Memoirs of the Courts and Cabinets of George the Third

by Duke of Richard Plantagenet Temple Nugent Brydges Chandos Grenville Buckingham and Chandos · English · Gutenberg #20982 · 860,372 chars · public domain (US)

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Title: Memoirs of the Courts and Cabinets of George the Third

Author: Duke of Richard Plantagenet Temple Nugent Brydges Chandos Grenville Buckingham and Chandos

Release date: April 4, 2007 [eBook #20982]

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MEMOIRS OF THE COURTS AND CABINETS OF GEORGE THE THIRD ***

Produced by Paul Murray, David King, and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net. (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)

THE COURT AND CABINETS

GEORGE THE THIRD.

VOL. I.

[Illustration: George the Third.]

MEMOIRS

OF THE

COURT AND CABINETS

GEORGE THE THIRD.

FROM ORIGINAL FAMILY DOCUMENTS.

THE DUKE OF BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS,
K.G.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.

LONDON:

HURST AND BLACKETT, PUBLISHERS,
SUCCESSORS TO HENRY COLBURN,
13, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET.
1853.

LONDON:
Printed by Schulze and Co., 13, Poland Street.

INTRODUCTION.

In the selection and arrangement of the Correspondence contained in
these Volumes, the intrusion of unnecessary commentaries and political
opinions has been carefully avoided. The letters themselves are so lucid
and complete, that the interest of the publication has been left to rest
upon their details as far as possible. But as a collection of
communications of this confidential nature, written from day to day upon
passing events, must necessarily involve numerous allusions which,
intelligible at the time, are either obscure or liable to
misapprehension now, occasional notices of the principal topics and
circumstances referred to have been introduced wherever they appeared to
be required. By the help of this illustrative frame-work a certain
degree of continuity has been attempted to be preserved, so that the
reader will have no difficulty in blending these materials into the
history of the period they embrace.

Contents

1782.

The Close of Lord North's Administration--The Second Rockingham
Cabinet--Mr. Thomas Grenville's Mission to Paris--The Shelburne
Administration--Lord Temple Appointed Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland--Irish
Affairs.

1783.

The Renunciation Bill--The Fall of the Shelburne Administration--The
Cabinet Interregnum--The Coalition Ministry--Resignation of Lord Temple.

1784.

Mr. Pitt's Administration--Lord Temple Created Marquis of
Buckingham--His Private Notes on the Coalition.

1785.

The Breach Between the Marquis of Buckingham and Mr. Thomas Grenville.

1786.

Mr. W. W. Grenville Joins Mr. Pitt's Administration.

1787.

The Dawn of Free Trade--The Assembly of Notables--Affairs of
Holland--Arthur Wellesley--The Marquis of Buckingham Assumes the
Government of Ireland for the Second Time.

1788.

Irish Correspondence--The India Declaratory Bill--Trial of Warren
Hastings--Contemplated Changes in the Administration--The King's
Interference in Military Appointments--The Irish Chancellorship--The
King's Illness--Views of the Cabinet Respecting the Regency.

1782.

As no inconsiderable portion of the Correspondence contained in these
volumes relates to the structure and conduct of Cabinets, throwing light
upon public affairs from those secret recesses to which historians
rarely have access, it may be useful, by way of introduction, to glance
at certain circumstances which, during the period embraced in the work,
exercised a special influence over the Government of the country: an
influence no less directly felt in the councils of Ministers than in the
measures and combinations of the Opposition.

The history of Administration in the reign of George III. presents some
peculiarities which distinguish it in a very striking degree from that
of most other reigns. The key to these peculiarities will be found in
the personal character of the Sovereign. To that character, and its
immediate action upon political parties, may be traced, to a greater
extent than has been hitherto suspected, the parliamentary agitation and
ministerial difficulties which were spread over nearly the whole of that
long and eventful period. The means of forming an accurate judgment on
matters of this nature exist only in confidential details, such as are
disclosed in the collection of letters now for the first time laid
before the public. In order, however, to render intelligible the
allusions that are scattered through them, and to point out their real
value as materials for the political history of the time, it is
necessary to offer a few preliminary remarks on the circumstances to
which reference has been made.

George III.--whose admirable business habits and inflexible integrity
inspired the highest deference and attachment amongst the personal
friends he admitted to his confidence--was remarkable in no one
particular more than in his jealousy of the prerogatives of the Crown.
He carried his zeal in that matter so far as even to draw upon himself
the charge of desiring to strain the rights of the Crown beyond
constitutional limitations. But as these limitations have never been
accurately defined, and as it has always been difficult to prescribe the
precise privileges which would relieve the Sovereign, on the one hand,
from being a mere state puppet, without giving him, on the other, too
great a preponderance of executive power, we need not discuss the
justice of an imputation which refers to the general complexion of the
King's views rather than to any particular acts of arbitrary authority.
That it was the great aim of His Majesty's life to preserve the royal
prerogatives from encroachment is undeniable; but it should be
remembered that when George III. ascended the throne, the relative
powers and responsibilities of the Sovereign and his advisers were not
so clearly marked or so well understood as they are at present; and if
His Majesty's jealousy of the rights which he believed to be vested in
his person led him to trespass upon the independence of his servants, or
to resist what he considered the extreme demands of the Parliament, it
was an error against the excesses of which our Constitution affords the
easiest and simplest means of redress.

Intimately conversant with official routine, and thoroughly master of
the details of every department of the Government, he acquired a
familiar knowledge of all the appointments in the gift of the Ministry,
and reserved to himself the right of controlling them. Nor was this
monopoly of patronage confined to offices of importance or considerable
emolument; it descended even to commissions in the army, and the
disposal of small places which custom as well as expediency had
delegated to the heads of those branches of service to which they
belonged. His Majesty's pertinacity on these points frequently
precipitated painful embarrassments of a personal nature, entailed much
disagreeable correspondence, and sometimes produced misunderstandings
and alienations of far greater moment than the paltry considerations in
which they originated. Amongst the numerous instances in which His
Majesty insisted on the preservation of patronage in his own hands, one
of the most conspicuous was his stipulation with the Marquis of
Rockingham for unconditional power over the nomination of the household,
at a moment when the exigency of public affairs compelled him to
surrender other points of infinitely greater importance. We shall find
in the course of the following letters that His Majesty's desire to
advance the interests of particular individuals interfered seriously, on
some occasions, with the convenience of the public service.

The same spirit guided His Majesty's conduct, as far as the forms of the
Constitution would permit, in his choice of Ministers. He had strong
personal likings and antipathies, and rather than consent to have a
Ministry imposed upon him consisting of men he disapproved, he would
have suffered any amount of difficulty or inconvenience. He prevailed
upon Lord North to remain in office three years in the face of sinking
majorities, and against his Lordship's own wishes, for the sole purpose
of keeping out the Whigs, whom he regarded with a feeling of the
bitterest aversion. Good reasons, no doubt, might be suggested for this
passionate abhorrence of the Whigs, who, independently of party
antecedents, had given His Majesty much cause of uneasiness, by their
strenuous opposition to the measures of his favourite Ministers, and by
their alliance with his son. So deeply was this feeling rooted in His
Majesty's mind, that when a junction with that party seemed to be all
but inevitable in March, 1778, he threatened to abdicate rather than be
"trampled on by his enemies." Four years afterwards he explicitly
repeated the same threat under the excitement of an adverse division;
and it was supposed by those who were best acquainted with the firmness
of his resolution that, had he been forced to extremities, he would have
carried his menace into execution.

His conduct to his Ministers was equally steadfast where he bestowed his
confidence, and stubborn where he withheld it. There were certain
questions upon which he was known to be inexorable, and upon which it
was useless to attempt to move him. Of these the most prominent were the
American War, Catholic Emancipation, and Parliamentary Reform. Whether
his judgment was right or wrong on these questions, it was fixed and
unalterable; and the Ministers who took office under George III. knew
beforehand the conditions of their service, so far as these paramount
articles of faith were concerned. It was the knowledge of this rigorous
trait in His Majesty's character, that made the Marquis of Rockingham
insist upon submitting to the King a programme of the policy he intended
to pursue before he would consent to enter upon the Government in 1782.
His Majesty desired nothing more than a list of the persons Lord
Rockingham wished to propose for the Cabinet; but Lord Rockingham
thought that something more was necessary to his own security and
independence. He considered that when a statesman undertakes the duties
of Administration, he assumes a responsibility irrespective of the
Sovereign, and that his duty requires of him that he shall lay before
His Majesty, in the first instance, as the basis of negotiation, an
outline of the measures by which alone he can conduct the affairs of the
kingdom with honour and success. In the adoption of this clear and
candid line of procedure there was no coercion on the Sovereign, who was
free to accept or reject the propositions, while the constitutional
principle at stake was acknowledged and vindicated on both sides.

