World's War Events, Vol. I
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Title: World's War Events, Vol. I
Editor: Francis J. Reynolds
Allen L. Churchill
Release date: July 4, 2008 [eBook #25962]
Most recently updated: January 3, 2021
Language: English
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[Illustration: THE CATHEDRAL OF NOTRE DAME AT RHEIMS]
WORLD'S WAR EVENTS
RECORDED BY STATESMEN . COMMANDERS
HISTORIANS AND BY MEN WHO FOUGHT OR SAW
THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS
COMPILED AND EDITED BY
FRANCIS J. REYNOLDS
FORMER REFERENCE LIBRARIAN . LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
AND
ALLEN L. CHURCHILL
ASSOCIATE EDITOR "THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR"
ASSOCIATE EDITOR "THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA"
VOLUME I
[Illustration]
P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY
NEW YORK
Copyright 1919
BY P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY
WORLD'S WAR EVENTS
VOLUME I
BEGINNING WITH THE CAUSES OF THE WAR
AND THE INVASION OF BELGIUM IN
1914 AND CARRYING THE HISTORY
OF THE WAR TO
THE CLOSE OF
1915
CONTENTS
ARTICLE PAGE
I. WHAT CAUSED THE WAR 7
_Baron Beyens_
II. THE DEFENSE OF LIEGE 41
_Charles Bronne_
III. THE GREAT RETREAT 62
_Sir John French_
IV. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 73
_Sir John French_
V. HOW THE FRENCH FOUGHT 83
_French Official Account_
VI. THE RACE FOR THE CHANNEL 96
_French Official Account_
VII. THE LAST DITCH IN BELGIUM 108
_Arno Dosch_
VIII. WHY TURKEY ENTERED THE WAR 125
_Roland G. Usher_
IX. THE FALKLAND SEA FIGHT 142
_A. N. Hilditch_
X. CRUISE OF THE EMDEN 176
_Captain Muecke_
XI. CAPTURE OF TSING-TAO 198
_A. N. Hilditch_
XII. GALLIPOLI 221
_A. John Gallishaw_
XIII. GAS: SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES 240
_Colonel E. D. Swinton_
XIV. THE CANADIANS AT YPRES 248
_By the Canadian Record Officer_
XV. SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA 277
_Judicial Decision by Judge J. M. Mayer_
XVI. MOUNTAIN WARFARE 313
_Howard C. Felton_
XVII. THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE OF 1915 322
_Official Account of the French Headquarters Staff_
XVIII. THE TRAGEDY OF EDITH CAVELL 348
_Brand Whitlock_
XIX. GALLIPOLI ABANDONED 366
_General Sir Charles C. Monro_
XX. THE DEATH-SHIP IN THE SKY 375
_Perriton Maxwell_
WHAT CAUSED THE WAR
BARON BEYENS
The National Review, June, 1916.
I
[Sidenote: Political designs of Francis Ferdinand.]
The Archduke Francis Ferdinand will go down to posterity without having
yielded up his secret. Great political designs have been ascribed to
him, mainly on the strength of his friendship with William II. What do
we really know about him? He was strong-willed and obstinate, very
Clerical, very Austrian, disliking the Hungarians to such an extent that
he kept their statesmen at arm's-length, and having no love for Italy.
He has been credited with sympathies towards the Slav elements of the
Empire; it has been asserted that he dreamt of setting up, in place of
the dual monarchy, a "triune State," in which the third factor would
have been made up for the most part of Slav provinces carved out of the
Kingdom of St. Stephen. Immediately after he had been murdered, the
_Vossische Zeitung_ refuted this theory with arguments which seemed to
me thoroughly sound.
The Archduke, said the Berlin newspaper, was too keen-witted not to see
that he would thus be creating two rivals for Austria instead of one,
and that the Serb populations would come within the orbit of Belgrade
rather than of Vienna. Serbia would become the Piedmont of the Balkans;
she would draw to herself the Slavs of the Danube valley by a process of
crystallization similar to that which brought about Italian unity.
[Sidenote: Army and Navy reorganized.]
From year to year the Archduke had acquired more and more weight in the
governance of the Empire, in proportion as his uncle's will grew weaker
beneath the burden of advancing age. Thus he had succeeded in his
efforts to provide Austria-Hungary with a new navy, the counterpart, on
a more modest scale, of the German fleet, and to reorganize the
effective army, here again taking Germany for his model. Among certain
cliques, he was accused of not keeping enough in the background, of
showing little tact or consideration in the manner of thrusting aside
the phantom Emperor, who was gently gliding into the winter of the years
at Schoenbrunn amid the veneration of his subjects of every race.
Another charge was that he appointed too many of his creatures to
important civil and military posts.
[Sidenote: Antagonism of Russia and Austria.]
We may well believe that this prince, observing the gradual decay of the
monarchy, tried to restore its vigour, and that his first thought was to
hold with a firm grasp, even before assuming the Imperial crown, the
cluster of nationalities, mutually hostile and always discontented, that
go to make up the Dual Empire. So far as foreign relations are
concerned, we may assume that he was bent on winning her a place in the
first rank of Powers; that he wished, above all, to see her predominant
all along the Danube and in the Balkans; that he even aimed at giving
her the road to Salonika and the Levant, though it were at the price of
a collision with Russia. This antagonism between the two neighbour
Empires must have often been among the topics of his conversations with
William II.
The Archduke needed military glory, prestige won on the battle-field, in
order to seat his consort firmly on the throne and make his children
heirs to the Caesars. He had been suspected, both in Austria and abroad,
of not wishing to observe the family compact which he had signed at the
time of his marriage with Countess Sophie Chotek. It was thought that he
perhaps reserved the right to declare it null and void, in view of the
constraint that had been put upon him. The successive honours that had
drawn the Duchess of Hohenberg from the obscurity in which the
morganatic wife of a German prince is usually wrapped, and had brought
her near to the steps of the throne, showed clearly that her rise would
not stop half-way.
[Sidenote: Domestic life of the Archduke.]
The Archduke, like William II himself, was reputed to be an exemplary
father and husband. He was one of those princes who adore their own
children, but, under the spur of political ambition, are very prone to
send the children of others to the shambles. A fine theme for Socialist
and Republican preachers to enlarge upon!
I often met the heir to the Imperial crown, especially at Vienna in
1910, where I had the honour of accompanying my Sovereign, and two years
later at Munich, the Prince Regent's funeral.
On each occasion this Hapsburg, with his heavy features, his scowling
expression, and his rather corpulent figure (quite different from the
slim build characteristic of his line), struck me as a singular type.
His face was certainly not sympathetic, nor was his manner engaging. The
Duchess of Hohenberg, whom, after having known her as a little girl when
her father was Austrian Minister at Brussels, I found gracefully doing
the honours in the Belvedere Palace, had retained in her high station
the genial simplicity of the Chotek family. This probably did not
prevent her from cherishing the loftiest ambitions for herself, and
above all for her eldest son, and from coveting the glory of the double
crown.
II
[Sidenote: Assassination of Francis Ferdinand.]
The news that an assassin's hand had struck down the Archduke and his
wife, inseparable even in death, burst upon Berlin on the afternoon of
Sunday, June 28, like an unexpected thunderclap in the midst of a calm
summer's day. I went over at once to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, in
order to express all the horror that I felt at this savage drama. Count
Szoegyen, the senior member of the diplomatic corps, was on the eve of
resigning the post that he had held for twenty years, honoured by all
his colleagues. It was whispered that his removal had been asked for by
the Archduke, who was anxious to introduce young blood into the
diplomatic service. I found the Ambassador quite overcome by the
terrible news. He seemed stricken with grief at the thought of his aged
Sovereign, who had already lost so many of his nearest and dearest, and
of the Dual Empire, robbed of its most skillful pilot, and with no one
to steer it now but an octogenarian leaning on a youth of twenty-six. M.
Cambon had come to the Embassy at the same time, and we left together
discussing the results, still impossible to foresee clearly, that this
fatality might have for European affairs.
[Sidenote: Serajevo tragedy a menace.]
From the very next day the tone of the Berlin Press, in commenting on
the Serajevo tragedy, was full of menace. It expected the Vienna Cabinet
to send to Belgrade an immediate request for satisfaction, if Serbian
subjects, as it was believed, were among those who had devised and
carried out the plot. But how far would this satisfaction go, and in
what form would it be demanded? There was the rub. The report, issued by
the semi-official _Lokalanzeiger_, of a pressure exerted by the
Austro-Hungarian Minister, with a view to making the Serbian Government
institute proceedings against the anarchist societies of which the
Archduke and his wife had been the victims, surprised no one, but was
not confirmed. On the other hand, a softer breeze soon blew from Vienna
and Budapest, and under its influence the excitement of the Berlin
newspapers suddenly abated. An order seemed to have been issued: the
rage and fluster of the public were to be allowed to cool down. The
Austro-Hungarian Government, so we were informed by the news agencies,
were quietly taking steps to prosecute the murderers. Count Berchtold,
in speaking to the diplomatic corps at Vienna, and Count Tisza, in
addressing Parliament at Budapest, used reassuring language, which
raised hopes of a peaceful solution.
[Sidenote: Opinion is moderate in Berlin.]
The Wilhelmstrasse also expressed itself in very measured terms on the
guarantees that would be demanded from Serbia. Herr Zimmermann, without
knowing (so he said to me) what decision had been arrived at in Vienna,
thought that no action would be taken in Belgrade until the
Austro-Hungarian Government had collected the proofs of the complicity
of Serbian subjects or societies in the planning of the Serajevo crime.
He had made a similar statement to the Russian Ambassador, who had
hastened to impart to him his fears for the peace of Europe, in the
event of any attempt to coerce Serbia into proceeding against the secret
societies, if they were accused of intrigues against the Austrian
Government in Bosnia and Croatia. Herr Zimmermann declared to M.
Sverbeeff that, in his opinion, no better advice could be given to the
Serbian Government than this: that it should put a stop to the nefarious
work of these societies and punish the accomplices of the Archduke's
assassins. The moderation of this remark fairly reflected the general
state of public opinion in Berlin.
[Sidenote: Kaiser William's opinion.]
But what of the Emperor, the Archduke's personal friend? Would not his
grief and anger find voice in ringing tones? All eyes were turned
towards Kiel, where the fatal news reached William II while he was
taking part in a yacht race on board his own clipper. He turned pale,
and was heard to murmur: "So my work of the past twenty-five years will
have to be started all over again!" Enigmatic words which may be
interpreted in various ways! To the British Ambassador, who was also at
Kiel, with the British squadron returning from the Baltic, he unburdened
himself in more explicit fashion: "Es ist ein Verbrechen gegen das
Deutschtum" ("It is a crime against Germanity"). By this he probably
meant that Germany, feeling her own interests assailed by the Serajevo
crime, would make common cause with Austria to exact a full retribution.
With more self-control than usual, however, he abstained from all
further public utterances on the subject.
It had been announced that he would go to Vienna to attend the
Archduke's funeral. What were the motives that prevented him from
offering to the dead man this last token of a friendship which, at first
merely political, had become genuine and even tender, with a touch of
patronage characteristic of the Emperor?
[Sidenote: William II not at the funeral.]
He excused himself on the ground of some slight ailment. The truth is,
no doubt, that he was disgusted with the wretched stickling for
etiquette shown by the Grand Chamberlain of the Viennese Court, the
Prince di Montenuovo, who refused to celebrate with fitting splendour
the obsequies of the late heir apparent and his morganatic wife. Under
these circumstances, Vienna could have no desire either for the presence
of William II or for his criticisms.
[Sidenote: The Kaiser goes to Norway.]
At the beginning of July, the Emperor left for his accustomed cruise
along the Norwegian coast, and in Berlin we breathed more freely. If he
could withdraw so easily from the centre of things, it was a sign that
the storm-clouds that had nearly burst over Serbia were also passing off
from the Danube valley. Such, I fancy, was the view taken by the British
Government, for its Ambassador, who was already away on leave, was not
sent back to Berlin. Other diplomats, among them the Russian Ambassador,
took their annual holiday as usual. But the Emperor, in the remote
fiords of Norway, was all the time posted up in the secret designs of
the Vienna Cabinet. The approaching ultimatum to Serbia was telegraphed
to him direct by his Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, a very
active worker, who strenuously advocated a policy of hostility towards
Russia, and from the first moment had wanted war.
[Sidenote: The Kaiser decides.]
We may assume that the Emperor, if his mind was not already made up at
Kiel, came to a decision during his Norwegian cruise. His departure for
the north had been merely a snare, a device for throwing Europe and the
Triple Entente off the scent, and for lulling them into a false
security. While the world imagined that he was merely seeking to soothe
his nerves and recruit his strength with the salt sea breezes, he was
biding his time for a dramatic reappearance on the stage of events,
allowing the introductory scenes to be played in his absence.
III
During the first half of July, my colleagues and I at Berlin did not
live in a fool's paradise. As the deceptive calm caused by Vienna's
silence was prolonged, a latent, ill-defined uneasiness took hold of us
more and more. Yet we were far from anticipating that in the space of a
few days we should be driven into the midst of a diplomatic maelstrom,
in which, after a week of intense anguish, we should look on, mute and
helpless, at the shipwreck of European peace and of all our hopes.
[Sidenote: Austria's ultimatum to Serbia.]
The ultimatum, sent in the form of a Note by Baron von Giesl to the
Serbian Cabinet on July 23, was not disclosed by the Berlin newspapers
until the following day, in their morning editions. This bolt from the
blue proved more alarming than anything we had dared to imagine. The
shock was so unexpected that certain journals, losing their composure,
seemed to regard the Vienna Cabinet's arraignment as having overshot the
mark. "Austria-Hungary," said the _Vossische Zeitung_, "will have to
justify the grave charges that she makes against the Serbian Government
and people by publishing the results of the preliminary investigations
at Serajevo."
[Sidenote: Russia would defend Serbia.]
My own conviction, shared by several of my colleagues, was that the
Austrian and Hungarian statesmen could not have brought themselves to
risk such a blow at the Balkan kingdom, without having consulted their
colleagues at Berlin and ascertained that the Emperor William would
sanction the step. His horror of regicides and his keen sense of
dynastic brotherhood might explain why he left his ally a free hand, in
spite of the danger of provoking a European conflict. That danger was
only too real. Not for one moment did I suppose that Russia would prove
so careless of Serbia's fate as to put up with this daring assault on
the latter's sovereignty and independence; that the St. Petersburg
Cabinet would renounce the principle of "The Balkans for the Balkan
nations," proclaimed to the Duma two months before by M. Sazonoff, in
short, that the Russian people would disown the ancient ties of blood
that united it with the Slav communities of the Balkan peninsula.
The pessimistic feeling of the diplomatic corps was increased on the
following day, the 25th, by the language addressed to it at the
Wilhelmstrasse. Herren von Jagow and Zimmermann said that they had not
known beforehand the contents of the Austrian Note. This was a mere
quibble: they had not known its actual wording, I grant, but they had
certainly been apprised of its tenor. They hastened to add, by the way,
that the Imperial Government approved of its ally's conduct, and did not
consider the tone of its communication unduly harsh. The Berlin Press,
still with the exception of the Socialist organs, had recovered from its
astonishment of the day before; it joined in the chorus of the Vienna
and Budapest newspapers, from which it gave extracts, and faced the
prospect of a war with perfect calm, while expressing the hope that it
would remain localized.
[Sidenote: No signs of peaceful settlement.]
In comparison with the attitude of the German Government and Press, the
signs pointing to a peaceful settlement seemed faint indeed. They all
came from outside Germany, from the impressions recorded in foreign
telegrams. Public opinion in Europe could not grasp the need for such
hectoring methods of obtaining satisfaction, when there was no case for
refusing discussion on the normal diplomatic lines. It seemed impossible
that Count Berchtold should ignore the general movement of reproof which
appeared spontaneously everywhere but in Berlin against his ultimatum. A
moderate claim would have seemed just; but Serbia could not be asked to
accept a demand for so heavy an atonement, couched in a form of such
unexampled brutality.
[Sidenote: Key to the situation in Berlin.]
The more I reflected on the ghastly situation created by the collusion
of German and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, the more certain did I feel
that the key to that situation (as M. Sazonoff said later) lay in
Berlin, and that there was no need to look further for the solution of
the problem. If, however, the choice between peace and war was left to
the discretion of the Emperor William, whose influence over his ally in
Vienna had always overruled that of others, then, considering what I
knew as to His Majesty's personal inclinations and the plans of the
General Staff, the upshot of it all was no longer in doubt, and no hope
of a peaceful arrangement could any longer be entertained. I
communicated this dismal forecast to the French Ambassador, whom I went
to see on the evening of the 25th. Like myself, M. Cambon laboured under
no illusions. That very night I wrote to my Government, in order to
acquaint it with my fears and urge it to be on its guard. This report,
dated the 26th, I entrusted, as a measure of precaution, to one of my
secretaries, who at once left for Brussels. Early next morning, my
dispatch was in the hands of the Belgian Foreign Minister.
[Sidenote: War aimed at Russia and France.]
The ultimatum to Serbia [it ran] is a blow contrived by Vienna and
Berlin, or rather, contrived here and carried out at Vienna. Requital
for the assassination of the Austrian heir apparent and the Pan-Serb
propaganda serves as a stalking-horse. The real aim, apart from the
crushing of Serbia and the stifling of Jugo-Slav aspirations, is to deal
a deadly thrust at Russia and France, with the hope that England will
stand aside from the struggle. In order to vindicate this theory, I beg
to remind you of the view prevailing in the German General Staff,
namely, that a war with France and Russia is unavoidable and close at
hand--a view which the Emperor has been induced to share. This war,
eagerly desired by the military and Pan-German party, might be
undertaken to-day under conditions extremely favourable for Germany,
conditions that are not likely to arise again for some time to come.
After a summary of the situation and of the problems that it raised, my
report concluded as follows:
We, too, have to ask ourselves these harassing
questions, and keep ourselves ready for the
worst; for the European conflict that has
always been talked about, with the hope that it
would never break out, is to-day becoming a
grim reality.
[Sidenote: Dangers for Belgium.]
The worst contingencies that occurred to me, as
a Belgian, were the violation of a part of our
territory and the duty that might fall upon our
soldiers of barring the way to the
belligerents. In view of the vast area over
which a war between France and Germany would be
fought, dared we hope that Belgium would be
safe from any attack by the German army, from
any attempt to use her strategic routes for
offensive purposes? I could not bring myself to
believe that she would be so fortunate. But
between such tentatives and a thoroughgoing
invasion of my country, plotted a long time in
advance and carried out before the real
operations of the war had begun, there was a
wide gulf, a gulf that I never thought the
Imperial Government capable of leaping over
with a light heart, because of the European
complications which so reckless a disdain for
treaties would not fail to involve.
