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The Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South African War

by Cecil Francis Romer · English · Gutenberg #25618 · 497,806 chars · public domain (US)

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Title: The Second Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South African War

Author: Cecil Francis Romer
        Arthur Edward Mainwaring


        
Release date: May 26, 2008 [eBook #25618]
                Most recently updated: January 3, 2021

Language: English

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THE SECOND BATTALION ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

With a Description of the Operations in the Aden Hinterland

by

MAJORS C. F. ROMER & A. E. MAINWARING







[Illustration: _W. & D. Downey._

H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught and Strathearn, K.G.,
Commander-in-Chief of The Mediterranean Forces, and Colonel-in-Chief
of The Royal Dublin Fusiliers.]



[Illustration: E Libris, The Royal Dublin Fusiliers.]


London: A. L. Humphreys, 187 Piccadilly, W.
1908




PREFACE


The 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers is one of the oldest
regiments in the service. It was raised in February and March, 1661,
to form the garrison of Bombay, which had been ceded to the Crown as
part of the dowry of the Infanta of Portugal, on her marriage with
King Charles II. It then consisted of four companies, the
establishment of each being one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign,
two sergeants, three corporals, two drummers, and 100 privates, and
arrived at Bombay on September 18th, 1662, under the command of Sir
Abraham Shipman. Under various titles it took part in nearly all the
continuous fighting of which the history of India of those days is
principally composed, being generally known as the Bombay European
Regiment, until in March, 1843, it was granted the title of 1st Bombay
Fusiliers. In 1862 the regiment was transferred to the Crown, when the
word 'Royal' was added to its title, and it became known as the 103rd
Regiment, The Royal Bombay Fusiliers. In 1873 the regiment was linked
to the Royal Madras Fusiliers, whose history up to that time had been
very similar to its own. By General Order 41, of 1881, the titles of
the two regiments underwent yet another change, when they became known
by their present names, the 1st and 2nd Battalions Royal Dublin
Fusiliers.

The 2nd Battalion first left India for home service on January 2nd,
1871, when it embarked on H.M.S. _Malabar_, arriving at Portsmouth
Harbour about 8 a.m. on February 4th, and was stationed at Parkhurst.
Its home service lasted until 1884, when it embarked for Gibraltar. In
1885 it moved to Egypt, and in 1886 to India, where it was quartered
until 1897, when it was suddenly ordered to South Africa, on account
of our strained relations with the Transvaal Republic. On arrival at
Durban, however, the difficulties had been settled for the time being,
and the regiment was quartered at Pietermaritzburg until it moved up
to Dundee in 1899, just previous to the outbreak of war.

The late Major-General Penn-Symons assumed command of the Natal force
in 1897, and from that date commenced the firm friendship and mutual
regard between him and the regiment, which lasted without a break
until the day when he met his death at Talana. The interest he took in
the battalion and his zeal resulted in a stiff training, but a
training for which we must always feel grateful, and remember with
kind, if sad, recollections. It was his custom to see a great deal of
the regiments under his command, and he very frequently lunched with
us, by which means he not only made himself personally acquainted with
the characters of the officers of the regiment, but also had an
opportunity of seeing for himself the deep _esprit de corps_ which
existed in it, and without which no regiment can ever hope to
successfully overcome the perils and hardships incidental to active
service.

As the shadow of the coming war grew dark and ever darker on the
Northern horizon, the disposition of the Natal troops underwent some
change, and General Penn-Symons' brigade, of which the regiment formed
part, was moved up to Dundee, and was there stationed at the time of
the outbreak of hostilities. In spite of the long roll of battle
honours, of which both battalions are so justly proud, the South
African Campaign was the first active service either had seen under
their present titles, and the first opportunity afforded them of
making those new titles as celebrated as the old ones which had done
so much towards the acquisition of our Indian Empire. Imbued with
these feelings the regiment lay camped within full view of Talana
Hill, waiting the oncoming of the huge wave of invasion which was so
shortly to sweep over the borders, engulf Ladysmith, and threaten to
reach Maritzburg itself. But that was not to be. Its force was spent
long ere it reached the capital, and a few horsemen near the banks of
the Mooi River marked the line of its utmost limit in this direction.

The present work only claims to be a plain soldier's narrative of the
part taken by the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers in stemming
this rush, and its subsequent efforts, its grim fights on the hills
which fringe the borders of the River Tugela, its long and weary
marches across the rolling uplands of the Transvaal, and its
subsequent monotonous life of constant vigil in fort and blockhouse,
and on escort duty.

All five battalions took part in the war. The 1st sailed from Ireland
on November 10th, 1899, and sent three companies under Major Hicks to
strengthen the 2nd Battalion. They arrived in time to share in the
action at Colenso on December 15th, and all the subsequent fighting
which finally resulted in the relief of Ladysmith, after which they
returned to the headquarters of the 1st Battalion, which formed part
of the Natal army under General Sir Redvers Buller, and later on
advanced through Laing's Nek and Alleman's Nek into the Transvaal. The
3rd Battalion sent a very strong draft of its reserve, and the 4th and
5th Battalions volunteered and came out to the front, where they
rendered most excellent service. In addition to the battalions there
were a good many officers of one or other battalion employed in
various ways in the huge theatre of operations. Major Godley and Major
Pilson had been selected for special service before the war, and the
former served in Mafeking during the siege, while the latter served
under General Plumer in his endeavours to raise it. Captain Kinsman
also served with the latter force. Major Rutherford, Adjutant of the
Ceylon Volunteers, arrived in command of the contingent from that
corps. Lieutenants Cory and Taylor served with the Mounted Infantry
most of the time, as did Lieutenants Garvice, Grimshaw, and Frankland,
after the capture of Pretoria, while Captain Carington Smith's share
in the war is briefly stated later on. Captain MacBean was on the
staff until he was killed at Nooitgedacht. The M.I. of the regiment
served with great distinction, and it is regretted that it is
impossible to include an account of the many actions and marches in
which they took part, but the present volume deals almost exclusively
with the battalion as a battalion.

The authors are desirous of expressing their most hearty and cordial
thanks to all those who have assisted them in the preparation of this
volume. They are especially indebted to Colonel H. Tempest Hicks,
C.B., without whose co-operation the work could not have been carried
out, for the loan of his diary, and for the sketches and many of the
photographs. To Colonel F. P. English, D.S.O., for the extracts from
his diary containing an account of the operations in the Aden
Hinterland and photographs. To Captain L. F. Renny for his Ladysmith
notes. Also to Sergeant-Major C. V. Brumby, Quartermaster-Sergeant
Purcell, and Mr. French (late Quartermaster-Sergeant), for assistance
in collecting data, compiling the appendix, and for photographs,
respectively.

                                        C. F. ROMER.

                                        A. E. MAINWARING.




CONTENTS


PART I.--FIGHTING.

  CHAP.                                                           Page

     I. Talana                                                       3

    II. The Retreat from Dundee                                     16

   III. From Colenso to Estcourt                                    22

    IV. Estcourt and Frere                                          28

     V. The Battle of Colenso                                       34

    VI. Venter's Spruit                                             42

   VII. Vaal Krantz                                                 55

  VIII. Hart's and Pieter's Hills--The Relief of Ladysmith          61

    IX. The Siege of Ladysmith                                      76

     X. Aliwal North and Fourteen Streams                           83


PART II.--TREKKING.

     I. From Vryburg to Heidelberg                                  97

    II. Heidelberg                                                 111

   III. After De Wet                                               121

    IV. September in the Gatsrand                                  141

     V. Frederickstadt--Klip River--The Losberg                    164

    VI. Buried Treasure--The Eastern Transvaal--The
          Krugersdorp Defences                                     182

   VII. The Last Twelve Months                                     193


PART III.

     I. The Aden Hinterland                                        205

    II. The Return Home and Reception                              217

   III. The Memorial Arch                                          229


APPENDIX                                                           239




ILLUSTRATIONS


FULL-PAGE PLATES.

  H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught and Strathearn,
    K.G., Commander-in-chief of the
    Mediterranean Forces, and Colonel-in-chief
    of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers                       _Frontispiece_

  Regimental Book-Plate                                   _Title-page_

  Casualties at Talana                                 _Facing page_ 8

  Major-General C. D. Cooper, C.B., commanding
    2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers in Natal                "     "      24

  Captain C. F. Romer and Captain E. Fetherstonhaugh   "     "      32

  General Hart's Flank Attack from the
    Boers' Point of View (Plan)                        "     "      34

  Casualties at Colenso                                "     "      36

  Group of twenty Sergeants taken after the
    Battle of Colenso, all that remained
    of Forty-Eight who left Maritzburg                 "     "      40

  Casualties at Tugela Heights                         "     "  56, 64

  Taking Fourteen Streams (Plan)                       "     "      88

  Miscellaneous Casualties                             "     "     104

  Colonel H. Tempest Hicks, C.B., commanding
    2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, March, 1900--March,
    1904                                             _facing Page_ 112

  Plan of Position at Zuikerbosch                     "     "      120

  Plan of Battle of Frederickstadt                    "     "      168

  Sketch Plan of Kilmarnock House and Fortifications  "     "      184

  Krugersdorp from Kilmarnock House                   "     "      200

  Officers of the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin
    Fusiliers who embarked for Aden                   "     "      216

  The Memorial Arch, Dublin                           "     "      232

  The South African Memorial, Natal                   "     "      238


ILLUSTRATIONS IN TEXT.

  The Last Rites                                                    10

  Armourer-Sergeant Waite--'Delenda Est Carthago'                   18

  Railway Bridge at Colenso                                         23

  Boer Trenches, Colenso                                            36

  Bringing down the Wounded                                         41

  After the Fight                                                   65

  The Grave of Colonel Sitwell and Captain Maitland,
    Gordon Highlanders (attached), near Railway
    at Pieter's Hill                                                67

  Pieter's Hill, Feb. 27th, 1900                                    69

  Pontoon Bridge, River Tugela, Feb. 28th, 1900                     70

  2nd Royal, Dublin Fusiliers, heading Relief Troops,
    marching into Ladysmith, March, 1900,                           72

  General Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., entering Ladysmith              73

  The Dublins are coming--Ladysmith                                 74

  Sir George White watching Relief Force entering
    Ladysmith                                                       75

  Sergeant Davis in Meditation over 'Long Cecil' at
    Kimberley. 'Shall I Take it for the Officers?'                  83

  St. Patrick's Day in Camp. Private Monaghan, the
    Regimental Butcher, in Foreground                               84

  A Wash in hot Water--Aliwal North                                 87

  The Regimental Maxim in Action at Fourteen
    Streams                                                         89

  Captain Jervis, General Fitzroy Hart, C.B., C.M.G.,
    and Captain Arthur Hart                                         91

  Issuing Queen Victoria's Chocolate. Colour-Sergeant
    Connell, 'G' Company, on left                                   93

  First Entry into Krugersdorp. Captain and Adjutant
    Fetherstonhaugh in Foreground                                   99

  'Speed, Dead Slow'                                               104

  Hoisting the Union Jack at Krugersdorp                           106

  Johan Meyer's House, five Miles outside Johannesburg             107

  Sergeant Davis, evidently with all we wanted                     108

  Paardekraal Monument, Krugersdorp                                110

  The Officers' Mess                                               120

  Corporal Tierney and Chef Burst                                  123

  Fourth Class on the Z.a.s.m.                                     125

  Fifth Class on the Z.a.s.m.                                      127

  The Vaal River, Lindeque Drift                                   133

  The R.D.F. Bathing in Mooi River, Potchefstroom                  136

  Father Mathews                                                   142

  Funeral of Commandant Theron and a British
    Soldier, Sept. 6th, 1900                                       149

  Buffelsdoorn Camp, Gatsrand Hills                                152

  A Group of Boer Prisoners taken at the Surprise
    of Pochefstroom                                                153

  Colour-Sergeant Cossy issuing Beer                               154

  'Come to the Cook-house Door, Boys!'                             163

  Sergeant French and the Officers' Mess, Nachtmaal                170

  4.7 crossing a Drift, assisted by the Dublin Fusiliers           172

  Boy Fitzpatrick waiting at Lunch                                 178

  'The Latest Shave.' Captain G. S. Higginson (mounted)
    and Major Bird                                                 181

  The Hairdresser's Shop                                           192

  Kilmarnock, Krugersdorp                                          193

  A Blockhouse                                                     196

  The 'Blue Caps' relieving the 'Old Toughs'                       201

  Dthala Camp                                                      210

  Dthala Village, From Camp                                        211

  A Frontier Tower--Abdali Country                                 213

  Homeward bound at last, after twenty Years'
    Foreign Service                                                219




PART I.

FIGHTING.




THE 2ND BATTALION

ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS




CHAPTER I.

TALANA.

  'The midnight brought the signal sound of strife,
  The morn the marshalling in arms, the day--
  Battle's magnificently stern array.'

                              _Byron._


The 2nd Battalion of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers left India for
Maritzburg, Natal, in 1897, and therefore, on the outbreak of the war
between Great Britain and the South African Republics, had the
advantage of possessing some acquaintance with the topography of the
colony, and of a two years' training and preparation for the long
struggle which was to ensue.

The political situation had become so threatening by July, 1899, that
the military authorities began to take precautionary measures, and the
battalion was ordered to effect a partial mobilisation and to collect
its transport. On September 20th it moved by train to Ladysmith,[1]
and four days later proceeded to Dundee. Here Major-General Sir W.
Penn-Symons assumed the command of a small force, consisting of 18th
Hussars, 13th, 67th, and 69th Batteries R.F.A., 1st Leicestershire
Regiment, 1st King's Royal Rifles, and 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
Each infantry battalion had a mounted infantry company. The brigade
was reinforced on October 16th by the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers.

         [Footnote 1: It was at Ladysmith that the battalion adopted
         the green tops on the helmets, a distinguishing badge which
         was worn throughout the war. The 1st Battalion painted theirs
         blue on account of the historic nickname, 'Blue-caps,'
         acquired by them at the time of the Mutiny.]

The country was still nominally at peace, but the Dundee force held
itself ready for emergencies, and sent out mounted patrols by day and
infantry piquets by night, while the important railway junction at
Glencoe was held by a company. The General utilised this period of
waiting in carrying out field-firing and practising various forms of
attack. As he was a practical and experienced soldier, he succeeded in
bringing his command to a high state of efficiency, and the battalion
owed much to his careful preparation. It was due largely to his
teaching that the men knew how to advance from cover to cover and
displayed such ready 'initiative' in the various battles of the Natal
Campaign. The opportunity of putting into practice this teaching soon
presented itself, for on October 12th news was received that the South
African Republics had declared war on the previous day.

Consideration of the advisability of pushing forward a small force to
Dundee, and of the reasons for such a movement, does not fall within
the scope of this work; but a glance at the map will show that Sir W.
Penn-Symons had a wide front to watch, since he could be attacked from
three sides. Although precise information regarding the Boer forces
was lacking, it was known that commandoes were assembling at
Volksrust, along the left bank of the Buffalo River, and on the far
side of Van Reenan's Pass.

Early in the morning of October 13th a telegram was received from Sir
G. White, asking General Penn-Symons to send a battalion to Ladysmith
at once, as the Boers were reported to be advancing on that town. The
General paid the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers the compliment of
selecting them for this duty, and they entrained accordingly, about
4.30 a.m., reaching Ladysmith some four hours later. They detrained
with the utmost haste and marched at once towards Dewdrop, whither the
Ladysmith garrison had been sent; but the report of a Boer advance was
discovered to be without foundation, and the battalion was halted five
miles outside Ladysmith, and ordered to return. It did not reach the
camp at Dundee until 11 p.m.

On the following day Sir W. Penn-Symons moved his detachment closer to
the town of Dundee, and placed his camp three or four hundred yards
north of the road to Glencoe Junction. It soon became clear that the
Boers meant to invade Natal, and Newcastle was occupied by them on the
15th, while the mounted patrols of the Dundee force were already in
touch with the commandoes on the left bank of the Buffalo. The
detached company at Glencoe was withdrawn on the 18th, and on the 19th
three companies of the regiment, under Major English, were sent to the
Navigation Colliery in order to bring away large quantities of mealie
bags stored there.

Colonel Cooper, commanding the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
had been given an extension of his command, and was hurrying back from
a short period of leave in England, so the battalion was at this time
under the command of Major S. G. Bird.

It was now evident to every one that we were on the eve of
hostilities, and a spirit of keen excitement and anticipation ran
through all ranks. After a long tour of foreign service, during which
the regiment had not had the good fortune to see active service,
though on three occasions they had been within measurable distance of
it, they were now to have the long-wished-for chance of showing that,
in spite of altered denominations and other changes, they were
prepared to keep their gallant and historical reputation untarnished.
Our advanced patrols had already seen the first signs of the coming
torrent of invasion, and one and all were seized with that feeling,
common to all mankind, of longing to get the waiting and the
preparation over, and to commence the real business for which they had
been so carefully and so thoroughly prepared. Full of the most
implicit confidence in their brave leader, the regiment knew to a man
that they would soon be at hand-grips, and their two years' residence
in the country and knowledge of the history of the last Boer War, and
the stain to be rubbed out, made every pulse tingle with the desire to
show that the past had been but an unfortunate blunder, and that the
British soldier of the present day was no whit inferior to his
predecessors of Indian, Peninsular, Waterloo, and Crimean fame.

On the night of the 19-20th October, Lieutenant Grimshaw was sent with
a patrol of the Mounted Infantry company of the battalion to watch the
road to Vant's and Landsman's Drifts, ten miles east of Dundee. About
2 a.m. on October 20th this officer reported that a Boer commando was
advancing on the town. At a later hour he forwarded a second message
to the effect that he was retiring before superior numbers, one man of
his party having been wounded, and that the enemy were in occupation
of the hills to the east of the town. On the receipt of this message
General Penn-Symons ordered two companies of the Dublin Fusiliers to
support Lieutenant Grimshaw. 'B' and 'E' companies, under Captains
Dibley and Weldon, accordingly left camp at 4 a.m., and, moving
through the town, took up a position in Sand Spruit, which runs along
the eastern edge of Dundee. The whole brigade stood to arms, as usual,
at 5 a.m., but was dismissed at 5.15 a.m. At about 5.30 a.m. the mist
lifted, and everybody's gaze was directed on Talana Hill, where
numbers of men in black mackintoshes could be seen. The general
impression was that they were members of the town guard, but the
arrival of the first shell soon dispelled this illusion.

Soon after 5.30 a.m. the Boer artillery opened fire on the camp. Their
fire was accurate enough, considering that the range was near 5400
yards, but the damage done was practically nothing, as very few shells
burst, and these only on impact. Our own artillery (13th and 69th
Field Batteries, with 'D' company of the battalion as escort) did not
immediately respond, as they were at the time engaged in watering
their horses; but as soon as possible they were in position to the
east of the camp, and began to shell the crest of Talana Hill. They
obtained the range almost immediately, and in a short time overpowered
the hostile guns, which were thus prevented from playing an important
part in the day's battle.

As soon as the Boers started shelling the camp, the battalion fell in
on its parade-ground in quarter-column and waited for orders. But when
a shell fell just behind the ranks, Major Bird moved it at the double
through the camp to a donga which afforded good cover. The men then
removed their great-coats, and stayed for some minutes watching the
Boer shells passing over their heads. Eventually the King's Royal
Rifles, Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the battalion were ordered by the
General to move in extended order through the town, and to concentrate
in the spruit already occupied by 'B' and 'E' companies. The
Leicesters and 67th Battery were left near the camp to watch Impati
Mountain, since it was probable that the Boer force which had occupied
Newcastle would appear from that direction. The mounted troops (18th
Hussars and the Mounted Infantry company of the Dublin Fusiliers,
under Captain Lonsdale, less Lieutenant Cory's section, which,
fortunately for it, was sent off in another direction), under the
command of Colonel Moeller, were sent to turn the right flank of the
Boers' position on Talana Hill and so threaten their rear.

