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Gutenberg · ebook 24538

1914

by Earl of Ypres John Denton Pinkstone French · English · public domain in the US

  • Language English
  • PG edition 2008
  • Rights public domain (US)
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Contents

    CHAPTER I.

    PRELIMINARY.

    For years past I had regarded a general war in Europe as an eventual certainty. The experience which I gained during the seven or eight years spent as a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and my three years tenure of the Office of Chief of the General Staff, greatly strengthened this conviction.

    For reasons which it is unnecessary to enter upon, I resigned my position as Chief of the Staff in April, 1914, and from that time I temporarily lost touch with the European situation as it was officially represented and appreciated.

    I remember spending a week in June of that year in Paris, and when passing through Dover on my return, my old friend, Jimmie Watson (Colonel Watson, late of the 60th Rifles, A.D.C. to the Khedive of Egypt), looked into my carriage window and told me of the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his Consort. I cannot say that I actually regarded this tragedy as being the prelude which should lead ultimately to a great European convulsion, but in my own mind, and in view of my past experience, it created a feeling of unrest within me and an instinctive foreboding of evil.

    Then came a few weeks of the calm which heralded the storm--a calm under cover of which Germany was vigorously preparing for "the day."

    One afternoon, late in July, I was the guest at lunch of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowski. It was a small party, comprising, to the best of my recollection, only Princess Henry of Pless, Lady Cunard, Lord Kitchener, His Excellency and myself. The first idea I got of the storm which was brewing came from a short conversation which I had with the Ambassador in a corner of the room after lunch.

    He was very unhappy and perturbed, and he plainly told me that he feared all Europe would be in a blaze before we were a fortnight older. His feeling was prophetic. His surprising candour foreshadowed the moral courage with which Prince Lichnowski subsequently issued his famous apologia.

    On July 28th Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The military preparations of the Dual Monarchy inevitably led to a partial mobilisation by Russia against Austria, whereupon the German Emperor proclaimed the "Kriegsgefahrszustand" on July 31st, following this up by declaring war against Russia on August 1st. On August 2nd German troops entered Luxemburg and, without declaration of war, violated French territory. Great Britain declared war against Germany on August 4th and against Austria on August 12th, France having broken off relations with Austria two days earlier.

    On Thursday, July 30th, I was sent for by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and was given private intimation that, if an expeditionary force were sent to France, I was to command it. On leaving the room I found some well-known newspaper correspondents in the passage. I talked a little with them and found that great doubt existed in their minds as to whether this country would support France by force of arms. This doubt was certainly shared by many.

    I remember well that on the morning of Saturday, August 1st, the day upon which Germany declared war on Russia, and it was known that the breaking out of hostilities between Germany and France was only a question of hours, I received a visit from the Vicomte de la Panouse, the French Military Attache in London. He told me that the Ambassador was much disheartened in mind by these doubts and fears. We talked matters over, and he came to dinner with me that night. Personally, I felt perfectly sure that so long as Mr.

    Asquith remained Prime Minister, and Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Winston Churchill continued to be members of the Cabinet, their voices would guide the destinies of the British Empire, and that we should remain true to our friendly understanding with the Entente Powers. As the result of the long conversation I had with the Vicomte de la Panouse, I think I was successful in causing this conviction to prevail at the French Embassy.

    England declared war on Germany on Tuesday, August 4th, and on the 5th the mobilisation of Regulars, Special Reserve and Territorials was ordered. On Wednesday, August 5th, a Council of War was held at 10, Downing Street, under the Presidency of the Prime Minister. Nearly all the members of the Cabinet were present, whilst Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener, Sir Charles Douglas, Sir Douglas Haig, the late Sir James Grierson, General (now Sir Henry) Wilson and myself were directed to attend. To the best of my recollection the two main subjects discussed were:--

    1. The composition of the Expeditionary Force.
    1. The point of concentration for the British Forces on

    their arrival in France.

    As regards 1.

    It was generally felt that we were under some obligation to France to send as strong an army as we could, and there was an idea that one Cavalry Division and six Divisions of all arms had been promised. As to the exact number, it did not appear that we were under any definite obligation, but it was unanimously agreed that we should do all we could. The question to be decided was how many troops it was necessary to keep in this country adequately to guard our shores against attempted invasion and, if need be, to maintain internal order.

    Mr. Churchill briefly described the actual situation of the Navy. He pointed out that the threat of war had come upon us at a most opportune moment as regards his own Department, because, only two or three weeks before, the Fleet had been partially mobilised, and large reserves called up for the great Naval Review by His Majesty at Spithead and the extensive naval manoeuvres which followed it. So far as the Navy was concerned, he considered Home Defence reasonably secure; but this consideration did not suffice to absolve us from the necessity of keeping a certain number of troops at home.

    After this discussion it was decided that two Divisions must for the moment remain behind, and that one Cavalry Division and four Divisions of all arms should be sent out as speedily as possible. This meant a force of approximately 100,000 men.

    As regards 2.

    The British and French General Staffs had for some years been in close secret consultation with one another on this subject. The German menace necessitated some preliminary understanding in the event of a sudden attack. The area of concentration for the British Forces had been fixed on the left flank of the French, and the actual detraining stations of the various units were all laid down in terrain lying between Maubeuge and Le Cateau. The Headquarters of the Army were fixed at the latter place.

    This understanding being purely provisional and conditional upon an unprovoked attack by Germany, the discussion then took the turn of overhauling and reviewing these decisions, and of making arrangements in view of the actual conditions under which war had broken out. Many and various opinions were expressed; but on this day no final decisions were arrived at. It was thought absolutely necessary to ask the French authorities to send over a superior officer who should be in full possession of the views and intentions of the French General Staff. It was agreed that no satisfactory decision could be arrived at until after full discussion with a duly accredited French Officer.

    I think this is the gist of the really important points dealt with at the Council.

    During the week the Headquarters of the Expeditionary Force were established in London at the Hotel Metropole, and the Staff was constituted as follows:--

    Chief of Staff Gen. Sir Archibald Murray.
    Sub-Chief Brig.-Gen. H. H. Wilson.
    Adjutant-General Major-Gen. Neville Macready.
    Quartermaster-General Major-Gen. Sir William Robertson.
    Director of Intelligence Brig.-Gen. Macdonogh.
    C.R.A. Major-Gen. Lindsay.
    C.R.E. Brig.-Gen. Fowke.
    Military Secretary Col. the Hon. W. Lambton.
    Principal Medical Officer Surg.-Gen. T. P. Woodhouse.
    Principal Veterinary Officer Brig.-Gen. J. Moore.

    It was about Thursday the 7th, or Friday the 8th, August, that Lord Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War, and on Monday, the 10th, the Mission sent by the French Government arrived. It was headed by Colonel Huguet, a well-known French Artillery Officer who had recently been for several years French Military Attache in London.

    As before mentioned, one of the most important matters remaining for discussion and decision was finally to determine whether the original plan as regards the area of concentration for the British Forces in France was to be adhered to, or whether the actual situation demanded some change or modification. There was an exhaustive exchange of views between soldiers and Ministers, and many conflicting opinions were expressed. The soldiers themselves were not agreed. Lord Kitchener thought that our position on the left of the French line at Maubeuge would be too exposed, and rather favoured a concentration farther back in the neighbourhood of Amiens.

    Sir Douglas Haig suggested postponing any landing till the campaign had actively opened and we should be able to judge in which direction our co-operation would be most effective.

    Personally, I was opposed to these ideas, and most anxious to adhere to our original plans. Any alteration in carrying out our concentration, particularly if this meant delay, would have upset the French plan of campaign and created much distrust in the minds of our Allies. Delay or hanging back would not only have looked like hesitation, but might easily have entailed disastrous consequences by permanently separating our already inferior forces.

    Having regard to what we subsequently knew of the German plans and preparations, there can be no doubt that any such delayed landing might well have been actively opposed. As will be seen hereafter, we were at first hopeful of carrying out a successful offensive, and, had those hopes been justified, any change or delay in our original plans would have either prevented or entirely paralysed it. The vital element of the problem was speed in mobilisation and concentration, change of plans meant inevitable and possibly fatal delay.

    Murray, Wilson, Grierson and Huguet concurred in my views, and it was so settled.

    The date of the embarkment of the Headquarters Staff was fixed for Friday, August 14th.

    During the fateful days which intervened, daily and almost hourly reports reached us as to the progress of mobilisation both of our Allies and our Enemies. From the first it became quite evident that the German system of mobilisation was quicker than the French. There was reason to believe that Germany had partly mobilised some classes of her reserves before formal mobilisation.

    The splendid stand made by the Belgians in defence of their frontier fortresses is well known, and the course of the preliminary operations on the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers, as well as those in the neighbourhood of Nancy, gave us hope that the wonderful army of which we had heard so much, was not altogether the absolutely invincible war machine we had been led to expect and believe. During this most critical time, my mind was occupied day and night with anxious thought.

    I will try to recall those days of the first half of August, 1914, and crystallise the result of my meditations. This will serve to show the doubts, fears, hopes and aspirations, in short the mental atmosphere in which I awaited the opening of the campaign.

    In the ten years previous to the War, I had constantly envisaged the probable course of events leading up to the outbreak of this world-war, as well as the manner of the outbreak itself. In imagination I had seen the spark suddenly emitted in some obscure corner of Europe, followed by the blowing-up of one huge magazine, such as the declaration of war between Russia and Austria would prove to be, then the conflagration spreading with lightning speed, and I had seemed to have a foretaste amid it all of the anxious hesitation which would precede our entry into the war.

    I have been a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence since 1906, and have assisted at the innumerable deliberations of that Aulic Council. It was somewhere about 1908 that the certainty of a war was forced upon my mind. Lord Haldane was then Secretary of State for War and I was Inspector-General of the Forces. Lord Haldane was himself alive to the possibility of war; but, while he hoped to ward it off by diplomacy and negotiation, he fully acquiesced in the desirability of making every preparation which could be carried out in complete secrecy.

    He told me that were he in power, if and when the event occurred, he would designate me to command the Expeditionary Force, and requested me to study the problem carefully and do all I could to be ready. It thus fell out that in August, 1914, the many possibilities and alternatives of action were quite familiar to my mind.

    It is now within the knowledge of all that the General Staffs of Great Britain and France had, for a long time, held conferences, and that a complete mutual understanding as to combined action in certain eventualities existed.

    Belgium, however, remained a "dark horse" up to the last, and it is most unfortunate that she could never be persuaded to decide upon her attitude in the event of a general war. All we ever had in our mind was defence against attack by Germany. We had guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, and all reports pointed to an intention by Germany to violate that neutrality. What we desired above all things was that Belgium should realise the danger which subsequently laid her waste. We were anxious that she should assist and co-operate in her own defence. The idea of attacking Germany through Belgium or in any other direction never entered our heads.

    Pre-war arrangements like these were bound in such circumstances to be very imperfect, though infinitely better than none at all.

    It will be of interest at this point to narrate a conversation I had with the Emperor William in August, 1911. When His Majesty visited this country in the spring of that year to unveil the statue of Queen Victoria, he invited me to be his guest at the grand cavalry manoeuvres to be held that summer in the neighbourhood of Berlin.

    It was an experience I shall never forget, and it impressed me enormously with the efficiency and power of the German cavalry. It was on about the third day of the manoeuvres that the Emperor arrived by train at five in the morning to find the troops drawn up on the plain close by to receive him. I have never seen a more magnificent military spectacle than they presented on that brilliant August morning, numbering some 15,000 horsemen with a large force of horse artillery, jaeger and machine guns.

    When His Majesty had finished the inspection of the line, and the troops had moved to take up their points for manoeuvre, the Emperor sent for me. He was very pleasant and courteous, asked me if I was made comfortable, and if I had got a good horse. He then went on to say that he knew all our sympathies in Great Britain were with France and against Germany. He said he wished me to see everything that could be seen, but told me he trusted to my honour to reveal nothing if I visited France.

    After the manoeuvres of the day were completed, at about 11 or 12 o'clock, I was placed next to His Majesty at luncheon and we had another conversation. He asked me what I thought of what I had seen in the morning and told me that the German cavalry was the most perfect in the world; but he added: "It is not only the Cavalry; the Artillery, the Infantry, all the arms of the Service are equally efficient. The sword of Germany is sharp; and if you oppose Germany you will find how sharp it is."

    Before I left, His Majesty was kind enough to present me with his photograph beautifully framed. Pointing to it, he remarked, semi-jocularly: "There is your archenemy! There is your disturber of the peace of Europe!"

    Reverting to my story. Personally, I had always thought that Germany would violate Belgian neutrality, and in no such half measure as by a march through the Ardennes, which was what our joint plans mainly contemplated. I felt convinced that if ever she took this drastic step, she would make the utmost use of it to pour over the whole country and outflank the Allies.

    The principal source of the terrible anxiety I felt took its root in the thought that we were too much mentally committed to meet an attack from the east, instead of one which was to come as it actually did. It reassured me, however, to know that our actual dispositions did not preclude the possibility of stemming the first outburst of the storm so effectively as to ward off any imminent danger which might threaten Northern France and the Channel Ports.

    To turn from the province of strategy to the sphere of tactics, a life-long experience of military study and thought had taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of troops must be instinctive. I knew that in putting the science of war into practice, it was necessary that its main tenets should form, so to speak, part of one's flesh and blood. In war there is little time to think, and the right thing to do must come like a flash--it must present itself to the mind as perfectly obvious.

    No previous experience, no conclusion I had been able to draw from campaigns in which I had taken part, or from a close study of the new conditions in which the war of to-day is waged, had led me to anticipate a war of positions. All my thoughts, all my prospective plans, all my possible alternatives of action, were concentrated upon a war of movement and manoeuvre.

    I knew perfectly well that modern up-to-date inventions would materially influence and modify our previous conceptions as to the employment of the three arms respectively; but I had not realised that this process would work in so drastic a manner as to render all our preconceived ideas of the method of tactical field operations comparatively ineffective and useless.

    Judged by the course of events in the first three weeks of the War, neither French nor German generals were prepared for the complete transformation of all military ideas which the development of the operations inevitably demonstrated to be imperative for waging war in present conditions.

    It is easy to be "wise after the event"; but I cannot help wondering why none of us realised what the most modern rifle, the machine gun, motor traction, the aeroplane and wireless telegraphy would bring about. It seems so simple when judged by actual results. The modern rifle and machine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the defence as against the attack. This precludes the use of the old methods of attack, and has driven the attack to seek covered entrenchments after every forward rush of at most a few hundred yards.

    It has thus become a practical operation to place the heaviest artillery in position close behind the infantry fighting line, not only owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction but also because the old dread of losing the guns before they could be got away no longer exists. The crucial necessity for the effective employment of heavy artillery is observation, and this is provided by the balloon and the aeroplane, which, by means of wireless telegraphy, can keep the batteries instantly informed of the accuracy of their fire.

    I feel sure in my own mind that had we realised the true effect of modern appliances of war in August, 1914, there would have been no retreat from Mons, and that if, in September, the Germans had learnt their lesson, the Allies would never have driven them back to the Aisne. It was in the fighting on that river that the eyes of all of us began to be opened.

    New characteristics of offensive and defensive war began vaguely to be appreciated; but it required the successive attempts of Maunoury, de Castelnau, Foch and myself to turn the German flanks in the north in the old approved style, and the practical failure of these attempts, to bring home to our minds the true nature of war as it is to-day.

    About the middle of November, 1914--after three and a half months of war--we were fairly settled down to the war of positions.

    It was, therefore, in a somewhat troubled frame of mind that I began to play my humble part in this tremendous episode in the history of the world. The new lessons had to be learned in a hard school and through a bitter experience. However, for good or for evil, I have always been possessed of a sanguine temperament. No one, I felt, had really been able to gauge the respective fighting values of the French and German Armies. I hoped for the best and rather believed in it; and in this confident spirit, although anxious and watchful, I landed at Boulogne at 5 p.m. on August 14th, 1914.

    It will be a fitting close to this chapter if I add the instructions which I received from His Majesty's Government before leaving.

    "Owing to the infringement of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany, and in furtherance of the Entente which exists between this country and France, His Majesty's Government has decided, at the request of the French Government, to send an Expeditionary Force to France and to entrust the command of the troops to yourself.

    "The special motive of the Force under your control is to support and co-operate with the French Army against our common enemies. The peculiar task laid upon you is to assist the French Government in preventing or repelling the invasion by Germany of French and Belgian territory and eventually to restore the neutrality of Belgium, on behalf of which, as guaranteed by treaty, Belgium has appealed to the French and to ourselves.

    "These are the reasons which have induced His Majesty's Government to declare war, and these reasons constitute the primary objective you have before you.

    "The place of your assembly, according to present arrangements, is Amiens, and during the assembly of your troops you will have every opportunity for discussing with the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, the military position in general and the special part which your Force is able and adapted to play. It must be recognised from the outset that the numerical strength of the British Force and its contingent reinforcement is strictly limited, and with this consideration kept steadily in view it will be obvious that the greatest care must be exercised towards a minimum of losses and wastage.

    "Therefore, while every effort must be made to coincide most sympathetically with the plans and wishes of our Ally, the gravest consideration will devolve upon you as to participation in forward movements where large bodies of French troops are not engaged and where your Force may be unduly exposed to attack. Should a contingency of this sort be contemplated, I look to you to inform me fully and give me time to communicate to you any decision to which His Majesty's Government may come in the matter.

    In this connection I wish you distinctly to understand that your command is an entirely independent one, and that you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any Allied General.

    "In minor operations you should be careful that your subordinates understand that risk of serious losses should only be taken where such risk is authoritatively considered to be commensurate with the object in view.

    "The high courage and discipline of your troops should, and certainly will, have fair and full opportunity of display during the campaign, but officers may well be reminded that in this, their first experience of European warfare, a greater measure of caution must be employed than under former conditions of hostilities against an untrained adversary.

    "You will kindly keep up constant communication with the War Office, and you will be good enough to inform me as to all movements of the enemy reported to you as well as to those of the French Army.

    "I am sure you fully realise that you can rely with the utmost confidence on the wholehearted and unswerving support of the Government, of myself, and of your compatriots, in carrying out the high duty which the King has entrusted to you and in maintaining the great tradition of His Majesty's Army.

    "(Signed) KITCHENER,
    "Secretary of State"

    CHAPTER II.

    THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

    I have thought fit to interrupt my narrative here to devote some pages to the composition of the original Expeditionary Force. The First Expeditionary Force consisted of the First Army Corps (1st and 2nd Divisions) under Lieut.-Gen. Sir Douglas Haig; the Second Army Corps (3rd and 5th Divisions) under Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Grierson (who died shortly after landing in France and was succeeded by Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien), and the Cavalry Division under Major-Gen. E. H. H.

    Allenby. To these must be added the 19th Infantry Brigade, which, at the opening of our operations in France, was employed on our Lines of Communication. The original Expeditionary Force was subsequently augmented by the 4th Division, which detrained at Le Cateau on August 25th. The 4th Division and the 19th Infantry Brigade were, on the arrival of Gen. Pulteney in France, on August 30th, formed into the Third Army Corps, to which the 6th Division was subsequently added.

    For the purpose of convenient reference, I have included in this chapter the composition of the 6th Division, which joined us on the Aisne, and of the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division, which came into line with the original Expeditionary Force in Belgium in the opening stages of the First Battle of Ypres; as also of the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps, which likewise took part in the Battle of Ypres.

    THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

    General Officer Commanding-in-Chief:
    Field-Marshal Sir J. D. P. FRENCH.

    Chief of the General Staff:
    Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. J. MURRAY.

    Adjutant-General:
    Major-Gen. Sir C. F. N. MACREADY.

    Quartermaster-General:
    Major-Gen. Sir W. R. ROBERTSON.

    • * * * *

    First Army Corps:
    Lieut.-Gen. Sir DOUGLAS HAIG.

    • * * * *

    1st Division:
    Major-Gen. S. H. LOMAX,
    wounded October 31st, replaced by Brig.-Gen. LANDON (temp.),
    then by Brig.-Gen. Sir D. HENDERSON.

    1st Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. F. I. MAXSE,
    succeeded by Brig.-Gen. FITZCLARENCE, V.C. (killed, November
    11th). Col. McEwen then took command. Later on, Col.
    Lowther was appointed to command the Brigade.
    1st Batt. Coldstream Guards.
    1st Batt. Scots Guards.
    London Scottish (joined Brigade in November).
    1st Batt. Royal Highlanders (the Black Watch).
    2nd Batt. Royal Munster Fusiliers (cut to pieces at Etreux,
    August 29th, replaced by 1st Batt. Cameron Highlanders).