His Majesty's immobility on certain questions had the practical effect
of literally placing them in abeyance in the councils of his Ministers.
As it was found to be impossible to form a strong Administration that
should unanimously agree with His Majesty, and at the same time possess
the confidence of the country, no alternative remained but to enter into
a tacit arrangement, by which those questions were to be dropped out of
the list of what were called Cabinet measures, each Minister being left
at liberty to vote upon them as he pleased, without being held to have
compromised the opinions of the Government. Had it not been for such an
arrangement as this, Pitt, who was pledged to the relief of the
Catholics from their disabilities, could never have held office under
George III. And thus was introduced into the practice of Administration
a principle which is undoubtedly a violation of its theory, and which,
taking advantage of a dangerous precedent, has been acted upon since
with less justification.

In the invention of this escape for the conscience of the King through
the side vent of "open questions," the direct influence of the Sovereign
upon the councils of the Administration may be clearly traced. There
were no other means of reconciling His Majesty to the appointment of a
Cabinet, demanded by the voice of the Parliament and the country. The
dilemma was obvious. There was no choice between the rejection of
Ministers who held certain doctrines adverse to His Majesty's
convictions, and compromise upon the points of difference. When it was
found impossible to conduct the Government of the kingdom with a Cabinet
that did not possess the popular confidence, the Sovereign was reduced
to the necessity of treating with men who did possess that confidence,
whether he agreed with them in opinion or not. In our own times, and
under most of the Sovereigns who have filled the throne since our
Constitution may be said to have been settled, there could be no great
difficulty in a case of this kind. Ministers undertaking office under
such circumstances would be responsible to the country for their policy,
and the Sovereign would feel himself at once relieved by that
responsibility from all further anxiety. But George III. took that
responsibility upon himself in reference to the great measures that
occupied the public mind; and when, by the exigency of circumstances,
Ministers were pressed upon him from whose views he dissented, he
accepted them upon conditions which restrained the action of the
Cabinet, as a whole, in certain directions, but left its members
individually free and unpledged. Such was the origin of "open
questions." It was a compromise on both sides; and of course it must
always depend upon the extent to which this compromise is carried, and
the necessity under which it is resorted to, whether it should be
regarded as a sacrifice of principle on the part of the Minister who
submits to it.

Another novelty originating in this reign, out of the same peculiar
state of things, and resting upon a similar theory of expediency, was
that of the formation of a Coalition Administration, in which party
differences were merged in a common agreement upon a general line of
policy. As considerable light is thrown upon this memorable incident in
the course of these volumes, it is unnecessary to dwell upon it here. It
will be abundantly elucidated in the proper place. For the present, it
is sufficient to refer to the junction, in a composite Ministry of
hostile statesman, as one of the singular results flowing from that
necessity of adaptation to circumstances which was rendered unavoidable
by the unyielding character of the Sovereign.

There were other circumstances which, combined with the personal
dispositions of the King, led to the strenuous assertion in this reign
of the prerogatives of the Executive against the interference and
control of the aristocracy and the Parliament. From the date of the
Revolution up to the accession of George III., the independent authority
of the Crown can scarcely be said to have had any practical
force--scarcely, indeed, to have had any existence. The Government of
the country was essentially Parliamentary. It was part of the compact
with William III. A foreign dynasty had been established, and the people
naturally looked to the protection of their domestic interests against
the possible preponderance of extrinsic sympathies in the reigning
power. Under William III., the claim of the United Provinces upon the
special regard of the Sovereign was the object of national jealousy; and
when the House of Brunswick ascended the throne, popular vigilance was
transferred to Hanover. The first two Princes of that House who ruled in
England scarcely spoke our language, and were so ignorant of our
Constitution and our customs, that they could not be admitted with
safety to an active participation in the Government. The Whigs, who had
brought about these changes, preserved in their own hands the entire
authority of the State. The Sovereign was merely the motionless
representative of the monarchical principle. But George III. was not an
alien. Born in the country, educated in its language and its usages, and
inspired by an ardent devotion to Protestantism, he entered life under
auspices that attracted at once towards the Crown an amount of
popularity which it had never enjoyed under his predecessors. The
qualities and dispositions of the King were favourable to the
cultivation of these opportunities. Without being profoundly versed in
the philosophy of character, he possessed a remarkable aptitude in the
discrimination of persons suited to his purposes. He had considerable
skill (to which Lord Shelburne bears special testimony) in extracting
the opinions of others, and turning the results to account. If his mind
was not vigorous and original, it was active and adaptive, inquisitive
and watchful. If his judgment was not always sound, his convictions were
strong, and the tenacity of his resolution commanded submission. An
accomplished linguist, fond of business, and having some talents as a
writer, which enabled him to express his meaning with facility and
clearness, he was well qualified to avail himself of the political
accidents which contributed to revive and strengthen the royal
prerogative.

The Whigs themselves helped mainly to bring about this struggle between
the Crown and the Parliament, or rather between the Crown and the "great
families," to use Mr. Canning's phrase, who had hitherto absorbed the
power and patronage of the State. United in principle, they were divided
by personal jealousies. The long possession of office had given a sort
of impunity to their pretensions; and believing that they held a
perpetual tenure of Administration, they were weak enough, at every new
ministerial change, to contend amongst themselves for the prizes. These
internal dissensions weakened and scattered them, and prepared the way
for those experiments which were made, during the early years of George
III., to conduct the Government without their aid.

The effects were felt in an entire change of system. The accession of
George III. was followed by a _coup-d'état_, which displaced the able
Cabinet that had been organized by the elder Pitt, to make room for the
Earl of Bute, who had the credit of being the author of the scheme, and
who was utterly incapable of carrying it out. Independently of his want
of the requisite qualifications as a statesman, there were other
objections of a private nature to Lord Bute, which rendered it
impossible that he could ostensibly continue to guide the councils of
the Ministry, however he might be permitted, or retained, to influence
them from behind the curtain. But his short essay at Government had
sufficiently disturbed the _ancien régime_, to leave in the King's hands
the power of choosing his Ministers without reference to popular clamour
or the will of Parliament. The consequence was, a rapid series of
Ministerial mutations, throughout which the contest for power was
maintained on both sides with so fierce a spirit, that during the first
ten years of the reign of George III., there were no less than seven
successive Administrations.

It was not till Lord North was called to the head of the Ministry, in
1770, that the public uneasiness was allayed, and a Cabinet of the
King's own choice was founded in security. Lord North was an especial
favourite with the King, whose extraordinary regard for him originated
in the promptitude with which he responded to His Majesty's appeal, at a
moment of serious embarrassment, when the Duke of Grafton unexpectedly
threw up the Government, and Lord North consented to undertake it. "I
love you as a man of worth, as I esteem you as a Minister," writes the
King to him on one occasion; "your conduct at a critical moment I can
never forget." The Whigs were readily reconciled to Lord North's
appointment, because he was not mixed up in their differences. They
preferred a Minister who had no alliances amongst them to one of
themselves, whose elevation would have produced discontents in the camp.
At first there was a show of dissatisfaction, and some attempts were
made to foment the popular passions; but the dignified firmness of the
Sovereign, and the moderate bearing of the favourite, speedily
tranquillized the public mind, and enabled Lord North to carry on the
Government with energy and success.

In his private character, Lord North was irreproachable; as a debater,
he displayed some valuable qualities--patience and endurance, facility
of resources on occasions of emergency, great calmness and courage, and
a playful wit, which never startled by its brilliancy, but seldom failed
of its point. He betrayed no ostentation or vainglory in his position;
never offended by any undue exhibition of the powers he wielded; and
restricted himself severely to the discharge of his duties as an adviser
of the Crown, deprecating the title of Prime Minister, which he declared
was an office unknown to the Constitution of this country. As a
statesman, he never achieved a high or distinguished reputation. The
American war was the blot upon his career; nor can even his devotion to
the Sovereign entirely excuse him for remaining in office at His
Majesty's entreaty to pursue a course of colonial policy which his
reason and his conscience disapproved. This was a political fault, which
no circumstances can palliate. Others have done worse, no doubt, from
meaner motives; but the mere desire of serving the King does not absolve
the Minister from censure for having acted contrary to his own
convictions on a question of such grave importance.