As the extended lines of the infantry moved through the town they were
greeted by pompom fire, which, however, did no damage. It was their
first introduction to this hated and under-rated weapon, whose moral
effect is so great that, even if the casualties it inflicts are small
in number, it is always likely to exercise a marked influence, more
especially on young troops and at the commencement of a campaign. Men
heard it in wonder, asking each other what it was, and why had we
nothing like it, and similar questions. By 6.30 a.m. the three
battalions were assembled in the bed of the spruit, and the General
rode up with the Staff in order to give his orders for the attack. The
2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers were to form the firing line, with the 60th
Rifles in support and the Royal Irish Fusiliers in reserve. Under
Talana Hill is a wood surrounding a small house known as Smith's Farm.
Between this wood and Sand Spruit is a long stretch of veld, which on
the day of the battle was intersected by several wire fences. The
battalion received orders to cross this open ground by successive
companies, 'H' company, under Lieutenant Shewan, formed the right of
the line, and was the first company to leave the shelter of the
spruit. It made for the south-east corner of the wood, where it was
afterwards joined by the maxims, and at once opened fire on Talana and
Dundee Hills. 'B' company under Captain Dibley, 'A' company under
Major English, and 'E' company under Captain Weldon extended to ten
paces, and followed in succession. The enemy had by this time
developed a vigorous fire, but the range was long and the casualties
small. The advancing companies moved on steadily, reached the edge of
the wood, and entered it. They now became somewhat separated. 'A,' 'G'
(Captain Perreau), and 'F' inclined to the left, 'C' and 'E' remained
in the centre with 'B' on their right, while 'H' was held back at the
corner of the wood. The latter was bounded on the far side by a stone
wall, beyond which stretched an open piece of ground until, further up
the hill, there was a second wall. At this point there was a sudden
change in the slope of the ground, which rose almost precipitously to
the crest. Immediately opposite the point where 'B' company issued
from the wood a third wall ran up the hill, connecting the two already
mentioned. When the attackers reached the far end of the wood, they
came under such a well-directed and heavy fire that their progress was
at first checked, in spite of the support afforded by our artillery,
which rained shrapnel on the hostile position. The Boers, lying behind
the boulders on the crest of Talana Hill, found excellent cover; while
from Dundee Hill they could bring an effective enfilade fire on the
open space between the two parallel walls. Opposite 'A' company a
donga ran up the hill, and at first sight seemed to offer an excellent
line of approach for an attacking force. Major English, in command of
the company, rushed forward and, in spite of a heavy fire, succeeded
in cutting a wire fence which closed the mouth of the donga. He then,
at about 8 a.m., led his company into the latter, and was followed by
'G' and 'F' (Captain Hensley) companies; but the donga proved almost a
death-trap, since it was swept by the rifles of some picked marksmen
on the right of the Boer position.

[Illustration: Casualties at Talana.

  Capt. G. A. WELDON. _Killed._
  Second Lieut. GENGE. _Died of Wounds._
  Capt. A. DIBLEY. _Wounded._
  Major LOWNDES. _Wounded._
  Lieut. C. N. PERREAU. _Wounded._
  Ser.-Maj. (Now Qr.-Mr) BURKE. _Wounded._]

It was impossible for these three companies to advance any further,
and they were therefore forced to limit their efforts to an attempt to
keep down the Boer fire. Meanwhile, General Penn-Symons had, about
9.15 a.m., come up to the far edge of the wood, and crying, 'Dublin
Fusiliers, we must take the hill!' crossed the wall. Shortly
afterwards he received a mortal wound. Captain Weldon was also killed
near the same spot in a gallant effort to help a wounded comrade, No.
5078 Private Gorman. Captain Weldon, together with several men of his
company, had surmounted the wall in face of a heavy fire, and had
taken cover in a small depression on its further side. Private Gorman
was hit in the very act of surmounting the obstacle, and was falling
backwards, when Captain Weldon, rushing out from his cover, seized him
by the arm, and was pulling him into safety when he himself was
mortally wounded. Privates Brady and Smith dragged him in under cover,
but he only lived a few minutes. His dog, a fox-terrier named Rose,
had accompanied him through the fight, and when his body was later on
recovered, the faithful little animal was found beside it, and was
afterwards taken care of by the men of 'E' company. There was no more
popular officer in the regiment than George Weldon, and his loss was
deeply felt by all ranks. He was the first officer of the Dublin
Fusiliers to fall in the war, which thus early asserted its claim to
seize the best. He was buried that same afternoon in the small
cemetery, facing the hill on which he had met his death.

[Illustration: The Last Rites.]

By this time, 9.30 a.m., the Rifles and Irish Fusiliers had closed up
and become merged in the firing line. Slowly, and by the advances of
small parties at a time, the attackers gained ground, principally by
creeping along the transverse wall which afforded cover from the enemy
on Dundee Hill, Helped by the incessant fire of the artillery, which
at 11.30 a.m. moved up to the coalfields railway, the infantry
gradually collected behind the second wall. They were now within 150
yards of the crest, and the roar of battle grew in intensity. About
11.30 a.m. Colonel Yule came up and ordered the hill to be assaulted,
directing the battalion to charge the right flank of the hill, and the
Rifles the centre. Captain Lowndes, who was with the companies on the
right, led them across the wall and over an open piece of ground. He
gave the command 'Right incline,' and so well were the men in hand
that the order was promptly obeyed, shortly after which he was badly
wounded. Meanwhile, in the centre, men of all three regiments, led by
the Staff and regimental officers, dashed over the wall and began to
clamber up the steep and rocky slope. The artillery quickened its fire
and covered the crest with shrapnel. But the Boers still remained
firm. Many of them stood up, their mackintoshes waving in the wind,
and poured a deadly fire on the assaulting infantry. Though most of
these brave burghers paid for their daring with their lives, they
repulsed this first gallant charge. The Dublin Fusiliers suffered many
casualties in this first assault. Captain Lowndes, the Adjutant, had
his leg practically shattered, as he, with the other officers, ran
ahead to lead the charge. Captain Perreau was shot through the chest;
Captain Dibley was almost on the top of the hill when hit. He had a
dim recollection of the gallant Adjutant of the Royal Irish Fusiliers
racing up almost alongside him and within a few paces of the summit,
when he suddenly saw an aged and grey-bearded burgher drawing a bead
upon him at a distance of a few paces only. He snapped his revolver at
him, but only to fall senseless next moment with a bullet through his
head. Marvellous though it seems he made a comparatively speedy
recovery, and was able to ride into Ladysmith, at the head of his
company, in the following February, having been in the hospital in the
besieged town in the interval. Evidence of the temporary nature of
the discomfort caused by a bullet through the head is afforded by the
fact that he is to-day one of the best bridge-players in the regiment.
Poor young Genge, who had only recently joined, was mortally wounded,
and died shortly after the battle, killed in his first fight and in
the springtime of life.

Sergeant-Major Burke's (now Quartermaster) experiences may be best
told in his own words: 'It must have been shortly after poor Weldon
was killed that I came across "E" company; finding no officer with
them I assumed command, and on arrival at the donga handed them over
to Major Bird, and accompanied Colonel Yule, who had just arrived, and
was ascending the hill. We had only gone a few yards, and were about
six paces from the top wall, when I was bowled over, hit in the leg.
It was a hot place, for as I lay there another bullet hit me in the
shoulder. I crawled as well as I could to a rock, and sitting up
underneath it lit a pipe. Scarcely had I got it to draw when a bullet
dashed it out of my hand, taking a small piece of the top of my thumb
with it. Two men were shot dead so close that they fell across my
legs, effectually pinning me to the ground, while two more were
wounded and fell alongside of me. At this juncture Colour-Sergeants
Guilfoyle (now Sergeant-Major) and James dashed out of cover, and,
picking me up, carried me to a more sheltered position, whence I could
see what was going on all round, without myself being seen.' He was
left at Dundee with the wounded, and subsequently taken to Pretoria
with other prisoners of war.

Whilst the men and officers were thus recovering their breath for a
renewed attack, a large number were undoubtedly hit by our own
shrapnel, as they clung closely to the hillside to avoid coming under
fire from the enemy, who still held the top. It was imperative to draw
our gunners' attention to their situation, to effect which purpose, an
intrepid signaller, Private Flynn, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, jumped
up, and at the imminent risk of his own life freely exposed himself in
his endeavour to 'call up' the guns. Finding, after repeated attempts,
that he could not attract their attention, he boldly walked back down
the hillside, torn as it was by mauser fire, and personally delivered
his message, a glorious and courageous example of that devotion to
duty which proved so strongly marked a characteristic of our N.C.O.'s
and privates throughout the war.

Major English now extricated his company from the donga and managed to
reach the second wall, where he collected all available men, including
'F' and 'G' companies, and maintained an incessant fire on Dundee and
Talana Hills. The artillery behind had never slackened in their
efforts to support the infantry, and their shrapnel searched the whole
length of the crest line. This combined fire began at last to tell.
The rattle of the enemy's musketry, which had lasted since 6.30 a.m.,
gradually grew feebler, until about 1 p.m. our infantry made a second
dash across the wall and this time reached the top of the hill. Below
them they saw the stream of flying Boers hurrying across the veld. It
was the moment for a vigorous outburst of musketry, but 'some one
blundered,' and the fleeting moment sped without being taken advantage
of. It is true that those men who first arrived on the summit were
firing away, and were joined in doing so by every other man who
breathlessly arrived. The company officers had just got their men well
in hand, and were directing the fire, when to every one's disgust, and
sheer, blank amazement, the 'Cease fire' sounded clear above the din
of the fight. There was nothing for it but to stop, but the sight of
the enemy streaming away in dense masses just below them, that enemy
who had up to now been pouring a relentless hail of bullets on them
for hours, was too much. Captain Hensley rushed up to Major English,
and after a brief conference, feeling certain the call must have been
blown in error, the latter gave the command to re-open fire. Barely
was it obeyed when the imperative bugle once more blared forth its
interference, and the company officers, the commanders of the
recognised battle-units, had nothing left them but compliance.

The guns with 'D' company as escort had come to the neck between
Talana and Dundee Hills, but did not fire. The fight was over and
Major English formed up the battalion. It then marched back as a
rearguard to the brigade, through Dundee to the camp, much as if after
a field-day, halting half-way to receive an issue of rations sent out
by the A.S.C. It had lost two officers and six men killed, and three
officers and fifty-two men wounded. As the troops passed through the
town they were warmly cheered by the inhabitants. Late in the
afternoon news reached the camp that the Mounted Infantry company,
together with a squadron of the 18th Hussars, had been captured, but
this was kept from the rank and file of the battalion. As already
stated above, Colonel Moeller had been sent with the mounted troops
round the right flank of the Boers. He succeeded in his task, but
proceeded too far, and when the enemy retreated from Talana Hill he
found himself with some 200 rifles attempting to stop a force of 4000
Boers. He was roughly handled, but managed to get clear. Then,
unluckily misled by the mist, he lost his way, and, instead of
returning to camp, moved towards Impati Mountain, where he stumbled
into the Boer main commando advancing from Newcastle. He took up a
defensive position, placing the cavalry in a kraal and the mounted
infantry on some rising ground near. The enemy brought up artillery
and soon surrounded him, finally forcing him to surrender.

Talana Hill, in point of numbers, may not rank as a great battle, but
its moral effect can scarcely be exaggerated. It was the first
conflict of the war. It was Majuba reversed, and the issue had
far-reaching consequences. The news of the victory spread quickly
through South Africa, and had considerable influence on the Dutch
Colonists, who were, to use an expressive colloquialism, 'sitting on
the fence,' and kept them sitting there, at a time when had they
descended on the wrong side their action could not have failed to be
extremely prejudicial to the interests of the Empire; but over and
above all else it showed to the world that the British infantry could
still attack and carry a position in face of modern rifle-fire, a
lesson which was never forgotten by Boer or Briton, in spite of after
events. Moreover, Talana must ever be a memorable name in the annals
of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, since it was the first battle in which
they had fought under their new title, which was from that day on to
become as well known as that of any regiment in the army.

The other regiments engaged had also suffered very severely, the 60th
Rifles losing, amongst other officers, their gallant chief, Colonel
Gunning. It was curious that on the last occasion the 2nd Royal Dublin
Fusiliers had seen active service--the siege and capture of
Mooltan--they should then have fought alongside the 60th, as they did
in the present instance.




CHAPTER II.

THE RETREAT FROM DUNDEE.

  'I am ready to halt.'--_Ps._ xxxviii. 17.


On the morning of October 21st, Colonel Yule, who, as senior officer,
had taken over command of the brigade, received the news that a Boer
commando, under General Joubert, was advancing by the Newcastle road.
As the camp was within long-range artillery fire from Impati Mountain,
the brigade moved off at a moment's notice to the south and took up a
defensive position. The tents were left standing, but each man carried
a waterproof sheet, a blanket, and great-coat, while the waggons,
massed in rear, had three to four days' supplies. Soon after 4:30 p.m.
the enemy appeared on Impati, and at once opened fire with a big gun,
probably a forty-pounder. The shells at first fell in the vacated
camp, but the Boer artillerymen quickly discovered the brigade, and
made good practice, although they caused but slight damage. Our
batteries attempted to reply, but were outranged, their shells falling
far short. Luckily for us a mist came on, and the Boer gun ceased
firing.

As soon as night fell the troops began to entrench themselves, for the
situation of the brigade was sufficiently unpleasant. In front was an
enemy with superior numbers and heavier artillery, and in rear,
between Dundee and Ladysmith, another hostile force of unknown
strength. To make matters worse, it rained persistently and the night
was cold. About 3 a.m. the brigade retreated to Indumana Kopje, some
one and a half miles to the south-east of the camp. Here a new
position was taken up before dawn, the guns and transport being massed
behind the hill in order to be out of sight from Impati.

Early in the morning of the 22nd, the spirits of the small force were
raised by the news of the victory at Elandslaagte. This caused great
delight among the men: they were proud of their own victory at Talana,
and this further success roused them to a still higher pitch of
enthusiasm. The strategic side of the situation seldom appeals to the
rank and file, and the consequence was that when the retreat was
commenced they were under the impression that they were being led to
yet another victory. When they were undeceived, they were undoubtedly
very savage, especially so at, what seemed to them, the callous
desertion of their wounded comrades in Dundee.

Since it was possible that some of the defeated Boers might be
retreating through the Biggarsberg, a demonstration towards Glencoe
Junction was ordered, the troops detailed being the 2nd Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, the 60th Rifles, one battery, and some cavalry. No time was
given for breakfasts, but the detachment moved off at 8 a.m. with the
battalion as advance guard. On arriving within 1500 yards of the
Junction, the battery shelled a party of the enemy on a hill to the
west of the railway, a proceeding which promptly provoked an answer
from the Boer gun on Impati, but another timely mist and rain saved
the detachment from this unwelcome attention. No Boers were seen in
the pass, so the force, with the battalion as rearguard, returned to
Indumana Kopje at 12.30 p.m., when they were able to obtain dinners,
the majority of the men having been without food for twenty-four
hours.

At 9 p.m. that evening orders were issued for the reoccupation of
Talana Hill by the whole force, but the various commanding officers
were informed confidentially that Colonel Yule's real intention was a
retreat to Ladysmith by the Helpmakaar road. It was an extremely dark
night, and the battalion occupied nearly two hours in collecting the
companies and reaching the place of assembly at the foot of the
kopje. It was not until after 11 p.m. that the brigade actually
started on the retreat in the following order: 1st 60th Rifles
(advance-guard), 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, 13th Battery, Mounted
Infantry, Transport, 67th and 69th Batteries, 2nd Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, 18th Hussars, 1st Leicestershire Regiment (rearguard). The
force occupied about four miles of road. The route was through Dundee,
over Sand Spruit, and down the Helpmakaar road through the Coalfields
village. It was impossible to find an opportunity for a return to the
camp, which was left standing. All the tents, stores, and baggage,
together with the wounded, were left to the enemy. The battalion thus
lost its band instruments and camp equipment, while the officers had
to sacrifice all their personal kit, and many articles belonging to
the mess. The waggons carried nothing but supplies, and no one in the
force was able to take away anything beyond what he carried on his
person.

[Illustration: Armourer-Sergeant Waite. 'Delenda Est Carthago.']

The column marched throughout the night, and far into the morning of
the 23rd, only halting at 10 a.m., when dinners were eaten on the
high ground south of Blesbok Pass, about fifteen miles from Dundee.
That the Boers were watching the retreat was proved by one of their
heliographs trying to 'pick up' the column. The march was resumed
after a two hours' rest, and continued to Beith (twenty-one miles from
Dundee), where, at 3 p.m., another halt was made. The men cooked their
teas, and had a chance of a brief sleep, but at 11 p.m. they had to
start again. The road, a very bad one, lay through the pass leading to
the Waschbank River. The battalion formed the advance-guard, with two
Natal mounted policemen as guides. It was a weary tramp, for, owing to
the wretched road, long halts were necessary in order to allow the
waggons to close up. At dawn, the 18th Hussars took over the duties of
advance-guard, and were supported by 'F' company, under Captain
Hensley.

During the night a mysterious heliograph was seen twinkling and
blinking away on the left flank. After some difficulty it was
ascertained that it was communicating with the farm of a man named
Potgieter, professedly a British subject. He was, in fact, caught _in
flagrante delicto_ in full communication with the unknown Boer
signaller, and paid for his crime with his life.

At 10 a.m. on the 24th, the head of the column reached the Waschbank
(thirty-six miles), crossed, and halted on the south side of the
river. The waggons were not over until 12.30 p.m. A welcome meal and a
bathe in the stream refreshed the men, some of whom had had no proper
sleep for three nights. Heavy firing was heard from the direction of
Ladysmith, and the mounted troops, with the artillery, were sent off
to reconnoitre and see if they could render any assistance to Sir
George White. They met with nothing, however, and returned before 5
p.m. Meanwhile the infantry had also been disturbed, for at 2 p.m.
they recrossed the river in order to occupy a better position to
oppose a rumoured pursuit of the Boers. As the latter did not appear,
the river was again forded at 4 p.m., and only just in time. A violent
thunderstorm burst, and the water rose ten feet in two hours. 'H'
company, under Lieutenant Shewan, and a patrol of the 18th Hussars
were left on the north bank, and were thus cut off from the main body
for several hours.

It rained in torrents until 11 p.m., and the battalion, formed in
quarter-column, had to lie down in pools of water, and get what sleep
it could. At 5 a.m. on the 25th, in bright sunshine, the retreat was
resumed. 'H' company crossed to the south bank a few minutes before
the column moved off, although the water was still up to the men's
waists. The Dublin Fusiliers formed the rearguard, and marched till
mid-day, when Sunday's River (forty-eight miles) was reached. 'A'
company remained on the north bank to cover the crossing of the
waggons, and at 2.30 p.m. the column went on, only halting at 4.30 for
tea. Everybody hoped to have a long rest here, but at 6.30 p.m. Major
Bird was sent for, and informed that, as the Boers were in close
pursuit, a night march was necessary.

The brigade accordingly started at 7 p.m., at the same moment that
heavy rain began to fall. The road quickly became inches deep in mud,
every one was soon wet to the skin, and the night was so dark that a
man in each section of fours had to hold on to the canteen strap of
the man in front in order to keep the proper direction. As an
additional evil, the battalion was still rearguard, which is generally
the most tiring position in a column. Halts were frequent, and the men
were so exhausted that many of them, when they stopped for a moment,
fell down in the mud and slept. Soon after midnight the 18th Hussars,
who were keeping connection between the Irish Fusiliers and the
rearguard, disappeared. It was so dark that the latter could have no
certainty of being on the right road, but was obliged to struggle on
blindly. Majors Bird and English established a code of signals by
whistle, in order to keep the companies closed up. Dawn still found
the battalion marching, dead tired, but luckily in its proper place
behind the column, and without a man missing. It was not until 8 a.m.
on the 26th that this wearisome march ended. Then Modderspruit, seven
miles north of Ladysmith, and sixty-five from Dundee, was reached, and
the men sank down, too weary to care about anything. After a brief
interval, however, they recovered sufficiently to eat their bully beef
and biscuits. It had been a trying march for all, although the column
had accomplished only twelve miles in eleven hours. As an instance of
the general weariness, it is recorded that a subaltern, during the
meal, was asked to pass the mustard, and fell asleep with his arm
outstretched and the mustard-pot in his hand.

But the brigade was still not allowed to rest. At 11 a.m. it was on
the 'trek' again, and marched till 2 p.m., when the long retreat came
to an end, and Ladysmith was entered. Here the Devonshire and
Gloucestershire Regiments earned the undying gratitude of the regiment
by providing officers and men with a meal, as well as by pitching a
camp for them.

On arriving at Ladysmith, tents, equipment, mules, and, in fact, all
that had been lost at Dundee, were issued, and the battalion went into
camp near the cemetery.

The column was fortunate in having Colonel (now General) Dartnell with
it. This officer, after serving with distinction for many years in the
regular army, had, on retirement, settled down in Natal, where he was,
previous to the war, in command of the Natal Police. A great hunter
and fisherman, he knew every inch of the country, knowledge which
proved of invaluable assistance in the trying march.




CHAPTER III.

FROM COLENSO TO ESTCOURT.

  'If thou hope to please all, thy hopes are vaine;
  If thou feare to displease some, thy feares are idle.'

                              _Francis Quarles._


On October 28th Colonel Cooper arrived at Ladysmith from England and
took over the command from Major Bird. The battalion was able to rest
from the 27th to the 29th, and recover from the fatigue of the retreat
to Ladysmith.

The Headquarter Staff issued orders on the 29th for a general
movement, to take place the next day, against the enemy, who were
closing in on the town. The Dublin Fusiliers formed part of Colonel
Grimwood's brigade, which also included the 1st and 2nd King's Royal
Rifles, the Leicesters, and the Liverpools. The task assigned to
Colonel Grimwood was the capture of Long Hill.

