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Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922

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Title: Greece and the Allies, 1914-1922

Author: G. F. Abbott


        
Release date: September 19, 2007 [eBook #22677]

Language: English

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Produced by Al Haines (This file was created from images
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Libraries.)






GREECE AND THE ALLIES

1914-1922



BY

G. F. ABBOTT



BY THE SAME AUTHOR

  SONGS OF MODERN GREECE
  MACEDONIAN FOLKLORE
  THE TALE OF A TOUR IN MACEDONIA
  GREECE IN EVOLUTION (ED.)
  TURKEY IN TRANSITION
  TURKEY, GREECE, AND THE GREAT POWERS
  UNDER THE TURK IN CONSTANTINOPLE



WITH A PREFACE BY

ADMIRAL MARK KERR, C.B., M.V.O.

  LATE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ROYAL HELLENIC NAVY
  AND HEAD OF THE BRITISH NAVAL MISSION TO GREECE



METHUEN & CO. LTD.

36 ESSEX STREET W.C.

LONDON




First published in 1922




{v}

PREFACE

The late convulsions in Greece and Turkey, and the consequent revival
of all the mis-statements which, during the War, flowed from ignorance
or malice, render the publication of this book particularly opportune.

Mr. Abbott deals with his subject in all its aspects, and presents for
the first time to the British public a complete and coherent view of
the complicated circumstances that made Greece, during the War, the
battle-ground of rival interests and intrigues, from which have grown
the present troubles.

In this book we get a clear account of the little-understood relations
between the Greek and the Serb; of the attitude of Greece towards the
Central Powers and the Entente; of the dealings between Greece and the
Entente and the complications that ensued therefrom.  Mr. Abbott traces
the evil to its source--the hidden pull of British versus French
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the open antagonism between
M. Venizelos and King Constantine.

All these subjects are of acute interest, and not the least interesting
is the last.

The persecution of King Constantine by the Press of the Allied
countries, with some few good exceptions, has been one of the most
tragic affairs since the Dreyfus case.  Its effect on the state of
Europe during and since the War is remarkable.  If King Constantine's
advice had been followed, and the Greek plan for the taking of the
Dardanelles had been carried out, the war would probably have been
shortened by a very considerable period, Bulgaria and Rumania could
have been kept out of the War, and probably the Russian Revolution and
collapse would not have taken place; for, instead of having Turkey to
assist Bulgaria, the Allied forces would have been between and
separating these two countries.  {vi}

In this case King Constantine would not have been exiled from his
country, and consequently he would not have permitted the Greek Army to
be sent to Asia Minor, which he always stated would ruin Greece, as the
country was not rich enough or strong enough to maintain an overseas
colony next to an hereditary enemy like the Turk.

It is illuminating to remember that the Greek King's policy was fully
endorsed by the only competent authorities who had a full knowledge of
the subject, which was a purely military one.  These were the late
Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, the British Admiral at the
head of the Naval Mission in Greece, and Colonel Sir Thomas Cuninghame,
British Military Attaché in Athens; but the advice tendered by these
three officers was disregarded in favour of that given by the
civilians, M. Venizelos and the Allied Ministers.

Mr. Abbott's book will do much to enlighten a misled public as to the
history of Greece during the last nine years, and many documents which
have not hitherto been before the public are quoted by him from the
official originals, to prove the case.

For the sake of truth and justice, which used to flourish in Great
Britain, I hope that this book will be read by everyone who has the
welfare of the British Empire at heart.


MARK KERR

4 _October_, 1922




{vii}

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

As this work goes to press, the British Empire finds itself forced to
vindicate its position in the East: a position purchased at the cost of
much blood and treasure during the war, to be jeopardized after the
conclusion of peace by the defeat of Greece and the defection of France.

In the following pages the reader will find the sequence of events
which have inevitably led up to this crisis: an account of transactions
hitherto obscured and distorted by every species of misrepresentation
and every known artifice for manipulating public opinion.

The volume is not a hasty essay produced to exploit an ephemeral
situation.  It embodies the fruit of investigations laboriously carried
on through six years.  A slight account of the earlier events appeared
as far back as the winter of 1916 in a book entitled, _Turkey, Greece,
and the Great Powers_: that was my first effort to place the subject in
its true perspective.  The results were interesting.  I was honoured by
the reproaches of several private and by the reprobation of several
public critics; some correspondents favoured me with their anonymous
scurrility, and some bigots relieved me of their acquaintance.  On the
other hand, there were people who, in the midst of a maelstrom of
passion, retained their respect for facts.

I pursued the subject further in a weekly journal.  Two of my
contributions saw the light; the third was suppressed by the
Authorities.  Its suppression furnished material for a debate in
Parliament: "This is a cleverly written article," said Mr. John Dillon,
"and I cannot find in it a single word which justifies suppression.
All that one can find in it is that it states certain facts which the
Government do not like to be known, not that they injure the military
situation in the least, but that they show that the Government, in the
opinion of the writer, made certain very bad blunders."  The Home
Secretary's answer was {viii} typical of departmental dialectics: "It
is inconceivable to me," he declared, "that the Government would
venture to say to the Press, or indicate to it in any way, 'This is our
view.  Publish it.  If you do not, you will suffer.'"  What the
Government did, in effect, say to the Editor of the _National Weekly_
was: "This is not our view.  Publish it not.  If you do, you will
suffer."

With an innocence perhaps pardonable in one who was too intent on the
evolution of the world drama to follow the daily development of
war-time prohibitions, I next essayed to present to the public through
the medium of a book the truth which had been banned from the columns
of a magazine.  The manuscript of that work, much fingered by the
printer, now lies before me, and together with it a letter from the
publisher stating that the Authorities had forbidden its publication on
pain of proceedings "under 27 (b) of the Defence of the Realm
Regulations."

And so it came about that not until now has it been possible for the
voice of facts to refute the fables dictated by interest and accepted
by credulity.  The delay had its advantages: it gave the story, through
the natural progress of events, a completeness which otherwise it would
have lacked, and enabled me to test its accuracy on every point by a
fresh visit to Greece and by reference to sources previously
inaccessible, such as the Greek State Papers and the self-revealing
publications of persons directly concerned in the transactions here
related.

I venture to hope that so thorough an inquiry will convey some new
information respecting these transactions even to those who are best
acquainted with their general course.  If they find nothing attractive
in the style of the book, they may find perhaps something useful,
something that will deserve their serious reflection, in the matter of
it.  For let it not be said that a story starting in 1914 is ancient
history.  Unless one studies the record of Allied action in Greece from
the very beginning, he cannot approach with any clear understanding the
present crisis--a struggle between Greeks and Turks on the surface, but
at bottom a conflict between French and British policies affecting the
vital interests of the British Empire.

G. F. A.

5 _October_, 1922




{ix}

_Besides information acquired at first hand, my material is mainly
drawn from the following sources_:

Greek State Papers now utilized for the first time.

_White Book_, published by the Government of M. Venizelos under the
title, "_Diplomatika Engrapha_, 1913-1917," 2nd edition, Athens, 1920.

_Orations_, delivered in the Greek Chamber in August, 1917, by M.
Venizelos, his followers, MM. Repoulis, Politis, and Kafandaris, and
his opponents, MM. Stratos and Rallis.  The Greek text ("_Agoreuseis,
etc._," Athens, 1917) and the English translation ("_A Report of
Speeches, etc.,_" London, 1918), give them all, though the speech of M.
Stratos only in summary.  The French translation ("_Discours, etc.,
Traduction de M. Léon Maccas, autorisée par le Gouvernement Grec,_"
Paris, 1917) curiously omits both the Opposition speeches.

Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, 1917; _Apologia_, 1919; _Semeioseis_, 1921.
The first of these publications is the ex-Premier's Reply to statements
made in the Greek Chamber by M. Venizelos and others in August, 1917;
the second is his Defence; the third is a collection of Notes
concerning transactions in which he took part.  All three are of the
highest value for the eventful period of the Skouloudis Administration
from November, 1915, to June, 1916.

_Journal Officiel_, 24-30 October, 1919, containing a full report of
the Secret Committee of the French Chamber which sat from 16 June to 22
June, 1916.

Next in importance, though not inferior in historic interest, come some
personal narratives, of which I have also availed myself, by leading
French actors in the drama:

_Du Fournet_: "Souvenirs de Guerre d'un Amiral, 1914-1916."  By
Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, Paris, 1920.

_Sarrail_: "Mon Commandement en Orient, 1916-1918."  By General
Sarrail, Paris, 1920.

_Regnault_:  "La Conquête d'Athènes, Juin-Juillet, 1917."  By General
Regnault, Paris, 1920.

{x}

_Deville_: "L'Entente, la Grèce et la Bulgarie.  Notes d'histoire et
souvenirs."  By Gabriel Deville, Paris, 1919.  The author was French
Minister at Athens till August, 1915, and the portions of his work
which deal with his own experiences are worth consulting.

_Jonnart_:  "M. Jonnart en Grèce et l'abdication de Constantin."  By
Raymond Recouly, Paris, 1918.  Though not written by the High
Commissioner himself, this account may be regarded as a semi-official
record of his mission.

The only English publications of equal value, though of much more
limited bearing upon the subject of this work, which have appeared so
far are:

The Dardanelles Commission _Reports_ (Cd. 8490; Cd. 8502; Cmd. 371),
and the _Life of Lord Kitchener_, by Sir George Arthur, Vol. III,
London, 1920.

Some trustworthy contributions to the study of these events have also
been made by several unofficial narratives, to which the reader is
referred for details on particular episodes.  The absence of reference
to certain other narratives is deliberate.




{xi}

CONTENTS

                                             PAGE
  INTRODUCTION      -    -    -    -    -       1
  CHAPTER     I.    -    -    -    -    -       7
  CHAPTER    II.    -    -    -    -    -      17
  CHAPTER   III.    -    -    -    -    -      21
  CHAPTER    IV.    -    -    -    -    -      33
  CHAPTER     V.    -    -    -    -    -      50
  CHAPTER    VI.    -    -    -    -    -      65
  CHAPTER   VII.    -    -    -    -    -      76
  CHAPTER  VIII.    -    -    -    -    -      85
  CHAPTER    IX.    -    -    -    -    -      95
  CHAPTER     X.    -    -    -    -    -     105
  CHAPTER    XI.    -    -    -    -    -     114
  CHAPTER   XII.    -    -    -    -    -     123
  CHAPTER  XIII.    -    -    -    -    -     139
  CHAPTER   XIV.    -    -    -    -    -     152
  CHAPTER    XV.    -    -    -    -    -     162
  CHAPTER   XVI.    -    -    -    -    -     172
  CHAPTER  XVII.    -    -    -    -    -     177
  CHAPTER XVIII.    -    -    -    -    -     186
  CHAPTER   XIX.    -    -    -    -    -     200
  CHAPTER    XX.    -    -    -    -    -     207
  CHAPTER   XXI.    -    -    -    -    -     217
  AFTERWORD    -    -    -    -    -    -     230
  INDEX        -    -    -    -    -    -     239




{1}

GREECE AND THE ALLIES

1914-1922


INTRODUCTION

Ingenious scholars, surveying life from afar, are apt to interpret
historical events as the outcome of impersonal forces which shape the
course of nations unknown to themselves.  This is an impressive theory,
but it will not bear close scrutiny.  Human nature everywhere responds
to the influence of personality.  In Greece this response is more
marked than anywhere else.  No people in the world has been so
completely dominated by personal figures and suffered so grievously
from their feuds, ever since the day when strife first parted Atreides,
king of men, and god-like Achilles.

The outbreak of the European War found Greece under the sway of King
Constantine and his Premier Eleutherios Venizelos; and her history
during that troubled era inevitably centres round these two
personalities.

By the triumphant conduct of the campaigns of 1912 and 1913, King
Constantine had more than effaced the memory of his defeat in 1897.
His victories ministered to the national lust for power and formed an
earnest of the glory that was yet to come to Greece.  Henceforth a halo
of military romance--a thing especially dear to the hearts of
men--shone about the head of Constantine; and his grateful country
bestowed upon him the title of {2} _Stratelates_.  In town mansions and
village huts men's mouths were filled with his praise: one dwelt on his
dauntless courage, another on his strategic genius, a third on his
sympathetic recognition of the claims of the common soldier, whose
hardships he shared, and for whose life he evinced a far greater
solicitude than for his own.

But it was not only as a leader of armies that King Constantine
appealed to the hearts of his countrymen.  They loved to explain to
strangers the reason of the name _Koumbaros_ or "Gossip," by which they
commonly called him.  It was not so much, they would say, that he had
stood godfather to the children born to his soldiers during the
campaigns, but rather that his relations with the rank and file of the
people at large were marked by the intimate interest of a personal
companion.

In peace, as in war, he seemed a prince born to lead a democratic
people.  With his tall, virile figure, and a handsome face in which
strength and dignity were happily blended with simplicity, he had a
manner of address which was very engaging: his words, few, simple,
soldier-like, produced a wonderful effect; they were the words of one
who meant and felt what he said: they went straight to the hearer's
heart because they came straight from the speaker's.

Qualities of a very different sort had enabled M. Venizelos to impose
himself upon the mind of the Greek nation, and to make his name current
in the Chancelleries of the world.

Having begun life as an obscure lawyer in Crete, he had risen through a
series of political convulsions to high notability in his native
island; and in 1909 a similar convulsion in Greece--brought about not
without his collaboration--opened to him a wider sphere of activity.
The moment was singularly opportune.

The discontent of the Greek people at the chronic mismanagement of
their affairs had been quickened by the Turkish Revolution into
something like despair.  Bulgaria had exploited that upheaval by
annexing Eastern Rumelia: Greece had failed to annex Crete, and ran the
risk, if the Young Turks' experiment succeeded, of seeing the {3}
fulfilment of all her national aspirations frustrated for ever.  A
group of military malcontents in touch with the Cretan leader
translated the popular feeling into action: a revolt against the reign
of venality and futility which had for so many years paralyzed every
effort, which had sometimes sacrificed and always subordinated the
interests of the nation to the interests of faction, and now left
Greece a prey to Bulgarian and Ottoman ambition.  The old politicians
who were the cause of the ill obviously could not effect a cure.  A new
man was needed--a man free from the deadening influences of a corrupt
past--a man daring enough to initiate a new course and tenacious enough
to push on with inexorable purpose to the goal.

During the first period of his career, M. Venizelos had been a capable
organizer of administrative departments no less than a clever
manipulator of seditious movements.  But he had mainly distinguished
himself as a rebel against authority.  And it was in the temper of a
rebel that he came to Athens.  Obstacles, however, external as well as
internal, made a subversive enterprise impossible.  With the quick
adaptability of his nature, he turned into a guardian of established
institutions: the foe of revolution and friend of reform.  Supported by
the Crown, he was able to lift his voice for a "Revisionist" above the
angry sea of a multitude clamouring for a "Constituent Assembly."

All that was healthy in the political world rallied to the new man; and
the new man did not disappoint the faith placed in him.  Through the
next two years he stood in every eye as the embodiment of constructive
statesmanship.  His Government had strength enough in the country to
dispense with "graft."  The result was a thorough overhauling of the
State machinery.  Self-distrust founded on past failures vanished.
Greece seemed like an invalid healed and ready to face the future.  It
was a miraculous change for a nation whose political life hitherto had
exhibited two traits seldom found combined: the levity of childhood and
the indolence of age.

For this miracle the chief credit undoubtedly belonged {4} to M.
Venizelos.  He had brought to the task a brain better endowed than any
associated with it.  His initiative was indefatigable; his decision
quick.  Unlike most of his countrymen, he did not content himself with
ideas without works.  His subtlety in thinking did not serve him as a
substitute for action.  To these talents he added an eloquence of the
kind which, to a Greek multitude, is irresistible, and a certain gift
which does not always go with high intelligence, but, when it does, is
worth all the arts of the most profound politician and accomplished
orator put together.  He understood, as it were instinctively, the
character of every man he met, and dealt with him accordingly.  This
tact, coupled with a smile full of sweetness and apparent frankness,
gave to his vivid personality a charm which only those could appraise
who experienced it.

Abroad the progress of M. Venizelos excited almost as much interest as
it did in Greece.  The Greeks are extraordinarily sensitive to foreign
opinion: a single good word in a Western newspaper raises a politician
in public esteem more than a whole volume of home-made panegyric.  M.
Venizelos had not neglected this branch of his business; and from the
outset every foreign journalist and diplomatist who came his way was
made to feel his fascination: so that, even before leaving his native
shores, the Cretan had become in the European firmament a star of the
third or fourth magnitude.  Reasons other than personal contributed to
enlist Western opinion in his favour.  Owing to her geographical
situation, Greece depends for the fulfilment of her national
aspirations and for her very existence on the Powers which command the
Mediterranean.  A fact so patent had never escaped the perception of
any Greek politician.  But no Greek politician had ever kept this fact
more steadily in view, or put this obvious truth into more vehement
language than M. Venizelos: "To tie Greece to the apron-strings of the
Sea Powers," was his maxim.  And the times were such that those Powers
needed a Greek statesman whom they could trust to apply that maxim
unflinchingly.

{5}

With the recovery of Greece synchronized, not by chance, the doom of
Turkey: a sentence in which all the members of the Entente, starting
from different points and pursuing different objects, concurred.  The
executioners were, naturally, the Balkan States.  Russia began the work
by bringing about an agreement between Bulgaria and Servia; England
completed it by bringing Greece into the League.  There ensued a local,
which, in accordance with the old diplomatic prophecy, was soon to lead
to the universal conflagration.  Organized as she was, Greece succeeded
better than anyone expected; and the national gratitude--the exuberant
gratitude of a Southern people--went out to the two men directly
responsible for that success: to King Constantine, whose brilliant
generalship beat the enemy hosts; and to M. Venizelos, whose able
statesmanship had prepared the field.  Poets and pamphleteers vied with
each other in expatiating on the wonders they had performed, to the
honour and advantage of their country.  In this ecstasy of popular
adoration the spirit of the soldier and the spirit of the lawyer seemed
to have met.

But the union was illusive and transient.  Between these two men, so
strangely flung together by destiny, there existed no link of sympathy;
and propinquity only forced the growth of their mutual antagonism.  The
seeds of discord had already borne fruit upon the common ground of
their Balkan exploits.  Immediately after the defeat of Turkey a
quarrel over the spoils arose among the victors.  King Constantine,
bearing in mind Bulgaria's long-cherished dream of hegemony, and
persuaded that no sacrifices made by Greece and Servia could do more
than defer a rupture, urged a Graeco-Servian alliance against their
truculent partner.  He looked at the matter from a purely Greek
standpoint and was anxious to secure the maximum of profit for his
country.  M. Venizelos, on the other hand, aware that the Western
Powers, and particularly England, wanted a permanent Balkan coalition
as a barrier against Germany in the East, and anxious to retain those
Powers' favour, was prepared to concede {6} much for the sake of
averting a rupture.  Not until the Bulgars betrayed their intentions by
actual aggressions in Macedonia did he withdraw his opposition to the
alliance with Servia, which ushered in the Second Balkan War and led to
the Peace of Bucharest.  He yielded to the pressure of the
circumstances brought to bear upon him; but the encounter represented
no more than the preliminary crossing of swords between two strong
antagonists.