IV
Until the end of the crisis, the idea of a preventive war continually
recurred to my mind. Other heads of legations, however, while sharing
my anxieties on this point, did not agree with me as to the
premeditation of which I accused the Emperor and the military chiefs. I
was not content with putting my questions to the French Ambassador,
whose unerring judgment always carried great weight with me. I also
visited his Italian colleague, an astute diplomat, thoroughly versed in
German statecraft. He had always put me in mind of those dexterous
agents employed by the sixteenth-century Italian republics.
[Sidenote: Signor Bollati's views.]
[Sidenote: Germany and Austria confident.]
According to Signor Bollati, the German Government, agreeing in
principle with the Vienna Cabinet as to the necessity for chastising
Serbia, had not known beforehand the terms of the Austrian Note, the
violence of which was unprecedented in the language of Chancelleries.
Vienna, as well as Berlin, was convinced that Russia, in spite of the
official assurances that had recently passed between the Tsar and M.
Poincare regarding the complete readiness of the French and Russian
armies, was not in a position to enter on a European war, and that she
would not dare to embark upon so hazardous an adventure. Internal
troubles, revolutionary intrigues, incomplete armaments, inadequate
means of communication--all these reasons would compel the Russian
Government to be an impotent spectator of Serbia's undoing. The same
confidence reigned in the German and Austrian capitals as regards, not
the French army, but the spirit prevailing among Government circles in
Paris.
At present [added the Ambassador] feeling runs so high in Vienna that
all calm reflection goes by the board. Moreover, in seeking to
annihilate Serbia's military power, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet is
pursuing a policy of personal revenge. It cannot realize the mistakes
that it made during the Balkan War, or remain satisfied with the
partial successes then gained with our aid--successes that, whatever
judgment may be passed upon them, were certainly diplomatic victories.
All that Count Berchtold sees to-day is Serbia's insolence and the
criticism he has had to endure even in Austria. By this bold stroke,
very unexpected from a man of his stamp, he hopes to turn the criticism
into applause.
The Ambassador held that Berlin had false ideas as to the course that
the Tsar's Government would adopt. The latter would find itself forced
into drawing the sword, in order to maintain its prestige in the Slav
world. Its inaction, in face of Austria's entry into the field, would be
equivalent to suicide. Signor Bollati also gave me to understand that a
widespread conflict would not be popular in Italy. The Italian people
had no concern with the overthrow of the Russian power, which was
Austria's enemy; it wished to devote all its attention to other
problems, more absorbing from its own point of view.
[Sidenote: Vienna welcomes war on Serbia.]
The blindness of the Austrian Cabinet with regard to Russian
intervention has been proved by the correspondence, since published, of
the French and British representatives at Vienna. The Viennese populace
was beside itself with joy at the announcement of an expedition against
Serbia, which, it felt sure, would be a mere military parade. Not for a
single night were Count Berchtold's slumbers disturbed by the vision of
the Russian peril. He is, indeed, at all times a buoyant soul, who can
happily mingle the distractions of a life of pleasure with the heavy
responsibilities of power. His unvarying confidence was shared by the
German Ambassador, his most trusted mentor. We can hardly suppose that
the Austrian Minister shut his eyes altogether to the possibility of a
struggle with the Slav world. Having Germany as his partner, however,
he determined, with the self-possession of a fearless gambler, to
proceed with the game.
At Berlin, the theory that Russia was incapable of facing a conflict
reigned supreme, not only in the official world and in society, but
among all the manufacturers who made a specialty of war material.
[Sidenote: Berlin believes Russia weak.]
Herr Krupp von Bohlen, who was more entitled to give an opinion than any
other of this class, declared on July 28 that the Russian artillery was
neither efficient nor complete, while that of the German army had never
before been so superior to all its rivals. It would be madness on
Russia's part, he inferred, to take the field against Germany under
these conditions.
V
The foreign diplomatic corps was kept in more or less profound ignorance
as to the _pourparlers_ carried on since the 24th by the Imperial
Foreign Office with the Triple Entente Cabinets. Nevertheless, to the
diplomats who were continually going over to the Wilhelmstrasse for
news, the crisis was set forth in a light very favourable to Austria and
Germany, in order to influence the views of the Governments which they
represented. Herr von Stumm, the departmental head of the political
branch, in a brief interview that I had with him on the 26th, summed up
his exposition in these words: "Everything depends on Russia." I should
rather have thought that everything depended on Austria, and on the way
in which she would carry out her threats against Serbia.
On the following day I was received by Herr Zimmermann, who adopted the
same line of argument, following it in all its bearings from the origin
of the dispute.
It was not at our prompting [he said], or in accordance with our advice,
that Austria took the action that you know of towards the Belgrade
Cabinet. The answer was unsatisfactory, and to-day Austria is
mobilizing. She can no longer draw back without risking a collapse at
home as well as a loss of influence abroad. It is now a question of life
and death to her. She must put a stop to the unscrupulous propaganda
which, by raising revolt among the Slav provinces of the Danube valley,
is leading towards her internal disintegration. Finally, she must exact
a signal revenge for the assassination of the Archduke. For all these
reasons Serbia is to receive, by means of a military expedition, a stern
and salutary lesson. An Austro-Serbian War is, therefore, impossible to
avoid.
[Sidenote: Attempts to limit conflict.]
England has asked us to join with her, France, and Italy, in order to
prevent the conflict from spreading and a war from breaking out between
Austria and Russia. Our answer was that we should be only too glad to
help in limiting the area of the conflagration, by speaking in a pacific
sense to Vienna and St. Petersburg; but that we could not use our
influence with Austria to restrain her from inflicting an exemplary
punishment on Serbia. We have promised to help and support our Austrian
allies, if any other nation should try to hamper them in this task. We
shall keep that promise.
If Russia mobilizes her army, we shall at once mobilize ours, and then
there will be a general war, a war that will set ablaze all Central
Europe and even the Balkan peninsula, for the Rumanians, Greeks,
Bulgarians, and Turks will not be able to resist the temptation to come
in.
As I remarked yesterday to M. Boghitchevitch [the former Serbian Charge
d'Affaires, who was on a flying visit to Berlin, where he had been
greatly appreciated during the Balkan War], the best advice I can give
Serbia is that she should make no more than a show of resistance to
Austria, and should come to terms as soon as possible, by accepting all
the conditions of the Vienna Cabinet. I added, in speaking to him, that
if a universal war broke out and went in favor of the Triplice, Serbia
would probably cease to exist as a nation; she would be wiped off the
map of Europe. I still hope, though, that such a widespread conflict may
be avoided, and that we shall succeed in inducing Russia not to
intervene on Serbia's behalf. Remember that Austria is determined to
respect Serbia's integrity, once she has obtained satisfaction.
I pointed out to the Under-Secretary that the Belgrade Cabinet's reply,
according to some of my colleagues who had read it, was, apart from a
few unimportant restrictions, an unqualified surrender to Austria's
demands. Herr Zimmermann said that he had no knowledge of this reply (it
had been handed in two days before to the Austrian Minister at
Belgrade!) and that, in any case, there was no longer any possibility of
preventing an Austro-Hungarian military demonstration.
[Sidenote: Serbian reply.]
The Serbian document was not published by the Berlin newspapers until
the 29th. On the previous day they all reproduced a telegram from
Vienna, stating that this apparent submission was altogether inadequate.
The prompt concessions made by the Pasitch Cabinet, concessions that had
not been anticipated abroad, failed to impress Germany. She persisted in
seeing only with Austria's eyes.
[Sidenote: Zimmermann's arguments.]
Herr Zimmermann's arguments held solely on the hypothesis that, in the
action brought by Austria against Serbia, no Power had the right to
come forward as counsel for the defendant, or to interfere in the trial
at all. This claim amounted to depriving Russia of her historic role in
the Balkans. Carried to its logical conclusion, the theory meant
condemning unheard every small State that should be unfortunate enough
to have a dispute with a great Power. According to the principles of the
Berlin Cabinet, the great Power should be allowed, without let or
hindrance, to proceed to the execution of its weak opponent. England,
therefore, would have had no right to succor Belgium when the latter was
invaded by Germany, any more than Russia had a right to protect Serbia
from the Austrian menace.
Russia, it was asserted at the Wilhelmstrasse, ought to be satisfied
with the assurance that Austria would not impair the territorial
integrity of Serbia or mar her future existence as an independent State.
What a hollow mockery such a promise would seem, when the whole country
had been ravaged by fire and sword! Surely it was decreed that, after
this "exemplary punishment," Serbia should become the lowly vassal of
her redoubtable neighbour, living a life that was no life, cowed by the
jealous eye of the Austrian Minister--really the Austrian Viceroy--at
Belgrade. Had not Count Mensdorff declared to Sir Edward Grey that
before the Balkan War Serbia was regarded as gravitating towards the
Dual Monarchy's sphere of influence? A return to the past, to the tame
deference of King Milan, was the least that Austria would exact.
[Sidenote: German opinion is misled.]
The version given out by the Imperial Chancellery, besides being
intended to enlighten foreign Governments, had a further end in view.
Repeated _ad nauseam_ by the Press, it aimed at misleading German
public opinion. From the very opening of the crisis, Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg and his colleagues strove, with all the ingenuity at
their command, to hoodwink their countrymen, to shuffle the cards, to
throw beforehand on Russia, in case the situation should grow worse, the
odium of provocation and the blame for the disaster, to represent that
Power as meddling with a police inquiry that did not concern her in the
least. This cunning man[oe]uvre resulted in making all Germany, without
distinction of class or party, respond to her Emperor's call at the
desired moment, since she was persuaded (as I have explained in a
previous chapter) that she was the object of a premeditated attack by
Tsarism.
VI
[Sidenote: German diplomacy.]
The game of German diplomacy during these first days of the crisis, July
24 to 28, has already been revealed. At first inclined to bludgeon, it
soon came to take things easily, even affecting a certain optimism, and
by its passive resistance bringing to naught all the efforts and all the
proposals of the London, Paris, and St. Petersburg Cabinets. To gain
time, to lengthen out negotiations, seems to have been the task imposed
upon Austria-Hungary's accomplice in order to promote rapid action by
the Dual Monarchy, and to face the Triple Entente with irrevocable
deeds, namely the occupation of Belgrade and the surrender of the
Serbians. But things did not go as Berlin and Vienna had hoped, and the
determined front shown by Russia, who in answer to the partial
mobilization of Austria mobilized her army in four southern districts,
gave food for reflection to the tacticians of the Wilhelmstrasse. Their
language and their frame of mind grew gentler to a singular degree on
the fifth day, July 28. It may be recalled, in passing, that in 1913,
during the Balkan hostilities, Austria and Russia had likewise proceeded
to partial mobilizations; yet these steps had not made them come to
blows or even brought them to the verge of hostilities.
[Sidenote: The Kaiser returns to Berlin.]
On the evening of the 26th the Emperor's return was announced in Berlin.
Why did he come back so suddenly? I think I am justified in saying that,
at this news, the general feeling among the actors and spectators of the
drama was one of grave anxiety. Our hearts were heavy within us; we had
a foreboding that the decisive moment was drawing near. It was the same
at the Wilhelmstrasse. To the British Charge d'Affaires Herr von
Zimmermann frankly confessed his regret at this move, on which William
II had decided without consulting any one.
Nevertheless, our fears at first seemed to be unwarranted. The 28th was
marked by a notable loosening of Germany's stiff-necked attitude. The
British Ambassador, who had returned to Berlin on the previous day, was
summoned in the evening by the Chancellor. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg,
while rejecting the conference proposed by Sir Edward Grey, promised to
use his good offices to induce Russia and Austria to discuss the
position in an amicable fashion. "A war between the Great Powers must be
averted," were his closing words.
It is highly probable that the Chancellor at that time sincerely wanted
to keep the peace, and his first efforts, when he saw the danger coming
nearer and nearer, succeeded in curbing the Emperor's impatience for
forty-eight hours. The telegram sent by William II to the Tsar on the
evening of the 28th is friendly, almost reassuring: "Bearing in mind
the cordial friendship that has united us two closely for a long time
past, I am using all my influence to make Austria arrive at a genuine
and satisfactory understanding with Russia."
How are we to explain, then, the abrupt change of tack that occurred the
following day at Berlin, or rather, at Potsdam, and the peculiar
language addressed by the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the
evening of the 29th? In that nocturnal scene there was no longer any
question of Austria's demands on Serbia, or even of the possibility of
an Austro-Russian war. The centre of gravity was suddenly shifted, and
at a single stride the danger passed from the southeast of Europe to the
northwest.
[Sidenote: Will England be neutral?]
What is it that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg wants to know at once, as he
comes straight from the council held at Potsdam under the presidency of
the Emperor? Whether Great Britain would consent to remain neutral in a
European war, provided that Germany agreed to respect the territorial
integrity of France. "And what of the French colonies?" asks the
Ambassador with great presence of mind. The Chancellor can make no
promise on this point, but he unhesitatingly declares that Germany will
respect the integrity and neutrality of Holland. As for Belgium,
France's action will determine what operations Germany may be forced to
enter upon in that country; but when the war is over, Belgium will lose
no territory, unless she ranges herself on the side of Germany's foes.
[Sidenote: A bargain proposed.]
Such was the shameful bargain proposed to England, at a time when none
of the negotiators had dared to speak in plain terms of a European war
or even to offer a glimpse of that terrifying vision. This interview was
the immediate result of the decisive step taken by German diplomacy on
the same day at St. Petersburg. The step in question has been made known
to us through the diplomatic documents which have been printed by the
orders of the belligerent Governments, and all of which concur in their
account of this painful episode. Twice on that day did M. Sazonoff
receive a visit from the German Ambassador, who came to make a demand
wrapped up in threats.
[Sidenote: Germany's demands on Russia.]
Count de Pourtales insisted on Russia contenting herself with the
promise, guaranteed by Germany, that Austria-Hungary would not impair
the integrity of Serbia. M. Sazonoff refused to countenance the war on
this condition. Serbia, he felt, would become a vassal of Austria, and a
revolution would break out in Russia. Count de Pourtales then backed his
request with the warning that, unless Russia desisted from her military
preparations, Germany would mobilize. A German mobilization, he said,
would mean war. The results of the second interview, which took place at
two o'clock in the morning, were as negative as those of the first,
notwithstanding a last effort, a final suggestion by M. Sazonoff to
stave off the crisis. His giving in to Germany's brutal dictation would
have been an avowal that Russia was impotent.
To the Emperor William, who had resumed the conduct of affairs since the
morning of the 27th--the Emperor William, itching to cut the knot,
driven on by his Staff and his generals--to him and no other must we
trace the responsibility for this insolent move which made war
inevitable. "The heads of the army insisted," was all that Herr von
Jagow would vouchsafe a little later to M. Cambon by way of explanation.
The Chancellor, and with him the Foreign Secretary and Under-Secretary,
associated themselves with these hazardous tactics, from sheer inability
to secure the adoption of less hasty and violent methods. If they
believed that this summary breaking off of negotiations would meet with
success, they were as grievously mistaken as Count de Pourtales, whose
reports utterly misled them as to the sacrifices that Russia was
prepared to make for Serbia.
At all events this upright man, when he realized the appalling effects
of his blunder, gave free play to his emotion. Such sensitiveness is
rare indeed in a German, and redounds entirely to his credit.
[Sidenote: Russian military development.]
[Sidenote: French military situation.]
But the Emperor and his council of generals--what was their state of
soul at this critical moment? Perhaps this riddle will never be wholly
solved. From the military point of view, which in their eyes claimed
first attention, they must have rejoiced at M. Sazonoff's answer, for
never again would they find such a golden opportunity for vanquishing
Russia and making an end of her rivalry. In 1917 the reorganization of
her army would have been complete, her artillery would have been at full
strength, and a new network of strategic railways would have enabled her
to let loose upon the two Germanic empires a vast flood of fighting men
drawn from the inexhaustible reservoir of her population. The struggle
with the colossus of the North, despite the vaunted technical
superiority of the German army, would in all likelihood have ended in
the triumph of overwhelming might. In the France of 1917, again, the
three years' term of service would have begun to produce its full
results, and her first-line troops would have been both more numerous
and better trained than at present.
On the other hand, William II could cherish no false hopes as to the
consequences of this second pressure that he was bringing to bear on
St. Petersburg. Had it succeeded in 1914 as in 1909, the encounter
between Germany and the great Slav Empire would only have been put off
to a later day, instead of being finally shelved. How could the Tsar or
the Russian people have forgiven the Kaiser for humbling them once more?
If they had pocketed the affront in silence, it would only have been in
order to bide their time for revenge, and they would have chosen the
moment when Russia, in possession of all her resources, could have
entered upon the struggle with every chance of winning.
[Sidenote: William II and Russia.]
Here an objection may be raised. The German Emperor, some may hold,
fancying that the weight of his sword in the scale would induce the Tsar
to shrink from action, had foreseen the anger of the Slav nation at its
sovereign's timorous scruples, and looked forward to revolutionary
outbreaks which would cripple the Government for years to come and make
it unable to think of war, if indeed they did not sweep the Romanoffs
from the throne. I would answer that this Machiavellian scheme could
never have entered the head of such a ruler as William II, with his deep
sense of monarchial solidarity, and his instinctive horror of anarchist
outrages and of revolution.
[Sidenote: The Kaiser eager to act.]
No: the Emperor, together with the military authorities whose advice he
took, wished to profit by a juncture which he had awaited with longing,
and which fickle Fortune might never again offer to his ambition.
Everything proves it, down to his feverish haste, as soon as M.
Sazonoff's reply was conveyed to him, to learn the intentions of
England, and to suggest, on that very day, a bargain that might purchase
her neutrality. This is why Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg received orders to
summon the British Ambassador on the night of the 29th. The Emperor
could not wait until the following morning, so eager was he to act. Is
this impatience the mark of one who was the victim of a concerted
surprise? If he had not wanted war, would he not have tried to resume
negotiations with Russia on a basis more in keeping with her dignity as
a Great Power, however heavy a blow it was to his own pride that he had
failed to intimidate her?
VII
The abortive efforts to overawe St. Petersburg and the offers made to
the British Ambassador, as if Great Britain's inaction could be sold to
the highest bidder, brought results that were not hard to foresee.
[Sidenote: Sir Edward Grey's telegram.]
In London, Sir Edward Grey's indignation found immediate vent in the
following passage of his telegram of July 30 to Sir Edward Goschen: "It
would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the
expense of France--a disgrace from which the good name of this country
would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain
away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality
of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either."
Through the brazen overtures of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, however, the
British Cabinet henceforth came to occupy itself, before all things,
with the fate allotted to our country by the Imperial Government in the
war that it was preparing. In order to tear off the mask from German
statesmanship, the surest method was to ask it a straightforward
question. On July 31, Sir Edward Grey, following the example of the
Gladstone Ministry of 1870, inquired both of Germany and France whether
they would respect the neutrality of Belgium. At the same time he gave
Belgium to understand that Britain counted on her doing her utmost to
maintain her neutrality.