Lord North continued to retain the royal favour until he entered into
the coalition with the Whigs. This was a step the King could not
forgive. No extremity could reconcile him to a measure so repulsive to
his feelings. Yet the coalition, after all, was more discreditable to
the Whigs than to Lord North, who may be pardoned for accepting it as a
tribute to his personal weight, and a recantation, in some sort, of all
the odium the Whigs had industriously heaped upon him during the whole
period of his Administration. If they really believed him to be the base
and dangerous person they had all along described him to be, the shame
was theirs for consenting to associate themselves with him, and to work
under him in the Government.

The Administration of Lord North lasted for twelve years--from 1770 to
1782. The most important consequence it effected, so far as political
parties were concerned, was to throw the Whigs into opposition, and to
draw the Tories into closer relations with the throne. This complete
exchange of position exactly suited the principles of the two great
factions; the loyalty and courtly aspirations of the Tories (now that
all hope of restoring the Stuarts was at an end) rendering them highly
acceptable in the councils of the monarch, while the popular doctrines
of the Whigs pointed to the benches of the Opposition as the appropriate
place for a party which is always more usefully employed in representing
the people than in exercising the functions of Government. Sixty years
elapsed before the Whigs recovered the ground which they had lost under
the Ministry of Lord North.

The American war--for the management of which the severest reproaches
were cast upon the Government--the state of Ireland, and Parliamentary
Reform, were the principal public questions that agitated the term of
Lord North's Administration. Amongst the Whigs who took a prominent part
in these proceedings were the Grenvilles. Connected by marriage with the
Pitt family, and distinguished by their own hereditary claims and high
talents, they exerted as conspicuous an influence out of office as they
had previously done when they had the reins of Government in their
hands. It will be necessary to retrace briefly the political heraldry of
the Grenvilles for the purpose of bringing the reader acquainted with
the character of the three brothers whose intimate correspondence forms
the substance of these volumes.

Richard Grenville succeeded his brother in the Earldom of Temple in
1752, and took an active part in the Administration of the elder Pitt
(Lord Chatham), who was married to his sister, Lady Hesther, the mother
of the "Great Commoner." He resigned office with Pitt in 1761, on the
question of the war with Spain. This circumstance estranged him from his
political connection with his only brother, George Grenville, who
remained in office under Lord Bute, as Treasurer of the Navy. Lord
Temple, espousing the cause of Wilkes (for which he was dismissed from
his Lieutenancy of the county of Bucks) continued in opposition till he
was finally reconciled to his brother in 1765. He afterwards had a
serious difference with Pitt on the formation of the Cabinet in 1766;
but a reconciliation having been effected between them in 1768, they
subsequently acted in concert except upon the taxation of America, Lord
Temple invariably supporting the policy of his brother and the Stamp
Act.

George Grenville had been educated for the bar, and entered Parliament
for the borough of Buckingham at the instance of his uncle, Lord Cobham;
joined the Administration in 1744, as a Lord of the Admiralty,
afterwards as a Lord of the Treasury, then as Treasurer of the Navy, and
continued in office at intervals till 1762, when, separating himself
from Lord Temple and Mr. Pitt, he joined Lord Bute as Secretary of
State. On the resignation of Lord Bute in 1763, he became First Lord of
the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, remaining at the head of
the Cabinet till his dismissal in 1765, after which he never again
accepted office.

He left three sons, George, Thomas, and William Wyndham, who variously
distinguished themselves in the public service, and whose letters,
chiefly those of the last, in all respects the ablest and most
celebrated, constitute the bulk of the following pages.

George Grenville succeeded to the title of Earl Temple on the death of
his uncle, and was afterwards created Marquis of Buckingham, and was
father of the late Duke of Buckingham. He twice filled the office of
Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.

Thomas Grenville, who died recently at an advanced age, filled several
high offices in the State, and accumulated one of the most splendid
libraries in the kingdom.

William Wyndham Grenville, afterwards Lord Grenville, was one of the
most eminent statesmen of the reign of George III., and, surviving all
his great contemporaries, died in 1834. "The endowments of his mind,"
observes Lord Brougham, "were all of a useful and commanding sort--sound
sense, steady memory, vast industry. His acquirements were in the same
proportion valuable and lasting--a thorough acquaintance with business
in its principles and in its details; a complete mastery of the science
of politics as well theoretical as practical; of late years a perfect
familiarity with political economy, and a just appreciation of its
importance; an early and most extensive knowledge of classical
literature, which he improved instead of abandoning, down to the close
of his life; a taste formed upon these chaste models, and of which his
lighter compositions, his Greek and Latin verses, bore testimony to the
last. His eloquence was of a plain, masculine, authoritative cast, which
neglected if it did not despise ornament, and partook in the least
possible degree of fancy, while its declamation was often equally
powerful with its reasoning and its statement. He was in this greatest
quality of a statesman pre-eminently distinguished, that, as he neither
would yield up his judgment to the clamour of the people, nor suffer
himself to be seduced by the influence of the Court, so would he never
submit his reason to the empire of prejudice, or own the supremacy of
authority or tradition." The character is accurately and justly
discriminated; but, however fully this searching panegyric is sustained
and justified by the public acts and recorded labours of Lord Grenville,
we must turn to his correspondence with Lord Temple for the complete
development of that sagacity and sound judgment, that intimate knowledge
of public affairs, and that remarkable comprehensiveness of view and
lucidity of statement, by which he was distinguished above his
contemporaries in an age of great political characters. This
correspondence, extending over a long period of years, is not less
remarkable for the constancy with which it was carried on than for the
minuteness of its details, and the freedom of its revelations. Written
with the ease of familiar intercourse, and in that confidential spirit
which was the exponent of one of the most touching attachments that ever
bound one man to another, it is no less valuable as a close, running
commentary on the events of the day, lighting up in its course the
hidden springs of parliamentary action and the policy of cabinets, than
it is fascinating from the teeming evidences with which it abounds of a
warm heart and a highly disciplined and accomplished mind.

The Correspondence commences in 1782, when Lord North, sinking under the
odium of the American war, found his small majorities rapidly
diminishing from 22 to 19, then to the vanishing point of 1, and finally
to a minority of 16. Every incident connected with the war, the taxes,
parliamentary reform, and all other questions upon which it was possible
to raise a discussion, were seized upon by the opposition to harass the
Ministry. The total surrender of York Town by Lord Cornwallis, with the
whole army under his command, to Washington, and of the British vessels
in the harbour to the French Admiral de Grasse in the October of 1781,
awakened universal indignation; and, when Parliament met in November, it
became evident that, however resolved the King or the Government might
be to persevere in their policy, the doom of the Administration was near
at hand. Amendments to the Address, pointing ominously to a change of
counsels, were moved in both houses by Lord Shelburne and Mr. Fox; but
nothing further was done till after the Christmas recess, with the
exception of an announcement that Ministers had resolved not to send a
fresh army to replace that surrendered by Lord Cornwallis.

About this time, very early in the session, a motion was contemplated on
the subject, the object of which, as may be gathered from the following
notes of the Marquis of Rockingham, was to relieve Lord Cornwallis from
the disgrace that impended over him, and to throw the real
responsibility upon Ministers. The Marquis of Rockingham, desirous of
proceeding upon more certain information than had at that time been
received, appears to have advised a little delay, and to have been of
opinion that if any motion were to be brought forward at that moment it
ought to have taken the shape of a motion for inquiry. It is evident
that the Marquis of Rockingham was already collecting his friends about
him. The name of Lord Rockingham's correspondent does not appear, but,
from a subsequent allusion, it may be presumed that these notes were
addressed to the Duke of Chandos.

THE MARQUIS OF ROCKINGHAM TO THE DUKE OF CHANDOS.

My Lord,

Your Grace does me much honour in the communication of the
thoughts you entertain of bringing forward some matters of
business in the House of Lords.

I shall be very happy to concur in opinion with your Grace, but
I must say that I cannot at present think that there is anything
come to our knowledge in regard to the actual conduct of Lord
Cornwallis, as commander of a British army in America, which
calls for the honour of a vote of thanks from the House of
Lords.

The fatal event of the army under his Lordship's command, having
been reduced to the situation of being obliged to lay down their
arms and surrender prisoners of war, naturally requires that an
explanation or justification should precede anything that could
be declaratory of approbation.

As I understand your Grace's proposition, I conceive your
intentions would be, that in thanking Lord Cornwallis for his
general conduct, you would at the same time state, that the
plans he _was directed_ to pursue and which had been so fatal,
were _highly censurable_.

An inquiry into _the causes_ of the loss of that army might
certainly be a very proper and becoming measure; and I have very
little, or rather no doubt that the blame and censure would fall
heavy on many of His Majesty's Ministers, if such an inquiry was
taken up, and tried by an uninfluenced or _undeluded_ jury.