{7}

CHAPTER I

From the moment when the rupture between Austria and Servia, in July,
1914, came to disturb the peace, Greece deliberately adopted an
attitude of neutrality, with the proviso that she would go to Servia's
assistance in case of a Bulgarian attack upon the latter.  Such an
attitude was considered to be in accordance with the Graeco-Servian
Alliance.  For, although the Military Convention accompanying the
Treaty contained a vague stipulation for mutual support in case of war
between one of the allied States and "a third Power," the Treaty itself
had as its sole object mutual defence against Bulgaria.[1]

In the opinion of M. Venizelos, her pact did not oblige Greece to go to
Servia's assistance against Austria, but at most to mobilize 40,000
men.[2]  Treaty obligations apart, neutrality was also imposed by
practical considerations.  It was to the interest of Greece--a matter
of self-preservation--not to tolerate a Bulgarian attack on Servia
calculated to upset the Balkan balance of power established by the
Peace of Bucharest, and she was firmly determined, in concert with
Rumania, to oppose such an attack with all her might.  But as to
Austria, M. Venizelos had to consider whether Greece could or could not
offer her ally effective aid, and after consideration he decided that
she {8} should not proceed even to the mobilization of 40,000 men, for
such a measure might provoke a Bulgarian mobilization and precipitate
complications.  For the rest, the attitude of Greece in face of
Servia's war with Austria, M. Venizelos pointed out, corresponded
absolutely with the attitude which Servia had taken up in face of
Greece's recent crisis with Turkey.[3]  On that occasion Greece had
obtained from her ally merely moral support, the view taken being that
the _casus faederis_ would arise only in the event of Bulgarian
intervention.[4]

Accordingly, when the Servian Government asked if it could count on
armed assistance from Greece, M. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs
under M. Venizelos, answered that the Greek Government was convinced
that it fully performed its duty as a friend and ally by adopting,
until Bulgaria moved, a policy of most benevolent neutrality.  The
co-operation of Greece in the war with Austria, far from helping, would
harm Servia; by becoming a belligerent Greece could only offer her ally
forces negligible compared with the enemy's, while she would inevitably
expose Salonica, the only port through which Servia could obtain war
material, to an Austrian attack; and, moreover, she would weaken her
army which, in the common interest, ought to be kept intact as a check
on Bulgaria.[5]

A similar communication, emphasizing the decision to keep out of the
conflict, and to intervene in concert with Rumania only should Bulgaria
by intervening against Servia jeopardize the _status quo_ established
by the Bucharest Treaty--in which case the action of Greece would have
a purely Balkan character--was made to the Greek Ministers abroad after
a Council held in the Royal Palace under the presidency of the King.[6]

This policy brought King Constantine into sharp collision with one of
the Central Powers, whose conceptions in regard to the Balkans had not
yet been harmonized.  Vienna readily acquiesced in the Greek
Government's declaration that it could not permit Bulgaria to
compromise {9} the Bucharest Treaty, and since by an eventual action
against Bulgaria Greece would not quarrel with Austria, the Austrian
Government, on its part, promised to abstain from manifesting any
solidarity with Bulgaria in the event of a Graeco-Bulgarian war.[7]
Not so Berlin.

The German Emperor egotistically presumed to dictate the course which
Greece should pursue, and on 31 July he invited King Constantine to
join Germany, backing the invitation with every appeal to sentiment and
interest he could think of.  The memory of his father, who had been
assassinated, made it impossible for Constantine to favour the Servian
assassins; never would Greece have a better opportunity of emancipating
herself, under the protection of the Central Powers, from the tutelage
which Russia aimed at exercising over the Balkan Peninsula; if,
contrary to the Kaiser's expectations, Greece took the other side, she
would be exposed to a simultaneous attack from Italy, Bulgaria and
Turkey, and by the same token all personal relations between him and
Constantine would be broken for ever.  He ended with the words: "I have
spoken frankly, and I beg you to let me know your decision without
delay and with the same absolute frankness."

He had nothing to complain of on that score.  King Constantine on 2
August replied that, while it was not the policy of Greece to take an
active part in the Austro-Servian conflict, it was equally impossible
for her "to make common cause with the enemies of the Serbs and to fall
upon them, since they are our allies.  It seems to me that the
interests of Greece demand an absolute neutrality and the maintenance
of the _status quo_ in the Balkans such as it has been created by the
Treaty of Bucharest."  He went on to add that Greece was determined, in
concert with Rumania, to prevent Bulgaria from aggrandizing herself at
the expense of Servia; if that happened, the balance in the Balkans
would be upset and it would bring about the very Russian tutelage which
the Kaiser feared.  "This way of thinking," he concluded, "is shared by
the whole of my people."

What the Kaiser thought of these opinions was summed up in one word on
the margin, "Rubbish."  This, however, was not meant for his
brother-in-law's ears.  To him he {10} used less terse language.  On 4
August he informed King Constantine through the Greek Minister in
Berlin that an alliance had that day been concluded between Germany and
Turkey, that Bulgaria and Rumania were similarly ranging themselves on
Germany's side, and that the German men-of-war in the Mediterranean
were going to join the Turkish fleet in order to act together.  Thus
all the Balkan States were siding with Germany in the struggle against
Slavism.  Would Greece alone stand out?  His Imperial Majesty appealed
to King Constantine as a comrade, as a German Field Marshal of whom the
German Army was proud, as a brother-in-law; he reminded him that it was
thanks to his support that Greece was allowed to retain Cavalla; he
begged him to mobilize his army, place himself by the Kaiser's side and
march hand in hand against the common enemy--Slavism.  He made this
urgent appeal for the last time, convinced that the King of Greece
would respond to it.  If not, all would be over between the two
countries--this being a slightly attenuated version of another marginal
note: "I will treat Greece as an enemy if she does not adhere at once."

King Constantine's answer was tactful but final: His personal
sympathies and his political opinions, he said, were on the Kaiser's
side.  But alas! that which the Kaiser asked him to do was completely
out of the question.  Greece could not under any conceivable
circumstances side against the Entente: the Mediterranean was at the
mercy of the united French and British fleets, which could destroy the
Greek marine, both royal and mercantile, take the Greek islands, and
wipe Greece off the map.  Things being so, neutrality, he declared, was
the only policy for Greece, and he ended up by meeting the Kaiser's
threat with a counter-threat, none the less pointed for being veiled
under the guise of an "assurance not to touch his friends among my
neighbours (i.e. Bulgaria and Turkey) as long as they do not touch our
local Balkan interests." [8]

{11}

Germany did not immediately resign herself to this rebuff.  The
Kaiser's Government thought King Constantine's attachment to neutrality
reasonable--for the present; but at the same time urged Greece to enter
as soon as possible into a secret understanding with Bulgaria and
Turkey for eventual action against Servia, describing the latter
country as the bear's skin of which it would be a good stroke of
business for Greece to secure a share.  The German Minister at Athens,
better acquainted with Greek views and feelings, took a less naïve
line.  He did not want Greece to attack her ally, but was content to
advise that she should free herself from the ties that bound her to
Servia, and in the event of Bulgarian aggression just leave her ally in
the lurch.  But, if he went less far than his chief in one direction,
he went farther in another, threatening, should Greece move on Servia's
behalf, to ask for his passport.  This threat, like all the others,
failed to move the Athens Government;[9] and, unable to gain Greece as
an ally, Germany was henceforth glad enough not to have her as an enemy.

So far all those responsible for the policy of Greece appeared to be
unanimous in the decision not to be drawn prematurely into the European
cataclysm, but to reserve her forces for the defence of the Balkan
equilibrium.  Under this apparent unanimity, however, lay divergent
tendencies.

King Constantine, a practical soldier, estimated that the European War
would be of long duration and doubtful issue: in this battle of giants
he saw no profit for pygmies, but only perils.  At the same time, he
did not forget that Greece had in Bulgaria and Turkey two embittered
enemies {12} who would most probably try to fish in the troubled
waters.  If they did so, he was prepared to fight; but to fight with a
definite objective and on a definite military plan which took into
account the elements of time, place, and resources.

The King's standpoint was shared by most Greek statesmen and soldiers
of note: they all, in varying degrees, stood for neutrality, with
possible intervention on the side of the Entente at some favourable
moment.  But it did not commend itself to his Premier.  Caution was
foreign to M. Venizelos's ambitious and adventurous temperament.
Military considerations had little meaning for his civilian mind.
Taking the speedy victory of the Entente as a foregone conclusion, and
imbued with a sort of mystical faith in his own prophetic insight and
star, he looked upon the European War as an occasion for Imperialist
aggrandizement which he felt that Greece ought to grasp without an
instant's delay.

It was not long before the underlying divergence came to the surface.

In the morning of 18 August, at a full Cabinet Meeting, M. Streit
mentioned that the Russian Minister had privately referred to the
possibility of Greece sending 150,000 men to fight with Servia against
the Austrians on the Danube--far away from the Greek Army's natural
base in Macedonia.  On hearing this M. Venizelos impulsively declared
that he was ready to place all the Greek forces at the disposal of the
Entente Powers in accordance with their invitation.  M. Streit
remonstrated that there had been no "invitation," but at most a
sounding from one of the Entente Ministers, which Greece should meet
with a counter-sounding, in order to learn to what extent the
suggestion was serious.  Further, he objected that, before Greece
committed herself, it was necessary to find out where she would be
expected to fight, the conditions under which she would fight, and the
compensations which she would receive in the event of victory.  As a
last resort he proposed to adjourn the discussion until the afternoon.
But M. Venizelos answered that there was no time to lose: the War would
be over in three weeks.[10]  Whereupon {13} M. Streit resigned, and M.
Venizelos offered to the Entente Ministers the adhesion of Greece
forthwith.

The terms in which this offer was couched have never been divulged; but
from the French Minister's descriptions of it as made "_à titre
gracieux_" and "_sans conditions,_" [11] it seems to have been
unconditional and unqualified.  On the other hand, M. Venizelos at a
later period explained that he had offered to place Greece at the
disposal of the Entente Powers, if Turkey went to war with them.[12]
And it is not improbable that the primary objective in his mind was
Turkey, who still refused to relinquish her claims to the islands
conquered by the Greeks in 1912, and had just strengthened her navy
with two German units, the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_.  However that
may be, King Constantine seconded the offer, expressing himself quite
willing to join the Entente there and then with the whole of his army,
but stipulating, on the advice of the General Staff, that the Greek
forces should not be moved to any place where they could not, if need
arose, operate against Bulgaria.

The King of England telegraphed to the King of Greece, thanking him for
the proposal, which, he said, his Government would consider.  The
French and Russian Governments expressed lively satisfaction, France,
however, adding: "For the moment we judge that Greece must use all her
efforts to make Turkey observe her promised neutrality, and to avoid
anything that might lead the Turkish Government to abandon its
neutrality."  The British answer, when it came at last, was to the same
effect: England wished by all means to avoid a collision with Turkey
and advised that Greece also should avoid a collision.  She only
suggested for the present an understanding between the Staffs with a
view to eventual action.

This suggestion was apparently a concession to Mr. Winston Churchill,
who just then had formed the opinion that Turkey would join the Central
Powers, and had arranged with Lord Kitchener that two officers of the
Admiralty should meet two officers of the War Office to work out a plan
for the seizure, by means of a Greek army, of the {14} Gallipoli
Peninsula, with a view to admitting a British fleet to the Sea of
Marmara.[13] But it no way affected the British Government's policy.
The utmost that England and France were prepared to do in order to meet
the offer of Greece, and that only if she were attacked, was to prevent
the Turkish fleet from coming out of the Dardanelles; France also
holding out some hope of financial assistance, but none of war material
on an adequate scale.[14]

Such a reception of his advances was not very flattering to M.
Venizelos--it made him look foolish in the eyes of those who had
pleaded against precipitancy; and he took the earliest opportunity to
vent his ill-humour.  King Constantine, in a reply to the British
Admiralty drafted with Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, stated that he would not
fight Turkey unless attacked by her--a statement in strict consonance
with the wishes of the Entente Powers at the time.  But M. Venizelos
objected.  After his own declarations to the Entente Ministers, and
after the exchange of telegrams with the King of England, he told his
sovereign he did not consider this reply possible.  Turkey was their
enemy, and was it wise for them to reject a chance of fighting her with
many and powerful allies, so that they might eventually have to fight
her single-handed?[15]

Thus M. Venizelos argued, in the face of express evidence that those
allies did not desire the immediate participation of Greece in a war
against Turkey--because, anxious above all things to establish close
contact with them, he wanted the offer to remain open: "a promise that,
should at any time the Powers consider us useful in a war against
Turkey . . . we would be at their disposal." [16]  And he professed
himself unable to understand how a course which appeared so clear to
him could possibly be obscure to others.  But he had a theory--a theory
which served him henceforward as a stock explanation of every
difference of opinion, and in which the political was skilfully mixed
{15} with the personal factor.  According to this theory, when face to
face with M. Venizelos, the King seldom failed to be convinced; but as
soon as M. Venizelos withdrew, he changed his mind.  This happened not
once, but many times.[17]  We have here a question of psychology which
cannot be casually dismissed.  M. Venizelos's persuasive powers are
notorious, and it is highly probable that King Constantine underwent
the fascination which this man had for others.  But behind it all,
according to the Venizelist theory, lurked another element:

"What, I think, confuses things and begets in the mind of your Majesty
and of M. Streit tendencies opposed to those supported by me, is the
wish not to displease Germany by undertaking a war against Turkey in
co-operation with Powers hostile to her."  Although M. Streit had laid
down his portfolio, he continued to be consulted by the King, with the
result, M. Venizelos complained, that the difference of opinions
between the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself was fast
developing into a divergence of courses between the Crown and the
Cabinet: such a state of things was obviously undesirable, and M.
Venizelos, "in order to facilitate the restoration of full harmony
between the Crown and its responsible advisers," offered his
resignation.[18]

M. Venizelos did not resign after all.  But his letter marks an epoch
none the less.  At first, as we have seen, the avowed policy of the
Premier, of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the King was the
same.  The difference which now emerges is that M. Venizelos desired to
throw Greece into the War immediately, without conditions and without
any invitation from the Entente, while the King and M. Streit were more
circumspect.  M. Venizelos chose to interpret their circumspection as
prompted by regard for Germany, and did not hesitate to convey this
view to Entente quarters.  It was, perhaps, a plausible insinuation,
since the King had a German wife and M. Streit was of German descent.
But, as a matter of fact, at the moment when it was made, King
Constantine voluntarily presented to the British Admiralty through
Admiral Kerr the plans for the taking of the Dardanelles which his
Staff had {16} elaborated, and for a long time afterwards continued to
supply the British Government, through the same channel, with
information from his secret service.[19]



[1] See Art. 1 of the Military Convention.  As this article originally
stood, the promise of mutual support was expressly limited to the "case
of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Servia and Bulgaria."  It
was altered at the eleventh hour at Servia's request, and not without
objections on the part of Greek military men, into a "case of war
between one of the allied States and a third Power breaking out under
the circumstances foreseen by the Graeco-Servian Treaty of Alliance."
But the only circumstances foreseen and provided for by that Treaty
relate to war with Bulgaria, and it is a question whether any other
interpretation would stand before a court of International Law, despite
the "third Power" phrase in the Military Convention.  All the documents
are to be found in the _White Book_, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6.

[2] See Art. 5 of the Military Convention.

[3] _White Book_, Nos. 19, 20, 22.

[4] _White Book_, Nos. 11, 13, 14.

[5] _White Book_, No. 23.

[6] Streit to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petersburg, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome, Constantinople, Bucharest, Sofia, Nish.  (No. 23,800.)

[7] _Ibid._

[8] Part of the correspondence is to be found in _Die deutschen
Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch_, by Count Mongelas and Prof. Walter
Schuking; part in the _White Book_, Nos. 24 and 26.  As much
acrimonious discussion has arisen over King Constantine's last
dispatch, it is worth while noting the circumstances under which it was
sent.  Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, Chief of the British Naval Mission in
Greece, relates how the King brought the Kaiser's telegram and read it
to him: "He was indignant at the interference in his country's affairs.
However, to stop such telegrams coming in daily, he determined to send
on this occasion a sympathetic answer."  (See _The Times_, 9 Dec.,
1920.)  The communication, therefore, was no secret from the British
Government.  Nor was it from M. Venizelos; for the King's dispatch is
but a summary of an identical declaration made by M. Venizelos's
Government itself to the German Government: Streit to Greek Legation,
Berlin, 26 July/8 Aug., 1914.  Though omitted from the _White Book_,
this document may now be read in the _Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, pp.
381-3.

[9] _White Book_, Nos. 28, 29, 30.

[10] My authority for this glimpse behind the scenes is M. Streit
himself.

[11] Deville, pp. 119, 128.

[12] _Orations_, pp. 93-4.

[13] _Dardanelles Commission_.  _Supplement to First Report_, par. 45.

[14] Gennadius, London, 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 21 Aug./3 Sept.; 23 Aug./5
Sept.; Romanos, Paris, 16/29 Aug., 1914.

[15] _White Book_, No. 31.

[16] See _Orations_, p. 103.

[17] _Ibid_, pp. 41-2, 98.

[18] _White Book_, No. 31.

[19] See the Admiral's statements in the _Weekly Dispatch_, 21 Nov.,
and in _The Times_, 9 Dec., 1920.  Though the plans in question were
not used, they were among the very few sources of reliable information
with which Sir Ian Hamilton left England to take up the command of the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.--_Dardanelles Commission, Final
Report_, par. 17.




{17}

CHAPTER II

Before proceeding any further with the development of the position in
Greece, it will be well to cast a glance on the attitudes maintained by
the other Balkan States and the views entertained towards them by the
Entente Powers.  One must know all the possible combinations on the
Balkan chess-board before one can profitably study or estimate the real
place of the Greek pawn.

Bulgaria proclaimed her firm intention to remain neutral; but, to judge
from the Greek diplomatic representatives' reports, there was every
indication that she only awaited a favourable opportunity, such as some
brilliant military success of the Central Powers, in order to invade
Servia without risk.  Meanwhile, well-armed irregular bands, equipped by
the Bulgarian Government and commanded by Bulgarian officers "on
furlough," made their appearance on the Servian frontier, and the
Bulgarian Press daily grew more hostile in its tone.[1]

Alarmed by these symptoms, the Greek General Staff renewed the efforts
which it had been making since the beginning of 1914, to concert plans
with the Servian military authorities for common action in accordance
with their alliance, and asked the Servian Minister of War if, in case
Bulgaria ordered a general mobilization, Servia would be disposed to
bring part of her forces against her, so as to prevent the concentration
of the Bulgarian army and give the Greek army time to mobilize.  The
reply was that, if Bulgaria did order mobilization, the Serbs were
obliged to turn against her with all their available forces.  Only, as
Austria had just started an offensive, nobody could know how many forces
they would have available--perhaps they could face the situation with the
25,000 or 30,000 men in the new provinces; but, in {18} any case, it did
not seem that Bulgaria meant to mobilize, or, if she did, it would be
against Turkey.  A little later, in answer to another Greek step, M.
Passitch, the Servian Premier, after a conference with the military
chiefs, stated that, as long as there was no imminent danger from
Bulgaria, Servia could not draw troops from the Austrian frontier,
because of her engagements towards the Entente, and that, should the
danger become imminent, Servia would have to consult first the
Entente.[2]  By Entente, he meant especially Russia, for M.  Sazonow had
already told the Greek Minister at Petrograd that it was all-important
that the Servian army should be left free to devote its whole strength
against the Austrians.[3]

Rumania, on whose co-operation Greece counted for restraining Bulgaria
and preserving the balance established by the Treaty of Bucharest,
maintained an equivocal attitude: both belligerent groups courted her,
and it was as yet uncertain which would prevail.[4]  For the present
Rumanian diplomacy was directed to the formation of a Balkan _bloc_ of
neutrality--between Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Greece--which might
enable those four States to remain at peace with each other and the whole
world, exempt from outside interference.  The first step to the
realization of this idea, the Rumanian Government considered, was a
settlement of the differences between Greece and Turkey; and, in
compliance with its invitation, both States sent their plenipotentiaries
to Bucharest.

The only result of this mission was to enlighten the Hellenic Government
on Turkey's real attitude.  At the very first sitting, the Turkish
delegate, Talaat Bey, in answer to a remark that the best thing for the
Balkan States would be to keep out of the general conflagration, blurted
out: "But Turkey is no longer free as to her movements"--an avowal of the
Germano-Turkish alliance which the Greeks already knew from the Kaiser's
own indiscretions.  After that meeting, in a conversation with the
Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which that gentleman reported to
the Greeks, Talaat said that, in his opinion, Greece could ignore her
Servian alliance, for, {19} as things stood, she might find herself at
war, not only with Bulgaria, but also with Turkey--a contingency not
foreseen when that alliance was made.  From these utterances the Greeks
derived a clear impression that Talaat acted on a plan drawn up in
Berlin.[5]  For the rest, the despatch of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_
to Constantinople, followed by the continued arrival of German officers
and sailors for the Ottoman Navy, spoke for themselves.  M. Sazonow
shared the Greek conviction that Turkey had made up her mind, and that no
amount of concessions would avail: "It is," he said to the Greek Minister
at Petrograd, "an abscess which must burst." [6]  The Greeks had even
reason to suspect that Turkey was secretly negotiating an agreement with
Bulgaria, and on this point also the information of the Russian
Government confirmed theirs.[7]

It was his intimate knowledge of the Balkan situation that had inspired
King Constantine's proposal to the Entente Powers in August for common
action against Turkey, qualified with the stipulation of holding Bulgaria
in check.  The proposal took cognizance of Balkan difficulties and might
perhaps have solved them, had it been accepted: an advance of the Greek
army on Thrace, combined with a naval attack by the British Fleet, early
in September, might have settled Turkey, secured Bulgaria's neutrality,
if not indeed her co-operation, or forced her into a premature
declaration of hostility, and decided Rumania to throw in her lot with us.