    2nd Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. E. S. BULFIN,
    wounded November 1st, succeeded by Col. Cunliffe-Owen (temp.).
    Brig.-Gen. WESTMACOTT took command November 23rd.
    2nd Batt. Royal Sussex Regt. 1st Batt. Northampton Regt.
    1st Batt. N. Lancs Regt. 2nd Batt. K.R.R.

    3rd Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. H. J. S. LANDON,
    appointed to command the Division after October 31st, Col.
    Lovett taking command of Brigade. Brig.-Gen. R. H. K.
    BUTLER was appointed to command the Brigade November
    13th.
    1st Batt. The Queen's Royal West Surrey Regt. (cut up
    October 31st, replaced by 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers).
    1st Batt. S. Wales Borderers.
    1st Batt. Gloucester Regt.
    2nd Batt. Welsh Regt.

    Divisional Cavalry:
    "C" Squadron 15th Hussars. 1st Cyclist Co.

    Royal Engineers:
    23rd & 26th Field Cos. 1st Signal Co.

    Royal Artillery:
    R.F.A. Batteries--
    XXV. Brigade--113, 114, 115.
    XXVI. Brigade--116, 117, 118.
    XXIX. Brigade--46, 51, 54.
    XLIII. Brigade (Howitzer)--30, 40, 57.

    Heavy Battery R.G.A.--26. 1st Divisional Train.

    R.A.M.C.: 1st, 2nd, & 3rd Field Ambulances.

    • * * * *

    2nd Division:
    Major-Gen. C. C. MONRO.

    4th (Guards) Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. R. SCOTT-KERR,
    wounded September 1st and succeeded by Brig.-Gen. the EARL
    OF CAVAN (arrived September 18th).

    2nd Batt. Grenadier Guards. 3rd Batt. Coldstream Guards.
    2nd Batt. Coldstream Guards. 1st Batt. Irish Guards.
    1st Herts (T.F.) (joined Brigade about November 10th).

    5th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. R. C. B. HAKING,
    wounded on September 16th; succeeded by Lieut.-Col.
    Westmacott until Haking returned on November 20th.

    2nd Batt. Worcester Regt. 2nd Batt. Highland L.I.
    2nd Batt. Oxf. & Bucks L.I. 2nd Batt. Connaught Rangers.
    (2nd Connaughts were amalgamated
    with their 1st
    Batt. at the end of November
    and replaced in the
    Brigade by 9th H.L.I.
    (Glasgow Highlanders).)

    6th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. R. H. DAVIES,
    invalided in September; succeeded by Brig.-Gen. FANSHAWE,
    September 13th.

    1st Batt. The King's (Liverpool) Regt. 1st Batt. Royal Berks Regt.
    2nd Batt. S. Staffs Regt. 1st Batt. K.R.R.

    Divisional Cavalry:
    "B" Squadron 15th Hussars. 2nd Cyclist Co.

    Royal Engineers:
    5th & 11th Field Cos. 2nd Signal Co.

    Royal Artillery:
    R.F.A. Batteries--

    XXIV. Brigade--25, 50, 70.
    XXXVI. Brigade--15, 48, 71.
    XLI. Brigade--9, 16, 17.
    XLIV. Brigade (Howitzer)--47, 56, 60.

    Heavy Battery R.G.A.--35. 2nd Divisional Train.

    R.A.M.C.: 4th & 6th Field Ambulances.

    • * * * *

    Second Army Corps:
    Lieut.-Gen. Sir JAMES GRIERSON,
    died August 17th; succeeded by Gen. Sir HORACE SMITH-DORRIEN.

    • * * * *

    3rd Division:
    Major-Gen. HUBERT I. W. HAMILTON,
    killed October 14th; Major-Gen. MACKENZIE in command till
    end of October; then Major-Gen. WING till November 6th;
    then Major-Gen. HALDANE.

    7th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. F. W. N. McCRACKEN,
    3rd Batt. Worcester Regt. 1st Batt. Wilts Regt.
    2nd Batt. S. Lancs Regt. 2nd Batt. Royal Irish Rifles.

    8th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. B. J. C. DORAN,
    invalided October 23rd; Brig.-Gen. BOWES took over command.

    2nd Batt. Royal Scots.
    2nd Batt. Royal Irish Regt. (Battalion cut up at Le Pilly,
    October 20th; became G.H.Q. troops, replaced by 2nd
    Suffolks.)
    4th Batt. Middlesex Regt.
    1st Batt. Gordon Highlanders. (Employed as G.H.Q. troops
    during September, being replaced by 1st Devons, but rejoined
    Brigade at beginning of October.)

    9th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. F. C. SHAW,
    wounded November 12th; succeeded by Lieut.-Col. Douglas
    Smith, Royal Scots Fusiliers.

    1st Batt. Northumberland Fusiliers.
    4th Batt. Royal Fusiliers.
    1st Batt. Lincolnshire Regt.
    1st Batt. Royal Scots Fusiliers.

    Divisional Cavalry:
    "A" Squadron 15th Hussars. 3rd Cyclist Co.

    Royal Engineers:
    56th & 57th Field Cos. 3rd Signal Co.

    Royal Artillery:
    R.F.A. Batteries--
    XXIII. Brigade--107, 108, 109.
    XL. Brigade--6, 23, 49.
    XLII. Brigade--29, 41, 45.
    XXX. Brigade (Howitzer)--128, 129, 130.
    Heavy Battery R.G.A.--48. 3rd Divisional Train.

    R.A.M.C.: 7th, 8th, & 9th Field Ambulances.

    • * * * *

    5th Division:
    Major-Gen. Sir CHARLES FERGUSSON,
    invalided October 22nd; succeeded by Major-Gen. MORLAND.

    13th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. G. J. CUTHBERT,
    invalided about the end of September; succeeded by Brig.-Gen.
    HICKIE, who went sick October 13th, Col. Martyn getting
    command (temp.).

    2nd Batt. K.O. Scottish Borderers.
    2nd Batt. (Duke of Wellington's) West Riding Regt.
    1st Batt. Royal West Kent Regt.
    2nd Batt. K.O. Yorkshire L.I.

    14th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. S. P. ROLT,
    invalided October 29th; succeeded by Brig.-Gen. F. S. MAUDE.

    2nd Batt. Suffolk Regt. (replaced by 1st Devons at the
    beginning of October, and became G.H.Q. troops).
    1st Batt. East Surrey Regt.
    1st Batt. Duke of Cornwall's L.I.
    2nd Batt. Manchester Regt.

    15th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. Count A. E. W. GLEICHEN.
    1st Batt. Norfolk Regt. 1st Batt. Cheshire Regt.
    1st Batt. Bedford Regt. 1st Batt. Dorset Regt.

    Divisional Cavalry:
    "A" Squadron 19th Hussars.

    Royal Engineers:
    17th & 59th Field Cos. 5th Cyclist Co.

    Royal Artillery:
    R.F.A. Batteries--
    XV. Brigade--11, 52, 80.
    XXVII. Brigade--119, 120, 121.
    XXVIII. Brigade--122, 123, 124.
    VIII. Brigade (Howitzer)--37, 61, 65.

    Heavy Battery R.G.A.--108. 5th Divisional Train.

    R.A.M.C.: 13th, 14th, & 15th Field Ambulances.

    19th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. L. G. DRUMMOND,
    succeeded early in September by Brig.-Gen. F. GORDON.

    [Note.--This Brigade was formed from units on Lines of
    Communication, and was attached successively to the Cavalry
    Division, Second Corps and Fourth Division during the retreat
    from Mons and advance to the Aisne. In the Flanders fighting
    of October-November, 1914, it worked with the Sixth Division.]
    2nd Batt. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
    1st Batt. Scottish Rifles.
    1st Batt. Middlesex Regt.
    2nd Batt. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
    19th Field Ambulance.

    Cavalry Division:
    Major-Gen. E. H. H. ALLENBY,
    took command of the Cavalry Corps on its formation in October,
    Brig.-Gen. DE LISLE taking command of the 1st Cavalry
    Division.

    • * * * *

    1st Cavalry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. C. J. BRIGGS.
    2nd Dragoon Guards. 5th Dragoon Guards.
    11th Hussars.

    2nd Cavalry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. H. De B. DE LISLE,
    transferred to command 1st Cavalry Division in October
    and succeeded by Brig.-Gen. MULLINS.

    4th Dragoon Guards. 9th Lancers.
    18th Hussars (Queen Mary's Own).

    3rd Cavalry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. HUBERT DE LA POER GOUGH.
    4th Hussars. 5th Lancers. 16th Lancers.

    4th Cavalry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. Hon. C. E. BINGHAM.
    Household Cavalry (Composite Regt.).
    6th Dragoon Guards. 3rd Hussars.

    5th Cavalry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. Sir PHILIP P. W. CHETWODE.
    12th Lancers. 20th Hussars.
    2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys).

    Royal Horse Artillery:
    Batteries--"D," "E," "I," "J," "L" ("L" Battery went
    home to refit after Nery (September 1st), and was replaced
    by "H," R.H.A., which arrived about the middle of
    September).

    Royal Engineers:
    1st Field Squadron. 1st Signal Squadron.

    [Note.--In September the 2nd Cavalry Division was formed,
    consisting at first of the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades under
    Major-Gen. Gough, Brig.-Gen. Vaughan taking command of the
    3rd Cavalry Brigade. With these brigades were "D" and "E"
    Batteries, R.H.A. In October the 4th Cavalry Brigade was
    transferred to the 2nd Cavalry Division, as was also "J"
    Battery, R.H.A. The 2nd Cavalry Division had the 2nd Field
    Squadron R.E. and 2nd Signal Squadron.]

    R.A.M.C.: corresponding Cavalry Field Ambulances.

    • * * * *

    Royal Flying Corps:
    Brig.-Gen. Sir DAVID HENDERSON.
    Aeroplane Squadrons Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5.

    • * * * *

    4th Division:
    Major-Gen. T. D. O. SNOW,
    invalided September; succeeded by Major-Gen. Sir H. RAWLINSON,
    who was transferred to 4th Army Corps early in
    October and replaced by Major-Gen. H. F. M. WILSON.

    10th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. J. A. L. HALDANE,
    appointed to command 3rd Division, November 6th; succeeded
    by Brig.-Gen. HULL.

    1st Batt. Royal Warwickshire Regt.
    2nd Batt. Seaforth Highlanders.
    1st Batt. Royal Irish Fusiliers.
    2nd Batt. Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

    11th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. A. G. HUNTER-WESTON.

    1st Batt. Somersetshire L.I. 1st Batt. Hampshire Regt.
    1st Batt. E. Lancs Regt. 1st Batt. Rifle Brigade.

    12th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. H. F. M. WILSON,
    in command of the 4th Division in October, and on promotion
    succeeded by Col. F. G. Anley.

    1st Batt. K.O. (R. Lancaster) Regt.
    2nd Batt. Lancashire Fusiliers.
    2nd Batt. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
    2nd Batt. Essex Regt.

    Divisional Cavalry:
    "B" Squadron 19th Hussars. 4th Cyclist Co.

    Royal Engineers:
    7th & 9th Field Cos. 4th Signal Co.

    Royal Artillery:
    R.F.A. Batteries--
    XIV. Brigade--39, 68, 88.
    XXIX. Brigade--125, 126, 127.
    XXXII. Brigade--27, 134, 135.
    XXXVII. Brigade--31, 35, 55.

    Heavy Battery, R.G.A.--31.

    R.A.M.C.: 10th, 11th, & 12th Field Ambulances.

    • * * * *

    Lines of Communication and Army Troops:

    1st Batt. Devonshire Regt. (transferred to 8th Brigade about middle of September, later to 14th Brigade).

    1st Batt. Cameron Highlanders (replaced 2nd Munsters in 1st Brigade about September 6th).

    [Note.--The 28th London (Artists' Rifles), 14th London (London Scottish), 6th Welsh and 5th Border Regt. were all in France before the end of the First Battle of Ypres, as was also the Honourable Artillery Company. These battalions were all at first on Lines of Communication.]

    • * * * *

    6th Division:
    Major-Gen. J. L. KEIR.

    16th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. C. INGOUVILLE-WILLIAMS.

    1st Batt. East Kent Regt. (The Buffs).
    1st Batt. Leicestershire Regt.
    1st Batt. Shropshire L.I.
    2nd Batt. York and Lancaster Regt.

    17th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. W. R. B. DORAN.

    1st Batt. Royal Fusiliers. 2nd Batt. Leinster Regt.
    1st Batt. N. Staffs Regt. 3rd Batt. Rifle Brigade.

    18th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. W. N. CONGREVE, V.C.

    1st Batt. West Yorks Regt. 2nd Batt. Notts and Derby Regt.
    1st Batt. East Yorks Regt. (the Sherwood Foresters).
    2nd Batt. Durham. L.I.

    Divisional Cavalry:
    "C" Squadron 19th Hussars. 6th Cyclist Co.

    Royal Engineers:
    12th & 38th Field Cos. 6th Signal Co.

    Royal Artillery:
    R.F.A. Batteries--
    II. Brigade--21, 42, 53.
    XXIV. Brigade--110, 111, 112.
    XXXVIII. Brigade--24, 34, 72.
    XII. Brigade (Howitzer)--43, 86, 87.

    Heavy Battery R.G.A.--24. 6th Divisional Train.

    R.A.M.C.: 16th, 17th & 18th Field Ambulances.

    • * * * *

    7th Infantry Division:
    Major-Gen. T. CAPPER.

    20th Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. H. G. RUGGLES-BRISE.

    1st Batt. Grenadier Guards. 2nd Batt. Border Regt.
    2nd Batt. Scots Guards. 2nd Batt. Gordon Highlanders.

    21st Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. H. E. WATTS.

    2nd Batt. Bedfordshire Regt. 2nd Batt. Royal Scots Fusiliers.
    2nd Batt. Yorkshire Regt. 2nd Batt. Wiltshire Regt.

    22nd Infantry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. S. T. B. LAWFORD.

    2nd Batt. The Queen's Royal West Surrey Regt.
    2nd Batt. Royal Warwickshire Regt.
    1st Batt. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
    1st Batt. S. Staffs Regt.

    Divisional Cavalry:
    Northumberland Yeomanry (Hussars). 7th Cyclist Co.

    Royal Engineers:
    54th & 55th Field Cos. 7th Signal Co.

    Royal Artillery:
    R.H.A. Batteries--"F" and "T."
    R.F.A. Batteries--
    XXII. Brigade--104, 105, 106.
    XXV. Brigade--12, 35, 58.
    Heavy Batteries R.G.A.--111, 112.

    R.A.M.C.: 21st, 22nd and 23rd Field Ambulances.

    • * * * *

    3rd Cavalry Division:
    Major-Gen. The Hon. JULIAN BYNG.

    6th Cavalry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. E. MAKINS.

    3rd Dragoon Guards (joined the Division early in November).
    North Somerset Yeomanry (attached to the Brigade before the
    end of First Battle of Ypres).
    1st Dragoons (The Royals).
    10th Hussars.

    7th Cavalry Brigade:
    Brig.-Gen. C. T. McM. KAVANAGH.

    1st Life Guards. 2nd Life Guards.
    Royal Horse Guards (the Blues).

    Royal Horse Artillery:
    Batteries "C" and "K."

    Royal Engineers:
    3rd Field Squadron.

    R.A.M.C.: 6th, 7th and 8th Cavalry Field Ambulances.

    CHAPTER III.

    THE SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

    I left Charing Cross by special train at 2 p.m. on Friday, August 14th, and embarked at Dover in His Majesty's cruiser "Sentinel." Sir Maurice FitzGerald and a few other friends were at the station to see me off, and I was accompanied by Murray, Wilson, Robertson, Lambton, Wake, Huguet and Brinsley FitzGerald (my private secretary). The day was dark, dull and gloomy, and rather chilly for August. Dover had ceased to be the cheery seaside resort of peace days, and had assumed the appearance of a fortress expecting momentary attack. Very few people were about, and the place was prepared for immediate action.

    The fine harbour was crowded with destroyers, submarines, and a few cruisers; booms barred all the entrances and mines were laid down.

    It was the first time since war had been declared that I witnessed the outward and visible signs of the great struggle for which we were girding our loins. Not the least evidence of this was the appearance of the officers and men of the "Sentinel." All showed in their faces that strained, eager, watchful look which told of the severe and continual daily and nightly vigil. This was very marked, and much impressed me.

    We sailed a little before 4 and landed at Boulogne about 5.30 in the evening. I was met by the Governor, the Commandant, and the port officials, and we had a very hearty reception. There were several rest camps at Boulogne, and I was able to visit them. Officers and men looked fit and well, and were full of enthusiasm and cheer.

    Boulogne was only a secondary port of embarkation, but I can vividly recall the scene. Everyone knows the curious and interesting old town, with its picturesque citadel, situated on a lofty hill. On all sides were evidences of great activity and excitement. Soldiers and sailors, both British and French, were everywhere. All were being warmly welcomed and cheered by the townspeople.

    The declining August sun lit up sinuous columns of infantry ascending the high ground to their rest camps on the plateau to the sound of military bands. From the heights above the town, the quays and wharves, where the landing of troops and stores was unceasingly going forward, looked like human beehives. Looking out to sea, one could distinguish approaching transports here and there between the ever wary and watchful scout, destroyer and submarine, which were jealously guarding the route.

    Over all towered the monument to the greatest world-soldier--the warrior Emperor who, more than a hundred years before, had from that spot contemplated the invasion of England. Could he have now revisited "the glimpses of the moon," would he not have rejoiced at this friendly invasion of France by England's "good yeomen," who were now offering their lives to save France from possible destruction as a Power of the first class? It was a wonderful and never to be forgotten scene in the setting sun; and, as I walked round camps and bivouacs, I could not but think of the many fine fellows around me who had said good-bye to Old England for ever.

    We left Boulogne at 7.20 the same evening, and reached Amiens at 9.

    There I was met by General Robert (Military Governor) and his staff, the Prefect and officials. Amiens was the Headquarters of General Robb, the Commander of our Line of Communications, and it was also the first point of concentration for our aircraft, which David Henderson commanded, with Sykes as his chief assistant. Whilst at Amiens I was able to hold important discussions with Robb and Henderson as to their respective commands.

    I left Amiens for Paris on the morning of the 15th and we reached the Nord Terminus at 12.45 p.m., where I was met by the British Ambassador (now Lord Bertie) and the Military Governor of Paris. Large crowds had assembled in the streets on the way to the Embassy, and we were received with tremendous greetings by the people. Their welcome was cordial in the extreme. The day is particularly memorable to me, because my previous acquaintance with Lord Bertie ripened from that time into an intimate friendship to which I attach the greatest value.

    I trust that, when the real history of this war is written, the splendid part played by this great Ambassador may be thoroughly understood and appreciated by his countrymen. Throughout the year and a half that I commanded in France, his help and counsel were invaluable to me.

    We drove to the Embassy and lunched there. In the afternoon, accompanied by the Ambassador, I visited M. Poincare. The President was attended by M. Viviani, Prime Minister, and M. Messimy, Minister for War. The situation was fully discussed, and I was much impressed by the optimistic spirit of the President. I am sure he had formed great hopes of a victorious advance by the Allies from the line they had taken up, and he discoursed playfully with me on the possibility of another battle being fought by the British on the old field of Waterloo. He said the attitude of the French nation was admirable, that they were very calm and determined.

    After leaving the President I went to the War Office. Maps were produced; the whole situation was again discussed, and arrangements were made for me to meet General Joffre at his Headquarters the next day.

    In the evening I dined quietly with Brinsley FitzGerald at the Ritz, and here it was curious to observe how Paris, like Dover, had put on a sombre garb of war. The buoyant, optimistic nature of the French people was apparent in the few we met; but there was no bombastic, over-confident tone in the conversation around us; only a quiet, but grim, determination which fully appreciated the tremendous difficulties and gigantic issues at stake. The false optimism of "A Berlin" associated with 1870 was conspicuously absent. In its place, a silent determination to fight to the last franc and to the last man.

    We left Paris by motor early on the 16th, and arrived at Joffre's Headquarters at Vitry-le-Francois at noon. A few minutes before our arrival a captured German flag (the first visible trophy of war I had seen) had been brought in, and the impression of General Joffre which was left on my mind was that he possessed a fund of human understanding and sympathy.

