see page 46), it
can have only indirect bearing, however important, upon the final
outcome of the hostilities against a strong and competent enemy. Like
other forms of surprise, the raid, injudiciously employed, may serve
only to disclose one's presence, and thus to betray more important
future plans. If the raid fails to attain its objective, it may even
strengthen enemy morale.
The form which surprise may take is not confined to the stratagem, the
ruse, or the sudden appearance. Any unexpected display of novel
methods or of fighting strength, moral, mental, or physical, the
last-named sometimes assuming the character of new and especially
effective weapons or equipment, is included in the category of
surprise. The potential value of such methods or weapons is, however,
reduced or even completely vitiated by the leakage of advance
information concerning them, not only as to their details, but as to
the fact of their existence.
Other conditions remaining unchanged, an offensive surprise measure is
therefore more likely to be effective when the opponent has not been
given time to prepare a defense against it. On the other hand, where
there is knowledge that an opponent or possible opponent is taking
steps of a new or unusual nature and no adequate defense is prepared,
the equivalent of surprise has been granted him.
Security measures are necessary in order to minimize or prevent
surprise, or to defeat other efforts aimed at disruption of plans.
Protection brings security; its basic objective is the conservation of
fighting strength for future employment. Primarily requiring the
maintenance of secrecy and the exercise of vigilance and foresight,
security may be furthered by efficient scouting, by appropriate
dispositions and formations within the command, and by the use of
protective detachments and of various types of works in the sphere of
engineering. Previous discussion (pages 64 and 69), with respect to
relative position and to the apportionment of fighting strength, has
indicated how, through fortification and related measures, the
commander may increase relative fighting strength and thereby promote
his own freedom of action while restricting that of the enemy.
A commander will be hampered in maintaining his fighting strength at
its maximum unless he has arranged for, and has at his disposal,
adequate logistics support. Because of its intimate relationship to
mobility and endurance, such support is an essential to freedom of
action. Logistics support requires provision for procurement and
replenishment of supplies, for evacuation, proper disposition, and
replacement of ineffective personnel, and for material maintenance.
Freedom of action is restricted beyond those limits to which logistics
support can be extended. (See page 63.)
The initiative is of paramount importance in ensuring freedom of
action. If the initiative is seized and maintained with adequate
strength, the enemy can only conform; he cannot lead. If initiative is
lost, freedom of action is restricted in like measure.
The offensive, properly employed, is a method of seizing the
initiative, and of regaining it if lost. Even though there be an
actual numerical superiority in fighting strength, an offensive will,
however, seldom assume practical form unless founded on an offensive
mental attitude, which ever seeks the favorable and suitable
opportunity to strike. Completely to abandon the offensive state of
mind is to forswear victory.
Whether physically on the defensive or the offensive, the competent
commander is always engaged in a mental and moral attack upon the will
of the enemy commander (see page 8). By effective attack upon the
hostile will, the commander disintegrates the enemy's plan, i.e., the
enemy's reasoned decision, as well as the detailed procedure on which
the enemy relies to carry this decision into effect.
It does not follow that offensive action is possible or even desirable
under all circumstances. Even with superior strength the most skillful
commander will scarcely be able, always, to apportion forces in such
manner as everywhere to permit the assumption of the offensive.
Without adequately superior strength, it may be necessary to adopt the
defensive for considerable periods. If the offensive mental attitude
is retained, together with fixed determination to take offensive
measures as soon as appropriate to do so, the calculated and
deliberate adoption of the defensive, for the proper length of time,
may best promote the ultimate attainment of the objective. It is of
the utmost importance, however, that a static defensive be not adopted
as a settled procedure (see page 65) beyond the time necessary to
prepare for an effective offensive.
Both the offensive and the defensive have their places in an operation
whose broad character is primarily either defensive or offensive. In
operations which involve movement over a considerable distance, a
combination of the offensive and the defensive is usually found
necessary (see also references to distant operations on pages 63 and
74). Though the movement itself be offensive, the ensurance of freedom
of action may require both defensive measures and tactically offensive
action. The enemy, primarily on the defensive, may be expected to
seize every opportunity to employ the offensive.
Thus, a judicious combination of the offensive and the defensive has
been found to be sound procedure (see also page 61), provided that the
general defensive is always viewed as a basis for the inauguration, at
the proper moment, of the offensive. The methods employed during the
period of the defensive are best calculated to promote freedom of
action if they are designed to facilitate a ready assumption of the
offensive as soon as conditions favorable to the offensive have been
created.
Familiarity with the physical characteristics of the actual and
possible theaters of operations, and accurate intelligence of the
strength, distribution, and activities of enemy forces likely to be
encountered, are of primary importance in the promotion of freedom of
action. Additions to this store of knowledge may be made by a
continuous interpretation and dissemination of new information
collected, analyzed, and evaluated by persistent effort. Of equal
importance is the denial of information to the enemy.
