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Lord Milner's Work in South Africa

by W. Basil Worsfold · English · public domain in the US

  • Language English
  • PG edition 2008
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    Lord Milner's Work in South Africa by W. Basil Worsfold is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #26490). [Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling has been maintained.]

    PREFACE

    In sending this book to press I have only two remarks to make by way of preface.

    The first is wholly personal. It has been my good fortune to reside twice for a considerable period in South Africa--first in the neighbourhood of Capetown (1883-5), and afterwards in Johannesburg (1904-5). During these periods of residence, and also during the long interval between them, I have been brought into personal contact with many of the principal actors in the events which are related in this book. While, therefore, no pains have been spared to secure accuracy by a careful study of official papers and other reliable publications, my information is not derived by any means exclusively from these sources.

    My second remark is the expression of a hope that the contents of this book may be regarded not merely as a chapter of history, but also as a body of facts essential to the full understanding of the circumstances and conditions of South Africa, as it is to-day. Since the restoration of peace--an event not yet five years old--a great change has been wrought in the political and economic framework of this province of the empire.

    None the less, with a few conspicuous exceptions, almost all of the principal actors in these pages are still there; and, presumably, they are very much the same men now as they were before, and during, the war. And in this connection it remains to notice an aspect of the South African struggle which transcends all others in fruitfulness and importance. It was a struggle to keep South Africa not a dependency of Great Britain, but a part of the empire. The over-sea Britains, understanding it in this sense, took their share in it.

    They made their voices heard in the settlement. The service which they thus collectively performed was great. It would have been infinitely greater if they had been directly represented in an administration nominally common to them and the mother country. No political system can be endowed with effective unity--with that organic unity which is the only effective unity--unless it is possessed of a single vehicle of thought and action.

    To create this vehicle--an administrative body in which all parts of the empire would be duly represented--is difficult to-day. The forces of disunion, which are at work both at home and beyond the seas, may make it impossible to-morrow.

    W. B. W.

    RIDGE, NEAR CAPEL, SURREY,

    October 19th, 1906

    CONTENTS

    CHAPTER I Page

    DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT.................. 1

    CHAPTER II

    THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS............... 48

    CHAPTER III

    A YEAR OF OBSERVATION.................................. 75

    CHAPTER IV

    UNDER WHICH FLAG?..................................... 130

    CHAPTER V

    PLAYING FOR TIME...................................... 188

    CHAPTER VI

    THE ULTIMATUM......................................... 253

    CHAPTER VII

    THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICS............................. 300

    CHAPTER VIII

    THE REBELLION IN THE CAPE COLONY...................... 341

    CHAPTER IX

    THE "CONCILIATION" MOVEMENT........................... 373

    CHAPTER X

    THE DISARMAMENT OF THE DUTCH POPULATION............... 413

    CHAPTER XI

    PREPARING FOR PEACE................................... 470

    CHAPTER XII

    THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING.......................... 536

    INDEX................................................... 585

    ILLUSTRATIONS

    PORTRAIT OF LORD MILNER Frontispiece
    From a photograph by Elliott & Fry (Photogravure)

    FACING PAGE

    LORD MILNER AT SUNNYSIDE.............................. 473

    MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA........................... At the End

    LORD MILNER

    CHAPTER I

    DOWNING STREET AND THE MAN ON THE SPOT

    The failure of British administration in South Africa during the nineteenth century forms a blemish upon the record of the Victorian era that is at first sight difficult to understand. If success could be won in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in India and in Egypt, why failure in South Africa? For failure it was.

    A century of wars, missionary effort, British expansion, industrial development, of lofty administrative ideals and great men sacrificed, had left the two European races with political ambitions so antagonistic, and social differences so bitter, that nothing less than the combined military resources of the colonies and the mother-country sufficed to compel the Dutch to recognise the British principle of "equal rights for all white men south of the Zambesi." Among the many contributory causes of failure that can be distinguished, the two most prominent are the nationality difficulty and the native question.

    But these are problems of administration that have been solved elsewhere: the former in Canada and the latter in India. Or, to turn to agencies of a different order, is the cause of failure to be found in a grudging nature--the existence of physical conditions that made it difficult for the white man, or for the white and coloured man together, to wring a livelihood from the soil? The answer is that the like material disadvantages have been conquered in Australia, India, and in Egypt, by Anglo-Saxon energy.

    We might apply the Socratic method throughout, traversing the entire range of our distinguishable causes; but in every case the inquiry would reveal success in some other portion of the Anglo-Saxon domain to darken failure in South Africa.

    Nevertheless, in so far as any single influence can be assigned to render intelligible a result brought about by many agencies, various in themselves and operating from time to time in varying degrees, the explanation is to be found in a little incident that happened in the second year of the Dutch East India Company's settlement at the Cape of Good Hope. The facts are preserved for us by the diary which Commander Van Riebeck was ordered to keep for the information of his employers.

    Under the date October 19th, 1653, we read that David Janssen, a herdsman, was found lying dead of assegai wounds, inflicted by the Beechranger Hottentots, while the cattle placed under his charge were seen disappearing round the curve of the Lion's Head.

    The theft had been successfully accomplished through the perfidy of a certain "Harry," a Hottentot chief, who was living on terms of friendship with the Dutch--a circumstance which was sufficiently apparent from the fact that the raid was timed to take place at an hour on Sunday morning when the whole of the little community, with the exception of two sentinels and a second herdsman, were assembled to hear a sermon from the "Sick-Comforter," Wylant.

    It was the first conflict between the Dutch and the natives; for Van Riebeck had been bidden, for various excellent reasons, to keep on good terms with the Hottentots, and to treat them kindly. But the murder of a white man was a serious matter. Kindness scarcely seemed to meet the case; and so Van Riebeck applied to the Directors, the famous Chamber of Seventeen, for definite instructions as to the course which he must pursue.

    [Sidenote: Van Riebeck's difficulty.]

    He was told that only the actual murderer of David Janssen (if apprehended) was to be put to death; that cattle equal in amount to the cattle stolen were to be recovered, but only from the actual robbers; and that "Harry," if necessary, should be sent to prison at Batavia. But he was not otherwise to molest or injure the offending Hottentots. Excellent advice, and such as we should expect from the countrymen of Grotius in their most prosperous era.

    But unfortunately it was quite impossible for Van Riebeck, with his handful of soldiers and sailors, planted at the extremity of the great barbaric continent of Africa, to think of putting it into effect. He replied that he had no means of identifying the individual wrong-doers, and that the institution of private property was unknown among the Hottentots. The only method by which the individual could be punished was by punishing the tribe, and he therefore proposed to capture the tribe and their cattle.

    But this was a course of action which was repugnant to the Directors' sense of justice. It aroused, besides, a vision of reinforcements ordered from Batavia, and of disbursements quite disproportionate to the practical utility of the Cape station as an item in the system of the Company. In vain Van Riebeck urged that a large body of slaves and ten or twelve hundred head of cattle would be a great addition to the resources of the settlement.

    The Chamber of Seventeen refused to sanction the proposals of the commander, and, as its own were impracticable, nothing was done. The Beechranger tribe escaped with impunity, and the Hottentots, as a whole, were emboldened to make fresh attacks upon the European settlers.

    [Sidenote: The Afrikander stock.]

    This simple narrative is a lantern that sheds a ray of light upon an obscure subject. Two points are noticeable in the attitude of the home authority. First, there is its inability to grasp the local conditions; and second, the underlying assumption that a moral judgment based upon the conditions of the home country, if valid, must be equally valid in South Africa.

    By the time that the home authority had become Downing Street instead of the peripatetic Chamber of Seventeen, the field of mischievous action over which these misconceptions operated had become enlarged.

    The natives were there, as before; but, in addition to the natives, there had grown up a population of European descent, some thirty thousand in number, whose manner of life and standards of thought and conduct were scarcely more intelligible to the British, or indeed to the European mind, than those of the yellow-skinned Hottentot or the brown-skinned Kafir.

    A century and a half of the Dutch East India Company's government--a government "in all things political purely despotic, in all things commercial purely monopolist"--had produced a people unlike any other European community on the face of the earth. Of the small original stock from which the South African Dutch are descended, one-quarter were Huguenot refugees from France, an appreciable section were German, and the institution of slavery had added to this admixture the inevitable strain of non-Aryan blood.

    But this racial change was by no means all that separated the European population in the Cape Colony from the Dutch of Holland. A more potent agency had been at work. The corner-stone of the policy of the Dutch East India Company was the determination to debar the settlers from all intercourse--social, intellectual, commercial, and political--with their kinsmen in Europe.

    One fact will suffice to show how perfectly this object was attained.

    Incredible as it may seem, it is the case that at the end of the eighteenth century no printing-press was to be found in the Cape Colony, nor had this community of twenty thousand Europeans the means of knowing the nature of the laws and regulations of the Government by which it was ruled. So long and complete an isolation from European civilisation produced a result which is as remarkable in itself as it is significant to the student of South African history. This phenomenon was the existence, in the nineteenth century, of a community of European blood whose moral and intellectual standards were those of the seventeenth.

    [Sidenote: The nationality difficulty.]

    Our dip into the early history of South Africa is not purposeless. It does not, of course, explain the failure of British administration; but it brings us into touch with circumstances that were bound to make the task of governing the Cape Colony--a task finally undertaken by England in 1806--one of peculiar difficulty. The native population was strange, but the European population was even more strange and abnormal.

    If we had been left to deal with the native population alone we should have experienced no serious difficulty in rendering them harmless neighbours, and have been able to choose our own time for entering upon the responsibilities involved in the administration of their territories. But, coming second on the field, we were bound to modify our native policy to suit the conditions of a preexisting relationship between the white and black races that was not of our creation, and one, moreover, that was in many respects repugnant to British ideas of justice.

    Nor was this all. The old European population, which should have been, naturally, our ally and fellow-worker in the task of native administration, gradually changed from its original position of a subject nationality to that of a political rival; and, as such, openly bid against us for the mastership of the native African tribes.

    Now when two statesmen are pitted against each other, of whom one is a man whose methods of attack are limited by nineteenth-century ideas, while the morality of the other, being that of the seventeenth century, permits him greater freedom of action, it is obvious that the first will be at a disadvantage. And this would be the case more than ever if the nineteenth-century statesman was under the impression that his political antagonist was a man whose code of morals was identical with his own.

    When once he had learnt that the moral standard of the other was lower than, or different from, his own, he would of course make allowance for the circumstance, and he would then be able to contest the position with him upon equal terms. But until he had grasped this fact he would be at a disadvantage.

    Generally speaking, the representatives of the British Government, both Governors and High Commissioners, soon learnt that neither the natives nor the Dutch population could be dealt with on the same footing as a Western European. But the British Government cannot be said to have thoroughly learnt the same lesson until, in almost the last week of the nineteenth century, the three successive defeats of Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso aroused it to a knowledge of the fact that we had been within an ace of losing South Africa.

    Many, indeed, would question whether even now the lesson had been thoroughly learnt. But, however this may be, it is certain that throughout the nineteenth century the Home Government wished to treat both the natives and the Dutch in South Africa on a basis of British ideas; and that by so doing it constantly found itself in conflict with its own local representatives, who knew that the only hope of success lay in dealing with both alike on a basis of South African ideas.

    As the result of this chronic inability of British statesmen to understand South Africa, it follows that the most instructive manner of regarding our administration of that country during the nineteenth century is to get a clear conception of the successive divergences of opinion between the home and the local authorities.

    At the very outset of British administration--during the temporary occupation of the Cape from 1795 to 1808--we find a theoretically perfect policy laid down for the guidance of the early English Governors in their treatment of the Boers, or Dutch frontier farmers.

    It is just as admirable, in its way, as were the instructions for the treatment of the Hottentots furnished by the Directors of the Dutch East India Company to Van Riebeck. In a despatch of July, 1800, the third Duke of Portland, who was then acting as Secretary for the Colonies, writes:

    [Sidenote: Non-interference.]

    "Considering the tract of country over which these border
    inhabitants are dispersed, the rude and uncultivated state in
    which they live, and the wild notions of independence which
    prevail among them, I am afraid any attempts to introduce
    civilisation and a strict administration of justice will be slow
    in their progress, and likely, if not proceeded upon with caution
    and management, rather to create a spirit of resistance, or to
    occasion them to emigrate still further from the seat of
    government, than answer the beneficent views with which they
    might be undertaken.

    In fact, it seems to me the proper system of
    policy to observe to them is to interfere as little as possible
    in their domestic concerns and interior economy; to consider them
    rather as distant communities dependent upon the Government than
    as subjects necessarily amenable to the laws and regulations
    established within the precincts of Government.

    Mutual advantages
    arising from barter and commerce, and a strict adherence to good
    faith and justice in all arrangements with them, joined to
    efficient protection and occasional acts of kindness on the part
    of the Government, seem likely to be the best means of securing
    their attachment."

    Who would have thought that this statement of policy, admirable as it is at first sight, contained in itself the germ of a political heresy of the first magnitude? Yet so it was. The principle of non-interference, here for the first time enunciated and subsequently followed with fatal effect, could not be applied by a nineteenth-century administration to the case of a seventeenth-century community without its virtually renouncing the functions of government. Obviously this was not the intention of the home authority.

    There remained the difficulty of knowing when to apply, and when not to apply, the principle; and directly a specific case arose there was the possibility that, while the local authority, with a full knowledge of the local conditions, might think interference necessary, the home authority, without such knowledge, might take an opposite view.

    [Sidenote: Slaghter's Nek.]

    A very few years sufficed to show that the most ordinary exercise of the functions of government might be regarded as an "interference with the domestic concerns and interior economy" of the European subjects of the British Crown in South Africa. At the time of the permanent occupation of the Cape (1806) the population of the colony consisted of three classes: 26,720 persons of European descent, 17,657 Hottentots, and 29,256 returned as slaves.

    One of the first measures of the British Governor, Lord Caledon, was the enactment of a series of regulations intended to confer civil rights on the Hottentots, while at the same time preventing them from using their freedom at the expense of the European population. From the British, or even European point of view, this was a piece of elementary justice to which no man could possibly take exception.

    As applied to the conditions of the Franco-Dutch population in the Cape Colony it was, in fact, a serious interference with their "domestic concerns and internal economy." And as such it produced the extraordinary protest known to history as the "Rebellion" of Slaghter's Nek. There was no question as to the facts. Booy, the Hottentot, had completed his term of service with Frederick Bezuidenhout, the Boer, and was therefore entitled, under the Cape law, to leave his master's farm, and to remove his property.

    All this Bezuidenhout admitted; but when it came to a question of yielding obedience to the magistrate's order, the Boer said "No." In the words of Pringle, "He boldly declared that he considered this interference between him (a free burgher) and his Hottentot to be a presumptuous innovation upon his rights, and an intolerable usurpation of tyrannical authority."

    And the danger of allowing the Boers to pursue their seventeenth-century dealings with the natives became rapidly greater when the European Colonists, Dutch and English, were brought, by their natural eastward expansion, into direct contact with the masses of military Bantu south and east of the Drakenberg chain of mountains--the actual dark-skinned "natives" of South Africa as it is known to the people of Great Britain.

    The Boer frontiersman, with his aggressive habits and ingrained contempt for a dark-skin, disintegrated the Bantu mass before we were ready to undertake the work of reconstruction. And therefore the local British authority soon learnt that non-interference in the case of the Boer generally meant the necessity of a much more serious interference at a subsequent date with both Boer and Kafir. And so non-interference, in the admirable spirit of the Duke of Portland's despatch, came to bear one meaning in Downing Street and quite another in Capetown.

    [Sidenote: D'Urban's policy.]

    The earliest of the three crucial "divergences of opinion," to which collectively the history of our South African administration owes its sombre hue, was that which led to the reversal of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's frontier policy by Charles Grant (afterwards Lord Glenelg) at the end of the year 1835. The circumstances were these. On Christmas Day, 1834, the Kafirs (without any declaration of war, needless to say) invaded the Cape Colony, murdering the settlers in the isolated farms, burning their homesteads, and driving off their cattle.

    After a six months' campaign, in which the Dutch and British settlers fought by the side of the regular troops, a treaty was made with the Kafir chiefs which, in the opinion of D'Urban and his local advisers, would render the eastern frontier of the Colony secure from further inroads.

    The Kafirs were to retire to the line of the Kei River, thus surrendering part of their territory to the European settlers who had suffered most severely from the invasion; while a belt of loyal Kafirs, supported by a chain of forts, was to be interposed between the defeated tribes and the colonial farmsteads.

    In addition to these measures, D'Urban proposed to compensate the settlers for the enormous losses[1] which they had incurred; since, as a contemporary and not unfriendly writer[2] puts it, the British Government had exposed them for fourteen years to Kafir depredations, rather than acknowledge the existence of a state of affairs that must plainly have compelled it to make active exertions for their protection.

    [Footnote 1: The official returns showed that 456 farm-houses
    had been wholly, and 350 partially, destroyed; and that 60
    waggons, 5,715 horses, 111,930 head of horned cattle, and
    161,930 sheep had been carried off by the Kafirs. And this
    apart from the remuneration claimed by the settlers for
    services in the field, and commandeered cattle and supplies.]

    [Footnote 2: Cloete. See note, p. 16.]

    The view of the home authority was very different. In the opinion of His Majesty's ministers at Downing Street the Kafir invasion was the result of a long series of unjustifiable encroachments on the part of the European settlers.

    D'Urban was instructed, therefore, to reinstate the Kafirs in the districts from which they had retired under the treaty of September, 1835, and to cancel all grants of land beyond the Fish River--the original eastern boundary of the Colony--which the Colonial Government had made to its European subjects from 1817 onwards; while, as for compensation, any indemnity was altogether out of the question, since the colonists had only themselves to thank for the enmity of the natives--if, indeed, they had not deliberately provoked the war with a view to the acquisition of fresh territory.

    The divergence between these two opinions is sufficiently well marked.

    To trace the precise agencies through which two diametrically opposed views were evolved on this occasion from the same groundwork of facts would be too lengthy a business; but, by way of comment, we may recall two statements, each significant and authentic.

    Cloete, writing while the events in question were still fresh in his mind, says of Lord Glenelg's despatch: "A communication more cruel, unjust, and insulting to the feelings not only of Sir Benjamin D'Urban ... but of the inhabitants ... could hardly have been penned by a declared enemy of the country and its Governor." And Sir George Napier, by whom D'Urban was superseded, stated in evidence given before the House of Commons: "My own experience, and what I saw with my own eyes, have confirmed me that I was wrong and Sir Benjamin D'Urban was perfectly right; that if he meant to keep Kafirland under British rule, the only way of doing so was by having a line of forts, and maintaining troops in them."

    [Sidenote: The Great Trek.]

    This settlement of a South African question upon a basis of British, or rather non-South African, ideas was followed by events as notorious as they were disastrous. It must be remembered that in 1819-20 the first and only effort to introduce a considerable British population into South Africa had been successfully carried out when the "Albany" settlers, to the number of some five thousand, were established in this and other districts upon the eastern border of the Cape Colony.

    The colonial farmers who suffered from the Kafir invasion of 1834-5 were not exclusively Boers. Among them there were many members of the new British population, and the divergence of opinion between D'Urban and Lord Glenelg was all the more significant, since in this case the British settlers were in agreement with the Boers. It was no longer merely a divergence of views as between the local and the home authority, but as between the British in Britain and the British in South Africa.