    I had heard of the French Commander-in-Chief for years, but had never before seen him. He struck me at once as a man of strong will and determination, very courteous and considerate, but firm and steadfast of mind and purpose, and not easily turned or persuaded. He appeared to me to be capable of exercising a powerful influence over the troops he commanded and as likely to enjoy their confidence.

    These were all "first impressions"; but I may say here that everything I then thought of General Joffre was far more than confirmed throughout the year and a half of fierce struggle during which I was associated with him. His steadfastness and determination, his courage and patience, were tried to the utmost and never found wanting. History will rank him as one of the supremely great leaders.

    The immediate task before him was stupendous, and nobly did he arise to it.

    I was quite favourably impressed by General Berthelot (Joffre's Chief of Staff) and all the Staff Officers I met, and was much struck by their attitude and bearing. There was a complete absence of fuss, and a calm, deliberate confidence was manifest everywhere. I had a long conversation with the Commander-in-Chief, at which General Berthelot was present. He certainly never gave me the slightest reason to suppose that any idea of "retirement" was in his mind. He discussed possible alternatives of action depending upon the information received of the enemy's plans and dispositions; but his main intention was always to attack.

    There were two special points in this conversation which recur to my mind.

    As the British Army was posted on the left, or exposed flank, I asked Joffre to place the French Cavalry Division, and two Reserve Divisions which were echeloned in reserve behind, directly under my orders. This the Commander-in-Chief found himself unable to concede.

    The second point I recall is the high esteem in which the General Commanding the 5th French Army, General Lanrezac, which was posted on my immediate right, was held by Joffre and his Staff. He was represented to me as the best Commander in the French Army, on whose complete support and skilful co-operation I could thoroughly rely.

    Before leaving, the Commander-in-Chief handed me a written memorandum setting forth his views as he had stated them to me, accompanied by a short appreciation of the situation made by the Chief of the General Staff.

    We motored to Rheims, where we slept that night. Throughout this long motor journey we passed through great areas of cultivated country. All work, it seemed, had ceased; the crops were half cut, and stooks of corn were lying about everywhere. It was difficult to imagine how the harvest would be saved; but one of my most extraordinary experiences in France was to watch the farming and agriculture going on as if by magic. When, how, or by whom it was done, has always been an enigma to me. There can be no doubt that the women and children proved an enormous help to their country in these directions. Their share of the victory should never be forgotten.

    It has been distilled from their sweat and tears.

    On the morning of the 17th I went to Rethel, which was the Headquarters of the General Commanding the 5th French Army. Having heard such eulogies of him at French G.H.Q., my first impressions of General Lanrezac were probably coloured and modified in his favour; but, looking back, I remember that his personality did not convey to me the idea of a great leader. He was a big man with a loud voice, and his manner did not strike me as being very courteous.

    When he was discussing the situation, his attitude might have made a casual observer credit him with practical powers of command and determination of character; but, for my own part, I seemed to detect, from the first time my eyes fell upon him, a certain over-confidence which appeared to ignore the necessity for any consideration of alternatives.

    Although we arrived at a mutual understanding which included no idea or thought of "retreat," I left General Lanrezac's Headquarters believing that the Commander-in-Chief had over-rated his ability; and I was therefore not surprised when he afterwards turned out to be the most complete example, amongst the many this War has afforded, of the Staff College "pedant," whose "superior education" had given him little idea of how to conduct war.

    On leaving Rethel, I motored to Vervins, where I interviewed the Commanders of the French Reserve Divisions in my immediate neighbourhood, and reached my Headquarters at Le Cateau late in the afternoon.

    The first news I got was of the sudden death of my dear old friend and comrade, Jimmie Grierson (General Sir James Grierson, Commanding the 2nd Army Corps). He was taken ill quite suddenly in the train on his way to his own Corps Headquarters, and died in a few minutes. I had known him for many years, but since 1906 had been quite closely associated with him; for he had taken a leading part in the preparation of the Army for war throughout that time. He possessed a wonderful personality, and was justly beloved by officers and men alike.

    He was able to get the best work out of them, and they would follow him anywhere. He had been British Military Attache in Berlin for some years, and had thus acquired an intimate knowledge of the German Army. An excellent linguist, he spoke French with ease and fluency, and he used to astonish French soldiers by his intimate knowledge of the history of their regiments, which was often far in excess of what they knew themselves. His military acquirements were brilliant, and in every respect thoroughly up-to-date.

    Apart from the real affection I always felt for him, I regarded his loss as a great calamity in the conduct of the campaign.

    His place was taken by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, although I asked that Sir Herbert Plumer might be sent out to me to succeed Grierson in command of the 2nd Corps. As a matter of fact, the question of Sir James Grierson's successor was not referred to me at all. The appointment was made at home. Although I knew Sir Horace to be a soldier who had done good service and possessed a fine record, I had asked for Sir Herbert Plumer because I felt he was the right man for this command.

    Lord Kitchener had asked me to send him a statement of the French dispositions west of the Meuse. I sent him this in the following letter:--

    "Headquarters,
    "Le Cateau,
    "August 17th, 1914.

    "My Dear Lord K.

    "With reference to your wire asking for information as to the position of French troops west of the line Givet--Dinant--Namur--Brussels, I have already replied by wire in general terms. I now send full details.

    "A Corps of Cavalry (three divisions less one brigade), supported by some Infantry, is north of the River Sambre between Charleroi and Namur. This is the nearest French force to the Belgian Army, and I do not know if and where they have established communication with them, nor do the French.

    "One French Corps, with an added Infantry Brigade and a Cavalry Brigade, is guarding the River Meuse from Givet to Namur. The bridges are mined and ready to be blown up.

    "In rear of this corps, two more corps are moving--one on Philippeville, the other on Beaumont. Each of these two corps is composed of three divisions. In rear of them a fourth corps assembles to-morrow west of Beaumont. Three Reserve divisions are already in waiting between Vervins and Hirson. Another Reserve division is guarding the almost impassable country between Givet and Mezieres.

    "Finally, other Reserve formations are guarding the frontier between Maubeuge and Lille.

    "I left Paris on Sunday morning (16th) by motor, and reached the Headquarters of General Joffre (French Commander-in-Chief) at 12. They are at Vitry-le-Francois. He quite realises the importance and value of adopting a waiting attitude. In the event of a forward movement by the German Corps in the Ardennes and Luxemburg, he is anxious that I should act in echelon on the left of the 5th French Army, whose present disposition I have stated above. The French Cavalry Corps now north of the Sambre will operate on my left front and keep touch with the Belgians.

    "I spent the night at Rheims and motored this morning to Rethel, the Headquarters of General Lanrezac, Commander 5th French Army. I had a long talk with him and arranged for co-operation in all alternative circumstances.

    "I then came on to my Headquarters at this place where I found everything proceeding satisfactorily and up to time. I was much shocked to hear of Grierson's sudden death near Amiens when I arrived here. I had already wired asking you to appoint Plumer in his place, when your wire reached me and also that of Ian Hamilton, forwarded--as I understand--by you. I very much hope you will send me Plumer;

    Hamilton is too senior to command an Army Corps and is already engaged in an important command at home.

    "Please do as I ask you in this matter? I needn't assure you there was no 'promise' of any kind.

    "Yours sincerely,
    "(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH.

    "P.S.--I am much impressed by all I have seen of the French General Staff. They are very deliberate, calm, and confident. There was a total absence of fuss and confusion, and a determination to give only a just and proper value to any reported successes. So far there has been no conflict of first-rate importance, but there has been enough fighting to justify a hope that the French artillery is superior to the German."

    It was on Tuesday, August 18th, that I was first able to assemble the Corps Commanders and their Staffs. Their reports as to the transport of their troops from their mobilising stations to France were highly satisfactory.

    The nation owes a deep debt of gratitude to the Naval Transport Service and to all concerned in the embarking and disembarking of the Expeditionary Force. Every move was carried out exactly to time, and the concentration of the British Army on the left of the French was effected in such a manner as to enable every unit to obtain the requisite time to familiarise troops with active service conditions, before it became necessary to make severe demands upon their strength and endurance.

    My discussion with the Corps Commanders was based upon the following brief appreciation of the situation on that day. This was as follows:--

    "Between Tirlemont (to the east of Louvain) and Metz, the enemy has some 13 to 15 Army Corps and seven Cavalry Divisions. A certain number of reserve troops are said to be engaged in the offensive of Liege, the forts of which place are believed to be still intact, although some of the enemy's troops hold the town.

    "These German Corps are in two main groups, seven to eight Corps and four Cavalry Divisions being between Tirlemont and Givet. Six to seven Corps and three Cavalry Divisions are in Belgian Luxemburg.

    "Of the northern group, it is believed that the greater part--perhaps five Corps--are either north and west of the Meuse, or being pushed across by bridges at Huy and elsewhere.

    "The general direction of the German advance is by Waremme on Tirlemont. Two German Cavalry Divisions which crossed the Meuse some days ago have reached Gembloux, but have been driven back to Mont Arden by French cavalry supported by a mixed Belgian brigade.

    "The German plans are still rather uncertain, but it is confidently believed that at least five Army Corps and two or three Cavalry Divisions will move against the French frontiers south-west, on a great line between Brussels and Givet.

    "The 1st French Corps is now at Dinant, one Infantry and one Cavalry Brigade opposing the group of German Corps south of the Meuse.

    "The 10th and 3rd Corps are on the line Rethel--Thuin, south of the Sambre. The 18th Corps are moving up on the left of the 10th and 3rd.

    "Six or seven Reserve French Divisions are entrenched on a line reaching from Dunkirk, on the coast, through Cambrai and La Capelle, to Hirson.

    "The Belgian Army is entrenched on a line running north-east and south-west through Louvain."

    My general instructions were then communicated to Corps Commanders as follows:--

    "When our concentration is complete, it is intended that we should operate on the left of the French 5th Army, the 18th Corps being on our right. The French Cavalry Corps of three divisions will be on our left and in touch with the Belgians.

    "As a preliminary to this, we shall take up an area north of the Sambre, and on Monday the heads of the Allied columns should be on the line Mons--Givet, with the cavalry on the outer flank.

    "Should the German attack develop in the manner expected, we shall advance on the general line Mons--Dinant to meet it."

    During these first days, whilst our concentration was in course of completion, I rode about a great deal amongst the troops, which were generally on the move to take up their billets or doing practice route marches. I had an excellent opportunity of observing the physique and general appearance of the men. Many of the reservists at first bore traces of the civilian life which they had just left, and presented an anxious, tired appearance; but it was wonderful to observe the almost hourly improvement which took place amongst them.

    I knew that, under the supervision and influence of the magnificent body of officers and non-commissioned officers which belonged to the 1st Expeditionary Force, all the reservists, even those who had been for years away from the colours, would, before going under fire, regain to the full the splendid military vigour, determination, and spirit which has at all times been so marked a characteristic of British soldiers in the field.

    I received a pressing request from the King of the Belgians to visit His Majesty at his Headquarters at Louvain; but the immediate course of the operations prevented me from doing so.

    The opening phases of the Battle of Mons did not commence until the morning of Saturday, August 22nd. Up to that time, so far as the British forces were concerned, the forwarding of offensive operations had complete possession of our minds. During the days which intervened, I had frequent meetings and discussions with the Corps and Cavalry Commanders.

    The Intelligence Reports which constantly arrived, and the results of cavalry and aircraft reconnaissances, only confirmed the previous appreciation of the situation, and left no doubt as to the direction of the German advance; but nothing came to hand which led us to foresee the crushing superiority of strength which actually confronted us on Sunday, August 23rd.

    This was our first practical experience in the use of aircraft for reconnaissance purposes. It cannot be said that in these early days of the fighting the cavalry entirely abandoned that role. On the contrary, they furnished me with much useful information.

    The number of our aeroplanes was then limited, and their powers of observation were not so developed or so accurate as they afterwards became. Nevertheless, they kept close touch with the enemy, and their reports proved of the greatest value.

    Whilst at this time, as I have said, aircraft did not altogether replace cavalry as regards the gaining and collection of information, yet, by working together as they did, the two arms gained much more accurate and voluminous knowledge of the situation. It was, indeed, the timely warning they gave which chiefly enabled me to make speedy dispositions to avert danger and disaster.

    There can be no doubt indeed that, even then, the presence and co-operation of aircraft saved the very frequent use of small cavalry patrols and detached supports. This enabled the latter arm to save horseflesh and concentrate their power more on actual combat and fighting, and to this is greatly due the marked success which attended the operations of the cavalry during the Battle of Mons and the subsequent retreat.

    At the time I am writing, however, it would appear that the duty of collecting information and maintaining touch with an enemy in the field will in future fall entirely upon the air service, which will set the cavalry free for different but equally important work.

    I had daily consultations with Sir William Robertson, the Quartermaster-General. He expressed himself as well satisfied with the condition of the transport, both horse and mechanical, although he said the civilian drivers were giving a little trouble at first.

    Munitions and supplies were well provided for, and there were at least 1,000 rounds per gun and 800 rounds per rifle. We also discussed the arrangements for the evacuation of wounded.

    The immediate despatch from home of the 4th Division was now decided upon and had commenced, and I received sanction to form a 19th Brigade of Infantry from the Line of Communication battalions.

    At this time I received some interesting reports as to the work of the French cavalry in Belgium. Their morale was high and they were very efficient. They were opposed by two divisions of German cavalry whose patrols, they said, showed great want of dash and initiative, and were not well supported. They formed the opinion that the German horse did not care about trying conclusions mounted, but endeavoured to draw the French under the fire of artillery and jaeger battalions, the last-named always accompanying a German Cavalry Division.

    At 5.30 a.m. on the 21st I received a visit from General de Morionville, Chief of the Staff to His Majesty the King of the Belgians, who, with a small staff, was proceeding to Joffre's Headquarters. The General showed signs of the terrible ordeal through which he and his gallant army had passed since the enemy had so grossly violated Belgian territory.

    He confirmed all the reports we had received concerning the situation generally, and added that the unsupported condition of the Belgian Army rendered their position very precarious, and that the King had, therefore, determined to effect a retirement on Antwerp, where they would be prepared to attack the flank of the enemy's columns as they advanced. He told me he hoped to arrive at a complete understanding with the French Commander-in-Chief.

    On this day, August 21st, the Belgians evacuated Brussels and were retiring on Antwerp, and I received the following message from the Government:--

    "The Belgian Government desire to assure the British and French Governments of the unreserved support of the Belgian Army on the left flank of the Allied Armies with the whole of its troops and all available resources, wherever their line of communications with the base at Antwerp, where all their ammunition and food supplies are kept, is not in danger of being severed by large hostile forces.

    "Within the above-mentioned limits the Allied Armies may continue to rely on the co-operation of the Belgian troops.

    "Since the commencement of hostilities the Field Army has been holding the line Tirlemont--Jodoigne--Hammemille--Louvain, where, up to the 18th August, it has been standing by, hoping for the active co-operation of the Allied Army.

    "On August 18th it was decided that the Belgian Army, consisting of 50,000 Infantry rifles, 276 guns, and 4,100 Cavalry should retreat on the Dyle. This step was taken owing to the fact that the support of the Allies had not yet been effective, and, moreover, that the Belgian forces were menaced by three Army Corps and three Cavalry Divisions (the greater part of the First Army of the Meuse), who threatened to cut their communications with their base.

    "The rearguard of the 1st Division of the Army having been forced to retire after a fierce engagement lasting five or six hours on August 18th, and the Commander of the Division having stated that his troops were not in a fit state to withstand a long engagement owing to the loss of officers and the weariness of the men; and, moreover, as the Commander of the 3rd Division of the Army, which was so sorely tried at Liege, had similarly come to the conclusion, on August 19th, that the defence of the Dyle was becoming very dangerous, more especially in view of the turning movement of the 2nd Army Corps and 2nd Cavalry Division, it was definitely decided to retreat under the protection of the forts at Antwerp.

    "The general idea is now that the Field Army, in part or as a whole, should issue from Antwerp as soon as circumstances seem to favour such a movement.

    "In this event, the Army will try to co-operate in its movements with the Allies as circumstances may dictate."

    Exhaustive reconnaissances and intelligence reports admitted of no doubt that the enemy was taking the fullest advantage of his violation of Belgian territory, and that he was protected to the right of his advance, at least as far west as Soignies and Nivelles, whence he was moving direct upon the British and 5th French Armies.

    In further proof that, at this time, no idea of retreat was in the minds of the leaders of the Allied Armies, I received late on Friday, the 21st, General Lanrezac's orders to his troops. All his corps were in position south of the Sambre, and he was only waiting the development of a move by the 3rd and 4th French Armies from the line Mezieres--Longwy to begin his own advance.

    As regards our own troops, on the evening of the 21st, the cavalry, under Allenby, were holding the line of the Conde Canal with four brigades. Two brigades of horse artillery were in reserve at Harmignies. The 5th Cavalry Brigade, under Chetwode, composed of the Scots Greys, 12th Lancers, and 20th Hussars, were at Binche, in touch with the French.

    Reconnoitring squadrons and patrols were pushed out towards Soignies and Nivelles.

    I visited Allenby's Headquarters in the afternoon of the 21st, and discussed the situation with him. I told him on no account to commit the cavalry to any engagement of importance, but to draw off towards our left flank when pressed by the enemy's columns, and there remain in readiness for action and reconnoitring well to the left.

    The 1st Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, was in cantonments to the north of Maubeuge, between that place and Givry. The 2nd Corps, under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, was to the north-west of Maubeuge, between that place and Sars-la-Bruyere. The 19th Infantry Brigade was concentrating at Valenciennes.

    Turning to our Ally, the 6th and 7th French Reserve Divisions were entrenching themselves on a line running from Dunkirk, through Cambrai and La Capelle, to Hirson. The 5th French Army was on our right, the 18th French Corps being in immediate touch with the British Army. Three Divisions of French cavalry under General Sordet, which had been operating in support of the Belgians, were falling back behind the 18th Corps for rest and refit. The 3rd and 4th French Armies, comprising 8-1/2 Corps, three Cavalry Divisions and some reserve Divisions, were between Mezieres and Longwy. The French troops further south had taken the offensive and marched into Alsace. Liege still held out.

    Namur was intact. The Belgians seemed secure behind the fortifications of Antwerp.

    Before going further it would be as well to give some account of the country in which the two opposing forces faced one another on the night of Friday, August 21st, the area Conde--Cambrai--Le Nouvion--Binche:--

    Distances.--Cambrai to Conde 24 miles.
    Conde to Binche 26 miles.
    Cambrai to Le Nouvion 26 miles.
    Le Nouvion to Binche 31 miles.

    This region forms part of the Belgian province of Hainault and the French Departments of the Nord and the Aisne, lying approximately between the upper valleys of the Rivers Scheldt and Sambre. Its northern boundary is formed by the basin of the River Haine. This river, formed from three streams which rise in the neighbourhood of Binche, passes Mons and flows into the Scheldt at Conde after a course of 30 miles. Close to its left bank, from Mons to Conde, a canal connects the former place with the Scheldt. Prior to the construction of this canal, the Haine was navigable by means of locks.

    Several small parallel streams run into it from the south, along sunken valleys in an undulating plateau, over which lie scattered the various mines of the Berinage coalfield.

    West of Mons the valley of the Haine forms a long, low plain, covered with meadows, through which the river meanders in broad bends as far as the Scheldt. Numerous water ditches, cut in the peaty soil and marked out by poplars and willows, drain the land and render the movement off the roads of any troops but infantry quite impracticable.

    On the northern boundary of the valley of the Haine, a belt of sand gives rise to a tract of rough uncultivated land which is in many places covered with woods. On its southern boundary the ground rises steeply on the east, and more gently on the west, to the Franco-Belgian frontier, over a rocky subsoil in which the affluents of the river have cut deep valleys.

    The Mons-Conde Canal has a length of 16-1/4 miles, 12-1/4 of which are in Belgian territory. It has a surface width of 64 feet and its maximum depth is 7 feet. The canal is crossed by 18 bridges, all of which, with the exception of the railway bridge east of St. Ghislain and the railway bridge at Les Herbieres, are swing bridges. A metalled towing-path runs along each bank.

    The principal passages across the valley of the Haine are at Mons from Brussels, at St. Ghislain from Ath, and near Pommeroeul from Tournai.

    The Scheldt, rising near Le Catelet at an altitude of 360 feet above the sea, soon approaches the St. Quentin Canal and runs alongside it as far as Cambrai, where the river and canal flow in one channel and form a navigable connection between the Scheldt and the Somme. Below Cambrai, the now canalised river flows on to Valenciennes, receiving on the way on its left bank the Sensee river and canal, and on its right bank the Ereclin, Selle, Ecaillon, and Rhonelle streams, which flow down in parallel courses from the watershed close to the left bank of the Sambre. From Valenciennes the Scheldt runs to Conde, where, as stated above, it is joined by the Mons-Conde Canal and the River Haine.