In order to be in position for the assault by dawn, it was necessary
for the brigade to make a night march, and the battalion paraded about
9.30 p.m. on Sunday evening, the 29th October. It formed the rear of
the brigade, to which was attached a brigade of artillery. 'F' and 'B'
companies were left behind on piquet duty.

Owing to the difficulties inherent in a night march, and, perhaps,
also to faulty staff management, the artillery, the Dublin Fusiliers,
and Liverpool Regiment diverged from the route followed by the rest of
the brigade. As a result of this mistake the battalion took
practically no part in the battle of the 30th, but, after a vain
endeavour to find Colonel Grim wood's force, spent the morning lying
on the crest of a small ridge near Lombard's Kop. It came under shell
and long-range rifle fire, but lost no men. The attempt to drive back
the Boers was a failure, and the army fell back on Ladysmith about
mid-day. The battalion reached camp at 2 p.m. and was dismissed. All
ranks were somewhat tired, for the sun had been hot, and after dinner
sleep reigned supreme.

[Illustration: Railway Bridge at Colenso.]

But about 4 p.m. Colonel Cooper received from Headquarters an order to
proceed by train to Colenso, with the object of protecting the
important railway bridge which crosses the Tugela at that place. The
Natal Field Artillery, in addition to his own unit, was placed under
his command. On the receipt of this order, camp was struck, and the
tents and baggage sent down to the station. The piquets found by the
Dublin Fusiliers were ordered to be relieved by other corps, but
although 'F' company, under Captain Hensley, came in, Lieutenant H. W.
Higginson's piquet, on the ridge to the east of the cemetery, could
not rejoin in time, principally owing to the fact that the greater
part of the Gloucestershire Regiment, which had been detailed to find
the relief, had been captured at Nicholson's Nek. Lieutenant Higginson
and his men were thus left to share in the siege of Ladysmith. The
battalion transport, under Lieutenant Renny, also had to remain
behind. An account of their experiences during the siege is given by
Lieutenant Renny in Chapter IX.

With these exceptions the whole battalion marched down to the station
soon after 11 p.m., and was dispatched in two trains. As Boers had
been reported on Bulwana Hill during the afternoon, a certain amount
of risk seemed to attend the journey. There was nothing to prevent the
enemy from cutting the line at any point in the hilly country between
Ladysmith and Pieter's Station, while even a small hostile force could
have played havoc with the crowded trucks.

However, the enemy had luckily not penetrated to the railway line, and
after an uneventful, though unpleasant, journey, Colenso was reached
at 4.30 a.m. on the 31st.

The two railway bridges over the Tugela and Onderbrook Spruit were
already protected by a small force, consisting of the Durban Light
Infantry, a squadron of the Imperial Light Horse, and a detachment of
the Natal Naval Volunteers, with a gun. These units had made good
defensive works, notably Forts Wylie and Molyneux, guarding the
railway bridges over the Tugela and Onderbrook Spruit respectively.

We encamped some 300 yards south-west of Colenso, and the day (October
31st) was spent in making further defences, and dividing the garrison
into sections. Colenso was not, however, an easy place to defend. It
was commanded by the lofty hills on the left bank of the Tugela, and
by Hlangwane Hill on the right bank to the east of the village. The
garrison, moreover, was lacking in artillery, having only some
muzzle-loading guns with a very limited range. Colonel Cooper
telegraphed to Maritzburg asking for a naval twelve-pounder, which,
however, could not be obtained.

[Illustration: Major-General C. D. Cooper, C.B. Commanding 2nd Royal
Dublin Fusiliers in Natal.]

The necessity for such an addition soon arose. At 8.15 a.m. on
November 1st, the staff at Ladysmith sent a wire to say that a Boer
force had moved at daybreak towards Colenso. On receipt of this news
the garrison was warned to be ready, and patrols of the Imperial Light
Horse and the Mounted Infantry section of the battalion were
dispatched towards Ladysmith, Springfield, and the country beyond
Hlangwane. These patrols returned soon after 1 p.m., and the party
which had reconnoitred towards Ladysmith reported that it had come
into touch and exchanged shots with the enemy. Later on in the
afternoon, Lieutenant Cory, commanding the Mounted Infantry section,
went out again and reported that he had seen a hostile force,
estimated at 2000 men, which was off-saddled near the main Ladysmith
road, some six miles out. He had skirmished with the scouts of this
commando and had lost one man. Another wire came from Ladysmith at the
same time announcing that the enemy had guns. Our piquets were, in
consequence of these events, pushed forward to the horseshoe ridge on
the left bank of the Tugela, while the parties guarding the two
bridges (road and railway) over this river were reinforced. The night,
however, passed quietly.

Mounted patrols were sent out at dawn of the 2nd, and Lieutenant Cory
was able to report, at 6.45 a.m., that the Boers were still in the
same position. But two hours later he forwarded another message to the
effect that the enemy was advancing on Grobelaar's Kloof. Soon
afterwards distant rifle-shots were heard, and the Mounted Infantry
retired into camp. About 10 a.m. parties of the enemy appeared on the
top of Grobelaar's Mountain, and by the aid of a good telescope it
could be seen that they were busily engaged in digging. Their
intention was not long in doubt, for a thin cloud became visible on
the sky-line, and the next moment a shell buried itself in the
river-bank.

Colonel Cooper at once ordered the tents to be lowered and the
trenches to be manned. But the enemy made no signs of attacking
Colenso, and contented themselves by occasionally firing shells which
invariably fell short. The interruption of telegraphic communication
with Ladysmith soon after 3 p.m. proved, however, that the enemy was
not being idle. Groups of Boers could be seen on the hills overhanging
the railway, and a train carrying General French was shelled after
leaving Pieters. The activity of our foes assumed a more aggressive
character when, about 5 p.m., they began to bombard Fort Molyneux.
From Colenso the shrapnel could be plainly seen bursting over the
work, and the piquets on the left bank of the Tugela reported that
heavy rifle-fire was in progress. As the garrison of the fort
consisted only of eighty men of the Durban Light Infantry, some
anxiety was felt regarding their safety, and this uneasiness was
intensified by the arrival of one of the defenders, who announced that
the redoubt was hard pressed. Lieutenant Shewan, with one hundred men
mostly from 'E' company, was promptly dispatched to reinforce them in
the armoured train. He found that the fort had been evacuated, but
managed to pick up several of the garrison in spite of the enemy's
rifle and shrapnel fire. Captain Hensley, who was holding the
horseshoe ridge, also advanced with 'F' company, and, by firing
long-range volleys, helped to cover the retirement of the remainder of
the garrison, the whole of which reached Colenso in the night. Colonel
Cooper telegraphed an account of these events to Brigadier-General
Wolfe-Murray at Maritzburg, who replied at nightfall that, since the
safety of Colenso bridge was very important, he would send the Border
Regiment next day to reinforce the garrison. But no mention was made
of any artillery.

Colonel Cooper had now a difficult decision to arrive at. In front of
him lay a superior force of the enemy with guns far outranging his own
obsolete muzzle-loaders, and during the afternoon disquieting rumours,
which might be true, of another commando at Springfield had reached
him. Ladysmith was invested, and the small garrisons of Colenso and
Estcourt alone stood between the Boers and Maritzburg. Having
consulted the senior officers of the garrison, Colonel Cooper sent
another wire to General Wolfe-Murray explaining the situation, and in
reply was authorised to fall back to Estcourt if he could not hold
Colenso. About 10 p.m. he reluctantly determined to retire.

The mounted troops and the Natal Field Artillery went by road,
starting at midnight. It was decided to send the rest of the garrison
by railway, and the stationmaster at Colenso, with great energy,
succeeded in obtaining three trains which arrived in the early hours
of November 3rd.

The operation of entraining was at once commenced. The night was dark,
and the packing of all the tents, supplies, and equipment in the
trucks proceeded but slowly. The Natal Naval Volunteers had to bring
their nine-pounder gun down the steep slope of Fort Wylie, a task
requiring great care and time; the piquets on the left bank of the
river had to be withdrawn, and the two bridges guarded up to the very
last moment. Although everything was done in the utmost possible
silence, it yet seemed that the necessary shunting of the trains must
warn the Boers of the evacuation, and bring on an attack. But there
was no interruption, and the last train steamed out of Colenso station
half an hour before dawn.

Estcourt was reached two hours later. The little town was already
occupied by a detachment of the Imperial Light Horse and Natal Mounted
Rifles. During the morning there also arrived from Maritzburg the 2nd
Border Regiment,[2] afterwards to be the comrades of the battalion in
the 5th Brigade.

         [Footnote 2: A great friendship sprang up between this
         celebrated regiment and ourselves.]

Colonel Cooper took over the command of the garrison and immediately
set to work on the arrangement of the defences. The next day, however,
General Wolfe-Murray and his staff appeared on the scene. Estcourt had
thus the honour of having three different commandants in two days.




CHAPTER IV.

ESTCOURT AND FRERE.

  'Great men are not always wise: neither do the aged understand
  judgment.'--_Job_, xxxii. 9.


The stay at Estcourt (November 3rd to 26th) was a period of great
anxiety and hard work. That there was cause for anxiety may be easily
understood when the state of affairs is remembered. The Army Corps had
not yet arrived from England, nor could any fresh troops be expected
before the 10th. The Boers had invaded Natal, had shut up in Ladysmith
the only British army in the field, and could still afford to send
five or six thousand men against Maritzburg. The Estcourt garrison
alone stood in their way.

There were necessarily many outposts, and tours were long and
frequent. Thunderstorms, Natal thunderstorms, visited the town with
painful regularity, and rendered piquet work even more uncomfortable
than usual. It was a period of strained waiting, when every one
wondered whether a Boer commando or a British brigade would be the
first arrival. Reliable news was scarce, though rumours of every kind
were rife.

The battalion was encamped in the market square, while the officers
inhabited a small room encumbered with planks. Trenches covered the
town to the north and north-east, and were pushed forward some two
miles on the Weenen road. The citadel, so to speak, was the sugar-loaf
hill, on which Lieutenant James, R.N., constructed, towards the middle
of the month, emplacements for his two naval twelve-pounders. These
guns arrived on November 14th, a welcome addition to the garrison,
which had been strengthened on the 13th by the West Yorkshire
Regiment. These reinforcements came at an opportune moment, for the
Boers had at last moved forward and on November 14th their patrols
were close to Estcourt. Their approach caused a certain amount of
alarm, and at first the evacuation of the town was proposed. The camp
was even struck, and a great part of the baggage was put on to trains
which were kept ready in the station. Later on other counsels
prevailed, and tents were raised again. It had rained most of the day,
and a general wetting was the chief result of this 'scare.' The Boers
quickly made their presence felt, and the next day inflicted a severe
blow on the garrison.

Our mounted troops had been busily engaged in reconnaissance work, and
in an evil hour it occurred to the authorities that the armoured train
was also an excellent means of gaining news. Captain Hensley had taken
it to Colenso on the 5th and 6th, and on the latter day surprised a
party of Boers engaged in looting the village. The dispatch of the
train, unsupported by any mounted troops, soon became almost a matter
of daily routine. This defiance of common sense could have only one
result. On November 15th, Captain Haldane,[3] of the Gordon
Highlanders, went out in the train with 'A' company and some men of
the Durban Light Infantry. He reached Frere and, learning from a Natal
policeman that the front was clear, pushed on to Chieveley. Here he
saw in the distance a small body of the enemy moving southwards, and,
having telegraphed the information to Estcourt, turned back. But as
the train was running down a steep gradient the Boers suddenly opened
fire with two guns from a ridge to the west of the line. Almost
immediately afterwards the train was derailed by stones placed on the
line, and the leading truck upset, thus stopping the engine.

         [Footnote 3: He had been wounded at Elandslaagte, and, being
         unable to rejoin his corps in Ladysmith, was attached to the
         battalion.]

It was a predicament trying to the nerves of even the bravest. The
Boer shells were well aimed, and came in quick succession. But Captain
Haldane and his men did all that could be done. Lieutenant Frankland
directed from the rear truck a vigorous fire, which kept the enemy at
a respectful distance, and even made them shift their gun. Meanwhile
Mr. Winston Churchill, who had accompanied the expedition as a Press
correspondent, collected some men and set to work to push the derailed
truck off the line. They were exposed to a heavy fire, but eventually
succeeded in their task. The train began to move again; luck did not,
however, favour them, for the coupling between the engine and rear
truck was broken by a shell. Then Captain Haldane ordered the engine
to return to Estcourt with as many wounded men as possible, while he
attempted with the remainder of the force to reach Frere station. The
engine reached Estcourt, but Captain Haldane was not so fortunate. The
men left the trucks and started to run along the line. No sooner did
our rifle-fire cease than the Boers galloped down the hill and, before
Captain Haldane could realise the danger, they were among the men, and
he had no course open but to surrender. The casualties of 'A' company
were three men killed, four or five wounded, and forty-two prisoners.
Private Kavanagh afterwards received the Distinguished Conduct Medal
for his gallantry on this occasion. The sound of the Boer guns could
be distinctly heard at Estcourt, and great anxiety was felt. A little
group of officers assembled in the trenches to the west of the
station, and eagerly scanned the country through their glasses.
Nothing could be seen, and the firing had ceased. Suddenly through the
air rang the shrill whistle of an engine, and at the sound every one
gave a sigh of relief. It was the armoured train, and all was well.
Another whistle, and round a sharp curve steamed the engine--but,
alas! without the trucks. It was evident that a disaster had occurred,
although particulars were not received until late in the afternoon;
while it was weeks later before the list of casualties could be
ascertained. Luckily this mishap occurred when the situation had in
other respects improved. The Army Corps was landing, and troops were
being pushed forward as quickly as possible. On the 16th, Estcourt was
reinforced by the 2nd Queen's and 2nd East Surreys of General
Hildyard's brigade, and General Barton's Fusilier brigade was
assembling at Mooi River.

The Boers were thus too late, and so lost the opportunity of capturing
Maritzburg. Although they doubtless knew of the arrival of fresh
troops, they still advanced, and, moving round Estcourt, appeared on
the hills to the north-west of Mooi River station. A detachment
reconnoitred Estcourt on the 18th, but a couple of shells from
Lieutenant James's naval guns induced them to stay at a distance.

The telegraph line south of the town was interrupted on the 22nd, and
for a brief period the garrison was cut off from the rest of the
world. But the action of Willow Grange, in which the battalion took no
part, caused a retirement of the enemy, who retreated through Weenen
on the 24th.

Their retreat was in no degree molested by our troops; but on November
26th the long-desired advance took place. It was an exhilarating
feeling to leave Estcourt, and lose sight of those hills and trenches,
the scene of so many weary vigils. The army did not, however, make a
big stride forward. The advance was only to Frere, some ten miles
nearer the Tugela.

As the column started at 8 a.m. there seemed every prospect of an easy
day. But on active service it is never safe to assume anything.
Although no opposition was met with, and the mounted troops hardly saw
a Boer, the progress was very slow, and sunset found the rear of the
column still three miles distant from Frere. The battalion had the
ill-luck to be in the rearguard, behind a seemingly interminable line
of transport. Then the inevitable drift intervened, and waggon after
waggon broke down. Finally, part of the transport decided to halt till
the morning, and the unfortunate rearguard was obliged to form a line
of outposts. As the battalion transport was some distance in front,
this meant no blankets, no food, nothing save a limited amount of
Natal water. The men were not allowed to consume the emergency
rations, and therefore had to suffer from cold and hunger. The night
passed somehow, however, and with the break of day we marched into
Frere, to find our waggons and obtain food.

Another monotonous fortnight was spent at Frere, the only excitement
being the arrival of fresh troops and the building of a temporary
railway bridge over the Blaukranz. The arrival of Sir Redvers Buller
and his staff gave hopes of an early advance, and everybody discussed
what our General ought to do, strategical plans becoming as numerous
as sandstorms.

Since leaving Ladysmith, the 2nd Dublin Fusiliers had not been
attached to a brigade, and now that the Army Corps had come there were
not wanting pessimists who foretold that as the battalion was nobody's
child it would be sent to guard the lines of communication. Early in
December, however, it was assigned to General Hart's 5th, or Irish,
Brigade, in place of the 1st Battalion. The latter was ordered to send
three companies, with a total strength of 287 men, to make up for the
wastage of six weeks' operations. These companies, which were
commanded by Major Tempest Hicks, arrived on December 7th, and were
allowed at first to maintain a separate organization, so that the 2nd
Battalion had eleven companies.

[Illustration: Capt. C. F. ROMER (standing) and Capt. E.
FETHERSTONHAUGH.]

The 5th Brigade was encamped close behind the ridge which lies to the
north-west of the railway station. General Hart utilised the fortnight
at Frere in making his battalions accustomed to his methods. Every
day the whole brigade stood to arms an hour before dawn, and advanced
up the slope of the ridge, where it stayed until scouts had reported
the front all clear. The General was also very particular about the
cleanliness of the camp, and made it a rule to go through the lines
every morning.




CHAPTER V.

THE BATTLE OF COLENSO.

  'Never shame to hear what you have nobly done.'--_Coriolanus._


On December 12th, the 6th and Naval Brigades marched from Frere to
Chieveley, and the rest of the army followed the next day. The
battalion happened to be finding the outposts, and could not march
with the 5th Brigade. Some delay in collecting the companies was
experienced, so it was not until 1 p.m. that a start was made, and
darkness came on before Chieveley was reached. It was, however, a
glorious moonlight night, and marching across the veld had a charm
which even the dust could not quite destroy. But romance soon gave way
to more worldly feelings when, on arriving at Chieveley about 8 p.m.,
it became necessary to find the brigade camp among the hundreds of
tents already pitched.

On the evening of the 14th, it was known that the army was to advance
next day, and attempt the passage of the Tugela. Colonel Cooper
assembled his officers in order to explain the Divisional and Brigade
orders. He stated that the 5th Brigade would cross the river at a
drift two miles west of Colenso, then move down the left bank so as to
take in rear the Boers defending Colenso bridge, which would be
attacked by the 2nd Brigade. The Brigade orders detailed the Dublin
Fusiliers to lead the advance to the river, and afterwards to cover
the rear of the brigade when it moved down the left bank. General Hart
urged in addition the necessity of keeping the men well in hand. They
were to cheer in the event of a charge, but were not to be allowed to
make a wild rush.

[Illustration: 2 miles West of Colenso. Genl. Hart's flank attack from
the Boer Point of View. 15th Dec/99. From a sketch by Col. H. Tempest
Hicks, C.B.]

Every one was early astir on December 15th. Breakfasts were at 3 a.m.,
but before that hour tents had been struck and packed in the
waggons, on which great-coats, blankets, and mess-tins were also
placed, so that the men only carried their haversacks, water-bottles,
rifles, and 150 rounds. The brigade fell in at 3.30 a.m. It was still
quite dark, and the Brigadier spent the ensuing half-hour in drilling
his command. The advance was commenced just as the eastern horizon
grew grey with the dawn.

The battalion, which led the brigade, deployed into line to the right,
and then advanced by fours from the right of companies. In front rode
the General with his staff and a Kaffir guide; behind came the other
three battalions of the brigade in mass. The deployment of the
battalion had brought 'A' on the left, and 'H' and the three companies
of the 1st Battalion on the right.

In this order the brigade moved across the broad expanse of veld,
leading to the banks of the Tugela. In front, beyond the river, rose
tier on tier of ridges and kopjes, backed by the towering mass of
Grobelaar's Kloof. In the morning light they looked strangely quiet
and deserted. Only on a spur to the left front could be seen a few
black specks, the figures of watching Boers.

Soon the naval guns in front of Chieveley opened fire, dropping their
shells on the horseshoe ridge to the north of Colenso, and into a
kraal further to the west. But no answer came. The brigade moved on,
tramping through the long grass, wet with the dew. There was a
momentary halt in order to cross a spruit running diagonally across
the line of march. The ridges in front grew nearer and plainer. They
still seemed deserted, although the eyes of many foes might be
watching the advancing khaki-clad troops. Behind came the thunder of
the big guns, and the shells screamed in the air overhead. It was past
6 a.m. Suddenly the hiss of a shell sounded marvellously close, there
was a metallic clang, and a cloud of dust arose some hundred yards in
front. It was a Boer shrapnel, and the battle had begun.

Each company of the battalion, without waiting for orders,
'front-formed,' and doubled forward. The mounted officers at once
dismounted, Major Hicks' horse being shot under him as he was in the
very act of getting off its back. Somehow it did not seem a bit
strange to him at the time that his horse should be down, and it never
occurred to him then that it had been shot. Another shrapnel burst
over the line and then the enemy's musketry blazed forth, finding an
excellent target in the massed brigade, which was deploying as best it
could.

[Illustration: Boer Trenches, Colenso.]