[Sidenote: Neutrality of Belgium.]
The answer of the Republican Government was frank and unhesitating. It
was resolved to respect Belgian neutrality, and would only act otherwise
if the violation of that neutrality by some other Power forced it to do
so in self-defence.
The Belgian Government, for its part, hastened to assure the British
Minister at Brussels of its determination to resist with might and main
should its territory be invaded.
At Berlin, however, the Foreign Secretary eluded Sir Edward Goschen's
questions. He said that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor.
In his opinion, any answer would entail the risk, in the event of war,
of partly divulging the plan of campaign. It seemed doubtful to him,
therefore, whether he would be able to give a reply. This way of
speaking was perfectly clear in its ambiguity. It did not puzzle Sir
Edward Grey for a moment. On the following day he declared to the German
Ambassador that the reply of the German Government was a matter of very
great regret. Belgian neutrality, he pointed out, was highly important
in British eyes, and if Belgium was attacked, it would be difficult to
restrain public feeling in his country.
On the same day, August 1, in accordance with instructions from my
Government, I read to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (at the
same time giving him a copy) a dispatch drafted beforehand and addressed
to the Belgian Ministers attached to the Powers that had guaranteed our
neutrality. This dispatch affirmed that Belgium, having observed, with
scrupulous fidelity, the duties imposed on her as a neutral State by the
treaties of April 19, 1839, would manifest an unshaken purpose in
fulfilling them; and that she had every hope, since the friendly
intentions of the Powers towards her had been so often professed, of
seeing her territory secure from all assault, if hostilities should
arise near her frontiers. The Belgian Government added that it had
nevertheless taken all the necessary steps for maintaining its
neutrality, but that, in so doing, it had not been actuated by a desire
to take part in an armed struggle among the Powers, or by a feeling of
distrust towards any one of them.
Herr Zimmermann listened without a word of comment to my reading of this
dispatch, which expressed the loyal confidence of my Government in
Germany's goodwill. He merely took note of my communication. His silence
did not surprise me, for I had just learnt of Herr von Jagow's evasive
reply to the British Government concerning Belgium; but it bore out all
my misgivings. His constrained smile, by the way, told me quite as much
as his refusal to speak.
[Sidenote: Russia and Germany hasten preparations.]
[Sidenote: Austria mobilizes.]
From the 30th, Russia and Germany--as an inevitable sequel to the
conversations of the 29th--went forward actively with their military
preparations. What was the exact nature of these preludes to the German
mobilization? It was impossible to gain any precise notion at Berlin.
The capital was rife with various rumors that augured ill for the
future. We heard tell of regiments moving from the northern provinces
towards the Rhine. We learnt that reservists had been instructed to keep
themselves in readiness for marching orders. At the same time, postal
communication with Belgium and France had been cut off. At the
Wilhelmstrasse, the position was described to me as follows: "Austria
will reply to Russia's partial mobilization with a general mobilization
of her army. It is to be feared that Russia will then mobilize her
entire forces, which will compel Germany to do the same." As it turned
out, a general mobilization was indeed proclaimed in Austria on the
night of the 30th.
Nevertheless, the peace _pourparlers_ went on between Vienna and St.
Petersburg on the 30th and 31st, although on the latter date Russia, as
Berlin expected, in answer both to the Austrian and the German
preparations, had mobilized her entire forces. Even on the 31st these
discussions seemed to have some chance of attaining their object.
Austria was now more accurately gauging the peril into which her own
blind self-confidence and the counsels of her ally were leading her, and
was pausing on the brink of the abyss. The Vienna Cabinet even consented
to talk over the gist of its Note to Serbia, and M. Sazonoff at once
sent an encouraging reply.
It was desirable, he stated, that representatives of all the Great
Powers should confer in London under the direction of the British
Government.
Was a faint glimmer of peace, after all, dawning above the horizon?
Would an understanding be reached, at the eleventh hour, among the only
States really concerned with the Serbian question? We had reckoned
without our host. The German Emperor willed otherwise. Suddenly, at the
instance of the General Staff, and after a meeting of the Federal
Council, as prescribed by the constitution, he issued the decree of
_Kriegsgefahrzustand_ (Imminence-of-War). This is the first phase of a
general mobilization--a sort of martial law, substituting the military
for the civil authorities as regards the public services (means of
communication, post, telegraphs, and telephones).
This momentous decision was revealed to us on the 31st by a special
edition of the _Berliner Lokalanzeiger_, distributed at every street
corner. The announcement ran as follows:
RUSSIA WANTS WAR!
"From official sources we have just received
(at 2 P.M.) the following report, pregnant with
consequences:
"'The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg sends
us word to-day that a general mobilization of
the Russian Army and Navy had previously been
ordered. That is why His Majesty the Emperor
William has decreed an Imminence-of-War. His
Majesty will take up his residence in Berlin
to-day.'
"Imminence-of-War is the immediate prelude to a
general mobilization, in answer to the menace
that already hangs over Germany to-day, owing
to the step taken by the Tsar."
[Sidenote: The Kaiser's ultimatum to Russia.]
As a drowning man catches at a straw, those who in Berlin saw
themselves, with horror, faced by an impending catastrophe, clutched at
a final hope. The German general mobilization had not yet been ordered.
Who knew whether, at the last moment, some happy inspiration from the
British Cabinet, that most stalwart champion of peace, might cause the
weapons to drop from the hands that were about to wield them? Once more,
however, the Emperor, by his swift moves, shattered this fond illusion.
On the 31st, at seven o'clock in the evening, he dispatched to the
Russian Government a summons to demobilize both on its Austrian and on
its German frontiers. An interval of twelve hours was given for a reply.
It was obvious that Russia, who had refused two days before to cease
from her military preparations, would not accept the German ultimatum,
worded as it was in so dictatorial a form and rendered still more
insulting by the briefness of the interval granted. As, however, no
answer had come from St. Petersburg by the afternoon of August 1st,
Herren von Jagow and Zimmermann (so the latter informed me) rushed to
the Chancellor and the Emperor, in order to request that the decree for
a general mobilization might at least be held over until the following
day. They supported their plea by urging that the telegraphic
communication with St. Petersburg had presumably been cut, and that this
would explain the silence of the Tsar. Perhaps they still hoped against
hope for a conciliatory proposal from Russia. This was the last flicker
of their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience.
Their efforts could make no headway against the stubborn opposition of
the War Minister and the army chiefs, who represented to the Emperor the
dangers of a twenty-four hours' delay.
[Sidenote: Germany mobilizes.]
The order for a mobilization of the army and navy was signed at five
o'clock in the afternoon and was at once given out to the public by a
special edition of the _Lokalanzeiger_. The mobilization was to begin on
August 2nd. On the 1st, at ten minutes past seven in the evening,
Germany's declaration of war was forwarded to Russia.
[Sidenote: Pretexts given in Germany.]
[Sidenote: Heroism of France.]
As all the world knows, the Berlin Cabinet had to resort to wild
pretexts, such as the committing of acts of hostility (so the military
authorities alleged) by French aviators on Imperial soil, in order to
find motives, two days later, for its declaration of war on France.
Although Germany tried to lay the blame for the catastrophe at Russia's
door, it was in reality her western neighbour that she wished to attack
and annihilate first. On this point there can be no possible doubt
to-day. "Poor France!" said the Berlin newspapers, with feigned
compassion. They acknowledged that the conduct of the French Government
throughout the crisis had been irreproachable, and that it had worked
without respite for the maintenance of peace. While her leaders
fulfilled this noble duty to mankind, France was offering the world an
impressive sight--the sight of a nation looking calmly and without fear
at a growing peril that she had done nothing to conjure up, and,
regarding her word as her bond, determined in cold blood to follow the
destiny of her ally on the field of battle. At the same time she offered
to Germany, who had foolishly counted on her being torn by internal
troubles and political feuds, the vision of her children closely linked
together in an unconquerable resolve--the resolve to beat back an
iniquitous assault upon their country. Nor was this the only surprise
that she held in store. With the stone wall of her resistance, she was
soon to change the whole character of the struggle, and to wreck the
calculations of German strategy.
No one had laboured with more energy and skill to quench the flames lit
by Austria and her ally than the representative of the Republic at
Berlin.
"Don't you think M. Cambon's attitude has been admirable?" remarked the
British Ambassador to me, in the train that was whirling us far away
from the German capital on August 6th. "Throughout these terrible days
nothing has been able to affect his coolness, his presence of mind, and
his insight." I cannot express my own admiration better than by
repeating this verdict of so capable a diplomat as Sir Edward Goschen,
who himself took a most active part in the vain attempt of the Triple
Entente to save Europe from calamity.
VIII
[Sidenote: Berlin enthusiastic.]
The Berlin population had followed the various phases of the crisis with
tremendous interest, but with no outward show of patriotic fervour.
Those fine summer days passed as tranquilly as usual. Only in the
evenings did some hundreds of youths march along the highways of the
central districts, soberly singing national anthems, and dispersing
after a few cries of "Hoch!" outside the Austro-Hungarian and Italian
Embassies and the Chancellor's mansion.
On August 2nd I watched the animation of the Sunday crowd that thronged
the broad avenue of the Kurfuerstendamm. It read attentively the special
editions of the newspapers, and then each went off to enjoy his or her
favourite pastime--games of tennis for the young men and maidens, long
bouts of drinking in the beer-gardens, for the more sedate citizens with
their families. When the Imperial motor-car flashed like a streak of
lightning down Unter den Linden, it was hailed with loud, but by no
means frantic, cheers. It needed the outcries of the Press against
Russia as the instigator of the war, the misleading speeches of the
Emperor and the Chancellor, and the wily publications of the Government,
to kindle a patriotism rather slow to take fire. Towards the close of my
stay, feeling displayed itself chiefly by jeers at the unfortunate
Russians who were returning post-haste to their native country, and
blackguardly behaviour towards the staff of the Tsar's Ambassador as he
was leaving Berlin.
[Sidenote: German people deluded.]
That the mass of the German people, unaware of Russia's peaceful
intentions, should have been easily deluded, is no matter for
astonishment. The upper classes, however, those of more enlightened
intellect, cannot have been duped by the official falsehoods. They knew
as well as we do that it was greatly to the advantage of the Tsar's
Government not to provoke a conflict. In fact, this question is hardly
worth discussing. Once more we must repeat that, in the plans of William
II and his generals, the Serbian affair was a snare spread for the
Northern Empire before the growth of its military power should have made
it an invincible foe.
[Sidenote: Uncertainty regarding Britain.]
[Sidenote: England's attitude.]
There is no gainsaying that uncertainty as to Britain's intervention was
one of the factors that encouraged Germany. We often asked ourselves
anxiously at Berlin whether Germany's hand would not have been stayed
altogether if the British Government had formally declared that it would
not hold aloof from the war. We even hoped, for a brief moment, that Sir
Edward Grey would destroy the illusions on which the German people loved
to batten. The British Foreign Secretary did indeed observe to Prince
Lichnowsky on July 29th that the Austro-Serbian issue might become so
great as to involve all European interests, and that he did not wish the
Ambassador to be misled by the friendly tone of their conversations into
thinking that Britain would stand aside. If at the beginning she had
openly taken her stand by the side of her Allies, she might, to be sure,
have checked the fatal march of events. This, at any rate, is the most
widespread view, for a maritime war certainly did not enter into the
calculations of the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz, while it was the
nightmare of the German commercial world. In my opinion, however, an
outspoken threat from England on the 29th, a sudden roar of the British
lion, would not have made William II draw back. The memory of Agadir
still rankled in the proud Germanic soul. The Emperor would have risked
losing all prestige in the eyes of a certain element among his subjects
if at the bidding of the Anglo-Saxon he had refused to go further, and
had thus played into the hands of those who charged him with conducting
a policy of mere bluff and intimidation. "Germany barks but does not
bite" was a current saying abroad, and this naturally tended to
exasperate her. An ominous warning from the lips of Sir Edward Grey
would only have served to precipitate the onslaught of the Kaiser's
armies, in order that the intervention of the British fleet might have
no influence on the result of the campaign, the rapid and decisive
campaign planned at Berlin.
[Sidenote: British opinion.]
We know, moreover, from the telegrams and speeches of the British
Foreign Minister, how carefully he had to reckon with public feeling
among his countrymen in general and among the majority in Parliament. A
war in the Balkans did not concern the British nation, and the strife
between Teuton and Slav left it cold. It did not begin to be properly
roused until it grasped the reality of the danger to France's very
existence, and it did not respond warmly to the eloquent appeals of Mr.
Asquith and Sir Edward Grey until the day when it knew that the Germans
were at the gates of Liege, where they threatened both Paris and
Antwerp--Antwerp, "that pistol pointed at the heart of England."
* * * * *
With the failure of diplomatic efforts to prevent war as a result of the
deliberate intention of Germany to bring about the conflict, the great
German war machine was put in motion. It was anticipated by the General
Staff that the passage across Belgium would be effected without
difficulty and with the acquiescence of King and people.
How wrong was this judgment is one of the curious facts of history. The
Germans discovered this error when their armies presented themselves
before the strong fortress of Liege, the first fortified place in their
path. Its capture was necessary for the successful passage of the German
troops.
[Sidenote: Importance of the delay.]
It was captured, but at a cost in time and in their arrangement of plans
which were a great element in the great thrust--back at the Marne.
THE DEFENCE OF LIEGE
CHARLES BRONNE
English Review, April, 1915.
[Sidenote: Germany invades Belgium.]
On Sunday, August 2nd, while the news was going round that a train had
entered Luxembourg with German forces, the German Minister at Brussels
delivered an ultimatum to Belgium demanding the free passage through our
territory of the German armies. The following day, Monday, the Belgian
Government replied that the nation was determined to defend its
neutrality. The same night the German advanced posts entered our
territory. Tuesday morning they were before Vise, at Warsage, at
Dolhain, and at Stavelot. The bridges of Vise and Argenteau and the
tunnels of Troisponts and Nas-Proue were blown up.
[Sidenote: Atrocities begin.]
From this day the atrocities committed by the pioneers of German
"Kultur" began at Vise with fire and the massacre of inhabitants. On
Thursday, they were to continue at Warsage and Berneau. On Wednesday,
August 5th, the investment of Liege began, the bombardment being
specially directed to the north-west sector which comprises the forts of
Evegnee, Barchon, and Fleron. In the afternoon the attack extended as
far as the fort of Chaudfontaine. The region attacked by the foe was
thus that between the Meuse and the Vesdre, the beautiful country of
Herve, where cornfields are followed by vineyards, where meadowland
encroaches on the sides of narrow but picturesque valleys, where small
but thick woods conceal the number of the assailants. It was found
necessary to destroy some prosperous little farms, several country
houses, and pretty villas. This was but a prelude to the devastation
brought by the soldiers of the Kaiser.
The enemy was in force. Later it was known that around Liege were the
10th Prussian Army Corps from Aix-la-Chapelle on the way to Vise, the
7th Corps, which had passed through the Herve country, the 8th, which
had entered through Stavelot, and also a brigade of the 11th Corps,
making up a total of about 130,000 men.
[Sidenote: Forts of Liege.]
To resist these forces, General Leman had forts more than twenty-four
years old and 30,000 men: the 3rd division of the army increased by the
15th mixed brigade, _i.e._, the 9th, 11th, 12th, and 14th of the line, a
part of the 2nd Lancers, a battalion of the 1st Carabineers, and the
Divisional Artillery.
* * * * *
Thursday, August 6th, was rich in moving incidents.
While the enemy were in force before Barchon, in a night attack, an
attempt was made on General Leman. The story has been variously told.
Here is the true version.
[Sidenote: German spies.]
The enemy's spies, so numerous in Liege, had been able to give the most
exact information regarding the installation of the General Staff in the
Rue Sainte Foy. They were quite aware that for a week the defender of
Liege had only been taking two or three hours' rest in his office, so as
to be more easily in telephonic communication with the forts and
garrison. These offices in the Rue Sainte Foy were very badly situated,
at the extreme end of the northern quarter, and were defended only by a
few gendarmes. General Leman had been warned, however, and the King
himself had at last persuaded him to take some precautions against a
possible attempt. He had finally given way to this advice, and a
rudimentary structure, but a sure one, fitted with electric light and
telephone, was being set up under the railway tunnel near the Palais
station.
This was, then, the last night the General would pass at Rue Sainte Foy.
[Sidenote: General Leman in danger.]
Towards half-past four in the morning a body of a hundred men descended
from the heights of Tawes. Whence did they come? How had they been able
to penetrate into the town? Some have said that they dressed in Liege
itself. In reality, they represented themselves to the advanced posts of
the fort of Pontisse as being Englishmen come to the aid of Liege, and
asked to be conducted to the General Staff. They were soldiers of a
Hanoverian regiment, and bore upon their sleeves a blue band with the
word "Gibraltar." This contributed in no small degree to cause them to
be taken for British sharpshooters. They were preceded by a spy who had
put on the Belgian uniform of the 11th of the line and who seemed to
know the town very well. At Thier-a-Liege, they stopped a moment to
drink at a wine-shop and then went on. They were more than a hundred in
number and were preceded by two officers. A detachment of Garde Civique,
posted at the gas factory of the Rue des Bayards, did not consider it
their duty to interfere. A few individuals accompanied the troop, crying
"Vive les Anglais." A few passers-by, better-aware of the situation,
protested. The troop continued its imperturbable march. The officers
smiled. Thus they arrived at Rue Sainte Foy where, as we have said, the
offices of the General Staff of General Leman were installed.
A German officer asked of the sentinel on the door an interview with
General Leman. The officers of the latter, who now appeared, understood
the ruse at once, and drew their revolvers. Shots were exchanged. One of
the officers, Major Charles Marchand, a non-commissioned officer of
gendarmes, and several gendarmes were killed. The Germans attempted to
enter the offices, of which the door had been closed. They fired through
the windows, and even attempted to attack the house by scaling the
neighbouring walls. General Leman, who was working, ran out on hearing
the first shots. He was unarmed. He demanded a revolver. Captain Lebbe,
his aide-de-camp, refused to allow him to expose himself uselessly, and
begged him to keep himself for the defence of Liege. He even used some
violence to his chief, and pushed him towards the low door which
separated the house from the courtyard of a neighbouring cannon foundry.
With the help of another officer, the captain placed his General in
safety. While this was happening, the alarm had been given, and the
Germans, seeing that their attempt to possess themselves of the person
of General Leman had failed, retired. The guard, which comprised some
fifty men, fired repeatedly on the retreating party. Some fifty Germans,
including a standard-bearer and a drummer, were killed. Others were made
prisoners.