    Immediately afterwards it enters Belgian territory, where it becomes the great river of the Flemish part of the country, just as the Meuse may be said to be the great river of the Walloon portion.

    There are 14 locks between Cambrai and Conde, each providing a means of passage over the river. The general breadth of the canalised river is 55 feet and its maximum depth 7 feet. The towing-path follows sometimes one bank and sometimes another. The principal points of crossing of the Scheldt between Cambrai and Conde are at Cambrai, Bouchain, Lourches, Denain, Bouvignies, Thiant, Trith, St. Legers, Valenciennes, and Conde.

    While the Scheldt as it grows older flows through country which is for the most part little above sea level, in its upper reaches it cuts through an upland plateau on its way to join the Belgian central plains.

    Rising near Fontenelle, 9 miles south-west of Avesnes, the Sambre flows through Landrecies, where it becomes navigable, and where it is connected with the Oise by the Sambre Canal. Flowing past Maubeuge it enters Belgium below Jeumont and traverses thence, in a north-easterly direction, one of the most important industrial districts of Belgium.

    The country through which the river flows from its source to Charleroi forms a plateau cut up by numerous dales and deep valleys.

    Below Landrecies the depth of the river is from 6 to 7 feet, while its breadth is 50 feet; it is nowhere fordable. A towing-path runs in places on the left bank, in places on the right bank. Nine locks regulate the depth of the canal between Landrecies and Jeumont, and afford a means of passage for pedestrians. Communication is amply supplied for wheeled traffic by 22 road and railway bridges, of which the most important are those at Landrecies, Berlaimont, Hautmont, Louvroil, Maubeuge, Jeumont, Erquelinnes, Merbes-le-Chateau and Lobbes.

    South of Landrecies important road bridges cross the Sambre Canal at Catillon and near Oisy.

    The principal tributaries of the Sambre, in the area under view, flow into the river from the eastern foothills of the Ardennes; the streams which join it on its left bank are few and insignificant. On the right bank the Rivierette, the Helpe Mineure, the Helpe Majeure, the Tarsy and the Solre, flowing in parallel courses in a north-westerly direction, lie in deeply cut valleys which broaden out as they reach the main stream. The high ground between these streams offers a succession of defensive positions against an enemy advancing from the north in a south-westerly direction.

    The area under review may be divided into two portions. A northern or industrial, with all the inconvenience to military operations characteristic of such a district, and a southern or agricultural with unlimited freedom of movement and view, resembling in many respects the features of Salisbury Plain. The dividing line of these two portions may be taken as a line running through Valenciennes and Maubeuge.

    With the exception of the thickly populated Berinage coalfield, west and south of Mons, the country is open, arable, and undulating.

    Extensive views are obtainable, the villages, though numerous, are compact, and movement across country is easy.

    A notable feature in the southern portions of the area is the Foret de Mormal and in its neighbourhood the Bois l'Eveque.

    The Foret de Mormal, which is 22,460 acres in extent, is situated on the summit and slopes of the high ground bordering the left bank of the Sambre between Landrecies and Boussieres. It is crossed by one first-class road from Le Quesnoy to Avesnes, and several second-class roads.

    The forest is also traversed by two railways; that from Paris to Maubeuge, which follows its southern boundary from Landrecies to Sassegnies, and that from Valenciennes to Hirson, which runs from north-west to south-east and joins the former line at Aulnoye. On account of its thick undergrowth, its streams and marshy bottoms, the forest is not passable for troops except by the above-mentioned roads.

    Le Bois Levesque (1,805 acres), situated between Landrecies and Le Cateau, may be considered as an extension of the Foret de Mormal, from which it is only about 2-1/2 miles distant. It is traversed by the railway line from Paris to Maubeuge, by the road from Landrecies to Le Cateau, and the country road from Fontaine to Ors.

    In conclusion, let us glance at the principal places of strategic importance in this region which witnessed the opening stages of the retreat from Mons.

    In the beginning of the war, Maubeuge, with 20,000 inhabitants, belonged to the second class of French fortresses, which possessed a limited armament and which were destined to act as points d'appui for mobile forces acting in their vicinity. The strategic value of Maubeuge is due to the fact that the main lines from Paris to Brussels via Mons, and to northern Germany via Charleroi and Liege, pass through the town, while from it runs a line towards the eastern frontier via Hirson and Mezieres, with branch lines leading to Laon and Chalons. It is also a junction of main roads from Valenciennes, Mons, Charleroi, and Laon.

    The fortress has a circumference of about 20 miles. The forts, which lie in open country, are mostly small. Shortly before the outbreak of the War the defences of Maubeuge had been strengthened to meet the increased effect of high explosives, and various redoubts and batteries had been constructed in addition to the above-mentioned works.

    Mons, the capital of Hainault, had a pre-war population of 28,000 inhabitants, and is situated on a sandhill overlooking the Trovillon.

    It is the centre of the Berinage, the chief coal-mining district of Belgium. Main roads from Brussels, Binche, Charleroi, Valenciennes and Maubeuge have their meeting place here, while the railway from Paris to Brussels passes through it. It is also the junction point of the canal from Conde and the Canal Du Centre, which connects the former with the Charleroi Canal and the Sambre.

    The town of Binche (12,000 inhabitants), lying 15 miles east-south-east of Mons, is a centre of roads from Charleroi, Brussels, Mons, Bavai, and Beaumont. Through it passes a double line of railway coming from Maubeuge on its way to Brussels.

    Conde, a small and old fortified town, owes its military value to its position at the confluence of the Scheldt and the Haine, and to its canal communications with Mons. A single railway line connects it on the north with Tournai and on the south with Valenciennes. The main road from Audenarde to Valenciennes and Cambrai passes here.

    The strategetical importance of Valenciennes, a town of 32,000 inhabitants, is due to its being the meeting places of main roads from Cambrai, Lille, Tournai, Conde and Mons. It is also the junction point of the main lines from Paris via Cambrai, Hirson, and the north. Its position on the canalised Scheldt has been already referred to.

    Cambrai (28,000 inhabitants), lying on the right bank of the Scheldt, which first becomes navigable here, is the centre of main roads from Peronne, Bapaume, Arras, Douai, Valenciennes, Bavai and Le Cateau. It is also important as being the junction point of railways from Paris to Valenciennes and from Douai to St. Quentin.

    Le Cateau, where, as I have already said, I established my first General Headquarters in France, is situated on the Selle. Before the War its population numbered 10,700 and it possessed important woollen mills. It is the junction point of main roads connecting Valenciennes with St. Quentin and Cambrai with Le Nouvion. It also stands on the main line from Paris to Maubeuge, while single-line railways connect it with Cambrai, Valenciennes, and Le Quesnoy.

    Lastly, with regard to communications throughout the area, they were good and ample. The principal roads from north to south are those from Conde, through Valenciennes, to Cambrai, Le Cateau, and Landrecies, and from Mons to Binche, to Le Cateau via Bavai and to Landrecies through Maubeuge. Numerous second-class roads afford good lateral communications between the above-mentioned roads.

    Such, then, was the region in which, on the night of Friday, August 21st, the British Expeditionary Force found itself awaiting its first great trial of strength with the enemy. That night we went to sleep in high hopes. The mobilisation, transport, and concentration of the British Army had been effected without a hitch. The troops had not only been able to rest after their journey, but a few days had been available for practice marches and for overhauling equipment. The condition of the reservists, even those who had been longest away from the colours, was excellent and constantly improving.

    The highest spirit pervaded all ranks, and the army with one accord longed to be at grips with the enemy. The cavalry had been pushed well to the front, and such engagements as had taken place between detachments of larger or smaller patrols had foreshadowed that moral superiority of British over German which was afterwards so completely established, and proved of such enormous value in the retreat, the Battles of the Marne and the Aisne, and in the opening phases of the first Battle of Ypres. The French troops had already secured minor successes, and had penetrated into the enemy's territory. The Allied Commanders were full of hope and confidence.

    CHAPTER IV.

    THE RETREAT FROM MONS.

    At 5 a.m. on the 22nd I awoke, as I had lain down to sleep, in high hopes. No evil foreboding of coming events had visited me in dreams; but it was not many hours later that the disillusionment began. I started by motor in the very early hours of a beautiful August morning to visit General Lanrezac at his Headquarters in the neighbourhood of Philippeville.

    Soon after entering the area of the 5th French Army, I found my motor stopped at successive cross roads by columns of infantry and artillery moving south. After several such delays on my journey, and before I had gone half the distance, I suddenly came up with Captain Spiers of the 11th Hussars, who was the liaison officer at General Lanrezac's Headquarters.

    There is an atmosphere engendered by troops retiring, when they expect to be advancing, which is unmistakable to anyone who has had much experience of war. It matters not whether such a movement is the result of a lost battle, an unsuccessful engagement, or is in the nature of a "strategic manoeuvre to the rear." The fact that, whatever the reason may be, it means giving up ground to the enemy, affects the spirits of the troops and manifests itself in the discontented, apprehensive expression which is seen on the faces of the men, and the tired, slovenly, unwilling gait which invariably characterises troops subjected to this ordeal.

    This atmosphere surrounded me for some time before I met Spiers and before he had spoken a word. My optimistic visions of the night before had vanished, and what he told me did not tend to bring them back. He reported that the Guard and 7th German Corps had since daybreak advanced on the Sambre in the neighbourhood of Franiere, and had attacked the 10th French Corps which was holding the river. The advanced troops had driven the Germans back; but he added that "offensive action was contrary to General Lanrezac's plans," and that this had "annoyed him."

    The 10th Corps had had to fall back with some loss, and were taking up ground known as the "Fosse Position," on the south side of the Sambre.

    Spiers thought that the 10th Corps had been knocked about a good deal.

    He gave me various items of information gleaned from the Chief of Intelligence of the French 5th Army. These reports went to show that the German turning movement in Belgium was extending far towards the west, the right being kept well forward as though a powerful envelopment was designed. It was evident that the enemy was making some progress in his attempts to bridge and cross the Sambre all along the front of the 5th Army. There appeared to be some difficulty in finding General Lanrezac, and therefore I decided to return at once to my Headquarters at Le Cateau.

    I found there that our own Intelligence had received information which confirmed a good deal of what I had heard in the morning. They thought that at least three German Corps were advancing upon us, the most westerly having reached as far as Ath.

    The hopes and anticipations with which I concluded the last chapter underwent considerable modification from these experiences and events; but the climax of the day's disappointment and disillusionment was not reached till 11 p.m., when the Head of the French Military Mission at my Headquarters, Colonel Huguet, brought a French Staff Officer to me who had come direct from General Lanrezac.

    This officer reported the fighting of which Spiers had already informed me, and said that the French 10th Corps had suffered very heavily. When thinking of our estimates of losses in those days, it must be remembered that a dearly bought experience had not yet opened our minds to the terrible toll which modern war exacts.

    The position of the 5th French Army extended from Dinant on the Meuse (just north of Fosse--Charleroi--Thuin back to Trelon) about five Corps in all. Sordet's Cavalry Corps had reported that probably three German Corps were advancing on Brussels.

    The German line facing the Anglo-French Army was thought to be "roughly" Soignies--Nivelles--Gembloux, and thence circling to the north of the Sambre, round Namur. A strong column of German infantry was advancing on Charleroi from Fleurus about 3 p.m. on the 21st.

    There had been heavy fighting at Tamines, on the Sambre, in which French troops had been worsted. General Lanrezac was anxious to know if I would attack the flank of the German columns which were pressing him back from the river.

    In view of the most probable situation of the German Army, as it was known to both of us, and the palpable intention of its Commander to effect a great turning movement round my left flank, and having regard to the actual numbers of which I was able to dispose, it is very difficult to realise what was in Lanrezac's mind when he made such a request to me.

    As the left of the French 5th Army (Reserve Division of 18th Corps) was drawn back as far as Trelon, and the centre and right of that Army were in process of retiring, the forward position I now held on the Conde Canal might quickly become very precarious.

    I, therefore, informed Lanrezac in reply that such an operation as he suggested was quite impracticable for me. I agreed to retain my present position for 24 hours; but after that time I told him it would be necessary for me to consider whether the weight against my front and outer flank, combined with the retreat of the French 5th Army, would not compel me to go back to the Maubeuge position.

    I should mention that earlier in the day, on my return to Headquarters after my talk with Spiers, I had despatched the following message to General Lanrezac:--

    "I am waiting for the dispositions arranged for to be carried out, especially the posting of French Cavalry Corps on my left. I am prepared to fulfil the role allotted to me when the 5th Army advances to the attack.

    "In the meantime, I hold an advanced defensive position extending from Conde on the left, through Mons to Erquelinnes, where I connect with two Reserve Divisions south of the Sambre. I am now much in advance of the line held by the 5th Army and feel my position to be as forward as circumstances will allow, particularly in view of the fact that I am not properly prepared for offensive action till to-morrow morning, as I have previously informed you.

    "I do not understand from your wire that the 18th Corps has yet been engaged, and they stand on my inner flank."

    I left my Headquarters at 5 a.m. on Sunday the 23rd and went to Sars-la-Bruyere (Headquarters of the 2nd Corps), and there I met Haig, Smith-Dorrien, and Allenby.

    The cavalry had, during the 22nd, drawn off towards my left flank after heavy pressure by the enemy's advancing columns, leaving detachments in front of my right to the east of Mons, which was not so severely threatened. These detachments extended in a south-easterly direction south of Bray and Binche, the latter place having been occupied by the enemy. They were in touch with the 5th French Army.

    Patrols and advanced squadrons had engaged similar bodies of the enemy and had held their own well.

    The 2nd Corps occupied the line of the Conde Canal, from that place round the salient which the canal makes to the north of Mons, and extended thence to the east of Obourg, whence that part of the line was drawn back towards Villers-St. Ghislain.

    The 5th Division was holding the line from Conde to Mariette, whilst the 3rd Division continued the line thence round the salient to the right of the line occupied by the 2nd Corps.

    The 1st Corps was echeloned on the right and in rear of the 2nd.

    I told the commanders of the doubts which had arisen in my mind during the previous 24 hours, and impressed on them the necessity of being prepared for any kind of move, either in advance or in retreat. I discussed exhaustively the situation on our front.

    Allenby's bold and searching reconnaissance had not led me to believe that we were threatened by forces against which we could not make an effective stand. The 2nd Corps had not yet been seriously engaged, while the 1st was practically still in reserve.

    Allenby's orders to concentrate towards the left flank when pressed by the advance of the enemy's main columns had been practically carried into effect. I entertained some anxiety as to the salient which the canal makes north of Mons, and enjoined on Smith-Dorrien particular watchfulness and care with regard to it.

    They all assured me that a quiet night had been passed and that their line was firmly taken up and held.

    The air reconnaissance had started at daybreak, and I decided to await aircraft reports from Henderson before making any decided plan.

    I instructed Sir Archibald Murray, my Chief of Staff, to remain for the present at General Smith-Dorrien's Headquarters at Sars-la-Bruyere, and gave him full instructions as to arrangements which must be made if a retreat became necessary. I then went on to Valenciennes. General Drummond (Commanding the 19th Infantry Brigade) and the French Commandant at Valenciennes met me at the station.

    I inspected a part of the entrenchments which were under construction, and the disposition of the Territorial troops (two divisions under General d'Amade) which were detailed to hold them and to guard our left flank. The 19th Brigade (2nd Batt. R. Welsh Fusiliers, 1st Batt.

    Scottish Rifles, 1st Batt. Middlesex Regt., and 2nd Batt. Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders) was just completing its detrainment, and I placed Drummond under the orders of General Allenby commanding the Cavalry Division.

    During this day (August 23rd) reports continued to reach me of heavy pressure on our outposts all along the line, but chiefly between Conde and Mons.

    Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, it will be remembered, was now in command of the 2nd Corps, having been sent out from England in succession to Sir James Grierson on the latter's untimely death.

    After my conference with the Corps Commanders on the morning of the 23rd, I left General Smith-Dorrien full of confidence in regard to his position, but when I returned to my Headquarters in the afternoon, reports came to hand that he was giving up the salient at Mons because the outpost line at Obourg had been penetrated by the enemy, and that he was also preparing to give up the whole of the line of the canal before nightfall. He said that he anticipated a gap occurring in his line between the 3rd and 5th Divisions in the neighbourhood of Mariette, and he went so far as to make a request for help to the 1st Corps.

    Up to this time there was no decided threat in any strength on Conde, Sir Horace, therefore, need not have feared an imminent turning movement, and, as regards his front, he was nowhere threatened by anything more than cavalry supported by small bodies of infantry.

    At that time no directions for retreat had been issued from Headquarters, although the Chief of the General Staff had been left at Sars-la-Bruyere on purpose to give orders for such a movement if it should become necessary.

    The General's anxiety seems to have lessened later in the afternoon, for at 5 p.m. a message from the 2nd Corps said that the commander was "well satisfied with the situation."

    The 3rd Division was now effecting a retirement south of the canal to a line running west through Nouvelles, and this movement had the inevitable result of bringing back the 5th Division and handing over the bridges of the canal to the German cavalry.

    Every report I was now receiving at Headquarters pointed to the early necessity of a retirement of the British Forces in view of the general strategic situation, and I did not, therefore, deem it desirable to interfere with the 2nd Corps commander.

    Reports of German activity on his front continued to be received from the G.O.C. 2nd Corps. At 7.15 p.m. he asked for permission to retire on Bavai; at 9.45 he was again reassured--a Divisional Headquarters which had retired was now "moving forward again"; and at 10.20 p.m. he reported, "casualties in no way excessive; all quiet now."

    The line which the 2nd Corps had taken up for the night showed an average retirement of three miles south of the canal. During the late afternoon the advanced troops of the 1st Corps were engaged, but not seriously threatened; they held their ground.

    During the late afternoon and evening very disquieting reports had arrived as to the situation on my right. These were confirmed later in a telegram from French Headquarters, which arrived at half-past eleven at night. It clearly showed that our present position was strategically untenable; but this conclusion had been forced upon me much earlier in the evening when I received a full appreciation of the situation as it then appeared at French General Headquarters. General Joffre also told me that his information led him to expect that I might be attacked the next day by at least three German Corps and two Cavalry Divisions.

    Appreciating the situation from the point of view which all reports now clearly established, my last hope of an offensive had to be abandoned, and it became necessary to consider an immediate retreat from our present forward position.

    I selected the new line from Jerlain (south-east of Valenciennes) eastwards to Maubeuge. This line had already been reconnoitred. The Corps and Divisional Staff Officers who were called into Headquarters to receive orders, especially those of the 2nd Corps, thought our position was much more seriously threatened than it really was and, in fact, one or two expressed doubts as to the possibility of effecting a retirement in the presence of the enemy in our immediate front. I did not share these views, and Colonel Vaughan (Chief of the Staff of the Cavalry Division) was more inclined to accept my estimate of the enemy's forces on or near the canal than the others were.

    His opportunities of gauging the enemy's strength and dispositions had been greatly enhanced by the fine reconnoitring work done on the previous two or three days by the Cavalry Division.

    However, I determined to effect the retreat, and orders were issued accordingly.

    The 1st Army Corps was to move up towards Givry and to take up a good line to cover the retreat of the 2nd Corps towards Bavai, which was to commence at daybreak. Our front and left flank was to be screened and covered by the cavalry and the 19th Infantry Brigade.

    At about 1 a.m. on the 24th, Spiers came in from the Headquarters of the 5th French Army and told me that they were seriously checked all along the line. The 3rd and 4th French Armies were retiring, and the 5th French Army, after its check on Saturday, was conforming to the general movement.

    The information previously referred to as arriving from French Headquarters at 11.30 p.m. on the 23rd was as follows:--

    1. Namur fell this day.
    1. The 5th French Army had been attacked all along their front by the

    3rd German Corps, the Guard, the 10th and 7th Corps, and was falling back on the line Givet--Philippeville--Maubeuge.

    1. Hastiere had been captured by the Germans on the 23rd.
    1. The Meuse was falling rapidly and becoming fordable in many places,

    hence the difficulty of defence.

    At 5.30 a.m. on the 24th I went out to my advanced Headquarters, which had been established at Bavai, a small village which is strategically important from the circumstance that it is the meeting place of roads from every point of the compass. The orders issued through the night had been carried out. The 1st Corps was on the line Nouvelles--Harmignies--Givry, with Corps Headquarters at Bonnet.