The battalion was dangerously crowded together, for it had been
advancing as if drilling on the barrack square, although Colonel
Cooper had tried to open out to double company interval, a proceeding
which the General had promptly counter-ordered. But all did their
best. The men rushed forward after their officers, and at their signal
lay down in the long grass, whence fire was opened at the invisible
foe.

It was very difficult to discover the Boer positions. There was one
long trench near the kraal which the naval guns had been shelling,
and further to the west could be seen another parapet from which came
an occasional puff of smoke betraying a Martini rifle and black
powder. But if the Boers could not be seen, they could be both heard
and felt. There was one ceaseless rattle of mausers, and a constant
hum of bullets only drowned by the scream of the shells.

[Illustration: Casualties at Colenso.

  Capt. BACON. _Killed._
  Lieut. HENRY. _Killed._
  Capt. H. M. SHEWAN. _Wounded._
  Major GORDON (_1st Battalion, attached_). _Wounded._
  Second Lieut. MACLEOD (_1st Battalion, attached_). _Wounded._]

Short rushes were made as a rule, and the flank companies edged away
in order to give room for a more reasonable extension. But no sooner
had the battalion opened out than it was reinforced by companies of
the Connaught Rangers, and, later, of the Inniskilling Fusiliers and
the Border Regiment. In a comparatively short time, after the first
Boer shell, the 5th Brigade had been practically crowded into one
line. Officers led men of all the four regiments, and encouraged them
with the cry, 'Come on, the Irish Brigade!'

There was no control, no cohesion, no arrangement in the attack. No
attempt was made to support, by the careful fire of one part of the
line, the advance of the remainder; nor did any order from the higher
ranks reach the firing line. Small groups of men, led by an officer,
jumped up, dashed forward a few scores of yards, and then lay down.
Nobody knew where the drift was, nobody had a clear idea of what was
happening. All pushed forward blindly, animated by the sole idea of
reaching the river-bank.

On the left, part of the battalion was almost on the river when the
Boers first opened fire, and quickly reached the bank. After a short
halt they turned to their right and moved in single file along the
river, being exposed all the time to a heavy fire. They passed through
a kraal, and eventually, not being able to find the drift, assembled
in a hollow, where they stayed until orders to retire reached them.
The centre and right advanced through low scrub into a loop of the
river. Some sections of the 1st Battalion, on the extreme right, came
upon a spruit, and, under shelter of its banks, pushed ahead of the
line.

Thus, by short and constant rushes, the assailants worked their way
forward. A brigade of field artillery was supporting the attack from
behind, but they found it as difficult as the infantry did to locate
the Boers, and most of their shells were quite harmless to the enemy,
while a few dropped close to the attacking infantry. They aided the
latter indirectly, however, since the Boer guns turned their attention
to them.

General Sir Redvers Buller had early recognised the difficulties of
the 5th Brigade, and sent orders for it to retire. But it is easier to
send a force into a battle than to draw it back. The great difficulty
at Colenso was to communicate with the company officers, who had to be
left entirely to their own 'initiative.' Finally an officer of the
Connaught Rangers volunteered to take to the firing line General
Hart's written order to retire. He succeeded in reaching the front,
but then, thinking he had struck the right of the line, turned to his
left. In reality he had gone to the centre of the attack, and,
consequently, the retirement was carried out partially and by
fractions. The left fell back about 10 a.m. in good order, though the
Boers, as usual, redoubled their fire when they saw their foes begin
to retreat. The centre and right, having received no order nor
warning, clung to their ground, and in some cases even made a further
advance. Section after section, however, gradually realised that their
left flank was uncovered and a general retreat of the brigade in
progress. A score of men, under the command of an officer, would rise
up and double back, causing, as they did so, an instant quickening of
the enemy's fire. All around the running figures the bullets splashed,
raising little jets of dust. Occasionally a man would stumble forward,
or sink down as if tired, but it seemed wonderful that the rain of
bullets did not claim more victims. They claimed enough, however, of
the unfortunate three companies of the 1st Battalion, whom the order
to retire never reached. Till 1 p.m., and the arrival of the Boers,
they lay where they were, suffering a loss of some 60 per cent. When
at last Major Hicks realised the situation, he touched with his stick
the man on his right, to tell him to pass the word to retire, but he
touched a dead man; he turned to the left, only to touch another
corpse. One company was brought out of action by a lance-corporal.
Then the Boers arrived, and began making prisoners. One shouted to
Major Hicks for his revolver; he replied that he had not got one--it
was in his holsters on his dead horse--and stalked indignantly off the
battlefield, without another question being put to him.

Major Gordon, who was commanding one of the three companies of the 1st
Battalion, had been shot through the knee early in the day by a rifle
bullet. He lay for two hours or so momentarily expecting to be hit
again. After a time he noticed that as long as he lay still no bullets
came in his direction, but that the moment he attempted to move there
would be a vicious hiss and spurt of sand and dust close beside him.
In spite of this he managed to crawl through a pool of blood to a
neighbouring ant-heap, which offered some sort of protection, and into
which a bullet plunged just as he reached it. Here he remained till
the retirement, when, assisted by two sergeants of the regiment,
Keenan and Dillon, he managed to hobble away. Even then he noticed
that as long as they kept away from the troops who were still actively
engaged few bullets came their way, as though the Boers were purposely
not firing at the wounded.

The Boer heavy artillery pursued the retiring troops with shells,
which made a prodigious noise, and raised clouds of dust, but seldom
did any damage. Gradually a region of comparative peace was reached,
where the ground was not being continually struck by bullets, and only
an occasional shell fell. The extended lines of the 4th Brigade,
ordered to cover the retirement, came into view, and behind them the
men of the Irish Brigade collected again in companies and battalions.
Then, although the artillery was still roaring fiercely, and the
mausers rattled with tireless persistence, the brigade trudged back to
its former camping-ground, pitched tents, and began to cook dinners. A
prosaic but practical ending to an impossible attack.

But there was still one task to accomplish--the preparation of the
casualty list: The regiment had suffered heavily. Two officers,
Captain Bacon (1st Battalion) and Lieutenant Henry, had been killed,
and three, Major Gordon (1st Battalion), Captain Shewan, and
Lieutenant Macleod (1st Battalion), wounded. The total casualties were
219, of whom 52 were killed. Among the latter were Colour-Sergeant
Gage (mortally wounded) and Sergeant Hayes.

Captain Bacon (1st Battalion) was killed by a bullet, and must have
died immediately. He had previously served for a short time with the
2nd Battalion, in which he had many friends, and his loss was bitterly
deplored by Officers, N.C.O.'s, and Privates alike.

Lieutenant Henry had scarcely two years' service, but had in that
short space of time endeared himself to every one in the regiment, and
was as smart and efficient a young officer as ever joined it. His
death must also have been mercifully instantaneous, as he was hit by a
shell.

Second Lieutenant Macleod had only joined the 1st Battalion a few days
before it left the Curragh on November 10th. He was very severely
wounded, his thigh being broken, and although his leg was saved, it
was left two inches shorter than it had been, and in the end he had to
leave the service on this account.

Major Gordon (1st Battalion), who received a Brevet
Lieutenant-Colonelcy for his services, was invalided home, but came
out again later on; while Captain Shewan, who had been shot through
the leg by a bullet, was back at work again in twelve days, a sterling
proof of that devotion to duty which was later on rewarded by the
well-merited distinction of the D.S.O.

[Illustration: Group of Twenty Sergeants taken after the Battle of
Colenso. All that remained of forty-eight who left Maritzburg.

The names reading from left to right in rows are:--(back row) Sergt.
Hanna; Band-Sergt. Cragg; Sergt. Davis; Lance-Sergt. Cullen; Sergt.
Rooney; Arm.-Sergt. Waite; Col.-Sergt. Cossey; Sergt. Smith; Sergt.
Sheridan. (2nd row) Sergt. Keenan; Sergt. French; Col.-Sergt. Ambrose;
Capt. Fetherstonhaugh; Col. Cooper; Col.-Sergt. Guilfoyle: Sergt.
McNay; Sergt. Hobson; Pioneer-Sergt. Duncan. (3rd row) Sergt.
Moriarty; Sergt. Purcell; Col.-Sergt. Connell; Sergt. Beatty.]

The three companies of the 1st Battalion had been the greatest
sufferers. Being on the right, they were the last to retire; in fact,
some of the men did not get in till 5 p.m., while a few were taken
prisoners on the banks of the river.

[Illustration: Bringing down the Wounded.]

Amongst a host of others who showed their worth under the trying
circumstances of this unfortunate day, was Bugler Dunne, a small boy
who did his duty well, and had the good fortune to be received by Her
Majesty the Queen on his return home. His father was also in South
Africa, a Colour-Sergeant in the 5th Battalion. Isolated cases must
always receive undue prominence--it is the way of the world--but the
spirit of the men was quite remarkable throughout, and made officers
and N.C.O.'s proud to command and lead them. Instead of depressing
them, the reverse seemed to have a contrary effect, and merely
hardened their determination to succeed.




CHAPTER VI.

VENTER'S SPRUIT.

  'Now no chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous, but
  grievous.'--_Heb._ xii. 11.


The greater part of December 16th was spent in burying the dead. At
nightfall orders were received to strike camp, and the brigade marched
back to Frere, which was reached in the early morning of the 17th,
when we occupied our former camping-ground.

Another weary wait followed. Frere at the best of times is an
uninteresting spot, but it became absolutely repulsive as the grass
disappeared and mud and flies reigned supreme. Life in the camp was
monotonous, only slightly preferable to the long tours of outpost
duty, and a bathe in the river, varied by a walk round the lines,
formed the only amusement.

General Hart did not relax any of his precautions, and his command
still stood to arms every morning. The rest of the army assembled at
Frere seemed, so far as could be seen, to rely on the 5th Brigade, for
no other unit followed the latter's example.

Our listlessness was broken on January 6th, when the thunder of the
guns around Ladysmith was so distinct that it seemed as if Chieveley
must be attacked. Everybody soon learned that the Boers were making a
desperate attempt to capture the town, and there was naturally some
anxiety as to the result.

A few days afterwards, signs of another forward movement became
apparent. One cheerful omen was the arrival of the doctors, whose duty
it was to convey the wounded back to the base, and of a large body of
civilian stretcher-bearers. General Warren's Division, fresh from
England, marched in, and the second effort to relieve Ladysmith was
begun.

The 5th Brigade left Frere at daybreak on January 11th, and, covered
by the 'Royals,' took the Springfield road. It had been raining
heavily, and the road, never good, soon became execrable. The column
was followed by a long line of waggons carrying baggage, supplies,
ammunition, pontoons, &c. On arriving at Pretorius' Farm, the brigade
halted and pitched camp. The battalion found the outposts, which were
especially ordered to protect themselves by building 'sangars' or
digging trenches.

Meanwhile the apparently endless line of waggons had been blocked by a
bad drift below the camp, and the brigade was called upon to help. The
road was somewhat improved by throwing into the soft mud stones
obtained from a wall, and many waggons had to be hauled by ropes
through the spruit. For over forty-eight hours did that collection of
vehicles continue to cross and require help.

On Thursday, January 12th, the 4th Brigade and General Warren's
Division passed through the camp and went straight on to Springfield,
since the cavalry had ascertained that there were no Boers south of
the Tugela in that direction. The 5th Brigade followed on the
afternoon of the 15th, crossing the Little Tugela by a foot
trestle-bridge made of spars cut by the Engineers from trees on the
bank. As the battalion approached Springfield, the sound of
artillery-fire greeted it, and our shrapnel could be seen bursting
against a hill which was evidently on the left bank of the Tugela. It
was clear that the army was again in touch with the enemy, but nobody
knew what Sir Redvers Buller had decided upon, although everybody, of
course, dogmatised on what he ought to do.

On the afternoon of the 16th, orders were issued for the brigade to
march that night, although nothing was stated regarding its
destination. Vigorous operations were plainly intended, since the
force was to move as lightly as possible. No tents or blankets were
allowed, and the great-coats were carried by the regimental transport,
in which officers were permitted to pack twenty pounds of baggage. Six
days' rations were also taken.

The army moved from Springfield at dusk, leaving the camp standing in
charge of a few details (cooks, &c.), who had strict orders to light
fires and walk about, so that the vigilant burgher might not discover
that the army had slipped away. The general direction of the march was
north-west. It was a bright moonlight night, but the column moved
slowly, for the numerous waggons took up the centre of the road, while
the troops moved on the side. About midnight it began to rain, which
made everybody cold and uncomfortable, especially as halts were long
and frequent. It was not easy to see where the army was going,
although the Tugela could not be far off. Nobody knew the plan of
operations, which, however, evidently aimed at a surprise crossing of
the river, and it seemed as if the enemy must hear the noise of the
creaking transport and tramping men.

About 2 a.m. there came a halt on the top of a ridge, where General
Hart formed up his brigade. Each regiment deployed into line, and then
lay down one behind the other in the following order: Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers, Connaught Rangers, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and
Border Regiment. Fatigued by a long night-march, every one soon fell
asleep. Unfortunately, however, the slumbers of the brigade were
disturbed by an incident which shows how easily confusion can arise in
night operations. A horse from somewhere in front broke loose and
galloped over the veld, straight into the ranks of the sleeping
regiments. For a moment everything was in confusion, and a general
panic nearly took place. Luckily the first glimmer of dawn had come,
and the company officers soon regained control of their men, but it
might have been a different tale had darkness still prevailed.

When daylight came, it showed the army to be on the top of a hill
overlooking Trichardt's Drift. On the other side of the river the
ground rose to a long ridge flanked on the east by a steep mountain,
and on the west by a bastion-like hill. Nobody then knew the country,
but that mountain was Spion Kop, and the ridge lying so calmly in the
morning light was to be the scene of six days' continuous fighting. At
dawn of January 17th, however, the ridge, which the natives called
Tabanyama, seemed deserted, and not a Boer was to be seen.

It was now learnt that Sir Redvers Buller had divided his forces,
sending two brigades, under General Lyttelton, to Potgieter's Drift,
while the remainder of the army, under General Warren, was assembled
ready to cross the river at Trichardt's Drift.

The battalion breakfasted quietly, and then 'H' company was sent down
to the drift in order to help in the construction of a bridge. As the
company descended the steep slope, the artillery from the heights
began to shell a farm on the far side of the river, whence a Boer
patrol had been sniping. The Engineers had massed the pontoon waggons
round a farm by the drift, and were looking for a suitable point for
the bridge. The pontoons were launched, and by 11.30 a.m. the first
bridge was ready. The infantry immediately began to cross, but the
artillery and transport had to wait for a second bridge, which was not
completed until after dark.

The 5th Brigade marched down to the river at 2 p.m. and crossed. On
reaching the left bank the battalion deployed into line, with four or
five paces between the men, and slowly moved up the slope in support
of the widely-extended lines of the Lancashire Brigade. Except for an
occasional shot from the artillery at Potgieter's Drift, everything
was still and peaceful; although, as the army moved away from the
river, most of the officers expected to be greeted by the familiar
'pick-pock' of the enemy's mausers.

The brigade in front eventually halted on the top of a minor ridge,
some three thousand yards or more from the crest-line of Tabanyama,
and separated from it by open and gently-sloping ground. The Dublin
Fusiliers formed quarter-column immediately behind the Lancashire
Brigade, and prepared to bivouac. Many of the officers strolled higher
up in order to look at the country through their glasses. The main
crest-line was evidently occupied, for men could be seen busily
digging. It was somewhat trying to think that precious time was being
wasted, while the burghers were preparing a defensive position.

Our transport was still on the other side of the Tugela, and
consequently we had to do without blankets, great-coats, and kettles.
The officers' mess was saved by a subaltern, who succeeded in
procuring a Kaffir cooking-pot and some very tough fowls, which
Captain Hensley boiled with great skill. The night was unpleasant, for
khaki drill is but an inefficient protection against the cold and
heavy dew. The experience proved too much for Major Butterworth,
R.A.M.C., who had to go on the sick list soon afterwards. He had been
with the battalion since Ladysmith, and his coolness and devotion at
the battle of Colenso had made him popular with all ranks.

The next day, January 18th, was spent in idleness, and the different
corps remained in their bivouacs. There was nothing to do except watch
the Boers still digging on the crest-line, and the shells fired by the
guns of General Lyttelton, who was apparently making a reconnaissance.
The greater part of General Warren's artillery crossed to the left
bank and took up a position close to the battalion.

On the 19th the regiment took part in the movement which was
initiated with the evident purpose of turning the Boer right by the
Acton Holmes road. Leaving the artillery and the Lancashire Brigade on
the ridge, the remainder of the army descended into the plain, and
moved up the left bank of the Tugela. The column marched along the
base of the main ridge, and was carefully watched by the Boer patrols
from Bastion Hill.

After fording Venter's Spruit the battalion halted about 2 p.m. on
some rising ground, whence a good view of the surrounding country was
obtained. As there seemed every prospect of a long halt, the men began
to take off their boots and putties, in order to dry them, but they
had to put them on again hurriedly enough, since the guns suddenly
opened fire. At first everybody imagined that the Boers were attacking
the artillery and Lancashire Brigade. Soon, however, it was seen that
the latter were making a reconnaissance. Not much opportunity for
looking at the spectacle was afforded, since we received an order to
recross Venter's Spruit and bivouac. The movement by Acton Holmes had
been given up for some reason which was unknown, and it was not
difficult to see that the alternative was a frontal attack on the
position which everybody had watched being fortified.

The battalion halted close to Venter's Spruit, and had a piquet ('H'
company) on the Trichardt's Drift road. The transport succeeded in
reaching the brigade that night, and the men were thus able to have
their great-coats. Not much sleep was, however, allowed. At a very
early hour, long before daylight, on the 20th, the brigade was
aroused. Great-coats were again packed on the waggons, and then,
without breakfast or any opportunity of issuing rations, the battalion
fell in and marched off. Owing to darkness and the rough track by
which the column marched, progress was at first very slow. When the
feeble light of early dawn enabled the country to be seen, the
regiment was crossing a spruit near Fairview Farm, lying at the foot
of the ridge. It then ascended a small valley leading to Three Tree
Hill, where the Field Artillery had concentrated.

The latter soon afterwards opened the battle, and fired on the Boer
trenches, which stood out more prominently than usual on the crest of
the ridge. The enemy's artillery did not reply, although a vigorous
rifle-fire was directed on the skirmishers of the Lancashire Brigade.

The Connaught Rangers had been temporarily detached on escort duty,
and General Hart now moved his three remaining battalions to the left
in line of quarter-columns. It was a hot day, and the men, who had
eaten nothing that morning, suffered some discomfort from such a close
formation. The ground, too, was broken and covered with long grass and
scrub, so that it was no easy matter to satisfy the General's
injunctions in the matter of 'dressing.' The brigade moved in full
view of the enemy, and so compact a body of men must have been a great
temptation to the Boer gunners, who, however, were either not ready or
exercised much self-restraint. After scrambling through a remarkably
steep valley, the brigade halted in a gentle depression, where it was
safe from the random bullets that were falling near. A long pause
ensued, and the men were able to obtain some much-needed water.

It was past noon before the infantry, in this part of the field,
advanced in earnest. Then the York and Lancaster Regiment and
Lancashire Fusiliers were sent forward as the firing-line against the
centre of the Boer position, and were supported by the Borders and 2nd
Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The formation adopted by General Hart for the
support was two lines. The first line, which was two deep, consisted
of the right half-battalions of the two regiments, the Borders being
on the right, and was followed at a distance of about two hundred
yards by a similar line, composed of the left half-battalions.

On emerging from the depression where it had been resting, the support
came under rifle-fire. The range must, however, have been a long one,
and the casualties were few. The attack was moving astride of a spur
which ran from the Boer position to the Tugela, a little distance to
the west of Three Tree Hill. At first this spur was broad, forming
almost a plateau, but further on it narrowed, and consequently the
left of the two lines advanced up a narrow valley, which afforded
excellent cover.

Led by General Hart, the brigade advanced at a steady pace and, after
a time, closed up on the firing-line. It then halted, and from a
slight elevation opened fire in order to support the Lancashire
Regiments, who, having taken the enemy's advanced position, found that
some thousand yards of very open and almost-level ground lay between
them and the Boer trenches, which lined the northern edge of the
summit of the ridge. The attack could now only advance slowly, since
it was exposed to a cross-fire from both flanks. Hitherto it had only
faced rifle-fire, but about 1.45 p.m. the Boer guns, posted somewhere
near Spion Kop, came into action. They were able to rake the whole
assaulting line, and, in fact, many officers thought at first that the
shells were 'short' ones from our own artillery. The Boers on this
occasion managed to burst their shrapnel with some accuracy, and it
was fortunate that the attack could find good cover.