    It must also be remembered that, in the same year as the Kafir invasion, a social revolution--the emancipation of slaves--had been accomplished in the Cape Colony by an Act of the British Parliament, in comparison with which the nationalisation of the railways or of the mines in England would seem a comparatively trifling disturbance of the system of private property to the Englishman of to-day. The reversal of D'Urban's arrangements for the safety of the eastern frontier was not only bad in itself, but it came at a bad time.

    Whether the secession of the Emigrant Farmers would in any case have taken place as the result of the emancipation of slaves is a matter which cannot now be decided.

    But, however this may be, the fact remains that two men so well qualified to give an opinion on the subject as Judge Cloete and Sir John Robinson, the first Prime Minister of Natal, unhesitatingly ascribe the determining influence which drove the Boers to seek a home beyond the jurisdiction of the British Government to the sense of injustice created by the measures dictated by Lord Glenelg, and by the whole spirit of his despatch.[3] And this judgment is supported by the fact that the wealthier Dutch of the Western Province were much more seriously affected by the emancipation of slaves than the "Boers" of the eastern districts of the Colony; yet it was these latter, of course, who provided the bulk of the emigrants who crossed the Orange River in the years of the Great Trek (1835-8) We shall not therefore be drawing an extravagantly improbable conclusion, if we decide that the movement which divided European South Africa was due to a well-ascertained divergence of opinion between the home and local authorities--both British.

    [Footnote 3: For the benefit of those who may desire to read
    the passages in which these opinions are expressed, I append
    the references. Cloete's opinion is to be found in his "Five
    Lectures on the Emigration of the Dutch Farmers," delivered
    before the Natal Society and published at Capetown in 1856. A
    reprint of this work was published by Mr. Murray in 1899. Sir
    John Robinson's opinion, which endorses the views of Mrs.
    Anna Elizabeth Steenekamp as expressed in The Cape Monthly
    Magazine
    for September, 1876, is to be found at pp.

    46, 47
    of his "A Lifetime in South Africa" (Smith, Elder, 1900).]

    [Sidenote: The birth of the republic.]

    [Sidenote: Sir George Grey.]

    The results of this secession of something like one-fourth of the Franco-Dutch population are common knowledge. Out of the scattered settlements founded by the Emigrant Farmers beyond the borders of the Colony were created, in 1852 (Sand River Convention) and 1854 (Bloemfontein Convention), the two Boer Republics, which half a century later withstood for two years and eight months the whole available military force of the British Empire. The first effect of the secession was to erect the republican Dutch into a rival power which bid against the British Government for the territory and allegiance of the natives.

    Secession, therefore, made the inevitable task of establishing the supremacy of the white man in South Africa infinitely more costly both in blood and treasure. The British nation accepted the task, which fell to it as paramount power, with the greatest reluctance. The endless and apparently aimless Kafir wars exhausted the patience of the country, and the destruction of an entire British regiment by Ketshwayo's[4] impis created a feeling of deep resentment against the great High Commissioner, whose policy was held--unreasonably enough--responsible for the military disaster of Isandlhwana.

    Two opportunities of recovering the lost solidarity of the Europeans were presented before the republican Dutch had set themselves definitely to work for the supremacy of South Africa through reunion with their colonial kinsfolk.

    That both were lost was due at bottom to the disgust of the British people at the excessive cost and burden of establishing a civilised administration over the native population in South Africa. But in both cases the immediate agency of disaster was the refusal of the Home Government to listen to the advice of its local representative.

    Sir George Grey would have regained the lost solidarity of the Europeans by taking advantage of the natural recoil manifested among the Free State Dutch from independence and responsibility towards the more settled and prosperous life assured by British rule. His proposal was to unite the Cape Colony, Natal, and the Free State in a federal legislature, consisting of representatives chosen by popular vote in the several states. In urging this measure he took occasion to combat the pessimistic views of South African affairs which were prevalent in England.

    The country was not commercially useless, but of "great and increasing value." Its people did not desire Kafir wars, but were well aware of the much greater advantages which they derived from the peaceful pursuits of industry. The colonists were themselves willing to contribute to the defence of that part of the Queen's dominions in which they lived. And, finally, the condition of the natives was not hopeless, for the missionaries were producing most beneficial effects upon the tribes of the interior.

    But the most powerful argument which Grey used was his ruthless exposure of the futility of the Conventions. By allowing the Boer emigrants to grow into independent communities the British Government believed that not only had they relieved themselves of responsibility for the republican Dutch, but that they had secured, in addition, the unfaltering allegiance of the larger Dutch population which remained behind in the Cape Colony.

    Grey assured the Home Government that in both respects it was the victim of a delusion bred of its complete ignorance of South African conditions. The Boer Republics would give trouble. Apart from the bad draftsmanship of the conventions--a fertile source of disagreement--these small states would be centres of intrigue and "internal commotions," while at the same time their revenues would be too small to provide efficiently for their protection against the warlike tribes.

    The policy of divide et impera--or, as Grey called it, the "dismemberment" policy--would fail, since the political barrier which had been erected was wholly artificial.

    [Footnote 4: Cetewayo.]

    "Although these European countries are treated as separate
    nations," he wrote, "their inhabitants bear the same family names
    as the inhabitants of this Colony, and maintain with them ties of
    the closest intimacy and relationship. They speak generally the
    same language--not English, but Dutch. They are for the most part
    of the same religion, belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church.
    They have the same laws--the Roman Dutch. They have the same
    sympathies, the same prejudices, the same habits, and frequently
    the same feelings regarding the native races....

    "I think that there can be no doubt that, in any great public, or
    popular, or national question or movement, the mere fact of
    calling these people different nations would not make them so,
    nor would the fact of a mere fordable stream running between them
    sever their sympathies or prevent them from acting in unison....
    Many questions might arise in which, if the Government on the
    south side of the Orange River took a different view from that on
    the north side of the river, it might be very doubtful which of
    the two Governments the great mass of the people would obey."[5]

    [Footnote 5: Despatch of November 19th, 1858, to Sir E. B.
    Lytton.]

    The "divergence of opinion" between Capetown and Downing Street was complete. Grey was charged with "direct disobedience" for listening to the offers of the Free State inhabitants. Recalled by a despatch of June 4th, 1859, he was reinstated in August on condition that "he felt himself sufficiently free and uncompromised," both with the Cape Legislature and the people of the Free State, to be able personally to carry out the policy of the Home Government, which, said the despatch,

    "is entirely opposed to those measures, tending to the resumption
    of sovereignty over that State, of which you have publicly
    expressed your approval in your speech to the Cape Parliament,
    and in your answers to the address from the State in question."

    Nor was that all. In his endeavours to establish a simple but effective system of European magistrates over the Kafirs beyond the eastern border of the Colony, he was hampered by the short-sighted economy of the Home Government. It seems incredible that a Colonial Governor, even at that epoch, should have been looked upon by Downing Street as a sort of importunate mendicant. But Grey's language shows that this was the attitude against which he had to defend himself.

    [Sidenote: The burden of the empire.]

    "I would now only urge upon Her Majesty's Government," he writes
    on September 8th, 1858, "that they should not distress me more
    than is absolutely necessary for the government and control of
    the people of the country which lies beyond the Colony of the
    Cape of Good Hope. Stripping the country as I am of troops [to
    serve in putting down the Indian Mutiny], some great disaster
    will take place if necessary funds are at the same time cut off
    from me.

    I am sure, if the enormous reductions I have effected in
    military expenditure are considered, the most rigid economists
    will feel that the money paid by Great Britain for the control of
    this country has been advantageously laid out."

    These extracts are not pleasant reading. They were written at the time when the Imperial spirit was at its nadir.

    In the plain language of the Secretary of State for the Colonies[6] in 1858, it was a time when ministers were "compelled to recognise as fact the increased and increasing dislike of Parliament to the maintenance of large military establishments in our colonies at Imperial cost." Yet one more passage must be cited, not so much because it is tinged by a certain grim humour--although this is a valuable quality in such a context--as because it affords an eminently pertinent illustration in support of the contention that the refusal of the Home Government to follow the advice of the "man on the spot" has been the operative cause of the failure of British administration in South Africa.

    The reply to the charge of "direct disobedience," which Grey formulates in one leisurely sentence, runs as follows:

    [Footnote 6: Sir E. B. Lytton.]

    "With regard to any necessity which might exist for my removal on
    the ground of not holding the same views upon essential points of
    policy as Her Majesty's Government hold, I can only make the
    general remark that, during the five years which have elapsed
    since I was appointed to my present office, there have been at
    least seven Secretaries of State for the Colonial Department,
    each of whom held different views upon some important points of
    policy connected with this country."

    [Sidenote: The discovery of diamonds.]

    Grey was not by any means the only Governor of the Cape to show the home authorities how impossible it was to govern South Africa from Downing Street, and to urge upon them the necessity of allowing their representative, the one man who was familiar with local conditions, to decide by what methods the objects of British policy could be most effectively advanced.

    But it was not until some considerable time after the Colonial Department had been placed under a separate Secretary of State, and the Colonial Office had been constituted on its present basis, with a staff of permanent officials, that these protests produced any appreciable effect.

    What really aroused an interest in South Africa--that is to say a practical interest, as distinct from the interest created by the stories of missionary enterprise and travel, and by the records of Kafir warfare--was the discovery of diamonds in Griqualand West in 1870, and the subsequent establishment of the diamond industry at Kimberley. It was the first time that anything certain had occurred to show that the vast "hinterland" of the Cape might prove to be a territory of industrial possibilities.

    The earnings of the diamond mines provided the Cape Colony with a revenue sufficient to enable it to link together its main towns by a tolerable railway system. The industry, once established, attracted British capital and British population, and by so doing it did what Blue-books and missionary reports had failed to do: it brought the every-day life of the British Colonist in South Africa within the purview of the nation.

    Thanks to the Kimberley mines the Cape ceased to be thought of as a country whose resources were exclusively pastoral and agricultural.

    The epoch of the next great divergence of opinion was a more hopeful time from an Imperialist point of view. Lord Beaconsfield, who was the first statesman to give practical expression to the belief that the maintenance of empire was not inconsistent with the welfare of the masses of the home population, was in power. British statesmen, and the class from which British statesmen are drawn, had begun to study Colonial questions in a more hopeful and intelligent spirit. Something had been learnt, too, of the actual conditions of South Africa. And yet it was at this epoch that what was, perhaps, the most ruinous of all the divergences of opinion between Capetown and Downing Street occurred.

    [Sidenote: Sir Bartle Frere.]

    When Sir Bartle Frere was sent out to South Africa to carry out a definite scheme for the union of the Republics with the British colonies in a federal system, British statesmen and the educated classes in general had adopted the views expressed by Grey twenty years before. Tardily they had learnt to recognise both the essential unity of the Dutch population and the value of the country as an industrial asset of the empire. But, in the meantime, the centre of political power had shifted in England.

    The extension of the franchise had placed the ultimate control of British policy in South Africa in the hands of a class of electors who were, as yet, wholly uneducated in the political and economic conditions of that country. The divergence of opinion between the home and the local authority became in this case wider than ever.

    In short, it was the will of the nation that caused Frere to be arrested midway in the accomplishment of his task, and gave a mandate in 1880 to the Liberal party to administer South Africa upon the lines of a policy shaped in contemptuous indifference of the profoundest convictions and most solemn warnings of a great proconsul and most loyal servant of the Crown.

    The facts of Frere's supersession and recall are notorious: the story is too recent to need telling at length. We know now that, apart from the actual discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-mines, all that he foresaw and foretold has been realised in the events which culminated, twenty years later, in the great South African War. The military power which at that time (1877-80) stood in the way of South African unity under the British flag was the Zulu people.

    The whole adult male population of the tribe had been trained for war, and organised by Ketshwayo into a fighting machine. With this formidable military instrument at his command Ketshwayo proposed to emulate the sanguinary career of conquest pursued by his grandfather Tshaka;[7] and he had prepared the way for the half-subdued military Bantu throughout South Africa to co-operate with him in a general revolt against the growing supremacy of the white man. Frere removed this obstacle.

    But in doing so he, or rather the general entrusted with the command of the military operations, lost a British regiment at Isandlhwana. This revelation of the strength of the Zulu army was, in fact, a complete confirmation of the correctness of Frere's diagnosis of the South African situation.

    His contention was that England must give evidence of both her capacity and her intention to control the native population of South Africa before she could reasonably ask the republican Dutch to surrender their independence and reunite with the British colonies in a federal system under the British flag.

    A native power, organised solely for aggressive warfare against one of two possible white neighbours, constituted therefore, in his opinion, not only a perpetual menace to the safety of Natal, but an insuperable obstacle to the effective discharge of a duty by the paramount Power, the successful performance of which was a condition precedent to the reunion of the European communities. The only point in dispute was the question whether the powers of Ketshwayo's impis had been exaggerated.

    To this question the disaster of Isandlhwana returned an emphatic "No."

    [Footnote 7: Chaka.]

    [Sidenote: The recall of Frere.]

    The divergence of opinion between Frere and Lord Beaconsfield's cabinet was trivial as compared with the profound gulf which separated his policy from the South African policy of Mr. Gladstone. After the return of the Liberal party to power in the spring of 1880, Frere was allowed to remain in office until August 1st, when he was recalled by a telegraphic despatch.

    But, as Lord Kimberley pointed out to him, there had been "so much divergence" between his views and those of the Home Government that he would not have been allowed to remain at the Cape, "had it not been for the special reason that there was a prospect of his being able materially to forward the policy of confederation." This prospect, of course, had then been removed by the failure of the Cape Government, on June 29th, to bring about the conference of delegates from the several States, which was the initial step towards the realisation of Lord Carnarvon's scheme of federal union.

    The vindication of Frere's statesmanship has been carried, by the inexorable logic of events, far beyond the sphere of Blue-book arguments. But it is impossible to read this smug despatch without recalling the words which Mr. Krueger wrote to Mr. (now Lord) Courtney on June 26th of the same year: "The fall of Sir Bartle Frere will ... be useful.... We have done our duty and used all legitimate influence to cause the conference proposals to fail." That is to say, it was known to these faithful confederates of that section of the Liberal party of which Mr.

    Courtney was the head, that the Gladstone Government had determined to recall Sir Bartle Frere three days before "the special reason" for maintaining him at the Cape had disappeared.

    [Sidenote: Frere's forecast.]

    But what we are really concerned with is the nature of the opinions upon the central question of South African administration which Frere put forward at this critical period. With these before us, the most elementary acquaintance with the events of the last ten years will suffice to indicate the profound degree in which his knowledge of South African conditions surpassed the knowledge of those who took upon themselves to reverse his policy.

    What, above all, Frere realised was, that a point had been reached at which the whole of South Africa must be gathered under the British flag without delay. He had noted the disintegrating influences at work in the Cape Colony and the strength of the potential antagonism of the republican Dutch. The annexation of the Transvaal was not his deed, nor did either the time or the manner in which it was done command his approval. But he asserted that British rule, once established there, must be maintained at all costs.

    With this end in view, he urged that every responsibility incurred by England in the act of annexation must be fulfilled to the letter. Utilising the information which he had gained by personal observation during his visit to the Transvaal in 1879, and availing himself of the co-operation of President Brand, of the Free State, and Chief Justice de Villiers, in the Cape Colony, he drafted a scheme of administrative reform sufficient to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Boers for self-government without endangering the permanency of British rule.

    It included proposals for administrative and financial reforms framed with a view of reducing the cost of government to the lowest point consistent with efficiency, for the reorganisation of the courts of law, for the survey of the proposed railway line to Delagoa Bay, and full details of a system of representative government. This measure he urged upon the Colonial Office as one of immediate necessity, since it embodied the fulfilment of the definite promises of an early grant of self-government made to the Boers at the time of annexation.[8]

    [Footnote 8: The receipt of the despatch in which these
    valuable recommendations were made was not even acknowledged
    by the Colonial Office. Frere himself gives the outlines of
    his proposals in an article published in The Nineteenth
    Century
    for February, 1881.]

    He recognised the value of Delagoa Bay as an essential factor in the political and commercial system of a united South Africa, and he earnestly recommended its acquisition by purchase from the Portuguese Government. His perception of the extreme importance of satisfying all legitimate claims of the Boers, and his acute realisation of the danger of allowing the Transvaal to become a "jumping-off ground" either for foreign powers or Afrikander Nationalists, are exhibited in due relationship in a private memorandum which he wrote from the Cape at the end of July, 1879:

    "Any reliance on mere force in the Transvaal must react
    dangerously down here in the old colony, and convert the Dutch
    Country party, now as loyal and prosperous a section of the
    population as any under the Crown, into dangerous allies of the
    small anti-English Republican party, who are for separation, thus
    paralysing the efforts of the loyal English party now in power,
    who aim at making the country a self-defending integral portion
    of the British Empire.

    Further, any attempt to give back or
    restore the Boer Republic in the Transvaal must lead to anarchy
    and failure, and probably, at no distant period, to a vicious
    imitation of some South American Republics, in which the more
    uneducated and misguided Boers, dominated and led by better
    educated foreign adventurers--Germans, Hollanders, Irish Home
    Rulers, and other European Republicans and Socialists--will
    become a pest to the whole of South Africa, and a most dangerous
    fulcrum to any European Power bent on contesting our naval
    supremacy, or injuring us in our colonies.

    "There is no escaping from the responsibility which has already
    been incurred, ever since the British flag was planted on the
    Castle here. All our real difficulties have arisen, and still
    arise, from attempting to evade or shift this responsibility....
    If you abdicate the sovereign position, the abdication has always
    to be heavily paid for in both blood and treasure.... Your object
    is not conquest, but simply supremacy up to Delagoa Bay. This
    will have to be asserted some day, and the assertion will not
    become easier by delay.

    The trial of strength will be forced on
    you, and neither justice nor humanity will be served by
    postponing the trial if we start with a good cause."

    Could not the man who foresaw these dangers have prevented them? It is impossible to resist the momentum of this thought.

    [Sidenote: The retrocession.]

    The events by which this forecast was so closely realised are not likely to be effaced from the memory of this generation. Frere had scarcely left the Colony from which he had been recalled by the joint efforts of Mr. Krueger and Lord (then Mr.) Courtney before the former, with his fellow triumvirs, had raised the Vier-kleur upon the still desolate uplands of the Witwatersrand. The attempt to put down by force the Boer revolt of 1880-81 failed. Mr. Gladstone's cabinet recoiled before the prospect of a war in which the Boers might have been supported by their kinsmen in the Free State and the Cape Colony.

    The retrocession of the Transvaal under the terms of the Pretoria Convention (1881) was followed by further concessions embodied in the London Convention of 1884. It is absolutely established as fact that Mr. Gladstone's Government intended, by certain articles contained in both conventions, to secure to all actual and potential British residents in the Transvaal the enjoyment of all the political rights of citizenship possessed by the Boers.

    But it is equally certain that the immediate contravention of Article XVI. of the Pretoria Convention, when in 1882 the period of residence necessary to qualify for the franchise was raised from two to five years, was allowed to pass without protest from the Imperial Government. And thus a breach of the Convention, which the discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields (1886) and the subsequent establishment of a great British industrial community made a matter of vital importance, was condoned.