But the Entente Powers were not yet ripe for action against Turkey: they
were still playing--with what degree of seriousness is a delicate
question--for the neutrality of Turkey, and for that Greek neutrality was
necessary.  As to Bulgaria, our diplomacy harboured a different project:
the reconstruction of the Balkan League of 1912 in our favour, on the
basis of territorial concessions to be made to Bulgaria by Servia and
Greece, who were to be compensated by dividing Albania between them.
Greece also had from England an alternative suggestion--expansion in Asia
Minor: a vague and {20} unofficial hint, destined to assume imposing
dimensions later on.  At this stage, however, the whole project lacked
precise outline.  One plan of the reconstructed League included
Rumania--who also was to make concessions to Bulgaria and to receive
compensations at the expense of Austria; and the League was to be brought
into the field on the side of the Entente.  Another plan had less
ambitious aims: Servia and Greece by conciliating Bulgaria were to
prevent a combination of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, or of Bulgaria
and Turkey, on the side of the Central Powers.  The more sanguine plan
was especially cherished by Great Britain; the other by Russia, who
feared a Rumano-Bulgaro-Turkish combination against her.  But the
key-stone in both was Bulgaria, whose co-operation, or at least
neutrality, was to be purchased at the cost of Servia and Greece.[8]
Meanwhile, the less serious the Entente Powers' hopes for Turkey's
neutrality, the more lively their anxiety must have been about Bulgaria's
attitude; and it is not improbable that in repelling King Constantine's
offer, they were actuated not so much by the wish to avoid Turkish
hostility--the reason given--as by the fear lest the stipulation which
accompanied his offer, if accepted, should provoke Bulgaria.

Highly speculative as this project was, it might have materialized if
Serbs and Greeks were willing to pay the price.  But neither Serbs nor
Greeks would think of such a thing.  At the mere report that they were
about to be asked to cede Cavalla, the Greeks went mad, and M.  Venizelos
himself, though he favoured the reconstruction of the Balkan League,
loudly threatened, if the demand was formulated, to resign.  Whereupon,
his consternation having been transmitted to the Entente capitals, he
received an assurance that no demand of the sort would be made[9]--for
the present.



[1] Naoum, Sofia, 11, 20 Aug. (O.S.); Alexandropoulos, Nish, 19 July, 19
Aug. (O.S.), 1914.

[2] Alexandropoulos, Nish, 31 July, 19, 26 Aug. (O.S.) 1914.

[3] Dragoumis, Petersburg, 20 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.

[4] Politis, Bucharest, 27 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.

[5] Politis, Bucharest, 15 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.

[6] Dragoumis, Petersburg, 17 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.

[7] Dragoumis, _ibid._

[8] Gennadius, London, 8, 10, 15, 23 Aug.; Romanos, Paris, 31 July, 16
Aug.; Dragoumis, Petersburg, 31 July, 12, 20 Aug.; Naoum, Sofia, 31 July,
11, 20, 23 Aug.; Alexandropoulos, Nish, 18 Aug.; Papadiamantopoulos,
Bucharest, 25 July (O.S.), 1914.

[9] Venizelos to Greek Legations, Petersburg, Bordeaux, London, 2 Sept.
(O.S.), 1914.




{21}

CHAPTER III

Two tasks now lay before the Allies in the East: to help Servia, and to
attack Turkey, who had entered the War on 31 October.  Both enterprises
were "under consideration"--which means that the Entente Cabinets were
busy discussing both and unable to decide on either.  Distracted by
conflicting aims and hampered by inadequate resources, they could not act
except tentatively and in an experimental fashion.

At the beginning of November the representatives of France, England, and
Russia at Athens collectively seconded a Servian appeal for assistance to
M. Venizelos, which the Greek Premier met with a flat refusal.  He gave
his reasons: such action, he said, would infallibly expose Greece to
aggression from Bulgaria, and it was more than probable that an automatic
agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey might engage the Greek army in a
struggle with the forces of three Powers at once.  Even if the attack
came from Bulgaria alone, he added, the Greek army needed three weeks to
concentrate at Salonica and another month to reach the theatre of the
Austro-Servian conflict, and in that interval the Bulgarian army,
invading Servia, would render impossible all contact between the Greek
and Servian armies.  The Entente Ministers endeavoured to overcome these
objections by assuring M. Venizelos that Bulgaria could not possibly
range herself against Russia, France, and England; and besides, they
said, their Governments could ask Rumania to guarantee Bulgarian
neutrality.  M. Venizelos replied that, if the co-operation of Bulgaria
with Rumania and Greece were secured, then the Greeks could safely assist
Servia in an effective manner; or the next best thing might be an
undertaking by Rumania to guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria; and he
proceeded to ascertain the Rumanian Government's views on the subject.
He learnt that, in {22} answer to a question put to the Rumanian Premier
by the Entente Ministers at Bucharest, "whether he would undertake to
guarantee the neutrality of Bulgaria towards Greece if the latter Power
sent succour to the Serbs," M. Bratiano, while professing the greatest
goodwill towards Greece and the Entente, declined to give any such
undertaking.[1]  Add another important fact to which the Greek Government
had its attention very earnestly drawn about this time--that not only
Servia, but even Belgium, experienced the greatest difficulty in
procuring from France the munitions and money necessary for continuing
the struggle.[2]

In the circumstances, there was no alternative for M. Venizelos but to
adopt the prudent attitude which on other occasions he was pleased to
stigmatize as "pro-German."  True, his refusal to move in November was
hardly consistent with his eagerness to do so in August; but, taking into
account his temperament, we must assume that he had made that rash _à
titre gracieux_ offer blindfold.  Events had not borne out his
predictions of a speedy victory, and, though his faith in the ultimate
triumph of the Entente remained unshaken, he had come to realize that,
for the present at any rate, it behoved Hellas to walk warily.[3]

Some ten weeks passed, and then (23 January, 1915) Sir Edward Grey again
asked M. Venizelos for assistance to Servia in the common interest; as
Austria and Germany seemed bent on crushing her, it was essential that
all who could should lend her their support.  If Greece ranged herself by
Servia's side as her ally, the Entente Powers would willingly accord her
very important territorial concessions on the Asia Minor Coast.  The
matter was {23} urgent, for, were Servia crushed, though the ultimate
defeat of Austria and Germany would not be thereby affected, there would
during the War come about in the Balkans accomplished facts which would
make it difficult or even impossible for either Servia or Greece to
obtain afterwards arrangements as favourable as those actually in view.
Conversely, the immediate participation of Greece and Rumania in the War
would, by bringing about the defeat of Austria, secure the realization of
Greek, Rumanian and Servian aspirations.  To render such participation
effective, it was desirable that Bulgaria should be assured that, if
Servian and Greek aspirations elsewhere were realized, she would obtain
satisfactory compensations in Macedonia, on condition that she came in or
at least maintained a not malevolent neutrality.  But the question of
compensations affected chiefly Servia: all he asked of M. Venizelos on
that point was not to oppose any concessions that Servia might be
inclined to make to Bulgaria.

Whether this semi-official request amounted to a proposal or was merely
in the nature of a suggestion is hard to determine.  But M. Venizelos
seems to have understood it in the latter sense, for in speaking of it he
made use of the very informal adjective "absurd."  No one, indeed, could
seriously believe that Bulgaria would be induced to co-operate, or even
to remain neutral, by the hypothetical and partial promises which Sir
Edward Grey indicated; and with a potentially hostile Bulgaria in her
flank Greece could not march to Servia's aid.  So M. Venizelos, under the
impulse of ambition, set his energetic brain to work, and within a few
hours produced a scheme calculated to correct the "absurdity" of the
British notion, to earn the gratitude of the Entente to himself, and an
Asiatic Empire for his country.  It was nothing less than a complete
reversal of his former attitude: that Greece should not only withdraw her
opposition to concessions on the part of Servia, but should voluntarily
sacrifice Cavalla to the Bulgars, provided they joined the Allies
forthwith.  This scheme he embodied in a lengthy memorandum which he
submitted to the King.

M. Venizelos recognized how painful a sacrifice the cession of Cavalla
would be, and therefore he had to use very strong arguments to commend it
to his Majesty.  In the {24} first place, he emphasized the imperative
need of helping Servia, since, should Servia be crushed, the
Austro-German armies might be tempted to advance on Salonica, or Bulgaria
might be invited to take possession of Servian Macedonia, in which case
Greece would have either to let the Balkan balance of power go by the
board, or, in accordance with her Treaty, go to Servia's assistance under
much more disadvantageous conditions.  In the second place, he argued
that the sacrifice of Cavalla was well worth making, since Greece would
eventually receive in Asia Minor compensations which would render her
greater and more powerful than the most sanguine Greek could even have
dreamt a few years before; and in Macedonia itself the loss of Cavalla
could be partially compensated for by a rectification of frontiers
involving the acquisition from Servia of the Doiran-Ghevgheli district.

In the event of Bulgaria accepting Cavalla and the Servian concessions as
the price of her alliance, M. Venizelos argued that the outcome would be
a reconstructed League of the Balkan States which would not only ensure
them against defeat, but would materially contribute to the victory of
the Entente Powers: even the ideal of a lasting Balkan Federation might
be realized by a racial readjustment through an interchange of
populations.  Should Bulgarian greed prove impervious, Greece must secure
the co-operation of Rumania, without which it would be too risky for her
to move.[4]

Sacrifices of territory, in King Constantine's opinion, were out of the
question; but he thought that, if Rumania agreed to co-operate, it might
be possible for Greece to go to Servia's assistance, as in that case
Bulgaria could perhaps be held in check by Rumanian and Greek forces left
along her northern and southern frontiers.  The Bucharest Government was
accordingly sounded, and returned an answer too evasive to justify
reliance on its co-operation.  So M. Venizelos fell back on the scheme of
buying Bulgarian co-operation by the cession of Cavalla, and submitted a
second memorandum to the King.

If the first of these documents was remarkable for its optimism, the
second might justly be described as a {25} masterpiece of faith pure and
undefiled by any contact with sordid facts.  Its theme is the magnitude
of the compensations which Greece might expect in return for her entry
into the War: "I have a feeling," says the author, "that the concessions
in Asia Minor suggested by Sir Edward Grey can, especially if we submit
to sacrifices to the Bulgars, assume such dimensions as to double the
size of Greece.  I believe that if we demanded"--he specifies in detail a
vast portion of Western Asia Minor--"our demand would probably be
granted."  He calculated that the surface of this territory exceeds
125,000 (the figure was soon raised to 140,000) square kilometres, while
the area to be ceded in Macedonia did not exceed 2,000 square kilometres,
and that loss would be further halved by the acquisition from Servia of
the Doiran-Ghevgheli district, which covered some 1,000 square
kilometres.  Thus, in point of territory, Greece would be giving up a
hundred and fortieth part of what she would be getting.  In point of
population also Greece would be receiving twenty-five times as much as
she would be sacrificing--an accretion of 800,000 as against a loss of
30,000 souls; and that loss could be obviated by obliging Bulgaria to buy
up the property of the Cavalla Greeks, who, he had no doubt, would gladly
emigrate _en masse_ to Asia Minor, to reinforce the Greek element there.
How was it possible to hesitate about seizing such an opportunity--an
opportunity for the creation of a Greece powerful on land and supreme in
the Aegean Sea--"an opportunity verily presented to us by Divine
Providence for the realization of our most audacious national
ideals"--presented to-day and never likely to occur again?

M. Venizelos did not doubt but that a transaction which appeared so
desirable and feasible to him must appear equally desirable and feasible
to others: and great was his surprise to find that such was by no means
the case.  The General Staff, he complained, "seem, strangely, not
attracted strongly by these views."  And the same might be said of
everyone who judged, not by the glow of prophetic insight, but by a cold
examination of facts.  When Asia Minor was first mentioned to the Greek
Minister in London, that shrewd diplomat answered:  "Greece would not
commit such a folly, for the day she set foot in {26} Asia Minor she
would find herself up against Great Powers as well as against Turkey."
[5]  At Athens to this objection were added others not less weighty.  The
General Staff pointed out that Greece had neither the men nor the money
required for the permanent occupation and efficient administration of
that distant region.  They feared both the difficulties of defending
those Turkish territories in Asia and the danger of future attack from
Bulgaria in Europe.  In short, they held that Greece by embarking on what
they aptly termed a Colonial policy would be undertaking responsibilities
wholly incommensurate with her resources.[6]

Dangers and difficulties! cried M. Venizelos: can you allow such things
to stand in the way of national ideals?  And he proceeded to demolish the
obstructions: the administrative success achieved in Macedonia proved
that the resources of Greece were equal to fresh responsibilities; the
Turks of Asia Minor--after the total disappearance of the Ottoman Empire,
which he deemed inevitable--would become contented and law-abiding Greek
subjects, and at all events the local Greek population would in a very
short space of time supply all the forces needed to maintain order in
Asia, leaving the main Greek army free for the defence of the European
frontiers.  During that brief period of transition, he thought it easy to
form an agreement with the Entente Powers for military assistance against
a Bulgarian attack, or, even without the Entente, "should the Bulgars be
so demented by the Lord as to attempt aggression, I have not the
slightest doubt that Servia, moved by her treaty obligations, her
interests, and her gratitude for our present aid, would again co-operate
with us to humble Bulgarian insolence." [7]

Thus at a moment's notice M. Venizelos became an impassioned advocate of
the policy of which he had hitherto been an impassioned opponent, and he
would have us believe that the King, persuaded by his eloquence,
authorised him to carry out his new plan.  Be that as it may, M.
Venizelos did not avail himself of this permission.  {27} For almost
simultaneously came the news of a Bulgarian loan contracted in the
Austro-German market--an event which made him abandon all hopes of
conciliating Bulgaria and profiting by the British overture.  During the
months when the revival of the Balkan League was perhaps still
practicable, he had combated the only expedient which might have given it
a chance of realization: by the time he became a convert, it was too late.

The Balkan situation remained as it was before Sir Edward Grey's
suggestion: so much so that, when a few days later the Entente Powers
again asked Greece to go to Servia's relief, offering her as security
against the Bulgarian danger to transport to Macedonia a French and a
British division, M. Venizelos, considering such security insufficient,
again refused;[8] a refusal which, justified though it was, gave great
umbrage.[9]

While the Greek Premier was going through these mental evolutions, the
scene of Entente activity shifted: and his flexible mind perforce veered
in a new direction.

As far back as 3 November, the outer forts of the Dardanelles had been
subjected to a brief bombardment with the object of testing the range of
their guns; and by 25 November the idea of a serious attack on the
Straits had engaged the attention of the British War Council.  But no
decision was arrived at until January, when Russia, hard pressed by the
Turks on the Caucasus, begged for a demonstration against them in some
other quarter.  In compliance with this appeal, the British War Council
then decided to attempt to force the Dardanelles by means of the Navy
alone.  After the failure of the naval attack of 19 February, however, it
was realized that the operations would have to be supplemented by
military action;[10] and as the magnitude of the enterprise became
clearer and the troops at the disposal of England and France were very
limited, the need of securing Balkan allies became more obvious.

From the first greater importance was attached to Bulgarian co-operation
than to Greek.  Even the grant of {28} a loan to Sofia by the Central
Powers appears to have produced little or no impression upon those
concerned.  Long afterwards it was admitted as a self-evident proposition
that belligerents do not lend to neutrals without being satisfied that
their money will not be used against themselves.  But at the time, after
a momentary shock, the Entente Governments were deluded, either by
Bulgarian diplomacy or by their own wishes, into the belief that
"Bulgaria would not commit the stupidity to refuse the advantages
offered." [11]  Nor, in thus reckoning on enlightened bad faith, were
they alone.  M. Venizelos, who a moment before had declared that the loan
had opened his eyes to the fact "that Bulgaria was definitely committed
to the Central Powers," now felt quite sure that, "notwithstanding the
loan, Bulgaria was capable of betraying her then friends and turning
towards those who promised her greater profits." [12]  Anxious,
therefore, to forestall the Bulgars, and concerned by the thought that he
had been obliged on three occasions to decline requests from the Entente,
he spontaneously proposed, on 1 March, to offer three Greek divisions for
the Dardanelles expedition, stating that this proposal was made with King
Constantine's assent.[13]

As a matter of fact, neither the King nor his General Staff approved of
M. Venizelos's strategy.  Having made a systematic study of the
Dardanelles problem, they judged that the Allies' enterprise, even under
the most skilful handling, presented but few chances, and those chances
had been discounted in advance by utter want of skilful handling: the
bombardment of the Straits in the previous November had given the Turks
warning of the blow and ample time to prepare against it--and the Turks
were no longer the happy-go-lucky fellows upon whose inefficiency one
might formerly have counted; they now mounted guard over the gates of
their capital equipped with German guns and commanded by German officers.
The enterprise was likely to become more hazardous still by arousing the
jealousy of the Bulgars.  If, therefore, Greece did join in, besides all
the other risks, she would expose herself to a {29} Bulgarian assault;
and with a considerable portion of her forces engaged in Gallipoli, and
no prospect either of Servian or of Rumanian assistance, how was she to
face that assault?

The King's disapproval was known to no one better than to M. Venizelos
himself.  But, for all that, he felt entitled to tell the British
Minister at Athens that he had the King's assent.  Here is his own
explanation: "The King was opposed to the enterprise.  I sought another
interview in order to speak to him again on the subject, and took with me
a third memorandum"--which has never been published, and cannot yet be
published.  "I asked him to let me read it to him, for in it were set
forth fully all the arguments which, in my opinion, imposed co-operation.
I read it.  I saw that the King became agitated.  For--I must do him that
justice--he rarely remained unconvinced when face to face with me.  So
profound was the emotion with which I spoke, so powerful were the
arguments which I used that the King, greatly moved, said to me: 'Well,
then, in the name of God.'  That is, he assented." [14]

However, the General Staff remained unconvinced; and Colonel Metaxas, a
brilliant soldier, then Acting-Chief of the Staff, resigned as a protest
against military proposals being made by a Greek minister to other
countries without previous consultation with the military experts of his
own.  M. Venizelos, on his part, was indignant that mere soldiers should
presume to meddle with the plans of statesmen; his view being that the
Staff's business was simply to carry out the policy of the Government.
Nevertheless, impressed by this resignation, he suggested the meeting of
a Crown Council composed of all the ex-Premiers, that their opinions
might be heard.  The Council met on 3 March and again on 5 March.  At the
first sitting M. Venizelos admitted that the objections of the military
experts, without altering his own convictions, might still inspire doubt
as to which policy was preferable: neutrality or intervention.  Should
the policy of neutrality be adopted, it must be carried on by a new
Cabinet, to which he would accord his parliamentary support.  At the
second sitting he endeavoured to remove the objections of the military
experts by reducing his proposed contribution to the {30} Gallipoli
expedition from three divisions to one, which should be replaced in the
existing cadres by a division of reserves, so as to leave the Greek Army
practically intact against a possible attack from Bulgaria.  And having
thus modified the conditions of intervention, he refused to entertain any
other policy or to support a Cabinet pledged to neutrality.[15]

Momentarily infected by the Cretan's enthusiasm, nearly all present urged
upon the King the acceptance of his proposal; one of them, M. Rallis,
even going so far as to say: "Sire, pray consider that you have a
Government clothed with the full confidence of the nation.  Let it carry
out its policy.  Else, you will incur undue responsibility."  The King's
answer was: "If you wish it, I will abdicate." [16]  He would rather give
up his crown than assume the responsibility of sanctioning a policy which
his whole military training and experience told him was insane and
suicidal: how justly, the event soon showed.  The losses of men and ships
which Gallipoli cost far exceeded the whole of Greece's military and
naval resources; and if that cost proved more than embarrassing to
England and France, it would have literally ruined Greece.  M. Rallis and
the other ex-Premiers in less than a fortnight gratefully recognised the
justness of the King's opposition to their views,[17] and thenceforth
parted company with M. Venizelos.

Meanwhile M. Venizelos hastened from the Palace to the British Legation,
and, "in order to save time till he could make an official _démarche_,"
he made to the Entente Ministers there assembled a semi-official
communication to this effect: "Following the natural evolution of its
policy of solidarity with the Entente Powers, the Royal Government has
judged that the Dardanelles operations afford it a favourable occasion to
translate its sentiments into deeds by abandoning its neutrality and
offering its co-operation in that enterprise with the whole of its Fleet
and one division of its army."  All this, "though the King {31} has not
yet given his adhesion." [18]  His hurry arose from the belief that the
Allies would reach Constantinople in a few days.

But the General Staff still remained unconvinced.  Yes, they said, one
division to begin with; but what if the Allies get stuck in the Straits,
as we believe they will be, and call upon us for more?  And, once we join
them, how can we refuse to supply their needs?  We shall be incurring
unlimited liabilities.  So the King, who had full confidence in his
military advisers, and who could not bring himself to look upon the
Gallipoli adventure as a "serious enterprise," [19] declined his adhesion
to M. Venizelos's plan; and M. Venizelos resigned in wrath (6 March).