There is a particular circumstance, which possibly, as your
Grace has been out of town, may not have come to your knowledge.
I understand that Lord Cornwallis and all the officers of the
army captured at York Town and Gloucester, _are under a parole
of honour, and on their faith neither to say or do anything
injurious to the interests of the United States or armies of
America, or their allies, until exchanged_.

Your Grace will recollect, that in the Articles of Capitulation,
much doubt has been held in regard to _the propriety_ of one of
the articles, whereby Lord Cornwallis had left some Americans
(who had been in or had joined our army) to be at the mercy of
the civil authority in America.

Many Lords will think that some explanation of that conduct in
Lord Cornwallis is necessary; and I do not conceive that any
explanation could at present be got from Lord Cornwallis.

The Duke of Richmond having called upon me this morning, I had
the honour to go with his Grace to your Grace's house, hoping
that you were arrived in London. The Duke of Richmond will be
early at the House of Lords to-morrow, and intends to desire the
House to be summoned for Monday next, in order to make some
inquiry in regard to the execution of Colonel Harris, at
Charlestown, in America. I will also be early at the House of
Lords to-morrow, and I shall then hope to have the opportunity,
along with the Duke of Richmond, of having the honour of some
more discourse upon the subject matter of your Grace's letter,
and that it will not impede your Grace's intentions of some
conversation in the House, on the loss of a great army.

I have the honour to be, with great regard,

Your Grace's most obedient and most humble servant,

Rockingham.

Grosvenor Square,
Wednesday, P.M. near Five o'clock,
Jan. 30th, 1782.

THE MARQUIS OF ROCKINGHAM TO THE DUKE DE CHANDOS.

My Lord,

Having not gone to dinner till rather late, and my company
having staid with me till just now, I have not been able to
return an answer to your Grace's very obliging letter as soon as
I otherwise should have done. It also prevented my being able to
profit of the honour you proposed to me of calling here this
evening.

I will call at the Duke of Richmond's before two o'clock
to-morrow, and I hope that his Grace and I shall have the honour
of meeting your Grace at the House of Lords, between two and
three o'clock; I should imagine, any time before three o'clock
will afford us time for the honour of some conversation
together.

I have the honour to be, with great regard,

Your Grace's most obedient and most humble servant,

Rockingham.

Grosvenor Square.
Wednesday night, past Nine o'clock,
Jan. 30th. 1782

THE MARQUIS OF ROCKINGHAM TO LORD TEMPLE.

My dear Lord,

I felt myself much honoured by the very kind intimation which
you sent to me by Mr. T. Grenville, that your Lordship would not
be unwilling to come to town, to attend in the House of Lords,
in case any matter was likely to come on, which might appear to
me to be of importance in the present miserable state of the
affairs of this country.

I should have wrote to your Lordship to have apprized you of the
motions intended by the Duke of Richmond on the subject of the
execution of Colonel Harris in Charlestown in North America, and
of the proclamation which had in consequence been issued by
General Green. I was very doubtful in regard to the _probable
day_ on which the business might come to be discussed.

On the Duke of Richmond's first mentioning the subject, it came
out that the Ministers at last acknowledged that they had no
official information; but as a vessel had arrived from New York,
and some officers had also arrived from Charlestown on Friday or
Saturday last, I thought it probable that on _Monday_ or
_yesterday_ we might have heard that they had got _official
information_, and that possibly some papers would be to be laid
before the House, and the discussion of the matter would then
have been fixed for some day, and regularly proceeded upon.

The event was different: they continued to say that they had no
official information, but chose to enter into a justification of
the whole proceeding, in part urging some accounts which they
said had been in a Pennsylvanian Gazette.

I am now to inform your Lordship, that the Duke of Chandos, who
had thrown out an idea of inquiring into the causes of the loss
and capture of Earl Cornwallis and his army, has been wished and
desired to move it on Thursday next.

The Duke of Richmond, the Duke of Chandos, and Duke of
Manchester, and some friends, have been here this morning, and
have prepared the enclosed motion for the inquiry, and also
motions for papers which would be necessary. Lord Shelburne and
Lord Camden have been acquainted with the intention; the Duke of
Grafton is also in town; so that I should imagine the business
will be well supported. I have no expectation of any success in
the House of Lords; but upon such a calamity and national
disgrace, it surely will become us to propose to bring on an
inquiry. Perhaps we may learn whether the Ministers intend to
throw the blame either on their Commander-in-Chief, General H.
Clinton, or on Earl Cornwallis, or (what some suppose), on Lord
Greaves. The public at large have a right to know whether the
real cause has not arose from the neglect, inability, or some
other cause, in His Majesty's Ministers.

As the business is now fixed for Thursday next, I have taken the
liberty of apprizing your Lordship by a messenger, who I hope
will arrive before your Lordship goes to bed to-night.

I wish I could have wrote earlier. I shall be very happy in the
honour of seeing your Lordship, which I hope may be soon, even
if your Lordship could not at this time come to London.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and regard,

Your Lordship's most obedient and obliged humble servant,

Rockingham.

Grosvenor Square,
Tuesday, Four o'clock,
Feb. 5th, 1782.

On the 22nd of February, General Conway moved an Address to the King,
imploring His Majesty to abandon the war. After a protracted debate,
which lasted till two o'clock in the morning, the Ministers found
themselves in an alarming majority of 1. But they persevered in the face
of these disasters, and, sustained in office by the tenacity of the
King, refused to submit to the constitutional warning of Parliament.
Three months before, the Duke of Richmond, writing to Lord Rockingham,
anticipated the obstinacy of the Cabinet, expressing his conviction,
that "no essential change of measures was meant, and none of men if it
could be avoided. When I say the Ministry," he added, "I mean the King;
for his servants are the merest servants that ever were."

Nor was it only by protecting an unpopular Ministry that His Majesty
showed his resolution to exercise his prerogative in direct opposition
to public opinion. It was in the midst of these accumulating defeats and
strong expressions of popular feeling, that His Majesty raised Lord
George Germain to the peerage with the title of Viscount Sackville, in
open indifference to the fact that his Lordship had been dismissed from
the army by the sentence of a court-martial, and declared incapable of
serving His Majesty in any military capacity, in consequence of his
conduct at the battle of Minden. To such proceedings as these Walpole
refers, when he observes at this time that "the power of the Crown has
increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished; and it is
diminished a good deal indeed." The diminution of its power, however,
was visible only in the spirited resistance of Parliament, in the motion
of Lord Carmarthen in the Upper House, that it was derogatory to the
honour of the House of the Lords, that any person labouring under so
heavy a sentence of a court-martial should be recommended to the Crown
as worthy of a peerage, and in the successive motions which were brought
forward in the Commons to force the Ministry to resign.

General Conway renewed his motion on the war on the 27th, and achieved a
complete triumph, his minority of 1 being converted in five days into a
majority of 19. But Lord North still clung to office, and it was not
till the 6th of March, when he was beaten by a majority of 16 on the
subject of the taxes, that he began to betray symptoms of a retreat. On
the 8th the motion on the war was renewed, when Ministers, collecting
the whole force of placemen and contractors, obtained a majority of 10,
which was reduced afterwards to 9 on a vote of confidence. The crisis
had now arrived. The Earl of Surrey had given notice in the Lords of a
motion to the effect that Ministers no longer possessed the confidence
of the country, when Lord North entered the House, and informed their
Lordships that His Majesty had come to a determination to make an entire
change of Administration.

This was on the 19th of March. But so far back as the 11th His Majesty
had been in negotiation with the Marquis of Rockingham, through the
agency of Lord Chancellor Thurlow, who detained his Lordship in the
House for an hour and a half after it had adjourned to converse with
him, by His Majesty's desire, upon the practicability of forming an
Administration "on a broad bottom." The negotiation with Thurlow spread
over an entire week, and entirely failed on the plan proposed by His
Majesty, who wished to limit Lord Rockingham in the first instance to
the nomination of a Cabinet whose policy should lie over for future
consideration. "I must confess," observes Lord Rockingham, in one of his
letters to the Lord Chancellor, "that I do not think it an advisable
measure, first to attempt to form a Ministry by arrangement of
office--afterwards to decide upon what principles or measures they are
to act."