    A few years more and the country which prided itself upon being the home of liberty and of free institutions was confounded by the spectacle of a South Africa of its own making, in which a British majority denied the franchise in a Dutch Republic, contrasted with a Dutch minority dominating and controlling the machinery of responsible government in a British colony.

    This situation brings us (to use a military phrase) within striking distance of the objective of the present work--the personality and efforts of the man who administered South Africa in the momentous years of the struggle for equal rights for all white men from the Zambesi to Capetown.

    If the records set out in the preceding pages leave any impression upon the mind, it is one that must produce a sense of amazement, almost exasperation, at the thought of the many mistakes and disasters that might have been avoided, if only greater weight had been attached to the advice tendered to the British Government by its local representative in South Africa.

    And with this sense of amazement a generous mind will associate inevitably a feeling of regret for the injustice unwittingly, but none the less irreparably, inflicted upon loyal and capable servants of the Crown--an injustice so notorious that it has made South Africa the "grave of reputations." Apart from the pre-eminence with which the period of Lord Milner's administration is invested by the occurrence within it of a military conflict of unparalleled magnitude, Lord Milner stands out in the annals of South Africa as the first High Commissioner whose knowledge of South African conditions was allowed to inspire the policy of the Home Government, and who himself was recognised by the Government and people of Great Britain as voicing the convictions and aspirations of all loyal subjects of the Crown in that province of the empire.

    The state of affairs with which Lord Milner was called upon to deal was in its essence the situation sketched by Frere twenty years before in the memorable forecast to which reference has been made. But the working of the forces indicated by Frere as destined, if unchecked, to drive England one day to a life-and-death struggle for her supremacy in South Africa, had been complicated by an event which cannot be omitted altogether from a chapter intended, like a Euripidean prologue, to prepare the mind of the spectator for the proper understanding of the characters and action of the drama. This event is the Jameson Raid.

    [Sidenote: The Jameson raid.]

    [Sidenote: Rhodes.]

    In order to see the Jameson Raid in its true perspective, it is not sufficient to place it in relationship to those familiar and notorious events by which it was followed. It must also be placed in relationship to the no less clearly defined events by which it was preceded.

    Thus placed it becomes the direct outcome of the refusal of the Imperial Government to use the advice of its local representative--or, more precisely, of the refusal to base its policy on South African instead of British conditions: and, as such, it convinced the Imperial Government of the need of reviving the power of its local representative. In other words, it is a connecting link between the High Commissionerships of Frere and Milner.

    The events which followed the recall of Frere were accepted by the British inhabitants of South Africa as a practical demonstration of the inherent viciousness of the system under which the decision of cardinal questions of South African administration was left in the hands of the House of Commons, a body in which they were not represented; which met 6,000 miles away; whose judgment was liable to be warped by irrelevant considerations of English party politics; and one which was admittedly unfamiliar with the country and peoples whose interests were vitally affected by the manner in which these questions were decided.

    The lesson of the retrocession was taken to heart so earnestly that, fifteen years later, the majority of the British residents in the Transvaal refused to support a movement for reform which involved the re-establishment of Imperial authority, while among those who were loyal to the British connection throughout South Africa its effect was to make them think, as did Rhodes, that the machinery of the various local British governments must be dissociated as much as possible from the principles and methods of the Home Government.

    Hence the necessity for what Rhodes called the "elimination of the Imperial factor." The expression, as he afterwards explained, was in no way inconsistent with attachment to the British connection.

    As read in the context in which it was originally used, it meant merely that the European population of Bechuanaland,[9] being mainly Boer immigrants, could be administered more successfully by officers responsible to a government which, like that of the Cape Colony, was well versed in South African conditions, than by officers directly responsible to the Imperial Government. The phrase was a criticism of Downing Street, and still more of English party government.

    In short, Rhodes was convinced that if a system of British administration, based on South African conditions, was ever to be carried on successfully, the local British authority, and not the Home Government, must be the machine employed; and in order to allow it to work freely, its action must be made as independent as possible of Downing Street. For Downing Street was an authority which blew hot or cold, in accordance with the views of the party for the time being in power.[10]

    [Footnote 9: The Crown Colony--not the Protectorate--annexed
    by the Cape Colony in 1895.]

    [Footnote 10: Rhodes's words were: "If we do not settle this
    [i.e. the question of Bechuanaland] ourselves, we shall see
    it taken up in the House of Commons on one side or the other,
    not from any real interest in the question, but simply
    because of its consequences to those occupying the
    Ministerial benches. We want to get rid of Downing Street in
    this question, and to deal with it ourselves, as a
    self-governing colony."]

    [Sidenote: New forces.]

    And, in point of fact, both parties in England acquiesced in this judgment of the South African British. During the years between Frere's recall and the appointment of Lord Milner (1880-1897) the High Commissioner was a decreasing force. Both Lord Rosmead and Lord Loch did little to mould the destiny of South Africa: not because they lacked capacity, but because it was the determination of the Home Government to leave the difficult problem of South African unity to local initiative.

    On the other hand, the progress which was made in this direction by local initiative, aided as it was by the fortuitous discovery of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, was considerable.

    The highlands of South Central Africa were acquired for the British race, and the Boer was effectively prevented from carrying the Vier-kleur beyond the Limpopo; the railway, drawn through the Free State by the magnet of the Rand, disturbed the retirement of the republican Dutch; and finally the Cape Colony and Natal were linked together with the Free State in a Customs Union. But the development of the mineral resources of the country led to the appearance of a new factor in South African politics.

    The comparative decline in the activity of the High Commissioner had been accompanied by the establishment and growth of powerful industrial corporations. It is easy to understand how a man like Rhodes, with the wealth and influence of De Beers and the Chartered Company at his command, might seek, by an alliance with the "great houses" of the Rand, to find in private effort an instrument for remedying the deficiencies of the Imperial Government even more appropriate than the local governmental action upon which he had previously relied.

    For the work of these industrial corporations had powerfully enlisted the interest and sympathy of the British public.

    The Jameson Raid was an illegitimate and disastrous application of an otherwise meritorious and successful effort to strengthen the British hold upon South Africa by private enterprise. It was at once the measure of Imperial inefficiency, and its cure.

    One other circumstance must be recalled in estimating the extent to which the Home Government had earned the distrust of the British population in South Africa. Only eighteen months[11] before the Raid the High Commissioner, Lord Loch, had gone to Pretoria carrying a despatch in which the grant of a five years' franchise was advocated on behalf of the Uitlanders. His instructions were to present this despatch, and press upon President Krueger personally the necessity for giving effect to its recommendations.

    These instructions were cancelled at the last moment by Lord Ripon, because the German Ambassador had made representations in London that such action would be regarded as an interference with the status quo in South Africa, and, as such, detrimental to German interests in that country. And six months later[12] President Krueger, in attending a "Kommers" given by the German Club at Pretoria in honour of the Kaiser Wilhelm II.'s birthday, alluded to Germany as a grown-up power that would stop England from "kicking" the child Republic.

    [Footnote 11: June, 1894.]

    [Footnote 12: January 28th, 1895.]

    [Sidenote: Rhodes's Plan.]

    The Raid was, therefore, a short cut to baffle German intrigue and solve the problem of South African unity at one blow. For to Rhodes the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders meant the withdrawal of the Transvaal Government from its opposition to his scheme of commercial federation. It is obvious that one ground of justification, and one only, can be found for the usurpation of the functions of government by a private individual, or group of individuals. This justification is success. It has been the custom to represent Dr.

    Jameson's decision to "ride in" as "an act of monumental folly," alike from a political and a military point of view. But this opinion overlooks the fact that the affair may have been so planned in Rhodes's mind that success did not depend upon the victory of the Uitlanders, aided by Jameson's troopers, but on the presence of the High Commissioner in the Transvaal under such conditions as would make the intervention of the Imperial Government at once imperative and effectual.

    The representative of the Imperial Government, backed by a Johannesburg in armed revolt against the Boer oligarchy, would find himself--so Rhodes thought--in a position highly favourable to the successful prosecution of the demands which had already been put forward on behalf of British subjects resident in the Transvaal. And in order that this essential part of the plan might be carried out without a moment of unnecessary delay, Rhodes kept a train, with steam up, in the station at Capetown ready to speed Lord Rosmead northwards directly the news of Dr.

    Jameson's arrival at Johannesburg should have reached him. Once Jameson's force had "got through," he relied upon the Reform Committee, however incomplete its preparations, being able to hold Johannesburg for a couple of days against any force the Boers could bring.[13] Nor in the light of what happened, during the war, both at Mafeking and Kimberley, can this expectation be thought extravagant.

    Here his responsibilities would have ended. The High Commissioner and the Imperial Government would have done the rest. To indulge in metaphor, the Imperial locomotive was to be set going, but the lines on which it was to run were those laid down by Mr. Rhodes.

    [Footnote 13: It is worth noticing that even the presence of
    the German Marines at Delagoa Bay was
    counterbalanced--whether by chance or design--by the
    coincidence of the arrival of a British troopship with
    time-expired men from the Indian garrison, off Durban.]

    If this was the essence of Rhodes's plan, it would matter comparatively little whether the Reformers had, or had not, completed their preparations, or whether Dr. Jameson had 1,200 or 500 men.

    Certainly some such assumption is necessary to account for the fact that Rhodes treated his confederates at Johannesburg as so many pawns on a chess-board. It is equally necessary to account for Dr. Jameson's action. "Twenty years friends, and now he goes in and ruins me," was Rhodes's comment on the news that Dr. Jameson had "ridden in," in spite of his own orders to the contrary and the message to the same effect which Captain Heany had delivered on behalf of the Reformers.

    But what if Dr. Jameson knew, or thought that he knew, that Rhodes's object in forcing the insurrection was not to make the Uitlanders reduce Krueger, but to compel the Imperial Government to step in? In this case he may well have thought that what was essential was not that the rising should be successful, but that there should be a rising of any kind; provided that it was sufficiently grave to arrest the attention of the world, and claim the interference of the Imperial Government.

    According to Mr. Chamberlain the continued inaction of the Imperial Government in the eighteen months that had passed since Lord Loch's visit to Pretoria in June, 1894, was due to two circumstances.

    In the first place, "the Uitlanders and their organs had always deprecated the introduction into the dispute of what is called in South Africa the 'Imperial factor'"; and in the second, the "rumours" of violent measures "were continually falsified by the event." Obviously, if Rhodes forced an insurrection with the intention of removing these obstacles--if, that is to say, the intervention of the Imperial Government, and not the success of the insurrection, was his primary object--the temerity of Dr. Jameson's invasion is materially diminished. Now Mr.

    Chamberlain's statement, made under date February 4th, 1896, i.e. five weeks after the Raid, is perfectly consistent with the view of the attitude of the Reformers expressed by Rhodes on the day before the Raid took place.

    [Sidenote: The reformers divided.]

    Dr. Jameson's force, it will be remembered, started on the evening of Sunday, December 29th, 1895. Up to three days before--the 26th--nothing had occurred to interfere with the final arrangement, telegraphed to Dr. Jameson from Capetown, that the movement in Johannesburg would take place on Saturday, the 28th. The circumstances which caused the Reformers to alter their plans were explained by Rhodes in an interview with Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary, at Capetown on the same Saturday, the 28th, with his accustomed vivacity. The Johannesburg insurrection, he said--

    "had fizzled out as a damp squib. The capitalists financing the
    movement had made the hoisting of the British flag a sine qua
    non
    . This the National Union rejected, and issued a manifesto
    declaring for a republic. The division had led to the complete
    collapse of the movement, and it was thought that the leaders
    would make the best terms they could with President Krueger."

    The telegrams which reached Dr. Jameson between the 26th and 29th contained the same facts, with the further information that Captain Heany was travelling by special train to him with a message direct from the Reformers. In these circumstances it is said that Rhodes at Capetown imagined as little as the Reform leaders at Johannesburg that Dr. Jameson would cross the frontier. That, however, there was another point of view from which the situation might present itself to Dr.

    Jameson is shown by the fact that Mr. Chamberlain, in reply to the High Commissioner's telegram reporting the substance of Rhodes's statement to Sir Graham Bower, at once[14] inquired of Lord Rosmead, "Are you sure Jameson has not moved in consequence of the collapse?"

    [Footnote 14: Afternoon of Monday, December 30th.]

    Was Mr. Chamberlain right? Did Dr. Jameson see in the fact that the Reformers were divided on such an issue only an additional reason for carrying out a plan which had for its object to compel the Imperial Government to intervene in the affairs of the Transvaal before it was too late; that is to say, before the British population had definitely committed itself to the policy of a purged republic, but a republic under any flag but that of Great Britain? Such a policy was not merely possible. It seemed inevitable to the vivacious French observer who wrote, not from hearsay, but "with his eyes upon the object," in December, 1893:

    "The Transvaal will never be an English colony. The English of
    the Transvaal, as well as those of Cape Colony and Natal, would
    be as firmly opposed to it as the Boers themselves, for they have
    never forgiven England for letting herself be beaten by the Boers
    at Majuba Hill and accepting her defeat, a proceeding which has
    rendered them ridiculous in the eyes of the Dutch population of
    South Africa.... With me this is not a simple impression, but a
    firm conviction."[15]

    [Footnote 15: "John Bull & Co.," by "Max O'Rell," 1894.]

    [Sidenote: Jameson's decision.]

    If these were the considerations which weighed with Dr. Jameson, his decision to "ride in" was inconsistent neither with friendship nor with patriotism. When Captain Heany had read from his pocket-book the message from the Reformers, Jameson paced for twenty minutes outside his tent. Having re-entered it, he announced his determination to disregard Heany's message no less than Rhodes's telegram. It was a momentous decision to take after twenty minutes' thought. Had he a reasonable expectation of carrying out the plan as Rhodes conceived it, in spite of the change in the position of affairs at Johannesburg?

    Had he any reason to believe that Rhodes desired him to force the insurrection in spite of his telegrams to the contrary? It is the answers to these questions that make the Raid, as far as Dr. Jameson is concerned, an "act of monumental folly," or a legitimate assumption of personal responsibility that is part of the empire-builder's stock-in-trade. The answer to the second question remains a matter of speculation. The answer to the first is to be found in the record of the expedition. Dr.

    Jameson reached Kruegersdorp at three o'clock on Wednesday, January 1st. A few hours before a cyclist had brought him congratulatory messages from the Reform leaders. The goal was almost within sight. What prevented Sir John Willoughby from taking his little force safely over the remaining twenty miles from Kruegersdorp to Johannesburg was the merest accident: the few hours' delay caused, naturally enough, by Dr. Jameson's desire that his force should be met and escorted by a small body of volunteers from the Rand.

    He did not want, as he said, to go to Johannesburg as "a pirate." Sir John Willoughby's evidence is perfectly definite and conclusive on the point. If the force had pushed on by road from Kruegersdorp to Johannesburg on Wednesday evening--had not, in Willoughby's words, "messed about" at Kruegersdorp in expectation of the welcoming escort--Johannesburg would have been reached in safety on Thursday morning. With Dr.

    Jameson in Johannesburg and Lord Rosmead speeding northwards in his special train, the way would have been prepared for that decisive and successful action on the part of the Imperial Government which Rhodes had desired to bring about.

    [Sidenote: Why the raid failed.]

    But, unsuccessful as was the actual expedition, the decision to "ride in" had secured the intervention of the Imperial Government. If intervention could have done what Rhodes expected of it, Dr. Jameson's decision to "ride in" would have gained, at the cost of few lives and no increase of the national debt, what the war gained four years later at the cost of twenty thousand lives and L220,000,000. As it was, it failed to win the franchise for the Uitlanders. Why did not Lord Rosmead, with so strong a Colonial Secretary as Mr.

    Chamberlain at his back, brush the Raid aside, and address himself to the removal of the greater wrong that gave it birth? If Lord Rosmead had acted in the spirit of Mr. Chamberlain's despatches; if he had reminded the Government of the Republic from the first "that the danger from which they had just escaped was real, and one which, if the causes which led up to it were not removed, might recur, although in a different form"; if he had used "plain language" to President Krueger; and if, above all, he had remembered--as Mr.

    Chamberlain reminded him--that "the people of Johannesburg had surrendered in the belief that reasonable concessions would have been arranged through his intervention, and until these were granted, or were definitely promised to him by the President, the root-causes of the recent troubles would remain,"--might he not yet have saved South Africa for the empire without subjecting her to the dread arbitrament of the sword?

    [Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain.]

    It is in the answer to this question that we find the actual cause of the utter failure of Rhodes's plan. The truth is that success in any real sense--that is to say, success which would have strengthened British supremacy and promoted the union of European South Africa--was impossible. The sole response which Lord Rosmead returned to Mr.

    Chamberlain's counsels was the weary confession: "The question of concessions to Uitlanders has never been discussed between President Krueger and myself." The methods employed by Rhodes were so questionable that no High Commissioner could have allowed the Imperial Government to have derived any advantage from them.

    To have gained the franchise for the Uitlanders as the result of violent and unscrupulous action, would have inflicted an enduring injury upon the British cause in South Africa for which the enfranchisement itself would have been small compensation. The disclosure of these methods and, with them, of the hollowness of Rhodes's alliance with the Afrikander Bond, alarmed and incensed the whole Dutch population of South Africa. What this meant Lord Rosmead knew, and Mr. Chamberlain did not know.

    The ten years' truce between the forces of the Afrikander nationalists and the paramount Power was at an end. To combat these forces something better than the methods of the Raid was required. Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis! No modern race have excelled the Dutch in courage and endurance. In Europe they had successfully defended their independence against the flower of the armies of Spain, Austria, and France. The South African Dutch were not inferior in these qualities to the people of the parent stock.

    If such a race, embarked upon what it conceived to be a struggle for national existence, was to be overcome, the hands of the conqueror must be clean as well as strong.

    None the less the active sympathy with the Uitlanders exhibited in Mr.

    Chamberlain's despatches was welcomed by the British as evidence that the new Colonial Secretary was more alert and determined than his predecessors. For the first time in the history of British administration in South Africa, Downing Street had shown itself more zealous than Capetown. It was the solitary ray of light that broke the universal gloom in which South Africa was enshrouded by the catastrophe of the Raid.

    CHAPTER II

    THE CREED OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONALISTS[16]

    [Footnote 16: "This is our Afrikander character. The
    descendants of Hollanders, Germans and Frenchmen
    inter-married, and are only known at present by their
    surnames. They form the Afrikander nationality, and call
    themselves Afrikanders. The Afrikanders are no more
    Hollanders than Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans.

    They have
    their own language, own morals and customs; they are just as
    much a nation as any other."--De Patriot, in the course of
    an article headed "A Common but Dangerous Error"--the error
    in question being the assertion that "the Cape Colony is an
    English colony" (translated and reproduced in The Cape
    Times
    , September 3th, 1884).]

    In the face of the colossal resistance offered to the British arms by the Boers and their colonial kinsmen in the South African War, it may seem unnecessary to produce any evidence in support of the contention that the military strength then displayed by the Dutch in South Africa was the result of long and careful preparation. But the same inability to grasp the facts of the South African situation which kept the Army Corps in England three months after it should have been sent to the Cape, is still to be met with.