[Sidenote: General Leman in Fort Loncin.]
The General retired to the citadel of Sainte Walburge, and later to the
fort of Loncin. From there he followed the efforts of the enemy
attacking anew the north-east and south-east sectors. The environs of
Fort Boncelles are as difficult to defend as those of the
Barchon-Evegnee-Fleron front. There is first the discovered part which
surrounds what remains of the unfortunate village of Boncelles, which
the Belgians themselves were forced to destroy to free their field of
fire, but for the rest, there are only woods, that of Plainevaux, which
reaches to the Ourthe, Neuville, and Vecquee woods, that of Begnac,
which continues Saint Lambert wood as far as Trooz and the Meuse.
[Sidenote: Belgian troops fight heroically.]
Every place here swarmed with Germans, 40,000 at least, an army corps
which had spent a day and a night in fortifying themselves, and had been
able to direct their artillery towards Plainevaux, to the north of
Neuville, and upon the heights of Ramet. Thirty thousand men at least
would have been needed to defend this gap and less than 15,000 were
available. A similar attack was delivered at the same time between the
Meuse and the Vesdre. On both sides miracles of heroism were performed,
but the enemy poured on irresistibly. They were able to pass, on the one
side, Val Saint Lambert, on the other, between Barchon and the Meuse,
between Evegnee and Fleron. Fighting took place well into the night, the
enemy being repulsed at Boncelles twice. The following morning I saw
pieces of German corpses. The Belgian artillery had made a real carnage,
and no smaller number of victims fell in the bayonet charges. The 9th
and the Carabineers, who had fought the day before at Barchon, were
present here.
[Sidenote: Retreat ordered.]
In the other sector, the soldiers of the 12th of the line particularly
behaved like heroes. The battle began towards two o'clock in the morning
at Retinne where, after prodigies of valour and a great slaughter of the
enemy, the Belgian troops were forced to retire. The struggle continued
at Saine and at Queue du Bois. Here Lieutenant F. Bronne and forty of
his men fell while covering the retreat. In spite of such devotion and
of a bravery that will not be denied, the enemy passed through. Why?
Some troops surrendered with their officers, who were afterwards set
free upon parole at Liege. But this was only a very small exception, and
it was under the pressure of an enemy four times as numerous that the
3rd division succumbed after three days of repeated fighting, during
which the soldiers were compelled to make forced marches from one
sector to another, and stop the rest of the time in the trenches
fighting. The enemy's losses were 5,000 killed and 30,000 wounded.
General Leman considered that he had obtained from his troops the
maximum effort of which they were capable and ordered a retreat. It was
executed in good order, and the enemy had suffered so severely that they
did not dream of pursuit. They contented themselves with pushing forward
as far as the plateau of Saint-Tilman (close to Boncelles) and that of
Robermont (behind Fleron) some cannons of 15, which had bombarded the
town the first time on Thursday, August 6th, at four o'clock in the
morning. No German troops, except some 200 men who entered as prisoners,
penetrated into the town on this day.
Although this retreat left behind a few men with several guns, it may be
said to have been effected in good order. I was able to see that for
myself in passing through with the troops, from the fifth limit of the
Saint Trond route, near Fort Loncin, up to the centre of the town. The
auto in which I was seated was able to pass easily.
[Sidenote: Refugees.]
The terrified population from Bressoux began to arrive. There were
people half-dressed, but who carried some object which to them seemed
the most precious, sometimes a simple portrait of a loved one. Others
drove cattle before them. The men carried children, while women followed
painfully loaded with household goods. Mixed up with them were the Garde
Civique. It had just been assembled and informed that it was disbanded,
and a certain number of them had told the inhabitants that the Prussians
were coming, and that there was nothing better to do than for everyone
to bolt himself in. The cannon had thundered all night. The citizens of
Liege had found in their letter-boxes a warning from the burgomaster
concerning the behaviour of the inhabitants in case of the town being
occupied by the enemy. This urgent notice, distributed the night before
between 9 and 11 p.m., foreshadowed an imminent occupation. The hasty
flight of the people of Bressoux stopped when they had crossed the
Meuse; but as the bombardment recommenced towards noon, fright again
seized on the population. The bombardment lasted till two. Some thirty
shells fell on different parts of the town.
[Sidenote: Bridge of Arches destroyed.]
At half-past twelve a dull noise was heard as far as the furthest fort;
it was the old Bridge of Arches which gave way, towards the left bank.
The engineers had just blown it up. It seemed wiser to destroy the
bridge at Val Benoit, which left the Germans railway communication. But
no one thought of this; or rather, orders to that effect were not given
by the higher authorities. This was afterwards to cause the degradation
to the ranks of the chief officer of engineers who was responsible for
this unpardonable lapse.
The second bombardment lasted till two o'clock. Several projectiles now
fell upon the citadel, where everything was in readiness to set fire to
the provisions and munitions which remained there along with some
unserviceable cannon, generally used in the training of the Garde
Civique. By 10 a.m. the citadel had been evacuated, only very few
persons remaining, among them a major, who hastily hoisted the white
flag.
[Sidenote: German envoys in Liege.]
Burgomaster Kleyer awaited developments at the Town Hall. At half-past
three, he received envoys, who demanded the surrender of the town and
forts. Put into communication with General Leman, who was all the time
at Loncin with his Staff, he informed him that if the forts persisted in
their resistance, the town would be bombarded a third time. General
Leman replied that the threat was an idle one, that it would be a cruel
massacre, but that the higher interests of Belgium compelled him to
impose this sacrifice on the town of Liege.
[Sidenote: Bombardment of Liege.]
[Sidenote: Gloomy aspect of the town.]
At 9 p.m. fresh shells fell on different parts of the city and caused
more damage if not more victims. This bombardment lasted till 2 a.m. It
recommenced at intervals of half-an-hour, and caused two fires, one in
Rue de Hanque, and the other in Rue de la Commune. After midday, the
streets were deserted and all dwelling houses closed. In the afternoon a
convoy of Germans taken prisoners were seen to pass along the
boulevards, and were then shut up in the Royal Athenaeum. Then there was
an interminable defile of autos and carts conveying both German and
Belgian wounded, especially the former, those who came from Boncelles
more particularly. Bodies of stragglers re-entered Liege slowly,
ignorant of what had happened, as they were either untouched by the
order to retire, or had been forgotten in the advanced posts or in the
trenches. They were very tired and hardly had the courage to accelerate
their pace, except when the few passers-by explained the position in a
couple of words. The aspect of the town was very gloomy, and the only
places where any animation was to be seen were around Guillemins
station, where trains full of fugitives were leaving for Brussels, the
West quarter, towards which the last of the retiring companies were
marching, and the North, where many were still ignorant of this
movement.
[Sidenote: Germans enter Liege.]
On Friday, August 7th, at 3 a.m., the bombardment of Liege began again,
chiefly directed against the citadel, where only a few soldiers now
remained. These evacuated the place after setting fire to some
provisions they were unable to carry off. The population passed through
hours of anguish, which were destined not to be the last. Everybody
took refuge in the cellars. Some people lived there for several days in
fear that a shell might fall upon their house. On this Friday the
Germans penetrated into the town at five o'clock in the morning by the
different bridges which had remained intact. They came in through
Jupille and Bois de Breux chiefly. They seemed tired and, above all,
hungry. Leaving detachments in the Place de Baviere and near the
bridges, they successively occupied the Provincial Palace and the
citadel.
Count Lammsdorf, Chief of the Staff of the 10th Corps, Commander of the
Army of the Meuse, arrested Burgomaster Kleyer at the Town Hall, and
conducted him to the citadel, where he at first made him a rather
reassuring communication as to the fate of the town. . . . He then spoke
anew and said that he understood all the forts would surrender, in
default of which the bombardment would recommence. M. Kleyer vainly
protested against a measure so contrary to the laws both of war and of
humanity. He was simply authorized to pass through the German lines with
a safe conduct, to discuss the matter with General Leman, or even with
the King himself.
[Sidenote: The Burgomaster's task.]
This task of the burgomaster of Liege was a heavy one, and terrible was
the expectant attitude of the German authorities. Later, some people
have discussed the attitude he should have taken up and conceived the
nature of what should have been his reply; they would have desired words
of defiance on his lips and an immediate answer.
He lacked courage for this, and who will dare to-day to blame him for
the immense anxiety he felt on hearing of the horrible fate with which
his beloved town and his unhappy fellow-citizens were threatened?
He gathered together at the Town Hall several communal and provincial
deputies, some deputies and senators. The general opinion at the
beginning of the discussion was that it was necessary to obtain the
surrender of the forts. Someone pointed out that there was not much
likelihood of getting this decision from General Leman, who had already
pronounced himself upon that question, and thought it would be necessary
to continue the work heroically begun of arresting the progress of the
invader, and that the forts, all intact, would powerfully contribute to
that end.
It was finally decided to approach General Leman again with a message
which was entrusted to the burgomaster, the Bishop of Liege, and M.
Gaston Gregoire, permanent deputy. These gentlemen repaired to the
citadel in search of the promised safe conduct. They were met there,
according to the demand of Count Lammsdorf, by some prominent Liege
citizens, to whom he had expressed his desire to explain the situation.
[Sidenote: Hostages to the Germans.]
At the moment the three delegates were about to depart on their mission,
with a good faith upon which it would be foolish to insist, the German
commander declared that all the persons present were detained as
hostages. He gave as a specious pretext for this violation of right that
some German soldiers had been killed by civilians in some neighbouring
villages, and that the hostages would enable the Germans to guard
against the repetition of such acts, the more so as they were prepared
to make a striking example at the beginning of the campaign.
All the Liege citizens who had entered the citadel on this day were kept
there till the next day, Saturday. Moreover, the following persons were
retained as responsible hostages for three days: 1. Mgr. Rutien, Bishop
of Liege; 2. M. Kleyer, Burgomaster of Liege; 3. M. Gregoire, Permanent
Deputy; 4. M. Armand Flechet, Senator; 5. Senator Van Zuylen; 6. Senator
Edouard Peltzer; 7. Senator Colleaux; 8. Deputy De Ponthiere; 9. Deputy
Van Hoegaerden; 10. M. Falloise, Alderman.
The hostages were shut up in damp case-mates, palliasses were given them
for the night and, as food, the first day each one had half a loaf and
some water. The burgomaster and the bishop were, however, allowed to go
about their duties after they had given their parole to remain at the
disposal of the German military authorities.
[Sidenote: Last train for Brussels.]
The same day at 9 a.m. the last train left Liege for Brussels with
numbers of fugitives. The number of persons who abandoned Liege and its
suburbs may be calculated at some five thousand. From this moment and
for several days Liege was absolutely cut off from the rest of the
world, all communications having been cut.
On Saturday, August 8th, while the Germans were methodically organising
the occupation of Liege, Burgomaster Kleyer was authorised to wait upon
the King, in order to discuss the surrender of the forts. Furnished with
a safe conduct and accompanied by a German officer, he reached Waremme
early in the afternoon, and placed himself in communication with the
General Staff. The King was consulted, and the reply brought back to
Liege was the one the mayor had foreseen.
The same day saw the appearance of the following order of the day
addressed to the soldiers of the army of Liege:--
"Our comrades of the 3rd Army Division and of
the 15th mixed brigade are about to re-enter
our lines, after having defended, like heroes,
the fortified position of Liege.
[Sidenote: The King encourages the army.]
"Attacked by forces four times as numerous,
they have repulsed all assaults. None of the
forts have been taken; the town of Liege is
always in our power. Standards and a number of
prisoners are the trophies of these combats. In
the name of the Nation I salute you, officers
and soldiers of the 3rd Army Division and the
15th mixed brigade.
"You have done your duty, done honour to our
arms, shown the enemy what it costs to attack
unjustly a peaceable people, but one who wields
in its just cause an invincible weapon. The
Fatherland has the right to be proud of you.
"Soldiers of the Belgian Army, do not forget
that you are in the van of immense armies in
this gigantic struggle, and that you await but
the arrival of our brothers-in-arms in order to
march to victory. The whole world has its eyes
fixed upon you. Show it by the vigour of your
blows that you mean to live free and
independent.
"France, that noble country which has
throughout history been associated with just
and generous causes, is hurrying to our aid and
her armies will enter our territory.
"In your name I address them a fraternal
salute. ALBERT."
[Sidenote: German precautions.]
[Sidenote: Barricades constructed.]
On this day the Germans, who were not yet sure as to the intentions of
the Belgian field army, and who feared a possible offensive on the part
of the French advanced guards, put Liege in a state of defence.
Moreover, they distrusted the civilian population, and fortified
themselves in the town itself. They placed machine guns at the head of
the bridges, and upon one of them, Boverie, which they feared might be
blown up, or might be bombarded by the forts, they placed a curtained
recess in which they shut up several citizens. They caused the soldiers
to occupy Quai des Pecheurs, Quai l'Industrie, and the houses in
proximity to the bridge, after clearing out the occupants. They placed
bags of earth in the windows, behind which were installed machine guns.
In the arteries leading to La Hesbaye and La Campine, and in the streets
of the latter, they erected barricades, and installed themselves in the
riverside houses. These labours continued during several days on the
heights of Saint Nicholas and Hollogne, while the soldiers of the 10th
Corps installed themselves on the plateau of Cointe, the General Staff
having taken possession there of a convent, although this had been
transformed into a hospital. In the town, the German troops, delayed for
a short time by the necessity of carrying off their dead, shifting their
wounded, and of taking a much-needed rest, entered in large numbers.
They occupied the different stations, that of Ans on the Herbignon
plateau being the last one where they established themselves.
On Sunday, September 6th, there were at Liege more than 100,000 Germans.
On this day, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the hostages were given
their unconditional liberty. On the same date, in the neighbourhood of
Landen, the King, accompanied by the General Staff, reviewed the valiant
and now reconstituted 3rd Division, reconstituted in spite of the heavy
losses in officers suffered by certain regiments. General Leman received
from M. Schollaert, President of the Belgian Chamber, the following
telegram: "With a heart overflowing with enthusiasm and patriotic pride,
I acclaim the glorious defender of Liege."
[Sidenote: Praise for defense of the city.]
[Sidenote: President Poincare honors General Leman.]
With reference to the defence of Liege, letters, despatches, and
addresses of felicitation were received at Brussels from the Presidents
of the French Chamber and the French Senate, from the Paris Municipal
Council, and other French municipalities, words of friendship and
encouragement were pronounced later in the British Parliament, while the
King of the Belgians received the congratulations of King George, the
Tsar, and the President of the French Republic. Finally, M. Poincare
sent him the most envied of distinctions, the military medal. The
resistance of Liege had everywhere aroused grateful enthusiasm, for the
days, and even the hours gained from the invader were now of inestimable
value. But while the twelve forts were not yet to harass, as they could,
the progress of the enemy, Liege, whose hatred of the Prussian is
ingrained, was to pay dearly for the resistance it had made, and its
heart was to suffer cruelly over the vexations of which it was to be the
object, while awaiting pillage and burning.
Here we enter upon a new period, which cannot, however, be separated
from the siege of Liege, for at this time the forts still held out.
[Sidenote: The twelve forts.]
[Sidenote: Forts on the banks of the Meuse.]
The forts still held out, but the resistance of their garrisons had to
be heroic. The defences crumbled quite rapidly. We should not be
surprised at this, but should rather remember that these forts were more
than twenty years old. Their construction began in 1889, and their
armament, though modified later in certain details, was not capable of
resisting the heavy artillery of the Germans. Liege was defended by
twelve forts, large and small. The most important works were Barchon,
Fleron, Boncelles, Flemalle, Loncin, and Pontisse. These forts possessed
five large cupolas and three or four small ones. They were armed with
two guns of 15 centimetres, four of 12, two howitzers of 21, and three
or four guns of 5'7, ten more of 5'7 flanking the ditches. The little
forts counted upon four large and three or four small cupolas. They were
armed with two pieces of 15, two of 12, a howitzer of 21, three or four
guns, without cupola, of 5'7, and of seven or eight commanding the
ditches. The forts are arranged around Liege in the following order:--On
the left bank of the Meuse: Flemalle, Hollogne, Loncin, Lantin, and
Pontisse. On the right bank, between the Meuse and the Vesdre: Barchon,
Evegnee, and Fleron. Between the Vesdre and the Ourthe: Chaudfontaine
and Embourg. Between the Ourthe and the Meuse: Boncelles. The forts are
four kilometres apart, except Flemalle-Boncelles and Embourg-Pontisse,
which are six kilometres apart, while Chaudfontaine and Embourg are only
two kilometres from one another. The forts are eight kilometres from the
limits of the town. The forts of Hollogne, Loncin, Lantin, and Liers are
in grassy country. Boncelles is nearly completely surrounded by woods;
Embourg and Chaudfontaine dominate the deep and winding valleys of the
Ourthe and the Vesdre. Pontisse, Flemalle, and Barchon, commanding the
Meuse, are on broken ground. This last-named fort, with Evegnee and
Fleron, holds the most important strategic position in the Herve
country, facing the German frontier, in a land cut up by meadows planted
with trees and by little woods, traversed by many vales, not very deep,
but winding.
[Sidenote: War conditions changed.]
It is known that in the Brialmont project the intervening spaces were to
be defended and fortified with siege artillery. To tell the truth, the
eminent military engineer, in the pamphlets where he set out the
project, only allowed for a small mobile garrison, but he confessed
later that the difficulties which he knew he would meet with in the
Belgian Parliament over the credits for the fortifications made him
underestimate the number of men required. Besides which, the conditions
of war have been greatly modified during the twenty-five years which
have passed, owing to the increased power of siege guns. So that it may
be laid down that 80,000, if not 100,000, men were needed to properly
defend the entrenched camp of Liege.
[Sidenote: Troops in the forts.]
As for the forts, they were each occupied by a battery of artillery (250
men) and three companies (120 men), a total of 370 men. About 4,500
artillerymen for the twelve forts.
General Leman was shut up in Loncin, one of the chief forts, which
commanded the road towards Waremme and Brussels. He had sent away all
his General Staff with the division, in spite of the supplications of
his officers, who begged to be allowed to share his fate. He continued
to direct the longest resistance possible. The enemy was anxious to cut
all the communications between the forts, but soldiers volunteered for
carrying messages to the different commanders. Several succeeded, but
many were killed, for the investment became steadily tightened. Indeed,
certain gaps, where the ground was most broken, could not be swept by
the guns from the forts, and, under cover of the night, troops ensconced
themselves there comfortably. Moreover, the Germans, having received
reinforcements and heavy artillery, undertook the siege systematically,
first of Barchon, which it was unable to take by storm any more than
Boncelles, but which it subjected to a formidable deluge of shells.
Barchon could only reply haphazard to heavy guns the position of which
it could not tell. It was, indeed, deprived of its observation posts,
and was in the position of a blind man desperately parrying the blows of
an adversary who could see where to strike.