    They were making an excellent stand to cover the retirement of the 2nd Corps, which was being hard pressed, particularly the 5th Division to the south-east of Conde. In fact, at 10 a.m. General Fergusson, Commanding the Division, found it necessary to call very urgently upon General Allenby for help and support.

    The 19th Infantry Brigade under Drummond had, it will be remembered, been placed at the disposal of the commander of the Cavalry Division, who, calling this Brigade up in immediate support of the 5th Division, directed Gough's 3rd and De Lisle's 2nd Cavalry Brigades (3rd Cavalry Brigade: 4th Hussars, 5th Lancers, and 16th Lancers; 2nd Cavalry Brigade: 4th Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers, and 18th Hussars) to threaten and harass the flanks of the advancing German troops, whilst Bingham's 4th Cavalry Brigade remained in observation towards the west.

    The intervention of Allenby and Drummond, and the support they rendered, was most effective in taking the severe pressure of the enemy off the 5th Division and enabling it to continue its retreat. About 11.30 a.m. the 2nd Corps Headquarters were retired from Sars-la-Bruyere to Hon.

    Soon after arriving at Bavai I visited the Headquarters of the 1st Corps at Bonnet and observed the fighting above mentioned. Our troops in this part of the line were very active and pushing. The 8th Brigade under Davies (2nd Batt. Royal Scots, 2nd Batt. Royal Irish Regt., 4th Batt. Middlesex Regt. and 1st Batt. Gordon Highlanders) was now at Nouvelles, on the left; then came the rest of the 2nd Division, and then the 1st Division under Lomax, on the right.

    I went out from Haig's Headquarters to a high ridge, whence the ground slopes down towards the north and north-east, along a gentle declivity stretching almost to the canal which was some distance away. The situation of the 1st Corps was excellent, and the artillery positions were well chosen. From where we stood we could observe the effect of our fire. It was very accurate, and shrapnel could be seen bursting well over the enemy lines and holding his advance in complete check, whilst the German fire was by no means so effective. The infantry were defending their position a long way down the slope with great determination and tenacity.

    The steadfast attitude and skilful retreat of our right wing at Mons had much to do with the success of our withdrawal, and the short time I spent with the 1st Corps that morning inspired me with great confidence.

    The subsequent retirement of the 1st Corps was carried out successfully and with little loss, Haig's Headquarters being established at Riez de l'Erelle at about 1 p.m.

    After visiting some important points in the field over which the 2nd Corps was fighting, I determined to seek out General Sordet, Commanding the French Cavalry Corps, which was in cantonments somewhere to the east of Maubeuge. I found Sordet's Headquarters at Avesnes. The scene in the village was very typical of continental war as it has been so often presented to us in pictures of the war of 1870.

    The Commander of the French Cavalry Corps and his Staff, whom I met in the central square, formed a striking group against a very suitable background of gun parks and ammunition wagons. One looked in vain for the fire-eating beau sabreur of a Murat.

    The man who had come back from that first desperate onslaught in Belgium, and had so grandly supported and succoured our hard-pressed Allies in their splendid defence, was a very quiet, undemonstrative, spare little figure of at least 60 years of age. He appeared hard and fit, and showed no sign of the tremendous strain he had already undergone. On the contrary, he was smart and dapper, and looked like the light-weight horseman he is.

    His clear-cut face and small, regular features, denoted descent from the old noblesse, and he struck me in his bright tunic as one who might be most fittingly imaged in a piece of old Dresden china; but added to all this was the bearing of a Cavalry Commander.

    His manner was courteous in the extreme; but he showed inflexible firmness and determination.

    His Staff were of the pattern of French cavalry officers. I have seen much of them for years past at manoeuvres, etc., and they combine the best qualities of cavalry leaders with the utmost camaraderie and good fellowship.

    I interviewed the General at some length, pointing out what I had been told by General Joffre and his Chief of Staff, namely, that the Cavalry Corps had been directed to operate on my left or outer flank. I informed him that in my opinion this was the point where his presence was chiefly required, and where his action would be most effective in checking the advance of the enemy.

    I told the General that I should be very glad of his help in that locality as soon as possible, because in my present forward position, and having regard to the continued retirement of the 5th French Army, I should sorely need all the assistance I could get to establish the Army under my command in their new position.

    General Sordet was very courteous and sympathetic. He expressed the utmost desire to help me in every possible way. He added that he had received no orders to move to the left flank and must, therefore, await these instructions before he could march. He further told me that after the arduous time he had experienced when supporting the Belgian Army, his horses stood in the most urgent need of rest, and that, in any case, it would be impossible for him to leave his present position for at least 24 hours. He promised, however, to do all in his power to help me, and, as my story will presently show, he kept his word splendidly.

    I then went back to Le Cateau to pick up any messages or news from Joffre or Lanrezac. Here I was gladdened by the sight of the detrainment of the advanced troops of the 4th Division (General Snow).

    After a brief halt at Le Cateau, I started again for my advanced Headquarters at Bavai. The experiences of that afternoon remain indelibly impressed on my memory. Very shortly after leaving Le Cateau I was met by streams of Belgian refugees, flying from Mons and its neighbourhood. They were lying about the fields in all directions, and blocking the roads with carts and vans in which they were trying to carry off as much of their worldly goods as possible. The whole country-side showed those concrete evidences of disturbance and alarm which brought home to all our minds what this retreat meant and all that it might come to mean.

    After much delay from these causes I reached Bavai about 2.30 p.m., and it was with great difficulty that my motor could wind its way through the mass of carts, horses, fugitives and military baggage trains which literally covered almost every yard of space in the small town. The temporary advanced Headquarters were established in the market place, the appearance of which defies description. The babel of voices, the crying of women and children, mingled with the roar of the guns and the not far distant crack of rifles and machine guns, made a deafening noise, amidst which it was most difficult to keep a clear eye and tight grip on the rapidly changing course of events.

    In a close room on the upper floor of the Mairie I found Murray, my Chief of Staff, working hard, minus belt, coat and collar. The heat was intense. The room was filled with Staff Officers bringing reports or awaiting instructions. Some of the Headquarters Staff had not closed their eyes for 48 hours, and were stretched out on forms or huddled up in corners, wrapped in that deep slumber which only comes to brains which, for the time being, are completely worn out.

    If some of the armchair critics who so glibly talk of the easy time which Staff Officers, compared with their regimental comrades, have in war--if some of them could have watched that scene, they would be more chary of forming such opinions and spreading such wrong ideas.

    Personally, I have always been far more a regimental than a Staff Officer, and I have every reason to sympathise with the former, but when I have witnessed scenes and gone through days such as I am now very imperfectly describing, and when I know such days to be frequent and long drawn out occurrences in war, it makes my blood boil to hear and to read of the calumnies which are often heaped upon the head of the unfortunate "Staff."

    Murray did splendid work that day and set the best of examples. On my arrival at Bavai he reported the situation fully and clearly to me.

    The action of the cavalry and the 19th Brigade on the left had greatly relieved the heavy pressure on the 5th Division, and the retirement was proceeding fairly well.

    Information had, however, reached me of the defeat and retreat of the 3rd French Army, and the continued falling back of Lanrezac. I judged also, by the method and direction of the attack, that strenuous attempts were being made to turn our left flank and press me back on Maubeuge. The force opposed to me was growing in size, and I judged it to be more than double my numbers. As subsequent information proved, we were actually opposed by four corps and at least two cavalry divisions.

    Early in the afternoon it was clear to me that further definite decisions must be taken. We could not stand on the line towards which the troops were now retiring.

    The fortress of Maubeuge lay close on my right rear. It was well fortified and provisioned. It is impossible for anyone, who has not been situated as I was, to realise the terrible temptation which such a place offers to an army seeking shelter against overpowering odds.

    For a short time on this fateful afternoon I debated within myself whether or not I should yield to this temptation; but I did not hesitate long, because there were two considerations which forced themselves prominently upon my mind.

    In the first place, I had an instinctive feeling that this was exactly what the enemy was trying to make me do; and, in the second place, I had the example of Bazaine and Metz in 1870 present in my mind, and the words of Sir Edward Hamley's able comment upon the decision of the French Marshal came upon me with overwhelming force. Hamley described it as "The anxiety of the temporising mind which prefers postponement of a crisis to vigorous enterprise." Of Bazaine he says, "In clinging to Metz he acted like one who, when the ship is foundering, should lay hold of the anchor."

    I therefore abandoned all such ideas, and issued orders at about 3 p.m. directing the retreat some miles further back to the line Le Cateau--Cambrai.

    The pressure of the enemy on our left flank became greater towards night. All reports and reconnaissances indicated a determined attempt to outflank us and cut across our line of retreat, but Allenby's cavalry was splendidly disposed and handled. The German columns were kept at bay, and the troops bivouacked generally on a line somewhat south of that towards which they had been ordered to retreat in the morning. There was some confusion in the retirement of the 2nd Corps.

    The 5th Division crossed the rear of the 3rd near Bavai, got to the east of them and somewhat on the line of the retreat of the 1st Corps, whose movement was thus hampered and delayed.

    I got back to Headquarters at Le Cateau late in the evening, where a budget of reports awaited me. The most important news was contained in a telephone message received at 9.40 p.m. from Major Clive of the Grenadier Guards, who was my liaison officer at French Headquarters. This ran as follows:--

    "The 4th Army, fighting against an enemy estimated at three Corps, has fallen back to the line Virton--Spincourt. Three Reserve Divisions made a counter-attack this afternoon from the south against the enemy's left flank. The 3rd Army, fighting in difficult country, has fallen back to better ground this side of the Meuse, about Mezieres and Stenai. The enemy have been unable to cross the Meuse. The 3rd Army is waiting for sufficient strength to make a counter-attack from its right. The 1st Corps of the 5th Army found that the Germans had crossed the Meuse behind them south of Dinant; they therefore fell back to the neighbourhood of Givet and Philippeville."

    Murray followed me to Headquarters about 3 a.m., and reported that all orders had been carried out effectually and that the move was proceeding satisfactorily. All the troops were very tired and had suffered severely from the heat. Our losses in the fighting of the last two days were considerable, but not excessive, having regard to the nature of the operations.

    In the early hours of the 25th the retreat was continued, again covered skilfully by Allenby's cavalry.

    During the night the 4th Division had nearly completed their detrainment, and were taking up the position assigned to them towards Cambrai. In the course of the morning of the 25th I visited Snow, who commanded this Division, and went over the ground with him.

    The only action of importance during the day occurred at Solesmes, when the rearguard of the 3rd Division under McCracken was heavily attacked. Allenby, with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade (4th Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers, and 18th Hussars), came to his assistance and enabled him to continue his retreat. He did not, however, arrive at his appointed destination till late in the evening, and then it was with very tired men.

    The reports received up till noon of the 25th showed that the French were retiring all along the line, and there was no longer any doubt in my mind as to the strength and intention of the enemy in our own immediate front. Three Corps and a Cavalry Division were concentrating against us, whilst a fourth Corps and another Cavalry Division were trying to turn our western flank.

    I had now to consider the position most carefully and again come to a momentous decision. Was I to stand and fight on the line to which the Army was now retiring (Le Cateau--Cambrai) or continue the retreat at daybreak?

    To hold the Le Cateau position in view of the heavy threat on my front and western flank was a decision which could only be justified if I were sure of the absolute determination of the French Commander to hold on all along the line with the utmost tenacity; but our Allies were already a day's march in rear of us, and every report indicated continual retreat.

    At least one Army Corps and two Cavalry Divisions of the enemy were engaged in an outflanking movement on my left, in which they had already made some progress, and the only help I could depend upon in that quarter was from two French Reserve Divisions spread out on an enormous front towards Dunkirk, and very hastily and indifferently entrenched. It was unlikely that they would be able to oppose any effective resistance to the enemy's flank movement.

    If this flank attack were successful, my communications with Havre would be practically gone.

    There had been neither time nor labour available to make the Le Cateau position strong enough to withstand a serious onslaught by the superior numbers which were advancing against my front, and the British troops, which had been almost continuously marching and fighting since Sunday morning, stood in much need of rest, which could only be secured by placing some serious obstacle, such as a river line, between my troops and the enemy.

    After long and anxious deliberation, it seemed clear to me that every consideration pointed to the necessity of resuming our march in retreat at daybreak on the 26th, and orders to that effect were accordingly issued.

    I determined to direct the march on St. Quentin and Noyon. The troops were to be held so concentrated as to enable me to take immediate advantage of any change in the situation which might check the retreat and offer favourable opportunities for taking the offensive. Failing such developments, my idea was to concentrate behind the Somme or the Oise. Behind such a barrier I should be able to rest the troops, fill up casualties and deficiencies in material, and remain ready to act effectively with the Allies in whatever direction circumstances might dictate.

    The retreat had been resumed at daybreak, and at 6 p.m. all the troops of the 2nd Corps were on the Le Cateau line except McCracken's Brigade, which, as before described, had been obliged to stand and fight at Solesmes. The 1st Corps, however, was delayed in starting for several hours, and was only able to reach the neighbourhood of Landrecies; so that at the conclusion of the day's march a somewhat dangerous gap existed between the 1st and 2nd Corps, which caused me considerable anxiety in the small hours of the morning of the 26th.

    When darkness fell on the 25th, the enemy had sent forward advance troops in motors and lorries through the Foret de Mormal in pursuit of the 1st Corps. This culminated in a violent attack on Landrecies, which, however, was splendidly driven off with heavy loss to the enemy, chiefly by the 4th (Guards) Brigade under Brigadier-General Scott-Kerr.

    With reference to this action, the following is an extract from a letter which I despatched to Lord Kitchener on August 27th:--

    "The 4th Brigade were fighting in the early morning in the streets of Landrecies. A German infantry column, about the strength of a brigade, emerged from the wood north of the town and advanced south in the closest order, filling up the narrow street.

    "Two or three of our machine guns were brought to bear on this magnificent target from the other end of the town. The head of the column was checked and stopped, a frightful panic ensued, and it is estimated that, in a very few minutes, no less than 800 to 900 dead and wounded Germans were lying in the streets."

    Sir Douglas Haig, although his troops were very tired and handicapped also by heavy rearguard fighting, still proceeded to carry out the instructions he had received, and the retirement of the 1st Corps was continued in excellent order and with complete efficiency.

    Things did not go so well with the 2nd Corps. General Allenby, who had been most ably covering the retreat of the Army with his cavalry, had already materially assisted the rearguard of the 3rd Division to surmount their difficulties at Solesmes. McCracken's Brigade (7th) (3rd Batt. Worcester Regt., 2nd Batt. S. Lancs Regt., 1st Batt. Wilts Regt., and 2nd Batt. R. Irish Rifles) did not reach the Le Cateau position until 10 or 11 p.m. on the 25th. His men were, of course, nearly done up, and he had suffered severe losses.

    Colonel Ansell, Commanding the 5th Dragoon Guards, one of the finest cavalry leaders in the Army, who fell at the head of his regiment a few days later, gave information to General Allenby at about 2 a.m. regarding the nature of the German advance. This seemed of such great importance that the latter at once sought out Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and warned him that, unless he was prepared to continue his march at daybreak, he would most probably be pinned down to his position and would be unable to get away.

    Sir Horace asked General Allenby what, in his opinion, were the chances he had if he remained and held the position, adding that he felt convinced his troops were so exhausted as to preclude the possibility of removing them for some hours to come. Allenby's reply was that he thought, unless the commander of the 2nd Corps made up his mind to move at daybreak, the enemy probably would succeed in surrounding him.

    Nevertheless, Sir Horace determined to fight. As to this decision, a commander on the spot, and in close touch with his Divisions and Brigades, is in the best position to judge of what his men can do.

    I had, late on the evening of the 25th, before leaving for my Headquarters at St. Quentin, visited several units of the 2nd Corps in their bivouacs and, though tired indeed, they had not struck me as being worn out troops.

    By the break of day on the 26th the 5th Division on the right had secured several hours' rest. The same may be said of the 8th and 9th Brigades, which came next in the line. The 7th Brigade had only just arrived at cantonments at 10 p.m. or 11 p.m. on the 25th, after a heavy day's march and some severe fighting, but they could in such an emergency have marched at dawn. The 4th Division on the left of the 2nd Corps was comparatively fresh.

    I visited in particular one Artillery Brigade, some of whose guns had been saved from capture on the previous day by the cavalry. The Brigade Commander broke down with emotion as he recounted to me the glorious bravery displayed by Francis Grenfell and the 9th Lancers.

    This Brigade fought magnificently for several hours next day on the Le Cateau position.

    All reconnaissance and intelligence reports received up to midnight on the 25th concur in saying that Cambrai was then still in the possession of the French, and that the position there was not yet seriously threatened; further, that whilst there were clear signs of the outflanking movement in progress, no considerable bodies of the enemy had yet crossed the line Valenciennes--Douai, and that, after their repulse at Solesmes by McCracken and Allenby, the enemy was not in strength south of the line Valenciennes--Maubeuge.

    This estimate of the situation was confirmed by a German wireless message, intercepted towards the evening of the 26th, which stated that the outflanking German Corps was only at that time "moving towards" Cambrai, and that the remaining Corps, which were engaged in the frontal attack, were only then "moving on" towards Cattenieres, Walincourt and Le Cateau respectively.

    The 1st Corps had, as we know, experienced a much harder day's march on the 25th, and was attacked at Landrecies and its neighbourhood before it could get any rest at all. Sir Douglas correctly appreciated the strength of the enemy on his immediate front and gauged the situation, namely, the German design to impose on us the idea that he was in great strength, and to pin our troops to the ground whilst his flanking movement became effective.

    For this purpose the enemy had hurried forward a large force of Artillery, composed of guns and howitzers of all calibres, escorted and protected by four Cavalry Divisions and a limited number of jaeger battalions.

    These troops were pushed forward against the 2nd Corps at Le Cateau as they had been against the 1st Corps at Landrecies, and with a precisely similar purpose.

    The superb gallantry of the troops, and the skilful leading by Divisional and Brigade and Battalion Commanders, helped very materially by the support given by Allenby and, as I afterwards learned, by Sordet and d'Amade, saved the 2nd Corps, which otherwise would assuredly have been pinned to their ground and then surrounded.

    The cavalry might have made good their retreat, but three out of five Divisions of the British Army with the 7th Brigade must have been lost.

    The enemy, flushed by this primary victory, would have pressed in on the flanks of the 1st Corps, cut off their retreat, and, continuing his combined front and flank attack, would have almost certainly pushed the whole Allied Army off their line of retreat, and a stupendous repetition of Sedan might well have resulted.

    The magnificent fight put up by these glorious troops saved disaster; but the actual result was a total loss of at least 14,000 officers and men, about 80 guns, numbers of machine guns, as well as quantities of ammunition, war material and baggage, whilst the enemy gained time to close up his infantry columns marching down from the north-east, at the cost of losses not greater than, if as great, as our own, but which were, in view of the immense superiority he possessed in numbers and fighting power, infinitely less important to him.

    The effect upon the British Army was to render the subsequent conduct of the retreat more difficult and arduous.

    The hope of making a stand behind the Somme or the Oise, or any other favourable position north of the Marne, had now to be abandoned owing to the shattered condition of the Army, and the far-reaching effect of our losses at the Battle of Le Cateau was felt seriously even throughout the subsequent Battle of the Marne and during the early operations on the Aisne. It was not possible to replace our lost guns and machine guns until nearly the end of September.

    In my dispatch, written in September, 1914, I refer eulogistically to the Battle of Le Cateau. I had been, together with my staff, directing the movements of the British Army day and night up to the time of the Battle of the Marne--in the course of which battle I received an urgent demand from the Government that a dispatch should be forwarded.

    It was completed, of necessity, very hurriedly, and before there had been time or opportunity to give thorough study to the reports immediately preceding and covering the period of that battle, by which alone the full details could be disclosed.

    It was, indeed, impossible, until much later on, to appreciate in all its details the actual situation on the morning of August 26th.

    At the time the dispatch was written, indeed, I was entirely ignorant of the material support which was rendered throughout the day by Generals Sordet and d'Amade, and I accepted without question the estimate made by the commander of the 2nd Corps as to the nature of the threat against him and the position of the German forces opposed to him.

    It is very difficult for the uninitiated to realise the concentration which the direction of an Army carrying out a vigorous offensive like that of the Marne, demands from the brain of the Commander-in-Chief, if he is to make the best use of the forces under his command.