    This attitude of mind--whether it be a consciousness of moral rectitude, or a mere insular disdain of looking at things from any but a British point of view--is still to be observed in the statements of those politicians who will even now deny that any trace of a definite plan of action, or of a concerted purpose, which could properly be described as a "conspiracy" against British supremacy was to be found among the Dutch population of South Africa as a whole, prior to the outbreak of the war.

    It is for the benefit of such politicians in part, and still more with a view of bringing the mind of the reader into something approaching a direct contact with the actual working of the Afrikander mind, that I transcribe a statement of the pure doctrine of the Bond, as it was expounded by the German, Borckenhagen, and his followers in the Free State. It will, however, be convenient to preface the quotation with a word of explanation in respect both of the text and the personality of Borckenhagen.

    [Sidenote: Carl Borckenhagen.]

    The passage, which is taken verbatim from a work entitled, "The Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed," is a collection of sentences gathered from Dutch pamphlets and articles "emanating from Holland," and translated literally into the somewhat uncouth English of the text. The author of the work, Mr. C. H. Thomas, was for many years a burgher of the Free State, where he shared the opinions of President Brand, and subsequently supported Mr. J. G. Fraser in opposing the policy of "closer union" with the South African Republic, advocated by Brand's successor, Mr. F. W. Reitz.

    The point of view from which the Dutch of Holland regarded the nationalist movement in South Africa was succinctly stated in an article published by the Amsterdam Handelsblad in 1881.

    "The future of England lies in India, and the future of Holland
    in South Africa.... When our capitalists vigorously develop this
    trade, and, for example, form a syndicate to buy Delagoa Bay from
    Portugal, then a railway from Capetown to Bloemfontein,
    Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Delagoa Bay will be a lucrative
    investment. And when, in course of time, the Dutch language shall
    universally prevail in South Africa, this most extensive
    territory will become a North America for Holland, and enable us
    to balance the Anglo-Saxon race."[17]

    [Footnote 17: Quoted by Du Toit in De Patriot: translation
    from the English reprint of De Transvaalse Oorlog.]

    Carl Borckenhagen, who, with Mr. Reitz,[18] advocated the establishment of the Bond in 1881, was a German republican. His name has been associated with Mr. Thomas's summary of the Bond propaganda in the Free State, because, as editor of The Bloemfontein Express up to the time of his death, early in 1898, he was probably the most consistent of all the South African exponents of the nationalist creed. Certainly it is no exaggeration to say that he converted the Free State of Brand into the Free State of Steyn.

    [Footnote 18: Then Judge, afterwards President of the Free
    State, and State-Secretary of the South African Republic in
    succession to Dr. Leyds.]

    [Sidenote: The doctrine of the Bond.]

    "THE BOND PROGRAMME

    "The Afrikander Bond has as final object what is summed up in its
    motto of 'Afrika voor de Afrikaners.' The whole of South Africa
    belongs by just right to the Afrikander nation. It is the
    privilege and duty of every Afrikander to contribute all in his
    power towards the expulsion of the English usurper. The States of
    South Africa to be federated in one independent Republic.

    The Afrikander Bond prepares for this consummation.

    Argument in justification:--

    (a) The transfer of the Cape Colony to the British Government
    took place by circumstances of force majeure and without the
    consent of the Dutch nation, who renounced all claim in favour of
    the Afrikander or Boer nation.

    (b) Natal is territory which accrued to a contingent of the
    Boer nation by purchase from the Zulu king, who received the
    consideration agreed for.

    (c) The British authorities expelled the rightful owners from
    Natal by force of arms without just cause.

    The task of the Afrikander Bond consists in:

    (a) Procuring the staunch adhesion and co-operation of every
    Afrikander and other real friend of the cause.

    (b) To obtain the sympathy, the moral and effective aid, of one
    or more of the world's Powers.

    The means to accomplish those tasks are:

    Personal persuasion, Press propaganda, legislation and diplomacy.

    The direction of the application of these means is entrusted to a
    select body of members eligible for their loyalty to the cause
    and their abilities and position. That body will conduct such
    measures as need the observance of special secrecy. Upon the rest
    of the members will devolve activities of a general character
    under the direction of the selected chiefs.

    One of the indispensable requisites is the proper organisation of
    an effective fund, which is to be regularly sustained. Bond
    members will aid each other in all relations of public life in
    preference to non-members.

    In the efforts of gaining adherence to the cause it is of
    importance to distinguish three categories of persons:

    (1) The class of Afrikanders who are to some extent deteriorated
    by assimilative influences with the English race, whose
    restoration to patriotism will need great efforts, discretion,
    and patience.

    (2) The apparently unthinking and apathetic class who prefer to
    relegate all initiative to leaders whom they will loyally follow.
    This class is the most numerous by far.

    (3) The warmly patriotic class, including men gifted with
    intelligence, energy, and speech, qualified as leaders, and apt
    to exercise influence over the rest.

    • * * * *

    Among these three classes many exist whose views and religious
    scruples need to be corrected. Scripture abounds in proofs and
    salient analogies applying to the situation and justifying our
    cause. In this, as well as in other directions, the members who
    work in circulating written propaganda will supply the correct
    and conclusive arguments accessible to all.

    Upon the basis of our just rights the British Government, if not
    the entire nation, is the usurping enemy of the Boer nation.

    In dealing with an enemy it is justifiable to employ, besides
    force, also means of a less open character, such as diplomacy and
    stratagem.

    [Sidenote: Anti-british methods.]

    The greatest danger to Afrikanderdom is the English policy of
    Anglicising the Boer nation--to submerge it by the process of
    assimilation.

    A distinct attitude of holding aloof from English influences is
    the only remedy against that peril and for thwarting that
    insidious policy.

    It is only such an attitude that will preserve the nation in its
    simple faith and habits of morality, and provide safety against
    the dangers of contamination and pernicious examples, with all
    their fateful consequences to body and soul.

    Let the Dutch language have the place of honour in schools and
    homes.

    Let alliances of marriage with the English be stamped as
    unpatriotic.

    Let every Afrikander see that he is at all times well armed with
    the best possible weapons, and maintains the expert use of the
    rifle among young and old, so as to be ready when duty calls, and
    the time is ripe for asserting the nation's rights and being rid
    of English thraldom.

    Employ teachers only who are animated with truly patriotic
    sentiments.

    Let it be well understood that English domination will also bring
    English intolerance and servitude, for it is only a very frail
    link which separates the English State Church from actual
    Romanism, and its proselytism en bloc is only a matter of short
    time.

    Equally repugnant and dangerous is England's policy towards the
    coloured races, whom she aims, for the sake of industrial profit,
    at elevating to equal rank with whites, in direct conflict with
    spiritual authority--a policy which incites coloured people to
    rivalry with their superiors, and can only end in common
    disaster.

    Whilst remaining absolutely independent, the ties of blood,
    relationship, and language point to Holland for a domestic base.

    As to commerce, Germany, America, and other industrial nations
    could more than fill the gap left by England, and such
    connections should be cultivated as a potent means towards
    obtaining foreign support to our cause and identification with
    it.

    If the mineral wealth of the Transvaal and Orange Free State
    becomes established--as appears certain from discoveries already
    made--England will not rest until these are also hers.

    The leopard will retain its spots. The independence of both
    Republics is at stake on that account alone, with the risk that
    the rightful owners of the land will become the hewers of wood
    and drawers of water for the usurpers.

    There is no alternative hope for the peace and progress of South
    Africa except by the total excision of the British ulcer.

    Reliable signs are not wanting to show that our nation is
    designed by Providence as the instrument for the recovery of its
    rights, and for the chastisement of proud, perfidious
    Albion."[19]

    [Footnote 19: P. 64 et seq. of The Origin of the
    Anglo-Boer War Revealed
    (Hodder & Stoughton).]

    These brief and disjointed sentences present in their shortest form arguments and exhortations with which the Dutch population of the Free State, the Transvaal, and the Cape Colony, were familiarised through the Press, the pulpit, the platform, and through individual intercourse and advocacy, from the time of the Retrocession in 1881 onwards.

    It is in effect the scheme of a Bond "worked out more in detail by some friends at Bloemfontein," as published by Borckenhagen in his paper, The Bloemfontein Express, on April 7th, 1881, to which Du Toit, the founder of the Bond in the Cape Colony, referred in the pamphlet, De Transvaalse Oorlog (The Transvaal War), which he issued from his press at the Paarl later on in the same year.

    The nationalist creed, as thus formulated, was preached consistently in the Free State; but in the Cape Colony it was modified by Hofmeyr to meet the exigencies of Colonial politics.

    None the less it was in the Cape Colony that the Bond, as a political organisation, was destined to find its chief sphere of action. In the Free State it was discouraged by President Brand, and in point of fact the British population was too insignificant a factor in the politics of the central republic to make it necessary to maintain a distinct organisation for the promotion of nationalist sentiment. In the Transvaal, again, the Bond maintained no regular organisation. And this for two reasons.

    Every burgher of the northern Republic was sufficiently animated by the anti-British sentiments which it was intended to promote; and the only "constitution" which the Transvaal Dutch would accept was one which embodied principles so flagrantly inconsistent with submission to British authority that it could not be adopted by the branches of the Bond in the Cape Colony without exposing its members to immediate prosecution for high treason.[20]

    [Footnote 20: Under the changed conditions of to-day the Boer
    population is organised in the Transvaal into Het Volk, and
    in the Orange River Colony into the Oranjie Unie; both
    practically identical with the Bond in the Cape Colony.]

    [Sidenote: The origin of the Bond.]

    In the politics of the Cape Colony, however, the Bond became the predominant force; and any picture, however briefly sketched, of South Africa as it was when Lord Milner's administration commenced, must include some account of the origin and methods of this remarkable organisation.

    The origin of the Afrikander Bond is to be found in the articles written by the Rev. S. J. du Toit, a Dutch predikant, in De Patriot, a newspaper published at the Paarl, of which he was the editor. Mr. du Toit's political standpoint is sufficiently revealed by the fact that in 1881 he claimed that De Patriot had done more than any other single agency to secure the successful revolt of the Boers from British authority accomplished in that year.

    The inspiration which drove his pen to advocate the founding of a political organisation, that should serve to prepare the way for a more general and complete "war of independence," was the defeat of the British troops by the Transvaal burghers.

    "This is now our time," he wrote, in the same year, "to establish
    the Bond, while a national consciousness has been awakened
    through the Transvaal War. And the Bond must be our preparation
    for the future confederation of all the States and Colonies of
    South Africa. The English Government keeps talking of a
    confederation under the British flag. That will never happen. We
    can assure them of that. We have often said it: there is just one
    hindrance to confederation, and that is the English flag. Let
    them take that away, and the confederation under the free
    Afrikander flag would be established.

    But so long as the English
    flag remains here the Afrikander Bond must be our confederation.
    And the British will, after a while, realise that Froude's advice
    is the best for them: they must just have Simon's Bay as a naval
    and military station on the road to India, and give over all the
    rest of South Africa to the Afrikanders."[21]

    [Footnote 21: Reprint of a pamphlet (found with the first
    leaf torn) containing an English translation of De
    Transvaalse Oorlog
    , p. 8.]

    This general statement of the purpose of the Bond was supported by reiterated appeals to racial passion:

    "The little respect which the Afrikander had for British troops
    and cannons [up to the Majuba defeat]," he writes, "is utterly
    done away. And England has learnt so much respect for us
    Afrikanders that she will take care not to be so ready to make
    war with us again.... The Englishman has made himself hated,
    language and all. And this is well."

    [Sidenote: The objects of the Bond.]

    When, by the use of these and even more violent expressions, the mind of the Dutch population had been sufficiently aroused, Du Toit proceeded to unfold his plan of campaign. His modus operandi is similar to that of Borckenhagen in its main features. The Bond, says De Patriot, must boycott all English traders, except only those who are ready to adopt its principles. English signboards, advertisements, shops and book-keepers, must be abolished. The English banks must be replaced by a National Bank. No land must be sold to Englishmen.

    The Republics must "make their own ammunition, and be well supplied with cannon, and provide a regiment of artillery to work them." And he cheerfully notices that "at Heidelberg there are already 4,000 cartridges made daily, and a few skilful Afrikanders have begun to make shells, too. This is right: so must we become a nation." For the Cape Colony, however, "such preparations are not so especially necessary." But, most of all, Du Toit insists upon the need of combating the growing use of the English language.

    "English education," he laments, "has done more mischief to our country and nation than we can express." And, therefore, he urges "war" against the English language. In the schools, in the Church, and "in our family life above all," it must be considered a "disgrace to speak English.... Who will join the war? All true Afrikanders, we hope."

    Thus was the Bond, the child of Majuba, quickened into conscious being by the fiery pen of the predikant, Du Toit. Poor Du Toit! His after life was a strange commentary upon this early triumph of his brain, won in the drowsy solitudes of the Paarl. Summoned to be Director of Education in the Transvaal, he was quickly disillusioned of his love of his Dutch mother-country by actual intercourse with the contemptuous Hollanders whom Krueger had invited to serve the Republic.

    Later, again, he was rejected by the Bond which he had himself created, and driven to find comfort in the broad freedom of allegiance to an Empire-state.

    The object of the Bond, as stated by Du Toit in De Transvaalse Oorlog, was the "creation of a South African nationality ... through the establishment of this Bond in all states and colonies of South Africa." Its organisation was to consist of a central governing body (bestuur), with provincial, district, and ward besturen.

    The central bestuur was to be composed of five members, two for the Cape Colony, and one each for the Transvaal, Natal, and Free State, who were "to meet yearly in one or other of the chief towns of the component states." The provincial besturen, consisting of one representative from each of the district besturen, were to meet every six months at their respective colonial or state capitals.[22]

    [Footnote 22: De Transvaalse Oorlog, pp. 7 and 8.]

    The first Congress of the Afrikander Bond was held at Graaf Reinet in

    1. In the draft constitution then drawn up for the approval of its

    members, the relationship of the Bond to the British Government in South Africa was defined with commendable frankness. In the "Programme of Principles" was the article:

    In itself acknowledging no single form of government as the only
    suitable form, and whilst acknowledging the form of government
    existing at present, [the Bond] means that the aim of our
    national development must be a united South Africa under its own
    flag.

    [Sidenote: Hofmeyr's influence.]

    And it was upon the basis of this "Programme of Principles" that the earliest Bond organisations were formed in the Transvaal, the Free State, and the Cape Colony. In the year following the Graaf Reinet Congress, however, the "Farmers' Protection Association" was amalgamated with the Bond in the Cape Colony, and the influence of Mr.

    J. H. Hofmeyr led the joint organisation to adopt a modified "programme." Mr. Hofmeyr, who was destined afterwards to assume the undisputed headship of the Bond, was an economist as well as a nationalist. He was intensely interested in the development of the country districts, and he saw that the conditions of agriculture could hardly be improved without the co-operation of the British and more progressive section of the farming class.

    He also knew that an organisation, professing to forward aims of avowed disloyalty, would rapidly find itself in collision with the Cape Government. With the growth of Mr. Hofmeyr's influence the policy, though not the aims, of the Bond was changed. All declarations, such as the clause "under its own flag," inconsistent with allegiance to the British Crown were omitted from the official constitution, and its individual members were exhorted to avoid any behaviour or expressions likely to prevent Englishmen from joining the organisation.

    As early as 1884 the Bond secured the return of twenty-five members to the Cape Parliament, and it was their support that enabled the Upington Ministry to maintain itself in office against an opposition which consisted of the main body of the representatives elected by the British population; and from this date onwards it was the recognised aim of Mr.

    Hofmeyr to control the Legislature of the Colony by making it impossible for any ministry to dispense with the support of the Bond members, although he refrained from putting a ministry of Bondsmen into office.

    To have done this latter might have united the British population and their representatives in a solid phalanx, and endangered the success of the effort to separate the British settlers in the country districts from the more recent arrivals from England--mostly townsmen--which remained a fruitful source of Afrikander influence up to the time of the Jameson Raid.

    By representing the new British population, which followed in the wake of the mineral discoveries, as "fortune-seekers" and adventurers and not genuine colonists, the Bond endeavoured, not merely to widen the natural line of cleavage between the townsman and the countryman, but actually to detach the older British settlers from sympathy with the mother country, and, by drawing them within the sphere of Afrikander nationalist aspirations, to make them share its own antagonism to British supremacy.

    [Sidenote: Merriman and the Bond.]

    But, in spite of the change of policy due to Mr. Hofmeyr, the old leaven of stalwart Bondsmen remained sufficiently in evidence to draw from Mr. J. X. Merriman--then a strong Imperialist in close association with Mr. J. W. Leonard--a striking rebuke. The speech in question was made, fittingly enough, at Grahamstown, the most "English" town in South Africa, in 1885. It was reprinted with complete appropriateness, in The Cape Times of July 10th, 1899. The struggle which Mr. Merriman had foreseen fourteen years before was then near at hand; while Mr.

    Merriman himself had become a member of a ministry placed in power by the Bond for the avowed purpose of "combating the British Government."

    "The situation is a grave one," he said. "It is not a question of
    localism; it is not a question of party politics; but it is a
    question whether the Cape Colony is to continue to be an integral
    part of the British Empire.... You will have to keep public men
    up to the mark, and each one of you will have to make up his mind
    whether he is prepared to see this colony remain a part of the
    British Empire, which carries with it obligations as well as
    privileges, or whether he is prepared to obey the dictates of the
    Bond.

    From the very first time, some years ago, when the poison
    began to be instilled into the country, I felt that it must come
    to this--Is England or the Transvaal to be the paramount force in
    South Africa?... Since then that institution has made a show of
    loyalty, while it stirred up disloyalty.... Some people, who
    should have known better, were dragged into the toils under the
    idea that they could influence it for good, but the whole
    teaching of history goes to show that when the conflict was
    between men of extreme views and moderate men, the violent
    section triumphed.

    And so we see that some moderate men are in
    the power of an institution whose avowed object is to combat the
    British Government. In any other country such an organisation
    could not have grown; but here, among a scattered population, it
    has insidiously and successfully worked.... No one who wishes
    well for the British Government could have read the leading
    articles of the Zuid Africaan, and Express, and De Patriot,
    in expounding the Bond principles, without seeing that the
    maintenance of law and order under the British Crown and the
    object they have in view are absolutely different things.

    My
    quarrel with the Bond is that it stirs up race differences. Its
    main object is to make the South African Republic the paramount
    power in South Africa."

    This was plain speaking. The rare insight revealed in such a sentence as this--"in any other country such an organisation could not have grown, but here, among a scattered population, it has insidiously and successfully worked"; the piquant incident of the reproduction of the speech on the eve of the war; the fact that the man who made this diagnosis was to drink the poison whose fatal effects he described so faithfully, was indeed to become the most bitter opponent of the great statesman that "kept South Africa a part of the British Empire,"--these things together make Mr.

    Merriman's Grahamstown speech one of the most curious and instructive of the political utterances of the period.

    [Sidenote: Change of Bond policy.]

    In the year following (1886) the Bond met officially, for the first and only time, as an inter-state organisation. Bloemfontein was the place of assemblage, and in the Central Bestuur, or Committee, the South African Republic, the Free State, and the Cape Colony were each represented by two delegates.