The day this letter was written Lord North resigned; and in two days
afterwards His Majesty renewed the negotiation with Lord Rockingham,
finally agreeing to the whole of his propositions, and reserving only
the household in his own hands. While these negotiations were in
progress, Lord Temple wrote to Lord Rockingham, expressing his earnest
hope that the "cards should be dealt only into those hands where he so
much wished them, from every motive of public and private regard."
Before the end of the month the cards _were_ dealt into the hands in
which Lord Temple wished to see them, and the new Ministry was
completed, with Lord Rockingham as First Lord of the Treasury; Lord
Shelburne and Mr. Fox as Secretaries of State; Lord John Cavendish,
Chancellor of the Exchequer; Admiral Keppel, at the head of the
Admiralty; General Conway (much to the King's dissatisfaction), at the
Horse Guards; with the additional strength of the Dukes of Richmond and
Grafton, and Lords Camden and Ashburton, Burke, Sheridan, and Colonel
Barré, in other offices; Thurlow (the only Tory in the Cabinet) still
continuing as Lord Chancellor.

One of the earliest measures of the new Government was to negotiate a
peace with America; and Mr. Thomas Grenville was appointed upon a
mission for that purpose to Paris, to meet Dr. Franklin. The history of
that mission is contained in a series of deeply interesting letters,
which, independently of the flood of light they throw upon the American
business, possess a permanent value as illustrations of the personal
characters of the writers (especially those of Sheridan, to whose
rashness Mr. Grenville makes express allusion), and as showing that,
even in office, the Whigs were not united amongst themselves. The
materials of which the Cabinet was formed, being composed of the
Rockingham, and the Chatham, or Shelburne Whigs--two sections of that
party which had never cordially coalesced--was not calculated to work
together; but it could not have been anticipated that their personal
jealousies would have taken a shape so dangerous as these letters
disclose.

It is clear, from the singular facts revealed in this Correspondence,
that, while an ostensible Minister was dispatched to Paris by the
general action of the Government, with the sanction of the King, to
negotiate terms with the American Minister, Lord Shelburne had taken
upon himself to appoint another negotiator, who was not only not to act
in concert with Mr. Grenville, but whose clandestine mission seems to
have been expressly intended to thwart and embarrass him, and whose
appointment was without the approval, or even the knowledge, of the
Cabinet. How far the King may have secretly supported Lord Shelburne in
this breach of faith with his colleagues, we are left to conjecture; but
the intriguing character ascribed to His Majesty by Lord Shelburne
himself, justifies, to some extent, the suspicion that a proceeding so
bold and so full of hazard to the Whig Administration, was not adopted
upon the sole responsibility of the Minister. Lord Shelburne said of the
King, that he "possessed one art beyond any man he had ever known; for
that by the familiarity of his intercourse he obtained your confidence,
procured from you your opinion of different public characters, and then
availed himself of this knowledge to sow dissensions." (Nicholl's
Recollections and Reflections during the reign of George III.) This
opinion, just or unjust (and there is no great reason to doubt its
justice), was founded upon extensive personal experiences, of which this
sinister attempt to break up the union of the Cabinet may have been one.

MR. SHERIDAN TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

St. James's, May 21st, 1782.

Dear Grenville,

You are certainly one of the best negotiators that ever
negotiated; and so says the King, your royal master, who is
going to send you the fine silver box which you receive with
this, and which, with great envy, I learn is your property; and
which, if the serious modesty of your former despatch could have
been seriously construed, you would not have been entitled to.
Though I have not written before, have not my punctuality and
remembrance appeared conspicuous in the newspapers you receive?
These tell you all the private news, and all that is important
of public you will have heard before you receive this; so this
must be a very short letter, and indeed the messenger is almost
going; and Charles has been writing to you, which is another
reason for my saying very little. Mr. Oswald talks very
sanguinely about Franklin, and says he is more open to you than
he has been to any one; but he is a Scotsman, and belonging to
Lord Shelburne. If the business of an American treaty seemed
likely to prosper in your hands, I should not think it
improbable that Lord Shelburne would try to thwart it. Oswald
had not yet seen Lord Shelburne; and by his cajoling manner to
_our secretary_ and eagerness to come to him, I do not feel much
prejudiced in his favour; but probably I judge wrongly whenever
the other secretary is concerned, for I grow suspicious of him
in every respect, the more I see of every transaction of his.

I am just told that the messenger is ready, so more in my next.
There is no particular news. The Dutch are got back to the
Texel. Lord Howe still off there, but nothing likely to come of
it. Sir G. Rodney, notwithstanding his victory, is to be
recalled, and Pigott is sailed. This I think very magnanimous in
the Ministers or very impolitic; events must justify, but it is
putting themselves too much in their power.

We had a good illumination for this news. You see how we go on
in Parliament by the papers; we were bullied outrageously about
our poor Parliamentary Reform; but it will do at last, in spite
of you all.

Yours ever sincerely,

R.B. Sheridan.

MR. FOX TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE

Dear Grenville,

If your letter of the 10th a little damped me in my hopes of
good effects from your journey, that of the 19th, which I have
just received, together with Mr. Oswald's conversation, has very
much revived me. I send away the messenger, for fear of the
delays which Cabinets are so apt to cause; but I hope you will
hear from us again very soon, with authority to offer the
Independence as unconditionally as you can wish. Mr. Oswald says
that Dr. Franklin is much inclined to confide in you; if so, ask
him at once in what manner we can act so as to gain a
substantial, if not a nominal, peace with America; and you may
depend upon all my influence in support of his advice.

I hope you will not be disappointed at our adhering to our first
ideas for the proposition _we_ are to make, rather than offering
concessions. If _we_ are to offer, we think it is not for us to
throw concessions at their head; but if they do not like our
proposals, it is for _them_ to ask such as may be reasonable. If
what they propose is really so, there is no doubt of our
complying; and if it is not, or they should refuse to make any
offer at all, it will surely be clear who was most in earnest in
his wishes for peace; and we must make the best advantage we can
of our situation, about which I begin to be more sanguine than I
used to do.

From your letter, there are surely great hopes of detaching
America; and from those we have just received from Petersburg,
there appears the most favourable disposition in that quarter to
enforce a peace with Holland; or if that cannot be, to take a
decisive part. And I know how much this disposition will be
increased, if we can fully convince His Imperial Majesty that
the failure of your negotiation is not our fault.

With regard to all your diffidence of yourself, we laugh at it.
If, in order to save yourself bodily labour, you want a
secretary, write, and you shall have one; but for any other
purpose, you want no assistance, but are allowed by everybody,
and the King in particular, to be the best writer of despatches
that is known in this office.

Adieu. I envy you the pleasure of announcing the news from the
West Indies, with all the modest insolence which belongs to the
occasion.

Yours most affectionately,

Pray make my best respects to Dr. Franklin, whose letter to me
contained some very promising expressions. Assure him that, in
spite of all that has happened, he and I are still of the same
country.

St. James's, Tuesday night,

May 21st, 1782.

MR. SHERIDAN TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

St. James's, May 26th, 1782.

My dear Grenville,

Charles not being well, I write to you at his desire, that you
may not be surprized at having no private letter from him with
the despatch which Mr. Oswald brings you. There is not room, I
believe, for much communication of any very private nature on
the subject of your instructions and situation, as his public
letter, you will see, is very sincerely to the purpose. If
anything in it admits of modification, or is not to be very
literally taken, I should conceive it to be the recommendation
of explicitness with Oswald; on which subject I own I have
suggested doubts; and Charles wishes you to have a caution for
your own discretion to make use of.

I perceive uniformly (from our intercepted information) that all
these _city_ negotiators--Mr. Wentworths, Bourdeaux,
&c.--insinuate themselves into these sort of affairs merely for
private advantages, and make their trust principally subservient
to stock-jobbing views, on which subject there appears to be a
surprising communication with Paris. Mr. Oswald's officiousness
in bringing over your despatch and other things I have been told
since by those who know him, lead me to form this kind of
opinion of him; but you will judge where this will apply to any
confidence that should be placed in him.

Surely, whatever the preliminaries of a treaty for peace with
France may be, it would be our interest, if we could, to drop
even mentioning the Americans in them; at least the seeming to
grant anything to them as at the requisition of France. France
now denies our ceding Independence to America to be anything
given to them, and declines to allow anything for it. In my
opinion it would be wiser in them to insist ostentatiously (and
even to make a point of allowing something for it) on the
Independence of America being as the first article of their
treating; and this would for ever furnish them with a claim on
the friendship and confidence of the Americans after the peace.
But since they do not do this, surely it would not be bad
policy, even if we gave up more to France in other respects, to
prevent her appearing in the treaty as in any respect the
champion of America, or as having made any claims for her; we
giving her up everything she wants equally, and her future
confidence and alliance being such an object to us. Were I the
Minister, I would give France an island or two to choose, if it
would expose her selfishness, sooner than let her gain the
_esteem of the Americans_ by claiming anything essential for
them in apparent preference to her own interest and ambition.
All people, of all descriptions, in America, will read the
treaty of peace, whenever it comes, which France shall make with
this country; and if they should see there that she has claimed
and got a good deal for herself, but has not appeared to have
thought of them, however they may have profited in fact, it
would certainly give us a great advantage in those sort of
arguments and competitions which will arise after a peace;
whereas if it appears as a stipulated demand on the part of
France that America should be independent, it will for ever be a
most handy record and argument for the French party in that
country to work with; and this, as things stand now, and as far
as my poor judgment goes, appears not to be a very difficult
thing to have either way. And so these are my politics on that
subject for you.