Then came the Entente replies to his communication; from which it
appeared that, as in August, 1914, so now the impetuous Cretan ran ahead
of the Powers: that, whilst he was inveighing against everyone who would
not let Greece co-operate with them, they had not yet even agreed as to
whether they desired her co-operation.

England regarded the communication as a merely preliminary and
preparatory step, and waited for a definite proposal after the King's
decision, when she would consult with her allies.  France and Russia
insisted on the impossibility of Greece limiting her participation to a
war against Turkey alone: to be an effective partner of the Entente,
Greece must be prepared to fight Austria and Germany also.  France added
that the question of the participation of Greece in the Dardanelles
enterprise could not be a useful subject of discussion between the Allies
until a definite decision by the Greek Government was taken.  Russia did
not even envisage the usefulness of such a discussion.  M. Sazonow
pointedly declared that he did not consider Greek co-operation in the
Dardanelles at all necessary, that the question of the Straits and of
Constantinople ought to be settled by the Entente Powers alone without
the intervention of third parties, and that Russia did not desire the
entry of a Greek army into Constantinople, though she had no objection to
its operating against Smyrna or elsewhere.[20]

{32}

Some days later, it is true, M. Delcassé affirmed that he had overcome
Russia's repugnance;[21] but, though it is probable that Russia, yielding
to pressure, would have accepted the participation of Greek troops, she
made no secret of her satisfaction at not having had to do so: "We
heartily consent to your receiving large compensations in Asia Minor,"
said the Russian Minister at Athens, in the presence of his British
colleague, to a high official of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
"But as to Constantinople, we prefer that you should not come there; it
would afterwards be painful for you and disagreeable for everybody to
turn you out." [22]

M. Venizelos knew these views perfectly well, and did not covet
Constantinople: what he coveted, so far as material gains went, were the
large compensations in Asia Minor.[23]  There lay the chief objective of
his strategy, and its net outcome was to widen the breach between him and
those elements in the country which still believed that the policy of
Greece must be governed by the solid necessities of the Balkan situation,
not by nebulous visions of Imperialist expansion.



[1] Psycha to Venizelos, Bucharest, 23 Oct./6 Nov.; Venizelos to Greek
Legations, London, Bordeaux, Petersburg, 24 Oct./7 Nov., 1914.

[2] Romanos, Bordeaux, 19 Nov., 1914.

[3] He explained, three years afterwards, that at the time of making his
offer of 18 Aug., 1914, he bore in mind "the impossibility of going to
Servia's assistance on account of the danger from Bulgaria."--_Orations_,
p. 93.  But precisely similar was the objection to going against Turkey
without a guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality: only the Bulgars, in the one
case, would have been on Greece's left flank and in the other on the
right.  The truth seems to be that the vision of M. Venizelos lacked the
penetration which, in matters of this sort, can only come from long study
and reflection.

[4] First Memorandum, 11/24 Jan., in the _Nea Hellas_, 21 March (O.S.),
1915.

[5] Gennadius, London, 10 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.

[6] _Orations_, p. 43.

[7] Second Memorandum, 17/30 Jan., in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.),
1915.

[8] See his own statement in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.

[9] Dragoumis, Petrograd, 16 Feb., 1915.

[10] Dardanelles Commission, First Report, pp. 14-5, 31-3; Final Report,
pp. 6-8.

[11] Deville, pp. 163, 215.

[12] _Orations_, pp. 103, 104.

[13] Dardanelles Commission, Supplement to First Report, p. 3.

[14] _Orations_, pp. 105-6.

[15] See Extracts from the Crown Council Minutes, in the _Balkan Review_,
Dec., 1920, pp. 384-5, which supplement M. Venizelos's very meagre
account of these proceedings in _Orations_, pp. 107-8.

[16] _Orations_, pp. 266-7.

[17] _Ibid_, pp. 267-8.

[18] Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, 20 Feb./5
March, 1915.

[19] _Orations_, p. 267.

[20] Gennadius, London, 21 Feb.; Sicilianos, Paris, 22 Feb.; Dragoumis,
Petrograd, 22 Feb. (O.S.), 1915.

[21] _White Book_, No. 37.

[22] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, Athens.  25 Feb./10 March,
1915.

[23] _Orations_, pp. 108, 113-14.




{33}

CHAPTER IV

Immediately after the resignation of M. Venizelos it was decided to
dissolve the Chamber and to have General Elections, in which for the
first time the territories conquered in 1912-13 would participate.
Meanwhile, the King called upon M. Gounaris, a statesman of
considerable ability, though with none of the versatility of mind and
audacity of character which distinguished his predecessor, to carry on
the Government and to preside over the elections.  Under ordinary
circumstances these would have taken place at once.  But owing to the
need of preparing electoral lists for the new provinces, they were
delayed till 13 June, and owing to a serious illness of King
Constantine which supervened--causing intense anxiety throughout the
nation and bringing political life to a standstill--two more months
passed before the new Parliament met.  The interval proved fruitful in
developments of far-reaching importance.

On its accession to power, the new Government issued a _communiqué_,
announcing that it would pursue the policy adopted at the beginning of
the War: a policy of neutrality qualified by a recognition of the
obligations imposed by the Servian Alliance, and a determination to
serve the interests of Greece without endangering her territorial
integrity.[1] And as the Entente representatives at Athens expressed a
certain disappointment at not finding in the _communiqué_ any allusion
to the Entente Powers,[2] M. Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
in order to remove all uneasiness on that score, instructed the Greek
representatives in London, Paris, and Petrograd to assure the
respective Governments categorically that the new Ministry did not
intend to depart in any way from the pro-Entente attitude dictated by
hereditary sentiments and interests alike.  The only {34} difference
between the Venizelos and the Gounaris Cabinets--the difference which
brought about the recent crisis and the change of Government--was one
regarding the danger of immediate action, but did not affect the basis
of Greek policy.[3]

That, by all the evidence available, was the truth.  M. Gounaris
thought as M. Venizelos thought, as King Constantine thought, as,
indeed, every Greek capable of forming an opinion on international
affairs thought--namely that, if Greece were to fight at all, interest
and sentiment alike impelled her to fight on the side of the
Entente.[4]  The only question was whether she should enter the field
then, and if so, on what conditions.

M. Venizelos persisted in declaring that the Dardanelles expedition
presented "a great, a unique opportunity," which he prayed, "God grant
that Greece may not miss." [5]  His successors had no wish to miss the
opportunity--if such it was.  But neither had they any wish to leap in
the dark.  M. Gounaris and his colleagues lacked the Cretan's infinite
capacity for taking chances.  Even in war, where chance plays so great
a part, little is gained except by calculation: the enterprise which is
not carefully meditated upon in all its details is rarely crowned with
success.

And so when, on 12 April, the representatives of the Entente signified
to M. Gounaris their readiness to give Greece, in return for her
co-operation against Turkey, the "territorial acquisitions in the
vilayet of Aidin," suggested {35} to his predecessor, M. Gounaris tried
to ascertain exactly the form of the co-operation demanded and the
extent of the "territorial acquisitions in the vilayet of Aidin"
offered.  The British Minister replied as to the first point that,
having no instructions, he was unable to give any details; and as for
the second, that it referred to the "very important concessions on the
Asia Minor coast" mentioned in Sir Edward Grey's communication of
January.  On being further pressed, he said it meant "Smyrna and a
substantial portion of the hinterland"--a definition with which his
Russian and French colleagues were inclined to concur, though both said
that they had no instructions on the subject.  Then M. Gounaris asked
whether their Excellencies had transmitted to their respective
Governments M.  Venizelos's interpretation of Sir Edward Grey's offer
regarding its geographical limits.  The British Minister replied that
he had no official knowledge of that interpretation; he had only heard
of it semi-officially and had transmitted it to his Government, but had
received no answer.  The Russian Minister replied that he had
transmitted nothing on the subject to his Government, as he had been
informed of it in but a vague way by the late Cabinet.  The French
Minister stated that the subject had never been mentioned to him, and
consequently he had not been in a position to make any communication to
his Government.[6]  Thus the grandiose Asiatic dominion of which M.
Venizelos spoke so eloquently dwindled to "Smyrna and a substantial
portion of the hinterland."

However, the King, the General Staff, and the Cabinet went on with
their work, and were joined by Prince George, King Constantine's
brother, who had come from Paris to Athens for the express purpose of
discussing with the Government the question of entering the war against
Turkey on the basis of guarantees to be determined by negotiations of
which Paris might be the centre.  In that order of ideas, they had
already indicated as the best guarantee the simultaneous entry of
Bulgaria, who, according to news from the Entente capitals, was on the
point of joining.  But this condition having proved {36}
unrealisable--Bulgaria refusing to be bought except, if at all, at a
price of Greek territory which Greece would on no account pay--they
dropped it and set about considering by what other combinations they
could come in without compromising their country's vital interests.
The upshot of their deliberations was a proposal, dated 14 April, to
the following effect:

If the Allies would give a formal undertaking to guarantee during the
War, and for a certain period after its termination, the integrity of
her territories, Greece would join them with all her military and naval
forces in a war against Turkey, the definite objective of which would
be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; for, unless the Ottoman
Empire disappeared, the Greek hold on Smyrna would not be very firm.
It was further stipulated that the Allies should define the territorial
compensations as well as the facilities regarding money and war
material which they would accord Greece in order to enable her to do
her part of belligerent efficiently.  On these conditions Greece would
assume the obligation to enter the field as soon as the Allies were
ready to combine their forces with hers.  All military details were to
be settled between the respective Staffs and embodied in a joint
Military Convention, with this sole reservation that, if Bulgaria
continued to stand out, the Greek Army's sphere of action could not be
placed outside European Turkey.  In an explanatory Note added a few
days later, at the instance of the General Staff, stress was laid upon
the ambiguous attitude of Bulgaria, on account of which the opinion was
expressed that the Allies should be prepared to contribute forces
which, combined with the Greek, would equal the united Turkish and
Bulgarian forces, and that the sphere of Greek action should be limited
to the west of the Gallipoli Peninsula; but it was agreed that, if the
Allies wished it, they should have the military assistance of Greece on
the Gallipoli Peninsula too, provided that they landed their own troops
first.[7]

Of these proposals, which were not put forward as final, but rather as
a basis of discussion, the Entente Powers did not condescend to take
any notice.  Only unofficially {37} the Greek Minister in Paris, on
approaching M. Delcassé, was told that, since the Hellenic Government
viewed the Dardanelles enterprise in a different light from them, an
understanding seemed impossible and discussion useless; for the rest,
that enterprise, for which England had desired the co-operation of the
Greeks, was now carried on without them, and the situation was no
longer the same as it was some days before.  Alarmed by this snub, and
anxious to dissipate any misunderstandings and doubts as to its
dispositions towards the Entente, the Hellenic Government assured M.
Delcassé that it continued always animated by the same desire to
co-operate and would like to make new proposals, but before doing so it
wished to know what proposals would be acceptable.  M. Delcassé replied
that he could not even semi-officially say what proposals would be
acceptable.[8]  But M.  Guillemin, his former collaborator and later
French Minister at Athens, then on a flying visit there, advised M.
Zographos to abandon all conditions and take pot luck with the Allies.

This notion succeeded to the extent that Greece proposed to offer to
enter the war against Turkey with her naval forces only, reserving her
army for her own protection against Bulgaria.[9]  The Entente Powers
intimated through M. Delcassé that they would accept such an offer,
provided it was made without any conditions.[10]  Before deciding,
Greece wanted to be assured that the integrity of her territory during
the War and in the treaty of peace would be respected, that all the
necessary money and material would be forthcoming, and that the
compensations in Asia Minor allotted to her would represent
approximately the area indicated by M. Venizelos.  If it was found that
on these three points the Hellenic Government interpreted the
intentions of the Entente Powers correctly, it would immediately submit
a Note in which the three points would be mentioned as going of their
own accord, so that the official reply of the Entente might cover, not
only the offer, but also its interpretation thus formulated.[11] {38}
M. Delcassé refused to listen to any points: Greece, he insisted
irritably, should enter the alliance without conditions, coupling her
offer simply with "hopes to have the benefit of full solidarity with
her allies, whence results a guarantee of her territorial integrity,"
and "entrusting the full protection of her vital interests to the three
Entente Powers."  The formula was not incompatible with the best
construction which one chose to put upon it; and Prince George--who had
returned to Paris directly after the first offer and acted as a
personal representative of King Constantine, together with the official
representative of the Hellenic Government--warmly advocated its
adoption, pleading that, if Greece did come in without delay and
without conditions, she might safely trust the Allies.[12]

Whether Prince George's plea sprang from blind faith or from
far-sighted fear, is a question upon which the sequel may throw some
light; for the present enough to state that it produced no effect.  In
a matter concerning the integrity of national territory acquired so
dearly, King Constantine felt that he could not afford to allow any
ambiguity or uncertainty: he was willing to waive the other two points,
but not that.  He therefore begged his brother to see M. Poincaré and
solicit in his name the President's help to secure that indispensable
assurance.  "The essential thing," he said, "is that the Entente Powers
should give us a solemn promise that they will respect and make others
respect, until the re-establishment of peace, our territorial
integrity, and that they will not permit any damage to it by the future
Peace Treaty.  Remark to him that Greece has the right to be astonished
that friendly Powers ready to accept her as an ally decline to explain
themselves clearly with her." [13]  What was in the King's mind may be
seen from the President's answer: The Powers did not wish to give a
formal pledge in as many words lest the Bulgars should be stirred to
{39} hostile action on realizing that Cavalla was lost to them.[14]

Prince George, in reporting M. Poincaré's reply, added that the fear of
any damage being inflicted on Greek territorial integrity by the future
Peace Treaty was completely devoid of foundation; that, having himself
expressed this fear, he had been answered: "How can you imagine that we
could dispose of any part whatever of the territory of an allied State
without its consent?" [15]

These fair words failed to reassure the Hellenic Government, which,
after mature reflection, concluded that the formula suggested by M.
Delcassé did not sufficiently safeguard Greece against combinations
likely to affect her territorial integrity.  Its misgivings, which
sprang in the first instance from the refusal of an explicit promise,
were strengthened by the reason given by M. Poincaré for that refusal.
Consequently, it regretted that the Entente Powers did not see their
way to come to an understanding for a collaboration which both sides
desired, and repeated the assurance of a most benevolent neutrality
towards them.[16]

The Greek position was plain: Greece made proposals which constituted a
break with the policy pursued deliberately since the beginning of the
War--proposals for an active partnership, and in return put forward
conditions which ultimately narrowed down to a mere pledge that she
should not, as the end of it all, find herself robbed of Cavalla.
There were certain things she could do and, therefore, wished to do.
There were certain things she could not do, and must be assured that
she would not be made to do them.  The Entente Powers, on the other
hand, would bind themselves to nothing: which is preferable, they said
in effect, the elaborate letter of a bargaining bond, or the spirit of
spontaneous co-operation; a legal obligation or the natural union of
hearts?  What Greece needs, rather than rigid clauses with a seal and a
signature, is the steady, unwavering sympathy of her friends.  If you
come with us in a courageous forward campaign for the {40} liberation
of the world and righteousness, how could we fail to be with you in
every single question affecting compensations or the integrity of your
territories?  That's all very fine, said the Greeks.  But----

The mistrust of the Greeks was only too well founded.  Although
Bulgaria received arms from Austria and allowed the free passage of
German munitions which enabled Turkey to carry on the defence of
Gallipoli, the Entente Powers, satisfied with her Premier's
explanations and professions of sympathy, would not give up the hope of
seeing her on their side.  Indeed, they were more hopeful than ever; M.
Poincaré told Prince George he would not be surprised to see that
happen "in two or three days," [17] and the British Minister at Sofia,
being less hopeful and giving proofs of perspicacity, was replaced.

About the same time it came to the knowledge of the Entente Governments
that the Greek General Staff had resumed its efforts to induce the
Servian military authorities to concert measures for their mutual
safety, pointing out that, the moment Bulgarian troops crossed the
Servian frontier, it would be too late.  Whereupon both Servia and
Greece were sternly warned against wounding Bulgarian
susceptibilities--and threatened with the displeasure of the Powers,
who wanted to maintain between the Balkan States good fellowship--by
the unhappy project which was once more to the fore.  And ere the end
of May both States learnt that their territories were actually on offer
to Bulgaria.

They received the intelligence as might have been expected.  The
Servian Premier, after consulting with the King, the Crown Prince, the
Cabinet, and all prominent statesmen, informed the representatives of
the Entente that Servia, in spite of her desire to meet the wishes of
her friends and allies, could not agree to put herself in their hands:
the Constitution forbade the cession of territory without the sanction
of the National Assembly.  He asked them to understand that this
decision was final, and that no future Servian Government could be
counted upon to {41} give a different answer, seeing that the present
Government embraced every political party.[18]

Not less uncompromising was the attitude of Greece.  When the news
reached Athens from Paris, the Hellenic Government could hardly believe
it: "It is so contrary to the principles of justice and liberty
proclaimed by the Entente Powers--it seems to us absolutely impossible
to despoil a neutral State, and one, too, whose friendly neutrality has
been so consistently useful to the Allies, in order to buy with its
territories the help of a people which has hitherto done all it could
to help the enemies of the Entente.  By what right, and on what ground
could they mutilate our country?  The opinions once expressed by M.
Venizelos, and since abandoned even by their author, do not constitute
a sufficient ground for spoliation.  The whole thing is an unthinkable
outrage: it shows that our fears were justified and our demand for a
guarantee was absolutely indispensable." [19]

France, through M. Delcassé, and England, through Lord Crewe, sought to
dispel these fears by formally disclaiming any intention to press upon
Greece a mutilation to which she objected, and explaining that the
eventual cession of Cavalla was only envisaged on condition that she
should consent of her own accord.  M. Zographos, however, who had done
his best to bring Greece in on reasonable terms, convinced of his
failure, resigned; and after his departure the Gounaris Government
would permit itself no further discussion upon the subject of
intervention.

During the lull that ensued, the Greek General Staff once more, in
June, approached the Servian Government with detailed suggestions for a
common plan against Bulgaria, dwelling on the necessity of a
preliminary concentration of sufficient Servian troops along the
Graeco-Serbo-Bulgarian frontier to counterbalance the Bulgarian
advantage in rapidity of mobilization.  These steps proved as barren as
all the preceding: while Servia would not try to conjure the Bulgarian
peril by the sacrifices which the Entente recommended, she could not
provide against it by entering into arrangements with Greece which the
Entente disapproved.

{42}

Matters came to a head on 3 August, when the British Minister at Sofia
made to the Bulgarian Government a formal offer of Cavalla and an
undefined portion of its hinterland, as well as of Servian territory in
Macedonia, stating that Great Britain would bring pressure to bear on
those countries, and make the cession to them of any compensations
elsewhere conditional on their consent to this transaction.

The shock lost nothing of its intensity by being long anticipated.  M.
Passitch, the Servian Premier, in an interview with the Greek Minister
at Nish, expressed his profound dismay at the corner into which Servia
was driven; much as she resented this proposal, the fact that she was
entirely dependent on the Entente--whose high-handed methods he did not
fail to criticize--forced her to give it consideration.

If Servia had been dismayed, Greece was enraged.  M. Gounaris addressed
a strongly-worded remonstrance to the British Minister at Athens,
reminding him that in May his Government had protested against the
offer of Greek territory to Bulgaria, and that both Lord Crewe and M.
Delcassé had disavowed any intention to bring the least pressure to
bear upon Greece, who had thus the right to count on her independence
being respected.  The Entente Powers, he went on, thought they could
promise Bulgaria an agreement in which their own will took the place of
Greece's consent, with the idea of exacting her acceptance afterwards.
But they were greatly mistaken.  The Hellenic Government, voicing the
unanimous sentiments of the people as well as its own judgment,
repelled with indignation the idea of making the national heritage an
object of a bargain; and while thanking the Entente Powers for the
courtesy which inspired their notification, it protested in the most
energetic and solemn manner against the injury which they proposed to
inflict upon the independence and integrity of Greece in defiance of
international law.

In reply, the British Government quietly informed the Hellenic
Government that the Entente Powers still hoped that Greece would come
into line with their policy, and that, as soon as Bulgaria had accepted
their offer, they would submit a concrete proposal dealing in detail
with {43} the surrender of Cavalla and defining precisely the Asiatic
concessions which Greece would receive in exchange.[20]

This brings the relations of the Entente Powers with M. Gounaris's
Government to an end.  It is a strange record.  We have, to begin with,
the curious reception of his first offer--the whole Greek Army, the
intervention of which might have turned the Gallipoli tragedy into a
victory.  Doubtless, there were reasons for declining so considerable a
reinforcement.  We know that, although Russia had modified her
objection to Greek participation, she still regarded the presence of a
large Greek force in European Turkey with disfavour; that the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was not agreeable to France; that
the Allies could not at that time afford the military contingents
stipulated by the Greek General Staff.  There will be no disposition to
underrate the complexities of the situation, or want of sympathy for
those upon whom fell the task of finding a solution satisfactory to all
the Powers concerned.  But, though these complexities might be good
reasons for not accepting the Gounaris offer, they were hardly reasons
for not acknowledging it, even in the interest of ordinary courtesy.