    This meeting revealed the practical difficulties which prevented the Cape nationalists from adopting the definitely anti-British programme of the Bond leaders in the Republics; and the conflict of commercial interests between the Cape Colony and the Transvaal, already initiated by the attempt of the latter to secure Bechuanaland in 1884-5, confirmed the Cape delegates in their decision to develop the Bond in the Cape Colony upon colonial rather than inter-state lines.

    The result of the divergences of aim manifested at Bloemfontein was speedily made apparent in the Cape Colony. In 1887 Mr. T. P. Theron, then Secretary of the Bond, delivered an address in which the new, or Hofmeyr, programme was formulated and officially adopted. In recommending the new policy to the members of the Bond, Mr. Theron made no secret of the nature of the considerations by which its leaders had been chiefly influenced.

    "You must remember," he said, "that the eyes of all are directed
    towards you. The Press will cause your actions, expressions, and
    resolutions to be known everywhere. You cannot but feel how much
    depends on us for our nation and our country. If we must plead
    guilty in the past of many an unguarded expression, let us be
    more cautious and guarded for the future."

    And he then proceeded to sketch a picture of racial conciliation, when all "differences and disagreements" between Dutch and English would be merged in the consciousness of a new and common nationality--pointing out, however, that the advent of that day depended on "you and me, my fellow Bond members."

    [Sidenote: Rhodes and Hofmeyr.]

    Assuming that the predominance of Afrikander ideals could be secured only by the complete separation of the local governments from the Government of Great Britain, nothing could be more masterly than the manner in which the Bond approached the task of reuniting the European communities of South Africa--the task which the Imperial Government had abandoned as hopeless.

    As inspired and controlled by Hofmeyr during the years between this date (1887) and the Jameson Raid, the Bond embodied a volume of effort in which the most sincere supporter of the British connection could co-operate. It was the assistance afforded by the Bond in moulding British administration in South Africa upon South African lines that provided the common ground upon which Rhodes and Hofmeyr met in their long alliance.

    Hofmeyr probably never abandoned his belief that a republican form of government was the inevitable denouement to which the administration of South Africa on a basis of South African ideas must lead. Rhodes never wavered in his loyalty to the British connection.

    But there was a great body of useful work which both men could accomplish in common, which each desired to see accomplished, which, when accomplished, would leave each free to choose the path--Republican or Imperial--by which the last stage was to be traversed and the goal of South African unity finally attained.

    The character and career of Rhodes afford material for a study of such peculiar and engrossing interest that any adequate treatment of the subject would require a separate volume. Fortunately, the broad facts of his life are sufficiently well known to make it unnecessary to attempt the almost impossible task of condensing a volume within the limits of a few pages.

    None the less, there is one incident in his political career which must be recalled here, and that for the simple reason that it establishes two facts, each of which is essential to the complete understanding of the situation in the Cape Colony as it developed immediately after the Raid. First, that all through the years of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance the Bond remained at heart true to the aim which it had at first openly avowed--the aim of establishing a united South Africa under its own flag.

    And second, that Rhodes was equally staunch in maintaining his ideal of a united South Africa under the British flag. The incident which exhibits both these facts in the clearest light is the refusal by Rhodes of the overtures made to him by Borckenhagen. At the time when these overtures were made Rhodes was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, the Chartered Company had been successfully launched, and the alliance between himself and Hofmeyr was in full operation.

    The occasion which led to them was the opening of the railway at Bloemfontein in 1890--a railway constructed by the Cape Government under a friendly arrangement with the Free State. And it was one, therefore, which afforded a conspicuous example of the value of the Bond influence as a means of securing progress in the direction of South African unity.

    The story was told by Rhodes himself in a speech which he made in the Cape Colony on March 12th, 1898.

    [Sidenote: Rhodes and Borckenhagen.]

    "I remember," he said, "that we had a great meeting at
    Bloemfontein, and in the usual course I had to make a speech. I
    think I was your Prime Minister. And this speech pleased many
    there, and especially--and I speak of him with the greatest
    respect--a gentleman who is dead, Mr. Borckenhagen. He came to me
    and asked me to dictate to him the whole of my speech. I said, 'I
    never wrote a speech, and I don't know what I said; but I will
    tell you what I know about it.' He wrote it down, and afterwards
    came to Capetown with me.... He spoke very nicely to me about my
    speech. 'Mr.

    Rhodes, we want a united South Africa.' And I said,
    'So do I; I am with you entirely. We must have a united South
    Africa.' He said, 'There is nothing in the way.' And I said, 'No;
    there is nothing in the way. Well,' I said, 'we are one.' 'Yes,'
    he said, 'and I will tell you: we will take you as our leader,'
    he said. 'There is only one small thing, and that is, we must, of
    course, be independent to the rest of the world.' I said, 'No;
    you take me either for a rogue or a fool.

    I would be a rogue to
    forget all my history and traditions; and I would be a fool,
    because I would be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by
    yours.' From that day he assumed a most acrid tone in his
    Express towards myself, and I was made full sorry at times by
    the tone. But that was the overpowering thought in his mind--an
    independent South Africa."[23]

    [Footnote 23: Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and
    Speeches.
    By Vindex; p. 533. Borckenhagen had just died.]

    The facts here disclosed explain how it was that the apparently satisfactory situation in South Africa before the Raid so rapidly developed into the dangerous situation of the years that followed it.

    The Raid tore aside the veil which the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance had cast over the eyes alike of Dutch and British, and left them free to see the essential antagonism of aim between the two men in its naked truth.[24] From that moment Rhodes was recognised by the Bond as its chief and most dangerous enemy; and as such he was pursued by its bitterest hostility to the day of his death; while Rhodes, on the other hand, was driven to seek support solely in the people of his own nationality. From that moment the Bond fell back upon the policy of

    1. The Dutch Press, pulpit, and platform commenced an active

    nationalist propaganda on the old racial lines; and the advocacy of anti-British aims increased in boldness and in definiteness as the Transvaal grew strong with its inflowing armaments.

    [Footnote 24: Ons Land, reputed to be controlled by Hofmeyr
    himself, and certainly the recognised organ of the Bond,
    published a paean of triumph over the surrender of Dr.
    Jameson's troopers at Doornkop. "Afrikanderdom has awakened
    to a sense of earnestness which we have not observed since
    the heroic war of liberty in 1881. From the Limpopo, as far
    as Capetown, the second Majuba has given birth to a new
    inspiration and a new movement amongst our people in South
    Africa....

    The flaccid and cowardly imperialism that had
    already begun to dilute and weaken our national blood,
    gradually turned aside before the new current that permeated
    our people.... Now or never the foundation of a
    wide-embracing nationalism must be laid....

    The partition
    wall has disappeared ... never has the necessity for a policy
    of a colonial and republican union been greater; now the
    psychological moment has arrived; now our people have
    awakened all over South Africa; a new glow illumines our
    hearts; let us lay the foundation-stone of a real United
    South Africa on the soil of a pure and all-comprehensive
    national sentiment."]

    [Sidenote: Effects of the raid.]

    We are now in a position to sum up the main features of the situation in South Africa as Lord Milner found it. British administration, controlled from Downing Street, had quickly led to what Sir George Grey called the dismemberment of European South Africa. The Imperial Government, having found out its mistake, had endeavoured to regain the lost solidarity of the European communities and its authority over them, by bringing the Republics into a federal system under the British Crown.

    It had been thwarted in this endeavour by the military resistance of the Boers in the Transvaal, and the fear of a like resistance on the part of the Dutch population throughout South Africa. Its impotency had invited, and in part justified, the efforts made by local British initiative to solve the problem of South African unity on South African lines, but in a manner consistent with the maintenance of British supremacy. The early success of these efforts, prosecuted mainly through the agency of Rhodes, had been obliterated by the Jameson Raid.

    All attempts to secure the reunion of South Africa under the British flag having failed alike under Imperial and local British initiative, the way was open for the Afrikander nationalists once more to put forward the alternative plan of a united South Africa under its own flag, which they had formulated in the year immediately following the retrocession of the Transvaal.

    In proportion as the friends and supporters of British supremacy were discredited and depressed by the catastrophe of the Raid, the advocates and promoters of Afrikander nationalism were emboldened and encouraged. It was not Sir Gordon Sprigg, the Prime Minister of the Cape who succeeded the discredited Rhodes (January 13th, 1896), but Mr. Hofmeyr, the veteran leader of the Afrikander Bond, that dictated the policy which Lord Rosmead must pursue to re-establish the integrity of the Imperial Government in the minds of its Dutch subjects. At the next presidential election in the Free State (March 4th, 1896), Mr. J. G.

    Fraser, the head of the moderate party which followed in the steps of President Brand, was hopelessly beaten by Mr.

    Marthinus Steyn, an Afrikander nationalist of the scientific school of Borckenhagen, and a politician whose immediate programme included the "closer union" of that state with the South African Republic, the terms of which were finally settled at Bloemfontein on March 9th,

    1. In the Cape Colony the Bond organised its resources with a view

    of securing even more complete control of the Cape Legislature at the general election of 1898. And lastly, President Krueger, who had ceased to rely upon Holland for administrative talent, and opened the lucrative offices of the South African Republic to the ambitious and educated Afrikander youth of the Free State and Cape Colony, commenced methodically and secretly to supply arms and ammunition to the adherents of the nationalist cause in the British Colonies.

    [Sidenote: Situation in 1896.]

    But disastrous as was the Jameson Raid in its method of execution and immediate effects, it produced certain results that cannot be held to have been prejudicial to the British cause in South Africa, if once we recognise the fact that the English people as a whole were totally ignorant, at the time of its occurrence, of the extent to which the sub-continent had already slipped from their grasp. Something of the long advance towards the goal of nationalist ambition, achieved by the Bond, was revealed.

    The emphatic cry of "Hands off" to Germany, for which the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation provided the occasion, was undoubtedly the means of arresting the progress of that power, at a point when further progress would have gained her a foot-hold in South Africa from which nothing short of actual hostilities could have dislodged her.

    And more important still was the fact that the Raid, with its train of dramatic incidents, had published, once and for all, the humiliating position of the British population in the Transvaal throughout the length and breadth of the Anglo-Saxon world, and compelled the Imperial Government to pledge itself to obtain the redress of the "admitted grievances" of the Uitlanders.

    [Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's policy.]

    Against the rallying forces of Afrikander nationalism Mr. Chamberlain, for the moment, had nothing to oppose but the vague and as yet unknown power of an awakened Imperial sentiment. Lord Rosmead's attitude at Pretoria had convinced him of the uselessness of expecting that any satisfactory settlement of the franchise question could be brought about through the agency of the High Commissioner.

    He, therefore, invited President Krueger to visit England in the hope that his own personal advocacy of the cause of the Uitlanders, backed up by the weight of the Salisbury Government, might remove the "root causes" of Transvaal unrest. But President Krueger refused to confer with the Colonial Secretary upon any other than the wholly inadmissible basis of the conversion of the London Convention into a treaty of amity such as one independent power might conclude with another. Mr.

    Chamberlain, therefore, having put upon record that the purpose of the proposed conference was to give effect to the London Convention and not to destroy it, proceeded to formulate a South African policy that would enable him to make the most effective use of the authority of Great Britain as paramount Power.

    His purpose was to win Dutch opinion in the Free State and the Cape Colony to the side of the Imperial Government, and then to use this more progressive Dutch opinion as the fulcrum by which the lever of Imperial remonstrance was to be successfully applied to the Transvaal Government.

    In the speech[25] in which he sketched the main lines of this policy he declared emphatically that the paramount power of England was to be maintained at all costs, that foreign intervention would not be permitted under any pretence, and that the admitted grievances of the Uitlanders were to be redressed:

    [Footnote 25: 1896.]

    "We have," he continued, "a confident hope that we shall be able
    in the course of no lengthened time to restore the situation as
    it was before the invasion of the Transvaal, to have at our backs
    the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population
    in South Africa, and if we have that, the opinion--the united
    opinion--which that will constitute, will be an opinion which no
    power in Africa can resist."

    With the record of the last ten years before us it seems strange that Mr. Chamberlain should ever have believed in the efficacy of such a policy: still more strange that he should have spoken of his "confident hope" of winning the Afrikander nationalists to support the paramount Power.

    But it must be remembered that the evidence of the real sentiments and purposes of the nationalists here set forth in the preceding pages, and now the common property of all educated Englishmen, was then known only to perhaps a dozen journalists and politicians in England; and if these men had attempted to impart their knowledge to the general public, they would have failed from the sheer inability of the average Englishman to believe that "British subjects" under responsible government could be anything but loyal to the Imperial tie.

    But little as Mr. Chamberlain knew of the real strength of the forces of Afrikander nationalism, he discerned enough of the South African situation to realise that this policy would have no chance of success, unless the maintenance of the British cause in South Africa was placed in the hands of a personality of exceptional vigour and capacity.

    When, therefore, Lord Rosmead intimated his desire to be relieved of the heavy responsibility of the joint offices of High Commissionship for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony no attempt to dissuade him was made. His health had been enfeebled for some time past, and he did not long survive his return to England. Both in Australia and at the Cape he had devoted his strength and ability to the service of the Empire. In the years 1883-5 he had resolutely and successfully opposed the attempt of the Transvaal Boers to seize Bechuanaland.

    His failure to control his powerful and impatient Prime Minister is mitigated by the circumstance that it was solely on the ground of public interest that, upon the retirement of Lord Loch in 1895, he had allowed himself, in spite of his advanced years and indifferent health, to assume the office of High Commissioner for a third time.

    CHAPTER III

    A YEAR OF OBSERVATION

    Lord Rosmead retired early in 1897. It is said that three men so different in character as Lord Salisbury, Mr. Chamberlain, and Mr.

    Stead, each separately fixed upon the same name as being that of the man most capable of undertaking the position of High Commissioner in South Africa--a position always difficult, but now more than ever arduous and responsible. To nine out of every ten men with whom he had been brought into contact there was little in Sir Alfred Milner--as he then was--to distinguish him from other high-principled, capable, and pleasant-mannered heads of departments in the Civil Service. His metier was finance, and his accomplishment literature.

    Commencing with journalism and an unsuccessful contest (in the Liberal interest) for the Harrow division of Middlesex, he had been private secretary to Lord Goschen, Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt, and Head of the Inland Revenue. In this latter office he had given invaluable assistance to Sir William Harcourt, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, in respect of what is perhaps the most successful of recent methods of raising revenue--the death duties.

    The principle of the graduated death duties was Harcourt's; but it was Milner who worked out the elaborate system which rendered his ideas coherent, and enabled them eventually to be put into effect. Academic distinctions, however ample, cannot be said to-day to afford a definite assurance of pre-eminent capacity for the service of the State.

    Yet it was certainly no disadvantage to Sir Alfred Milner to have been a scholar of Balliol, or a President of the Oxford Union.[26] Whatever direct knowledge the educated public had of him was based probably upon the impression created by his book England in Egypt.

    This was a work which indicated that its author had formed high ideals of English statesmanship, and that his experience of a complex administrative system, working in a political society full of intrigue and international jealousy, had developed in him the rare qualities of insight and humour. Some of his readers might have reflected that an active association with so accomplished a master of financial and administrative method as Lord Cromer was in itself a useful equipment for a colonial administrator.

    [Footnote 26: Mr. Bodley, in his Coronation of King Edward
    VII.
    , remarks that of the seventy Balliol scholars elected
    during the mastership of Jowett (1870-1893) only three had at
    that time (1902) "attained eminence in any branch of public
    life." These three were Mr. H. H. Asquith, Dr. Charles Gore
    (then Bishop of Worcester), and Lord Milner.]

    [Sidenote: Sir Alfred Milner.]

    But the British public, both in England and South Africa, took their view of the appointment from the opinions expressed by the many prominent men to whom Sir Alfred Milner was personally known. The leaders and the Press of both parties were unstinted in approval of the choice which Mr. Chamberlain had made. The banquet given to Sir Alfred Milner three weeks before his departure to the Cape (March 28th, 1897) provided an occasion for an expression of unrestrained admiration and confidence unique in the annals of English public life.

    "He has the union of intellect with fascination that makes men mount high," wrote Lord Rosebery. And Sir William Harcourt, "the most grateful and obliged" of Milner's "many friends and admirers," pronounced him to be "a man deserving of all praise and all affection." Mr.

    Asquith, who presided, stated in a speech marked throughout by a note of intimate friendliness that "no appointment of our time has been received with a larger measure both of the approbation of experienced men and of the applause of the public." The office itself was "at the present moment the most arduous and responsible in the administrative service of the country." Not only "embarrassing problems," but "formidable personalities" would confront the new High Commissioner for South Africa:

    "But," he added, "we know that he takes with him as clear an
    intellect and as sympathetic an imagination, and, if need should
    arise, a power of resolution as tenacious and as inflexible as
    belongs to any man of our acquaintance."

    Milner's reply is significant of the spirit in which he had undertaken his task. Like Rhodes, he had found in his Oxford studies the reasoned basis for an enlightened Imperialism. Chief among his earliest political convictions was the belief that--

    "there was no political object comparable in importance with that
    of preventing a repetition of such a disaster [as the loss of the
    United States]: the severance of another link in the great
    Imperial chain.... It is a great privilege to be allowed to fill
    any position in the character of what I may be, perhaps, allowed
    to call a 'civilian soldier of the Empire.' To succeed in it, to
    render any substantial service to any part of our world-wide
    State, would be all that in any of my most audacious dreams I had
    ever ventured to aspire to.

    But in a cause in which one
    absolutely believes, even failure--personal failure, I mean, for
    the cause itself is not going to fail--would be preferable to an
    easy life of comfortable prosperity in another sphere."

    [Sidenote: Personal traits.]

    This was the man who was sent to maintain the interests of the paramount Power in a South Africa shaken by racial antagonism, and already feverish with political intrigue and commercial rivalry. Of all the tributes of the farewell banquet, Sir William Harcourt's was closest to the life--"worthy of all praise and all affection." The quality of inspiring affection to which this impressive phrase bore witness was one which had made itself felt among the humblest of those who were fortunate enough to have been associated with Lord Milner in any public work.

    Long after Milner had left Egypt, the face of the Syrian or Coptic Effendi of the Finance Department in Cairo would light up at the chance mention of the genial Englishman who had once been his chief. And in remote English counties revenue officials still hang his portrait upon the walls of their lodgings. Such men had no claim to appraise his professional merit or his gifts of intellect; but their feelings were responsive to the charm of his nature.

    "He was so considerate": that was their excuse for retaining his name and personality among the pleasant memories of the past. But the other side of Milner's character, the power of "tenacious and inflexible resolution," of which Mr. Asquith spoke, was destined to be brought into play so prominently during the "eight dusky years" of his South African administration, that to the distant on-looker it came to be accepted as the characterising quality of the man.

    To some Milner became the "man of blood and iron"; determined, like Bismarck, to secure the unity of a country by trampling with iron-shod boots upon the liberties of its people: even as in the view of others his clear mental vision--never more clear than in South Africa--became clouded by an adopted partisanship, and he was a "lost mind." Nothing could be further from the truth.

    If the man lived who could have turned the Boer and Afrikander from hatred and distrust of England and English ideas by personal charm and honourable dealing, it was the man who had universally inspired all his former associates, whether equals or subordinates, with admiration and affection.