[Sidenote: Fort Barchon taken.]
The struggle was not for long, and the fort, reduced to impotence, left
a wide breach through which the invader scrambled. Through there he
could also introduce his heavy siege guns, howitzers of 28, and even
pieces of 42 cms.
[Sidenote: Forty-two centimetre guns.]
The enemy then followed a tactic which was to succeed rapidly. He
attacked the different fortifications in a reverse way. Thus Loncin,
Lantin, Liers, and Pontisse were bombarded by batteries placed in the
citadel itself and to which the Belgians could not reply without
shelling the town and doing frightful damage. A battery was also placed
in a bend of ground up Rue Naniot, under the "Tomb," where some of those
who fell in 1830 are buried, but it was discovered and had to be
withdrawn. Forts Boncelles and Embourg were attacked by guns placed on
the hill at Tilff, a pretty village, which would have been completely
destroyed had the firing been responded to. Finally, along the line of
the plateau of Herve, no longer dominated by Barchon and Fleron, now
destroyed, the enemy was able to bring into the very centre of the town
four of those howitzers of 42 cms. which were later to bombard Namur,
Maubeuge, and Antwerp.
The following are the dates on which the different forts succumbed:
Barchon and Evegnee fell on August 9th. Right from the 5th they had not
ceased to be the object of continual attacks. They had valiantly
resisted repeated assaults and field artillery. The heavy pieces poured
in a hurricane of fire.
Pontisse, which had so usefully barred the passage of the enemy below
Vise, did not give way till the 12th. On the 13th Embourg surrendered
after a twenty-six hours' bombardment.
[Sidenote: Forts yield one by one.]
The same day saw the fall of Chaudfontaine and Nameche, where two
accidents happened worthy of being related. A shell burst on a cupola
gun as it was finishing its movement after being loaded. The whole gun
was shattered and ten men were wounded. A little while after, a shell
entered the fort through the embrasure and set fire to the powder
magazine. One hundred and ten artillerymen were terribly burned, fifty
dying upon the spot. The 14th saw the fall of Boncelles, Liers, and
Fleron. Boncelles from the 5th had offered an admirable resistance.
Commandant Lefert had been wounded on the 8th, when 200 Germans,
presenting themselves to surrender, treacherously fired upon him.
Suffering greatly, he none the less went on directing the defence until
his officers met together in a kind of council of war, and had him taken
away in an ambulance. The unfortunate man was seized by a fever and
became delirious. Boncelles was bombarded unceasingly for a whole day
and the following morning. It was nearly destroyed, and may be
considered as the fort which was the centre of the worst carnage of
German soldiers. The enormous heaps of dead buried around it bear
witness to the fact. Liers was put out of action by guns installed at
Sainte Walburge.
[Sidenote: Loncin and Lantin fall.]
To get the better of the obstinate resistance of Fleron (Commandant
Mozin), the Germans united twenty guns by an electric battery and fired
them all off at the same time upon the fort, which trembled in its
massive foundations. No one can have an idea of how demoralising this
rain of projectiles was. On the 15th, Loncin and Lantin fell, the
defenders firing until they were overcome by asphyxia. On the 16th, it
was the turn of Flemalle, and on the 18th, of Hollogne.
We know that it was at Loncin, which dominated the roads of La Hesbaye,
where General Leman was shut up. Commandant Naessens and Lieutenant
Monard had the honour of defending the fort under the General's eyes.
Electrified by the presence of the governor of the fortress, the
soldiers of Loncin wrote with their blood the most heroic page of the
heroic defence of Liege. Commandant Naessens modestly narrated the
story when he had been wounded and transported to the military hospital
of Saint Laurent. General Leman has also _resumed_ the different phases
of the attack, while a prisoner at Magdeburg. We will listen to his
clear and crisp recital.
[Sidenote: General Leman's story.]
He distinguishes four periods during the bombardment. The first
commenced on August 14th at 4.15 p.m. The shell fire, directed with
great exactitude, lasted two hours without interruption. After a break
of half-an-hour, some 21-centimetre guns opened fire. All night, at
intervals of ten minutes, they rained shells upon the fort, causing it
considerable damage. The escarpment was damaged, the protecting walls of
the left flank battery destroyed, and the shutters of the windows
pierced. Another unfavourable circumstance was that all the places of
the escarpment where shelter could be obtained were full of smoke from
the shells which had burst either in the protecting wall or in the
ditches. The deleterious gases rendered it impossible to stand in the
covered places, and forced the General to assemble the garrison in the
interior and in the gallery. Even in these refuges the stupefying
effects of the gases allowed themselves to be felt, and weakened the
fighting value of the garrison.
[Sidenote: Horrors of the bombardments.]
The third period of bombardment began on the 15th at 5.30 a.m. and
continued until two o'clock in the afternoon. The projectiles caused
fearful havoc. The vault of the commanding post, where General Leman was
present with his two adjutants, was subjected to furious shocks, and the
fort trembled to its foundations. Towards two o'clock, a lull occurred
in the firing, and the general took advantage of it to inspect the fort.
He found part of it completely in ruins.
[Sidenote: Currents of poisonous gas.]
The fourth period is described as follows: "It was two o'clock when the
bombardment recommenced with a violence of which no idea can be given.
It seemed to us as if the German batteries were firing salvoes. When the
large shells fell we heard the hissing of the air, which gradually
increased into a roar like a furious hurricane, and which finished by a
sudden noise of thunder. At a certain moment of this formidable
bombardment, I wished to reach the commanding post in order to see what
was happening, but at the end of a few paces in the gallery I was
knocked down by a shock of violent air and fell face forward. I got up
and wished to continue my way, but I was held back by a current of
poisonous air which invaded the whole space. It was a mixture of the gas
from the exploded powder and of the smoke of a fire which had started in
the rooms of the troops where furniture and bedding were kept.
[Sidenote: The fort blown up.]
[Sidenote: General Leman a prisoner.]
"We were thus driven back to the place whence we had come, but the air
had become unbreathable. We were near to being asphyxiated when my
adjutant, Major Collard, had the idea of taking off the top of the
shutter, which gave us a little air. I was, however, obsessed by the
idea of placing part of the garrison in safety, and I told my comrade I
desired to reach the counter-escarpment. I managed to pass the gap and
reach the ditch, which I crossed. What was my amazement when I perceived
that the fort was blown up, and that the front was strewn with ruins,
forming a quay reaching from the escarpment to the counter-escarpment.
Some soldiers were running to and fro upon it. I took them for Belgian
gendarmes and called to them. But I was being suffocated, giddiness
seized upon me, and I fell to the ground. When I came to, I found myself
in the midst of my comrades, who tried to come to my aid. Among them was
a German major, who gave me a glass of water to drink. As I learnt
afterwards, it was then about 6.30 p.m. I was placed in an ambulance
carriage and transported to Liege.
"I was taken, but I had not yet surrendered."
* * * * *
[Sidenote: Surrender of Namur.]
Following the capture of Liege the German armies made rapid progress
through Belgium. After several sharp engagements with Belgian troops,
which resisted with heroic tenacity, the Germans on August 19 took
Louvain, and then began the deliberate system of atrocities which
horrified the civilized world. The most valuable parts of the city,
including many beautiful and important edifices, were burned, citizens
were killed and tortured, and the utmost brutality was practiced, under
the excuse that German troops had been fired upon by citizens of the
town. On August 17 Brussels had been abandoned by the Belgian Government
which withdrew to Antwerp. The former city was surrendered without
resistance. In the meantime the French had hurried their armies to
assist the Belgian forces and, joined by the available troops of the
English Expeditionary Force, they encountered the Germans at Charleroi.
On August 23 the great fortress of Namur was surrendered under the fire
of the heavy German artillery, and on the following day, the Allied
armies were defeated at Charleroi, and began the Great Retreat toward
Paris which was to continue to the banks of the Marne. The French armies
were under the command of General Joffre, while Sir John French
commanded the British Expeditionary Force. In the following narrative
General French describes the heroic performances of his gallant troops
during the terrible ordeal.
THE GREAT RETREAT
SIR JOHN FRENCH
The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was
effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its
destination in this country well within the scheduled time.
[Sidenote: Disposition of British forces.]
The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday,
September 21st, and I was able to make dispositions to move the force
during Saturday, the 22d, to positions I considered most favorable from
which to commence operations which the French Commander in Chief,
General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in
prosecution of the campaign.
The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Conde on the
west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as
follows:
From Conde to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and to
the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The
Fifth Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.
In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the cavalry
division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or
move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward
reconnoissance was intrusted to Brigadier General Sir Philip Chetwode
with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send
forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.
[Sidenote: Advance on Soignies.]
During the 22d and 23d these advanced squadrons did some excellent work,
some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took
place in which our troops showed to great advantage.
2. At 6 A. M. on August 23, I assembled the commanders of the First and
Second Corps and cavalry division at a point close to the position and
explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to
be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the
immediate situation in front of us.
From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that
little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's army corps, with
perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position; and I was
aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed
in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue
opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observations of my
aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate.
[Sidenote: Attack on Mons line.]
About 3 P. M. on Sunday, the 23d, reports began coming in to the effect
that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in
some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was
being particularly threatened.
The commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high
ground south of Bray, and the Fifth Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche,
moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.
[Sidenote: Germans gain passages of the Sambre.]
The right of the Third Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons,
which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the commander
of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient
too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behind
Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 P. M., I
received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph,
telling me that at least three German corps, viz., a reserve corps, the
Fourth Corps and the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front,
and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the
direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French
divisions and the Fifth French Army on my right were retiring, the
Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of
the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur.
3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position,
I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitred. This
position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extended
west to Jenlain, southeast of Valenciennes, on the left. The position
was reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings
made the siting of trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire
in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good
artillery positions.
[Sidenote: British retire to Maubeuge position.]
When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German
threatening on my front reached me, I endeavored to confirm it by
aeroplane reconnoissance; and as a result of this I determined to effect
a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th.
A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout
the night and at daybreak on the 24th the Second Division from the
neighborhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake
Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the First and Second
Divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in the
neighborhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second
Corps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The Third Division
on the right of the corps suffered considerable loss in this operation
from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.
The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially intrenched
themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to
withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further
loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 P. M. Toward midday the
enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.
I had previously ordered General Allenby with the cavalry to act
vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavor to take the pressure
off.
[Sidenote: General Allenby supports Fifth Division.]
About 7:30 A. M. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles
Fergusson, commanding the Fifth Division, saying that he was very hard
pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message
General Allenby drew in the cavalry and endeavored to bring direct
support to the Fifth Division.
During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the Second
Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyze the
further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on
his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up
by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the Ninth Lancers and
the Eighteenth Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the
brigade.
The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the line of
communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22d and
23d. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south
of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.
[Sidenote: Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien suffers great losses.]
With the assistance of the cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled
to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of
the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great
losses in doing so.
At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west
of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the
fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the Nineteenth Brigade in position
between Jenlain and Bry, and the cavalry on the outer flank.
4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as
was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of
the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his
intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not
a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.
I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat
exhausted and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped,
therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me
effecting my object.
The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only
owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion
of the troops.
The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a
position in the neighborhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered
to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5:30 A. M.
[Sidenote: General Allenby covers west flank.]
Two cavalry brigades, with the divisional cavalry of the Second Corps,
covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the cavalry
division, with the Nineteenth Brigade, the whole under the command of
General Allenby, covered the west flank.
The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday,
the 23d, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigade
of artillery with divisional staff were available for service.
I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his right
south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south
of La Chaprie. In this position the division rendered great help to the
effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position.
Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le
Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been
partially prepared and intrenched, I had grave doubts--owing to the
information I had received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy
against me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.
[Sidenote: Retirement of French troops on right.]
Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my
exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II.) to
envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I
determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could
put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my
troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and
reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the corps commanders to
continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could toward the general
line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.
The cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the
retirement.
Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued
its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of
the Foret de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had
intended that the corps should come further west so as to fill up the
gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and
could not get further in without rest.
[Sidenote: British brigade in Landrecies.]
[Sidenote: French reserve divisions support First Corps.]
The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9:30 P. M.
a report was received that the Fourth Guards Brigade in Landrecies was
heavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who were
coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought
most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in
issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss
has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the
same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his First
Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent
urgent messages to the commander of the two French reserve divisions on
my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they
eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the
skillful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from an
exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were
able at dawn to resume their march south toward Wassigny on Guise.
By about 6 P. M. the Second Corps had got into position with their right
on Le Cateau, their left in the neighborhood of Caudry, and the line of
defense was continued thence by the Fourth Division toward Seranvillers,
the left being thrown back.
During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the cavalry became a good deal
scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby had
succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.
The Fourth Division was placed under the orders of the general officer
commanding the Second Army Corps.
On the 24th the French cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions
under General Sordet, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way
back from Bavai, which was my "Poste de Commandement" during the
fighting of the 23d and 24th, I visited General Sordet, and earnestly
requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction
from his army commander to act on my left flank, but said that his
horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered
me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was
unable for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most
critical day of all, viz., the 26th.
[Sidenote: British Second Corps and Fourth Division heavily attacked.]
At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of
his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second
Corps and the Fourth Division.
At this time the guns of four German army corps were in position against
them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it
impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face
of such an attack.
I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavors to break off the action
and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me
to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable
of movement.
The French cavalry corps, under General Sordet, was coming up on our
left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to
do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank;
but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to
intervene in any way.
There had been no time to intrench the position properly, but the troops
showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.
[Sidenote: British artillery outmatched by four to one.]
The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a
splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.
At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be
avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to
commence it about 3:30 P. M. The movement was covered with the most
devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had itself
suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the further
retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of
this most difficult and dangerous operation.
Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an
energetic pursuit.
[Sidenote: General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien cited for conspicuous
service.]
I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British
troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable
services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army
under my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have been
accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness,
intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct
the operation.
[Sidenote: British retreat holding on line Noyon-Chauny-La Fere.]
The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the
27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line
Noyon-Chauny-La Fere, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's
pursuit.
On the 27th and 28th August I was much indebted to General Sordet and
the French cavalry division which he commands for materially assisting
my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on
Cambrai.
General D'Amade also, with the Sixty-first and Sixty-second French
Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighborhood of Arras on the
enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British
forces located there.
[Sidenote: End of four days' battle at Mons.]
This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at
Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23d August, and which really constituted a
four days' battle.
At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present dispatch.
[Sidenote: Serious losses in British forces.]
I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British forces have
suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the
fact that the British Army--only two days after a concentration by
rail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German army
corps.
It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the
two general officers commanding army corps; the self-sacrificing and
devoted exertions of their staffs; the direction of the troops by
divisional, brigade, and regimental leaders; the command of the smaller
units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed
by non-commissioned officers and men.
[Sidenote: Royal Flying Corps cited for admirable work.]
I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable
work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their
skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have
furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has
been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at
constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every
kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.
Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in
destroying five of the enemy's machines.
I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance I
received from the General and Personal Staffs at Headquarters during
this trying period.
[Sidenote: Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, Major General
Wilson, Brigade General Hon. Lambton cited for admirable work.]
Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff;
Major General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under them
have worked day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill,
self-sacrifice, and devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by me
to Brigadier General Hon. W. Lambton, my Military Secretary, and the
personal Staff.
[Sidenote: Major General Sir William Robertson cited for admirable
work.]
In such operations as I have described the work of the Quartermaster
General is of an extremely onerous nature. Major General Sir William
Robertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficulties
with his characteristic energy, skill, and determination; and it is
largely owing to his exertions that the hardships and sufferings of the
troops--inseparable from such operations--were not much greater.
[Sidenote: Major General Sir Nevil Macready.]
Major General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant General, has also been
confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection with
disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He has
been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult situations
which arose.
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
SIR JOHN FRENCH
17th September, 1914.
My Lord: In continuation of my dispatch of September 7, I have the honor
to report the further progress of the operations of the forces under my
command from August 28.
On that evening the retirement of the force was followed closely by two
of the enemy's cavalry columns, moving southeast from St. Quentin.
The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the Third and
Fifth Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme General Gough, with the Third
Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans of the Guard with considerable
loss.
[Sidenote: General Chetwode routs German attack.]
General Chetwode, with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, encountered the
eastern column near Cerizy, moving south. The brigade attacked and
routed the column, the leading German regiment suffering very severe
casualties and being almost broken up.
The Seventh French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up from
the south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th it nearly completed its
detrainment, and the French Sixth Army got into position on my left, its
right resting on Roye.
The Fifth French Army was behind the line of the Oise, between La Fere
and Guise.
[Sidenote: Vigorous pursuit of retreating German forces.]
The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous; some five or six German
corps were on the Somme, facing the Fifth Army on the Oise. At least two
corps were advancing toward my front, and were crossing the Somme east
and west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were opposing the Sixth
French Army on my left.
This was the situation at 1 o'clock on the 29th, when I received a visit
from General Joffre at my headquarters.
I strongly represented my position to the French Commander in Chief, who
was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He told
me that he had directed the Fifth French Army on the Oise to move
forward and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking
pursuit. He also told me of the formation of the Sixth French Army on my
left flank, composed of the Seventh Army Corps, four reserve divisions,
and Sordet's corps of cavalry.
[Sidenote: Short retirement towards Compiegne-Soissons.]
I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further short
retirement toward the line Compiegne-Soissons, promising him, however,
to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him.
In pursuance of this arrangement the British forces retired to a
position a few miles north of the line Compiegne-Soissons on the 29th.
[Sidenote: Right flank of German army in dangerous line of connection.]
The right flank of the Germany Army was now reaching a point which
appeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre. I
had already evacuated Amiens, into which place a German reserve division
was reported to have moved.
Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an
advance base at Le Mans. This operation was well carried out by the
Inspector General of Communications.
[Sidenote: Retirement to the Marne ordered.]
In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard Tenth and Guard
Reserve Corps of the German Army by the First and Third French Corps on
the right of the Fifth Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan to
pursue this advantage; and a general retirement to the line of the
Marne was ordered, to which the French forces in the more eastern
theatre were directed to conform.
A new Army (the Ninth) had been formed from three corps in the south by
General Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the Fifth
and left of the Fourth Armies.
While closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy on
at all points until a favorable situation was created from which to
assume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify from
day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing
to the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general
situation.
In conformity with the movements of the French forces, my retirement
continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely
pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually.
[Sidenote: Attack on British First Cavalry Brigade.]
On the 1st September, when retiring from the thickly wooded country to
the south of Compiegne, the First Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some
German cavalry. They momentarily lost a horse artillery battery, and
several officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help,
however, of some detachments from the Third Corps operating on their
left, they not only recovered their own guns, but succeeded in capturing
twelve of the enemy's.