You will find Rodney has taken some more ships. The unluckiness
of his recal, I think, appears to increase in its ill effect;
and people don't seem to fancy Pigott. Rolle has given notice
that he will move on Thursday to know who advised His Majesty to
recal Rodney; and out of doors the talk is the same. Charles
gave Johnson, who had been very violent on this subject the
other day, an excellent trimming; but there was a good deal of
coy with the other.

The arming plan don't seem to take at all. We have not yet heard
from Ireland since Burgoyne took them over a constitution.[1]

There is nothing odd or new to tell you, but that here is a most
untimely strange sort of an influenza which every creature
catches. You must not mind the badness of my scrawl: and let me
hear from you. Does Lafayette join your consultation dinners
with Franklin, as some of our Roupell intelligence sets forth? I
take it for granted the French Ministers will think it a point
of spirit to seem rather less desirous of peace since your
defeat in the West?

Howe is still off the Texel, and the Dutch safe within.

What mere politics I write to you! One might as well be a
newspaper editor at once, I believe, as anything that politics
can make one: but all other pursuits are as idle and
unsatisfactory, and that's a comfort.

Yours ever,

R. B. Sheridan.

[Footnote 1: The Duke of Rutland had been appointed by the new Ministry
Lord-Lieutenant in Ireland and General Burgoyne Commander-in-Chief
there.]

MR. FOX TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Dear Grenville,

I have only time to write a line to tell you that I have
received your letter by Gregson, and also that by the post
containing the letters that passed between M. de Vergennes and
you. I do not choose to tell you anything more of my opinion by
this conveyance, than that all you have done is perfectly and
exactly right, and that His Majesty is of the same opinion.

Rolle moved yesterday, and Rosewarne seconded, a sort of censure
on the recal of Rodney, and Lord North made such a figure as
made even his enemies pity him; he showed such a desire to
support the motion, without daring to do it, as was perfectly
ridiculous. Adieu!

Yours, ever affectionately,

C. J. F.

We are all surprised at your not knowing the great news on the
24th, which was the date of your letter by Gregson.

Every account from Ireland is pleasant to the greatest degree.

St. James's, May 31st, 1782

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO MR. FOX.

Paris, June 4th, 1782.

Dear Charles,

The _public_ letter which I send to you by Lauzun, is, as you
will see, of no other use than that of accounting for his
journey, and enabling him to carry to you this _private_ one, of
which I had once almost determined to be myself the bearer; an
apprehension, however, that so sudden an arrival might be
embarrassing to you, has decided me not to take that step, till
I had explained to you my reasons for wishing to do so, though I
should not care to write them, except in the full confidence
that they will be seen by no person whatever but yourself.
Recollect always that this letter is written in that confidence,
and I am sure I never can repent of having sent it.

You will easily see, from the tenor of the correspondence we
have hitherto had, that what little use I could be of to you
here, appeared to me to be in the communication that I had with
Franklin; I considered the rest of the negotiation as dependent
upon that, and the only possible immediate advantages which were
to be expected, seemed to me to rest in the jealousy which the
French Court would entertain of not being thoroughly supported
in everything by America. The degree of confidence which
Franklin seemed inclined to place in me, and which he expressed
to me more than once in the strongest terms, very much favoured
this idea, and encouraged me in wishing to learn from him what
might be in future ground for a partial connection between
England and America; I say in future, because I have hitherto
never much believed in any treaty of the year 1782; and my
expectation, even from the strongest of Franklin's expressions,
was not of an immediate turn in our favour, or any positive
advantage from the Commissioners in Europe, till the people in
America should cry out to them, from seeing that England was
meeting their wishes. It was in this light, too, that I saw room
to hope for some good effects from a voluntary offer of
unconditional independence to America, a chance which looked the
more tempting as I own I considered the sacrifice as but a small
one, and such as, had I been an American, I had thought myself
little obliged to Great Britain in this moment for granting,
except from an idea that if it was an article of treaty, it
would have been as much given by France as by England. I repeat
this only to remind you that, from these considerations, the
whole of my attention has been given to Franklin, and that I
should have considered myself as losing my time here, if it had
not been directed to that subject.

I believe I told you in my last, that I had very sanguine
expectations of Franklin's being inclined to speak out when I
should see him next; indeed, he expressly told me, that he would
think over all the points likely to establish a solid
reconciliation between England and America, and that he would
write his mind upon them, in order that we might examine them
together more in order; confiding, as he said, in me, that I
would not state them as propositions from him, but as being my
own ideas of what would be useful to both countries. (I
interrupt myself here to remind you of the obligation I must put
you under not to mention this). For this very interesting
communication, which I had long laboured to get, he fixed the
fourth day, which was last Saturday; but on Friday morning, Mr.
Oswald came, and having given me your letters, he went
immediately to Franklin, to carry some to him. I kept my
appointment at Passy the next morning, and in order to give
Franklin the greatest confidence, and at the same time, too, not
knowing how much Mr. Oswald might have told him, I began with
saying, that though under the difficulty which M. de Ve. and he
himself had made to my full power, it was not the moment as a
politician, perhaps, to make farther explanations till that
difficulty should be relieved; yet, to show him the confidence I
put in him, I would begin by telling him that I was authorized
to offer the independence in the first instance, instead of
making it an article of general treaty. He expressed great
satisfaction at this, especially, he said, because, by having
done otherwise, we should have seemed to have considered America
as in the same degree of connection with France which she had
been under with us; whereas, America wished to be considered as
a power, free and clear to all the world. But when I came to
lead the discourse to the subject which he had promised four
days before, I was a good deal mortified to find him put it off
altogether till he should be more ready; and notwithstanding my
reminding him of his promise, he only answered that it should be
in some days. What passed between Mr. Oswald and me will explain
to you the reason of this disappointment.

Mr. Oswald told me that Lord Shelburne had proposed to him, when
last in England, to take a commission to treat with the American
Ministers; that upon his mentioning it to Franklin now, it
seemed perfectly agreeable to him, and even to be what he had
very much wished; Mr. Oswald adding that he wished only to
assist the business, and had no other view; he mixed with this a
few regrets that there should be any difference between the two
offices; and when I asked upon what subject, he said, owing to
the Buckingham party being too ready to give up everything.

You will observe though, for it is on that account that I give
you this narrative, that this intended appointment has
effectually stopped Franklin's mouth to me; and that when he is
told that Mr. Oswald is to be the Commissioner to treat with
him, it is but natural that he should reserve his confidence for
the quarter so pointed out to him; nor does this secret seem
only known to Franklin; as Lafayette said, laughing, yesterday,
that he had just left _Lord Shelburne's ambassador_ at Passy.
Indeed, this is not the first moment of a separate and private
negotiation; for Mr. Oswald, suspecting, by something that I
dropped, that Franklin had talked to me about Canada, (though,
by the bye, he never had), told me this circumstance as follows.
When he was in England, the last time but one, he carried with
him a paper, entrusted to him by Franklin, under condition that
it should be shown only to Lord Shelburne, and returned into his
own hands at Passy; this paper, under the title of "Notes of a
Conversation," contained an idea of Canada being spontaneously
ceded by England to the Thirteen Provinces, in order that
Congress might sell the unappropriated lands, and make a fund
thereby, in order to compensate the damages done by the English
army, and even those sustained too by the royalists. This paper,
given with many precautions, for fear of its being known to the
French Court, to whom it was supposed not to be agreeable, Mr.
Oswald showed to Lord Shelburne, who, after keeping it a day, as
Mr. Oswald supposes to show to the King, returned it to him, and
it was by him brought back to Franklin.