    Whatever bitterness was displayed against Lord Milner personally by the Boer and Afrikander leaders after the issue of the war was decided was due to their perception that he was then--as always--a source of strength and an inspiration for renewed effort to those whom they regarded as their rivals or opponents. They hated him just as the French hated Bismarck--because he was the strong man on the other side.

    Lord Milner's inflexibility was, in its essence, a keener perception of duty than the ordinary: it was a determination to do what he believed to be for the good of South Africa and the Empire, irrespective of any consideration of personal or party relationship.

    It was in no sense the incapacity to measure the strength of an opponent, still less did it arise from any failure to perceive the cogency of an opinion in conflict with his own. Before the eight years of his administration had passed, Lord Milner's knowledge of the needs of South Africa and the Empire had become so profound that it carried him ahead of the most enlightened and patriotic of the home statesmen who supported him loyally to the end. Through the period of the war, when the issues were simple and primitive, they were wholly with him.

    But afterwards they supported him not so much because they understood the methods which he employed and the objects at which he aimed, as because they were by this time convinced of his complete mastery of the political and economic problems of South Africa.

    It is to this inability to understand the facts of the South African situation, as he had learnt them, that we must attribute the comparative feebleness shown by the Unionist leaders in resisting the perverse attempt which was made by the Liberal party, after the General Election of 1906, to revoke the final arrangements of his administration.

    The interval that separated Lord Milner's knowledge of South Africa from that of the Liberal ministers was profound; but even the Unionist chiefs showed but slight appreciation of the unassailable validity of the administrative decisions with which they had identified themselves, when the "swing of the pendulum" brought these decisions again, and somewhat unexpectedly, before the great tribunal of the nation.

    [Sidenote: Arrival at Cape Town.]

    Lord Milner sailed for the Cape on April 17th, 1897. At the actual moment of his arrival the relations between the Home Government and the South African Republic were strained almost to the breaking point.

    In a peremptory despatch of March 6th, Mr. Chamberlain had demanded the repeal of the Aliens Immigration and Aliens Expulsion Laws of 1896--the former of which constituted a flagrant violation of the freedom of entry secured to British subjects by Article XIV. of the London Convention. This virtual ultimatum was emphasised by the appearance of a British squadron at Delagoa Bay, and by the despatch of reinforcements to the South African garrisons.

    The evident determination of the Imperial Government induced the Volksraad to repeal the Immigration Law and to pass a resolution in favour of amending the Expulsion Law. The crisis was over in June, and during the next few months the Pretoria Executive showed a somewhat more conciliatory temper towards the Government of Great Britain. And in this connection two other facts must be recorded.

    In August, 1896, Sir Jacobus de Wet had been succeeded as British Agent at Pretoria by Sir William (then Mr.) Conyngham Greene, and the Imperial Government was assured, by this appointment, of the services of an able man and a trained diplomatist. The Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, promised in July, 1896, met on February 16th, 1897, and reported on July 13th of the same year. Its report did little more than reassert the findings of the Cape Parliamentary Inquiry, which had been before the British public for the last year.

    It was otherwise remarkable for the handle which it gave (by the failure to insist upon the production of certain telegrams) to some extreme Radicals to assert Mr. Chamberlain's "complicity" in the "invasion" of the Transvaal as originally planned by Mr. Rhodes.

    [Sidenote: Milner's thoroughness.]

    Lord Milner had expressed his intention of acquainting himself with the conditions of South Africa by personal observation before he attempted to take any definite action for the solution of the problems awaiting his attention. Nor, after the first month of anxious diplomatic controversy with the Pretoria Executive, was there anything either in the political situation in the Cape Colony, or in the attitude of the Transvaal Government, to prevent him from putting his purpose into effect.

    Apart from the circumstance that the reorganisation of the Chartered Company's Administration--a question in which the political future of Mr.

    Rhodes was largely involved--was a matter upon which his observation and advice were urgently required by the Colonial Office, Lord Milner had no intention, as he said, of "being tied to an office chair at Capetown." He had resolved, therefore, to visit at the earliest opportunity, first, the country districts of the colony which formed the actual seat of the Dutch population, and, second, the two protectorates of Bechuanaland and Basutoland, which were administered by officers directly responsible to the High Commissioner, as the representative of the Imperial Government.

    In point of fact he did more than this. Within a year of his arrival he had travelled through the Cape Colony (August and September, 1897), through the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Rhodesia (November and December, 1897), and visited Basutoland (April, 1898).

    And with characteristic thoroughness he set himself to learn both the Dutch of Holland and the "Taal"--the former in order that he might read the newspapers which the Afrikanders read, and the latter to open the way to that intercourse of eye and ear which most helps a man to know the character of his neighbour.

    Lord Milner's year of observation may be said to have ended with the speech at Graaf Reinet (March 3rd, 1898), which held his first clear and emphatic public utterance. During the greater part of this period he was by no means exclusively occupied with the shortcomings of President Krueger. The discharge of his official duties as Governor of the Cape Colony required more than ordinary care and watchfulness in view of the disturbed state of South African politics.

    And as High Commissioner he was called upon to deal with a number of questions relative to the affairs of Rhodesia and the Protectorates, of which some led him into the new and unfamiliar field of native law and custom, while others involved the exercise of his judgment on delicate matters of personal fitness and official etiquette.

    But an account of these questions--questions which he handled with equal insight and decision--must yield to the commanding interest of the actual steps by which he approached the two central problems upon the solution of which the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa depended--the removal of the pernicious system of race oligarchy in the Transvaal, and the preservation of the Cape Colony in its allegiance to the British Crown.

    [Sidenote: His friendliness to the Boers.]

    The position which Lord Milner took up in his relations with the Transvaal Government was one that was consistent alike with his personal characteristics and with the dictates of a high and enlightened statesmanship. Within the first few weeks of his arrival he let it be known, both through the British Agent at Pretoria, and through those of the Afrikander leaders in the Cape Colony who were on terms of intimacy with President Krueger, that he desired, as it were, to open an entirely new account between the two governments.

    He, a new High Commissioner with no South African past, with no errors to retrieve, no failures to rankle, could afford to bury the diplomatic hatchet. There was nothing to prevent him from approaching the discussion of any questions that might arise in a spirit of perfect friendliness, or from believing that the President would be inspired, on his side, by the same friendly feelings.

    It was his hope, therefore, that much of the friction incidental to formal diplomatic controversy might be avoided through the settlement of all lesser matters by amicable and informal discussion between President Krueger and himself.

    This was no mere official pose. Milner never posed. He, too, desired to eliminate the Imperial factor in his own way. He saw from the first the advantage of limiting the area of dispute between Downing Street and Pretoria; and he made it his object to settle as many matters as possible by friendly discussion on the spot. The desire to avoid unnecessary diplomatic friction, and to make the best of President Krueger, was manifested in all he did at this time.

    In the course of the preparations for the celebration of the Diamond Jubilee by the British community on the Rand, the new High Commissioner was asked to decide whether the toast of Queen Victoria, or that of President Krueger, should come first upon the list at the public banquet. He replied unhesitatingly that the courtesy due to President Krueger, as the head of the State, must be fully accorded.

    On this occasion, of all others, British subjects, he said, "should be most careful to avoid anything which might be regarded as a slight to the South African Republic or its chief magistrate."[27]

    [Footnote 27: The incident is otherwise interesting as
    affording the first sign of that confidence of the British
    population in Lord Milner, which, steadily increasing as the
    final and inevitable struggle approached, earned for him at
    length the unfaltering support of British South Africa.

    After
    the Rand celebrations were over, he was informed that his
    advice had been put into effect with "very considerable
    difficulty." The argument which had prevailed was this: "The
    new High Commissioner is a tested man of affairs; we all look
    to him to put British interests on a solid basis; and as we
    do this, let us obey him in a matter like this."]

    [Sidenote: Milner and the Conventions.]

    While to President Krueger Lord Milner said, "Let us see if we cannot arrange matters by friendly discussion between ourselves"; to the Colonial Office he said, "Give them time; don't hurry them. Reform there must be: if by no other means, then by our intervention. But before we intervene, let us be sure that they either cannot, or will not, reform themselves.

    Therefore let us wait patiently, and make things as easy as possible for President Krueger." More than this, he had almost as little belief in the utility of the Conventions[28] as Grey had in those of his epoch. Whether the Boers did, or did not, call the Queen "Suzerain" seemed to him to be a small matter--an etymological question, as he afterwards called it. What was essential was that men of British blood should not be kept under the heel of the Dutch.

    Moreover, the grievances for which the observance of the London Convention, however strictly enforced, could provide a remedy, were insignificant as compared with the more real grievances, such as the attack upon the independence of the law courts, the injury to industrial life caused by a corrupt and incompetent administration, and the denial of elementary political rights, which no technical observance of the Convention would remove.

    Nor did it escape Lord Milner's notice that a policy of rigid insistence upon the letter of the Conventions might place the Imperial Government in a position of grave disadvantage. If any breach of the Conventions was once made the subject of earnest diplomatic complaint, the demand of the Imperial Government must be enforced even at the cost of war. The Conventions, therefore, should be invoked as little as possible.

    For, if the Boers denied the British Law Officers' interpretation of the text, the Imperial Government might find itself on the horns of a dilemma.

    Either it must beat an undignified retreat, or it must make war upon the Transvaal for a mere technicality, a proceeding which would gain for the Republic a maximum, and for the Imperial Government a minimum of sympathy and support. Therefore, he said, "Keep the Conventions in the background. If we are to fight let it be about something that is essential to the peace and well-being of South Africa, and not a mere diplomatic wrangle between the Pretoria Executive and the British Government."

    [Footnote 28: Apart from the question of the validity of the
    preamble to the Pretoria Convention (1881), two
    Conventions--the London Convention (1884), and the Swaziland
    Convention (1894)--were in force between the South African
    Republic and Great Britain. The relations of the Imperial
    Government to the Free State were regulated by the
    Bloemfontein Convention (1854). This latter and the Sand
    River Convention (1852), were the Conventions of Grey's
    time.]

    [Sidenote: Transvaal affairs.]

    Lord Milner's hope that President Krueger might meet him half-way, although it was shown by subsequent events to have been devoid of foundation, had for the moment superficial appearances in its favour.

    After their retreat on the question of the Aliens Immigration Law the attitude of the Pretoria Executive remained for some time outwardly less hostile to the Imperial Government. Woolls-Sampson and "Karri" Davies were released from Pretoria gaol in honour of Queen Victoria's Jubilee,[29] and at the same period the first and only step was taken that offered a genuine promise of reform from within. The Industrial Commission, appointed earlier in the year by the Executive at the request of President Krueger, surprised the Uitlander community by conducting its inquiry with a thoroughness and impartiality that left no ground for complaint.

    Its report, reviewing in detail the conditions of the mining industry, was published in July. It afforded a complete confirmation of the fiscal and administrative complaints put forward by the Uitlanders against the Government; and as Mr.

    Schalk Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was both a member of the Executive and the leader of the more progressive section of the Boers, there seemed to be a reasonable prospect of the recommendations of the Report being carried into effect. Scarcely more than six months later President Krueger proved conclusively that the hope of these, or of any other, reforms was entirely unfounded; but so long as there remained any prospect of the Uitlanders and the Transvaal Government being able to settle their differences by themselves, Lord Milner consistently pursued his intention of "making things easy" for the Transvaal Government.

    And this although the Pretoria Executive soon began to make heavy drafts upon his patience in other respects.[30]

    [Footnote 29: These two men, now Colonel Sir Aubrey
    Woolls-Sampson and Major W. D. "Karri" Davies, had refused to
    sign the petition of appeal--an act of submission which
    President Krueger required of the Johannesburg Reformers,
    before he released them from Pretoria gaol.

    They did so on
    the ground that the Imperial Government had made itself
    responsible for their safety; since they and the other
    Reformers, with the town of Johannesburg, had laid down their
    arms on the faith of Lord Rosmead's declaration that he would
    obtain reasonable reforms from President Krueger for the
    Uitlanders.]

    [Footnote 30: In the question of the Swaziland border, the
    affair of Bunu, and the continued and increasing
    ill-treatment of the Cape Boys, the Boer Government
    manifested its old spirit of aggression and duplicity. All
    these matters involved Lord Milner in anxious and wearisome
    negotiations, which, however, he contrived by mingled
    firmness and address to keep within the limits of friendly
    discussion.]

    If Lord Milner was prepared to make the most of Paul Krueger and the Boers, he showed himself no less ready to see the best side of the Dutch in the Cape Colony. As we have already had occasion to notice, the year of his appointment was that of the Diamond Jubilee celebration; and on June 23rd he sent home a brief despatch in which he dwelt with evident satisfaction upon the share taken by the Dutch in the general demonstrations of loyalty called forth by the occasion in the Cape Colony. After a reference to the number of loyal addresses or congratulatory telegrams which had been sent to the Colonial Secretary for transmission to the Queen, he continued:

    "The enthusiasm evoked here ... seems to me to be of peculiar
    interest ... in view of recent events, which, as you are aware,
    have caused a feeling of considerable bitterness among different
    sections of the community. All I can say is that, so far as I am
    able to judge, these racial differences have not affected the
    loyalty of any portion of the community to Her Majesty the Queen.
    People of all races, the English, the Dutch, the Asiatics, as
    well as the African natives, have vied with one another in
    demonstrations of affection for her person and devotion to the
    throne.

    When every allowance is made for the exaggeration of
    feeling caused by the unparalleled scale and prolonged duration
    of the present festivities, and for the contagious excitement
    which they have produced, it is impossible to doubt that the
    feeling of loyalty among all sections of the population is much
    stronger than has sometimes been believed. In my opinion, the
    impression made by the world-wide celebration of Her Majesty's
    Jubilee has strengthened that feeling throughout South Africa,
    and is likely to have a permanent value."[31]

    [Footnote 31: This short despatch has been given practically
    in extenso. It was not published in the Blue-books, but it
    was communicated to the Press some three months after it had
    been received.]

    [Sidenote: First impressions of the Dutch.]

    It has been urged that the opinion here recorded is inconsistent with the charge of anti-British sentiment subsequently brought by Lord Milner against the Dutch leaders in the Cape Colony, and the despatch itself has been cited as affording evidence of the contention that the unfavourable view subsequently expressed in the Graaf Reinet speech, and more definitely in the despatch of May 4th, 1899, was not the result of independent investigation, but was a view formed to support the Imperial Government in a coercive policy towards the Transvaal.

    This criticism, which is a perfectly natural one, only serves to establish the fact that Lord Milner actually did approach the study of the nationality difficulty in complete freedom from any preconceived notions on the subject. As he said, he went to South Africa with an "open mind." So far from having any prejudice against the Dutch, his first impression was distinctly favourable, and as such he recorded it, suitably enough, in this Jubilee despatch.

    But it must be remembered that the opinion here recorded was based upon a very limited field of observation.

    At the time when this despatch was written Lord Milner had not yet been quite two months in South Africa, and his experience of the Dutch of the Cape Colony had been confined to intercourse with the Dutch of the Cape peninsula; that is to say, he had only come into contact with that section of the Cape Dutch which is, as indeed it has been for a century, closely identified, from a social point of view, with the official and mercantile British population of Capetown and its suburbs.

    What the Jubilee despatch really shows is that Lord Milner was prepared to make the best of the Dutch. The contrast between its tone of ready appreciation and the note of earnest remonstrance in the Graaf Reinet speech is apparent enough. The despatch is dated June 23rd, 1897; the speech was delivered on March 3rd, 1898. What had happened in this interval of nine months to produce so marked a change in the mind of the genial, clear-sighted Englishman, who, as Mr.

    Asquith said, took with him to South Africa "as sympathetic an imagination" as any man of his acquaintance? Nemo repente fuit turpissimus. Whether the diagnosis of his Graaf Reinet speech was right or wrong, something must have happened to turn Lord Milner from ready appreciation to grave remonstrance.

    The circumstances which provide the answer to this question form an element of vital importance in the volume of evidence upon which posterity will pronounce the destruction of the Dutch Republics in South Africa to have been a just and necessary, or a needless and aggressive, act. But to see them in true perspective, the reader must first be possessed of some more precise information of the political situation in the Cape Colony at this time.

    [Sidenote: The Sprigg ministry.]

    At the period of Lord Milner's appointment the political forces set in motion by the Raid were operating already to prepare the way for the new and significant combinations of persons and parties in the Cape Colony that took definite form in the parliamentary crisis of May,

    1. The Ministry now in office was that formed by Sir Gordon Sprigg

    upon Mr. Rhodes's resignation of the premiership after the Raid (January 6th, 1896). Like every other Cape Ministry of the last thirteen years, it was dependent upon the support of the Afrikander Bond, which supplied two out of the six members of the cabinet--Mr.

    Pieter Faure, Minister of Agriculture, and a moderate Bondsman, and Dr. Te Water, the intimate friend of Mr. Hofmeyr, and his direct representative in the Ministry. Another minister, Sir Thomas Upington, who had succeeded Mr. Philip Schreiner as Attorney-General, had been himself Prime Minister in the period 1884-6, when he and Sir Gordon Sprigg (then Treasurer-General), had opposed the demand for the intervention of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, successfully and strenuously advocated by Mr. J. W. Leonard and Mr. Merriman.

    It was, therefore, eminently, what would be called in France "a Ministry of the Centre." Sir Gordon Sprigg's regard for British interests was too lukewarm to command the confidence of the more decided advocates of British supremacy; while, on the other hand, his more or less friendly relations with Mr. Rhodes aroused the suspicions of the Dutch extremists. But Dr. Te Water's presence in the Ministry, offering in itself a sufficient assurance that no measures deemed by Mr.

    Hofmeyr to be contrary to the interests of the Bond would be adopted, had secured for the Government the votes of the majority of the Dutch members of the Legislative Assembly. An example of the subserviency of the Sprigg Ministry to the Bond at this date was afforded upon Lord Milner's arrival. As we have seen, the Home Government determined to reinforce the South African garrison, in order to strengthen its demand upon the Transvaal Government for the repeal of the Aliens Immigration Law.

    Although no direct opposition was offered by the Ministry to this measure, the insufficiency of barrack accommodation in the Cape Colony was used as a pretext for placing obstacles in the way of its accomplishment. These difficulties were successfully overcome by Lord Milner, and in the end the reinforcements arrived without giving rise to any political excitement.[32]

    [Footnote 32: By August the South African garrison had been
    raised to the very moderate strength of rather more than
    8,000 troops.]

    [Sidenote: Navy contribution bill.]

    A more disagreeable incident was the covert attempt made by the Bond to obstruct the business of the Cape Parliament, in order that Sir Gordon Sprigg might be prevented from taking his place among the other prime ministers of the self-governing colonies at the Colonial Conference, and representing the Cape in the Jubilee celebrations in England.[33] This was the beginning of a disagreement between the Ministry and the Bond, which gradually increased in seriousness after Sir Gordon's return from England, until it culminated in the resignation of Dr.

    Te Water (May, 1898). The offer of an annual contribution to the cost of the British Navy, which was affirmed in principle by the Cape Parliament at this time, was understood in England to be a mark of Afrikander attachment to the British connection. In point of fact the measure received practically no support from the Bondsmen in Parliament; while, outside of Parliament, on Bond platforms and in the Bond Press, the Government's action in the matter was employed as an effective argument to stimulate disaffection in the ranks of its Dutch supporters. Mr.