    In the surroundings and under the conditions of a great battle, the preparation of material for and the compilation of any dispatch is a matter of great difficulty. It is very easy to say: "Why not employ others?" I have always held that it is only the General who conducts an operation of any magnitude who can, or should, sum up and describe it. No one else can know what was passing in his mind, or how his judgment was directed and formed by the swiftly moving procession of events.

    Nor can exact information become available for weeks or months, sometimes, indeed, even for years, after the conclusion of a particular series of operations.

    In more than one of the accounts of the retreat from Mons, it is alleged that some tacit consent at least was given at Headquarters at St. Quentin to the decision arrived at by the commander of the 2nd Corps. I owe it to the able and devoted officers of my Staff to say that there is not a semblance of truth in this statement.

    CHAPTER V.

    FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT.

    General Joffre had arranged for a conference at my Headquarters at St.

    Quentin with Lanrezac and myself, to take place early on the 26th.

    I had reached St. Quentin at about 8 a.m. on the 25th. There had been little sleep during the night for any of us. In the earlier hours continual reports came in regarding the dangerous position of the 1st Corps. In addition to the unfortunate but inevitable delay in commencing their march in the morning, the troops were further greatly embarrassed and worried by the retirement of the French from the Sambre, and their convergence on our own line of march.

    The enemy's cavalry, supported by guns, Jaeger, and detachments of Infantry carried on motor cars and lorries, closely pressed our columns through the Foret de Mormal. The result of this was to make it imperative that the 2nd Division should make a firm stand at Landrecies and Maroilles before the 1st Corps could reach the line assigned to it in the morning. A gap of some eight miles existed between the right of the 2nd Corps at Le Cateau and the left of the 1st Corps at Landrecies.

    The moment this news reached me I summoned Huguet, and through him dispatched an urgent request to two French Reserve Divisions (which formed part of the 5th French Army and were nearest to the British) to move up and assist Haig.

    They readily responded, and the effect of the diversion enabled Haig to extricate his Corps from this most dangerous situation, which he did with great skill and judgment, whilst inflicting severe loss on the enemy.

    Towards morning it was reported to me that the enemy had drawn off, and at dawn the retreat was resumed by the whole of the 1st Corps as ordered. The fighting of the 1st Corps through this night, combined with its skilful and efficient withdrawal in the morning, was one of the most brilliant episodes of the whole retreat.

    No sooner was my mind made easier by this happy deliverance of the 1st Corps when the trouble related in the last chapter commenced with the 2nd Corps.

    It was not until 8 a.m. on the 26th that I knew the left wing of the Army was actually committed to the fight. At this time I was anxiously awaiting the arrival of Joffre and Lanrezac.

    Staff Officers were sent to General Smith-Dorrien, carrying peremptory orders to break off the action and to continue the retreat forthwith.

    Shortly afterwards the French Commander-in-Chief arrived with his Chief of Staff. He was followed by the Commander of the 5th French Army, and we proceeded to discuss the situation.

    I narrated the events of the previous two days, and pointed out the isolated situation in which the British Army had been placed by the very sudden change of plan and headlong retirement of the 5th French Army on my right.

    Lanrezac appeared to treat the whole affair as quite normal, and merely incidental to the common exigencies of war. He offered no explanation, and gave no reason for the very unexpected moves he had made. The discussion was apparently distasteful to him, for he remained only a short time at my Headquarters, and left before any satisfactory understanding as to further plans and dispositions had been arrived at.

    Joffre remained with me some considerable time. I gathered that he was by no means satisfied with the action and conduct of his subordinate General. No very definite plans were then decided upon, the understanding, as the French Commander-in-Chief left, being that the retreat was to be continued as slowly and deliberately as possible, until we found ourselves in a favourable position to make a firm stand and take the offensive. The Commander-in-Chief urged me to maintain my position in the line, which I told him I hoped, in spite of the heavy losses which we had suffered, to be able to do.

    Immediately Joffre left I set out for Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's Headquarters, as I could get no satisfactory report from that General.

    For the first few miles we were able to make fair progress, but as we went on, the road got worse and worse, and sometimes we were absolutely blocked for several minutes together.

    The whole country-side was covered with refugees and their belongings, whilst our own transport were endeavouring to make all the haste they could to convey much needed food, ammunition and material to the Divisions in front.

    Several messages reached me on the road, and at last I got information that Smith-Dorrien had broken off the action and that his columns were once more on the march. He was only just in time, for subsequent reports reached me during this motor journey of considerable Uhlan patrols in the neighbourhood, and towards evening St. Quentin itself was threatened by hostile cavalry, which, however, did not succeed in entering the town.

    On reaching Headquarters I found that more or less detailed reports had arrived, which showed the shattered condition of the troops which had fought at Le Cateau.

    All idea of making any prolonged stand on the Somme south of St.

    Quentin, which had during the day seriously entered my mind as a possibility, was definitely abandoned.

    The first necessity was to rally and collect the troops, which had become mixed up and scattered by the trying experiences of the previous days and nights. The great essential was to recover order, restore confidence, and infuse fresh spirit with a clear aim in view.

    To enable all this to be brought about we had first to look to the cavalry. Orders were at once sent to Allenby to make such dispositions as would effectually cover our rear and western flank. I told him he was to enlist the co-operation of the French cavalry under Sordet. The Corps Commanders were ordered to move towards the line La Fere--Noyon.

    On the evening of the 26th, Headquarters were moved to Noyon, where I arrived late at night to consider the possibilities of making a stand behind the Oise.

    On the 27th the orders issued for the efficient conduct of the retreat began to take effect, and the cavalry kept the enemy well at bay.

    Smith-Dorrien reported himself in the early hours of the morning, and later Major Dawnay (2nd Life Guards)--the recollection of whose splendid and invaluable services until he fell at the head of his regiment will for ever remain with me--brought news of Haig's progress, whilst Shea of the Indian cavalry--afterwards a renowned leader of a Division at the front--told me of the valuable role which was being so efficiently performed by the Cavalry.

    In a telegram, which I communicated to the troops, General Joffre very handsomely acknowledged what he described as the "invaluable" services rendered to the Allied cause by the British Army throughout the past few days.

    It was a sincere gratification to the Army to see the generous terms in which the French Commander-in-Chief expressed his appreciation.

    I spent the early hours of the 27th in personally reconnoitring the country bordering the south bank of the Oise, in the neighbourhood of Noyon.

    The one idea which now possessed my mind was the possibility of making a stand with the object of obtaining the necessary time for rest, and to make good equipment and bring up reinforcements.

    At first sight it appeared to me that the line of the Oise and its tributary canalised waters offered such an opportunity.

    The cursory examination of the ground which I was able to make on the morning of the 27th satisfied me that it possessed decided capabilities for a defence which was not intended to be prolonged, and I thought, also, that the tortuous course of the river afforded some alternative features, by availing ourselves of which a powerful offensive might be commenced at the right time.

    During the day I had another interview with Joffre, which took place before I had time to estimate the actual fighting capabilities of the 2nd Corps and the 4th Division.

    I was not even then fully aware of the terrible extent to which we had suffered at Le Cateau. That these losses were heavy I never doubted, but I had no idea, until many hours later, that they were such as must paralyse for several days any movement in the direction of taking the offensive.

    My early morning deliberations were very much in accord with the view of the French Commander-in-Chief. The proposal Joffre then communicated to me was that the Allied Armies should fall back on a line, roughly, from Rheims on the east to Amiens on the west, which would bring the British Forces into the zone of country south of the Oise, whose course I had already reconnoitred. We discussed the situation thoroughly, and Joffre was most sympathetic and "understanding" in reference to our special position.

    He promised that the 5th French Army should be directed to take energetic action to relieve us from undue pressure by the enemy, and told me of his projects for the formation of the 6th French Army on our left.

    We parted without coming to any actual decision: for my part I could give no promise until I knew exactly what I had to rely upon; whilst energetic pursuit by the enemy might well prevent Joffre rendering me that support on both flanks which the situation imperatively demanded.

    As a matter of fact, no more was heard of this project, and the idea of standing on the above-mentioned line was abandoned.

    On the morning of the 28th, General Headquarters moved to Compiegne, where we remained till the morning of the 31st.

    It was during Friday the 28th that I fully realised the heavy losses we had incurred. Since Sunday the 23rd this had reached, in officers and men, the total of upwards of 15,000. The deficiency in armament and equipment were equally serious. Roughly, some 80 guns and a large proportion of our machine guns, besides innumerable articles of necessary equipment and a large quantity of transport, had fallen into the enemy's hands.

    It became quite clear to me that no effective stand could be made until we were able to improve our condition.

    It was on this day that I received the assurance, the most welcome to a commander in retreat, that the cavalry under Allenby's skilful direction was effectively holding off the enemy's pursuit.

    Gough with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at St. Quentin, and Chetwode with the 5th at Cerizy, vigorously attacked the leading troops of the German cavalry at both these places, and threw them back in confusion and with heavy loss on to their main bodies.

    On our left, d'Amade with the two French Reserve Divisions, and Sordet with his Corps of cavalry, attacked the Germans in and around Peronne.

    Allenby's Headquarters were then at Cressy (north-west of Noyon), and Sordet called upon him for support in this enterprise.

    Before arrangements could be made for such assistance the French were driven back.

    Although this attack failed to drive the Germans north, it was most valuable and effective in checking the pursuit, and by their vigorous action the troops of d'Amade and Sordet showed the stuff of which the embryo 6th Army was being formed: that Army which a few days later covered itself with imperishable glory on the Marne and Ourcq.

    On our right there still appeared little encouragement to hope for an early effective stand. The 5th French Army was in full retreat, the Reserve Divisions, after fighting at Urvillers, were retiring on the Oise, whilst the 18th Corps on their right was thrown back from Itancourt to the Oise by a violent German attack.

    I spent several hours of the 28th in going the round of the troops, as it was possible to intercept various columns on the march or at their temporary halts. I was able to get the men together on the roadside, to thank them for the splendid work they had done, to tell them of the gratitude of the French Commander-in-Chief, and the immense value of the service they had rendered to the Allied cause. I charged them to repeat all this to their comrades, and to spread it throughout the units to which they belonged.

    There was neither time nor opportunity for any formal inspection or set parade. The enemy was on our heels, and there was little time to spare, but it touched me to the quick to realise how, in the face of all the terrible demand made upon their courage, strength and endurance, these glorious British soldiers listened to the few words I was able to say to them with the spirit of heroes and the confidence of children.

    It afforded me gratifying evidence of the wonderful instinctive sympathy which has always existed between the British soldier and his officer. These men had seen how they had been led, they knew the far greater proportionate loss suffered by their officers, they felt that they trusted them and were ready to follow them anywhere. It is this wonderful understanding between "leaders" and "led" which has constituted the great strength and glory of the British Army throughout all ages.

    In all these roadside talks and confidences never did I hear one word of complaint or breath of criticism. The spirit of discipline was as palpably shown amongst these scattered groups of unkempt, overstrained, tired soldiers, as on any "King's Birthday" Review ever held on the Horse Guards Parade. Their one repeated question was: "When shall we turn round and face them again?" And they would add: "We can drive them to hell."

    It was distressing, indeed, to look at some battalions, which I had seen near Mons only some three or four days earlier in all their fresh glory and strength, now brought down to a handful of men and two or three officers; but the glorious spirit I saw animating the men gave me the keenest pleasure, and inspired a confidence which was of the utmost help.

    On this day I inspected a large proportion of the transport of both Army Corps, which I found in a much better condition than could have been thought possible.

    I did not reach my Headquarters at Compiegne until five. I found Huguet waiting for me with a Staff Officer of the 7th French Army Corps, which was to form part of the new 6th French Army. It was from the talk I had with them that I learnt how Joffre was forming the new 6th Army.

    Huguet informed me that a considerable force was being railed round from Verdun to Amiens, and that the new Army would be commanded by General Maunoury. I knew nothing then of the French Commander-in-Chief's ultimate plans, and I doubt if at that moment he had been able to formulate any decided line of action. At this particular time I think the unprepared condition of Paris loomed largely in his mind, and that his original intention with regard to the 6th Army was most probably to make further provision for the protection of the capital.

    Joffre had particularly asked me to undertake the Air reconnaissance on the western flank of the Allied forces.

    Our Intelligence Service had been admirably organised, and was working most effectively under the able direction of Brigadier-General Macdonogh. I cannot speak too highly of the skill and ability displayed by this distinguished officer throughout the whole time during which we served together. His service was invaluable; his ingenuity and resource in obtaining and collecting information, his indefatigable brain, and the unfailing versatility and insight with which he sifted every statement and circumstance were beyond all praise. He trained an excellent Staff who valued his leadership, for he had an extraordinary power of getting the most and best work out of everyone.

    His information as to the enemy's movements were remarkably accurate, and placed me throughout in the best position to interpret the enemy's probable intentions.

    During my stay at Compiegne all appreciations of the situation pointed to the immediate investment of Paris by the right wing of the German Army as being the enemy's first objective.

    It is fairly certain that the concentration of an important new Army on the western flank of the British, to the north of Paris, was quite unknown to the Germans, and did not enter into their calculations until some days later.

    We had also the best reason for believing that the German Higher Command regarded the British Forces as shattered and almost useless, at any rate so far as any effort which we could make for the defence of Paris was concerned. In fact, believing the capital to be practically at its mercy, the right wing of the German Army was blindly marching into a veritable hornet's nest, in spite of the backward condition of the Paris defence.

    On the 29th a very brilliant and successful attack by the French 5th Army at Guise heavily defeated three German Army Corps and threw them back with severe loss. This had a great effect in assisting the retreat, for it not only enabled the 5th Army to hold its own for some time on the Oise, between Guise and La Fere, but it considerably relieved hostile pressure on the British and on the French troops on our left.

    From Roye on the west, Montdidier, Noyon, La Fere, Guise, up to Hirson on the east, the heads of the Allied columns were established, well covered by their advanced cavalry.

    Throughout this day reports often contradictory and conflicting reached me. It was quite clear that our position on the Oise was being dangerously threatened by superior forces, and I felt it to be impossible to stand on that line even until we could make good some of our heavy losses, and I could not hope to get anything up for several days to come.

    With great reluctance I ordered the retreat to be continued to the line of the Aisne from Compiegne to Soissons, but in view of the knock given to the enemy at Guise by the 5th French Army, and the desire expressed by General Joffre that the Allied forces should hold their ground as long as possible and only retire when necessary, I directed commanders to carry out their marches with all deliberation, and to take advantage of every opportunity to check the enemy's advance.

    It now became known to the Allied Command that the enemy had detached a considerable force to his eastern frontier, where he was being seriously threatened by the Russians. Joffre's natural desire to profit by this, coupled with his fears for the safety of Paris, made him very anxious to take the offensive at the earliest possible moment. He came to see me on the afternoon of the 29th August at Compiegne, and urged these views upon me. I remained firm in my absolute conviction that the British forces could not effectively fulfil their share in such action for some days, and that, so far as we were concerned, a further retreat was inevitable.

    I assured the French Commander-in-Chief that no serious gap should be made in his line by any premature or hasty retirement, but I imperatively demanded the necessary time to refit and obtain reinforcements.

    I strongly represented to Joffre the advantage of drawing the German armies on still further from their base, even although we had to move south of the Marne. Indeed, the ideas which I afterwards expressed at the British Embassy in Paris to M. Millerand, the French Minister of War, in the presence of Lord Kitchener, were the same which I had in my mind during this interview with Joffre, namely, that our stand should be made on some line between the Marne and the Seine.

    The French Army was still in full retreat. The 6th French Army on our left was not yet formed, and the Commander-in-Chief had put no definite plan of attack before me, with an assigned role which he desired me to fulfil. All he asked me to do was to remain in the line and fill up the gap between the 5th and 6th Armies. This I had every intention of doing.

    I am bound to say that I had to make this decision in the face of resistance from some of my subordinate commanders, who took a depressed view as to the condition of their troops. When I discussed the situation at a meeting of British commanders held at Compiegne, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien expressed it as his opinion that the only course open to us was to retire to our base, thoroughly refit, re-embark and try to land at some favourable point on the coast-line.

    I refused to listen to what was the equivalent of a counsel of despair.

    Our communications with Havre being now dangerously threatened, it became necessary to effect a change of base and establish a fresh line. St. Nazaire and Nantes were fixed upon, with Le Mans as advanced base.

    The morning of the 30th found our cavalry with two brigades to the north-west of Compiegne, one to the north and one to the north-east.

    The 5th, under Chetwode, covered the retirement of the 1st Corps. Our line that night was through Nampiel on the west to Coucy-le-Chateau.

    Huguet to-day communicated to me Joffre's new dispositions. He was retiring the 5th French Army to the line of the Serre, their left on La Fere; their right on the left of the 4th French Army towards Rethel. The 6th French Army was to fall back to the line Compiegne--Clermont. Sordet's Cavalry Corps was to be on the left of the line.

    Joffre sent an urgent request to me to destroy the bridges over the Oise between Compiegne and La Fere.

    Huguet once more pressed upon me Joffre's urgent desire that I should remain and fill the gap between Compiegne and La Fere. In reply I again repeated emphatically what I had previously stated, namely, that I could be in no condition to stand and fight for several days, and therefore I could not consent to fill any portion of a "fighting" line. I was fully prepared to continue the retreat slowly and deliberately, retaining my present position between the 5th and 6th Armies.

    Now, as before, the view I took of my responsibilities, in accordance with my interpretation of the "special instructions" given me, guided my deliberations in these difficult days.

    I could not forget that the 5th French Army had commenced to retreat from the Sambre at least 24 hours before I had been given any official intimation that Joffre's offensive plan had been abandoned. I knew that it was alone due to the vast superiority of our cavalry over that of the enemy, and to the splendid tenacity and the superior marching and fighting powers of our troops, that we had been saved from overwhelming disaster. My duty to my country demanded that I should risk no recurrence of such a situation, and I determined that our needs and the interests of our Empire must be duly weighed and balanced in the councils of the Supreme Headquarters Staff.

    I despatched a letter to Lord Kitchener on this day, in which the following passage occurs:--

    "I feel very seriously the absolute necessity for retaining in my hands complete independence of action and power to retire towards my base should circumstances render it necessary."

    On this day Pulteney arrived, and the formation of the 3rd Army Corps under his command was commenced forthwith. It was composed of the 4th Division and the 19th Brigade, with some mounted troops temporarily attached, pending the arrival of the 6th Division, which had now been ordered to France.

    On the morning of the 31st, Headquarters were moved to Dammartin.

    After riding round to see whatever troops I could, we reached there early in the afternoon. Huguet was waiting for me with more information and messages from Joffre. The demand that we should stand and fight was not only urgently repeated, but was actually backed by imperative messages from the French President, and from Lord Kitchener and the British Government, yet at this very moment Lanrezac was actually throwing back the left flank of the 5th Army and widening the gap between us. At the same time Lord Kitchener was assuring the Home Government that our losses were comparatively small, and that all deficiencies had been made good.

    I retain the most profound belief that, had I yielded to these violent solicitations, the whole Allied Army would have been thrown back in disorder over the Marne, and Paris would have fallen an easy prey into the hands of the Germans.

    It is impossible to exaggerate the danger of the situation as it existed. Neither on this day nor for several subsequent days did one man, horse, gun, or machine gun reach me to make good deficiencies.

    I refused. This brought Lord Kitchener to Paris, where I met him on September 1st at the British Embassy. I went there with my Chief of Staff at his urgent request, regarding him as a representative of His Majesty's Government.

    I deeply resented being called away from my Headquarters at so critical a time. Two important actions were fought by considerable detachments of the Army under my command during this day, over which there was no one to exercise any co-ordinating control. Either might have easily brought on a general engagement.

    The interview had one important result. M. Millerand (the War Minister) and M. Viviani (the Prime Minister) were present at the Conference, and before them all I was able to give a clear exposition of my views as to the future conduct of the Allied operations.

    M. Millerand undertook to lay this document before General Joffre at once. This great statesman and invaluable servant of his country occupied the post of War Minister during most of the time I was in France. His invariable kindness and courtesy, coupled with his skilful and astute appreciation of the military situation throughout all its difficult and varying periods, will always be gratefully remembered by me.

    The result of my proposals will be the better understood if I quote General Joffre's reply to the War Minister, and a personal letter which I received from the Commander-in-Chief on the same subject.

    "Grand Quartier General des Armees de l'Est,
    Au G.Q.G. le 2 septembre 1914.

    "Le General Commandant-en-Chef a M. le Ministre de la Guerre.

    "J'ai recu les propositions du Marechal French que vous avez voulu me communiquer; elles tendent a organiser sur la Marne une ligne de defense qui serait tenue par des effectifs suffisamment denses en profondeur et particulierement renforces derriere le flanc gauche.