This artillery and the increased rifle-fire on the right flank caused
the line to swing round in that direction, but any further advance was
suspended by superior orders soon after 4.30 p.m. The Borders, who had
pushed ahead, were ordered back, and the other regiments took cover
among the rocks, and maintained a vigorous fire. The rattle of
musketry gradually died away as the light failed, until after
nightfall the battalion assembled behind a wall and bivouacked.

By great efforts the regimental transport had succeeded in getting
touch with the battalion, which was thus able to obtain rations. But
it was not until 8 p.m. that the men could get anything to eat.

Thus ended the fight of January 20th. It had cost the regiment one of
its most efficient officers, Captain Hensley, who was mortally
wounded.[4] Major English had been hit in the leg--he was back within
a fortnight--and of the rank and file four were killed and twenty
wounded--among the former being Lance-Sergeant Taylor, a most
excellent N.C.O. Although the opposing forces were so close, the night
passed quietly. With daylight (January 21st), however, the rifle-fire
at once broke out. The battalion had just managed to have a scratch
meal when orders were received to move to the support of the 2nd
Brigade, which was away to the left. General Hart ordered Colonel
Cooper to move by the straightest line, first down a ravine across a
spruit, and then over a hill. While climbing the latter, the battalion
was in full view of the enemy, who at once opened fire with guns and
rifles. Each company extended in succession, and doubled, so far as
possible, over the exposed ground. Once over the hill a region of
comparative safety was reached, and General Hart finally formed up his
command behind a rocky ridge overlooking the position held by the 2nd
Brigade. The latter were having a rifle duel with the Boer trenches
but did not advance. The 5th Brigade played a very passive part, and
spent the day behind the rocks. Bullets continually whistled overhead,
and the hostile artillery near Spion Kop burst an occasional shrapnel
along the position. Otherwise there was no excitement.

         [Footnote 4: Poor Hensley was not only one of the most
         popular officers in the regiment, but also one of the best
         and bravest. All his life he had been devoted to field
         sports, and his fame as a plucky big-game hunter and skilful
         shot was well known in many a Central Indian village and
         Cashmere valley. Educated at the Canadian Military College,
         he was a master of his profession, while the long months
         spent in Indian jungles had turned him into a handy man
         indeed. Wonderful and varied were the uses to which he could
         put an empty paraffin-tin or biscuit-box, and excellent were
         the stews he could produce out of a mess-tin. On one occasion
         in India a wounded panther was mauling one of his beaters.
         His rifle was empty, but without a moment's hesitation he
         dashed in, and drove the animal away by beating it over the
         head. Alas! poor Hensley, we could spare him ill, but, after
         all, we know he died the death he would have chosen.]

Towards evening, the regiment received orders to move some few hundred
yards to the right, and bivouac. Colonel Cooper directed the companies
to close in succession, and march from the rocks to the new position.
This movement almost escaped the notice of the Boer artillery, and it
was not until the last company ('H') moved that two shells were fired.
They fell to the right and in front of the leading fours, and did no
damage. The battalion assembled in a narrow amphitheatre just below
the southern crest, and at the head of a valley leading to Fairview
Farm. Although the bivouac could not be seen by the enemy, except from
Spion Kop, it was not altogether sheltered from fire, for every now
and then a bullet would clear the crest-line and strike the ground
below.

In this amphitheatre we perforce remained for three days, having a far
from pleasant time. From sunrise to sunset the rattle of musketry
practically never ceased, only at intervals the hum of the passing
bullets was drowned by the clang of bursting shrapnel. The Boer guns,
posted both directly in front and on the right flank, burst their
shells just over the crest, and fired intermittently all day. There
were four battalions crowded in the amphitheatre, and each one
occupied in turn the crest, whence an uninterrupted fire was directed
on the Boer trenches opposite. The enemy's marksmen had the range of
this crest-line, and it was a dangerous matter to stand up even for a
minute. Stone sangars were built and the companies relieved each other
by the men crawling up the slope. The enemy's artillery near Spion Kop
could rake the line of sangars, thus necessitating numerous
traverses. When not in the firing line, we lay behind the slope in
column, each company being protected by a parapet of earth or stone.
Immediately below the amphitheatre the ground fell steeply, forming a
ravine in which the cooks set up their field kitchens in comparative
security. It was characteristic of the British soldier that whereas
during the greater part of the day he crouched behind his cover, the
sight of a fatigue party with the kettles made him forget the shells
and bullets, and he dashed off for his food regardless of danger.

On Tuesday night (January 22nd) the proposed assault on Spion Kop was
announced, and every one hoped that a general advance would be the
result.

The morning of January 23rd dawned with a thick white mist, which hid
everything from view. It was our turn to occupy the ridge, and the
companies lay there for nearly an hour before the usual exchange of
rifle-fire began. No news of the capture of Spion Kop had reached the
amphitheatre, but the fact could be guessed from the absence of the
Boer guns in that direction. Only the artillery in front of the
battalion's position fired in the morning, and even that ceased during
the afternoon. The enemy was evidently concentrating the greater part
of his forces against Spion Kop, and parties of mounted burghers could
be seen moving from their extreme right. On Spion Kop hung the white
clouds of bursting shrapnel, and the stuttering sound of the pompom
scarcely ceased for a moment, but the 5th Brigade made no advance. The
companies behind the sangars fired hundreds of rounds at the Boer
trenches, while their comrades below ate and slept.

At dawn of the 25th, glasses and telescopes were turned on to the
summit of the mountain, and it was a bitter blow when the moving
figures there were seen to be Boers. It was not until late in the
forenoon, however, that the evacuation of Spion Kop was officially
communicated. But the renewal of the Boer artillery fire against the
crest-line had been a sufficiently eloquent announcement of the fact.

As there seemed no reason why the regiment should remain in the
amphitheatre when it was not required to man the sangars, Colonel
Cooper obtained permission that afternoon to move down the valley
below Bastion Hill. The new bivouac was more sheltered, although an
occasional Boer shell still fell near.

It was now evident that the second attempt to relieve Ladysmith had
failed, and that the army would have to recross the Tugela. On the
afternoon of the 25th, fatigue parties were sent by the battalion to
improve the track leading to Fairview Farm, and it was rumoured that
the retreat would take place that night. At 10.30 p.m. 'H' company was
sent to the farm, with orders to hold it during the retirement. But
the army did not move until Friday night, January 26th. At 10 p.m. on
that date, General Hart's command began to descend the valley in heavy
rain, which rendered the track extremely greasy.

Only a short distance had been covered when there was an outburst of
rifle-fire from the rearguard, which was still holding the sangars.
For a moment it seemed as if the Boers had anticipated the retreat and
were attacking. The battalion halted, but the firing soon ceased, and
the march was continued, the men stumbling down the track as quickly
as the many boulders would permit. At Fairview Farm the column halted
for a considerable period, in order to let the rearguard close up. By
this time every one was wet to the skin, and the enforced rest was
somewhat trying, owing to the cold.

However, after a wait of about an hour, the retirement was resumed.
The track was marked by orderlies and tins, but even with this help it
was difficult to find the way in the utter darkness. The surface of
the road, too, had become so slippery that falls were frequent.
Altogether, progress was painfully slow and the march a very
fatiguing one. It was past 4 a.m., January 27th, before the pontoon
bridge at Trichardt's Drift was reached. The column had another
prolonged wait here, and so tired were the men that many of them
dropped to the ground and slept in the mud. Early dawn had come when
the brigade recrossed the Tugela and toiled up the steep slope on the
other side. A Boer gun sent a parting shell just as the column reached
the summit.

It was a great relief to look back towards Tabanyama, where the
discarded biscuit tins were gleaming in the morning light, and say
good-bye to that long line of sangars and trenches. The men's spirits
were, moreover, cheered up by the sight of the 'Scotch' cart with the
kettles and rations. Breakfasts were cooked, and after a short rest
the brigade moved to the camping-ground selected for it. But it
arrived only to find that the position was within view and artillery
range of Spion Kop. So once more it had to trudge over the veld,
General Hart moving it in line of quarter-columns, and being as
particular about the 'dressing' as if he were on Laffan's Plain. His
command hardly appreciated this smartness at the time. But all were
finally rewarded by the arrival of the transport with tents and
baggage, and every one spent the night in comparative luxury.




CHAPTER VII.

VAAL KRANTZ.

  'The best laid schemes o' mice and men
           Gang aft agley.
  And lea'e us naught but grief and pain
           For promised joy.'

                              _Burns._


On January 30th we were reinforced by a draft of 400 men, principally
militia reservists, who were brought up by Captain Venour. They were a
welcome addition, being a physically fine body of men, and, although
their training was naturally not so good as that of their 'regular'
comrades, they proved equally brave and ready to follow their
officers.

The battalion shifted its camp on January 29th to Spearman's Hollow,
where it stayed a week. It was here that Sir Redvers Buller visited
every brigade in turn, and made his speech stating that the fighting
around Spion Kop had enabled him to discover the key to Ladysmith. He
had earned the gratitude of the men by putting them on extra rations,
and was always a warm favourite with the rank and file, who love a
brave man and instinctively know one.

On February 2nd the regiment left Spearman's Hollow for Spearman's
Hill, and, on the afternoon of Sunday, February 4th, marched with the
rest of the brigade towards Potgieter's Drift. The trek was a short
one, and at 6 p.m. we bivouacked behind Swaartz Kop. At nightfall the
officers were assembled and informed of the proposed operations for
the next day. The idea was to make a feint attack on Brakfontein and
then assault Vaal Krantz, the capture of which, it was thought, would
break the enemy's line.

We rose at dawn on the 5th, had a comfortable breakfast, and only
moved off about 7 a.m., just as the heavy artillery on Mount Alice and
Swaartz Kop began the fight by shelling Brakfontein. The hills around
rolled with the thunder of the guns, while the faint echoes of the
lyddite explosions on the distant ridges formed a piano accompaniment.
With this music in its ears, the battalion marched through the gap
between Mount Alice and Swaartz Kop by the road leading to Potgieter's
Drift. There was a short halt made at the gap, from which a splendid
view of the battlefield was obtainable. Immediately below stretched
the silver line of the Tugela, with all its many loops and twistings
visible. Beyond came a small brown ridge, which had evidently been
held by our troops, since a few biscuit-tins glistened on the near
slope. Further away was the background formed by the Boer position,
extending in a gigantic curve from Spion Kop on the spectator's left
to the lofty mass of Doorn Kloof on his right, the centre being formed
by Brakfontein and Vaal Krantz, over both of which heavy columns of
smoke were hanging. The Lancashire Brigade had commenced the feint
attack, and its extended lines could be plainly seen as they advanced
slowly in succession, while behind them the batteries of field
artillery had unlimbered on the plain, and were already shelling the
Boer trenches.

After a short pause the regiment began to descend the hill. The 5th
Brigade was following the 4th, both of them marching in 'fours.'
Before reaching the drift, the head of the column wheeled to the right
and proceeded along the narrow plain between the Tugela and Swaartz
Kop. The sight of that long winding line must have been a great
temptation to the Boer gunners, but they remained silent. Not even a
rifle had spoken. It was only when the Lancashire Brigade began to
retire that the enemy disclosed himself. Then Brakfontein spluttered
with musketry, and the Boer artillery vented its wrath on the
batteries dotted over the plain. But both our infantry and gunners
seemed to treat the fusillade with contempt. The former marched
back without apparently quickening their pace, and the latter,
limbering up, trotted off to support the attack on Vaal Krantz. This
hill was being literally covered with shells, and soon had the
appearance of a smoking volcano.

[Illustration: Casualties at Tugela Heights.

  Second Lieut. LANE. _Wounded at Hart's Hill._
  Lieut. J. MCD. HASKARD. _Wounded at Pieter's Hill._
  Second Lieut. BRADFORD. _Wounded at Pieter's Hill._
  Capt. A. V. HILL (_1st Battalion, attached_). _Wounded at Pieter's
    Hill._
  Second Lieut. BRODHURST HILL (_1st Battalion, attached_). _Wounded
    at Pieter's Hill._]

About 1 p.m. the Durham Light Infantry filed over the pontoon under
Swaartz Kop, and extended for the attack. At the same time we were
moved to a position below the southern end of the Kop in order to
cover by long-range rifle-fire the right of the 4th Brigade. 'B'
company fired a few volleys at some invisible snipers on the slopes of
Doorn Kloof, but with this exception we did not come into action.

Watched by the whole army the Durhams advanced against Vaal Krantz,
which they took about 4 p.m. amidst the cheers of the onlookers. But
with this success the operations practically ended for the day.

The battalion remained all the afternoon in the same position, and
then finally bivouacked there, having luckily succeeded in
communicating with the transport, so that the men had blankets. Its
outposts were pushed well round the southern slopes of Swaartz Kop,
thus overlooking the Tugela. A reconnoitring patrol was fired on from
the left bank, but otherwise the night passed without incident.

We did not move on the 6th, and had practically nothing to do. The
artillery on both sides fired continually, although the damage done
must have been very small in proportion to the noise and expenditure
of ammunition.

Every one watched with special interest a duel between our heavy
artillery and a large Boer gun which had suddenly been unmasked on
Doorn Kloof. This gun fired black powder, and its discharge could be
plainly seen, but it was apparently run up for every round behind a
parapet. It displayed absolute impartiality in its attentions. One
round would be directed against the infantry on Vaal Krantz, another
covered with dust a field battery on the plain, a third just missed
the battalion, while a fourth shell would crash among the trees on
Swaartz Kop. All our heavy guns had a try at silencing it, and their
efforts sometimes met with partial success. The Boer gun would cease
firing for a time, but it always re-appeared when least expected.
Towards the evening it became quite lively and put a shell through the
pontoon bridge.

The night of February 6th-7th was spent in comparative peace, although
the Boer artillery somewhat spoiled the first part of the night by
shelling Vaal Krantz. February 7th was a repetition of the 6th, except
that the gun on Doorn Kloof paid slightly more attention to our
position. The Colonel found it necessary to post a man on the
look-out, whose duty it was, on seeing the white puff of smoke, to
blow a whistle, whereupon everybody sought the shelter of the nearest
and largest boulder. But although, when the huge shell burst, the air
seemed unpleasantly full of whizzing iron fragments, no damage was
done, and the gun merely mitigated, to some extent, the monotony of
idleness.

By this time it was clear that Sir Redvers Buller did not intend to
press the attack home, and no one was surprised to find the army in
retreat on the morning of the 8th. The battalion acted as rearguard
and marched back between the river and Swaartz Kop in widely extended
lines. The Boer guns on Doorn Kloof, the shoulder of Spion Kop, and
Brakfontein shelled us on our way, and one man of the rear company
('H') was killed, this being our only casualty between February 5th
and 8th. The heavy artillery on Mount Alice covered the retreat and
prevented the enemy's guns from being too attentive.

The 5th Brigade halted at Springfield, and two days later went on to
Pretorius' Farm. On the 18th it made a march of fourteen miles to the
Blaukranz River, starting about 3.30 a.m. The day was hot, and as
there was no water on the route the newly-joined militia reservists
suffered considerably. After a rest of two days the brigade moved to
a camp near Gun Hill at Chieveley, where the naval six-inch gun was in
position.

The rest of the army was now engaged in the operations against Cingolo
and Hlangwane, and the battalion occupied itself in guarding
Chieveley, in beginning the construction of a railway to Hussar Hill,
and in convoying ammunition to the latter place. This was a somewhat
trying task, as during part of the way the convoy became the object of
many a Boer shell. The operations against Cingolo and Hlangwane proved
successful, and these positions were captured on the 19th. The next
day General Hart took the regiment on a reconnaissance towards
Colenso. It advanced cautiously on the west of the railway in column
of extended companies. The village was found unoccupied, but a party
of Boers, holding the horseshoe ridge on the left bank of the Tugela
opened a vigorous fire. The leading companies at once doubled forward
and lined the right bank, whence they answered the Boer marksmen. The
left half-battalion remained in support behind the village. A
detachment of Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry appeared on the scene,
and having forded the Tugela above the road bridge, turned the Boers
out of their position. Later on in the afternoon a train steamed into
Colenso station from Chieveley, and took us back just before dusk.

At 6 a.m. on February 21st, the Connaught Rangers and the Dublin
Fusiliers went by train to Colenso, where they were joined by a
battery. The horseshoe ridge on the left bank was being held by a
detachment of Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, but General Hart was
desirous of crossing the river with at least part of his force. For
this purpose he had brought on the train a boat, which was promptly
launched. As, however, the boat was small, and hardly capable of
holding more than four men, the General gave orders for the
construction of a raft. After some trouble this was ready by 4 p.m.,
and some two hours later about seven companies of the Connaught
Rangers had succeeded in reaching the left bank.

General Hart now received an order to cross early next morning, with
three battalions of his brigade, the pontoon bridge, which had been
constructed under Hlangwane. The regiment bivouacked in Colenso, and
at 5 a.m. on February 22nd marched down the right bank and crossed the
bridge. One company had been sent back to Chieveley for the purpose of
striking the camp, and with the transport rejoined the battalion about
7 a.m., after the latter had crossed the bridge and taken up a
position on the western side of the horseshoe ridge.

Here it stayed the whole day, all ranks passing the time in examining
the Boer trenches, and picking up more or less worthless loot. Heavy
fighting was taking place in front, but only an occasional shell fell
near the ridge.




CHAPTER VIII.

HART'S AND PIETER'S HILLS--THE RELIEF OF LADYSMITH.

               'But since I knew
  No rock so hard but that a little wave
  May beat admission in a thousand years,
  I re-commenced.'

                              _Tennyson._


Late on February 22nd, orders were issued for the brigade[5] to be
ready to move at an early hour next morning. Breakfasts were eaten
before 4 a.m., and the battalion fell in at about 4.15 on February
23rd. The brigade was to move from the left to the right of the army,
and it was probably the intention of the Headquarter Staff for the
march to take place during darkness. But there was a hitch in the
distribution of biscuits, and it was already broad daylight when we
started.

         [Footnote 5: The Borders had been left behind at Chieveley.
         In their place General Hart received half a battalion of the
         newly-raised Imperial Light Infantry.]

General Hart moved his command in column of route, and the long line
soon attracted the notice of the enemy's artillery. It was somewhat
trying to the nerves to hear the whistle of a shell coming nearer and
nearer, until finally it struck the ground within a few yards of the
column. Luckily, the Boers were either using common shell or their
shrapnel did not burst, and the battalion had no casualties. Finally
the railway was reached, and the brigade turned to the left, each
battalion forming column of companies in succession. A halt was made
close to the railway line and a short distance to the south of the
viaduct over the Onderbrook Spruit. But as a few shells fell
dangerously near, and showed that the enemy could still see the
brigade, it was moved to the left behind a rocky ridge. The battalion
stayed here for the rest of the morning. The Boer gunners fired
frequently at the ridge, but the slope of the ground saved us from any
losses. Sir Redvers Buller and his staff rode up about mid-day in
order to explain to General Hart what was required of him. This was
the capture of the hill known as Inniskilling, or Hart's Hill. It
could be plainly seen from the summit of the ridge behind which we
lay, and all officers and section commanders were called up in order
to have a look at it. They were told that it formed the extreme left
of the Boer position, and that its capture meant the relief of
Ladysmith. General Hart desired all officers to inform their men of
the necessity for a resolute assault. Our heavy artillery on the right
bank of the Tugela now began to shell the hill, which was quickly
covered by the smoke and dust of the lyddite explosions.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Brigade was preparing the way by an assault on a
ridge some 1000 yards to the front. They had a tough fight, and their
wounded were soon being brought down the railway in trucks and
stretchers.

The afternoon was well advanced when the 5th Brigade moved to the
attack. The hill to be assaulted lay some 3000 yards to the north-east
of the ridge which had been sheltering us, and the nature of the
intervening ground forbade a direct advance, which would dangerously
expose the left flank. It was necessary to hug the river-bank until a
position from which a direct attack became possible was reached.

The brigade at first moved along the railway line in file in the
following order: Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Connaught Rangers,
Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and Imperial Light Infantry. The battalion
moved with the left in front. A brigade in file takes up a
considerable space, and by the time the regiment could start, a heavy
outburst of firing showed that the Inniskilling Fusiliers were already
engaged.

The advance along the railway line, through a cutting and over the
Onderbrook Spruit, was very slow, since checks were frequent. The Boer
artillery missed this favourable opportunity of shelling their foes,
luckily for the latter. After crossing Onderbrook Spruit, the column
turned to the right and crept along the river. The enemy were sweeping
the bank with pompoms and a heavy rifle-fire, but by crouching under
the bank the column obtained good cover for the greater part of the
way. But every now and then there came an exposed bit of ground over
which it was necessary to double, and so narrow was the track that men
had often to jump over the wounded or killed.

The Langverwacht Spruit had to be crossed by the railway bridge. As
the latter was in full view of the enemy and was being raked by pompom
shells and bullets, it proved a great delay to the progress of the
column. It was only possible to cross at more or less long intervals.
Each man was forced to run the gauntlet by himself, and had to double
over as hard as he could. Beyond the bridge complete cover was
obtained except for a small stretch of ground by the Boer bridge.
Below the latter, the river ran between high hills, and the column was
therefore screened from view.