    Hofmeyr, however, was careful not to allow the Bond, as an organisation, to commit itself to any overt opposition to the principle of a contribution to the British Navy--an attitude which would have been obviously inconsistent with the Bond's profession of loyalty--and with characteristic irony the third reading of the Navy Contribution Bill was eventually passed, a year later, without a division in the Legislative Assembly by a Ministry[34] placed in office by Bond votes for the declared purpose of opposing the policy of the Imperial Government on the one question--the reform of the Transvaal Administration--upon the issue of which depended the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa.

    [Footnote 33: Sir Gordon Sprigg's long service as a minister
    of the Crown fully entitled him to this honour; nor was his
    presence rendered any the less desirable by the fact that Sir
    Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice, was also attending the
    Jubilee in England.]

    [Footnote 34: The Schreiner Ministry.]

    [Sidenote: Rhodes's position.]

    But circumstances of deeper significance contributed to deprive the Sprigg Ministry of the support of the Bond, causing its majority to dwindle, and driving Sir Gordon himself, in an increasing degree, into the opposite camp. The British population for the first time showed a tendency to organise itself in direct opposition to the Bond. As Sir Gordon Sprigg grew more Imperialist, the Progressive party was formed for parliamentary purposes; while for the purpose of combating the Afrikander nationalist movement in general an Imperialist organisation, called the South African League, was established with the avowed object of maintaining British supremacy in South Africa.

    Mr. Cecil Rhodes, immediately after the Raid, announced his intention of taking no further part in the politics of the Cape Colony, and of devoting himself, for the future, to the development of Rhodesia. But upon his return from England, after giving evidence before the Committee of Inquiry into the Raid, he was received with so much warmth by the British population at Capetown in July, 1897, that he had retracted this decision, and determined to assume the same position of real, though not nominal, leadership of what was afterwards the Progressive party as Mr. Hofmeyr held in the Bond. Mr.

    Rhodes's return to political life, following, as it did, upon the report of the Committee of Inquiry, aroused the most bitter hostility against him on the part of his former associates in the Bond. And the Sprigg Ministry, by their increasing reliance upon the new party of which he was the leader, incurred the distrust of its Dutch supporters to a corresponding extent. In the meantime the Bond leaders had adopted Mr.

    Philip Schreiner, who was not a member of the Bond, as their parliamentary chief in the place of Rhodes, and this new combination was strengthened by the accession of Mr. J. X. Merriman and Mr. J. W. Sauer. Thus the opening months of the new year, 1898, found the population of the Cape Colony grouping itself roughly, for the first time, into two parties with definite and mutually destructive aims.

    On the one side there was the Sprigg Ministry, now almost exclusively supported by the British section of the Cape electorate, soon to be organised on the question of "redistribution" into the Progressive party, with Rhodes as its real, though not its recognised, leader; and on the other there was the Bond party, with Schreiner as its parliamentary chief and Hofmeyr as its real leader, depending in no less a degree upon the Dutch population of the Colony, and naturally opposed to an electoral reform that threatened to deprive this population of its parliamentary preponderance.

    And in a few months' time, as we shall see, the Schreiner-Bond coalition took for its immediate aim the prevention of British interference in the Transvaal; while the Progressive party came, no less openly, to avow its determination to promote and support the action of the Imperial Government in seeking to obtain redress for the Uitlander grievances.

    The movements here briefly indicated were, of course, perfectly well known to Lord Milner as constitutional Governor of the Colony. But at Graaf Reinet he probes the situation too deeply, and speaks with too authoritative a tone, to allow us to suppose that the remonstrance which he then addressed to the Cape Dutch was based upon any sources of knowledge less assured than his own observation and experience.

    For the Graaf Reinet speech is not an affair of ministers' minutes or party programmes; it is the straight talk of a man taught by eye and ear, and informed by direct relationships with the persons and circumstances that are envisaged in his words. To restate our question, which among these facts of personal observation and experience produced the change from the ready appreciation of the Cape Dutch, shown in the Jubilee despatch, to the earnest remonstrance of the Graaf Reinet speech?

    The historian cannot claim, like the writer of creative literature, to exhibit the working of the human mind. In the terms of the Aristotelian formula, he can relate only what "has" happened, leaving to the craftsman whose pen is enlarged and ennobled by the universal truth of art to tell what "must" happen.

    But such satisfaction as the lesser branch of literature can afford is at the disposal of the reader, in "good measure, pressed down, and running over." Without assuming, then, the philosophic certainty of poetry, we know that between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech the development of the great South African drama reached its "turning-point" in the Transvaal; while in the Cape Colony Lord Milner was learning daily more of the "formidable personalities" and the "embarrassing problems" to which Mr. Asquith had referred.

    [Sidenote: No reform in the Transvaal.]

    The more hopeful situation in the Transvaal that followed upon the determined action of the Imperial Government in May was succeeded by a period punctuated by events which, taken collectively, obliterated all prospect of "reform from within." The treatment accorded to the report of the Industrial Commission, which, as we have noticed, established the truth of practically all the fiscal and administrative complaints of the Uitlanders, was a matter of especial significance.

    The Commission was created by President Krueger; it was in effect the fulfilment of his promises, made after the Raid, to redress the grievances of the Uitlanders. The Commissioners were his own officials, Boers and Hollanders; men who had no prejudice against the Government, and no sympathy with the new population, yet their recommendations, if carried into effect, would have removed the most serious of the industrial grievances of the British community. The Report had raised great expectations.

    It was thought that, not all, but a substantial proportion of its recommendations would be put into effect. Here, then, was an opportunity for reform which involved no loss of prestige, entailed no danger to the independence of the Republic, and held not the slightest threat to the stability of burgher predominance. If what President Krueger was waiting for was a convenient opportunity, he had such an opportunity now. This reasonable forecast was utterly falsified by the event. Mr. Schalk Burger, the Chairman of the Commission, was denounced by Mr.

    Krueger in the Volksraad as a traitor to the Republic, because he had dared to set his hand to so distasteful a document. The report itself was thrown contemptuously by the grim old President from the Volksraad to the customary committee of true-blue "doppers," whose ignorance of the industrial conditions of the Rand was equalled only by their personal devotion to himself.

    Here the adverse findings of the commissioners on the dynamite and railway monopolies were reversed; and the recommendation for a Local Board for the Rand was condemned as subversive of the authority of the State. At length, after the report had been tossed about from Volksraad to committee, and from committee to Volksraad, until very little of the original recommendations remained, the Government took action.

    In addition to an immaterial reduction of the exorbitant rates charged by the Netherlands Railway Company--a concession subsequently alleged to have been the price paid by the Hollander Corporation to avoid further inquiry into its affairs--it was announced that, with the object of lessening the cost of living on the Rand, the import duties upon certain necessaries in common use would be reduced, in accordance with the recommendations of the Commissioners on this point; but that, since it was obviously inexpedient to diminish the revenue of the Republic, the duties upon certain other articles of the same class would be raised to an extent more than counterbalancing the loss upon the reduction. Parturiunt montes; nascitur ridiculus mus.

    [Sidenote: Krueger re-elected president.]

    This singular display of mingled effrontery and duplicity marked the closing months of the year (1897). In the February following Mr.

    Krueger was elected to the presidency of the South African Republic for the fourth time. It was generally recognised that the success of his candidature was inevitable, but few, within or without the Transvaal, had expected him to secure so decisive a victory over his competitors.

    The figures--Krueger 12,858, Schalk Burger 3,750, and Joubert (Commandant-General) 2,001--were additional evidence of the impotency or lukewarmness of the reform party among the burghers. The first act of President Krueger, on his return to power, was to dismiss Chief Justice Kotze. Mr. Kotze's struggle for the independence of the law courts, thus summarily closed, had commenced a year before with what was known as the "High Court crisis." At that time President Krueger had obtained power from the Volksraad by the notorious law No.

    1 of 1897 to compel the judges, on pain of dismissal, to renounce the right, recently exercised, to declare laws, which were in their opinion inconsistent with the Grondwet (Constitution), to be, to that extent, invalid. As a protest against this autocratic proceeding the entire bench of judges threatened to resign, and the courts were adjourned. The deadlock continued until a compromise was arranged through the intervention of Chief Justice de Villiers.

    The President undertook to introduce a new law providing satisfactorily for the independence of the Courts, and the judges, on their side, pledged themselves not to exercise the "testing" right in the meantime. In February, 1898, Chief Justice Kotze wrote to remind President Krueger that his promise remained unfulfilled,[35] withdrawing at the same time the conditional pledge not to exercise the "testing" right given by himself. The President then dismissed Mr. Kotze under Law No. 1, compelled a second judge, Mr.

    Justice Amershof (who had supported the Chief Justice in the position he had taken up) to resign, and appointed, as the new Chief Justice, Mr. Gregorowski, who, as Chief Justice of the Free State, had presided at the trial of the Reformers in 1896, and at the time of the crisis a year before had declared that "no honourable man could possibly accept the position of a judge so long as Law No.

    1 remained in force." The judicature was now rendered subservient to the Executive, and the Uitlanders were thus deprived of their last constitutional safeguard against the injustice of the Boer and Hollander oligarchy.

    [Footnote 35: There appears to have been some question as to
    whether the terms of the President's undertaking bound him to
    introduce the proposed measure into the Volksraad in 1897, or
    in 1898. Chief Justice de Villiers held that the latter date
    was contemplated by the President. But the point is
    immaterial, since President Krueger denied in the Volksraad,
    after the dismissal of Mr. Kotze, that he had ever given an
    undertaking at all to Chief Justice de Villiers or to anybody
    else.]

    [Sidenote: His reactionary policy.]

    This was the position in the Transvaal in February, 1898. President Krueger had demonstrated by his refusal to carry out the recommendations of the Industrial Commission, and by the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze, that he was determined not merely to set himself against all measures of reform, but to increase the disabilities under which the Uitlanders had hitherto lived. He had been placed, for the fourth time, at the head of the Republic by an overwhelming majority; he had refused to sacrifice a penny of revenue, and he was in possession of ample resources, which were being sedulously applied in increasing his already disproportionate supply of munitions of war.

    Through Dr. Leyds, who had returned from his mission to Europe, he had opened up communications with European Powers, that placed him in a position to avail himself to the full of the possible embarrassment of Great Britain through international rivalries or disagreements. In South Africa he had carried through a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the Free State, and he had received more than one recent assurance that the flame of Afrikander nationalism had been kindled anew by the Bond in the Cape Colony.

    These events were disquieting enough in themselves; but what made the disappearance of any prospect of spontaneous reform in the Transvaal still more serious to the High Commissioner for South Africa, was the complaisance with which President Krueger's reactionary policy was regarded by the Dutch subjects of the Crown. It was just here that Lord Milner's observations must have yielded the most startling results.

    We know that the days which had passed since the Jubilee despatch was written had brought him constant and varied opportunities for seeing "things as they really were" in South Africa; we know that he was keenly alert in the accomplishment of his mission, and we may presume, therefore, that few, if any, of these opportunities were lost.

    In September Lord Milner had travelled right round the Colony. At every little town and dorp--wherever, in fact, he went--he conversed with the Dutch, whom his pleasant manner quickly won to friendliness; and all the speeches that he made in reply to the addresses of welcome were extremely conciliatory in tone.

    This was the time when there were hopeful anticipations of the good results that were to come from the Industrial Commission; and Lord Milner often began his speech with an expression of the sense of relief which he felt--a feeling which his audience must share--that now there was to be peace in South Africa. These conciliatory utterances of the new High Commissioner were almost completely ignored by the Dutch Press. An exception to this rule of silence was significant. The High Commissioner was accompanied by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr.

    (now Sir Pieter) Faure. On one occasion Mr. Faure made some remarks in the same spirit as that in which Lord Milner had spoken. "People," he said, "talk of Africa for the Afrikanders; but what I say is, Africa for all." The expression of this moderate sentiment drew down upon Mr. Faure a sharp reproof from Ons Land. From this and many other such incidents it must have begun to dawn upon Lord Milner's mind that what the Dutch of the Cape Colony wanted was not conciliation but domination.

    [Sidenote: Attitude of the Cape Dutch.]

    [Sidenote: "Hands off" the Transvaal.]

    And so it came about that in the months that President Krueger was busy shutting the door against reform, Lord Milner was learning to realise that on this all-important matter there was nothing to hope from the Cape Dutch. When once the question of reform, or no reform, in the Transvaal came up, all conciliatory speeches were useless.

    It made no difference whether the Transvaal was right or wrong; it was always, "Our Transvaal, good or bad." In short, all that happened both in the Transvaal and the Cape Colony during this (South African) spring and summer was of the nature to impress conclusively upon Lord Milner's mind that on the crucial issue between the Imperial Government and the Transvaal, the leaders of Dutch opinion in the Cape Colony were against the British cause.

    The rank and file of the Dutch population, if left to themselves, might be indifferent, possibly friendly; but the Bond organisation had placed them under the control of the Bond leaders; and the Bond was hostile. What, more than anything else, would serve to confirm this impression was Lord Milner's constant study of the Dutch Press. Among these journals, Ons Land presented the most authoritative and significant expression of the Bond policy, as directed by Mr. Hofmeyr's astute brain and unrivalled experience.

    The editorial columns of Ons Land rarely contained a sentence that, standing alone, could be quoted as evidence of its advocacy of anti-British action. Its method was far more subtle. In everything in which Great Britain was concerned the attitude which it adopted was one of profound alienation, rather than of aggressive hostility. England's position in the world was presented and discussed as though "Afrikanders" were no more interested in it than they were in that of any foreign country.

    And, in South African matters, the tone of the Dutch Press, and of the Bond leaders, was not merely discouraging; at any hint of possible British action for the improvement of the administrative conditions of the Transvaal, it took a note of menace. "Hands off" the Transvaal: that was the sum and substance of Bond policy.

    Between the Jubilee despatch and the Graaf Reinet speech, then, the Transvaal Government had shown that it had set its face definitely against reform, and Lord Milner had had time to realise the true state of political feeling in the Colony of which he was Governor. While there was anger among the British at the hopeless situation in the Transvaal, among the Dutch was a fixed determination not to allow the Transvaal to be interfered with. And there was something else that Lord Milner would have observed during his travels throughout the Colony.

    It was the utter despondency of the British population, and the condition of abasement to which they had been reduced. Nor can he have failed to observe that everywhere among the British there was a constant apology for the Raid; while, on the part of the Dutch, there was no recognition of all that the British had done to wipe out its stain and to mitigate its effects: in a word, that the moral conquest of the Colony by the Dutch was practically complete.

    [Sidenote: Milner at Graaf Reinet.]

    It was with this accumulated evidence in his mind that Lord Milner travelled down, on March 2nd, 1898, from Capetown to Graaf Reinet, expecting to take part in a Governor's function of the ordinary sort at the opening of the railway on the following day.

    The conventional expressions of loyalty to the Queen, and the scarcely veiled hypocrisy and defiance with which the Dutch reiterated them, at the time when the whole weight of their influence was thrown against Great Britain on the only South African question that really mattered, had become nauseating even to his serene temper and generous disposition. He was wearied, too, of receiving a frivolous or unfriendly reply from the Pretoria Executive to the most reasonable proposals of the Imperial Government.

    Late at night there was brought to him, in the train, a copy of an address from the Graaf Reinet branch of the Afrikander Bond, which was to be presented to him on the morrow.

    It contained, in more than usually pointed language, a protest against "the charges of disloyalty made against the Bond," and a request that the High Commissioner would "convey to the Queen the expression of its unswerving loyalty." As he read on we can imagine how, in ominous contrast to the superficial protestations of the text, something exceptionally aggressive in the tone of the address, something which emphasised the inconsistency of these formal professions of attachment to the throne with the very practical hostility of their authors to British policy, struck the High Commissioner with peculiar force.

    The Dutch, who, under British rule, enjoyed--one might almost say abused--every privilege of citizenship in the Cape Colony, were quite prepared to see the British excluded, under Dutch rule, from these same privileges in the Transvaal. More than that, they were determined to employ all the agencies at their command to prevent any effective interference with the Transvaal oligarchy.

    Lord Milner evidently felt that the time had come for remonstrance, so, gathering up the impressions which had been accumulating in his mind, he wrote down then and there his answer, which was delivered on the following day.

    "Of course, I am glad to be assured that any section of Her
    Majesty's subjects is loyal, but I should be much more glad to be
    allowed to take that for granted. Why should I not? What reason
    could there be for any disloyalty? You have thriven wonderfully
    well under Her Majesty's Government. This country, despite its
    great extent and its fine climate, has some tremendous natural
    disadvantages to contend against, and yet let any one compare the
    position to-day with what it was at the commencement of Her
    Majesty's reign, or even thirty years ago.

    The progress in
    material wealth is enormous, and the prospects of future progress
    are greater still. And you have other blessings which by no means
    always accompany material wealth. You live under an absolutely
    free system of government, protecting the rights and encouraging
    the spirit of independence of every citizen. You have courts of
    law manned by men of the highest ability and integrity, and
    secure in the discharge of their high functions from all external
    interference. You have--at least as regards the white
    races--perfect equality of citizenship.

    And these things have not
    been won from a reluctant sovereign. They have been freely and
    gladly bestowed upon you, because freedom and self-government,
    justice and equality, are the first principles of British policy.
    And they are secured to you by the strength of the power that
    gave them, and whose navy protects your shores from attack
    without your being asked to contribute one pound to that
    protection unless you yourselves desire it. Well, gentlemen, of
    course you are loyal; it would be monstrous if you were not.

    "And now, if I have one wish, it is that I may never again have
    to deal at any length with this topic. But in order that I may
    put it aside with a good conscience, I wish, having been more or
    less compelled to deal with it, to do so honestly, and not to
    shut my eyes to unpleasant facts. The great bulk of the
    population of the Colony--Dutch as well as English--are, I firmly
    believe, thoroughly loyal, in the sense that they know they live
    under a good constitution, and have no wish to change it, and
    regard with feelings of reverence and pride that august lady at
    the head of it.

    If we had only domestic questions to consider; if
    political controversy were confined to the internal affairs of
    the country, there would, no doubt, be a great deal of hard
    language used by conflicting parties, and very likely among the
    usual amenities of party warfare somebody would call somebody
    else disloyal; but the thing would be so absurd--so obviously
    absurd--that nobody would take it seriously, and the charges
    would be forgotten almost as soon as uttered.

    [Sidenote: The loyalty of the Bond.]

    "What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty in this case,
    what makes it stick, and what makes people wince under it, is the
    fact that the political controversies of this country at present
    unfortunately turn largely upon another question--I mean the
    relations of Her Majesty's Government to the South African
    Republic--and that, whenever there is any prospect of any
    difference between them, a number of people in the Colony at once
    vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality,
    espouse the side of the Republic. Personally I do not think that
    they are disloyal.

    I am familiar at home with the figure of the
    politician--often the best of men, though singularly
    injudicious--who, whenever any disputes arise with another
    country, starts with the assumption that his own country must be
    in the wrong. He is not disloyal, but really he cannot be very
    much surprised if he appears to be so to those of his
    fellow-citizens whose inclination is to start with the exactly
    opposite assumption.