Similarly, to the eastward, the First Corps, retiring south, also got
into some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguard
action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the Fourth Guards Brigade
suffered considerably.
[Sidenote: British forces in position south of the Marne.]
On September 3 the British forces were in position south of the Marne
between Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested
by General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as
possible, and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the
necessary dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been
effected, I was asked by the French Commander in Chief to continue my
retirement to a point some twelve miles in rear of the position I then
occupied, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine.
This retirement was duly carried out. In the meantime the enemy had
thrown bridges and crossed the Marne in considerable force, and was
threatening the Allies all along the line of the British forces and the
Fifth and Ninth French Armies. Consequently several small outpost
actions took place.
On Saturday, September 5, I met the French Commander in Chief at his
request, and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive
forthwith, as he considered conditions very favorable to success.
[Sidenote: General Joffre announces intention to take offensive.]
General Joffre announced to me his intention of wheeling up the left
flank of the Sixth Army, pivoting on the Marne and directing it to move
on the Ourcq; cross and attack the flank of the First German Army, which
was then moving in a southeasterly direction east of that river.
He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left resting
on the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army--to fill the gap between
that army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against the enemy in my
front and join in the general offensive movement.
[Sidenote: Battle begins Sunday, September 6.]
These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September 6,
at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened on
a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the left
flank of the Sixth French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Mauperthuis,
which was about the British centre, Courtecon, which was on the left of
the Fifth French Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the
Ninth Army under General Foch, and so along the front of the Ninth,
Fourth and Third French Armies to a point north of the fortress of
Verdun.
[Sidenote: Battle concluded September 10. Germans driven to the line
Soissons-Rheims.]
This battle, in so far as the Sixth French Army, the British Army, the
Fifth French Army, and the Ninth French Army were concerned, may be said
to have concluded on the evening of September 10, by which time the
Germans had been driven back to the line Soissons-Rheims, with a loss of
thousands of prisoners, many guns, and enormous masses of transport.
About September 3 the enemy appears to have changed his plans and to
have determined to stop his advance south direct upon Paris, for on
September 4 air reconnoissances showed that his main columns were moving
in a southeasterly direction generally east of a line drawn through
Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq.
On September 5 several of these columns were observed to have crossed
the Marne, while German troops, which were observed moving southeast up
the left flank of the Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be halted
and facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing
at Changis, La Ferte, Nogent, Chateau Thierry, and Mezy.
[Sidenote: German columns converging on Montmirail.]
Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on
Montmirail, while before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were located
in the neighborhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La Ferte-Gaucher,
and Dagny.
I should conceive it to have been about noon on September 6, after the
British forces had changed their front to the right and occupied the
line Jouy-Le Chatel-Faremoutiers-Villeneuve Le Comte, and the advance
of the Sixth French Army north of the Marne toward the Ourcq became
apparent, that the enemy realized the powerful threat that was being
made against the flank of his columns moving southeast, and began the
great retreat which opened the battle above referred to.
[Sidenote: Position of allies and Germans on September 6.]
On the evening of September 6, therefore, the fronts and positions of
the Allied Army were roughly as follows:
_Sixth French Army._--Right on the Marne at Meux, left toward Betz.
_British Forces._--On the line Dagny-Coulommiers-Maison.
_Fifth French Army._--At Courtagon, right on Esternay.
_Conneau's Cavalry Corps._--Between the right of the British and the
left of the French Fifth Army.
The position of the German Army was as follows:
_Fourth Reserve and Second Corps._--East of the Ourcq and facing that
river.
_Ninth Cavalry Division._--West of Crecy.
_Second Cavalry Division._--North of Coulommiers.
_Fourth Corps._--Rebais.
_Third and Seventh Corps._--Southwest of Montmirail.
[Sidenote: First and Second German army.]
All these troops constituted the First German Army, which was directed
against the French Sixth Army on the Ourcq, and the British forces, and
the left of the Fifth French Army south of the Marne.
The Second German Army (IX., X., X.R., and Guard) was moving against the
centre and right of the Fifth French Army and the Ninth French Army.
On September 7 both the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were heavily
engaged on our flank. The Second and Fourth Reserve German Corps on the
Ourcq vigorously opposed the advance of the French toward that river,
but did not prevent the Sixth Army from gaining some headway, the
Germans themselves suffering serious losses. The French Fifth Army threw
the enemy back to the line of the Petit Morin River after inflicting
severe losses upon them, especially about Montceaux, which was carried
at the point of the bayonet.
The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by his Second and Ninth
and Guard Cavalry Divisions, which suffered severely.
Our cavalry acted with great vigor, especially General De Lisle's
brigade, with the Ninth Lancers and Eighteenth Hussars.
[Sidenote: Germans retreat September 8.]
On September 8 the enemy continued his retreat northward, and our army
was successfully engaged during the day with strong rearguards of all
arms on the Petit Morin River, thereby materially assisting the progress
of the French armies on our right and left, against whom the enemy was
making his greatest efforts. On both sides the enemy was thrown back
with very heavy loss. The First Army Corps encountered stubborn
resistance at La Tretoire, (north of Rebais.) The enemy occupied a
strong position with infantry and guns on the northern bank of the Petit
Morin River; they were dislodged with considerable loss. Several machine
guns and many prisoners were captured, and upward of 200 German dead
were left on the ground.
[Sidenote: Forcing of Petit Morin September 9.]
The forcing of the Petit Morin at this point was much assisted by the
cavalry and the First Division, which crossed higher up the stream.
Later in the day a counter-attack by the enemy was well repulsed by the
First Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns again falling
into our hands.
On this day (September 8) the Second Army Corps encountered considerable
opposition, but drove back the enemy at all points with great loss,
making considerable captures.
The Third Army Corps also drove back considerable bodies of the enemy's
infantry and made some captures.
[Sidenote: British First and Second Army Corps forced passage of Marne.]
On September 9 the First and Second Army Corps forced the passage of the
Marne and advanced some miles to the north of it. The Third Corps
encountered considerable opposition, as the bridge at La Ferte was
destroyed and the enemy held the town on the opposite bank in some
strength, and thence persistently obstructed the construction of a
bridge; so the passage was not effected until after nightfall.
During the day's pursuit the enemy suffered heavy loss in killed and
wounded, some hundreds of prisoners fell into our hands and a battery of
eight machine guns was captured by the Second Division.
[Sidenote: Sixth French Army heavily engaged west of River Ourcq.]
On this day the Sixth French Army was heavily engaged west of the River
Ourcq. The enemy had largely increased his force opposing them; and very
heavy fighting ensued, in which the French were successful throughout.
The left of the Fifth French Army reached the neighborhood of Chateau
Thierry after the most severe fighting, having driven the enemy
completely north of the river with great loss.
The fighting of this army in the neighborhood of Montmirail was very
severe.
[Sidenote: British and French advance on the line of the Ourcq,
September 10.]
The advance was resumed at daybreak on the 10th up to the line of the
Ourcq, opposed by strong rearguards of all arms. The First and Second
Corps, assisted by the cavalry divisions on the right, the Third and
Fifth Cavalry Brigades on the left, drove the enemy northward. Thirteen
guns, seven machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and quantities of
transport fell into our hands. The enemy left many dead on the field.
On this day the French Fifth and Sixth Armies had little opposition.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--END OF GERMAN RETREAT AND THE
INTRENCHED LINE ON THE AISNE RIVER]
[Sidenote: First and Second German armies in full retreat.]
As the First and Second German Armies were now in full retreat, this
evening marks the end of the battle which practically commenced on the
morning of the 6th inst.; and it is at this point in the operations that
I am concluding the present dispatch.
In concluding this dispatch I must call your Lordship's special
attention to the fact that from Sunday, August 23, up to the present
date, (September 17,) from Mons back almost to the Seine, and from the
Seine to the Aisne, the army under my command has been ceaselessly
engaged without one single day's halt or rest of any kind.
[Sidenote: Continuous fighting of British from Sunday, August 23, to
September 17, from Mons to Seine and from Seine to the Aisne.]
[Sidenote: Amiens and Rheims captured.]
In the narratives preceding we have seen how the English forces
conducted themselves during the Great Retreat and at the Marne. It must
be remembered, however, that they comprised but a small proportion of
the armies opposing the Germans. The French bore the brunt of the
attack, and a French army turned the tide of battle. Beginning with the
first days of September all other military events were overshadowed by
the Great Retreat. On September 1 the Germans, in spite of French and
British resistance, had reached Senlis. On September 4th Amiens was
captured, and two days later the German army entered Rheims. In the
following narrative is shown, through the official records, how the
French armies bore themselves during the Great Retreat, the First Battle
of the Marne, and in the fighting which marked the hurried return of the
German armies to the banks of the Aisne which they had, with true
foresight, fortified with such a possible situation in mind.
HOW THE FRENCH FOUGHT
THE FRENCH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT
The first month of the campaign began with successes and finished with
defeats for the French troops. Under what circumstances did these come
about?
[Sidenote: Two principal actions.]
Our plan of concentration had foreseen the possibility of two principal
actions, one on the right between the Vosges and the Moselle, the other
on the left to the north of Verdun-Toul line, this double possibility
involving the eventual variation of our transport. On August 2, owing to
the Germans passing through Belgium, our concentration was substantially
modified by General Joffre in order that our principal effort might be
directed to the north.
From the first week in August it was apparent that the length of time
required for the British Army to begin to move would delay our action in
connection with it. This delay is one of the reasons which explain our
failures at the end of August.
[Sidenote: Mulhouse occupied.]
Awaiting the moment when the operations in the north could begin, and to
prepare for it by retaining in Alsace the greatest possible number of
German forces, the General in Chief ordered our troops to occupy
Mulhouse, (Muelhousen,) to cut the bridges of the Rhine at Huningue and
below, and then to flank the attack of our troops, operating in
Lorraine.
This operation was badly carried out by a leader who was at once
relieved of his command. Our troops, after having carried Mulhouse, lost
it and were thrown back on Belfort. The work had, therefore, to be
recommenced afresh, and this was done from August 14 under a new
command.
[Sidenote: Enemy losses.]
Mulhouse was taken on the 19th, after a brilliant fight at Dornach.
Twenty-four guns were captured from the enemy. On the 20th we held the
approaches to Colmar, both by the plain and by the Vosges. The enemy had
undergone enormous losses and abandoned great stores of shells and
forage, but from this moment what was happening in Lorraine and on our
left prevented us from carrying our successes further, for our troops in
Alsace were needed elsewhere.
On August 28 the Alsace army was broken up, only a small part remaining
to hold the region of Thann and the Vosges.
The purpose of the operations in Alsace was, namely, to retain a large
part of the enemy's forces far from the northern theatre of operations.
It was for our offensive in Lorraine to pursue still more directly by
holding before it the German army corps operating to the south of Metz.
This offensive began brilliantly on August 14. On the 19th we had
reached the region of Saarburg and that of the Etangs, (lakes,) and we
held Dieuze, Morhange, Delme, and Chateau Salins.
[Sidenote: French offensive stopped.]
On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in the
strong organization of the region, in the power of the enemy's
artillery, operating over ground which had been minutely surveyed, and,
finally, in the default of certain units.
[Sidenote: German reinforcements.]
On the 22d, in spite of the splendid behavior of several of our army
corps, notably that of Nancy, our troops were brought back on to the
Grand Couronne, while on the 23d and 24th the Germans concentrated
reinforcements--three army corps, at least--in the region of Luneville
and forced us to retire to the south.
This retreat, however, was only momentary. On the 25th, after two
vigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other from
west to east, the enemy had to fall back. From that time a sort of
balance was established on this terrain between the Germans and
ourselves. Maintained for fifteen days, it was afterward, as will be
seen, modified to our advantage.
[Sidenote: Battle of the north.]
There remained the principal business, the battle of the
north--postponed owing to the necessity of waiting for the British Army.
On August 20 the concentration of our lines was finished and the General
in Chief gave orders for our centre and our left to take the offensive.
Our centre comprised two armies. Our left consisted of a third army,
reinforced to the extent of two army corps, a corps of cavalry, the
reserve divisions, the British Army, and the Belgian Army, which had
already been engaged for the previous three weeks at Liege, Namur, and
Louvain.
The German plan on that date was as follows: From seven to eight army
corps and four cavalry divisions were endeavoring to pass between Givet
and Brussels, and even to prolong their movements more to the west. Our
object was, therefore, in the first place, to hold and dispose of the
enemy's centre and afterward to throw ourselves with all available
forces on the left flank of the German grouping of troops in the north.
[Sidenote: The offensive fails.]
On August 21 our offensive in the centre began with ten army corps. On
August 22 it failed, and this reverse appeared serious.
The reasons for it are complex. There were in this affair individual and
collective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy,
divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments, precipitate retreats, a
premature waste of men, and, finally, the inadequacy of certain of our
troops and their leaders, both as regards the use of infantry and
artillery.
In consequence of these lapses the enemy, turning to account the
difficult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from the
advantages which the superiority of his subaltern complements gave him.
[Sidenote: Enemy crosses the Sambre.]
In spite of this defeat our manoeuvre had still a chance of success, if
our left and the British Army obtained a decisive result. This was
unfortunately not the case. On August 22, at the cost of great losses,
the enemy succeeded in crossing the Sambre and our left army fell back
on the 24th upon Beaumont-Givet, being perturbed by the belief that the
enemy was threatening its right.
On the same day, (the 24th,) the British Army fell back after a German
attack upon the Maubeuge-Valenciennes line. On the 25th and 26th its
retreat became more hurried. After Landrecies and Le Cateau it fell back
southward by forced marches. It could not from this time keep its hold
until after crossing the Marne.
[Sidenote: The British retreat.]
The rapid retreat of the English, coinciding with the defeat sustained
in Belgian Luxembourg, allowed the enemy to cross the Meuse and to
accelerate, by fortifying it, the action of his right.
The situation at this moment may be thus summed up: Either our frontier
had to be defended on the spot under conditions which the British
retreat rendered extremely perilous, or we had to execute a strategic
retirement which, while delivering up to the enemy a part of the
national soil, would permit us, on the other hand, to resume the
offensive at our own time with a favorable disposition of troops, still
intact, which we had at our command. The General in Chief determined on
the second alternative.
[Sidenote: New offensive planned.]
Henceforward the French command devoted its efforts to preparing the
offensive. To this end three conditions had to be fulfilled:
1. The retreat had to be carried out in order under a succession of
counter-attacks which would keep the enemy busy.
2. The extreme point of this retreat must be fixed in such a way that
the different armies should reach it simultaneously, ready at the moment
of occupying it to resume the offensive all together.
3. Every circumstance permitting of a resumption of the offensive before
this point should be reached must be utilized by the whole of our forces
and the British forces.
[Sidenote: Counter-attacks.]
The counter-attacks, executed during the retreat, were brilliant and
often fruitful. On August 20 we successfully attacked St. Quentin to
disengage the British Army. Two other corps and a reserve division
engaged the Prussian Guard and the Tenth German Army Corps, which was
debouching from Guise. By the end of the day, after various
fluctuations, the enemy was thrown back on the Oise and the British
front was freed.
On August 27 we had also succeeded in throwing back upon the Meuse the
enemy, who was endeavoring to gain a foothold on the left bank. Our
successes continued on the 28th in the woods of Marfee and of Jaulnay.
Thanks to them we were able, in accordance with the orders of the
General in Chief, to fall back on the Buzancy-Le Chesne-Bouvellemont
line.
Further to the right another army took part in the same movement and
carried out successful attacks on August 25 on the Othain and in the
region of Spincourt.
[Sidenote: Recrossing the Meuse.]
On the 26th these different units recrossed the Meuse without being
disturbed and were able to join in the action of our centre. Our armies
were, therefore, again intact and available for the offensive.
On August 26 a new army composed of two army corps, five reserve
divisions, and a Moorish brigade was constituted. This army was to
assemble in the region of Amiens between August 27 and September 1 and
take the offensive against the German right, uniting its action with
that of the British Army, operating on the line of Ham-Bray-sur-Somme.
[Sidenote: The retreat continues.]
The hope of resuming the offensive was from this moment rendered vain by
the rapidity of the march of the German right wing. This rapidity had
two consequences, which we had to parry before thinking of advancing. On
the one hand, our new army had not time to complete its detraining, and,
on the other hand, the British Army, forced back further by the enemy,
uncovered on August 31 our left flank. Our line, thus modified,
contained waves which had to be redressed before we could pass to the
offensive.
To understand this it is sufficient to consider the situation created by
the quick advance of the enemy on the evening of September 2.
A corps of cavalry had crossed the Oise and advanced as far as
Chateau-Thierry. The First Army, (General von Kluck,) comprising four
active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne.
The Second Army, (General von Buelow,) with three active army corps and
two reserve corps, was reaching the Laon region.
The Third Army, (General von Hausen,) with two active army corps and a
reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne between the Chateau Porcien and
Attigny.
[Sidenote: The German armies.]
More to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Armies, namely,
twelve army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous Ersatz formations,
were in contact with our troops, the Fourth and Fifth Armies between
Vouziers and Verdun and the others in the positions which have been
indicated above, from Verdun to the Vosges.
[Sidenote: The left in peril.]
It will, therefore, be seen that our left, if we accepted battle, might
be in great peril through the British forces and the new French Army,
operating more to the westward, having given way.
A defeat in these conditions would have cut off our armies from Paris
and from the British forces and at the same time from the new army which
had been constituted to the left of the English. We should thus be
running the risk of losing by a single stroke the advantage of the
assistance which Russia later on was to furnish.
General Joffre chose resolutely for the solution which disposed of these
risks, that is to say, for postponing the offensive and the continuance
of the retreat. In this way he remained on ground which he had chosen.
He waited only until he could engage in better conditions.
[Sidenote: The limit of the retreat.]
In consequence, on September 1, he fixed as an extreme limit for the
movement of retreat, which was still going on, the line of
Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-Francois, and
the region to the north of Bar-le-Duc. This line might be reached if the
troops were compelled to go back so far. They would attack before
reaching it, as soon as there was a possibility of bringing about an
offensive disposition, permitting the co-operation of the whole of our
forces.
On September 5 it appeared that this desired situation existed.
The First German Army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued its
endeavor to envelop our left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and reached
the region of Chauffry, to the north of Rebaix and of Esternay. It aimed
then at cutting our armies off from Paris, in order to begin the
investment of the capital.
[Sidenote: The German lines.]
The Second Army had its head on the line Champaubert, Etoges, Bergeres,
and Vertus.
The Third and Fourth Armies reached to Chalons-sur-Marne and
Bussy-le-Repos. The Fifth Army was advancing on one side and the other
from the Argonne as far as Triacourt-les-Islettes and Juivecourt. The
Sixth and Seventh Armies were attacking more to the east.