By the time that the leading company of the battalion had cleared
'Pompom' bridge, the Inniskilling Fusiliers were advancing against the
Boer position on Hart's Hill. It was about 5 p.m., and the General
could not wait until his brigade had concentrated, but sent his troops
forward as they arrived. The left half-battalion of the Royal Dublin
Fusiliers formed up near a deserted Boer bivouac overlooking the
river, and then, without stopping for the right half, advanced to
where General Hart was standing.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sitwell was in command of the left half-battalion,
and in a short time he was sent for by the General, who told him to
advance and help the Inniskilling Fusiliers to capture the hill.

The leading company ('H') was directed to extend to six paces and move
forward, the remaining companies ('G,' 'F,' and 'E') following at a
distance of 100 yards. No sooner had 'H' company cleared the crest of
the hill on which General Hart was standing, than it came under a
heavy rifle-fire, principally from the direction of Railway Hill.
Lieutenant Lane fell badly wounded--shot clean through the head from
one side to another, a wound from which he made a marvellous
recovery--and three or four men were hit. The company received the
order to double, no easy task down a steep slope strewn with rocks and
boulders. The railway line at the bottom of the slope was crossed, and
the opposite side of the valley, which was dotted with small trees,
ascended. The company had now caught up the lines of the Connaught
Rangers, and all climbed up the hill, the crest of which had been
gained by the Inniskilling Fusiliers. Although the attacking infantry
could not be seen from the Boers on Hart's or Railway Hill, they were
still exposed to an enfilade fire from the left.

On arriving with 'H' company at the top of the hill,
Lieutenant-Colonel Sitwell found the Inniskilling Fusiliers lying
along the crest-line and facing the Boer trenches, which ran at about
three hundred yards distance on the far side of the flat plateau. The
Inniskillings had already suffered serious casualties, but, on
Lieutenant-Colonel Sitwell stating that he had been ordered to charge,
claimed the right of leading the assault. To this Colonel Sitwell
agreed, but it was decided to wait until the remaining companies of
the left half-battalion of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers were up.
Meanwhile our guns and the cavalry maxims on the right bank of the
Tugela were directing against the enemy's trenches a stream of bullets
and shrapnel shells, the latter seeming to burst immediately over the
infantry.

[Illustration: Casualties at Tugela Heights (_continued_).

  Capt. A. HENSLEY. _Killed at Venter's Spruit._
  Lieut.-colonel SITWELL. _Killed at Hart's Hill._
  Capt. MAITLAND. (_Gordon Highlanders, attached_) _Killed at
    Hart's Hill._
  Major F. P. ENGLISH. _Wounded at Venter's Spruit and Zuikerbosch._
  Second Lieut. DENNIS. _Wounded at Hart's Hill. Died of Enteric at
    Aliwal North._]

The sun had set, and the light was already failing by the time that
the four companies of the left half-battalion had come up, principally
on the left of the Inniskilling Fusiliers. Then the signal to charge
was given, and the whole line rose up, and with a yell dashed forward.
But it was met by a murderous fire. In the gathering darkness the Boer
trenches quivered with the rifle-flashes, and the bullets struck out
sparks as they hit the rocks. At such a short range the enemy's
marksmen could hardly miss, and the line of charging infantry was
almost mowed down. The assault was checked, and the attackers flung
themselves on the ground and sought what little cover there was.

[Illustration: After the Fight.]

Luckily night intervened, and, although the Boers never for a moment
ceased their fire, the survivors of that charge managed to creep back
to the crest. Here Colonel Brooke, of the Connaught Rangers, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Sitwell collected them, and took steps to guard
against a counter-attack. A low stone wall was built below the crest,
and behind this the night was spent.

It was very dark, and the ground, covered with boulders, most
difficult to move over. Wounded men lay all over the hill, but there
were no doctors, no stretcher-bearers, and no water. It was impossible
to help or to move them. Their groans, combined with the intermittent
rifle-fire, made sleep difficult.

We had three officers wounded (Lieutenants Lane, Hill, and Dennis),
and some twenty casualties. Lieutenant Hill was again hit as he lay,
and subsequently lost his foot in consequence.

The infantry crouching behind the stone wall were unable to
communicate with the rest of the army. At dawn, however, Major
McGrigor, the Brigade-Major, came up to the line and told Colonel
Brooke that General Hart wished him to hold on to his position, to
which reinforcements would be sent. Colonel Brooke explained that food
and water would have to be sent also, and, above all, that his left
must be protected. Having promised to do what he could, Major McGrigor
returned to his General. With daylight the battle recommenced. The
Boers, from their trenches on Hart's and Railway Hills, kept up a
vigorous rifle-fire, and were answered as far as possible by the men
of the 5th Brigade behind the wall. Our artillery shelled Hart's Hill,
and many of their shrapnel which burst short hit the unlucky wounded
who were still lying on the plateau.

But the Boers were not content to remain on the defensive. Gradually
their skirmishers worked round the left of the hill, moving by the
dongas which ran down to the railway line, and were able to fire up
into the rear of the defenders of the wall. Part of the latter were
extended at right angles to the wall, and endeavoured to drive off the
enemy. But the Boers had excellent cover, whereas the infantry crowded
together on the hill presented an easy target. Casualties became
numerous. The morning wore on, and there were no signs of the promised
reinforcements or of the much-needed water and food. It seemed useless
to stay on the hill, and about 8 a.m. Colonel Brooke gave the order
to retire. As the men rose to their feet and ran down the hill, the
rattle of the Boer musketry increased in volume, and the bullets
whistled among the retreating soldiers. Lieut.-Colonel Sitwell was
killed as he descended the slope, and Captain Maitland, of the Gordon
Highlanders, who had been in command of 'G' company since November,
was mortally wounded almost at the same time. Luckily, the distance
was not very great, and once over the railway line the stream of
bullets ceased.

[Illustration: The Grave of Colonel Sitwell and Captain Maitland,
Gordon Highlanders (attached), near Railway at Pieter's Hill.]

Lieut.-Colonel Sitwell's loss was severely felt. Though he had only
recently joined us, he had given numerous proofs of his soldierly
ability. He had the benefit of considerable previous war service, and
had he lived would doubtless have risen to high rank. Captain
Maitland, Gordon Highlanders, had been unable to join his regiment in
Ladysmith, and had been attached to the battalion since Estcourt. Over
and over again he had proved himself to be a most gallant soldier, and
had endeared himself to all his temporary comrades (see Appendix). He
commanded 'G' company, which was most unfortunate in respect of its
commanders, having no less than six during the war. Colour-Sergeant
Connell, however, than whom no braver man lives, was with it
throughout.

As the retiring infantry climbed up the slope of Hart's Hollow they
met the advancing lines of the 4th Brigade, who had been sent to
reinforce the 5th. The latter quickly re-formed--there were not many
of the Inniskilling Fusiliers left to re-form--and were able to obtain
food after a fast of nearly twenty-four hours.

The casualties of the left half-battalion amounted to two officers
killed and three wounded, and eleven killed and fifty-six wounded of
the rank and file.[6]

         [Footnote 6: There were, of course, many narrow escapes, but
         none narrower than that of Major Romer, whose modesty forbids
         him to allude to it. His helmet was shot through by a bullet
         which actually parted his hair in its passage, a feat never
         before accomplished.--A. E. M.]

The right half-battalion, under Major English, had, during the assault
of Hart's Hill, watched the right flank towards Pieter's Hill. General
Hart proposed that they should attack the Boers in that quarter, but
Colonel Cooper, who was with the right half-battalion, pointed out
that the day was too far advanced. The right half-battalion spent the
night of the 23rd-24th February among the rocks on the hill whence
General Hart had directed the attack. About 8 a.m. on February 24th,
'B' company was sent to drive off small parties of the enemy who had
crept down the dongas and reached the railway on the left. This
company came under a severe fire, and Lieutenant Brodhurst Hill was
wounded in the leg, but the Boers were driven back. The 24th was spent
in a ceaseless rifle-duel with the enemy, who had brought a gun to
bear on the hill. During the afternoon, preparations were made for a
fresh attack on Hart's Hill, to be undertaken by Colonel Cooper with
two battalions, while General Hart, with the remainder of the force
at hand, assaulted Railway Hill. The attack was, however, postponed.

The enemy evidently feared another assault, for in the course of the
night of February 24th-25th, they opened a vigorous fire, which
disturbed the slumbers of General Hart's force, and created some
excitement.

During all this time the unlucky wounded, who had been hit on the
23rd, had been left lying in front of the Boer trenches. It was
impossible to help them, since all attempts in that direction had been
frustrated by the enemy. But on the morning of Sunday, February 25th,
a partial armistice was agreed upon in order to bring in the wounded
and to bury the dead. The armistice ended at 6 p.m., and both sides
commenced firing immediately afterwards.

[Illustration: Pieter's Hill. February 27th, 1900.]

Meanwhile, Sir Redvers Buller had evolved a new plan of operations,
and decided to attack with his combined force the three
hills--Pieter's, Railway, and Hart's. For this purpose the greater
part of the artillery was brought from the left bank and concentrated
on the right bank, opposite the points to be assaulted. It was in
position by the 26th, and began a slow bombardment of the Boer
trenches. During the night, the pontoon bridge under Hlangwane was
dismantled, and carried down to a point below the Boer bridge, where
it was relaid, an operation which was not concluded until 10 a.m. on
the 27th.

On the day before, the Dublin Fusiliers had been ordered to join
temporarily General Barton's Brigade. It left its position among the
rocks of Hart's Hollow about 7 a.m. on February 27th, and, moving down
the hill through the deserted Boer laager, halted by the pontoon
bridge. Here it was joined soon after 9 a.m. by the Irish and Scots
Fusiliers, and came under the command of General Barton.

[Illustration: Pontoon Bridge, River Tugela. February 28th, 1900.]

The battalion followed the Scots Fusiliers, and moved along the left
bank of the Tugela at the foot of a steep ridge, being covered by
infantry and maxim fire from the right bank.

After a march of two miles, and at the point where the Klip River
joins the Tugela, the 6th Brigade turned to its left and prepared to
attack the Boer position, which, lying some two miles from the river,
stretched from the ridges north of Eagle's Nest to the various kopjes
constituting Pieter's Hill. General Barton directed the Royal Irish
Fusiliers to assault the western end of Pieter's Hill and the Scots
Fusiliers the eastern, while the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers formed the
reserve.

The assault was successful, and the greater part of Pieter's Hill fell
into our hands, but the Boers still held a kopje to the north of the
hill, and maintained a heavy fire. General Barton, anxious to complete
his victory, directed three companies of the battalion and one company
of the Scots Fusiliers to advance against the kopje. 'B,' 'C,' and 'H'
were the three companies selected, the first named being on the right
and the latter on the left, connecting with the Scots Fusiliers.
Guided by Captain MacBean, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Brigade-Major 6th
Brigade, the detachment advanced about 2.30 p.m., and came at once
under a heavy rifle and pompom fire. The companies pushed forward,
however, by successive rushes until they reached a donga some three
hundred yards from the kopje. Here further progress was checked for a
time, and General Barton ordered forward three companies of the Royal
Irish Fusiliers. The latter came up about 5.30 p.m., and, supported by
the covering fire of 'B,' 'C,' and 'H' companies, rushed the left of
the hill, when the above-mentioned companies of the battalion, led by
Captain Venour, assaulted the right. The attack was successful, and
the kopje was captured.

During the advance Lieutenants Haskard and Bradford, in command of 'C'
and 'H' companies, were wounded, and the engagement cost the regiment
nine killed and forty-three wounded. 'D' company, under Lieutenant
Ely, towards the close of the afternoon came up on the left of 'H'
company, in order to fill the gap between the latter and the Scots
Fusiliers.

[Illustration: 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, heading Relief Troops,
marching into Ladysmith, March, 1900.]

The three companies which had made their attack on the kopje spent the
night on the captured position. Captain Venour, who was the senior
officer present, re-formed the men of the Irish and Dublin Fusiliers,
and constructed sangars, with a view of warding off a Boer
counter-attack. In the meantime 'A,' 'E,' 'F,' and 'G' companies--with
whom was Colonel Cooper--were directed to the right, in order to guard
the flank of the brigade against the Eagle's Nest position. These
companies gained about 2 p.m. a ridge opposite the Eagle's Nest, and
overlooking the extensive plain which stretches up to Bulwana
Mountain. The enemy opened a well-aimed fire on this ridge, and also
brought into action a gun which was placed on the shoulder to the
north of the Nest. As the right of the four companies was thrown back
towards the Tugela, this Boer gun could nearly enfilade part of the
line. Sangars were built, however, and there were not more than three
or four casualties in this part of the field. The firing ceased at
dusk, but otherwise the night was unpleasant, for it rained, and the
waggons could not get near the fighting line, so that the men had to
do without their great-coats.

Before daybreak on February 28th the battalion collected its scattered
companies and was ready for action. There was no reliable news of what
had happened on other parts of the field during the 27th, and the full
extent of the victory was still unknown. When daylight came it was
evident that the Boers had evacuated the Eagle's Nest, and small
parties of them could be seen retiring, while the tents of their
laager under Bulwana were gradually diminishing. But even then few
could believe that the relief of Ladysmith was practically
accomplished.

[Illustration: General Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., entering Ladysmith.]

Before mid-day an order came, directing the Dublin Fusiliers to move
after dinner and join the 11th Brigade, the position of which was not
indicated. Major English rode on ahead in order to discover its
whereabouts, but by the time he found it, the battalion had gone two
miles out of its way. The 11th Brigade was joined about 4 p.m., and
the regiment bivouacked between Hart's and Railway Hills. A heavy
thunderstorm burst over the country soon after 8 p.m., and made
everybody somewhat miserable, although the officers had been cheered
by the arrival of the invaluable Corporal Tierney, who, as usual,
succeeded in giving them food.

The services of this N.C.O. (now Mess-Sergeant) will never be
forgotten by the regiment, as long as an officer who was present with
it in South Africa remains in it. Over and over again he brought up
food to the officers under heavy fire, and through those desperate
thunderstorms. Always cheery, ever ready, there he was in his
shirt-sleeves, with a drink and a snack, just as one had resigned
oneself to going without anything. A word must also be said in praise
of our French _chef_, M. Burst, who cooked for the officer's mess
throughout, and proved himself on all occasions a brave man.

[Illustration: The Dublins are coming--Ladysmith.]

After breakfast on March 1st, the 11th Brigade advanced along the
railway towards Ladysmith. It was thought that the Boers would be
holding Bulwana, and the brigade had orders to attack the hill. But it
was soon learnt that the enemy had retired, and we eventually reached
Nelthorpe Station about mid-day and bivouacked. Major English and
Captain Venour took the opportunity of riding into Ladysmith.

March 2nd was spent at Nelthorpe. On the 3rd, Sir Redvers Buller's
army entered Ladysmith, and the honour of leading the army fell to the
2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers--an honour which nobody grudged
them, on account of the constant fighting they had taken part in since
the beginning of the war, and the heavy casualties they had suffered.
The route was by the railway bridge, and the streets of the little
town were lined by the garrison, who, emaciated but clean, presented a
startling contrast to their war-stained relievers.

[Illustration: Sir George White watching Relief Force entering
Ladysmith.]

The entry into Ladysmith, with its enthusiasm and meeting of old
friends, formed a fitting ending to the battalion's Natal campaign.
Hardly any other unit in the army had suffered such casualties. Only
five company officers marched through Ladysmith with it. The others
had been killed, wounded, or disabled.




CHAPTER IX.

THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH.

  'I am shut up.'--_Ps._ lxxxviii. 8 and _Jer._ xxxvi. 5.


_Chronicle of the part taken by the detachment 2nd Battalion Royal
Dublin Fusiliers in the Siege of Ladysmith from November 1st, 1899, to
February 28th, 1900._ _By_ LIEUT. L. F. RENNY, _2nd Batt. Royal Dublin
Fusiliers_.


The detachment which was left behind in Ladysmith when the battalion
was ordered to Colenso consisted of two officers, three
non-commissioned officers and fifty-one men. The latter were made up
by a section of 'G' company which was left on piquet because they
could not be relieved in time, and the men of the regimental
transport, which had been left behind owing to there being no facility
for sending the waggons and animals by train with the battalion.

The morning after the departure of the latter I was ordered by the
D.A.A.G. of the divisional troops to proceed to the various camps in
Section A, and find convenient space for the transport waggons. I
found the necessary ground in rear of the camp of the 1st Battalion
Gloucester Regiment, behind the railway cutting leading to the Orange
Free State Junction. Here we were joined in the afternoon by
Lieutenant H. W. Higginson, who took command, and the section of 'G'
company, when the Gloucesters helped us in every way, and made us as
comfortable as they possibly could. All that day we were left in
comparative peace, there being no firing on either side; but the next
morning about 5 a.m. the Boers opened with 'Long Tom' from Pepworth
Hill, and commenced a duel of some hour's duration with our naval 4.7,
which was placed on Junction Hill. They also kept up a continual
cannonade with their long-range twelve-pounders, but did little or no
damage, as they had not yet discovered the exact location of our
camps.

For the next three or four days we remained in the Gloucester's camp
and aided in starting the trenches which eventually formed the fort
known as 'Tunnel Hill.' This was by no means pleasant work, as it was
carried out under fire, the enemy being very quick at spotting our
working parties and remarkably so at obtaining our range. We used to
watch with great interest the duel every morning between the two big
guns. Once the Boers hoisted a large white flag over their epaulement
and proceeded to repair some small damage to their gun--they have very
weird ideas about the white flag.

On November 7th our detachment was suddenly ordered to proceed to
'Bell's Spruit,' and form the guard there. I was ordered to hand over
our transport to the Army Service Corps, so we took away the majority
of the men and brought the strength of our piquet up to thirty-one
men; the transport was sent to the railway station yard for the use of
the Army Service Corps, where it remained throughout the siege. We
were stationed at the mouth of the spruit just where it runs through
the ridge opposite the cemetery. Our fortifications consisted of a
thick wall with sandbag loopholes running right across the spruit;
about fifty yards in front were strips of high and low wire
entanglement, making it practically impossible for the enemy to rush
the post at night. By night we had to man two sangars placed on the
hills on each side of the spruit. I know nothing more productive of
bad language than visiting the sentries on those hills in the dark,
scrambling over the hugest boulders up a hill like the side of a
house. We were not very comfortable at first, there being absolutely
no shelter from sun or rain, but after about a week we managed to
obtain a couple of railway tarpaulins, and rigged up shelters on the
sides of the spruit. We were all very lucky in not getting hit, as
the enemy had a nasty habit of bursting shrapnel over the place and
sending common shell on to the crests, which produced a shower of
rocks, splinters and stones; but although we were in the spruit for
seven weeks with absolutely no cover, not a man in the detachment was
hit. During our stay in the spruit our rations were exceptionally
good, as we got extras in the way of bacon, jam, chocolate, &c.

The night-work at this time was very hard, as everybody not actually
on outpost duty had to work at the trenches from 6.30 in the evening
till 3 a.m. the next morning. Sleep being impossible in the day-time
owing to the heat and a plague of flies, this continual night-work
told on the men severely. On November 9th the enemy made a feeble
attempt at capturing the place, and came on in considerable numbers
against Observation Hill, but were easily repulsed. On the night of
December 7th-8th an attack was made on Gun Hill, where the Boers had a
'Long Tom' and a five-inch howitzer, besides one or two small guns.
These guns had been annoying us very greatly for the past three weeks,
and we were all delighted in the early morning when we heard the
attack had been successful, and the guns blown up. We none of us knew
anything about this affair till it was over. I was visiting our posts
about 2.30 a.m. when I saw two large flashes on Gun Hill; on listening
I could not hear any shells travelling or bursting, so concluded the
enemy were amusing themselves by firing blank charges. It was not till
we saw our column returning at dawn that we solved the problem. We
found the spruit very unpleasant in wet weather, as the water used to
come down like a mountain torrent and wash away bits of our wall and
shelters; after wet nights we used to spend our time in digging our
belongings out of the sand, having spent the night sitting on the
rocks.

About December 18th, after the failure of General Buller's first
attempt to relieve us, there was a general interchange of posts
amongst the troops of our section, and the detachment received orders
to proceed to the Newcastle Road examining guard. We were all heartily
sick of the spruit, and glad of the change. It was about this time
that our rations began to be diminished, and we had completely run out
of all extras. The post of the examining guard was on the road just
inside the ridge which formed our general line of defence, but by
night we moved out as a piquet about half a mile on to the veld into a
spruit which ran under the Harrismith line, whence we patrolled out to
Brooke's Farm, and the surrounding country. I think this was the worst
post we had throughout the siege, as we came in for a long spell of
wet weather, and night after night had to lie out on the open veld
from 8 p.m. till 4 a.m., wet to the skin and miserably cold. The
duties on this post came very hard on our men, as we had to find a
double and single sentry by day, so that they never got a night in
bed, and only about one day in three off duty.