    "Les emplacements actuels de la Ve Armee ne permettent pas de realiser le programme trace par le Marechal French et d'assurer a l'Armee Anglaise, en temps voulu, une aide efficace sur la droite.

    "Par contre, l'appui de l'Armee du General Maunoury qui doit se porter a la defense des fronts Nord-Est de Paris est toujours assure a l'Armee Anglaise sur la gauche; celle-ci pourrait, dans ces conditions, tenir sur la Marne pendant quelque temps, puis se retirer sur la rive gauche de la Seine qu'elle tiendrait de Melun a Juvisy; les forces Anglaises participeraient ainsi a la defense de la capitale et leur presence serait pour les troupes du camp retranche un precieux reconfort.

    "Je dois ajouter que des instructions viennent d'etre donnees aux Armees en vue de coordonner leurs mouvements, et qu'il pourrait etre desavantageux de modifier ces instructions. Elles tendent a placer nos troupes dans un dispositif leur permettant de prendre l'offensive dans un delai assez rapproche. Le date de leur mouvement en avant sera communique au Marechal French afin de permettre a l'Armee Anglaise de participer a l'offensive generale."

    • * * * *

    "Grand Quartier General des Armees de l'Est,
    Etat Major,
    Au G.Q.G. le 2 septembre 1914.

    "Le General Commandant-en-Chef a M. le Marechal French, Commandant-en-Chef les Forces Anglaises.

    "Monsieur le Marechal,

    "J'ai l'honneur de vous addresser mes remerciements pour les propositions que vous avez bien voulu soumettre au Gouvernement de la Republique, relatives a la co-operation de l'Armee Anglaise et qui m'ont ete communiquees.

    "La situation actuelle de la 5e Armee ne permet pas a cette Armee d'assurer a l'Armee Anglaise un appui suffisamment efficace sur la droite.

    "En raison des evenements qui se sont passes depuis deux heures, je ne crois pas possible actuellement d'envisager une manoeuvre d'ensemble sur la Marne avec la totalite de nos forces. Mais j'estime que la co-operation de l'Armee Anglaise a la defense de Paris est la seule qui puisse donner un resultat avantageux dans les conditions exposees par la lettre ci-jointe que j'adresse a M. le Ministre de la Guerre et dont j'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir la copie.

    "Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Marechal, l'expression de ma haute consideration et mes sentiments de cordiale camaraderie."

    I replied as follows:--

    "Mortcerf,
    "September 3rd, 1914, 12 noon.

    "To the Commandant-en-Chef from Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief, British Forces.

    "Dear General,

    "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your very kind and cordial letter of September 2nd (3332).

    "I felt some considerable hesitation in putting forward my views as to the general trend of the future operations, and I am much indebted to you for the kind and friendly support which you have accorded to my expression of opinion.

    "I have now received your 'Instruction No. 4' and your 'Note pour les Commandants d'Armee' of September 2nd, and I completely and clearly understand your plans and the part you desire me to take in carrying them out.

    "You may rely on my most cordial co-operation in every respect.

    "My troops have very much appreciated the kind consideration you have shown them in sending so many decorations for distribution.

    (Signed) "FRENCH."

    I touch with some diffidence on less agreeable features of this memorable discussion in Paris.

    Lord Kitchener arrived on this occasion in the uniform of a Field Marshal, and from the outset of his conversation assumed the air of a Commander-in-Chief, and announced his intention of taking the field and inspecting the troops.

    On hearing this, the British Ambassador (Sir Francis, now Lord, Bertie) at once emphatically objected, and drafted a telegram to the Foreign Secretary stating clearly and unmistakably his views, and demanding instructions. He gave this despatch to Lord Kitchener to read. The latter then asked for my opinion, and I said my views on the subject coincided entirely with those of the Ambassador.

    After some discussion, the Secretary of State decided to abandon his intention, and the telegram to Sir Edward Grey was not sent. In the conversation which followed between us all, Lord Kitchener appeared to take grave exception to certain views which I expressed as to the expediency of leaving the direction of the operations in the field in the hands of the military chiefs in command in the field.

    He abruptly closed the discussion and requested me to accompany him for a private interview in another room.

    When we were alone he commenced by entering a strong objection to the tone I assumed. Upon this I told him all that was in my mind. I said that the command of the British Forces in France had been entrusted to me by His Majesty's Government; that I alone was responsible to them for whatever happened, and that on French soil my authority as regards the British Army must be supreme until I was legally superseded by the same authority which had put that responsibility upon me.

    I further remarked that Lord Kitchener's presence in France in the character of a soldier could have no other effect than to weaken and prejudice my position in the eyes of the French and my own countrymen alike. I reminded him of our service in the field together some 13 years before, and told him that I valued highly his advice and assistance, which I would gladly accept as such, but that I would not tolerate any interference with my executive command and authority so long as His Majesty's Government chose to retain me in my present position.

    I think he began to realise my difficulties, and we finally came to an amicable understanding.

    Important telegrams and messages were then brought me, and I told Lord Kitchener that it was impossible for me to absent myself any longer from my Headquarters, whither I at once repaired with all possible speed.

    It is very difficult for any but soldiers to understand the real bearing and significance of this Paris incident. If the confidence of the troops in their commander is shaken in the least degree, or if his influence, power and authority are prejudiced by any display of distrust in his ability to conduct operations, however slight the indications of such distrust may be, the effect reacts instantly throughout the whole Army. This is more than ever true with troops which, as at the moment in question, were being subjected to great and severe demands upon their courage, endurance, and, above all, faith in their leaders.

    Then again there was the effect which might have been produced on the French. Ministers and Generals were present and witnessed Lord Kitchener's apparent assertion of his right to exercise the power and authority of a Commander-in-Chief in the Field.

    Fortunately, the incident terminated in a manner which led to no regrettable publicity. Lord Kitchener realised his mistake and left Paris that night.

    I did not reach my Headquarters at Dammartin until about 7 in the evening of September 1st. Two important rearguard actions had been fought during the day, one at Nery--where Captain Bradbury was killed, whilst "L" battery fought heroically against overwhelming odds--and the other at Villers-Cotterets.

    The proximity of the enemy, and the close presence of detachments of hostile cavalry with guns, which had broken through our line, required the retirement of my Headquarters to Lagny on the Marne. As it was necessary to move with precaution, this place was not reached until 1 a.m. on the 2nd.

    I have already reproduced the communications from General Joffre under date September 2nd, in connection with the Paris interview on the 1st.

    Although I did not receive these documents until late on the 2nd, they indicated the ideas which occupied my own mind on that day, namely, the defence of the Marne with a view to a subsequent offensive.

    On this day I also received a letter from the Governor of Paris which, with my reply, run as follows:--

    "Gouvernement Militaire de Paris,
    "Le Gouverneur,
    "Paris, le 2 septembre 1914.

    "Le General Gallieni, Gouverneur Militaire de Paris et Commandant-en-Chef des Armees de Paris a Monsieur le Marechal French, Commandant-en-Chef des Armees Anglaises.

    "Monsieur le Marechal,

    "J'ai appris ce matin, dans la tournee que j'ai faite dans nos regions N.E. de Paris, que vous veniez d'arriver a Dammartin.

    "Comme Gouverneur de Paris et Commandant-en-Chef des Armees de Paris, je m'empresse de vous souhaiter le bienvenu et de vous dire combien je suis heureux de savoir que les braves troupes anglaises qui se sont conduites si vaillamment ces derniers jours, se trouvent a la proximite de Paris. Vous pouvez compter sur le concours absolu que nous devons a nos courageux compagnons d'arme.

    "Personnellement, j'ajouterai que votre nom ne m'est pas inconnu, etant moi-meme un colonial ayant fait de nombreuses campagnes, et notamment m'etant trouve a Madagascar lorsque vous commandiez l'expedition anglaise contre les Boers. Je suis donc sur d'avance que je puis fermement compter sur l'entiere collaboration d'un chef tel que vous.

    "Vous savez que le General Commandant-en-Chef vient de faire placer Paris dans la zone de ses operations. Je vous envoie donc les dispositions que je viens de prendre, afin que vous soyiez bien oriente a ce sujet, pour couvrir les fronts N. et E. de Paris qui paraissent les plus exposes et d'autre part, pour attirer sur nous les corps qui menacent le flanc gauche de notre armee.

    "Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien me tenir au courant de vos intentions et des dispositions que vous prendrez.

    "Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Marechal, l'assurance de ma haute consideration et de mes sentiments profondement devouees.

    "GALLIENI."

    "Mortcerf,
    "September 3rd, 1914, 12 noon.

    "My dear General,

    "I have received your very kind letter (with enclosures) for which I beg to offer you my most sincere thanks.

    "A French officer attached to my Staff is now going into Paris, and will explain the situation of the British Forces and their intentions fully to you.

    "You may rely upon my most cordial and energetic co-operation with the French Forces on my right and left.

    "I have duly received Gen. Joffre's 'Instruction No. 4' and his 'Notes pour les Commandants d'Armee' of September 2nd, and I fully understand the Commander-in-Chief's plans and intentions.

    "May I say what a keen pleasure and satisfaction it is to me and the Army under my command to be fighting side by side with the Grand Army of France!

    "Believe me, My dear General,
    "Yours most sincerely,
    (Signed) "FRENCH, Field Marshal,
    "Commander-in-Chief, British Forces."

    From these documents it will be seen that the safety of the capital was the paramount thought in the minds of the French Generals.

    On September 2nd, the 5th French Army on my right and the 6th on my left were retiring on Chateau-Thierry and Paris respectively, whilst our own troops reached the line of the Marne towards Lagny and Meaux.

    The 4th Division was, however, delayed by a small rearguard action and passed the night south of Dammartin.

    I had spent the greater part of the day in carefully reconnoitring the best defensive positions south of the Marne, and to these points the British forces were directed to move on the following day, destroying the bridges after they had passed.

    By early morning of September 3rd, General Joffre's letter (quoted above) had reached me, by which I judged that, whilst generally agreeing in my views, the General did not think it advisable to attempt a deliberate defence of the Marne. On this, the orders given to the British troops on the night of the 2nd were modified, and they were directed to continue their march to the line Montry--Crecy--Coulommiers.

    Reinforcements of all kinds were ordered up to these points and were well on their way, but the railways were badly blocked and there was much delay.

    I must now turn to the discussion of important information which began to reach us on the afternoon of the 3rd regarding the movements of the enemy.

    It appeared that a direct advance on Paris by the German right wing was no longer intended. They were reported to be moving in large columns south-east and east. A few regiments were said to be moving east by train. Later on, further reports arrived that the country in our front for several miles north of the Marne was clear of the enemy. No less than four German Corps were said to be concentrating on Chateau-Thierry and to the east along the Marne, and it was reported that they had begun an attack on the 5th French Army.

    The latest information told us that Chateau-Thierry was in the hands of the enemy, and that the 5th French Army was retiring south to the Seine.

    The ideas underlying this concentration on their centre by the enemy look as if it was based on a totally wrong appreciation of our situation. The Germans were ignorant of the real strength which was gathering north of Paris in the formation of the 6th French Army. They regarded the British Army as practically crushed, and almost useless as a fighting force.

    Relying upon this, they had no hesitation in leaving what they thought were the remnants of the Allied forces immediately north and east of the Paris fortifications to be dealt with by such of their own forces as were operating through Amiens and on their extreme right. The German Higher Command then decided to strike with overwhelming force at the Allied centre south of the Marne and to cut our Armies in two.

    The first necessity for the enemy was a quick decision by a great victory to be achieved at once. They were out-marching their supplies; there was Russia to be crushed and their eastern frontier to be secured; and, further, a prolonged campaign was what they desired to avoid at all costs.

    The desperate attempt was no sooner fairly launched than the fatal error of over-confidence and the folly of under-rating one's enemy stared them in the face with all its stupendous consequences, as west of the Ourcq the country was seen to blaze along its whole length with the fire of the French 75's, whilst the British and 5th French Armies, now at bay, threw the enemy back in confusion over the Marne.

    With their usual arrogance and pomposity the Germans, ignoring the fact that it was their own negligence which had led them into a most dangerous situation, claim that General von Kluck showed unusual skill in extricating the 1st German Army from the toils.

    After considering the subject very carefully, and with a thorough knowledge of the situation and the ground, I have formed the opinion that von Kluck manifested considerable hesitation and want of energy.

    The rear section of the British General Staff had been established during this day at Melun, on the Seine. The leading section remained with me at Mortcerf, which became my advanced Headquarters.

    Information which arrived during the 4th confirmed all our anticipations of the previous day, and, in the evening at Melun, messages reached me from Joffre that he was formulating his new plan.

    I had spent most of the day at advanced Headquarters, and had passed some time with Haig near Coulommiers. It seemed likely, by the direction of the German advance, that the 1st Corps might be attacked, and Haig had retired his 2nd Division in line with the 1st and was preparing for any eventuality. I conversed with him for a considerable time on the state of his troops, about which he expressed some anxiety. He said they stood in urgent need of rest and refitment, but as usual he was full of fight and ready to meet any emergency.

    Whilst I was with Haig, Smith-Dorrien arrived.

    The British Army had, indeed, suffered severely, and had performed an herculean task in reaching its present position in such fighting form, and its moral had withstood the ordeal.

    I think the Germans were probably justified in doubting our offensive powers, but the thing they forgot was the nation from which we spring.

    On my return to Melun on this night (September 4th) I found that Murray had received a visit from General Gallieni, Governor of Paris, who had communicated Joffre's plans for my consideration.

    He wished the 6th French Army to recross the Marne between Lagny and Meaux on Sunday the 6th, and then to take up a position facing east towards the Ourcq. He asked me to fill up the space between the right of the 6th Army (on the Marne) and the left of the 5th Army (near Provins). He then intended the whole of the Allied Armies to advance east, north-east, and north, and endeavour to crush the German Corps operating between us.

    General Franchet d'Esperey had now superseded Lanrezac in command of the 5th Army. I had sent Wilson (Sub-Chief of the General Staff) to him on the previous day, and to-night he returned and told me that d'Esperey was making similar plans.

    I must say a word here with regard to Henry Wilson. I have known him for many years. He possesses a striking personality. In appearance very tall and spare, his frame is surmounted by a face in which one sees great intelligence and power, combined with a very kindly and humorous expression. In looking at him it is impossible not to realise the strength of will and character which he undoubtedly possesses. His appearance does not belie him, he is all that he looks.

    Not one of his many friends has had a more thorough experience of him than I, both in "Sunshine and Shadow." However dark the surroundings, however desperate the situation, however gloomy the prospect, his fine humour, splendid courage and high spirit are always the same.

    In those many weary, anxious days we passed together during my term of command in France, I cherish a most grateful remembrance of his unfailing and invaluable help, as well as of his sincere, loyal, and wholehearted support. Of iron nerve and frame, nothing seemed to tire him. Having passed through the Staff College early in life with high honours, he was marked out for the most important Staff work; and after filling many important minor positions with distinction he became Commandant of the Staff College, where his great talents were employed in reforming and much improving that institution.

    His magnum opus in peace time was done when he was Director of Military Operations at the War Office during the four years preceding the War.

    His countrymen have never realised, and probably may never know, the vital importance and invaluable results of the work he did there, not only in regard to the share he took in the preparation of the Expeditionary Force, but also in establishing those happy relations with the French Army which have proved of such help to Allied operations throughout the War.

    Fearing no man, it was the very essence of his nature to speak his mind openly on all occasions, and when the great Irish crisis in the spring of 1914 was at its height, he sided openly with his native Ulster. He accompanied me to France as Sub-Chief of the General Staff, and when Murray's health broke down, in January 1915, I selected Wilson as his successor; but, owing to his candid expression of opinion in the Irish embroglio, he had many enemies, and his appointment was vetoed. It was this bad luck alone which prevented his valuable services then being used for his country's benefit in the best direction, and in a position for which he was better qualified than anyone else.

    But to return to my story.

    I somewhat feared the gap which existed between my right and d'Esperey's left, although the cavalry under Allenby at Garatin were on this flank. Because of this, and also because the Germans were exercising some pressure on Haig on this night (September 4th), I ordered the British Forces to retire a few miles further south.

    This facilitated the movements of reinforcements, supplies and material, which were coming up fast.

    I have now brought the story down to September 5th, the last day of the great German advance. The British forces had halted on the previous night on a line facing nearly east and extending from Villers-sur-Morin on the north to Fontenay on the south. The 5th French Army lay east of my right flank on an east and west line through Provins, facing north. The 6th Army was on my left, preparing to recross the Marne between Lagny and Meaux.

    I was at Melun early in the morning. Huguet had arrived in the night with despatches and a Staff Officer from Joffre, with whom I held a long conference.

    It appeared that the 6th Army had already crossed the Marne, and would be in position west of the Ourcq at 9 a.m. on the 6th, on which day the French Commander-in-Chief proposed that the whole Allied Army should advance to the attack.

    Shortly afterwards General Maunoury, commanding the 6th French Army, arrived, and we proceeded to discuss the situation fully. He described in detail what he intended doing, which was almost exactly as I have explained above. He thought that very few of the enemy still remained north of Paris, his cavalry having reconnoitred for some distance north and north-west. He expressed it as his intention to attack most vigorously (au fond), and asked for my best support, which I promised to give.

    I despatched Murray at once to visit the Corps and Cavalry Commanders and ascertain exactly the condition of their troops. He returned later in the day with very favourable reports. All were in excellent spirits and eager for the advance. They were having some much-needed rest; whilst reinforcements both of men and material were beginning to arrive.

    Reports received during the day confirmed all we had previously heard.

    The enemy's concentration against the centre of our line was complete.

    They had crossed the Marne at several points, and their advanced troops had been engaged during the past night and this day with our cavalry and 1st Army Corps on our right, and along the entire front of the 5th French Army.

    Later in the day Joffre came to Melun, and I had a long conference with him. We again went over all plans, and it was definitely arranged that the attack was to commence all along the line next day, the 6th.

    Joffre was full of enthusiasm, and very hopeful of success if we all fulfilled our respective roles and attacked au fond.

    Thus ended the "Great Retreat."

    • * * * *

    In these pages I have avoided as far as possible any detailed account of the many splendid engagements which have added new and undying laurels to the battle rolls of all the distinguished regiments which fought them.

    I repeat that the main cause of the success, which prepared this vast battle ground and opened the way for the decisive battle of the Marne, is to be found in the able dispositions made by the leaders; the magnificent example set by officers and non-commissioned officers; and in the wonderful spirit, courage, and endurance which was displayed by the rank and file of the Army.

    My main object in writing this record is to explain as clearly as possible to my countrymen the line of thought which was in my own mind, the objects I set out to attain, and the reasons why I directed the troops as I did and came to the decisions at which I arrived at each successive phase of the operations.

    In concluding this chapter I am anxious to lay particular stress on a principle which seems to me of the utmost importance, namely, the danger of undue interference by the Government at home with the Commander of an Army in the field. Stanton's interference with McClellan in the American Civil War should have been a sufficient warning.

    I have referred to the natural anxiety which was deeply felt by the French President, Government, and Generals for the safety of Paris.

    The utmost pressure was brought to bear upon me to alter my dispositions so as to make a dangerous stand on lines and in places which, in my judgment, would have exposed the British Army to the greatest danger of annihilation.

    The shattered condition of my troops was not realised, but perhaps in view of the situation such pressure was natural and inevitable.

    I had the power, in accordance with the instructions which I had received before coming to France, to use my full discretion in agreeing to or resisting such demands, and in all my happy experience of them, never did I find my French comrades resentful of such resistance when they realised the true reason for it.

    But when, in spite of my earnest representation of the true condition of affairs, the Secretary of State for War himself and the Government with him, brought still greater pressure to bear, backed by the authority they possessed, to enforce their views, I was placed in a position of the utmost difficulty.

    Lord Kitchener came to Paris with no other object than to insist upon my arresting the retreat, although no sign of a halt appeared at any part of the Allied line.

    He was ignorant of the condition of the Army as I knew it, and was mistaken in his assertion that reinforcements of men and material had already reached me. The impression conveyed by his visit was that I had greatly magnified the losses which had occurred, and exaggerated the condition of the troops. It was difficult to resist such pressure.

    Fortunately I was able to do so.

    CHAPTER VI.

    THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE.

    When day dawned on the ever memorable morning of September 6th, 1914, some ray of the great hopes in which I had indulged during the first two or three days at my Headquarters at Le Cateau seemed to revive.