But--and here is a capital difference between the situation of September
5 and that of September 2--the envelopment of our left was no longer
possible.
In the first place, our left army had been able to occupy the line of
Sezanne, Villers-St. Georges and Courchamps. Furthermore, the British
forces, gathered between the Seine and the Marne, flanked on their left
by the newly created army, were closely connected with the rest of our
forces.
[Sidenote: Allies' armies ready.]
This was precisely the disposition which the General in Chief had wished
to see achieved. On the 4th he decided to take advantage of it, and
ordered all the armies to hold themselves ready. He had taken from his
right two new army corps, two divisions of infantry, and two divisions
of cavalry, which were distributed between his left and his centre.
On the evening of the 5th he addressed to all the commanders of armies a
message ordering them to attack.
[Sidenote: Joffre orders the advance.]
"The hour has come," he wrote, "to advance at all costs, and to die
where you stand rather than give way."
If one examines on the map the respective positions of the German and
French armies on September 6 as previously described, it will be seen
that by his inflection toward Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluck
was exposing his right to the offensive action of our left. This is the
starting point of the victory of the Marne.
[Sidenote: The Battle of the Marne.]
On the evening of September 5 our left army had reached the front
Penchard-Saint-Soutlet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its
attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of
the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front
Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, who
had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second and
Fourth Army Corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacks
of extreme violence. They occupied Betz, Thury-en-Valois, and
Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. But in spite of this pressure our troops held
their ground well. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and,
being reinforced, prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that
this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat toward
the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th we established
ourselves on the Aisne.
[Sidenote: Enemy left exposed.]
Why did the German forces which were confronting us and on the evening
before attacking so furiously retreat on the morning of the 10th?
Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south to
the north to face our left the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks
of the British Army, which had immediately faced around toward the
north, and to those of our armies which were prolonging the English
lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring
about. This is what happened on September 8 and allowed the development
and rehabilitation which it was to effect.
[Sidenote: The part of the British.]
On the 6th the British Army had set out from the line Rozcy-Lagny and
had that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the
7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the
north of the Marne below Chateau-Thierry, taking in flank the German
forces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, our left army.
Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British Army,
going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached
the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval.
[Sidenote: The role of the French army.]
The role of the French Army, which was operating to the right of the
British Army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on
its left. It had on its right to support our centre, which from
September 7 had been subjected to a German attack of great violence.
Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and
the reserve corps which faced it.
On the 7th it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and
crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers,
mitrailleuses, and 1,300,000 cartridges. On the 12th it established
itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with our
centre, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in
haste.
[Sidenote: Attack on the French centre.]
Our centre consisted of a new army created on August 29 and of one of
those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in Belgian
Luxembourg. The first had retreated on August 29 to September 5 from the
Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general front
Sezanne-Mailly.
The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line
Humbauville-Chateau-Beauchamp-Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy.
[Sidenote: A further retreat.]
The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his
enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 10th to
pierce our centre to the west and to the east of Fere-Champenoise. On
the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of our new army, which
retired as far as Gouragancon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning,
there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the
left the other army corps also had to go back to the line
Allemant-Connantre.
[Sidenote: Foch out-man[oe]uvres Germans.]
Despite this retreat the General commanding the army ordered a general
offensive for the same day. With the Morocco Division, whose behavior
was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left toward
the marshes of Saint Gond. Then with the division which had just
victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sezanne,
and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in
the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard,
which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surprise
by this bold man[oe]uvre, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat.
[Sidenote: Centre armies established.]
On the 11th we crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry,
driving the Germans in front of us in disorder. On the 12th we were in
contact with the enemy to the north of the Camp de Chalons. Our other
army of the centre, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had
been intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of
disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that, being
reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its
action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But,
perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous
expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th the
result had none the less been attained, and our two centre armies were
solidly established on the ground gained.
To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to
cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the
flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But
a wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them from
our centre. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliant
success for our artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the
Sixteenth German Army Corps.
[Sidenote: Germans retreat on the right.]
On the 10th inst. the Eighth and Fifteenth German Army Corps
counter-attacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th our progress continued
with new successes, and on the 12th we were able to face round toward
the north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of the
enemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th.
The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the
left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating between
Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before our two armies of the
East, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had
evacuated. The offensive of our right had thus prepared and consolidated
in the most useful way the result secured by our left and our centre.
Such was this seven days' battle, in which more than two millions of men
were engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the road to
its neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the adversary
which the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of one
articulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of
intention and method animating the supreme command.
[Sidenote: Meaning of the victory.]
To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was
gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which,
when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent
as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to
meet the whole German army, and that from the time they marched forward
they never again fell back. Under their pressure the German retreat at
certain times had the appearance of a rout.
[Sidenote: Numbers of German prisoners.]
In spite of the fatigue of our men, in spite of the power of the German
heavy artillery, we took colors, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, more than
a million cartridges, and thousands of prisoners. A German corps lost
almost the whole of its artillery, which, from information brought by
our airmen, was destroyed by our guns.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: The next objective is the Channel ports.]
After the failure of the German drive against Paris, whose capture was
the first objective in the plan of campaign of the German General Staff,
preparations were made to carry out the plans for the second objective,
the capture of the Channel seaports, and the control of the coasts. The
Allied commanders were quite aware of this purpose, and made plans to
circumvent it. Then followed the famous Race for the Channel, which is
described by official French observers in the pages that follow.
THE RACE FOR THE CHANNEL
FRENCH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT
As early as September 11 the Commander in Chief had directed our left
army to have as important forces as possible on the right bank of the
Oise. On September 17 he made that instruction more precise by ordering
"a mass to be constituted on the left wing of our disposition, capable
of coping with the outflanking movement of the enemy." Everything led us
to expect that flanking movement, for the Germans are lacking in
invention. Indeed, their effort at that time tended to a renewal of
their manoeuvre of August. In the parallel race the opponents were bound
in the end to be stopped only by the sea; that is what happened about
October 20.
[Sidenote: Allies in the race to the sea.]
The Germans had an advantage over us, which is obvious from a glance at
the map--the concentric form of their front, which shortened the length
of their transports. In spite of this initial inferiority we arrived in
time.
From the middle of September to the last week in October fighting went
on continually to the north of the Oise, but all the time we were
fighting we were slipping northward. On the German side this movement
brought into line more than eighteen new army corps (twelve active army
corps, six reserve corps, four cavalry corps). On our side it ended in
the constitution of three fresh armies on our left and in the transport
into the same district of the British Army and the Belgian Army from
Antwerp.
[Sidenote: Resistance in Battle of Flanders.]
For the conception and realization of this fresh and extended
disposition the French command, in the first place, had to reduce to a
minimum the needs for effectives of our armies to the east of the Oise,
and afterwards to utilize to the utmost our means of transport. It
succeeded in this, and when, at the end of October, the battle of
Flanders opened, when the Germans, having completed the concentration of
their forces, attempted with fierce energy to turn or to pierce our
left, they flung themselves upon a resistance which inflicted upon them
a complete defeat.
The movement began on our side only with the resources of the army which
had held the left of our front during the battle of the Marne,
reinforced on September 15 by one army corps.
This reinforcement, not being sufficient to hold the enemy's offensive
(district of Vaudelincourt-Mouchy-Uaugy), a fresh army was transported
more to the left, with the task "of acting against the German right wing
in order to disengage its neighbor, * * * while preserving a flanking
direction in its march in relation to the fresh units that the enemy
might be able to put into line."
[Sidenote: Reinforcements for the First Army.]
To cover the detrainments of this fresh army in the district
Clermont-Beauvais-Boix a cavalry corps and four territorial divisions
were ordered to establish themselves on both banks of the Somme. In the
wooded hills, however, which extend between the Oise and Lassigny the
enemy displayed increasing activity. Nevertheless, the order still
further to broaden the movement toward the left was maintained, while
the territorial divisions were to move toward Bethune and Aubigny. The
march to the sea went on.
[Sidenote: Alternate reverse and success.]
From the 21st to the 26th all our forces were engaged in the district
Lassigny-Roye-Peronne, with alternations of reverse and success.
It was the first act of the great struggle which was to spread as it
went on. On the 26th the whole of the Sixth German Army was deployed
against us. We retained all our positions, but we could do no more;
consequently there was still the risk that the enemy, by means of a
fresh afflux of forces, might succeed in turning us.
Once more reinforcements, two army corps, were directed no longer on
Beauvais, but toward Amiens. The front was then again to extend. A fresh
army was constituted more to the north.
From September 30 onward we could not but observe that the enemy,
already strongly posted on the plateau of Thiepval, was continually
slipping his forces from south to north, and everywhere confronting us
with remarkable energy.
[Sidenote: Cavalry operations.]
Accordingly, on October 1 two cavalry corps were directed to make a leap
forward and, operating on both flanks of the Scarpe, to put themselves
in touch with the garrison of Dunkirk, which, on its side, had pushed
forward as far as Douai.
But on October 2 and 3 the bulk of our fresh army was very strongly
attacked in the district of Arras and Lens. Confronting it were two
corps of cavalry, the guards, four active army corps, and two reserve
corps. A fresh army corps was immediately transported and detrained in
the Lille district.
But once more the attacks became more pressing, and on October 4 it was
a question whether, in view of the enemy's activity both west of the
Oise and south of the Somme, and also further to the north, a retreat
would not have to be made. General Joffre resolutely put this
hypothesis aside and ordered the offensive to be resumed with the
reinforcements that had arrived. It was, however, clear that, despite
the efforts of all, our front, extended to the sea as it was by a mere
ribbon of troops, did not possess the solidity to enable it to resist
with complete safety a German attack, the violence of which could well
be foreseen.
[Sidenote: Transport of the British Army.]
In the Arras district the position was fairly good. But between the Oise
and Arras we were holding our own only with difficulty. Finally, to the
north, on the Lille-Estaires-Merville-Hazebrouck-Cassel front, our
cavalry and our territorials had their work cut out against eight
divisions of German cavalry, with very strong infantry supports. It was
at this moment that the transport of the British Army to the northern
theatre of operations began.
[Sidenote: British Army taken from the Aisne.]
Field Marshal French had, as early as the end of September, expressed
the wish to see his army resume its initial place on the left of the
allied armies. He explained this wish on the ground of the greater
facility of which his communications would have the advantage in this
new position, and also of the impending arrival of two divisions of
infantry from home and of two infantry divisions and a cavalry division
from India, which would be able to deploy more easily on that terrain.
In spite of the difficulties which such a removal involved, owing to the
intensive use of the railways by our own units, General Joffre decided
at the beginning of October to meet the Field Marshal's wishes and to
have the British Army removed from the Aisne.
It was clearly specified that on the northern terrain the British Army
should co-operate to the same end as ourselves, the stopping of the
German right. In other terms, the British Army was to prolong the front
of the general disposition without a break, attacking as soon as
possible, and at the same time seeking touch with the Belgian Army.
But the detraining took longer than had been expected, and it was not
possible to attack the Germans during the time when they had only
cavalry in the Lille district and further to the north.
[Sidenote: Wearied Belgian troops.]
There remained the Belgian Army. On leaving Antwerp on October 9 the
Belgian Army, which was covered by 8,000 British bluejackets and 6,000
French bluejackets, at first intended to retire as far as to the north
of Calais, but afterwards determined to make a stand in Belgian
territory. Unfortunately, the condition of the Belgian troops, exhausted
by a struggle of more than three months, did not allow any immediate
hopes to be based upon them. This situation weighed on our plans and
delayed their execution.
On the 16th we made progress to the east of Ypres. On the 18th our
cavalry even reached Roulers and Cortemark. But it was now evident that,
in view of the continual reinforcing of the German right, our left was
not capable of maintaining the advantages obtained during the previous
few days. To attain our end and make our front inviolable a fresh effort
was necessary. That effort was immediately made by the dispatch to the
north of the Lys of considerable French forces, which formed the French
Army of Belgium.
The French Army of Belgium consisted, to begin with, of two territorial
divisions, four divisions of cavalry, and a naval brigade. Directly
after its constitution it was strengthened by elements from other points
on the front whose arrival extended from October 27 to November 11.
These reinforcements were equivalent altogether in value to five army
corps, a division of cavalry, a territorial division, and sixteen
regiments of cavalry, plus sixty pieces of heavy artillery.
Thus was completed the strategic manoeuvre defined by the instructions
of the General in Chief on September 11 and developed during the five
following weeks with the ampleness we have just seen. The movements of
troops carried out during this period were methodically combined with
the pursuit of operations, both defensive and offensive, from the Oise
to the North Sea.
[Sidenote: Five armies co-ordinated.]
On October 22 our left, bounded six weeks earlier by the Noyon district,
rested on Nieuport, thanks to the successive deployment of five fresh
armies--three French armies, the British Army, and the Belgian Army.
Thus the co-ordination decided upon by the General in Chief attained its
end. The barrier was established. It remained to maintain it against the
enemy's offensive. That was the object and the result of the battle of
Flanders, October 22 to November 15.
The German attack in Flanders was conducted strategically and tactically
with remarkable energy. The complete and indisputable defeat in which it
resulted is therefore significant.
The forces of which the enemy disposed for this operation between the
sea and the Lys comprised:
[Sidenote: German forces between the sea and the Lys.]
(1) The entire Fourth Army commanded by the Duke of Wuerttemberg,
consisting of one naval division, one division of Ersatz Reserve, (men
who had received no training before the war,) which was liberated by the
fall of Antwerp; the Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-sixth and
Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps, and the Forty-eighth Division belonging to
the Twenty-fourth Reserve Corps.
(2) A portion of another army under General von Fabeck, consisting of
the Fifteenth Corps, two Bavarian corps and three (unspecified)
divisions.
(3) Part of the Sixth Army under the command of the Crown Prince of
Bavaria. This army, more than a third of which took part in the battle
of Flanders, comprised the Nineteenth Army Corps, portions of the
Thirteenth Corps and the Eighteenth Reserve Corps, the Seventh and
Fourteenth Corps, the First Bavarian Reserve Corps, the Guards, and the
Fourth Army Corps.
(4) Four highly mobile cavalry corps prepared and supported the action
of the troops enumerated above. Everything possible had been done to
fortify the "morale" of the troops. At the beginning of October the
Crown Prince of Bavaria in a proclamation had exhorted his soldiers "to
make the decisive effort against the French left wing," and "to settle
thus the fate of the great battle which has lasted for weeks."
[Sidenote: Importance of thrusts in Flanders.]
[Sidenote: German plan in Flanders.]
On October 28, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria declared in an army order
that his troops "had just been fighting under very difficult
conditions," and he added: "It is our business now not to let the
struggle with our most detested enemy drag on longer * * * The decisive
blow is still to be struck." On October 30, General von Deimling,
commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps (belonging to General von Fabeck's
command), issued an order declaring that "the thrust against Ypres will
be of decisive importance." It should be noted also that the Emperor
proceeded in person to Thielt and Courtrai to exalt by his presence the
ardor of his troops. Finally, at the close of October, the entire German
press incessantly proclaimed the importance of the "Battle of Calais."
It is superfluous to add that events in Poland explain in a large
measure the passionate resolve of the German General Staff to obtain a
decision in the Western theatre of operations at all costs. This
decision would be obtained if our left were pierced or driven in. To
reach Calais, that is, to break our left; to carry Ypres, that is, to
cut it in half; through both points to menace the communications and
supplies of the British expeditionary corps, perhaps even to threaten
Britain in her island--such was the German plan in the Battle of
Flanders. It was a plan that could not be executed.
[Sidenote: Dunkirk the first objective.]
The enemy, who had at his disposal a considerable quantity of heavy
artillery, directed his efforts at first upon the coast and the country
to the north of Dixmude. His objective was manifestly the capture of
Dunkirk, then of Calais and Boulogne, and this objective he pursued
until November 1.
[Sidenote: Ramscapelle retaken.]
[Sidenote: Allies win the Battle of Calais.]
On October 23 the Belgians along the railway line from Nieuport to
Dixmude were strengthened by a French division. Dixmude was occupied by
our marines (fusiliers marins). During the subsequent day our forces
along the railway developed a significant resistance against an enemy
superior in number and backed by heavy artillery. On the 29th the
inundations effected between the canal and the railway line spread along
our front. On the 30th we recaptured Ramscapelle, the only point on the
railway which Belgians had lost. On the 1st and 2d of November the enemy
bombarded Furnes, but began to show signs of weariness. On the 2d he
evacuated the ground between the Yser and the railway, abandoning
cannon, dead and wounded. On the 3d our troops were able to re-enter the
Dixmude district. The success achieved by the enemy at Dixmude at this
juncture was without fruit. They succeeded in taking the town. They
could not debouch from it. The coastal attack had thus proved a total
failure. Since then it has never been renewed. The Battle of Calais, so
noisily announced by the German press, amounted to a decided reverse for
the Germans.
The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor,
in view of the numbers engaged in it. This attack was intended as a
renewal to the south of the effort which had just been shattered in the
north. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought to
drive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerful
masses. This was the Battle of Ypres.
[Sidenote: Importance of the Ypres position.]
[Sidenote: British cavalry a connecting link.]
In order to understand this long, desperate, and furious battle we must
hark back a few days in point of time. At the moment when our cavalry
reached Roulers and Cortemark (October 28) our territorial divisions
from Dunkirk, under General Biden, had occupied and organized a
defensive position at Ypres. It was a point d'appui, enabling us to
prepare and maintain our connections with the Belgian Army. From October
23 two British and French army corps were in occupation of this
position, which was to be the base of their forward march in the
direction of Roulers-Menin. The delays already explained and the
strength of the forces brought up by the enemy soon brought to a
standstill our progress along the line Poelcapelle, Paschendaele,
Zandvorde, and Gheluvelt. But in spite of the stoppage here, Ypres was
solidly covered, and the connections of all the allied forces were
established. Against the line thus formed the German attack was hurled
from October 25 to November 13, to the north, the east, and the south of
Ypres. From October 26 on the attacks were renewed daily with
extraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at the
most threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus, on October 31, we
were obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the two
British corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, and
finally to intercalate between these two corps a force equivalent to two
army corps. Between October 30 and November 6 Ypres was several times in
danger. The British lost Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, Messines, and Wytschaete.
The front of the Allies, thus contracted, was all the more difficult to
defend; but defended it was without a recoil.
[Sidenote: French reinforcements.]
The arrival of three French divisions in our line enabled us to resume
from the 4th to the 8th a vigorous offensive. On the 10th and 11th this
offensive, brought up against fresh and sharper German attacks, was
checked. Before it could be renewed the arrival of fresh reinforcements
had to be awaited, which were dispatched to the north on November 12. By
the 14th our troops had again begun to progress, barring the road to
Ypres against the German attacks, and inflicting on the enemy, who
advanced in massed formation, losses which were especially terrible in
consequence of the fact that the French artillery had crowded nearly 300
guns on to these few kilometers of front.