Then came the sterile pourparlers through Paris.  Here, again,
political difficulties explain without justifying the attitude of the
Entente Powers.  Their refusal of the guarantee demanded by Greece as
an essential condition of her entry into the war was, of course, a
natural result of their Bulgarian policy--a policy for which very
little could be said.  Time perhaps was, at the beginning of the War,
when Bulgaria might have been won; for it is not necessary to adopt the
Graeco-Servian view that she had from the first decided to join the
enemies of the Entente and that no amount of reasonable concessions
would have satisfied her ambition; the Bulgars are a practical people,
and there was at Sofia a pro-Entente party which might have prevailed,
if the Entente Powers had, without delay, defined the proposed
concessions and proceeded to press Greece and Servia to make them--to
expect from either {44} State a voluntary self-mutilation was to expect
a miracle.  By not doing so, by shilly-shallying at Athens, Nish, and
Sofia, they only lost the confidence of Greeks and Serbs without
gaining the confidence of the Bulgars, who could hardly take seriously
proposals so vague in their formulation and so uncertain of their
fulfilment.  If, on the other hand, the Allies were unable to define
the concessions or afraid to shock public opinion by forcing them upon
Greece and Servia, then they ought to have dropped their hopeless
scheme, without wasting valuable time, and worked on the lines of
Graeco-Servian co-operation against Bulgaria.  Instead, they squashed,
as we saw, every attempt which the Greek General Staff made to that end.

But it is not the only aberration with which history will charge our
statesmen and diplomats.

Greece was going through an internal crisis; and those who know Greece
will know what that means.  In private life no people is more
temperate, more moderate, than the Greek: a sense of measure always
seasons its pleasures, and even the warmest passions of the heart seem
to obey the cool reflections of the brain.  In public life, by way of
compensation, the opposite qualities prevail; and as citizens the
Greeks display an astonishing lack of the very virtues which
distinguish them as men.  The spirit of party burns so hot in them that
it needs but a breath to kindle a conflagration.  That spirit, whose
excesses had, several times in the past, brought the fundamental
principles of the Constitution into question, and the country itself to
the brink of ruin, was once again at work.  Former friends had become
deadly enemies: the community was rent with dissensions and poisoned
with suspicions.  Preposterous falsehoods were freely scattered and
readily snatched at on both sides: the side of M. Venizelos and the
side of M. Gounaris.  Politicians who had been eclipsed by the Cretan's
brilliance, came forth now to regain their lustre at his expense.  For
like all men who have played leading parts on the world's stage, M.
Venizelos had gathered about him as much animosity as admiration; and
hate is more enterprising than love.

M. Venizelos and his partisans were at least as resourceful as their
opponents.  The Cretan had never been able to bear contradiction.  If
his greatness had created him {45} many enemies, his pettiness had
created him more.  His tone of prophetic and impeccable omniscience was
vexatious at all times, but particularly galling at this agitated
period.  It was now his constant cry that the situation called for the
work of a statesman and not of an international lawyer or strategist.
There were times when he declaimed this thesis in so violent a fashion
that no self-respecting man could work with him.  He had lost all the
able collaborators of the great Reconstruction era, and nothing could
make him forgive these "apostates."  Everybody who could not see eye to
eye with him was to M. Venizelos a traitor.  It was impossible for M.
Venizelos to admit that others besides himself might be actuated by
patriotic as well as by personal motives; that he did not possess an
exclusive patent of sincerity any more than of vanity.  He found it
easier to believe that the alpha and the omega of their policy was to
undo him.  He would undo them--even at the cost of the cause he had at
heart: to see Greece openly on the side of the Entente.  It is not that
he thought less of the cause, but he thought more of himself.  His
egoism was of that heroic stature which shrinks from nothing.  His
nature impelled him to this labour; his privileged position as the
particular friend of the Entente supplied him with the means.

M. Venizelos had taken a long stride towards that end when he
insinuated that King Constantine's disagreement with him was due to
German influence.  Henceforth this calumny became the cardinal article
of his creed, and the "Court Clique" a society for the promotion of the
Kaiser's interests abroad and the adoption of the Kaiser's methods of
government at home.  M. Streit, though no longer a member of the
Cabinet, was represented as its mainspring: a secret counsellor who
wielded the power, while he avoided the title, of Minister; M.
Gounaris, though in name a Prime Minister, was in reality a mere
instrument of the sovereign's personal policy--so were the members of
the General Staff--so was, in fact, everyone who held opinions at
variance with his own: they all were creatures of the Crown who tried
to hide their pro-Germanism under the mask of anti-Venizelism.  Their
objections to his short-sighted and wrong-headed Asiatic
aspirations--objections the soundness of which has been amply {46}
demonstrated by experience--were dictated by regard for Germany, the
patron of Turkey.  Their offers to fight for the dissolution of
Germany's protégé were not genuine: the conditions which accompanied
them were only designed to make them unacceptable.  The Entente should
beware of their bad faith and learn that M. Venizelos was the only
Greek statesman that could be trusted.[21]

The Powers who had long since adopted M. Venizelos found it convenient
to adopt all his theories.  M. Delcassé, when called upon to explain
why the Greek offer met with such scant ceremony, did so by saying that
it came from M. Gounaris, who was the instrument of the personal policy
of the sovereign, and who combated among the electors M. Venizelos, the
champion of rapprochement with the Entente; that the proposal for the
dispatch of large contingents to the East, involving as it did a
depletion of the Western Front, was calculated to please the imperial
brother-in-law of King Constantine; that the territorial guarantee
demanded by Greece would have become known to Bulgaria, thrown her into
the arms of Germany, and precipitated her against Servia, whom King
Constantine intended to leave to her fate; the trick was too gross to
deceive the Allies, and they gave it the reception it deserved.
Likewise in squashing the Greek efforts to concert with Servia measures
for mutual safety against Bulgaria, while there was yet time, the
Allies, said M. Delcassé, acted on the advice of M. Venizelos, who told
them that the Graeco-Servian Treaty was purely defensive: that it did
not provide for action unless Bulgaria attacked; and what a misfortune
if Servia, by such measures, should appear to take an initiative which
would give Bulgaria an excuse for the aggression she meditated.
Therefore, they bade Servia devote her whole attention to the security
of her Austrian frontier and not play Bulgaria's game by furnishing her
with a pretext for attack.[22]

{47}

On this side of the Channel the inventions of M. Venizelos, it would
seem, were accepted as discoveries with equal solemnity.  During the
Paris pourparlers, according to the French Ambassador in London at all
events, England was much annoyed by the Greek Government's hesitations,
which she attributed to King Constantine's opposition, and asked
herself whether she could either then or in the future treat with a
country governed autocratically.  She was persuaded that Greece lay
under the influence of Germany, and asked herself whether she could in
future support a country which let itself be guided by Powers whose
interests were absolutely contrary to her own.[23]

The Entente Ministers at Athens, as was natural, had greater
opportunities of displaying their solidarity with M. Venizelos.  They
would perhaps have been better advised had they followed the example of
their colleagues at Rome.  It can hardly be questioned that the
discreet and decorous aloofness of the Entente diplomats from the
long-protracted struggle between the Italian advocates of war and
neutrality, assisted by Prince von Bülow's indiscreet and indecorous
participation in that struggle, facilitated a decision in our favour:
nothing does so much to alienate a high-spirited nation as an attempt
on the part of outsiders to direct its internal affairs.  In Greece the
need for discretion was even more imperative.  All controversy at such
a juncture was injudicious.  But if preference had to be shown, it
would have been better to have taken the King's side, for all that was
valuable to us from the military point of view rallied round him; and,
in any case, since the hopes of the Venizelists for oversea expansion
depended on the goodwill of the Sea Powers, {48} they were tied to us
securely enough: so if the land school represented by the General Staff
could have been satisfied, the country would have remained united and
on our side.  Instead of adopting this sane attitude, the local agents
of the Entente ostentatiously associated themselves with the
Venizelists and boycotted the others, thus gratuitously contributing to
a cleavage from which only our enemies could profit.

And that was not all.  Having begun by endeavouring to influence the
Greeks, they ended by being entirely influenced by them.  Forgetting
that no correct perception of facts or estimate of motives is possible
without a certain mental detachment, they allowed themselves to be
swallowed up, as it were, in the atmosphere of suspicion and slander
generated by party friction: they ceased to have any eyes, ears, or
minds of their own; they saw and heard just what M. Venizelos willed
them to see and hear, and thought just as M. Venizelos willed them to
think.  If the King refused to enter the War, his refusal was inspired
by the desire to serve the Kaiser; if he offered to do so, his offers
were prompted by the desire to dish M. Venizelos.[24]

Hence, every proposal made to the Entente by M. Venizelos's successors
was rejected.  Greece was kept out of the Allies' camp, and Servia was
sacrificed.  For it should be clearly understood that the fate of
Servia was decided in the months of June and July, 1915, not only by
the development of the Germano-Bulgarian plan, but also by the failure
of all co-operative counter-measures on the part of the Serbs, Greeks,
and Entente Powers while time was still available.  If only there had
been anyone of sufficient authority and independence of view to
correlate and compose the clashing interests of the moment, a gallant
ally might have been saved from destruction.  But those best qualified
to judge of what was coming, and in a position to frame the
corresponding policy, had been driven into reserve by the storm of
calumny, whereby their motives were misconstrued, their counsels
derided, and their authority undermined; so that in the general uproar
their voices were scarcely heard.  And there were none--or {49} very
few--to act as intermediaries; for the personnel of the Entente
Legations, "wholly believing a lie," had withdrawn in a body from all
intercourse with them, had nicknamed them "Boches," and were accustomed
to assess as concocted in Berlin every notion that emanated from them.
Even the few members of those Legations who had the moral courage to
walk the streets without blinkers were subjected to every form of
odious insinuation and attack.  Venizelos in office, out of office, on
matters technical or lay, to him and to him only would anyone listen,
and as he knew rather less about the rudiments of the military art than
most people, and refrained from consulting those that did, the results
were not difficult to predict.

Yet, as late as June, the elements of a good plan were ready to hand in
abundance.  The General Staff was, as stated, continuing its efforts
for co-operation with the Serbs.  The King, though too ill to conduct
business, would have assented to any military proposal put forward by
the General Staff.  The people would have followed the King as one man.
And the enemy were not ready.  All that was necessary was to study with
attention and sympathy the advice of the experts: to call the soldiers
of the countries concerned to council, and to inaugurate a joint
campaign.  It was not done--and it is difficult to say now to whom the
failure proved most disastrous--to Servia, to Greece, or to the Entente
Powers.  But for this failure a proportionate share of blame must be
laid upon those who, instead of striving to heal divisions in Greece,
did everything they could to foment them.



[1] _White Book_, No. 34.

[2] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, 25 Feb./10 March, 1915.

[3] _White Book_, No. 35.

[4] The best proof is to be found in the Venizelist _White Book_, No.
36,--an exhaustive memorandum by M. Streit on the probabilities of the
War, dated 13/26 March, 1915.  It is both striking and illuminating
that, while in dealing with the attitude of Bulgaria, the author
considers three alternatives: (1) Bulgaria in alliance with the
Entente.  (2) Bulgaria as neutral.  (3) Bulgaria as an enemy of the
Entente.  In dealing with the attitude of Greece he does not for a
single moment contemplate more than two alternatives: (1) Greece as an
ally of the Entente.  (2) Greece as neutral.  Further, in the course of
the argument which follows, M. Streit discusses a possible
understanding between Greece on the one part and Rumania and Bulgaria
on the other, with the object either of a common neutrality or, failing
that, of a simultaneous entry into war in favour of the Entente, "on
whose side alone we can range ourselves."

[5] See the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.

[6] _Conversation entre le Président du Conseil et les Ministres des
Puissances de la Triple Entente, 30 mars/12 avril, 1915_.

[7] Zographos to Greek Minister, Paris, 1/14 April, with the Proposal
of same date; _Orations_, pp. 67-9.

[8] Romanos, Paris, 17/30 April, 1915.

[9] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 18 April/1
May, 1915.

[10] Romanos, Paris, 4 May (N.S.), 1915.

[11] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 22 April/5 May, 1915.

[12] Prince George to Zographos, Paris, 24 April/7 May, 1915.

[13] King Constantine to Prince George, 27 April/10 May, 1915.  From
this document we also learn that on 7/20 April, M. Poincaré had assured
the Prince that such a guarantee would certainly be given to Greece,
"_pour la période de la guerre et durant la période des négociations de
la paix_."

[14] Prince George to King Constantine, 28 April/11 May, 1915.

[15] _Ibid._

[16] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 30
April/13 May, 1915.

[17] Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915.
M.  Delcassé, then and for months afterwards, strove to gain over
Bulgaria _coûte que coûte_, deploring the possession of Cavalla by
Greece.  See Deville, pp. 163, 218.

[18] Alexandropoulos, Nish, 15/28 May, 1915.

[19] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 15/28 May, 1915.

[20] Communication of Entente Powers to Greek Premier, 21 July/3 Aug.;
Greek Premier's reply (No. 8118); Alexandropoulos, Nish, 23 July/5
Aug.; 25 July/7 Aug.; Communication by British Minister at Athens, 23
July/5 Aug., 1915.

[21] See the _Nea Hellas_, 20, 21 March (O.S.), 1915; _Orations,
passim_.

[22] _Journal Officiel_, p. 76.  To appreciate the community of
sentiments between M. Venizelos and M. Delcassé fully, one must compare
the above statement with that in _Orations_, pp. 68-9.  The differences
are equally instructive.  The Venizelist orator, prudently suppresses
from a Greek audience the fact that his Chief frustrated the General
Staff's efforts to co-operate with Servia; he boldly surmises, on the
other hand, that behind the General Staff's stipulations as to the
sphere of Greek military action lurked the _arrière pensée_ to confront
the Allies with the risk of provoking Bulgaria, whom they still
regarded as a potential friend: so the stipulations were, as they were
intended to be, unacceptable.  Again, while M. Delcassé, addressing a
French audience nervous about the Western Front, reckoned that the
Entente contingents demanded by the Greek General Staff would amount to
at least 600,000 or 800,000 men, M. Politis, less fantastically,
estimates them at 450,000 men: this force, which Greece deemed
necessary for success, it will be seen, was not far removed from that
which France and England eventually wasted in failure.

[23]Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915.

[24] See M. Poincaré's statement to the _Matin_, reproduced in the
_Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, p. 386; Deville, pp. 161, 168-9.




{50}

CHAPTER V

On 23 August, M. Venizelos returned to power as a result of the General
Elections held on June 13.  The outcome of those elections proved how
great his popularity still was.  True, in 1910 he had obtained 146
seats out of 182, and now only 185 out of 314.  But the majority,
though diminished, remained substantial enough to show that he still
was, for most people, the man who had cleansed Greece.  Nor did M.
Venizelos imperil his popularity by revealing his differences with the
King.  On the contrary, in his own country, his attacks were carefully
confined to the statesmen and soldiers opposed to him: the King, M.
Venizelos proclaimed, far from sharing their narrow, unpatriotic,
pro-German views, "did not exclude exit from neutrality under given
conditions, but accepted it in principle as imposed for the serving of
the national rights." [1]  By his organs, too, the King was described
as "a worthy successor of the Constantines who created the mighty
Byzantine Empire--imbued with a sense of his great national
mission--Greek in heart and mind." [2]  So anxious, indeed, was M.
Venizelos not to lose votes by any display of ill-feeling against the
popular sovereign that he even took some pains to have himself
photographed calling at the Palace to inquire after the King's health.

As to policy, it is difficult to determine the part which it played in
the contest.  M. Venizelos refrained from publishing any sort of
programme.  His opponents asserted that a vote for Venizelos meant a
vote for war.  But his most prominent supporters declared that such was
by no means the case: although, at a certain moment, he was ready to
participate in the Gallipoli enterprise, circumstances had changed, and
his future course would depend on the situation which he would find on
returning to {51} power.  This vagueness, though not very helpful to
the voters, doubtless helped the voting; for there was hardly any
pro-war feeling among the masses.  The noble ideals emblazoned upon the
Entente banners produced little impression on their minds.  The
experience of two thousand years has taught the Greeks that Governments
never fight for noble ideals, and, if they relieve a small nation from
a foreign yoke, it is, as often as not, in order to impose a new one.
To them the War was a struggle for power and plunder between two
European groups.  It was matter of common knowledge that Constantinople
had been allotted to the Russians, and the Greeks were not particularly
keen on shedding their blood in order to place a Tsar on the Byzantine
throne.  Nor did the Smyrna bait attract them greatly, since it
involved parting with Cavalla.  At the same time, the lurid accounts of
German frightfulness disseminated by the Entente propaganda, instead of
inflaming, damped still further their enthusiasm.[3]  The Venizelist
candidates were, therefore, wise in repudiating the allegation that
their victory would inevitably mean intervention in the conflict; and,
on the whole, the people who voted for the Cretan statesman seem to
have paid a tribute to his personality rather than to his policy.

Meanwhile, Servia, under pressure from the Entente, had decided to
promise Bulgaria territorial concessions, and the communication of this
decision to the Hellenic Government formed the occasion of M.
Venizelos's first official act.  Greece, he wrote in reply, not wishing
to embarrass her friend and ally at a moment when imperative necessity
forced the latter to submit to painful sacrifices, abandoned her
objections.  But she would be lacking in sincerity if she failed to
tell Servia straightway that "the _raison d'être_ of the
Alliance--namely, the territorial equilibrium and the mutual guarantee
of their respective possessions--being profoundly affected by the
contemplated changes, the reciprocal obligations of the Alliance could
not survive except by virtue of a renewal."  M. Passitch replied
verbally that he thought like M. Venizelos.  But, as it happened, the
question did not arise; Servia's promise was coupled with so many
stipulations and reservations, that, in the opinion of the Entente
Powers, {52} it amounted almost to a refusal;[4] and the thread of the
negotiations was very soon broken by events.  Destiny moved too fast
for diplomacy.

Hardly had these dispatches been exchanged, when Colonel Vlachopoulos,
the emissary of the Greek General Staff to Servia, arrived in Athens,
bringing a report of the gravest nature.  After twelve months'
evasions, the Servian Minister of War had at last mentioned to him the
need for an understanding between the two Staffs, and the Servian
Director of Military Operations stated that Servia, far from being able
to contribute to a common struggle against Bulgaria the 150,000
combatants stipulated by the Graeco-Servian Convention, could not at
the moment transport to the northern parts of the Bulgarian frontier
more than one or two divisions, while as to the southern parts, which
most immediately concerned Greece, they would have to be left with the
eight regiments of 1915 conscripts--that is, raw recruits.
Simultaneously, the fear which the Greek military authorities had
expressed to their Servian colleagues in the previous spring--that
delay might prove fatal--was being realized: from all sides came
intelligence of the concentration of large Austro-German forces towards
the Danube.

In the circumstances, after studying Colonel Vlachopoulos's report, the
Greek General Staff submitted to the Government (14 September) the
opinion that for Greece to embark on a war against Bulgaria, so long as
she was not assured of the co-operation of adequate Servian forces, was
tantamount to courting annihilation; and of such co-operation there was
no prospect: the moment the Serbs found themselves faced by a superior
Austro-German army, the Greeks would have to fight the Bulgars as well
as, in all probability, the Turks alone.

As if in confirmation of this forecast, a week later (21 September),
the Hellenic Government received from Sofia the official announcement
of the conclusion of a Turco-Bulgarian agreement and of Bulgarian
mobilization; the latter measure being, according to the Bulgarian
Premier, purely precautionary: as the Austro-German {53} armies had
just begun an attack on Servia, and the theatre of war approached the
Bulgarian frontiers, his country was obliged to take up an attitude of
armed neutrality.[5]

The news threw M. Venizelos into a fever of excitement.  He had,
meanwhile, become most solicitous about Greece-Servian co-operation,
and had not permitted his mind to be impressed by Colonel
Vlachopoulos's report.  When Austria and Germany had their hands full
elsewhere, Servia's peril had left him cold; it set him on fire now
when they were ready to hurl their legions into the Balkan
Peninsula--when it was no longer for Greece a question of fighting
Bulgaria only, but Bulgaria and Turkey and the Central Empires.  M.
Venizelos was a statesman of broad ideas, a hater of dry facts, and an
impenitent believer in his own star.  For the matter of time he cared
very little; considerations of odds did not weigh with him unduly; and
he cherished a sovereign contempt for the cautious attitude of
professional soldiers and other uninspired persons.  Never did these
qualities appear more vividly than on this 21st of September.