On Christmas Eve the men came into possession of a fine pig, so that
we all had pork for our Christmas dinner, a great change from eternal
'trek ox,' but unfortunately nothing stronger to drink than tea. I'm
sure it was the first Christmas any of us had spent in such an
uncongenial way.

On January 6th the enemy made their desperate attack on Waggon Hill
and Caesar's Camp. They seem to have completely surprised our
outposts, as they succeeded in crawling up the hill in the dark, and
the fighting commenced at 3 a.m. The cannonade all day was something
tremendous, 'Long Tom' firing 125 rounds. They kept us pretty busy on
our side of the defences as well, but never developed any serious
attack. Whilst on this post we were subjected to a continuous and
daily course of sniping, the enemy getting on the kopjes behind
Brooke's Farm, and firing all day at a range of 2800 yards. At this
range the bullets used to whiz over the hill and drop amongst us,
although we were only a few yards behind the crest. Higginson and I
used to spend hours lying on the crest with rifles and glasses trying
to spot them, but never succeeded in doing so, as they used to take up
their position before dawn and never move all day.

It was about this time that our men began to show the effects of
exposure and constant sentry-go, and several of them went down with
fever and rheumatism; but we were extremely lucky throughout the
siege, having only one casualty: Private Ward, 'G' company, a
reservist, who died of enteric at Intombi Camp.

I forgot to mention that on January 6th our section had to be entirely
denuded of supports and reserves in order that they might be sent to
Waggon Hill, so that if the enemy had attacked us seriously we should
have had a hard job to keep them back.

On January 25th the detachment was ordered to garrison Liverpool
Castle, a fort overlooking the Newcastle Road, but we had not been
there twelve hours before we were ordered to Tunnel Hill. This latter
post consisted of a large main fort capable of holding two hundred
men, and two small works about a quarter of a mile on each flank, in
all of which we had to find a guard. Our fighting strength was at this
time reduced to twenty-seven men, so that they did guard and patrol
alternate nights. We had to send out five of the latter during the
night about half a mile to the front and a mile laterally along the
valley. The confinement in this fort was rather trying, and the
eternal manning of the trenches at 4 a.m. very monotonous. After about
three weeks on this post I was suddenly seized with a 'go' of fever,
and was sent down to a room in one of the houses. When I rejoined the
detachment, after a fortnight on the sick list, they had moved to the
railway station as guard over the bridge across the Klip River. Here
we had to endure rather a severe dose of 'Long Tom'--this gun never
missed a day without dropping shells into and round the station, it
was one of its favourite spots, and all the tin buildings about bore
evidence of its attentions. One shell, pitching in the parcels office,
blew the roof off and the floor in, having first penetrated
half-a-dozen walls to get there. We had trenches on our side of the
river, which we manned, as usual, at 4 a.m. We also had to man them in
the afternoon about 5 o'clock, when the train from Intombi Camp was
due. This used to be rather a comic proceeding: a 'key' was made in
the line about half a mile outside the station, where the train was
brought to a standstill, then either Higginson or myself had to walk
out and inspect the train to see there were no Boers inside it. We
often used to wonder what would have been our lot if the train had
been full of them. On our reporting 'all correct' to the Railway Staff
Officer (Captain Young, R.E.), the train was allowed to proceed into
the station, and the little play was over till the next day. This was
undoubtedly the most comfortable job we had, as the men lived in a
shed, whilst Higginson and I had a railway carriage.

On the afternoon of February 28th we heard the joyful tidings of
General Buller's victory at Pieter's Hill, and in the evening descried
Lord Dundonald and his men crossing the plain; our wild excitement may
be left to the imagination. I'm sure we all put on about seven pounds
of our lost weight at the mere thought of our being at last relieved.
Our troubles were not over yet, however, as the next morning we were
ordered back to Tunnel Hill, a spot we had learned to loathe with a
truly deep loathing. This move was due to our flying column going out
to hurry the enemy's retreat, most of the troops in our section taking
part in it. For some unknown reason we were kept four or five days in
that smelly fort, and it was not till March 7th that we received
orders to rejoin the battalion, which was encamped about two miles out
of Ladysmith. We all felt as though we had begun a new life; but it
was heartbreaking to see the havoc in our regiment; one had to look
about to find faces that one recognised.

Our rations were pretty well reduced towards the end of the siege: one
biscuit, one pound of horseflesh, two teaspoonfuls of sugar, and a
pinch of tea is not much to keep body and soul together, and we were
all pretty feeble and pulled down. I think we must have done the
record piquet duty of any men in any service, as we were never
relieved throughout the whole siege; I suppose this was on account of
being left as a separate unit all through, but we certainly thought it
rather hard work. It is a wonder that our little detachment stuck out
four months' constant exposure with so little sickness, whilst our
luck in sitting under that constant shelling without a man being hit
was nothing short of providential.

I have merely chronicled the chief moves and duties of the detachment
throughout the siege: it would take a small book to set down all our
little experiences, details, and troubles.




CHAPTER X.

ALIWAL NORTH AND FOURTEEN STREAMS.

  'But thus much is certain: that he that commands the
    sea is at great liberty, and may take as much,
      and as little of the war, as he wish.'

                              _Bacon._


After marching through Ladysmith, the battalion proceeded with the
11th Brigade to a camp about three miles to the north of the town and
on the left bank of the Klip River. It remained here until March 7th,
when it rejoined the 5th Brigade, which was encamped on the south side
of the Klip River, and about one mile nearer Ladysmith. On the same
date, Colonel Cooper was given the command of the 4th Brigade, and
accordingly handed over the battalion to Major Bird.

[Illustration: Sergeant Davis in Meditation over 'Long Cecil' at
Kimberley. 'Shall I take it for the Officers?']

There was another change of camping-ground on March 12th, the brigade
moving to the north-east of Ladysmith, under Surprise Hill. It was an
uneventful time, although outpost duties were somewhat severe.

In recognition of the gallantry displayed by the Irish regiments in
the Natal campaign, the Queen had directed that the shamrock should be
worn by all ranks on St. Patrick's Day. Accordingly, on March 17th,
every man wore a piece of green, since shamrock was unobtainable, and
the tents were decorated with boughs. A telegram was dispatched to the
Queen, who sent the following message in reply:--

'The Queen desires to thank her Dublin Fusiliers for their expression
of loyalty.'

[Illustration: St. Patrick's Day in Camp. Private Monaghan, the regimental
Butcher, in foreground.]

The battalion also received many congratulatory telegrams from Irish
associations and individuals in various parts of the world.

The detachment of the 1st Battalion was sent back to Colenso on March
21st. It had been just over four months with the 2nd Battalion, and
had borne its full share of the casualties. Originally numbering
eight officers and 287 rank and file, it returned with only two
officers and 92 rank and file.

The 5th Brigade moved on the 23rd to Modderspruit, and thence on the
next day to Elandslaagte, where it encamped a short distance to the
west of the battlefield. Here it stayed for ten days, and, as there
was little to do beyond outpost work, the battalion resumed ordinary
parades and route marching.

On April 4th, General Warren's Division relieved General Hunter's at
Elandslaagte, and the brigade marched back to Modderspruit. The 10th
Division (General Hunter), which consisted of the 5th and 6th
Brigades, was to proceed to Cape Colony for the relief of Mafeking.

On April 7th, Major Tempest Hicks, 1st Battalion Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, arrived from Colenso, and assumed command of the battalion.
The 5th Brigade began to move by train to Durban on the 9th, and we
were ordered to entrain at 1.45 p.m. on the 10th. But during the
morning, heavy firing broke out at Elandslaagte, and, as the enemy
seemed aggressive, the troops at Modderspruit were directed to be
ready to move to Elandslaagte.

We had struck camp and packed all the baggage in the train, and had,
therefore, to lie out in the hot sun for several hours, and await with
patience the development of events. The Boers apparently contented
themselves by a demonstration, and at 6 p.m. the battalion was allowed
to depart. The train reached Colenso at 9 p.m., where the 1st
Battalion was encamped, and Maritzburg about 4 a.m. Here, in spite of
the early hour, a number of friends, together with a band, were on the
platform, and the regiment received a warm greeting. The men were
given cigarettes and tobacco.

Durban was reached about 10 a.m. on April 11th, and the battalion at
once commenced to embark. The headquarters and about six companies
were carried by the _Cephalonia_, while the remaining two companies
went in the _Jamaica_. They were both slow ships, but the absolute
peace, the good food, the clean baths, and many other luxuries, made
everybody regret that they were not even slower.

East London was reached on the 12th, and the battalion was ordered to
disembark, since the 5th Brigade was urgently required to relieve
Wepener, which was surrounded by the enemy. General Hart, with the
Border Regiment and Somersetshire Light Infantry[7] started for Aliwal
North at once, but the battalion remained on board during the whole of
the 13th, although 'H' company, under Captain Romer, disembarked in
the afternoon, and was at once dispatched by train. The other
companies landed on the 14th, and left East London in two trains,
starting at 4 and 6 p.m.

         [Footnote 7: This regiment had joined the 5th Brigade after
         the relief of Ladysmith in place of the Inniskilling
         Fusiliers.]

Lieutenant Le Mesurier, who had been captured on October 20th, but
had, with Captain Haldane (Gordon Highlanders), effected a plucky
escape from Pretoria, rejoined us at East London. Unluckily he at once
developed typhoid fever, and had to be left behind.

Aliwal North was not reached until 10.30 a.m. on April 16th. 'H'
company had arrived the previous afternoon, and was encamped near the
station, but the remainder of the battalion crossed the Orange River,
and pitched camp about 600 yards from the bridge, with its outpost
line pushed forward on the high ground to the north.

Major Hicks became commandant of Aliwal North, and had no easy task.
The town was General Hart's base during the operations for the relief
of Wepener, and there was consequently much to be done. Moreover, the
surrounding country was disturbed, the Dutch population had to be
watched, and there were constant rumours of the approach of
commandoes. In the early hours of the 21st, a report reached the
commandant that a large body of Boers was marching on the town. He
therefore decided to bring the regiment back to the south side of the
river, only leaving the piquets on the north bank. We therefore at
once struck camp, and, crossing the river, bivouacked near the bridge.
But as the report proved to be misleading, camp was re-pitched on a
square in the middle of Aliwal North. The outskirts of the town were
put into a state of defence, and a series of trenches covered the
approaches to the bridge. Although this necessitated much labour,
everybody enjoyed their stay at Aliwal. It was a pretty place, with
trees and gardens full of roses, with plenty of water, including a hot
stream running through the camp, with a well-stocked library, and
lastly, but by no means leastly, with a hotel possessing excellent
lager beer.

[Illustration: A Wash in hot Water. Aliwal North.]

The time passed, in fact, too quickly, for on the 26th news was
received of the relief of Wepener, and orders were issued for our
movement to Kimberley. We started at once in two trains, the first
leaving at midnight the second at 1 a.m. on the 27th. It was a long
and monotonous journey, the only breaks in which were stops for the
purpose of cooking meals. Kimberley was reached at 10 p.m. on the
28th, and the train stopped the night in the station, going on at 6
a.m. on the 29th to Doornfield, about eight miles north of Kimberley,
where the Connaught Rangers and the 6th Brigade were already encamped.
Since General Hart, with the Borders and Somersetshire Light Infantry
were still near Wepener, Colonel Brooke assumed the command of the
brigade.

General Hunter's division had been ordered to relieve Mafeking, and
the General decided to cross the Vaal near Windsorton with the 6th
Brigade, and to advance up the right bank; while General Paget with
the Royal Munster Fusiliers, Connaught Rangers, and Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, faced the Boer position at Fourteen Streams. Colonel
Mahon's mounted column was to move by Barkley West, and reach Mafeking
by sweeping round the Boer flank.

The battalion accordingly left Doornfield by train at 9 a.m. on May
2nd, and about mid-day reached Content, where it detrained and
encamped. The next day it marched with the Connaught Rangers to a
position about two miles south of Warrenton. The opposite bank of the
Vaal was held by the Boers, who were strongly entrenched and had
field-guns. On the south bank of the Vaal were the Munster Fusiliers,
a battery of field artillery, a six-inch gun mounted on a railway
truck, and a balloon, the whole detachment being under Major-General
Paget.

[Illustration: Taking XIV STREAMS on 7th May 1900 at 9.30 a.m. very
bad ford. _From a sketch by Col. H. Tempest Hicks, C.B._]

As all tents had been left at Content, the regiment bivouacked, and
remained more or less idle. The Munsters were holding Warrenton, and
there was constant sniping between their posts and the Boer trenches.
The balloon ascended daily, and the six-inch gun fired an occasional
shot, while the enemy's field-guns came into action at intervals. It
was a monotonous and unpleasant time for the Connaught Rangers and
ourselves, since there was nothing to do, while it was very hot by day
and cold by night.

[Illustration: The regimental Maxim in Action at Fourteen Streams.]

A little excitement was afforded on May 6th, when the Connaught
Rangers and half the battalion made a demonstration against a drift to
the east of Fourteen Streams. The object apparently was to draw the
Boers' attention from the 6th Brigade, who, after a victory at Rooi
Dam, were moving up the right bank. The movement caused a slight
amount of sniping, and the detachment returned to the bivouac soon
after 2 p.m.

The approach of the 6th Brigade, aided, perhaps, by this
demonstration, caused the enemy to evacuate hurriedly their trenches
during the afternoon of the 6th. Early on the morning of the 7th, the
Connaught Rangers and the right half-battalion started to ford the
Vaal at Warrenton.

The river at this point was broad and swift. The ford was a difficult
one, being beset by rocks and holes, and it took a considerable time
for the column to cross, since the water was up to the men's waists.
The left half-battalion under Major Bird moved one and a half miles up
the river near Fourteen Streams, where there was a ferry-boat. The
latter had been rendered useless by the Boers, but as they had left
the wire hawser, it was easy for the Royal Engineers to construct a
raft, on which the left half-battalion crossed comfortably and
quickly.

The right half-battalion joined the left half at the ferry, and
breakfasts were cooked. Before leaving the river-bank everybody made
an inspection of the Boer trenches, which formed an exceedingly strong
position. They were very deep, and so well adapted to the ground, that
it was no easy matter to discover them from the opposite bank.
Evidences of the hurried Boer retreat were plentiful in the shape of
full ammunition-boxes, half-cooked food, blankets, and kettles. One
Boer, who was too ill to march, was captured in the trenches.

After breakfasts, the battalion moved through a piece of ground
thickly covered with bush, and eventually bivouacked about one mile
from the Vaal, near the railway line. The 6th Brigade halted near the
same place, and the whole force was occupied for the next fortnight in
covering Fourteen Streams. The important railway bridge at this point
had been destroyed by the Boers, and the Royal Engineers, aided by
large working parties from the infantry, at once commenced to
construct a deviation bridge. This necessitated a great amount of
labour, and since, in addition, defensive works had to be made, we
were all kept very busy.

The stay at Fourteen Streams was interrupted on May 15th by a movement
on Christiana, a town in the Transvaal, reported to be held by a
strong party of Boers. The whole of the 10th Division took part in the
operations, and were thus the first regular troops to enter the
Transvaal. The frontier was crossed at 9 a.m. The advance was through
an undulating country, at times thickly covered by bush. Towards the
afternoon the brigade halted, as news was received that the mounted
troops had entered Christiana. A bivouac was formed in a clearing
among the bush, and dinners were cooked.

The next day the brigade marched back to Fourteen Streams, and reached
that place early on May 17th, having done some twenty-six miles in
nineteen hours. Work on the railway bridge was resumed, and, as the
6th Brigade had not returned, the battalion had to watch a more
extensive area. Each company was given a section, and constructed a
redoubt.

[Illustration: Captain Jervis, General Fitzroy Hart, C.B., C.M.G., and
Captain Arthur Hart.]

About May 24th, Second Lieutenant Bradford, with twenty-nine men, was
sent up the line to garrison Border Siding, where they were picked up
three days later.

The deviation bridge over the Vaal having been completed, the
battalion was sent forward by train to Vryburg, travelling in two
trains. Camp was pitched just outside the station, and for the next
two days every one spent their time in buying _karosses_ and in
shooting partridges.

The 10th Division, when Mafeking had been relieved by Colonel Mahon,
was ordered to march to Johannesburg via Lichtenburg. As the first
part of the route lay through a country very deficient in water, the
division marched in several columns, which followed each other at a
day's interval. The battalion left Vryburg on May 30th at 7.30 a.m.,
and proceeded to Devondale, and on the next day made a march of
twenty-two miles to Dornbult, where Captain Mainwaring, with Second
Lieutenants Newton and Smith, joined.

Their wanderings before they succeeded in doing so are sufficient
evidence how little was known, even to our own staff officers of the
whereabouts of the several columns. On arrival at Cape Town in the
s.s. _Oratava_, they were transhipped to the s.s. _Ranee_ and sent to
Port Elizabeth. On reporting themselves there they were entrained and
sent to Bloemfontein. No one there seemed to know where the regiment
was, but at that very time the report arrived of the march on
Christiana. Captain Mainwaring then met Captain Carington Smith of the
regiment, who was at that time serving in Roberts' Horse (which he
later on commanded), and as that officer was shortly going north with
some men of his corps, it seemed to both that the speediest way to get
to the Dublin Fusiliers was for Captain Mainwaring to be attached to
Roberts' Horse. An application to that effect was made to the staff
and granted, but shortly afterwards the news of the Christiana
column's return to the railway came to hand, so the three officers
once more entrained, and proceeded via De Aar to Kimberley.

Although Captain Carington Smith did not serve with either battalion
during the war, it would not be out of place here to mention the great
part he took in it. He commenced by serving in Roberts' Horse, and was
with them throughout Lord Roberts' advance to Bloemfontein. In the
action at Sanna's Post he was shot through the knee, but resolutely
refused to be invalided home. His recovery from this severe wound was
little short of marvellous, and he actually managed to rejoin the
headquarters of his corps in time to share in the entry into
Pretoria. Shortly after this he was again shot at Heidelberg, this
time through the other knee, and again made a second and equally
marvellous recovery. Towards the end of the war he commanded Roberts'
Horse, and later on the South African Light Horse, and his trekking
during the campaign amounted to no less than 9000 miles.

[Illustration: Issuing Queen Victoria's Chocolate. Colour-Sergeant
Connel, 'G' Company, on left.]




PART II.

TREKKING.




CHAPTER I.

VRYBURG TO HEIDELBERG.

  'None of us put off our clothes.'

                              _Neh._ iv. 23.


Now commenced a different phase of warfare. If, in the constant
fighting of the Natal campaign, the regiment had been called upon to
prove its fighting capabilities--a call to which their noble response
earned them encomiums wherever they went--they were now to be called
upon to prove another essential of the true soldier--their mobility.
And well they proved it. Day after day, week after week, the tired,
footsore, but stout-hearted column-of-route made its slow and
wearisome way over the apparently limitless expanse of the swelling
veld. And how monotonous that veld can be none can appreciate save
those who have experienced its deadly sameness. Ahead, behind, all
round, nothing but veld, veld, veld. No trees, no hills, no rivers, no
lakes, no houses, no inhabitants! Here and there, perhaps, a miserable
shanty of the sealed-pattern South African type: rough stone walls and
corrugated-iron roof, a room on each side of the door, a narrow
verandah--occasionally occupied by a quiet, peaceful-looking old
patriarch, with a grey beard, and an air savouring rather of the
pulpit than the sheltered side of a boulder--a scraggy tree or two,
and a lick of water in a 'pan'--or pond as we should call it--hard by;
a woman, some children, and a couple of goats; a few mealie cobs
yellowing on the roof, and a scared, indignant, and attenuated fowl.

Alas! how those quiet-looking, quiet-spoken old gentlemen, open Bible
on knee, deceived us. Oh, no! they had never wished for war. Fight?
yes; they had fought, and surrendered, and taken the oath, and hoped
never to fight again. Peace? yes; they wanted peace, and urged us to
hasten on and conclude it. The same story everywhere: in the villages
as in the solitary hamlets. A vast, empty, forsaken wilderness, with
nothing more bellicose than a lean and hungry boar-hound or two. And
yet for two long years to come this very country, over which the
battalion trekked so peacefully, fifes and drums playing, officers out
on the flanks shooting, mess-president cantering miles away in quest
of eggs and their producers, was to be the scene of many a hard-fought
fight and many weary nights of outposts. Indeed, it never really
succumbed to the very end; the happy hunting-ground of the gallant De
la Rey, it was a thorn in the side of our leaders up to the day the
Delegates came in.