Thus the main mass of the Germans sustained the same defeat as the
detachments operating further to the north along the coast. The support
which, according to the idea of the German General Staff, the attack on
Ypres was to render to the coastal attack, was as futile as that attack
itself had been.
[Sidenote: Losses of the enemy.]
During the second half of November the enemy, exhausted and having lost
in the Battle of Ypres alone more than 150,000 men, did not attempt to
renew his effort, but confined himself to an intermittent cannonade. We,
on the contrary, achieved appreciable progress to the north and south
of Ypres, and insured definitely by a powerful defensive organization of
the position the inviolability of our front.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: The war in Belgium.]
[Sidenote: Siege of Antwerp.]
[Sidenote: Belgian troops retreat to Ostend.]
[Sidenote: The territory left to the Belgians.]
We have seen that, with the fall of Liege the German armies swept
through Belgium on their way to Paris. Brussels was abandoned as the
capital, and the Government moved hastily to Antwerp, where a portion of
the Belgian army also gathered to defend the city. The remainder of the
Belgian forces, under the leadership of their gallant King, opposed as
stoutly as their numbers would permit the advance of the Germans.
Battles were fought at Alost and Termonde in which the Germans were, for
the time, repulsed, but their ever-increasing reinforcements enabled
them to advance despite the efforts of the Belgians to check them. Ghent
was captured on September 5 and the Belgians, in an effort to stay the
German advance on Antwerp, opened the dikes and let in the waters of the
North Sea. Termonde fell on September 13, and seven days later the
German armies began the siege of Antwerp. The military authorities in
command of the city had taken whatever measures were possible for
defense. A body of British marines was hurried to the beleaguered city
and preparations were made for a long siege. The Germans brought up guns
of heavy caliber, with which they bombarded the city at long range.
After a brave defense of two weeks, during which the inhabitants endured
many hardships, it was plain that further resistance was useless, and
the city was surrendered on October 10. The Belgian troops in the city,
and many of the noncombatants escaped. The Belgian troops retreated to
Ostend, which they reached on October 11 and 12, after having been
greatly harassed by the pursuing Germans. On the 13th, Ostend was
evacuated, and was occupied by the Germans, and Bruges on the following
day. The German forces now controlled the whole of Belgium, with the
exception of the northwest corner, north of Ypres, to the coast of the
Channel. This little slip of territory they held throughout the entire
war, and at what a cost! But the heroic defense of this territory by the
Belgians saved the French coast cities and prevented the Germans from
breaking through the line which extended now from the North Sea to
Belgium.
THE LAST DITCH IN BELGIUM
ARNO DOSCH
Copyright, World's Work, January, 1915.
[Sidenote: The Yser the Belgian's last ditch.]
A little piece of the Low Countries, so small I walked across it in two
hours, was all that remained of Belgium in the last days of October. A
tide-water stream, the Yser, ebbed and flowed through the sunken fields,
and there King Albert with his remnant of an army stopped the German
military machine in its advance on Calais. If he and his forty thousand
men had been crushed back ten miles farther they would have been
fighting on French soil. The Yser was the last ditch in Belgium.
The Belgians were able to hold that mere strip of land against more men
and better artillery because they had determined to die there. Some of
those who had not yet paid the price of death told me. They were not
tragic about it. There was no display of heroics. They said it
seriously, but they smiled a little, too, over their wine glasses, and
the next morning they were back in the firing-line.
I counted on my American passport and my _permit de sejour_ in Paris
seeing me through the zone of the fighting, and they did. At the station
at Dunkirk, when I admitted I had no _laisser passer_, an obliging
gendarme led me to his commander, and he placed his visee on my passport
without question. He asked me whether I was a correspondent, and I
confessed to it, but it seemed only to facilitate the affair. Earlier
experiences had made me feel that the French gendarmes were my natural
enemies, but I have had a kindlier regard for them since.
[Sidenote: Troop trains.]
The train I was on had ten cars full of French and Belgian soldiers. The
Belgians had all been recently re-equipped. On other troop trains which
passed us going forward there were many more Belgian soldiers, some of
whom I had seen only a few hours earlier in the streets of Calais
without rifles. As their trains passed now I could see them studying the
mechanism and fondling their new firearms.
Coming in through the suburbs of Dunkirk we passed hundreds of children
perched on the fences singing the Marseillaise. Nor were their voices
flat and colorless like most school children's. They felt every word
they sang, and they put their little hearts into it. Looking back along
the side of the cars at the faces of soldiers leaning out, I could see
they were touched by the faith of the children.
[Sidenote: In Dunkirk.]
As I rattled along on the cobbles of Dunkirk half an hour later I heard
an explosion with a note unfamiliar to me. It sounded close, too, but it
did not seem to bother the people of the street. A few children ran
behind their mothers' skirts and a young girl hurried from the middle of
the street to the protection of an archway, but that was all.
Standing up in the fiacre I could see a thin smoke about three hundred
feet away in a garden in the direction from which the explosion came,
and high in the evening sky I could barely make out an aeroplane. "A
German bomb?" I asked the driver in some excitement.
"Oh, yes," he replied, cracking his whip, "we usually get three or four
every afternoon about this time, but they have not hurt any one."
Dunkirk that night answered the description of what a threatened town
which was not afraid should look like. It had none of the depressing
atmosphere of Calais. All the refugees and the wounded were passed on
to a safer place. It was full of French, English, and Belgian soldiers,
with a scattering of sailors and breezy officers from both the French
and English navies. They kept the waiters in the cafes on the run, and
there was only an occasional bandage showing from under a cap or around
a hand to indicate these men were engaged in any more serious business
than a man[oe]uvre.
[Sidenote: Armored motor-car.]
In the street, however, in front of the statue of Jean Bart, an armored
Belgian motor-car was standing. It was built with a turret where the
tonneau usually is and it was covered with thick sheet steel right down
to the ground. Just in front of the driver was a slit with a lip
extending over it, giving it somewhat the effect of the casque belonging
to an ancient suit of armor. That was the only opening except the one
for the barrel of the rapid-fire gun in the turret. The armor was dented
in a dozen places where bullets had glanced off, but it had only been
penetrated at one spot, about six inches from the muzzle of the gun.
From the soldier at the steering gear I learned that that bullet had
passed over the shoulder of the man in the turret.
[Sidenote: Bombardment of Nieuport.]
Twenty-four hours later, at Nieuport, when the German shells seemed to
be falling in every street and on every house, I saw this car again,
going forward at not less than forty miles an hour. The turret was being
swung to bring the gun-muzzle forward, as if the gunner were expecting
to go into action almost immediately. As the last of the Belgian
trenches were just the other side of the town, I have no doubt that he
did.
[Sidenote: A walk to the firing line.]
Getting out of Dunkirk was rather more of a problem than going in. To
obtain permission to ride toward the Belgian line in any kind of
conveyance was an elaborate performance, and quite properly so, as I
soon learned. There were preparations for defence going on there which
should not have been publicly known. The country was full of spies. Four
suspects had been picked up on the boat coming from Folkestone. If I had
realized what I was to see in the next few miles I would not have
attempted what I did. But, as I was anxious to get on and the
firing-line was only twenty miles away, I decided to walk.
A French hat and a French suit of clothes, I think, were alone
responsible for my success in passing through the city gate. Two
military automobiles were stopped and forced to show their credentials,
but I strolled through unmolested. Once outside, the reservists guarding
the various barricades let me pass as soon as I showed them my passport
vised in Dunkirk. I was stopped many times, too, trying each time not to
give an appearance of too great interest in the works of defence being
built all around me.
[Sidenote: Sand-dune barricades.]
Even though this cannot be published for some time I do not feel free to
tell what these defences were. I have no doubt there are complete
descriptions of these works in the hands of the German army, their spy
system is so thorough, but I would not care to have any military secrets
escape through anything I write. I think I can go so far as to say,
though, that I received a liberal education in how to barricade
sand-dunes and low-lying fields.
Ten miles out of Dunkirk I was surprised to see a civilian on a bicycle,
as civilians were no longer permitted to go near the theatre of war on
bicycles, a precaution taken against spies. As he approached I
recognized Mr. J. Obels, the Belgian correspondent of the Chicago _Daily
News_, whom I had last seen under arrest near Brussels when the German
army first passed through Belgium. He told me he had been kept in prison
seventeen days by the German military governor of Brussels, but, once
released, was given every possible kind of pass. I was relieved to see
him alive and free.
As Obels left me to continue his journey to Dunkirk and on to London to
deliver his own "copy," he advised me to go directly to Furnes, the most
considerable town in what was left of Belgium, and have my passport
vised again. So I continued down the long, flat highway, bordered on
both sides by sunken fields, toward the cannonading I could now hear
ahead. The road had been fairly full of automobiles, motor-trucks,
motorcycles, and bicycles over its whole length, but it became crowded
now with the addition of a long string of Parisian motor-buses taking
several infantry regiments forward. A whole artillery division of yellow
French "Schneiders" also took up its share of the wide road, and at the
barricades there were traffic blockades lasting at times for ten
minutes.
[Sidenote: The road to Furnes.]
All the way from Dunkirk I had been struck by the character of the land.
As I approached Furnes, the dykes were being opened and half the fields
were already inundated. It seemed a poor country for military
operations. There were at most three highways, all defended. They could
only be taken at a price no army could afford, and any departure from
them meant being mired in the heavy fields, now being hastily harvested
of a bumper crop of sugar-beets: at one place a whole French regiment in
uniform was gathering the beets preparatory to inundation. With the
dykes open these fields would be covered with four feet of water half
the time. The only possible course for an army was over the sand-dunes,
which lay a mile to the north, looking like the imitation mountains you
see in the scenic-railways at every amusement resort in the United
States.
[Sidenote: Tommies' battles on the sand-dunes.]
A reservist with whom I walked a mile or so told me Dunkirk had never
been successfully attacked except over those sand-dunes, and the English
and French had fought some of the bloodiest battles of history there
against the Spanish, when they held Dunkirk. I doubt, though, that they
were as bloody as the battle I was to see within a few hours.
[Sidenote: Belgian soldiers.]
The old Flemish town of Furnes had much less military precision about it
than Dunkirk. It was on the very edge of the battle, and an occasional
shell was dropping in the town. One exploded as I crossed the bridge and
entered a narrow street, but it was on the far side of town, too far
away for the soldiers halted in the street to notice. These were tired
and dirty men, but not too tired to be courteous. They were also passing
jokes among themselves, and laughing. By that, even if I had not known
their uniforms, I could have told they were Belgians.
[Sidenote: The enemy held at the Yser.]
Every street and every courtyard in Furnes was full of Belgian soldiers.
They were resting for the day, waiting to go forward at night-fall to
relieve the men on the firing line only five miles away. Even above the
noises of the street I could hear the answer of their small field
artillery to the heavy assault of the German guns. Nothing I heard the
soldiers say, however, would have given the idea that the Belgians
considered themselves outclassed by their enemy. They seemed superbly
unconscious of the absurdity of their position. This was the tenth day
they had held the Germans at the Yser, and they had done it with rifles
and machine guns, taking punishment every minute from the big
fieldpieces the Germans had brought against them. So far they had lost
twelve thousand men at that ditch, but the thought of giving it up had
evidently not even occurred to them. They could not give it up, one of
them explained to me later, it was all they had left. There was a little
irritation in his tone, too, as he said it, such as one might feel
toward a child who was slow at grasping a simple fact.
[Sidenote: Military automobiles and wagons.]
The town square was full of military automobiles and a few provision
wagons. I did not see any fieldpieces or machine guns. Every last one
was right up on the firing-line. My feet were tired from walking over
the Belgian blocks, and I held tenaciously to the sidewalk passing
around the square, though it was mostly taken up with cafe tables and
bay trees in boxes. At one point the tables were empty and a single
sentry was sauntering up and down. I stopped to ask him the way to the
_gendarmerie_, and, in the middle of giving me the directions, he came
to attention, as a door opened behind me, and saluted.
[Sidenote: Two Belgian generals.]
Two men came out of the door, one rather tall, with an easy manner, and
smartly dressed as a general in the Belgian army. The other was older,
also a general, wearing, if anything, the more gold braid of the two.
They entered a waiting automobile and drove off as casually as two men
at home might leave their office for their club.
Something about the first of the two men impressed me as familiar. I had
only seen his back, but that had arrested my attention. I thought
possibly I had seen him at the beginning of the war in Brussels, so I
asked the sentry his name.
[Sidenote: King Albert.]
"That is our king, Albert," he said quite simply.
During the next couple of days I saw the King of Belgium a number of
times. He spent his nights at a small villa on the seashore at La Panne,
a hundred yards possibly beyond the hotel where I spent mine. He passed
through the streets as unnoticed as any one of the other Belgians who
had retreated from Antwerp and Ghent ahead of the army, but preferred
the chilly nights in an unheated seaside hotel in Belgium to comfort
somewhere beyond. It seemed to be a point of courtesy on the part of the
Belgians not to bother their king with ceremony at this trying time. I
doubt if he cares much for ceremony, anyhow. Searching around for a
single adjective to describe him, I should call him off-handed. His
manner, even then, while alert, was casual. It is easy to see why the
Belgians love him. If kings had always been as simple and direct as
Albert, I am inclined to think democracy would have languished.
[Sidenote: Luncheon at La Panne.]
At La Panne, which I reached at noon on a little steam railway running
from Furnes, I had luncheon with several Belgian soldiers and a Belgian
in civilian clothes, who told me I would see all the fighting I was
looking for at Nieuport, just beyond. The civilian, a tall youth with a
blond beard, volunteered to show me the way to the beach, the shortest
route, and ended by going all the way. He told me he was recovering from
an "attack of Congo," which I take to be an intermittent fever. He had
just been mustered out of the civic guard and was waiting for a uniform
to join the army. He had the afternoon free and his Belgian sense of
hospitality impelled him to see that the stranger was properly looked
after.
For several miles along the wide, flat beach, which stretches
unobstructed as far as Ostend, except for the piers at Nieuport-les-Bains
and Westende, there were Belgian soldiers bathing in the shallow water.
Some of them, cavalrymen, were riding naked into the deeper water, and
this, mind you, was late October. They were even playing jokes on one
another, and did not seem to be paying any attention to the fifteen
English and French cruisers and gunboats which were standing off the
shore almost opposite them, keeping up a steady stream of fire obliquely
along the beach at the sand dunes just beyond the pier at
Nieuport-les-Bains. In these dunes, _five_ miles away, big German guns
were hidden.
[Sidenote: Fishermen unconcerned.]
Farther on, and even right up to the pier at Nieuport, we passed, along
the beach behind the shrimp fishermen, who seemed even less interested
in the novel fight on land and sea. The barelegged men and women were as
industriously taking advantage of the low-tide as if nothing at all were
happening. The French and English warships were directly opposite them,
and, by this time, they were drawing the German fire. German shells,
probably from siege guns, were plumping down into the water all around
them only a couple of miles off-shore, but, though the shrimpers looked
up occasionally when the explosion of a shell fairly shook the face of
the ocean, their attention would be directed again to their work before
the column of water raised by the shell had had time to fall again. The
shelling kept up about an hour, but none of the warships was struck.
They kept moving at full-speed in an uneven line, making it impossible
to get their range.
[Sidenote: A panorama of battle.]
[Sidenote: Germans try to cross the Yser.]
Just before we reached the pier heavy cannonading began inland. We
climbed the sand dunes and there we came suddenly upon a perfect
panoramic view of the battle all the way from the dunes across the
inundated fields to Dixmude in the distance. The whole line of battle
for ten miles was in the midst of a German attack, covered by a terrific
artillery fire. Over the white, red-tiled cottages of the fishermen,
almost lost among the lesser sand dunes, we could make out the Belgian
line by the fire of their rifle and machine guns. At two points we could
see the Yser Canal and at one of these the Germans were trying to throw
across a pontoon bridge.
We could see it only through the smoke of breaking shells, but it was
the most exciting event I have ever witnessed. At three miles or more,
though, the figures of the men were so small, it was hard to keep the
fact in mind that those who dropped were not merely stooping, but had
been shot. Eager to get closer, we ran over the sand dunes, but never
got another view of it.
[Sidenote: Running to see a battle.]
My Belgian friend knew his way and we trotted along a raised path among
the fields toward Nieuport. It was under fire, but it seemed worth the
risk to get close enough so we could see the pontoons being rushed into
the water. As we neared Nieuport, however, the firing became much more
active and we stopped for second thought. After catching our breath, we
decided to pass through the edge of Nieuport and to go on to the village
of Ramscapelle to the south of it. Few shells seemed to be breaking
there.
[Sidenote: Almost under fire.]
Along the cross road we took, alternately running and walking. The
Belgian trenches were perhaps a half mile beyond us, and we could make
out the tap-tap of the rifle fire which had been only a continuous
cracking a mile in the rear. Into this the machine guns cut with a whir.
Spent bullets dropped here and there in the inundated field to the west
of us, but the German shell fire must have been right in the trenches.
Somewhere before we reached Ramscapelle we crossed a road with military
automobiles going both ways, but my desire to get behind the sheltering
buildings of Ramscapelle was too strong at the moment to take it in.
[Sidenote: Fires and explosions in Ramscapelle.]
About a hundred yards from the village there was a house on the edge of
a canal, and we stopped behind it, safe from bullet-fire, to catch our
breath again. It was as far as we were destined to get. All at once
shells began dropping on the village, and I have not seen shells drop so
fast in so small an area. In the first minute there must have been
twenty. Three fires broke out almost at once. Between the explosions we
could hear the falling tiles.
The short October day grew unexpectedly dusk and the fires in the
village reflected in the water on the fields. After the bombarding had
been going on without the least let-up for fully fifteen minutes, a bent
old woman, a man perhaps older but less bent, and a younger woman
appeared on the road to Furnes just beyond us, hurrying along without
once looking back. They were the only people we saw and the destruction
of the town looked like the most ruthless piece of vandalism. It had a
military purpose, however. The Germans were concentrating an attack on
it with the hope of reaching Furnes. They occupied it that night, but
were later driven out again. I have learned since some of the villagers
remained through that bombardment, and were killed in their houses.
[Sidenote: Destruction of Ramscapelle.]
While we stood sheltered by the house on the canal, speculating as to
which one of the houses still standing in Ramscapelle would be hit next,
the light from those on fire reflected on the dark, brackish water of
the canal, which was running in with the tide. Presently we noticed
something in the water, and, stooping down in the twilight, we made out
the body of a man face downward. The color of the coat and the little
short skirt to it showed it was the body of a German soldier. It passed
on and was followed by three more before we left. They had been in the
water several days.
The fire from the trenches died down at dusk and we made our way back
along the empty crossroad. Half way back to the dunes we passed a Red
Cross motor ambulance, headed towar
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