At 5 p.m. M. Venizelos went to Tatoi, the King's country residence, to
confer with him, having previously arranged that a mobilization Order
should be drawn up and presented to his Majesty for signature at 6.30
p.m., by which time he expected to have finished his conversation.  The
following is a synopsis of that memorable interview based on a report
from M. Venizelos's own lips.[6]

The King readily agreed to mobilize, but firmly resisted the proposal
to enter the war, on the ground that the odds were too heavy.  M.
Venizelos argued that, even if Germany had five million men available
on other fronts, she could not bring them to the Balkans, and
consequently there was no cause for fear: he spoke learnedly and at
enormous length of geographical conditions and means of transport, of
victualling, of guns and bayonets, of _morale_--he had allowed himself
an hour and a half.  How the King must have felt under this harangue,
any expert who has had to listen to an amateur laying down the law to
him on his own subject may imagine.  On finding his military arguments
fruitless, M. Venizelos shifted his ground; though, the military habit
being too strong, he {54} could not get away from military phraseology:
"I was then obliged," he tells us, "to bring forward my heavy
artillery."

"Majesty," I said, "I have not succeeded in persuading you.  I am very
sorry; but it is my duty, as representing at this moment the
Sovereignty of the People, to tell you that you have no right to
disagree with me this time.  The people by the last elections has
approved my policy and given me its confidence.  It knew that the basis
of my policy was not to let Bulgaria, by crushing Servia, become too
big and crush us to-morrow.  You cannot therefore at this moment depart
from this policy--unless you decide to set aside the Constitution; in
which case you must say so clearly, abrogating the Constitution by a
Decree and assuming the responsibility."

The King replied: "You know I recognize that I am bound to obey the
popular verdict when it is a question of the internal affairs of the
country; but when it is a question of foreign affairs--the great
national questions--my view is that, so long as I consider a thing
right or wrong, I must insist that it shall or shall not be done,
because I feel responsible before God."

At this utterance, M. Venizelos narrates, "I remember that a feeling of
distress came over me, and with clasped hands, I shook my head in a
melancholy manner, saying: 'Alas! we are before the theory of kingship
by the grace of God: poor Greece!'" [7]  After a little, he told the
King that, in the actual circumstances, he could not undertake a
struggle for the Constitution; he could only tender his resignation.

The King expostulated: "How can you resign in the face of a Bulgarian
mobilization?  In these circumstances, as you know, we must not delay
even twenty-four hours.  After all, who assures us that Bulgaria will
attack Servia?  It is possible that she may maintain an armed
neutrality; in which case our disagreement vanishes, and you can stay
in power and carry on your policy."  Whereupon M. Venizelos withdrew
his resignation.

Of course, he was not deluded by the Sofia Government's {55}
announcement of "armed neutrality," and he was determined to go for
Bulgaria at once.  But how?  In his own mind, as he had already
demonstrated to the King, no doubt existed that, if the Greeks attacked
the Bulgars, they had every chance of crushing them and even of taking
their capital.  But there was that General Staff by whose opinions the
King set such store.  They objected Servia's inability to contribute,
as she was bound by her Military Convention to do, 150,000 combatants.
Therefore, in order to meet this objection, he said: "Don't you think
we might ask the English and the French whether they could not furnish
150,000 combatants of their own?"

"Certainly," replied the King; "but they must send Metropolitan
(European) troops, not Colonials."

By his own account, M. Venizelos did not take this as meaning that the
King had agreed, if the English and the French supplied these
reinforcements, to depart from neutrality.  He left Tatoi with a clear
perception of the divergence between their respective points of view:
while they both concurred in the need of instant mobilization, one was
for a defensive and the other for an offensive policy; but, as soon
appeared, not without hopes of converting his sovereign by some means
or other.

A busy, ambitious child of fortune never lets the grass grow under his
feet:

"I returned to the Ministry at 7 p.m.," goes on the curious record,
"and telephoned to the Entente Ministers to come and see me quickly.
When they came, I informed them that a mobilization Order was being
signed at that very moment and would be published that evening; but for
our further course I needed to know if the Powers were disposed to make
good the 150,000 combatants whom Servia was obliged by our Treaty to
contribute for joint action against Bulgaria.  They promised to
telegraph, and immediately dispatched an extra urgent telegram, adding
that they would let me know the answer.  This happened at about 8 p.m.,
and at 8.15 there arrived M. Mercati (the Marshal of the Court) with a
message from the King, asking me not to make this _démarche_ to the
Entente.  I replied that the _démarche_ had already been made." [8]

{56}

Forty-eight hours later arrived the Entente Powers' answer, that they
would send to Salonica the 150,000 men asked for.  M. Venizelos, on
communicating this answer to the King, was requested by him to tell the
Entente Ministers that, so long as Bulgaria did not attack Servia, and
consequently the question of Greece going to Servia's assistance did
not arise, no troops should be sent, as their landing on Greek soil
would constitute a violation of Greek neutrality.  M. Venizelos tells
us that he communicated the King's wish to the Entente Ministers, who
telegraphed it to their Governments.

King Constantine, it would seem, was left under the impression that the
affair had ended; and the general belief was that the policy of
neutrality still held good; when suddenly the report came that Allied
troops were on their way to Salonica and that Greece was expected to
assist in their landing.

The news would have astonished the Greeks in any circumstances; but the
circumstances in which it reached them were of a nature to heighten
astonishment into alarm.  Just then (28 September) Sir Edward Grey
stated in the House of Commons, amid loud applause, "Not only is there
no hostility in this country to Bulgaria, but there is traditionally a
warm feeling of sympathy;" and he reiterated the Balkan policy of the
Entente--a Balkan {57} agreement on the basis of territorial
concessions.  The inference which the Greeks drew from this coincidence
was that the Entente Powers were sending troops to despoil them on
behalf of the Bulgars--that they intended to bid for Bulgaria's
friendship at the twelfth hour by forcibly seizing the parts of
Macedonia which they had endeavoured in vain to persuade Greece to
yield.[9]

M. Venizelos himself carried the report to the King, inveighing, it is
said, intemperately against the Allies: "I will protest with the
greatest energy," he cried, trembling with anger.  "I will protest
against this unqualifiable violation of our soil."

"Certainly," replied the King, "you must protest very energetically."
[10]

{58}

And M. Venizelos hurried off to his office and drew up the following
telegram, which, now printed for the first time, reveals many things:

"A grave misunderstanding threatens to develop between Greece and the
Entente Powers on the subject of the despatch of international troops
through Salonica to Servia.  When I suggested the dispatch of 150,000
men destined to complete the Servian contingents in case of a common
struggle against Bulgaria, I did not ask this succour for Greece, but
for Servia in order to remove the objection raised against our
Alliance, said to have become null by Servia's inability to fulfil her
engagement.  By accepting in principle to proceed to such dispatch the
Powers rendered above all a service to Servia and to their own cause in
the East.  Likewise, I had clearly specified that, so long as Greece
was neutral, the landing of international troops at Salonica could not
have our official adhesion.  Our neutrality imposed upon us to protest
for form's sake; after which matters would go on as at Moudros." [11]

{59}

"It remained for us to take all the necessary measures for facilitating
the landing and the direct passage to Servia of the international
troops, combining these operations with the needs of our own
mobilization.  The Minister of Communications was to go at once to
Salonica with a number of engineers to arrange on the spot these
technical matters, very complicated from the paucity of means of
transport in Macedonia.  It was understood that, before any dispatch of
troops to Salonica, we should have twenty-four hours' notice.

"Things were at this point, when the Military Governor of Salonica--on
Wednesday--received a visit from the French Consul, the Commander of a
French man-of-war, and two French officers from the Dardanelles, who
told him that, in pursuance of a pretended understanding between the
Premier and the French Minister, they were going to start
reconnaissance work for the landing of French troops and the defence of
Salonica against enemy submarines.  Furthermore, on Thursday there
arrived at Salonica General Hamilton with his Staff and notified the
Governor that the Allies were going to occupy part of the town and
port, and put them in a state of defence with a view to a landing of
troops.  General Moschopoulos, very firmly though very politely,
declared to them that, without orders from his Government, it would be
his painful duty to oppose any seizure of national territory.

"Such a misunderstanding inspires us with the liveliest alarm, for the
contemplated landing has not yet been definitely accepted, and after
being accepted it cannot be carried out, (1) without a preliminary
protest for form's sake, which the British Government has informed us
it does not want;[12] (2) without the absolute maintenance of the
powers of our authorities, who alone would decide the measures for the
use of the port and railways in such a manner as not to compromise the
transport and concentration of our own armies."

{60}

"Moreover, the great emotion caused in the public by the recent speech
of Sir Edward Grey compels the Royal Government to demand from the
Entente Powers certain preliminary assurances.  While people here
expected to see the Powers, after the Bulgarian mobilization, proceed
to decisive acts, and at the very least to a declaration that the
territorial promises made to Bulgaria in August would be cancelled if
within a very short time she did not agree to co-operate with the
Entente, they were stupefied to see that to the most evident proof of
Bulgarian duplicity and disloyalty they replied by redoubling their
solicitude and goodwill.  Sir Edward Grey's speech, followed closely by
the visits made without notice at Salonica by the representatives of
the French and British Staffs, gives birth to the fear that certain
Entente Powers may harbour the design of using the troops which would
be sent to Servia as the fittest instrument for giving practical effect
to the territorial ambitions of the Bulgars in Macedonia.  Well or ill
founded, this fear exercises over people in Greece, and we have reason
to believe in Servia also, a demoralizing effect and threatens to
compromise the success of our mobilization.

"The Royal Government finds itself confronted with a situation created
much against its will, which imposes upon it the duty, in order to calm
as soon as possible the alarms of the people now in arms, of asking the
Powers to dispel the fears inspired by their attitude towards Bulgaria
by declaring, if possible, that the offers made to her are henceforth
null, and that the eventual dispatch of international troops to Servia
would in no case be turned to the detriment of the territorial
integrity of Greece and Servia.  Only formal assurances in this sense
could justify in the eyes of Greek public opinion the Government which,
while protesting for form's sake, would agree to facilitate the landing
at Salonica and the passage across its territory of international
troops destined for Servia.

"Please speak to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of this
telegram." [13]

From the tenor of this interesting document we gather that, while fully
aware of the King's attitude, M. Venizelos {61} went on negotiating
with the Allies for immediate action; and that the Allies proceeded to
act before any agreement had been reached.  To judge by its tone, M.
Venizelos seems to have been annoyed at the Allies' haste as at an
unwarrantable attempt to commit him irretrievably without heeding his
conditions or waiting for his definite consent: so grave a breach of
propriety could not but pain him.  But, however annoyed he might be on
the surface, at bottom he was doubtless pleased: the move supplied the
best means for the conversion of his Sovereign--no argument is so
persuasive as an accomplished fact.  That was what really mattered--the
manner was a detail; and it is impossible to suppose that he meant to
let his annoyance stand in the way of his high purpose.[14]
Themistocles, to whom the Cretan statesman bears some affinity, it will
be remembered, forced the Greeks to fight at Salamis by a similar
stratagem.

This, of course, does not exculpate the Allies.  Their conduct merits
at least the appellation of irregular.  But when foreign diplomats and
native politicians become fused into a happy family, it would be
strange, indeed, if irregularities did not occur.  The whole of the
Greek story is so thoroughly permeated with the spirit of old-fashioned
melodrama that no incident, however startling, seems out of place.

What follows is something of an anticlimax.  Next day, the French
Minister--from this point onwards France takes the lead and England
recedes into the second place--had the honour to announce to his
Excellency the Greek Premier the arrival at Salonica of a first
detachment of troops, declaring at the same time that the Entente
Powers sent it to assist their ally Servia, and that they counted on
Greece, who had already given them so many proofs of friendship, not to
oppose measures taken in the interest of a country to which she also
was allied.[15]

{62}

In reply, the Greek Premier had the honour to declare to his Excellency
the French Minister that, being neutral, Greece could not authorize
measures which violated her neutrality.  The Hellenic Government was
therefore obliged to protest against the passage of foreign troops
through Greek territory.  The circumstance that those troops were
destined solely to the assistance of Servia, who was Greece's ally,
nowise altered the case; for, before the _casus faederis_ was realized,
the neutrality of Greece could not be affected by the danger which
menaced Servia.[16]

To return from formalities to realities.  On the same day (2 Oct.), the
Bulgarian forces began to mass on the Servian frontier, while the
Austro-German battalions were fighting their way across the Danube; and
on the 4th Russia launched her ultimatum on Bulgaria.  This rapid
fulfilment of their own prognostications roused the Greeks to the
highest pitch of excitement.  But all faith in the Entente had not yet
been extinguished.  On the very day on which the Petrograd Government
delivered its tardy and ineffectual ultimatum at Sofia, at Athens the
Chamber held a historic debate, in which M. Venizelos for the first
time proclaimed that the Graeco-Servian Treaty imposed an absolute
obligation upon Greece to make war on Bulgaria and Turkey; adding--in
answer to a question, what he would do if on going to Servia's
assistance he met the German and Austrian armies--that Germany and
Austria must be fought as well, if necessary, and backing his thesis
with those appeals to honour which, whether pertinent or not, seldom
fail to move a popular audience.  The debate lasted till four o'clock
in the morning and ended with a vote of confidence in M. Venizelos's
military policy--a policy which M. Venizelos, a civilian, expounded to
an assembly of civilians as a settled plan, without waiting for the
consent of the King and in defiance of the technical advice of the
General Staff.  In fairness to the Chamber, it should be added that the
motion was carried on the assumption that the King was in agreement.[17]

{63}

But we know King Constantine's attitude; and if M. Venizelos hoped by
these tactics to force his hand, he was speedily undeceived.  No sooner
was the debate over than the King summoned his Prime Minister and asked
him to modify his policy or to resign.  Faced by such a dilemma, M.
Venizelos did the only thing he could do--he resigned; and his country
shrank back on to the solid ground of neutrality.

It was a narrow escape--how narrow became evident a few hours later.
The Allies had promised to send 150,000 combatants.  Even if this
promise had been kept, the Allied force would not have been, in any
strategical sense, an adequate substitute for the Servian contingent.
For it was not in place for covering purposes or subsequent offensive
action; it was not trained to Balkan fighting; it was not equipped for
mountain warfare; and, coming to the same ports as the Greeks, it would
have delayed the process of concentration.  But, be that as it may, the
promise was not kept.  What is more, it could not possibly have been
kept.  Politicians casting about for arguments wherewith to back their
views may leave their hearers to imagine that Great Powers keep armies
ready to be planked down at any point at a moment's notice; but the
fact is that an army, even if it can be spared from other tasks, is a
cumbrous affair to move about, requiring all sorts of tiresome
things--food, arms, ammunition--the provision of which requires, in its
turn, complicated processes, before the army is potentially effective
for the role assigned to it in the creative mind of an excited orator.
Something of the sort had, indeed, been intimated to the Hellenic
Government by the Entente Powers themselves when they wished both
Greeks and Serbs to avert Bulgarian hostility by territorial
concessions--namely, that, as after the commitment of troops to
Gallipoli, none remained to rescue Servia, there was nothing for it but
to conciliate Bulgaria.  Of course, it may be asked, such being the
facts, what value had the promise of 150,000 men?  This {64} is a
question which M. Venizelos would have done well to ponder, as King
Constantine and his military advisers pondered it.  As it was, when
that afternoon the Allied forces turned up at Salonica, the Greek
people had the mortification to find that they amounted to 20,000.  Nor
did they approach the stipulated figure for months after.

The arguments which had prevailed with many some hours before were
suddenly exploded, and to the feeling of confidence which had prompted
the Chamber's vote immediately succeeded a feeling of panic.  What!
cried everybody at Athens, are we to stake our liberty--our national
existence--on such a chance: 150,000 Greeks, _plus_ 200,000
half-exhausted Serbs, _plus_ 20,000 Allies, against 200,000
Austro-Germans, _plus_ 300,000 Bulgars, _plus_ 100,000 Turks?  Nay, if
the French and the English love gambling, we don't: we cannot afford
the luxury.  Venizelos has allowed himself to be duped, said some;
others, Venizelos has tried to dupe us.

Such were the circumstances under which the Allies landed at Salonica.
Their action has been pronounced immoral and perfidious by some English
and even by some French critics; and as it was attended with ill
success, it brought double shame upon the contrivers.[18]  Certainly,
it will not bear investigation from the standpoint of political tact:
it was the first of the many performances which little by little
alienated a friendly nation from them and discredited M. Venizelos with
his countrymen.



[1] M. Venizelos in the _Nea Hellas_, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.

[2] _Ibid._

[3] Deville, p. 174.

[4] Venizelos to Greek Legation, Nish, 18/31 Aug.; Alexandropoulos,
Nish, 19 Aug./1 Sept.; 20 Aug./2 Sept.; 22 Aug./4 Sept., 1915.

[5] _White Book_, No. 41.

[6] _Orations_, pp. 131-8.

[7] This utterance, for the exactness of which we have to rely entirely
on M. Venizelos's memory, was the origin of the charge henceforth
brought against King Constantine that he claimed to reign by Divine
Right.

[8] According to another and ampler version of these events, it had
been agreed between the King and M. Venizelos that, while the latter
opened conversations with the British and French Ministers about the
possibility of sending 150,000 combatants, the former should
simultaneously open conversations with the German Emperor relating the
steps taken in regard to the Entente, and asking what Germany would
give for Greek neutrality.  But when M. Venizelos returned to Athens,
he sent a letter to the King informing him that he had changed his mind
and that, as a responsible Minister, he could not sanction the
projected negotiations with Germany.  Whereupon the King forwarded by
M. Mercati a reply that, in such a case, he retracted the permission to
approach the Entente with regard to reinforcements.  See the _Balkan
Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. 387-8.  Yet another version supplies some
additional details: M. Venizelos assured M. Mercati that his _démarche_
was of a strictly personal character and did not commit the State in
the least; next day he repeated this assurance to the King himself and,
at the King's instance, promised to cancel the _démarche_; and two days
afterwards the French Minister, M. Guillemin, formally declared to the
King that M. Venizelos's _démarche_ was considered as null and
void--_nulle et non avenue_.--See S. Cosmin's _Diplomatic et Presse
dans l'Affaire Grecque_ (Paris, 1921), pp. 123-4.

[9] The Greek Ministers abroad had for some time been informing their
Government of a contemplated occupation by Allied troops of the
territories which were to be ceded to Bulgaria; and the suspicion that
a dispatch of Entente Forces to Salonica might have for its object
"really to occupy for Bulgaria, until the conclusion of peace, the
territories coveted by her," has been expressed even by a French
diplomat.--See Deville, p. 129, n. 1.

[10] I venture to borrow this little scene from S. Cosmin, p. 125.  M.
Venizelos at this stage of the proceedings is more eloquent than
coherent.  He tells us (_Orations_, p. 139), that on informing the King
that the Allied troops were on their way to Salonica, his Majesty said:
"That's all right.  Only please let your protest be in any case,
emphatic," and that he replied: "Emphatic--yes, but only up to a
certain point, considering what lies beneath."  Now, as on M.
Venizelos's own showing, the King was no party to the Allies' step, it
is not very easy to see how he could have spoken to him as if the King
had a secret understanding with them.  The episode is one on which more
light could be shed with advantage.  The same may be said of an
allegation that King Constantine secretly informed Bulgaria that, even
in the event of an attack on Servia, she would meet with no opposition
from Greece.  This allegation is supported chiefly by a telegraphic
dispatch from the Bulgarian Minister at Athens to Sofia (_White Book_,
No. 43), which somehow (it is not stated how) fell into the hands of M.
Venizelos's friends and was produced by them in the Skouloudis Inquiry.
The authenticity of this document was publicly denied by its alleged
author, and its portentous length (three large pages of close print),
as well as its unusual style render it very suspicious: it begins:
"To-day, 9th instant," and it is dated "23"--as if the author did not
know that the difference between the Old and New Calendar was 13 days.
In face of these difficulties, strong evidence would be required to
establish its genuineness: the more because that Inquiry witnessed a
number of similar curiosities--among them an alleged dispatch from the
Turkish Minister at Athens to the Grand Vizier, regarding the
conclusion of a secret Graeco-Turkish treaty.  When challenged, M.
Skouloudis declared that such treaty never was even thought of and
denounced the dispatch as "from beginning to end a forgery," whereupon
nothing more was said.  (See Skouloudis's _Apologia_, pp. 85-8).  These
matters are of interest as illustrating the atmosphere of mistrust that
poisoned Greek politics at this period, and particularly the relations
between the King of Greece and her leading politician.