In connection with counter-information measures (see page 127), the
scrutiny of information of a military nature intended for popular
consumption demands the exercise of sound professional judgment prior
to publication. A resourceful enemy is ever alert to evaluate and turn
to his own advantage all available information, including that
ostensibly innocuous.
As to all of the foregoing considerations, a fund of professional
knowledge, previously acquired through study, or experience, or both,
and coupled with a sound concept of war, is the best basis for
devising suitable, feasible, and acceptable measures for freedom of
action.
With a given fighting strength, the ensurance of freedom of action,
within the field of responsibility of a commander, requires
consideration of such matters as:
(a) Efficient provisions for exercise of command,
(b) Effective training,
(c) A state of high and stable morale, founded on
(d) sound discipline,
(e) The offensive spirit,
(f) The initiative,
(g) Surprise,
(h) Security,
(i) Adequate logistics support,
(j) Adequate intelligence and counter-intelligence.
A more detailed analysis of such factors is provided hereafter
(Chapter VI, as to Section I-B of the Estimate Form). With proper
provision made in these respects, the commander will be better able to
deal with those restrictions on freedom of action imposed by the enemy
and by adverse geographical conditions. With respect to restrictions
that in a particular situation may be due to the latter cause, it will
at once be appreciated how greatly freedom of action may depend on the
selection of correct physical objectives, on utilization of
advantageous relative positions, and on an effective apportionment of
fighting strength.
Each measure, or each operation, for freedom of action, if it is to
meet the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability,
will be planned on the basis of the foregoing considerations and will
take account, also, of the inherent requirements of that measure, or
operation, for freedom of action for itself.
On occasion, higher authority may request the recommendations of the
commander (see page 42, as to opinions) with reference to provision
for freedom of action. Such recommendations will properly be based on
the elements considered in the preceding discussion.
IV. SUMMARY
All these considerations involve the proper evaluation of the factors
applicable (page 25) to the particular problem. Each objective, prior
to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, will
require examination of its suitability with regard to the appropriate
effect desired; of its feasibility with respect to the action
contemplated as to physical objectives, relative positions, the
concurrent apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action;
and, finally, of its acceptability with reference to consequences as
to costs.
CHAPTER V
THE FOUR STEPS IN THE SOLUTION OF A MILITARY PROBLEM
Chapter V discusses the four steps in the application of
mental effort to the successful attainment of a military
objective. Emphasis is placed on such matters as: the Estimate
of the Situation in basic problems, together with certain
details as to tasks, the mission, courses of action, and the
Decision; the formulation of detailed plans, including
subsidiary plans; directives; the Running Estimate of the
Situation; and the use of Forms in the solution of problems.
In Chapter II it has been brought to notice that every problem,
regardless of its type and scope, has its source in a perplexity
created by an apparent difficulty inherent in a situation. Where there
is a sufficient incentive to change or maintain the situation, the
problem is one which requires solution. (See page 20.)
A situation may be actual or assumed. In broad outline, an actual
military situation is always likely to present a picture of opposing
organizations of human beings, each possessed of fighting strength and
disposed in a locality or localities which constitute relative
positions with reference to each other.
This picture may be expected to assume various aspects as action
progresses (see page 38). The concern of the commander is to control
the unfolding of the original situation, to the end that he may attain
the effect he desires (page 72). (See also Chapter IX.)
The incentive to solve a problem is provided by a realization, on the
part of the individual concerned, of a need to make provision for the
attainment of an objective. In the ease of a military problem, such
incentive may result (1) from a directive issued by higher authority,
usually in the form of an assigned task, or (2) from the fact that a
decision already reached by the commander has introduced further
problems, or (3) from a recognition of the demands of the situation.
(See page 44.)
An objective is best attained by the successful application of
properly directed effort. There is thus an essential and continuing
relationship between the incentive to solve a problem, and the task
which assigns the objective (or objectives) and thus motivates the
procedure necessary for the attainment of the objective(s) so assigned
(page 50).
Such a task may, therefore, be referred to as the motivating task.
The natural mental processes which normal human beings employ in
solving their problems of business, public affairs, or even personal
matters, have been previously described as the natural processes for
employment in the solution of military problems (see Chapter II). In
adapting these natural processes to military requirements (page 43),
the only difference imposed is that of studied insistence that the
factors peculiar to the conduct of war, as recognized in the
Fundamental Military Principle (page 41), receive thorough analytical
treatment from the professional viewpoint.