One day's march varied little from another. Up at dawn, and off after
the scantiest of scrappy breakfasts. Good marching while the dew was
on the grass, and the sun a welcome ally after the clear, crisp,
frosty nights; soon, however, to get hot enough, until the welcome
mid-day halt and meal, after which tighten up belts once more and on,
and on, one horizon following another with wearisome regularity, and
never a sign of the long-looked-for water, till at last, as the sun
set behind our backs, its last rays would glint on the miserable 'pan'
by whose side we were to halt for the night. And then what bitter
feelings of depression and disgust when sometimes the fiat would go
forth 'Water for cooking purposes only,' and one had to turn into
one's blankets grimy, dusty, clammy, and miserable.

On May 31st, the regiment, having arrived at the railway, was told
they would halt there next day. But on the morning of June 1st, the
order was given for the column[8] to march at 2 p.m. to Marigobo Pan,
a distance of eight miles only, but quite ten by the route taken. The
evenings soon close in at this time of year in South Africa, and it
was almost dark when the column arrived. As it was a fine mild night,
every one hoped to be allowed to bivouac, but tents were pitched after
all, and naturally enough pitched anyhow.

         [Footnote 8: Border Regiment, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Bearer
         Company, and Supply Detachment.]

In this matter of pitching tents, the battalion particularly prided
itself. On arrival at the selected site of the camp the Sergeant-Major
blew a whistle, when all those whose duty it was to assist ran towards
him, the men to mark the tent-poles, bayonets in hand, and two others
with the mekometer, to ensure a true right-angle. Every one knew his
particular job, so no time was wasted, while the symmetrical lines
obtained by the use of the instrument were a joy to the General's
eye.[9]

         [Footnote 9: _Vide_ General Hart's letter in Appendix.]

[Illustration: First Entry into Krugersdorp. Captain and Adjutant
Fetherstonhaugh in foreground.]

In the same way, whenever a halt was ordered, it was the regiment's
custom to lay out their kits, mess-tins, belts, &c., in lines outside
their tents. Each Colour-Sergeant had a ball of string, which was
stretched between a couple of pegs; the kits were laid along it, the
string was rolled up and pitched into a tent, and neatness and
regularity prevailed without any extra trouble to any one. This
neatness in camp, in addition to its other soldierly qualities,
endeared the battalion in the eyes of General Hart, a soldier of the
old school, to whom order and regularity particularly appealed.

On the 2nd the column made another short march to Greysdorp, where
there were two or three good wells, but where the water in the pan was
of a most peculiar green colour.

The Mafeking relief column was met on the way, and very hard and
serviceable they looked, while several officers met old friends,
amongst others Prince Alexander of Teck, whom we had known at
Maritzburg before the war.

A longish march of nineteen or twenty miles on the 3rd, with a halt
midway, brought us in the evening to a place called Barber's Pan,
somewhat superior to the generality of these places. There was a
certain amount of water in the pan, but brackish and unpleasant to
drink. Round it were scattered some half-dozen houses, but the most
remarkable thing in connection with it was the sunset. As the light
faded, a mist rose from the veld, which after a few minutes began to
change colour, until at last it settled down to a most beautiful shade
of light green. None of us had seen anything similar before, nor did
we ever see anything like it again.

A march of about fourteen or fifteen miles on the 4th brought us to a
most uncomfortable camp. On the way, Captain Fetherstonhaugh (acting
Adjutant since Captain Lowndes was hit at Talana) rode off some
distance to a flank to try and get some supplies. He returned with a
great story of his reception by crowds of women and one or two men;
the latter stated they had been reluctantly compelled to fight against
us at Modder River, on pain of being shot, but that their sympathies
were entirely with us, &c. They even gave him a pound of butter. And
we believed this story at the time.

But, for that matter, who would not have been taken in? Every one
coming up the line brought better and better news. Lord Roberts was
close to the capital, and, thought we in our simplicity, that of
course must end the war. No one guessed there was extra time--two
solid years extra time--to be played. So we enjoyed the butter, and
said they were sensible people after all, and hoped we'd be in time
for the siege of Pretoria.

The next day's march was a pleasanter one than usual, the halts being
better arranged, with the result that the troops and transport got
into camp quite as early as they would have done under the ordinary
circumstances, but very much fresher and fitter. The fact is, staff
officers do not understand marching. They go tittuping gaily past long
straggling columns, passing the time of day cheerily to friends, and
momentarily halting to deliver some ironical knock to acquaintances on
the subject of their transport, or their sections of fours, or
something of the sort. But the regimental officer, who foots it
alongside his company, he understands marching right enough. He will
tell you when the going is good, and when it only looks good; he will
tell you the effects of five-minute halts, and how much benefit the
closing-up rear of the column derives from them; he will tell you when
a steady, swinging pace is being set that the men could keep up for
ever; and he will also tell you when some long-legged officer in front
is going four miles an hour, till some one suggests it is too fast,
and he sinks into a slow and tiring two and a half. Colonel Hicks
commanded the column on the 5th, and let us march our own way, with
the beneficial results already recorded.

And that cheery rumour about Pretoria. French reported to be there,
and Mr. Kruger gone off with a couple of millions. What did we care
about the latter? We should not have got any of it.

Another short march of a little over ten miles brought us to a camp
where there was actually a stream. Here the men got the chance of a
much-needed bathe, and how they enjoyed it! Every one, in fact, was in
excellent spirits, for the news about Pretoria turned out to be true,
and though some of us were disappointed at not being up in time to
share in the triumphant entry into the capital, the majority were all
for England, home, and beauty.

On the 7th we arrived at Lichtenburg, a small town or village that was
to see some heavy fighting later on in the war. On the present
occasion all seemed most peaceful. The houses were of the stereotyped
South African pattern, with the invariable half-stoep, half-verandah
running half-way along their fronts. Clear streams of water ran coolly
and pleasingly by the sides of the streets, shaded by the ubiquitous
weeping-willow. There was nothing to be bought, and no one to be seen,
however, and those of us who went into the town next morning were very
soon satisfied, returning to camp minus the various articles we had
set forth to buy. It was interesting, however, to see the Boers
handing in their rifles and taking the oath of allegiance.

Captain MacBean, who was now on General Hunter's staff, turned up
here, and dined with the regiment, and very glad we were to see him.
He gave us all sorts of news, too, which we were very deficient of, as
the system of daily bulletins had not then started.

After having halted for the 8th and 9th, we resumed our desert march
on the 10th, but only made some ten miles. It was most bitterly cold
all the way.

The next day proved far pleasanter, and another short, easy march of
about ten miles saw us in camp by 1.30 p.m.

On the 12th we made a march of sixteen miles. We were then within
about thirty-three miles of the railway from Johannesburg to
Potchefstroom, and, when a wire came ordering us to do it in two days,
we thought a lot of the task, whereas a few months later we were doing
that distance in one day, and, curiously enough, almost in the same
neighbourhood.

In consequence of this we marched right through Ventersdorp, to our
regret, as it looked quite a nice place, and there was a regular
trout-stream flowing past it, in which a bathe would have been most
welcome. We did eighteen miles before halting.

As indicative of the curious state of the war even in these early
days, General Hunter's experience at Vryburg was a good example. He
had ridden on with only thirty cavalrymen to Ventersdorp, when
suddenly some two hundred and fifty of the enemy appeared on the
scene. Fortunately for the General, their only object was to give up
their arms and take the oath.

Starting at 7.30 a.m. next day, we made short work of the march to the
railway, which we struck at Frederickstadt, a place that many of us
were destined to become very well acquainted with before we had done.
It is rather prettier than most Boer villages, being situated on the
pleasant little Mooi River, whose clear, rapid current reminded us of
our home streams. There are a few trees in the vicinity, whilst on the
further bank and beyond the railway rise the serrated, well-wooded,
and extremely picturesque Gatsrand Hills.

There was only one man to be seen, peacefully hoeing his potato-patch.
But if the men were scarce and polite, the same could not be said for
the fair sex, who, despite the fact that their knowledge of English
was only to be compared with our ignorance of Dutch, did not fail to
let us know their opinions of things generally. Indeed, the
mess-president, who had gone on ahead on a pony in search of
farmyard products, had a battle-royal with an elderly Dutch lady who
asked six shillings a dozen for her eggs.

We heard more detailed accounts here of the relief of Mafeking, and of
the gallant part Major Godley of ours had taken in its defence, while
Major Pilson and Captain Kinsman (also Royal Dublin Fusiliers) had
assisted in the relief. As Carington Smith had arrived in Kimberley
with the cavalry, we were able to claim representation in all three of
the great sieges and reliefs of the war.

[Illustration: 'Speed Dead Slow.']

But a disappointment was in store for us all the same. The column did
not move next day (the 15th), but although engine after engine came
puffing up from Potchefstroom they all failed to bring the carriages
which our aching legs made us so anxiously look for. We heard of the
strike of forty engine-drivers at Potchefstroom, but as they had all
been cast into durance vile, and the engines still continued to
arrive, that could not have been the reason. However, any doubts we
entertained were soon set at rest by an order to continue our march to
Johannesburg next day.

[Illustration: Miscellaneous Casualties.

  Lieut. ELY. _Died at sea of Enteric._
  Capt. H. CARINGTON SMITH. _Wounded at Sanna's Post and Heidelberg._
  Capt. WATSON. (_Attached to Scottish Horse_). _Killed at Moedwil._
  Capt. H. J. KINSMAN. _Wounded in Transvaal._
  Capt. J. A. MACBEAN. _Killed at Nooitgedacht._
  Lieut. ADRIAN TAYLOR. _Severely wounded when serving with M.I. near
    Parys._]

Starting on the 16th, an uneventful march of twelve miles brought us
to Wolverdiend, a place which had not then attained the importance it
afterwards assumed.

It was another fifteen on to Blauw Bank Station next day. This march
was remarkable in that it was the first occasion since this trek
started that the column moved with any military precautions worth
mentioning.

Leaving Bank, as it got to be called later on, we struck off from the
railway, left shoulders up, in a bee-line for Johannesburg, the city
of our dreams, which it was hard to believe was not paved with gold,
if one listened to the reports of those who had been there before the
war. After a short march of ten miles we halted at a farm called
Gemsbokfontein, and looked with longing eyes at the distant ridge,
peeping over which could plainly be seen the huge mine-chimneys, like
sentinels along the hills, duly noting our arrival.

A fierce grass-fire broke out here, which necessitated the active
co-operation of all hands, and all blankets, to oppose it, one
too-adventurous officer getting rather scorched for his pains.

As we sat at lunch we could see General Mahon's mounted column
ascending the long rise to Randfontein, on our left front, and heard
they had gone to Krugersdorp.

'Krugersdorp! Where's that?' 'Let's look at your map,' and so on.
Well, we undoubtedly knew where it was a few weeks later. Moreover,
there must be Boers there, for had not a party on an engine come out
that very day, and after destroying a small bridge, and firing a
couple of shots, snorted their way back to the Dorp.

The Royal Dublin Fusiliers supplied the advanced guard on the 19th,
and duly started for Johannesburg, but a message very shortly came
ordering a left incline, and nominating Krugersdorp as our objective.
It was disappointing, but General Mahon had reported the
Krugersdorpers 'truculent,' and we had to make a demonstration. This
we most certainly did, halting above the railway, just outside the
town, and then--producing drums and fifes--forming up and marching
through to 'St. Patrick's Day' and the 'British Grenadiers.' But,
unlike the peaceful and amiable agriculturist, these townsfolk had no
smiles of reciprocation to our advances, and we marched through long
lines of scowling male faces, with here and there one or two of the
fair sex, but also, alas! sombre to a degree.

[Illustration: Hoisting The Union Jack at Krugersdorp.]

After emerging on the far side of the town we passed the famous
Paardekraal Monument on our right, and finally camped about half a
mile further on. It appears it was a very close thing whether they
opposed us or not, and the peaceful solution that eventually took
place was largely due to the tactful intervention and determination of
an Englishman, Mr. W. Bruce Honman, who had considerable influence
amongst the Dutch.

The troops halted at Krugersdorp next day, and the town was formally
taken over in the Queen's name, an impressive parade for that purpose
being held in the market square. Each regiment furnished a Guard of
Honour of 100 men. The Royal Dublin Fusilier Guard was under the
command of Major English, with Captain Higginson and Lieutenant
Haskard. It was extremely interesting for those of us who were not on
duty to watch the faces of the large numbers of Boers, male and
female, who watched this ceremony and the hoisting of the Union Jack.
On the whole they took it extremely well, and for the most part
behaved like brave men, who, having fought and lost, were content to
make the best of the situation.

[Illustration: Johan Meyer's House, five Miles outside Johannesburg.]

The trek commenced again on the 22nd, and this time we felt convinced
our destination must be Johannesburg, as we were marching along the
Witwaters Rand straight for it. A halt was made after some ten miles,
at Florida, rather a pleasant sort of Saturday-to-Monday resort of
Johannesburgers, with a nice lake and pleasant woods.

At last we seemed about to receive our reward, only to have our hopes
dashed rudely to the ground. True, we marched to Johannesburg, and
even through it, but only through the most miserable of its slums,
seeing nothing of its fine buildings, nothing of the wealth and
magnificence we had confidently expected. But, indeed, even the
finest part of it was only a sorry spectacle in those days, and for
many a weary month afterwards. Skirting the racecourse, we marched on
to a spot some six miles from the town, near the house of Johan Meyer,
a brother of Lucas Meyer. Colonel Hicks and Captain Fetherstonhaugh
called on this gentleman, and got a lot of interesting information
from him. His house was one of the finest we saw in the whole
Transvaal, and from its site--at the head of a fine valley--commanded
a magnificent view of the country almost as far as Heidelberg.

But, as some set-off to our disappointment and long, tiring march of
fifteen miles, Captain Sir Frederick Frankland, who had gone on to
Joh'burg, as it is universally called, to buy what stores he could,
turned up just before dinner, not only with a large amount of
provisions, but also with a case of excellent champagne, which he
presented to the mess, God bless him! We were very proud of our noble
Baronet that night, and he had to reply to the toast of his health
over and over again.

[Illustration: Sergeant Davis, evidently with All we wanted.]

Sergeant Davis, champion forager of the Army, also put in an
appearance here, having met with no end of adventures and
misadventures since the Colonel had sent him back to the
Kimberley-Mafeking Railway. As usual, he had a fine lot of stores,
and, also as usual, just what we wanted: baccy, chocolate, biscuits,
sjamboks, stamps, etc., etc.

An uneventful march of fifteen miles, with a halt at Reitfontein, was
only noticeable for a particularly cold night and the final splitting
up of the Irish Brigade, the Connaughts and Borders being ordered to
Pretoria.

On the 25th our long march came to an end with a twelve-mile step into
Heidelberg. The band of the Derbyshire Regiment played us in, while
our old friend, General Bruce Hamilton, rode out to meet us. We halted
on a slope about three-quarters of a mile outside the town, which in
its essential features is remarkably like Krugersdorp, the streets
being lined with tall blue-gum trees, and the plan of course
rectangular, with the usual market square in the centre.

There had been a fight here, and we found Captain Carington Smith
again amongst the wounded; this time, as already mentioned, with a
bullet through his other knee, but as cheery as ever, and smiling away
at seeing us all again. Lieutenant Adrian Taylor, of the regiment, was
also here, and very glad we were to see him once more. Like Captain
Carington Smith he was detached from the regiment throughout the
campaign, serving with the M.I., and was about a month later very
severely wounded near Parys when De Wet crossed the Vaal with Lord
Kitchener at his heels. Still another Dublin Fusilier met us at
Heidelberg--Major Rutherford, Adjutant of the Ceylon Volunteers, who
had come over in command of a detachment of that corps.

In addition to all these, General Cooper (our late C.O.) and his
A.D.C., Lieutenant Renny, R.D.F., were also coming up from the south,
while the 1st Battalion, who had helped to win Alleman's Nek, were not
far off.

On arrival at Heidelberg we had marched just 300 miles in
twenty-seven days, and although we had not pressed in any way, we had
come along fairly well seeing that we were not bound on any specific
object, such as the relief of a town, or the participation in a siege
or battle. We averaged just over eleven miles a day, including halts
at Lichtenburg (two days), Frederickstadt and Krugersdorp (two days),
or just a shade under fourteen miles for each marching day.

[Illustration: Paardekraal Monument, Krugersdorp.]




CHAPTER II.

HEIDELBERG.

  'Wherever a man's post is, whether he has chosen it of his own
  will, or whether he has been placed at it by his commander, there
  it is his duty to remain and face the danger, without thinking of
  death, or of any other thing except dishonour.'--_Socrates._

  'Such officers do the King best service in the end.'--_Hamlet._


A considerable force had now assembled at Heidelberg, but it was not
to remain there long. General Hunter took over command from General
Ian Hamilton, who had had a bad fall from his horse, and shortly moved
off to the Free State, where he and his men soon covered themselves
with distinction by the rounding-up of Prinsloo's commandoes near
Golden Gate, on the Basuto border.

The 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, a half-battalion Somersetshire Light
Infantry, and the 28th Field Battery Royal Artillery, with some
details, were left to garrison Heidelberg.

The battalion was soon split up into a number of small detachments,
and posted at various places along the railway line, which had
suffered considerably at the hands of the Boers. Scarcely a bridge
remained intact, while the presence of wandering bodies of the enemy
in the neighbourhood necessitated the utmost caution and continual
vigilance on the part of the companies, half-companies, and even
sections, into which some of the companies were at length subdivided.

Headquarters and those companies not on detachment in the meantime had
plenty of work cut out for them too. In order to defend the place two
hills to the west of the town were occupied, one by the Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, known as Dublin Hill, and the other by the Somersetshire
Light Infantry. Our hill was put into a most thorough state of
defence by many hours of hard labour and efficient work under the
direction of Colonel Hicks. Sangars were built on every spur and knoll
which afforded a good field of fire; traverses and shelters were
numerous; in case of a night attack whitened stones along well-made
tracks showed the nearest way to the various posts; while not only
every company, but every section, had its well-defined trench or wall
to rally on and hold.

To some of us, indeed, all these precautions at the time seemed
somewhat excessive, and it is true that no attack was ever made; but
just as example is better than precept and practice better than
theory, so prevention is better than cure, and there is little doubt
that the fortification of that hill, in full view of many a Boer
field-glass in the town, whence our movements were of course fully
reported as frequently as possible to the enemy in the field, had a
deterrent effect on any designs our very active foes might otherwise
have contemplated.

On the morning of the 26th the left half-battalion, under Major Bird,
was suddenly ordered off to Nigel Road Station, about three miles out
on the railway to Johannesburg. The Boers having blown up a bridge
between this station and Heidelberg, all stores, &c., arriving from
Johannesburg had to be dumped down on the veld here, and it was
necessary to have a force on the spot to load them into waggons, as
well as to guard them and the trains. These soon began to arrive in
large numbers, and as each came up the sides of the railway waggons
were opened, and their heterogeneous contents chucked out anyhow into
a huge mass. In the mean time R.E. construction trains also arrived,
and the quiet little siding was soon a scene of wild bustle and
excitement. The R.E. went to work on the broken bridge, and made a
most excellent job of it in a surprisingly short time, though a casual
inspection of the temporary structure they built for trains to
pass over gave the lay mind the impression that an extra strong puff
of wind would blow the whole thing over. However, it answered its
purpose very thoroughly, and reflected much credit on its
constructors.

[Illustration: Colonel H. Tempest Hicks, C.B. Commanding 2nd Royal
Dublin Fusiliers March 1900 to March 1904.]

In the meantime Major Bird soon produced law and order out of chaos.
The coolies were made to put mealie-bags in one place and
biscuit-boxes in another, while the soldiers built both up into a very
serviceable sort of fort for the time being, an example of soldierly
adaptability which was not lost on any one who saw it or took part in
its erection.

We spent two or three very cheery days at Nigel Siding, the
stationmaster's house (two rooms) forming an ideal officers' mess, but
on the 28th 'E' and 'F' companies, under Captains Shewan and G. S.
Higginson, were recalled to headquarters, 'H' company, under Captain
Romer, was sent nine miles nearer Johannesburg to guard Reit Vlei
Bridge, while 'G' company remained at Nigel Road to watch over such
stores as had not yet been removed. This company was shortly further
subdivided by the left half-company, under Lieutenant E. St. G. Smith,
being sent to guard a culvert half-way to Reit Vlei Bridge.

In the meantime Colonel Hicks never for a moment relaxed the soldierly
precautions which it was his custom to observe, whether the Boers were
reported in the neighbourhood or not; and several times rumours of
intended attacks did arrive, though they invariably proved false.

The town of Heidelberg itself was very Dutch and seething with
malcontents and treachery. One could easily forgive them for not being
exactly content, but what one could not forgive was their slimness,
their plausible exterior, and their inner mass of falsehood. No class
were more bitter than the clergymen, and one of these gentry was
strongly suspected of being in constant communication with the Boers
in the field, though his oath of neutrality was taken and he was
availing himself of ou

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