[11] In pursuance of a decision taken by the War Council on 16 Feb., a
British force was sent to Lemnos to support the naval attack on the
Dardanelles, landing at Moudros on 6 March.  Greece told the British
Government that she considered the action irreconcilable with her
position as a neutral.  The British Government justified it by saying
that, as Turkey had not accepted the verdict of the Powers whereby
Lemnos and the other islands conquered in 1912 were assigned to Greece,
England had the right to treat them as Turkish territory: at the same
time declaring that this did not entail any diminution of Greek
sovereignty.  Thus, whilst Turkey was a friend, the British Government
had decided that these islands did not belong to her; it recognized her
claim to them when she became an enemy; but not altogether--only for
the duration of the War: it was merely a temporary expedient to meet a
temporary exigency.  By the same line of reasoning, England in the
following July justified the occupation of Mytilene.  The Greek answer
was that "without consenting to the occupation of part of her territory
or admitting the arguments put forward by the British Government to
justify its action from the standpoint of International Law, Greece had
to bow before an accomplished fact."--Elliot to Greek Premier, Athens,
9 March, 25 July; Minister for Foreign Affairs to Greek Legations,
London and Paris, 16/29 July, 1915.

[12] Sir Edward Grey objected to a protest because it would enable
Germany to say that we had violated Greek neutrality.--Gennadius,
London, 29 Sept., 1915.

[13] Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, Rome, 18
Sept./1 Oct. 1915.  (Confidential.)

[14] "For my policy the arrival of the Anglo-French was a most material
asset.  I went for war against Bulgaria and had made up my mind, if
Bulgaria attacked Servia, to fight.  It was in my interest, besides the
150,000 Greek and the 200,000 Servian bayonets, to have 150,000
Anglo-French, consequently it was a political move absolutely necessary
for the prosecution of my own policy."--_Orations_, p. 140.

[15] Guillemin to Venizelos, Athens, 19 Sept./2 Oct., 1915.

[17] Venizelos to Guillemin, Athens, 19 Sept./2 Oct., 1915.  This
merely formal protest--quite distinct from the confidential dispatch
given above--is the only one of which the world has hitherto been
allowed to hear.

[17] M. Venizelos had insisted that the reports spread through the
Press concerning the divergence of views between him and the Crown
should be contradicted, and, by telling the King that otherwise the
mobilization would have no effect on Bulgaria, had obtained the King's
permission to publish a _communiqué_ in which he stated that "the Crown
is in accord with the responsible Government not only as regards
mobilization but also as regards future policy."--_Orations_, p. 136.

[18] See House of Commons Debate, in _The Times_, 19 April, 1916;
Chambre des Deputés, secret debate of 20 June, 1916, in the _Journal
Officiel_, p. 77.




{65}

CHAPTER VI

M. Zaimis formed a Government pledged to the policy which Greece had
pursued since the beginning of the European War: her future course
would be guided by the course of events: meanwhile, she would seek to
safeguard her vital interests by remaining armed.[1]

As regards Servia, the new Premier had an opportunity of expressing his
views at length soon after his accession to office.  The Servian
Government, judging that the imminent attack from Bulgaria realized the
_casus faederis_, asked him if, in conformity with her alliance, Greece
would be ready to take the field.  M. Zaimis answered that the Hellenic
Government was very sorry not to be able to comply with the Servian
demand so formulated.  It did not judge that in the present conjuncture
the _casus faederis_ came into play.  The Alliance, concluded in 1913,
for the purpose of establishing an equilibrium of forces between the
Balkan States, had a purely Balkan character and nowise applied to a
general conflagration.  Both the Treaty and the Military Convention
accompanying it showed that the contracting parties had in view only
the case of an isolated attack by Bulgaria against one of them.
Nowhere was there any allusion to a concerted attack by two or more
Powers.  Nor could it be otherwise: it would have been an act of mad
presumption for either of the contracting parties to offer the other
the manifestly powerless and ridiculous assistance of its armed forces
in the case of a war with several States at once.  And such was the
present case.  If the Bulgarian attack apprehended by the Servian
Government took place, it would be in concert with Germany, Austria,
and Turkey: it would be combined with the attack already carried on by
the two Central Empires: it would be an episode of the European War.
{66} The Servian Government itself had recognized this in advance by
breaking off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria in imitation of the
Entente Powers, her European Allies, without a previous understanding
with Greece, her Balkan ally.  In these circumstances, the Hellenic
Government was convinced that no obligation weighed upon it.

Further, Greece was persuaded that her armed assistance freely offered
at such a moment would ill serve the common interest of the two
countries.  Greece had remained neutral in the European War, judging
that the best service she could render Servia was to hold in check
Bulgaria by keeping her forces intact and her communications open.  The
common interest demanded that the Greek forces should continue in
reserve for better use later on: that Greece should remain neutral and
armed, watching the course of events carefully with the resolution to
guard in the best possible way, not only her own vital interests, but
also those which she had in common with Servia.

The Hellenic Government, while deeply and sincerely regretting that it
was materially impossible for it to do at present more for Servia,
wished to assure her that, faithful to their friendship, it would
continue to accord her every assistance and facility consistent with
its international position.[2]

The Entente Powers took no exception to this attitude; which is not to
be wondered at, seeing that they had hitherto uniformly ignored the
Graeco-Servian Treaty, and, by their project of territorial concessions
to Bulgaria, had laboured, as much as in them lay, to annul a pact made
for the defence of the territorial _status quo_ against Bulgaria: not
until Bulgaria had been at open war with Servia for some days (14
Oct.), could they bring themselves to declare that the promises of
Servian and Greek territory which they had made to her no longer held.
Unable, therefore, to tell Greece that she was under any obligation to
enter the War on Servia's behalf, Sir Edward Grey attempted to induce
her to do so for her own benefit by offering her the island of Cyprus.
This offer, made on 17 October, Greece felt compelled to decline: what
would it have profited her to gain Cyprus and lose Athens?  And what
could an acceptance have profited Servia either?  As {67} M. Zaimis
said, by intervening at that moment Greece would perish without saving
Servia.

Servia could have been saved had an Anglo-French expedition on an
adequate scale taken place at any of the times which the Greek General
Staff proposed for Graeco-Servian co-operation--indeed, at any time
except only the particular time chosen by the Entente.  When their
troops arrived at Salonica, the Servian army--what had been left of it
after fourteen months' fighting and typhus--was already falling back
before the Austro-Germans, who swarmed across the Drina, the Save, and
the Danube, occupied Belgrade and pushed south (6-10 Oct.), while the
Bulgars pressed towards Nish (11-12 Oct.).  On the day on which the
English offer was made (17 Oct.), the Austro-Germans were fifteen miles
south of Belgrade, and by the 2nd of November there was no longer any
Servia to save, the Bulgars having on that day entered Monastir.

The co-operation of Greece might still have been obtained if the Allies
could even then have sent to Salonica forces large enough to assure her
that the struggle would be waged on more equal terms.[3]  There had
always been an influential group among the principal military leaders
at Athens who held that it was to the vital interest of their country
that Bulgaria should be attacked, and who, to secure the help of the
Entente Powers against Bulgarian pretensions in the future, were
prepared to run great immediate risks.  As it was, the dilatoriness of
the Allies imposed upon M. Zaimis a policy of inaction.

This policy, besides being imposed by circumstances, also accorded with
the new Premier's character.

M. Zaimis stands out in the political world of Greece as a singular
anomaly: a politician who never made speeches and never gave
interviews: a silent man in a country where every citizen is a born
orator: an unambitious man in a country where ambition is an endemic
disease.  To find a parallel to his position, one must go back to the
days when nations, in need of wise guidance, implored reluctant sages
to undertake the task of guiding them.  This thankless task M. Zaimis
performed several times to everybody's temporary satisfaction.  On the
present, as on other occasions, he enjoyed the confidence of the
Entente Powers, {68} as well as the confidence of the King and the
people of Greece.  Even the journals of M. Venizelos, and the
Anglo-French Press which M. Venizelos inspired, paid the customary
tribute to M. Zaimis's integrity and sagacity.  The homage was due to
the fact that M. Zaimis was neither a Venizelist nor an
anti-Venizelist, but simply a Zaimist.  In domestic affairs he belonged
to no party; in foreign affairs to no school: he neither sought nor
shunned a change of course.

That explains why he succeeded in ruling Greece for four weeks, and
also why he failed to rule her longer.

M. Venizelos had not abandoned his standpoint.  Of M. Zaimis's person
he spoke with much respect; but of his policy he spoke just as one
might have expected M. Venizelos to speak: M. Zaimis had broken the
Servian Treaty and would go down to history as a man who had
dishonoured the signature of Greece.  With regard to the Entente
Powers, M. Venizelos thought that M. Zaimis meant honestly--the fact
that he was as well known to them as M. Venizelos himself, having
served as their High Commissioner in Crete for two years (1906-08),
exempted him from the imputation of duplicity--and since the Entente
Powers tolerated him, he would do likewise.  He only taunted the Zaimis
Government in Parliament for not obtaining for its policy a price from
those whom that policy unintentionally helped: Greece, to be sure, did
not remain neutral to serve Germany's but her own interests,
nevertheless, as Germany benefited by that neutrality, she should be
asked to give a _quid pro quo_.[4]

It was not the first time that M. Venizelos expressed this idea.  At
the Crown Council of 3 March he had suggested, if his own policy of
intervention was not adopted, to ask from Germany compensations for the
continuance of neutrality; and he urged that the King should personally
bargain with the Kaiser's Minister.  Again on 21 September, when
sounding the Entente Powers on the {69} possibility of sending troops
to Salonica, he advised the King simultaneously to sound the German
Emperor on the price of neutrality.[5]  King Constantine had always
shrunk from entering into any understanding whatever with Germany.
And, although the advice may have been given in good faith, it is easy
to guess the use to which its acceptance might be turned by M.
Venizelos, who, even as it was, did not hesitate to whisper of
"pledges" given to Germany.  So M. Zaimis endured the taunt and avoided
the trap.

This state of truce lasted for a month.  Then strife broke out afresh.
Early in November a member of the Government insulted the Opposition.
The Opposition demanded his dismissal.  This was refused and matters
were pushed to a crisis--whether by the adversaries of M. Venizelos,
anxious to get rid of a Chamber with a hostile majority, or by M.
Venizelos himself, anxious to get rid of a Cabinet that had succeeded
in establishing friendly relations with the Entente, it is impossible
to say.  Both conjectures found favour at the time, and both seem
probable.[6]  In any case, M. Venizelos made of that incident an
occasion for an attack on the Government's foreign policy, which,
ending in an adverse vote, led to the resignation of M. Zaimis and the
formation of a new Ministry under M. Skouloudis (7 November).

There ensued a dissolution of the Chamber (11 November) and a fresh
appeal to the people; the King, on the advice of M. Skouloudis,
inviting M. Venizelos to the polls, as who should say: When you got
your majority in June, the nation was with you; many things of the
gravest national concern have happened since; let us see if the nation
is with you now.  M. Venizelos declined the invitation: "The
elections," he said, "will be a farce.  All my supporters are detained
voteless under arms, and the only votes cast will be those of the older
and more timid men."  How many supporters he had under arms the near
future was to show.  Meanwhile, he and his partizans reinforced this
reason for abstention from the polls with other arguments.

{70} King Constantine, they alleged, was guilty of unconstitutional
behaviour.  He had twice disagreed with a Government supported by a
majority of the representatives of the people, and twice within a few
months had dissolved a Parliament duly chosen by the people.  Was such
a thing ever heard in a constitutional State?  The Constitution had
been violated: openly, insolently violated.

In Greece this cry has always been among the Opposition's common
stock-in-trade: it is enough for a Minister to misapply fifty drachmas
to acquire the title of a violator of the Constitution, and nobody ever
is the wiser or the worse for it.  M. Venizelos himself had often been
accused by his opponents of aiming at the subversion of Parliamentary
Government.  But in this instance the cry was destined to have, as we
shall see, epoch-making results, and for this reason it merits serious
examination.

The King's supporters denied that any violation of the Constitution had
taken place.  The Constitution of Greece, they pointed out, gives the
Crown explicitly the right to dismiss Ministers and to dissolve
Chambers.[7]  M. Venizelos himself had, no longer ago than 5 March, at
the second sitting of the Crown Council, declared himself an adversary
of the doctrine that the Parliamentary majority is absolute, and
recognized the right of the Crown to choose another Government; "On the
other hand," he said, "the necessary consequence of the formation of a
Cabinet not enjoying a majority in the Chamber is the dissolution of
the Chamber." [8]  It was in pursuance {71} of this advice that the
King, who, as M. Venizelos on that occasion emphatically stated, "has
always absolutely respected the Constitution," [9] dissolved the
Chamber.

The only question, therefore, is about the dissolution of the Chamber
elected on 13 June, 1915, which gave M. Venizelos a majority of 56.
This action, it was alleged, violated the spirit, though not the
letter, of Constitutional Law, because the dissolved Chamber
represented the will of the people.  But, the other side retorted, it
was precisely because there was ground for believing that the
Parliamentary majority had ceased to represent the will of the people
that the King proceeded to a dissolution; and in so doing he had
excellent precedent.  His father had dissolved several Chambers
(specifically in 1902 and 1910) on the same ground, not only without
incurring any censure, but earning much applause from the Venizelist
Party.[10]  In fact, the last of those dissolutions had been carried
out by M. Venizelos himself under the following circumstances: The
General Elections of August, 1910, had given a majority to the old
parties: King George, however, in the belief that public opinion really
favoured M. Venizelos, called him to power, though he was only the
leader of a Parliamentary minority.  M. Venizelos formed a Government,
but, as the majority in Parliament obstructed his policy, he persuaded
the Sovereign to dissolve it,[11] declaring in the House (11/24
October, 1910): that "it is impossible to limit the prerogative of the
Crown to dissolve any Chamber."  Obviously, what was {72} lawful for
King George could not be unlawful for King Constantine; and the fact
that M. Venizelos's majority of 56 had since the recent elections
dwindled to 16, was reason sufficient for the belief that he no longer
represented the will of the people, even if it were conceded that the
issue of war had been clearly put before the electors who had voted for
him in June, and that, at best, a majority of 56 in an assembly of 314
was an adequate expression of the will of the people on so grave an
issue.  Events had moved so fast in those months and the situation
changed so abruptly that King Constantine would have been guilty of a
dereliction of duty had he not, by exercising his indisputable
prerogative, given the nation an opportunity to reconsider its opinion.

Sophisms suited to the fury of the times apart, the whole case of M.
Venizelos against his Sovereign rested, avowedly, on the theory,
improvised for the nonce, that the Greek Constitution is a replica of
the British--a monarchical democracy in which the monarch is nothing
more than a passive instrument in the hands of a Government with a
Parliamentary majority.[12]  It is not so, and it was never meant to be
so.  The Greek Constitution does invest the monarch with rights which
our Constitution, or rather the manner in which we have for a long time
chosen to interpret it, does not.  Among these is the right to make, or
to refrain from making war.  That was why M. Venizelos in March, 1915,
could not offer the co-operation of Greece in the Dardanelles
enterprise officially without the King's approval, and why the British
Government declined to consider his semi-official communication until
after the King's decision.  Similarly M. Venizelos's proposals for the
dispatch of Entente troops to Salonica in September, so far as that
transaction was carried on above-board, were made subject to the King's
consent.  Of course, if the King exercised this right without advice,
he would be playing the part of an autocrat; but King Constantine
always acted by the advice of the competent authority--namely, the
Chief of the General Staff.  In truth, if anyone tried to play the part
of an autocrat, it was not the King, but M. Venizelos.  His argument
seemed to be that the King should acquiesce in the view {73} which a
lay Minister took of matters military and in decisions which he arrived
at without or in defiance of technical advice.

In this again, M. Venizelos appears to have been inspired by British
example.  We saw during the War the responsibility for its conduct
scattered over twenty-three civil and semi-civil individuals who
consulted the naval and military staffs more or less as and when they
choose, and the result of it in the Gallipoli tragedy.  We saw, too, as
a by-product of this system, experts holding back advice of immense
importance because they knew it would not be well received.  The
Reports of the Dardanelles Commission condemned this method.  But it is
to a precisely similar method that the Greek General Staff objected
with such determination.  "Venizelos," they said, "does not know
anything about war.  He approaches the King with proposals containing
in them the seeds of national disaster without consulting us, or in
defiance of our advice.  Greece cannot afford to run the risk of
military annihilation; her resources are small, and, once exhausted,
cannot be replaced."  The King, relying on the right unquestionably
given to him under the terms of the Constitution, demanded from his
chief military adviser such information as would enable him to judge
wisely from the military point of view any proposal involving
hostilities made by his Premier.  It was this attitude that saved
Greece from the Gallipoli grave in March, and it was the same attitude
that saved her a second time at the present juncture.

But, in fact, at the present juncture the King acted not so much on his
prerogative of deciding about war as on the extreme democratic
principle that such decision belongs to the people, and, finding that
the Party which pushed the country towards war had only a weak
majority, he preferred to place the question before the electorate, to
test beyond the possibility of doubt the attitude of public opinion
towards this new departure.

From whatever point of view we may examine Constantine's behaviour, we
find that nothing could be more unfair than the charge of
unconstitutionalism brought against it.  M. Venizelos himself a little
later, by declaring that he aimed at the "definite elucidation of the
obligations and rights of the royal authority," through a "new {74}
Constitution," [13] unwittingly confessed that the actual Constitution
could not bear his interpretation.  As things stood, the charge might
with a better show of justice be brought against M. Venizelos, who, it
was pointed out, had violated the Constitution by inviting foreign
troops into Greek territory without the necessary Act of Parliament.[14]

Nor should it be forgotten that King Constantine had suffered
grievously both as a Greek and as a general from too punctilious an
observance of parliamentary etiquette by his father in 1897.  At that
date the policy of M. Delyannis was supported by the whole Chamber.  It
was a policy which the late Lord Salisbury very aptly summed up at the
time in the one word, "strait-waistcoat."  But, for lack of a man at
the top strong enough and courageous enough to take the responsibility
of opposing it, it was carried out: Greece rushed headlong into war
with a superior power and was smashed.  Upon King Constantine, then
Crown Prince, had devolved the tragic duty of leading the Greek army to
self-destruction, and it was upon his devoted head that afterwards the
nation visited the criminal levity of M. Delyannis.  Was he to suffer
calmly a repetition of the same catastrophe on an infinitely larger
scale--to see his country trampled under German and Bulgarian
heels--for M. Venizelos's sake?

The practical wisdom and patriotism of the King's conduct cannot be
questioned; but we should guard ourselves against exaggerating its
moral courage.  King Constantine, in turning an inattentive ear to the
warlike outpourings of the People's Chosen, knew perfectly well that he
ran no risk of wounding the people's conscience--just {75} as in
offering to lay the question before the tribunal of public opinion he
knew that he ran no risk of finding it at variance with his own.  He
could afford to act as he did, because the country trusted him
implicitly.  Writing about the middle of November, an English observer
described the situation as follows: "The people generally are afraid,
waiting and leaving everything to the King. . . .  No one now counts in
Greece but the King." [15]  And the absence of any popular murmur at
the rejection of the offer of Cyprus, to anyone who knows how deeply
popular feeling is committed to the ultimate union of that Greek island
with the mother country, speaks for itself.

This does not mean that M. Venizelos had as yet lost caste altogether.
On that fateful 5th of October his reputation as a serious statesman
among his countrymen had received a severe blow.  The idolatrous
admiration with which he had been surrounded until then gave way to
disenchantment, disenchantment to bewilderment, and bewilderment to
dismay: the national prophet from whom fresh miracles had been
expected, was no prophet at all, but a mere mortal--and an uncommonly
fallible mortal at that.  Nevertheless, while many Greeks found it hard
to pardon the Cretan politician for the ruin into which he had so very
nearly precipitated them, there were many others who still remained
under the spell of his personality.  Yet it may well be doubted
whether, had a plebiscite been taken at that moment, he would have got
anything more than a substantial minority.  Fully conscious of the
position, M. Venizelos, in spite of advice from his Entente friends to
stand his ground, boycotted the polls, and the new Parliament, returned
by the elections of 19 December, was a Parliament without an
Opposition.  M. Skouloudis remained at the helm.



[1] _White Book_, No. 45.

[2] _White Book_, No. 46.

[3] See _The Times_, 1 Nov., 1915.