    And so I do not take it that in this case
    people are necessarily disloyal because they carry their sympathy
    with the Government of the Transvaal--which, seeing the close tie
    of relationship which unites a great portion of the population
    here with the dominant section in that country, is perfectly
    natural--to a point which gives some ground for the assertion
    that they seem to care much more for the independence of the
    Transvaal than for the honour and the interests of the country to
    which they themselves belong.

    "For my own part, I believe the whole object of those people in
    espousing the cause of the Transvaal is to prevent an open
    rupture between that country and the British Government. They
    loathe, very naturally and rightly, the idea of war, and they
    think that, if they can only impress upon the British Government
    that in case of war with the Transvaal it would have a great
    number of its own subjects at least in sympathy against it, that
    is a way to prevent such a calamity.

    "But in this they are totally wrong, for this policy rests on the
    assumption that Great Britain has some occult design on the
    independence of the Transvaal--that independence which it has
    itself given--and that it is seeking causes of quarrel in order
    to take that independence away. But that assumption is the exact
    opposite of the truth.

    So far from seeking causes of quarrel, it
    is the constant desire of the British Government to avoid causes
    of quarrel, and not to take up lightly the complaints (and they
    are numerous) which reach it from British subjects within the
    Transvaal, for the very reason that it wishes to avoid even the
    semblance of interference in the internal affairs of that
    country, and, as regards its external relations, to insist only
    on that minimum of control which it has always distinctly
    reserved, and has reserved, I may add, solely in the interests of
    the future tranquillity of South Africa.

    That is Great Britain's
    moderate attitude, and she cannot be frightened out of it. It is
    not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government
    which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at
    all. It is that unprogressiveness--I will not say the
    retrogressiveness--of the Government of the Transvaal and its
    deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain which makes it
    devote its attention to imaginary external dangers, when every
    impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers
    which threaten it are internal.

    [Sidenote: Milner's appeal to the Dutch.]

    "Now, I wish to be perfectly fair. Therefore, let me say that
    this suspicion, though absolutely groundless, is not, after all
    that has happened, altogether unnatural. I accept the situation
    that at the present moment any advice that I could tender, or
    that any of your British fellow-citizens could tender in that
    quarter, though it was the best advice in the world, would be
    instantly rejected because it was British.

    But the same does not
    apply to the Dutch citizens of this colony, and especially to
    those who have gone so far in the expression of their sympathy
    for the Transvaal as to expose themselves to these charges of
    disloyalty to their own flag.

    Their good-will at least cannot be
    suspected across the border; and if all they desire--and I
    believe it is what they desire--is to preserve the South African
    Republic, and to promote good relations between it and the
    British Colonies and Government, then let them use all their
    influence, which is bound to be great, not in confirming the
    Transvaal in unjustified suspicions, not in encouraging its
    Government in obstinate resistance to all reform, but in inducing
    it gradually to assimilate its institutions, and, what is even
    more important than institutions, the temper and spirit of its
    administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa,
    such as this Colony or the Orange Free State.

    That is the
    direction in which a peaceful way out of these inveterate
    troubles, which have now plagued this country for more than
    thirty years, is to be found."[36]

    [Footnote 36: Cape Times, March 4th, 1898.]

    Here was a bolt from the blue! All South Africa stood to attention. No such authoritative and inspiring utterance had come from the High Commissioners for South Africa since Frere had been recalled, now eighteen years ago. The Afrikander nationalists saw that their action and policy were exposed to the scrutiny of a penetrating intellect, and grew uneasy.

    The position which Lord Milner had taken up was impregnable. What is the good of your loyalty, he said in effect to the Cape Dutch, if you refuse to help us in the one thing needful? And this the one thing of all others the justice of which you Afrikanders should feel--that the Transvaal should "assimilate its institutions ... and the tone and temper of its administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa such as this Colony and the Orange Free State."

    The impact of these words was tremendous. The weight behind them was the weight of inevitable truth.

    A week later Mr. J. X. Merriman wrote to President Steyn to beg him to urge President Krueger to be careful. Under date March 11th, 1898, he says:

    "You will, no doubt, have seen both Sir Alfred Milner's speech at
    Graaf Reinet and the reported interview with Mr. Rhodes in The
    Cape Times
    . Through both there runs a note of thinly veiled
    hostility to the Transvaal and the uneasy menace of trouble
    ahead....

    "Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the
    future lies in the attitude of President Krueger and his vain hope
    of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow, unenlightened
    minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using
    the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true
    Republic on a broad Liberal basis. The report of recent
    discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their
    mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs
    cannot last.

    It must break down from inherent rottenness, and it
    will be well if the fall does not sweep away the freedom of all
    of us.

    "I write in no hostility to republics; my own feelings are all in
    the opposite direction.... Humanly speaking, the advice and
    good-will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between
    the South African Republic and a catastrophe."[37]

    [Footnote 37: Cd. 369.]

    [Sidenote: Sprigg and the Bond.]

    Still more striking and salutary was the effect produced upon the British population in the Cape Colony. All who were not utterly abased by the yoke of Bond domination stood upright. Those whose spirit had been cowed by the odium of the Raid took heart. Never had the essential morality of England's dealings with the Dutch been vindicated more triumphantly. The moral right of the Power which had done justice to the Dutch in its own borders to require the Dutch to do justice to the British within the borders of the Republic was unassailable.

    We have noticed before how in the year 1897 the different sections of the British population were manifesting a tendency to draw closer together. After the Graaf Reinet speech this movement rapidly developed into a general determination to challenge the long domination of the Bond. It had been recognised for some time past that the recent and considerable growth of the urban population of the Colony, which was mainly British, had not been accompanied by any corresponding increase in the number of its parliamentary representatives.

    In February (1898), the anomalous condition of the Cape electoral system was brought before the Ministry.

    The indignation caused by the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze, and the growing evidence of President Krueger's determination to ride rough-shod over the British population in the Transvaal, contributed to unite the Colonial British of all sections, with the exception of the one or two men who were wholly identified with the Bond, in the common aim of obtaining a fair representation for the chief centres of British population in the Cape Colony; and the practically solid British party thus formed adopted the title of "Progressives." The Ministry knew, of course, that any such measure would be displeasing to Mr.

    Hofmeyr; but Sir Gordon Sprigg, being now assured of the almost united support of the British members in the Colonial Parliament, resolved to bring forward a Redistribution Bill. The draft Bill was approved by the Executive Council on May 13th, and Dr. Te Water, Mr.

    Hofmeyr's representative in the Ministry, thereupon resigned.[38]

    [Footnote 38: He was succeeded in the Colonial Secretaryship
    by Dr. Smartt, a former member of the Bond, but now a
    Progressive, and at the same time Sir Thomas Upington, who
    had resigned from ill-health, was succeeded by Mr. T.
    Lynedoch Graham, as Attorney-General.]

    [Sidenote: Redistribution.]

    Sir Gordon Sprigg had now done a thing unprecedented in the parliamentary history of the Cape Colony in the last fifteen years. He had defied the Bond. He knew that the Bond was quite able to turn his Ministry out of Office. But he had made up his mind, in this event, to throw in his lot with the Progressive party, of which Mr. Rhodes was the actual chief. Mr. Hofmeyr did not leave him long in doubt. On the resignation of Dr. Te Water all the Bond artillery was at once turned on to the Ministry. On May 31st Mr.

    Schreiner gave notice of a vote of "no confidence." It was put off until June 13th, and in the meantime the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was met by the "previous question" moved by Mr. Theron, the Chairman of the Provincial Council of the Bond. No attempt was made, either in Parliament or in the Press, to conceal the fact that, under the question of redistribution, wider and more momentous issues were at stake.

    The counts in the Bond's indictment of the Ministry, as set out in Ons Land, were (1) its Imperialist tendencies as evidenced by the proposed gift of a warship to the British Navy; and (2) its lack of sympathy with the South African Republic.

    Against these crimes it had nothing to place, except that it had permitted the employment of the captured Bechuanas, as indentured labourers[39]--its sole merit, in the opinion of the Bond journal. The Cape Times, on the other hand, declared with equal frankness that the real point to be decided was, whether the interests of President Krueger and the South African Republic, or those of the Cape Colony, as part of the British Empire, had the greater claim upon the Government and Parliament of the Colony. And Mr.

    Schreiner, when, on June 13th, he introduced the "no confidence" motion, asked the House to condemn the Ministry on the ground that it had not shown any "sympathy" with, or made any "conciliatory approach" towards, the "sister Republic." On Monday, June 20th, the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was carried by a majority of seven, but two days later, June 22nd, the Ministry found itself in a minority of five on Mr.

    Schreiner's motion of "no confidence."[40] In these circumstances Sir Gordon Sprigg determined not to resign, but to appeal to the electorate--a course justified by constitutional usage--and Parliament was dissolved.

    [Footnote 39: These were prisoners taken in the suppression
    of the revolt in Bechuanaland in 1897.]

    [Footnote 40: The little group of six, of which Sir James
    Innes was the head--including Sir R. Solomon and four
    others--voted with the Ministry for the Redistribution
    Bill, but against it on the "no confidence" motion (with
    the exception of Sir James himself). Also one moderate
    Bondsman voted for "redistribution," but went against the
    Ministry on the "no confidence" motion.]

    [Sidenote: The general election, 1898.]

    The election which ensued was fought with great determination and no little bitterness. Both the Progressive party and the Bond were supplied with ample funds; the former had the purse of Mr. Rhodes and other Englishmen to draw upon, while the latter was subsidised by President Krueger and his agents from the revenues of the Transvaal.[41] Mr.

    Schreiner's election utterances were studiously moderate; indeed, his letter of thanks to the electors of the Malmesbury division, by whom he was returned to Parliament, contained a reference to "the noble empire which was theirs, and to which they belonged." But such pronouncements by no means represented the sentiment of the party with which he had identified himself.

    The objects of the Afrikander party, as presented in their most attractive form by Ons Land, were to overthrow Rhodes and all his works, to oppose the "Chartered clique" and "the influence of Mammon in politics," and to secure a "pure administration" and "the cultivation of friendly relations with the neighbouring states:" in other words, to give every possible encouragement to the Transvaal in the diplomatic struggle with Great Britain. The Dutch press in general preached the creed of Afrikander nationalism without disguise.

    The under-current of anti-British feeling which prevailed among the Dutch population may be understood from the fact that the following frank appeal from a republican nationalist to the Cape Afrikanders was published in the columns of Ons Land:

    [Footnote 41: Mr. Rhodes was opposed at Barkly West by a
    candidate financed from Pretoria.]

    "When one considers the state of affairs in the Cape Colony, it
    must be confessed the future does not appear too rosy. The
    majority of the Afrikander nation in the Cape Colony still go
    bent under the English yoke. The free section of the two
    Republics is very small compared to that portion subject to the
    stranger, and, whatever may be our private opinion, one thing at
    least is certain, namely, that without the assistance of the Cape
    Colonial Afrikanders the Afrikander cause is lost. The two
    Republics by themselves, surrounded as they are by the stranger
    [i.e. British] are unable to continue the fight.

    One day the
    question of who is to be master will have to be referred to the
    arbitrament of the sword, and then the verdict will depend upon
    the Cape Colonial Afrikanders. If they give evidence on our side
    we shall win. It does not help a brass farthing to mince matters.
    This is the real point at issue; and in this light every
    Afrikander must learn to see it. And what assistance can we
    expect from Afrikanders in the Cape Colony?... The vast majority
    of them (Afrikanders) are still faithful, and will even gird on
    the sword when God's time comes."[42]

    [Footnote 42: As translated in South Africa, October 15th,
    1898.]

    At the same period the Dutch Reformed Church in the Colony had become what was, to all intents and purposes, a vehicle for the advocacy of rebellion. The manner in which the principles of Afrikander nationalism were combined with religious doctrine may be gathered from certain extracts from the Studenten Blad of the Theological Seminary of Burghersdorp, which were translated and published by The Albert Times. The passage following appeared on May 26th, 1899; and by November 16th the Seminary was closed, since the bulk of the students had at that date joined the Boer forces:

    [Sidenote: Anti-british sentiment.]

    "Must we love this people [the English] who robbed our ancestors
    of their freedom, who forced them to leave a land dear to them as
    their heart's blood--a people that followed our fathers to the
    new fatherland which they had bought with their blood and
    snatched from the barbarians, and again threatened their freedom?
    Our fathers fought with the courage of despair, and retook the
    land with God's aid and with their blood. But England is not
    satisfied. Again is our freedom threatened by the same people,
    and not only our freedom, but our language, our nationality, our
    religion!

    Must we surrender everything, and disown our fathers? I
    cannot agree with this. The thought is hateful to me--the thought
    of trampling on the bodies of our fathers as we extend the hand
    of friendship to those who have slain our fathers in an
    unrighteous quarrel.... But some may say that the Bible teaches
    us to love our enemies. I think, however, that the text cannot be
    here applied. Race hatred is something quite distinct from
    personal enmity.

    When I meet an Englishman as a private
    individual I must regard him as my fellow-creature; if, however,
    I meet him as an Englishman, then I, as an Afrikander, must
    regard him as the enemy of my nation and my religion--as a wolf
    that is endeavouring to creep into the fold. This is the chief
    reason why we must regard them as our enemies; they are the
    enemies of our religion."

    At the beginning of September, when the bulk of the elections were over, 40 Afrikander members and 36 Progressives had been returned.

    Three seats remained to be filled. Mr. Rhodes, who had been returned both for Barkly West and Namaqualand, decided to sit for the former constituency, and the decision of the Bond to contest the seat thus vacated caused a delay in the new election for Namaqualand. The return of the two representatives of the Vryburg division was not to take place until the 15th. As all three constituencies were expected to elect Progressives--an expectation which was fulfilled--the result of the general election was to give the Bond a bare majority of one, and this in spite of the fact that a considerably larger total of votes had been cast for the Progressive than for the Bond candidates.[43]

    [Footnote 43: In a house of 79, 40 Afrikander and 39
    Progressive members were returned. A very careful and
    reliable calculation showed that, of an aggregate of 82,304
    votes polled, 44,403 were cast for Progressive, and 37,901
    for Afrikander candidates. More than this, while no
    Progressive member was returned by a majority of less than
    137, three Afrikanders won their seats by respective
    majorities, of two, ten, and twenty. The Progressives,
    therefore, were entitled, on their aggregate vote, to a
    majority of six.]

    [Sidenote: Milner's impartiality.]

    These somewhat unusual circumstances gave rise to an incident which is significant of the absolute impartiality with which Lord Milner discharged the duties of his office as constitutional Governor of the Cape Colony. In view of the circumstance that the Progressives had polled a majority of the electorate, although they were actually in a minority in the Assembly, Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that the Ministry should remain in office, and postpone the meeting of Parliament until the Namaqualand election had been held.

    He believed, further, that in the period of grace thus obtained it would be found possible to induce one or other of the Bond members to change sides, and thereby put the Ministry again in a majority. The immediate obstacle to the execution of this plan of action was the necessity of obtaining "supply." The partial appropriation made by Parliament before the dissolution was exhausted, and the only method by which funds could be provided without the authority of Parliament was the issue of Governor's warrants on the Treasury.

    Lord Milner was willing to sign warrants to enable the Ministry to carry on the administration during the unavoidable interval between the exhaustion of the last appropriation and the commencement of the new session. But, in view of the constitutional principle that no ministry which cannot obtain supply is justified in remaining in office, he absolutely refused to issue warrants for any longer period.

    He held, moreover, that as the Namaqualand election was a bye-election, the new Parliament would be completed, and therefore competent to transact business, so soon as the two members for Vryburg had been duly returned. Lord Milner was, no doubt, aware that the Sprigg Ministry would have had a fair prospect of retaining office if Mr. Rhodes had been allowed time to put his tactics into effect. On the other hand, he can scarcely have failed to observe that there was another aspect of the question.

    A loyalist ministry, by showing an undue desire to cling to office, with or without the employment of questionable political methods, would run the risk of alienating the more scrupulous of the British members, and of failing to obtain the support of the moderate Afrikander, who might otherwise have been won to the Progressive and Imperialist side. But, as Governor of the Colony, he refused to allow any considerations of party interest, on this or on any subsequent occasion, to influence his judgment.

    While he conceived it to be his duty to give advice and criticism to public men of all shades of political opinion, he showed himself inexorably opposed to the thought of straining his constitutional powers in the slightest degree for the benefit of one side or the other.[44] Accordingly provision for the expenses of administration was made by Governor's warrants up to September 30th, and on the day following the Vryburg election (September 16th), a proclamation summoning Parliament for October 7th was issued.

    [Footnote 44: Mr. Rhodes had obtained an interview with Lord
    Milner for the purpose of laying his views before him. But,
    it is said, the unwonted sternness of the Governor's
    expression at once convinced him of the hopelessness of his
    mission; and he withdrew without any attempt to argue his
    case. As Rhodes was a man of great personal magnetism, the
    incident is not without significance.]

    [Sidenote: Schreiner, prime minister.]

    On October 11th the Government was again defeated on a vote of "no confidence" by a majority of two.[45] On the 17th the House assembled with an Afrikander Ministry formed by Mr. Schreiner. In addition to the Premier it contained Dr. Te Water and Mr. Herholdt, both members of the Bond; Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, who were now in close association with the Bond; and Mr. (now Sir) Richard Solomon. The latter, who had been defeated in the general election, was provided with a seat upon his accepting office as Attorney-General. The Progressives continued to be led in opposition by Sir Gordon Sprigg.

    Mr. (now Sir) James Rose Innes was returned as an "independent," since he had found himself unable to work in association with a party in which Mr. Rhodes had a dominant influence. The new Ministry was not strong enough to resist the continued demand of the Progressives for a measure of electoral reform; but the Redistribution Bill, as now passed, took the form of a compromise so disastrous to the British population that the Bond majority was increased to eight by the new elections held in April, 1899.[46]

    [Footnote 45: Both sides were one short of their full
    strength, but a Progressive, Dr. (now Sir William) Berry, was
    chosen Speaker of the House.]

    [Footnote 46: The second reading of the Navy Contribution
    Bill, giving effect to Sir Gordon Sprigg's pledge, was
    carried on Dece

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    Title
    Lord Milner's Work in South Africa
    Author
    W. Basil Worsfold
    Release date
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    Produced by A www.PGDP.net Volunteer, Christine P. Travers
    and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
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    Front matter as received (title page, contents)
    [Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected,
    all other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's
    spelling has been maintained.]
    
    
    
    
    LORD MILNER'S WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA
    
    FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT IN 1897 TO
    THE PEACE OF VEREENIGING IN 1902
    
    
    CONTAINING HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED INFORMATION
    
    
    BY W. BASIL WORSFOLD
    
    
    WITH PORTRAITS AND MAP
    
    
    
    
         "What would have been the position to-day in South Africa if
         there had not been a man prepared to take upon himself
         responsibility; a man whom difficulties could not conquer, whom
         disasters could not cow, and whom obloquy could never
         move?"--LORD GOSCHEN _in the House of Lords, March 29th, 1906_
    
    
    
    
      LONDON
      JOHN MURRAY ALBEMARLE STREET W
      1906
    
    
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