I say nothing to the proposition itself, to the impolicy of
bringing a strange neighbourhood to the Newfoundland Fishery, or
to the little reason that England would naturally see in having
lost thirteen provinces to give away a fourteenth; but I mention
it to show you an early trace of separate negotiation, which
perhaps you did not before know. Under these circumstances, I
felt very much tempted to go over and explain them to you _vivâ
voce_ rather than by letter, and I must say, with the farther
intention of suggesting to you the only idea that seems likely
to answer your purpose, and it is this: the Spanish Ambassador
will in a day or two have the powers from his Court; the
Americans are here, so are the French; why should you not
consider this then as a Congress in full form, and send here a
person of rank, such as Lord Fitzwilliam, if he would come, so
as to have the whole negotiation in the hands of one person; you
would by that means recover within your compass the essential
part which is now out of it; nor do I see how Lord Shelburne
could object to such an appointment, which would in every
respect very much facilitate the business. Let me press this a
little strongly to you, for another reason: you may depend upon
it, people here have already got an idea of a difference between
the two offices, and consider how much that idea will be
assisted by the embarrassments arising from two people
negotiating to the same purpose, but under different and
differing authorities, concealing and disguising from each other
what with the best intentions they could hardly make known, and
common enough to each. I am almost afraid of pressing this as
strongly as I should, for fear you should think me writing
peevishly; but if I did not state the thing to you in the
situation in which I see it, I should think I was betraying your
interests instead of giving attention to them. I must entreat
you very earnestly to consider this, to see the impossibility of
my assisting you under this contrariety, to see how much the
business itself will suffer if carried on with the jealousy of
these clashing interests, and to see whether it may not all be
prevented by some such single appointment in high rank as that I
mentioned; _au reste_, I cannot but say that I feel much easier
with the hope of making over what remains of this business. I
begin to feel it weighty, and you know how much I dislike the
_publicity_ you packed off to me in that confounded silver box;
I could not bring myself to say anything civil about it in my
last letter, and you ought to give me credit for great
self-denial in not taking this opportunity of telling you my own
story at the Secretary's office, as nothing but the
embarrassment it might give you upon the sudden, prevented me.
Once more, I tell you I cannot fight a daily battle with Mr.
Oswald and _his secretary_; it would be neither for the
advantage of the business, for your interest, or your credit or
mine; and even if it was, I could not do it.

Concluding then the American business as out of the question,
which _personally_ I cannot be sorry for, you surely have but
one of two things to do: either to adopt the proposition of a
new _dignified_ peer's appointment, which being single, may
bring back the business to you by comprehending it all in one;
or Lord Shelburne must have his minister here, and Mr. Fox his;
by doing which, Mr. Fox will be pretty near as much out of the
secret, at least of what is most essential, as if he had nobody
here; and the only real gainers by it will be the other
Ministers, who cannot fail to profit of such a jumble. Besides
which, upon this latter part of the subject, I must very
seriously entreat you not to ask me to keep a situation here, in
no circumstances pleasant, and in none less so than those I have
described. The grievance is a very essential one, the remedy is
Lord Fitzwilliam.

Adieu. I recommend to Lauzun to make all the haste he can, as I
shall not stir a step till you answer this letter, and my step
then will, I hope, be towards you. Sheridan's letter of
suspicion was written, as you see, in the spirit of prophecy. I
owe him an answer, which, by word of mouth or word of letter, he
shall have very soon. The news of the day is, that the Cadiz
fleet, twenty-six of the line and five French, are sailed for
Brest, but I rather imagine they have no authentic account of it
yet.

I enclose to you P. Guemené's offer of some good champagne; if
you choose to have any, tell me what number of bottles, and let
Brooks or somebody let me know how they are to be sent to
England. I don't understand champagne, but this has a good
character.

Adieu. Let Lord Fitzwilliam answer my letter.

MR. FOX TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

(Private.)

St James's, June 10th, 1782.

Dear Grenville,

I received late the night before last your very interesting
letter of the 4th, and you will easily conceive am not a little
embarrassed by its contents. In the first place, it was not
possible to comply with your injunction of perfect secrecy in a
case where steps of such importance are necessary to be taken;
and therefore I have taken upon me (for which I must trust to
your friendship to excuse me) to show your letter to Lord
Rockingham, the Duke of Richmond and Lord John, who are all as
full of indignation at its contents as one might reasonably
expect honest men to be. We are perfectly resolved to come to an
explanation upon the business, if it is possible so to do,
without betraying any confidence reposed in me by you, or in you
by others.

The two principal points which occur are the paper relative to
Canada, of which I had never heard till I received your letter,
and the intended investment of Mr. Oswald with full powers,
which was certainly meant for the purpose of diverting
Franklin's confidence from you into another channel. With these
two points we wish to charge Shelburne directly; but pressing as
the King is, and interesting as it is both to our own situations
and to the affairs of the public--which are, I fear,
irretrievably injured by this intrigue, and which must be ruined
if it is suffered to go on--we are resolved not to stir a step
till we hear again from you, and know precisely how far we are
at liberty to make use of what you have discovered. If this
matter should produce a rupture, and consequently become more or
less the subject of public discussion, I am sensible the Canada
paper cannot be mentioned by name; but might it not be said that
we had discovered that Shelburne had withheld from our knowledge
matters of importance to the negotiation? And with respect to
the other point, might it not be said, without betraying
anybody, that while the King had one avowed and authorized
Minister at Paris, measures were taken for lessening his credit
and for obstructing his inquiries by announcing a new intended
commission, of which the Cabinet here had never been apprized.

Do, pray, my dear Grenville, consider the incredible importance
of this business in every view, and write me word precisely how
far you can authorize us to make use of your intelligence. It is
more than possible that, before this reaches you, many other
circumstances may have occurred which may afford further proofs
of this duplicity of conduct; and if they have, I am sure they
will not have escaped your observation. If this should be the
case, you will see the necessity of acquainting me with them as
soon as possible. You see what is our object, and you can easily
judge what sort of evidence will be most useful to us. When the
object is attained--that is, when the duplicity is proved--to
what consequences we ought to drive; whether to an absolute
rupture, or merely to the recal of Oswald and the simplification
of this negotiation, is a point that may be afterwards
considered. I own I incline to the more decisive measure, and so
I think do those with whom I must act in concert.

I am very happy indeed that you did not come yourself: the
mischief that would have happened from it to our affairs are
incredible; and I must beg of you, nay, entreat and conjure you,
not to think of taking any precipitate step of this nature. As
to the idea of replacing you with Lord Fitzwilliam, not only it
would be very objectionable on account of the mistaken notion it
would convey of things being much riper than they are, but it
would, as I conceive, be no remedy to the evil. Whether the
King's Minister at Paris be an Ambassador Extraordinary or a
Minister Plenipotentiary, can make no difference as to the
question. The clandestine manner of carrying on a separate
negotiation, which we complain of, would be equally practicable
and equally blameable if Lord Fitzwilliam was Ambassador, as it
is now that Mr. Grenville is Plenipotentiary. I must therefore
again entreat you, as a matter of personal kindness to me, to
remain a little longer at Paris; if you were to leave it, all
sorts of suspicions would be raised. It is of infinite
consequence that we should have it to say that we have done all
in our power to make peace, not only with regard to what may be
expected from America, but from Europe.

The King of Prussia is certainly inclined to be our friend; but
he urges and presses to make peace if possible. If we could once
bring the treaty to such a point as that, stating the demands on
each side to him, we could have his approbation for breaking it
off, I think it not impossible but the best consequences might
follow; and with regard to North America, it is surely clear to
demonstration, that it is of infinite consequence that it should
be publicly understood who is to blame if the war continues. I
do hope, therefore, that you will at all events stay long enough
to make your propositions, and to call upon them to make others
in return. I know your situation cannot be pleasant; but as you
first undertook it in a great measure from friendship to me, so
let me hope that the same motive will induce you to continue in
it at least for some time.

What will be the end of this, God knows; but I am sure you will
agree with me, that we cannot suffer a system to go on which is
not only dishonourable to us, but evidently ruinous to the
affairs of the country. In this instance, the mischief done by
intercepting, as it were, the very useful information we
expected through you from Franklin, is I fear in a great degree
irremediable; but it is our business, and indeed our duty, to
prevent such things for the future.

Everything in Ireland goes on very well; and I really think
there is good reason to entertain hopes from Prussia and Russia,
if your negotiation either goes on or goes off as it ought to
do.

I can hardly read Monsieur de Guemené's letter, but wish to have
two hundred bottles of the champagne, if there is really reason
to think it good. By the way, I beg you will remember me to
Monsieur de Guemené, and put him in mind of our former
acquaintance in the Rue St. Pierre. If the wine in question is
as good as that he used to rob from Monsieur de Soubise, I shall
be very well satisfied. I will give Brooks directions to
acquaint you with the proper manner of sending it. I am quite
ashamed of dwelling so long upon this, after the very serious
business of this letter; but you know I cannot help being a
friend to the _poor abuses_; and besides, in a political light,
good wine is no mean ingredient in keeping one's friends in good
humour and steady to the cause.