    Taught now by a bitter experience, I felt more than ever the necessity of being prepared for anything. There was much, however, to inspire confidence. Great changes had been made amongst the higher commanders in the army of our Allies. The finest military leaders of France were now heading the splendid soldiers of that truly martial nation, and we had all learnt most valuable and practical lessons in the hard school of adversity.

    The latest reports showed that French and British soldiers alike were animated by the highest spirit and meant to "do or die." As regards the British Army, reinforcements had arrived, deficiencies in armament and material had been partially made good, and, most important of all, the promise of an immediate advance against the enemy had sent a thrill of exultation and enthusiasm throughout the whole force. A modicum of rest had also been secured.

    As I have said before, it is not my purpose in these pages to write a history. Many volumes have been published with this object. They have appeared in many countries and in many languages. A few have seemed to me to be wonderfully accurate accounts, considering the great difficulty of arriving at the truth long before the time when full and authentic material can possibly be available.

    All I have had in my mind in writing this book is to explain, so far as I can, my own part throughout these great events in carrying out the responsible task entrusted to me by my country; the aspect in which the situation presented itself in my mind from day to day; and my reasons for the decisions which guided the action of the troops under my command.

    My desire here is to recall exactly what was in my mind on the morning of the 6th September, which saw the opening of the Battle of the Marne, and to describe the view which presented itself to me of the situation on both sides; in other words, the basis for the orders which were issued to the troops.

    These orders were necessarily founded upon my own personal appreciation of the situation as it appeared to me at the moment. It was impossible for me to know that situation accurately in all its details. For instance, I could not then know, as I know now, that the Germans had abandoned their vigorous offensive 24 hours earlier than this, nor should I have conceived it possible that they could have done so.

    Reverting, then, to my general view of things on the morning of the 6th; in the first place, my personal conference with Joffre on the night of the 5th had put me in full possession of his exact plans and all that was in his mind.

    His intention was to attack at all points au fond, to inflict a crushing defeat on the whole German Army on our front by assailing its flank with the 6th French and British Armies attacking from a line running roughly from Le Plessis-Belleville on the north through Cuisy--Iverny--Neufmontiers--Meaux, across the Marne to Villers-sur-Morin--Rozoy--la Chapelle Iger to Gastins on the south.

    At the same time the 5th French Army was to advance north from its present position and, with all the French Armies to its right, Franchet d'Esperey was to make a simultaneous frontal attack.

    The following were General Joffre's orders of September 4th:--

    1. Advantage must be taken of the risky situation of the German 1st

    Army to concentrate against it the efforts of the Allied Armies on our extreme left. All preparations must be made during the 5th for an attack on the 6th September.

    1. The following general arrangements are to be carried out by the

    evening of September 5th:--

    (a) All the available forces of the 6th Army north-east of
    Meaux are to be ready to cross the Ourcq between Lizy and
    May-en-Multien, in the general direction of Chateau-Thierry. The
    available portions of the 1st Cavalry Corps which are close at
    hand are to be handed over to General Maunoury for this
    operation.

    (b) The British Army is to establish itself on the line
    Changis--Coulommiers, facing east, ready to attack in the general
    direction of Montmirail.

    (c) The 5th Army will close slightly on its left and take up
    the general line Courtacon--Esternay--Sezanne, ready to attack,
    generally speaking, from south to north. The 2nd Cavalry Corps
    will ensure connection between the British Army and the 5th Army.

    (d) The 9th Army will cover the right of the 5th Army
    by holding the southern outlets of the St. Gond marshes and by
    placing part of its forces on the tableland north of Sezanne.

    1. These different armies are to attack on the morning of September

    6th.

    The 8th Division of the 4th French Corps was to arrive south of Meaux during the early morning and maintain connection with the British 3rd Corps about Villers-sur-Morin, whence the British line following the points named above was facing nearly due east.

    My own view of the enemy's situation and intentions was fairly in accordance with the Germans' actual positions, although I did not know at that time that a retreat had really set in, or how the various Corps and Divisions were placed.

    Judging from the Air and Cavalry reconnaissances and from Intelligence Reports, I thought that a large part of von Kluck's 1st Army was now south of the Grand Morin River, and that the enemy's western columns had crossed the Marne about Meaux and Trilport, although one or two Divisions were still north of that river and west of the Ourcq.

    From the fact that the rearguards of both my 1st and 2nd Corps in their retirement on the day previous were slightly engaged, whilst a few outpost affairs were reported as having occurred in the night, I judged the enemy to have got some distance south of the Grand Morin River. The appearance of hostile cavalry detachments on the previous evening indicated the presence of that arm.

    Whilst it appeared to me that our dispositions promised great things, I also realised fully that the situation demanded the utmost care and watchfulness, as everything depended on the timing of our movements, the utmost measure of mutual support, and the most vigorous and continuous attacks.

    The area in which the British Army operated in the Battle of the Marne may be described as the country enclosed between the tributaries of the Marne, the Ourcq on the north and the Grand Morin on the south, between which boundaries it is intersected by the Marne itself, and a third tributary, the Petit Morin.

    This area forms the western portion of the Plateau de la Brie, which rises to a height of 400 to 500 feet above the plain of Champagne. The general slope of the ground is from east to west. The plateau is of rock formation, and the rivers, which were formerly of greater volume than at present, have worn away deep channels, with the result that the ground falls very steeply to the river-beds. A certain amount of alluvial deposit has been brought down by the rivers and streams, in the immediate vicinity of which are to be found marshy pools and swamps.

    With the exception of the Foret de Crecy, to the south-west of the area under consideration, there are no extensive woods, the higher ground being covered with small copses of thick undergrowth with a sprinkling of oak.

    The country generally is open, and presents no obstacles to the passage of troops of all arms. The steep cliffs rising abruptly from the river-beds afford good defensive positions suitable for rearguard actions, obliging an advancing force to concentrate at defiles.

    The roads and railways follow generally the course of the rivers.

    The chief roads are--

    (a) Paris--Meaux--La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, where one branch continues through Montmirail to Chalons, and the other bends slightly north through Chateau-Thierry and Dormans to Rheims and Epernay.

    (b) Paris--Lagny--Coulommiers--La Ferte-Gaucher--Esternay.

    (c) Soissons--Villers-Cotterets--Meaux, and thence through the Foret de Crecy to Melun.

    The chief railways are--

    (1) Paris--Nanteuil--Crepy-en-Valois, thence to Compiegne and Soissons.

    (2) Paris--Meaux--Rheims (following the Ourcq).

    (3) Paris--Meaux--Chateau-Thierry--Epernay (following the Marne).

    (4) Paris--Tournan, through the Foret de Crecy to Coulommiers, and thence to Esternay (following the Grand Morin).

    In addition to the roads mentioned above, which are routes nationales, there are numerous smaller roads (routes departementales) which are practicable for all arms and transport. In places the gradients are steep where the roads cross the deep beds of the rivers.

    The march of the Army on the morning of the 6th was ordered in a direction bearing generally about east-north-east, and I did not then expect to reach the Grand Morin River the same evening, as heavy fighting was most probable.

    I joined Haig about 9.30 a.m. He was then engaged all along his front against detachments of the enemy, which appeared to be advanced guards with some supporting cavalry. The fighting had commenced about 7.30 a.m. by a move of hostile infantry on Rozoy. They were attacked and thrown back by the 4th Guards Brigade.

    Although the German artillery was in action early in the day, close observation, combined with constant reports, showed us before noon that this advance was not being pushed with much vigour, and later (the right of the 1st Division being thrust forward towards Vaudoy, the left of the 2nd Division at Ormeaux), as we attempted to close with them, it was discovered that a general retreat was in progress, covered by rearguards.

    A visit which I paid to the 2nd Corps on Haig's left confirmed this impression.

    On this I gave orders that the enemy was to be closely pressed, and that, if possible, the line of the Grand Morin River was to be made good before night.

    As a matter of fact, this was not done till the next day, but a considerable further advance was made. Our cavalry from Gastins drove the enemy back north of Dagny.

    On the morning of September 7th, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was acting as left flank guard to the Cavalry Division, with the 9th Lancers as advanced guard to the Brigade.

    On reaching Fretoy, the village of Moncel was found to be occupied by a patrol of Germans, and was taken at a gallop by the leading troop, followed by the one remaining machine gun of the regiment. About a troop and a half, accompanied by the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel D. Campbell and Major Beale-Browne, moved up on the left of the village. Shortly afterwards two squadrons of the 1st Garde Dragoner charged the village and drove out the troop of the 9th Lancers after a little street fighting. A third Dragoner squadron then came up to the village from the north in support.

    The troop and a half of the 9th Lancers, led by the Commanding Officer and 2nd in Command, attacked this squadron in perfect order, charged the left half of the German squadron and pierced it with loss, both sides facing the charge; the Germans at a 15-mile rate and the 9th Lancers at speed.

    Swinging round after the charge, the 9th Lancers gained the village and rallied on the south of it. At the same time, the 18th Hussars, who had been sent up in support, drove off the Germans by fire from the wood on the left of the village. In this charge by the 9th Lancers Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell was wounded in the arm by a lance and in the leg by a bullet, both wounds, however, being slight. The adjutant, Captain G. F. Reynolds, was severely wounded in the shoulder by a lance. Lieutenant Alfrey, the machine-gun officer, who must have gone to his assistance from the village, was killed whilst extracting the lance from Captain Reynolds.

    Our casualties were slight--one officer (Lieutenant Alfrey) killed, two men killed; two officers (Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and Captain Reynolds) wounded and five men wounded. The number of Germans left on the ground was considerable.

    Shortly afterwards, "I" Battery, R.H.A., was moved to the north of the village, and the 18th Hussars were sent to Faujus and to a line of trees to the south of that village.

    "B" Squadron, 18th Hussars, under Major Leveson, took up a position by this line of trees, dismounting in the corn stooks, and was immediately charged by a German squadron in perfect order, in line at close order. The 18th Hussars squadron met the charge with well-directed fire at close range, and the German squadron was almost annihilated. A few passed through the firing line and were shot by the horse holders. Thirty-two dead and wounded Germans were counted on the ground in front of the squadron, and of the 60 or 70 which charged not more than a dozen escaped. A second charge was attempted shortly afterwards, but did not approach closer than 400 yards.

    Aircraft at night reported the German 2nd Corps (which had been moving north nearly all day) to have entered a large forest from which we supposed them to be debouching through Lizy north of the wood.

    The 3rd Corps were practically in reserve, but moved up during the day a little on our left rear.

    On this day I saw most of the troops and found them in excellent spirits.

    The 6th French Army on our left was opposed chiefly by the German 4th Reserve Corps, which, however, was reinforced by a considerable part of the retiring 2nd Corps. The 4th German Corps had also been directed towards this part of the battlefield.

    The 5th French Army on our right, after a heavy day's desperate fighting, reached the line Courtacon--Esternay--La Villeneuve-les-Charleville. At the close of the advance and fighting on the 6th, I returned to Melun to receive reports and ascertain the general situation of the Allied Forces. It was perfectly clear now that the enemy had abandoned the offensive and was in full retreat towards the Marne. I sent a despatch to General Joffre, telling him of our work during the day and the points we had reached, and requested instructions from him for the 7th.

    Very late at night I got his reply, telling me that the 5th Army had made good progress, which had been materially helped by the pressure of the British Forces east of the enemy's right flank. He asked me to continue the move to-morrow, but in a rather more northerly direction.

    During the night of the 6th-7th it became necessary to study the situation with great care. Joffre's original plan presupposed a continued German advance to the south and south-east, culminating in a great attack on the 5th and 9th French Armies. His directions to me on the 5th were to move east, and attack this advance in flank.

    It was to attain that object that the moves of the 6th were ordered, and, as a matter of fact, the 1st Corps under Haig did move almost due east. The troops which opposed him were on that day supposed to be the flank guard of the enemy which was attacking the 5th French Army.

    As stated above, I spent some time in the morning of the 6th with the 1st Corps, but it was not before noon that the possibility of a German retirement began to take shape in my mind. The conviction that such a retirement was actually taking place was increased as the day wore on and after my visits to the 2nd and 3rd Corps.

    It was on my return to Melun late in the evening of this day that Air and Intelligence Reports, combined with the impression which my own observations had made upon me, left no doubt in my mind that the German retreat had really been in full progress for many hours, and that the British Army must be immediately moved in a direction which would bring it in close contact with the enemy.

    Orders were therefore issued directing the march on the Grand Morin River, which was to be forced and passed with all possible speed on the 7th.

    Joffre's request to me to move in a rather more northerly direction pointed to some such conclusion; but I do not think that his information during the day had impressed him to the same extent with the drastic change in the situation, and the fact that the Germans had so soon taken the alarm and been overtaken by a veritable "panic."

    My intention to close at all speed with the enemy had to be tempered by consideration for the French Armies on my flank, both of which were opposed by much larger forces.

    It was necessary to keep close touch with Franchet d'Esperey on my right, and to direct the movements of the 3rd Corps on my left so as to bring the best possible support to the hard-pressed right of the 6th Army, who were fighting there so gallantly and well.

    The cavalry acted with great vigour in advance of the Army throughout the 7th, and on that day the Grand Morin River was forced and positions were taken up well to the north-east of it.

    The 5th and 6th French Armies were both heavily engaged throughout the 7th. The left of the 5th Army on my right reached La Ferte--Gaucher at nightfall.

    The position of the British Army at daybreak on the 8th was, roughly:--

    3rd Corps--La Haute Maison.
    2nd Corps--Aulnoy and neighbourhood.
    1st Corps--Chailly and Jouy-sur-Morin.

    The problem before me on the night of the 7th-8th may be stated thus:--

    I knew that the 5th Army on my right had been heavily opposed on the 7th, and that powerful forces of the enemy were still in front of it.

    The 6th Army was fighting hard west of the Ourcq, opposed to nearly all the German 1st Army. I gathered at this time that the enemy forces opposing our own immediate advance consisted chiefly of cavalry with a strong artillery supporting, backed up by some infantry detachments.

    I have referred before in this book to a visit I paid to Germany in

    1. On that occasion I saw a great deal o
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    Title
    1914
    Author
    Earl of Ypres John Denton Pinkstone French
    Release date
    February 6, 2008 [eBook #24538]
    Language
    English
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    E-text prepared by Michael Ciesielski, Christine P. Travers, and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (https://www.pgdp.net)
    Most recently updated
    January 3, 2021
    Transcriber and production notes
    E-text prepared by Michael Ciesielski, Christine P. Travers, and the
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    (https://www.pgdp.net)
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    Transcriber's note:
    
          Obvious printer's errors have been corrected; all other
          inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling
          has been retained.
    
    
    
    
    
    1914
    
    
    
                           THIS BOOK
                        IS DEDICATED TO
               THE RT. HON. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, M.P.,
                   TO WHOSE PREVISION, ENERGY
                     AND TENACITY THE ARMY
                         AND THE EMPIRE
                          OWE SO MUCH.
    
    
    
    
    1914
    
    by
    
    FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT FRENCH OF YPRES,
    K.P., O.M., ETC.
    
    With Maps
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    London
    Constable and Company Ltd.
    1919
    
    
    
    
    CONTENTS
    
                                                             Page
      PREFACE ................................................ xi
    
      Chap.
    
          I--PRELIMINARY ...................................... 1
    
         II--THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ................. 16
    
        III--THE SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE .......... 31
    
         IV--THE RETREAT FROM MONS ........................... 56
    
          V--FURTHER COURSE OF THE RETREAT ................... 81
    
         VI--THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE ........................ 113
    
        VII--THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE AND ITS PROGRESS
             UP TO SEPTEMBER 30TH ........................... 142
    
       VIII--THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP .................. 175
    
         IX--THE LAST DAYS OF THE BRITISH OPERATIONS
             ON THE AISNE--THE NORTHERN MOVE ................ 193
    
          X--THE BATTLE OF YPRES--FIRST PHASE, OCTOBER
             15TH TO OCTOBER 26TH ........................... 214
    
         XI--THE BATTLE OF YPRES--SECOND PHASE,
             OCTOBER 27TH TO OCTOBER 31ST ................... 237
    
        XII--THE BATTLE OF YPRES--THIRD PHASE, NOVEMBER
             1ST TO NOVEMBER 10TH ........................... 257
    
       XIII--THE BATTLE OF YPRES--FOURTH AND FINAL
             PHASE, NOVEMBER 11TH TO THE END OF
             THE BATTLE ..................................... 277
    
        XIV--THE ENTRY OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY .............. 287
    
         XV--A REVIEW OF THE ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST
             AT THE CLOSE OF THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES ...... 301
    
        XVI--THE OPERATIONS OF DECEMBER 14TH-19TH, 1914 ..... 320
    
       XVII--THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1914 ..................... 332
    
      XVIII--AMMUNITION ..................................... 347
    
      INDEX ................................................. 363
    
    
    LIST OF MAPS.
    
      1. GENERAL MAP OF NORTHERN FRANCE AND BELGIUM.
    
      2. MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE RETREAT FROM MONS AND
         BATTLES OF THE MARNE AND THE AISNE.
    
      3. MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGN IN BELGIUM, 1914.
    
    
    
    
    PREFACE
    
    
    Le Marechal FRENCH commandait en Chef l'Armee Britannique au debut de
    la Guerre.
    
    Comme on le sait, les allemands ont cherche en 1914 a profiter de leur
    superiorite numerique et de l'ecrasante puissance de leur armement,
    pour mettre hors de cause les Armees Alliees d'Occident, par une
    manoeuvre enveloppante, aussi rapide que possible.
    
    Apres avoir cherche en vain la decision a la MARNE, puis a l'AISNE et
    a la SOMME, ils la poursuivent successivement a ARRAS, sur l'YSER et a
    YPRES.
    
    A mesure que dans cette course a la mer, le terrain disponible se
    restreint devant eux, les coups se precipitent et se repetent plus
    violents, les reserves s'engagent, de nouveaux Corps d'Armee entrent
    en ligne nombreux et intacts. La reddition d'ANVERS assure d'ailleurs
    a l'ennemi d'importantes disponibilites.
    
    Mais deja l'Armee Belge, appuyee de troupes francaises, arrete les
    allemands sur l'YSER, de NIEUPORT a DIXMUDE. Apres avoir pris part aux
    actions de l'AISNE, l'Armee Britannique a ete transportee dans le
    Nord. C'est ainsi qu'elle s'engage progressivement de la
    BASSEE a YPRES, s'opposant partout a l'invasion.
    
    Bref, les allemands, apres avoir vainement developpe leurs efforts de
    la Mer a la LYS, des le 15 octobre, sont dans l'obligation, a la fin
    du mois, de vaincre a YPRES, ou bien leur manoeuvre echoue
    definitivement, leur offensive expire en Occident et la Coalition
    reste debout.
    
    Ainsi sont-ils amenes, sur ce point d'YPRES, dans une lutte acharnee,
    a concentrer leurs moyens, une forte artillerie lourde largement
    approvisionee, renforcee de minenwerfers, de corps d'armee nombreux et
    renouveles.
    
    Quant aux Allies, ils sont reduits a recevoir le choc avec des
    effectifs restreints, des munitions comptees et rares, une faible
    artillerie lourde. Toute releve leur est interdite par la penurie de
    troupes, quelle que soit la duree de la bataille. Pour ne citer qu'un
    exemple, le premier corps britannique reste engage du 20 octobre au 15
    novembre--au milieu des plus violentes attaques et malgre de
    formidables pertes.
    
    Mais a cette derniere date la bataille etait gagnee. Les Allies
    avaient inflige un retentissant echec a l'ennemi: ils avaient sauve
    les communications de la Manche et par la fixe le sort et l'avenir de
    la Coalition.
    
    Si l'union etroite du Commandement Allie et la valeur des troupes ont
    permis ces glorieux resultats, c'est que le Marechal FRENCH a deploye
    la plus_ _entiere droiture, la plus complete confiance, la
    plus grande energie: resolu a se faire passer sur le corps plutot qu'a
    reculer.
    
    La Grande-Bretagne avait trouve en lui un grand soldat. Il avait
    maintenu ses troupes a la hauteur de celles de WELLINGTON.
    
    Avec l'emotion d'un souvenir profond et toujours vivant, je salue le
    vaillant compagnon d'armes des rudes journees et les glorieux drapeaux
    Britanniques de la Bataille d'YPRES.
    
    [Illustration: Signature Foch]
    
                                            _Marechal de France_.
    Header as received
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    Title: 1914
    
    Author: Earl of Ypres John Denton Pinkstone French
    
    
            
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