[4] _Orations_, pp. 143-50.  It would hardly be credited, did it not
come out of his own mouth, that the compensations and guarantees which
M. Venizelos thought, or at least said, that Greece could obtain from
Germany in return for her neutrality (a neutrality always benevolent
towards Germany's enemies) exceeded those which the Entente had refused
to grant Greece for her active alliance!

[5] _The Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, pp. 384, 387; _Orations_, p. 266.

[6] It may not be irrelevant to note that the end of the truce
coincided with the end of the Allies' uncertainty as to whether they
would persist in the Salonica enterprise or give it up.

[7] Art. 31, 37.

[8] Extracts from Minutes in _The Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, p. 385.
Not for the first time had M. Venizelos expounded that thesis.  Here is
a speech of his on 2/15 May, 1911.

"We are accused of seeking the destruction of Parliamentary Government,
because we conceive that one of the foundations of the Government is
that those who represent the majority do everything, that it is enough
for them that they represent the majority to impose their will.  But
we, the Liberal Party, entertain an entirely opposite conception both
of the State and the Laws and of the powers of majorities, because
modern progress has proved that humanity cannot prosper so long as the
action of those in authority is not subjected to rules and restrictions
preventing every transgression or violation of justice.  We shall make
the Greeks truly free citizens, enjoying not only the rights which
emanate from the Constitutional ordinances, but also those which
emanate from all the laws.  _We shall defend them against every
tyrannical exercise of Government power derived from a majority._"

This report is taken from a panegyric on the speaker: _Eleutherios
Venizelos_, by K. K. Kosmides, D.Ph., Athens, 1915, pp. 56-7.  On p. 58
of the same work, occurs another reply by M. Venizelos to a charge of
anti-Parliamentarism, dated 14/27 Nov., 1913.

[9] _The Balkan Review, loc. cit_.  Cp. _The New Europe_, 29 March,
1917, where M. Venizelos expressly admits that "in February, 1915, the
King's action might be regarded as constitutional."

[10] _Orations_, pp. 17-8.  Cp. p. 217.

[11] His opponents then acted as he did now: to avoid exposing their
weakness, they pronounced the dissolution unconstitutional and
boycotted the new elections.  For a full account of these events see
another panegyric: _E. Venizelos: his life--his work_.  By Costa
Kairophyla, Athens, 1915, pp. 73-82.

[12] _Orations_, pp. 12-15.

[13] _Eleutheros Typos_, 23 Oct./5 Nov., 1916; _Orations_, p. 102.

[14] See Art. 90 of the Constitution.

It was in order to defend himself against this grave charge that M.
Venizelos denied in the Chamber and out of it, that he had "invited"
the Allies to Salonica.  Just as it was in order to avoid the charge of
violating International Law that Sir Edward Grey in the House of
Commons (18 April, 1916) and M. Briand in the Chamber of Deputies (20
June, 1916), affirmed that the Allies had been "invited."  From the
account of that affair already given, the reader will easily see that,
for forensic purposes, both the denial and the affirmation rest on
sufficient grounds.  The discrepancy might be removed by the
substitution of "instigated" for "invited."

[15] J. M. N. Jefferies, in the _Daily Mail_, 23 Nov., 1915.  The
testimony is all the more notable because it comes from an avowed
partisan of M. Venizelos: "the only man in Greece with a policy."




{76}

CHAPTER VII

A momentous question--upon the answer to which depended, among other
things, the fate of Greece during the War--confronted the Allies as
soon as they realized that their Balkan campaign had come to an
untimely beginning.

The dispatch of troops to Macedonia originally was based on the
agreement that M. Venizelos would get Greece to join.  Once M.
Venizelos failed to do so, the plan fell to the ground.  Again, the
object of the expedition was to rescue Servia; and Servia being already
conquered, the expedition had no longer any purpose.  Such were the
views of the British Government, and similar views were held in France
by many, including M. Delcassé, who resigned when Bulgaria's
"defection" sounded the knell of his Balkan policy.  But other French
statesmen, with M. Briand at their head, saw in Macedonia a field which
promised great glory and gain, if only the noble British nation could
be brought to understand that there were interests and sentiments at
stake higher than agreements.[1]

The process involved some talking: "I have had my interview with Briand
and Gallieni," wrote Lord Kitchener to the Prime Minister.  "As regards
Salonica it is very difficult to get in a word; they were both full of
the necessity of pushing in troops, and would not think of coming out.
They simply sweep all military difficulties and dangers aside, and go
on political lines--such as saving a remnant of Serbs, bringing Greece
in, and inducing Rumania to join." [2]

Other conferences followed, at all of which the French spoke so loudly
that the noble British nation could not possibly help hearing--_la
noble nation britannique n'est pas restée sourde_.  The truth is,
France was set on what {77} M. Delcassé now called the _mirage
balkanique_, partly from considerations of a domestic nature, chiefly
for reasons connected with the future balance of power in the Near
East--and England could not leave her there alone.  So the "_nous
resterons_" policy prevailed; and the continued presence of
Franco-British forces on Greek soil led, as it was bound to do, to
abnormal relations with the Greek Government.

The wish of the Allies was to obtain from Greece full licence for the
safe accommodation and the operations of their troops; while it was the
earnest endeavour of Greece not to let her complaisance towards one
group of belligerents compromise her in the eyes of the other.  The
little kingdom found itself between two clashing forces: the one
triumphant on land, the other dominating the sea.  But of the two the
German peril was the more imminent.  The Kaiser's legions were at
Monastir--any act that might be construed as a breach of neutrality
would bring them in a month to Athens.

M. Skouloudis--a stately octogenarian who, after refusing three times
the Premiership, had assumed power in this crisis at the King's
insistent desire because, as he said, he considered it his duty so to
do--took up the only attitude that could have been expected in the
circumstances: the attitude that was dictated by the instinct of
self-preservation.

Unlike M. Venizelos, whose mind revolved constantly about war at all
hazards: unlike other statesmen who regarded war as an eventuality to
be accepted or declined according as conditions might be favourable or
unfavourable, M. Skouloudis seemed resolutely to eliminate war from his
thoughts.

On taking office he gave the Entente Powers "most categorical
assurances of a steady determination to carry on the policy of
neutrality in the form of most sincere benevolence towards them.  The
new Ministry," he added, "adopts M. Zaimis's repeated declarations of
Greece's friendly attitude towards the Allied armies at Salonica, and
is sufficiently sensible of her true interests and of her debt to them
not to deviate for the whole world from this course, and hopes that the
friendly sentiments of those Powers towards Greece will never be
influenced by false {78} and malicious rumours deliberately put into
circulation with the object of cooling the good relations between
them."  To Servia also he expressed "in the most categorical terms
sentiments of sincere friendship and a steady determination to continue
affording her every facility and support consistent with our vital
interests." [3]

But at the same time, when told by the Servian Minister that a Servian
army might probably, pressed by the enemy, enter Greek territory, he
replied that he wished and hoped such a thing would not happen--that
Greece might not find herself under the very unpleasant necessity of
applying the Hague Rules regarding the disarmament of a belligerent
taking refuge in neutral territory.  And he repeated this statement to
the French Minister, adding, in answer to a question.  What would
Greece do if the Allied forces retired into Greek territory? that it
would be necessary to apply the Hague Rules, but that he hoped very
much the contingency would not present itself.  On being reminded of
the assurances given by his predecessor that no material pressure would
ever be exerted on the Allied forces, he replied that the Hellenic
Government nowise proposed to go back on those assurances, and hoped
that the Powers, taking into consideration the irreproachable attitude
of Greece, would be pleased to relieve her of complications and find a
solution safeguarding all interests concerned.[4]

The solution he hinted at was that the Allies should re-embark; in
which case Greece was prepared to protect the parting guests "even by
her own forces, so as to afford them the most absolute security." [5]

But, as nothing was farther from their thoughts, his explanation did
not satisfy the Allies.  M. Skouloudis was therefore obliged to give
their representatives again and again to understand that in no case
would the Hellenic Government think of exerting the least pressure, and
that, if he had alluded to the Rules regarding neutrality, he had done
so because such ought to be the official language of a State which was
and wished to remain neutral.  But from the very first he had clearly
indicated that Greece did not mean to apply those Rules: she would
confine {79} herself to a mere reminder of international principles
without in any way seeking to enforce respect for them.  Greece being
and wishing to remain neutral, could not speak officially as if she
were not, nor trumpet abroad the assurances which she had not ceased
giving the Entente Powers.  Surely they must perceive the most delicate
position in which Greece stood between the two belligerent groups, and,
given that they did not dispute, nor could dispute, her right to remain
neutral, it was reasonable and just that they should accept the natural
consequences and not demand from her impossibilities.[6]

The Entente Powers could not, of course, deny the reasonableness of
this plea; but neither could they ignore the inconveniences to
themselves that would arise from its frank recognition.  Between their
base at Salonica and the troops which had advanced to Krivolak
interposed several Greek army corps; at Salonica also Greek camps lay
among the Franco-British camps scattered round the town: these
conditions impeded organized operations.  General Sarrail, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, had nothing but praise for the
courtesy of the Greek authorities, both civil and military.  Yet not a
day passed without incidents.  He complained that obstacles were placed
in his action through a multitude of secondary details: the
Municipality claimed duties; the Railway Service did not assist as
liberally as could be wished in the work of getting off the stores
which arrived at the port.  It was necessary that the Greek troops
should be moved out of the Allies' way and leave them in full control:
privileges which no State could voluntarily grant and remain neutral;
which no army could forgo and work efficiently.  So the General, while
confessing that "we often place them in a difficult position by
demanding permissions which their virtual neutrality cannot allow them
to give," impressed on the Entente Governments the need of taking
strong measures with the Greeks.[6]

Germany would have proceeded to deeds without wasting words--beyond a
casual "Necessity knows no law."  But nations fighting for noble ideals
could not imitate Germany's cynicism.  A case had to be made out to
{80} justify coercion.  It was.  Greece did not really wish to remain
neutral.  Misled by a Germanophile Court, she only waited for a chance
of joining the enemy--of stabbing the Allies in the back.  When this
amazing theory--widely popularized by the French and English Press--was
hinted to M. Rallis by "Our Special Correspondent," on 18 November, the
Greek Minister could hardly credit his collocutor's sanity: "It is
mad!" he cried out.  "It is senseless to imagine such a thing--when you
could have the guns of your fleet levelled on our cities!"  The answer,
however--an answer the conclusiveness of which a glance at the map is
enough to demonstrate to the dimmest intelligence--fell upon
deliberately deaf ears.  The very journal which in one page recorded
it, in another wrote: "Bulgaria has gone; Greece is trembling in the
balance.  Only a display of overwhelming force on our part can hold her
steady and prevent the accession of another 500,000 men to the enemy's
strength."

That the publicists who argued thus and who, to give to their argument
greater cogency, generously added to the Greek army some 200,000 men,
were persuaded by their own reasoning, it is hard to believe without
libelling human sense.  Apart from the ocular refutation supplied by
the map, what had Greece to gain by siding with the enemies of the
Entente?  That she would lose all her islands, have her coast towns
pulverized and her population starved, was certain.  What she could get
in return, it needed a very robust imagination to suggest.  The only
countries at whose cost the Hellenic Kingdom could possibly compensate
itself for these inevitable sacrifices were Turkey and Bulgaria; and
those countries were Germany's allies.  A moment's reflection raises a
number of equally unanswerable questions: If the Greeks wanted to join
Germany, why did they not do so when the Kaiser invited them at the
very beginning of the War?  Why did they not resist the landing of the
Allies?  Why did they not attack them when they had them at their
mercy: 60,000 French and British, with the Germans and the Bulgars in
front of them, and 150,000 Greeks between them and Salonica?[8]

{81}

In this connexion the evidence of an eminent English soldier and an
eminent French statesman who visited Athens at that time to study the
situation on the spot may be cited.  To each King Constantine and M.
Skouloudis, in the course of lengthy interviews, declared that the
Allied forces had nothing to fear in Greece.  Each was convinced of
their sincerity, and of the true motives of their attitude: "They
both," reported Lord Kitchener, "seem very determined to stick to their
neutrality."  Likewise General Dousmanis, Chief of the General Staff,
and Colonel Metaxas, who were represented to the Entente publics as
Germanophile pedants, satisfied Lord Kitchener of their genuine concern
about the British sphere in the East, and startled him by pressing upon
him a plan of action "almost exactly the same as detailed in my
telegrams, and based their conclusions on the same argument almost word
for word.  They emphatically stated that there was no other way of
preventing the accomplishment of the German project." [9]  M. Denys
Cochin even went so far as to publish to the whole world that the
suspicions entertained against King Constantine had no other source
than party rancour.[10]

For the rest, a striking proof that the Entente Powers themselves did
not believe the story of the Greek Government's hostile intentions is
afforded by the fact that, instead of demanding, they deprecated the
disbandment of the Greek army.  When Lord Kitchener saw M. Skouloudis,
the latter said that the Allies' mistrust might well force Greece to
consider whether it would not be better for her to demobilize, leaving
to them all responsibility for the consequences.  Lord Kitchener, in
the presence of the British Minister, replied that, "as to some partial
demobilization, it was for Greece to decide according to her interests,
but he did not think a general demobilization advisable."  And again, a
little later on, when {82} M. Skouloudis, irritated by a fresh
exhibition of mistrust, told the French Minister that, in face of such
a state of things, nothing was left for his unhappy country but to
order at once a general demobilization, and let the Entente Powers do
what they liked to her, M. Guillemin cried out, "Ah, no.  I am
decidedly against demobilization."  Naturally: "the Greek Army," said
Sir Thomas Cuninghame, the British Military Attaché, to General
Moschopoulos.  Military Governor of Salonica, "saves and secures the
flanks and rear of the Allies." [11]

However, the story served the purpose of supplying a pretext for
pressure.  All ships carrying foodstuffs and other commodities were
held up.  In addition, Milo--an island not far from Athens--was
occupied, and the Allied Fleet was ordered to be ready, in case things
should be pushed to extremes, to open war on Greek commerce, to destroy
the Greek Fleet, and to bombard Athens, _en respectant les monuments
anciens_.[12]

Fortunately, the occasion for extreme measures, by which even the
ancient ruins might have suffered, did not arise.  General Sarrail, who
at first urged that the naval demonstration against Athens should be
proceeded with immediately, on second thoughts, prompted by nervousness
as to the safety of his troops, deprecated such action.  At the same
time, M. Skouloudis, alarmed by the blockade--Greece never has more
than a very limited food reserve--invited the Allies to state their
demands, saying that he would accede to them if it was possible to do
so.[13]

Whereupon the Allies, "ever animated by the most benevolent intentions
towards Greece, and anxious that the equivocal situation in which
events had placed her towards them should come to an end and their
relations be re-established on a basis of mutual and lasting
confidence," demanded first of all a formal assurance that in no
circumstances would the Greek troops attempt to disarm or intern the
retiring Allied troops, but that the policy of benevolent neutrality
promised would be maintained with all its consequences.  They disavowed
any wish or intention to compel the Hellenic Government to {83}
participate in the European War from which it had declared that it
meant to hold aloof.  But it was a vital necessity for them not to let
it in any way hinder the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or
compromise the security of their troops throughout the field of their
operations.  They therefore must be assured that they will obtain,
according to the promise already given by M. Zaimis, all the facilities
which they might require, notably in the port of Salonica and on the
roads and railways.  It was understood that the Entente Powers would
restore in full at the end of the War all the parts of Greek territory
which they might be obliged to occupy during the hostilities, and that
they would duly pay indemnities for all damage caused by the
occupation.[14]

M. Skouloudis, after thanking the Entente Powers for the benevolent
intentions with which they declared themselves to be animated towards
Greece, willingly repeated the assurances he had so many times already
given, that the Greek troops would in no circumstances seek to disarm
or intern the Allied troops, and that the Greek Government in its
relations with the Entente Powers would in everything hold fast to its
policy of benevolent neutrality.  He once more noted the reiterated
disavowal by the Allied Governments of any wish or intention to force
Greece into the War, and on his part disavowed any wish or intention to
hinder in any way the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or to
compromise in any way the security of their troops.  The Hellenic
Government had always kept the promises made by M. Zaimis to the very
utmost of its ability, and had no difficulty in renewing the assurance
that the Allied Governments would continue to receive all the
facilities their troops might require in the port of Salonica, and on
the roads and railways.[15]

These prefatory amenities led on 10 December to a detailed Agreement,
the Greek Government promising to move its troops out of the way and
"not to oppose by force the construction of defensive works or the
occupation of fortified points," but reserving to itself the right to
protest {84} against such operations "energetically and seriously, not
as a mere form"--a right which the Allies easily conceded[16]--and
emphatically declaring that "should the Allied troops by their
movements bring the war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would
withdraw so as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle
their differences."

The Entente Ministers expressed their satisfaction, and M. Skouloudis
expressed the hope that their Governments, convinced at last of the
Greek Government's sincerity, would not only drop coercion, but comply
with its request for financial and commercial facilities.  They
promised that all difficulties would disappear as soon as the military
authorities on the spot had given effect to the agreement; and the
French Minister repeated his Government's declaration that it would be
happy to accord Greece all financial and commercial facilities as soon
as the situation cleared.[17]



[1] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 61, 70, 75-8.

[2] Sir George Arthur's _Life of Lord Kitchener_.  Vol. III. p. 261.

[3] _White Book_, Nos. 47, 48, 49.

[4] Skouloudis's _Apantesis_, pp. 43-5.

[5] _White Book_, No. 52.

[6] _White Book_, No. 51.

[7] Sarrail, pp. 311-12; _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 198.

[8] Those were the figures on 17 Nov.--_Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III,
p. 199.  I have only seen an answer to the second of the above
questions: it is from M. Venizelos, and it is: "absent-mindedness":
"Why did not the General Staff do this, since it was to Germany's
interest that the Anglo-French should not land?  Because, immersed in
politics, it no longer took account of military matters!"--Orations, p.
140.

[9] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, pp. 202-3.

[10] See interview with M. Denys Cochin at Messina, in the _Daily
Mail_, 29 Nov., 1915.  Cp. _Le Temps_, 25 Nov.

[11] Skouloudis, _Apantesis_, pp. 4-5; _Semeioseis_, p. 46.

[12] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 71-2.

[13] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 199-203.

[14] Communication by the Entente Ministers, Athens, 10/23 Nov., 1915.

[15] Skouloudis to Entente Ministers, Athens, 11/24 Nov., 1915.

[16] "_Le Gouvernement Grec se réservait de protester; nous nous
réservions de ne pas répondre_.  (_Rires_)."  M. Briand in the _Journal
Officiel_, p. 72.

[17] _White Book_, No. 54.




{85}

CHAPTER VIII

The situation did not clear--how could it?  Of all diplomatic fictions
that of "benevolence" is perhaps the most incompatible with the grim
realities of war.

General Sarrail had from the outset been empowered to take any measures
which he might judge necessary at his discretion.  But fear of the
Greek army for a time compelled him to temper vigour with caution.
That fear decreased in proportion as the Allied contingents in
Macedonia increased; and hence a series of acts which show how the
General used his discretion.

First, he judged it necessary to blow up the bridge of Demir-Hissar.
He blew it up--thus completely cutting off the Greek forces in Eastern
Macedonia, and, incidentally, letting the enemy know that no offensive
across the Struma was contemplated by the Allies.  Next, he judged it
necessary to seize the Fort of Kara-Burnu which commands the entrance
to Salonica Harbour.  He seized it--despite a solemn engagement to the
contrary.[1]  Then he judged it necessary to occupy the town of
Florina.  He occupied it.  An appreciation of the efficacy or
expediency of these measures--beyond a passing allusion to the obvious
blunder committed by the destruction of the Demir-Hissar bridge--would
be out of place here.  For our present purpose their interest lies in
the light they throw upon the conditions, apart from the purely
military difficulties, created by the intrusion of foreign troops on
neutral soil.

Afloat the Allies were not less vigorous than ashore.  They judged it
necessary to occupy Corfu, in order to accommodate the remnants of the
Servian army that had escaped across Albania.  They occupied Corfu.
They judged it necessary to occupy Castellorizo, an islet off the coast
of Asia Minor.  They occupied Castellorizo.  They {86} judged it
necessary to occupy Suda Bay in Crete and Argostoli Bay in Cephalonia.
They occupied them.

It is worthy of note that the occupation of Castellorizo was prepared
by a local revolt stirred up by the French Consular and Naval
authorities,[2] and that the occupation of Corfu constituted a flagrant
violation of international pacts (Treaties of London, 14 Nov., 1863,
and 29 March, 1864) to which the Entente Powers were signatories, and
by virtue of which the perpetual neutrality of the island was
guaranteed as strictly as that of Belgium--a circumstance that afforded
the Central Powers an opportunity to protest against Anglo-French
contempt for the sanctity of treaties.[3]

Among other arbitrary proceedin

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