The same observations apply when the field of military operations is
restricted to that which primarily concerns the naval branch of the
military profession. No fundamental difference in the solution of
problems is introduced thereby. The only variations in the application
of the Fundamental Military Principle are those due to the fact that
the sea provides the theater of naval operations with distinctive
characteristics (see page 62).
The Approach to the Solution
Studies of the subject indicate that the successful attainment of an
assigned military objective involves the application of mental effort
in four distinct steps (see page 3), in fixed sequence, as follows:
(1) The selection, by the commander, of a correct objective
(or objectives) by achieving which he may attain his
assigned objective(s). Such selection includes the
determination, in proper detail, of the action required.
(2) The resolution of the required action into detailed
military operations.
(3) The formulation of a directive, or directives, with the
intention of immediately inaugurating planned action.
(4) The supervision of the planned action.
In the chapters which follow, the fundamental procedure distinctive of
each of these steps will be treated separately and in the sequence
shown. The sequence of the steps is fixed because of the consequential
nature of the relationship among the procedures distinctive of the
several steps. The complete solution of a problem involves,
necessarily, all four steps. Each step deals with a distinctive type
of problem, or problems, pertaining to an aspect of the comprehensive
problem whose solution requires all four steps. No step after the
first can properly be undertaken unless the included problems involved
in the preceding steps have been solved.
It does not follow that the completion of one step necessarily
requires that the next step be undertaken immediately. It will be
seen, for instance, that the first two steps are concerned with
planning, the latter two more especially with execution. It is not
always necessary that a plan be executed; it may be drawn up as a
precautionary measure.
It is possible, therefore, that the first step only may be taken;
i.e., that the procedure for the attainment of a particular assigned
objective may be determined for the sole purpose of making provision
against a contingency, at that particular time merely an obscure
probability. Or, as may frequently be the case during peace, the
procedure may terminate, for the time being, with the completion of
the second step. In such cases, certain of the necessary military
operations are worked out in the desired detail as a provision against
future possibilities, are listed, and filed for reference as needed.
Parts II and III, which follow, deal primarily with the solution of
those problems of the naval commander which require familiarity with
the entire process, i.e., all of the four steps given above.
For simplicity of presentation, the procedure is described throughout
from the mental standpoint of the same commander. The arrangement of
subject matter conforms to this basis. The several types of problems,
classified according to the source of the incentive (page 79), are
discussed in connection with the appropriate step. When a problem
typical of a previous step arises during the process, the sequence of
steps is interrupted thereby, but is resumed by a mental return, on
the part of the commander, to the proper earlier step.
The First Step
The mental procedure distinctive of the first step (more fully
discussed in Chapter VI) deals with the usual case where a commander
becomes acquainted with the nature of his assigned objective through
receipt of a directive from his immediate superior, ordinarily in the
form of an assigned task or assigned tasks. In the discussion of the
first step, this most likely type of problem is chosen for
description, i.e., the one where the motivating task (see page 80)
comes directly from the immediate superior.
For purposes of reference, this problem may conveniently be termed a
basic problem. In such a case the original situation which gives
character to the problem may be similarly referred to as the basic
situation. The full solution of a basic problem always involves a
basic estimate of the situation, a basic Decision, a basic plan of
operations, and one or more basic directives. It may, as will be
shown, also require certain additional directives.
The military Estimate of the Situation, based on the natural mental
processes (pages 19-20 and 43), is introduced in the first step. The
reason for making such an Estimate is to provide a basis for a plan to
accomplish the assigned task. The Estimate constitutes a systematic
procedure for selection of a correct objective (or objectives),
suitable to the appropriate effect desired, feasible of attainment,
and acceptable as to the consequences involved in its achievement. The
selection of such an objective or objectives involves, incidentally
(see page 44), the determination, in the proper detail, of the action
required.
This estimate procedure is founded on the Fundamental Military
Principle (page 41). The procedure is the same as previously indicated
for the correct selection of objectives (Section II of Chapter IV).
On the basis of a summary of the situation, a recognition of the
incentive, and an appreciation of the assigned objective(s) (page 79),
the estimate of a basic problem enables the commander to obtain,
first, an understanding of (page 43) the appropriate effect desired.
As a result of this procedure, he can then correctly formulate his
mission (discussed hereinafter).
For the further understanding of all details pertaining to the
situation (page 43), the estimate next determines relative fighting
strength through a survey of the means available and opposed, as
influenced by the characteristics of the theater.
With the basis for solution of the problem thus established, the
actual solution (page 44), conforming to the system indicated in the
Fundamental Military Principle, starts with consideration of pertinent
methods of procedure, as tentative solutions of the problem. These
take the form of military operations, each denominated a course of
action (discussed in detail hereinafter). Each such course embodies,
specifically or inferentially, an objective to be achieved for the
attainment of the appropriate effec
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