I am,

My dear Grenville,

Yours most affectionately,

C. J. Fox.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO MR. FOX.

(Private.)

Paris, June 16th, 1782.

Dear Charles,

I received your letter of the 10th by Ogg on the night of the
14th, and would have sent him back as immediately as you seemed
to wish; but having no other messenger to carry M. de
Vergennes's answer, I was obliged to keep him till he could be
the bearer of that likewise.

I can easily conceive the embarrassment occasioned to you by my
letter, and have so much confidence in the honour of the persons
to whom you communicated it, that I am not under the smallest
uneasiness on that account; the explanation, however, that you
wish to come to, certainly has its difficulties; and amongst
them some so sacred, that unless they can be kept altogether
clear, you cannot but agree with me in thinking that they must
be buried at least in silence, though not in oblivion. In order
therefore that you may see into every part of this business, I
will, as you desire, state in the most explicit manner the
circumstances of it, as far as I think they affect any
confidence reposed in me.

In the first place, then, you will have observed, that although
Franklin has actually made me no confidence, owing, as I
believe, without doubt, to the reasons I stated, yet as the
communication he had said he would make to me was of the most
confidential nature, and in full trust that the subjects which
he should mention should not be given as propositions coming
from him, I think it would be a breach of that confidence to
make it known even that he had promised to hold such a
conversation with me; and therefore to charge Lord Shelburne
with having diverted from me that expected communication, would
be to proclaim Franklin's promise to me; which promise, though
it has not been followed up, I cannot think myself at liberty to
quote. The delicacy of Franklin's situation with respect to the
French Court was, as he said, the ground of the caution which he
observed, and which, nevertheless, he was once inclined to risk
in my trust. He would certainly have both to repent and to
complain if anything on my part should lead to betray even the
confidential disposition he had entertained. These reasons you
will, I am sure, agree with me in considering as decisive
against any mention being to be made of the expectations I had
formed from the conversation I was to have had with Franklin.

The Canada paper is not perhaps quite under the same
circumstances. The only knowledge I have of that is from Oswald;
and as I before told you, I had it from him at a moment when I
fancy he apprehended I had heard or should hear of it from
Franklin. No other reason, indeed, can account for his not
mentioning it from the end of April till the 31st of May. He
told it me under no express limitation of confidence: the words
in which he introduced it were, "I think it right you should
know;" and I am perfectly sure that he asked from me no
engagement of secrecy, nor do I conceive myself under any with
regard to him, except that general secrecy which is always
attached to business of a confidential nature, such as was the
business I related to you. I recollect asking whether he had
showed the paper to you: he said No; but did not add any
injunction to me not to do so; indeed, if he had, I should have
stated to him the impossibility of my keeping from you a
circumstance of that importance, or of my becoming, by my
silence in it, a separate party to a business which it was my
duty fully and entirely to lay before you and to receive from
you; nor indeed at this moment is the knowledge of it confined
to Lord Shelburne; as I am pretty sure Oswald told me that Lord
Ashburton was with Lord Shelburne when he, Oswald, asked if he
might give any answer to Franklin about the paper, or rather
observed that he supposed he could not then have any answer to
it. Under these circumstances, the difficulty with regard to the
Canada paper, of which I have no copy, lies more possibly in the
indelicacy and perhaps bad policy of bringing forward Franklin
where he wished so much not to appear, than in the quoting it
from me. I do not wish to be quoted, if there exists the least
doubt whether I should. But I cannot more exactly explain to you
the whole extent of that doubt, than by showing you that it does
not exist in any specific obligation on my part, but only in the
nature of what was told to me; the subject itself carrying with
it, as you will see, many reasons for secrecy, and every mark of
it in the manner of conducting it; but as to positive engagement
or obligation upon this subject, I have none.

The remaining circumstance--of the intention mentioned to Mr.
Oswald by Lord Shelburne, of giving him a commission if it
should be necessary--stands altogether clear of the slightest
shade of difficulty upon the point of confidence; indeed, at the
time I wrote you word of it, I did not imagine I was informing
you of anything new or unknown to you; and only so far meant to
dwell upon it, as to regret its happening precisely at the
instant when it was most important it should not. I apprehended
that Lord Shelburne might have already expressed such an
intention to the rest of the King's Ministers, upon the ground
of the American share of this business, which ground, in the
present stage of it, I thought possibly you had not found it
easy to object to. In this idea it was that Lord Fitzwilliam's
appointment occurred to me, not to prevent a clandestine
negotiation, but to unite a separated one; always imagining that
you knew of, but did not resist, the intended commission to Mr.
Oswald, and therefore hinting the expediency of superseding it,
by giving to another person an appointment of such rank and
magnitude as should include a power which it seems neither for
the public interest, nor for yours and your friends' interests,
to leave separate and distinct.

To return, however, to the point of confidence: upon this last
subject there is none; and you are certainly at full liberty to
proclaim at Charing Cross that Lord Shelburne told Mr. Oswald he
supposed he would not object to a commission if it should be
necessary; and that since his last return to Paris, Mr. Oswald
has told me he found it very much Franklin's wish likewise. If I
may repeat, therefore, in a few words, what I have tried to
express to you in a good many, it is that, as to Franklin's
first intention of a private and confidential communication with
me, I hold myself so engaged in secrecy to him, that I think it
would be a breach of confidence in me to have that intention at
all spoken of. As to the Canada paper, I leave it, with the
comment I have made upon it, altogether to your discretion; and
as to the proposed commission, you are certainly at full liberty
to say of it what you please. I have it not in my power to give
you any additional proofs of sinister management in this
business. I seldom see Oswald, though upon good terms with him;
and have seen Franklin, since Oswald's coming, but once, when he
was as silent as ever, notwithstanding my reminding him of his
promise; so that I cannot help thinking that business altogether
irretrievable. But neither do I know what you will gain by
forcing Oswald's return; indeed I am inclined to think it might
be much more prudent to save appearances by leaving him here,
till you shall have completed your purpose of receiving the
propositions you wish or the refusal you wish from Versailles.
Perhaps, politically speaking, you may not think it wise to make
the conduct, or rather misconduct, of a foreign negotiation the
ground of a domestic rupture, which may betray too much weakness
and disunion; but this is too delicate a subject for me to say
anything upon, more than to assure you that, whatever is your
determination about it, you will not find me shrink from the
part I have or may have to take in it.

And one word here about the desire I have expressed to return to
England: it is impossible not to say that I feel that desire in
the strongest degree. I would not speak peevishly about my
disappointment in the unlucky check that I have met with; but I
think you will agree that the real service it might have been my
good fortune perhaps to have been assisting in, is by that check
completely annihilated, nor can any step now taken recover or
retrieve it; and that consideration weighs pretty heavily in a
situation in itself not agreeable to me. But if I repeat this
now, it is to keep you awake to the earnest solicitations I make
of returning in the first moment you may think it practicable;
till then you need have no apprehension of seeing me, but may
trust that no personal motives, however strong, can weigh
against the important reasons you state, as well as the desire
you express, for my continuing something longer at Paris.

I am writing to you on the 16th, waiting impatiently for M. de
Vergennes's answer, which he gave me reason to hope I shall have
to-morrow.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO MR. FOX.

June 21st.

I have been waiting day after day, and have not got my answer
till a few hours ago. I am sorry to have kept you so long, but
you see it was impossible to avoid it. A report prevails that
Bougainville is arrived at St. Domingo with two ships, as
likewise are the four that were at Curaçao. They add that Rodney
had been obliged to burn three of his captured ships. La Motthe
Peguet has twice had orders to sail from Brest with his seven
ships, and as often been recalled. They expect Guichen soon with
the fleet from Cadiz of thirty-two ships: they are said to have
sailed on the 4th.

Pray tell Sheridan to be more cautious in what he writes by the
post. If I had time I should give him a lecture; but I want to
send away the messenger.

Adieu. Oswald affects to consider me now as fully authorized,
but I believe expects different news as soon as the Independence
Bill is passed; but I cannot help thinking you had better leave
him where he is, for his going away will mend nothing. I have
bought your wine.

Ever very affectionately yours,
T.G.

* * * * *

Within a few days after this letter reached England, the Rockingham
Administration had ceased to exist. The Marquis of Rockingham, whose
health had been declining for some time, died on the 1st of July, and
was succeeded in his title by his nephew, the Earl Fitzwilliam, who is
alluded to in these letters by Mr. Thomas Grenville. The first
intimation of this event conveyed to the Plenipotentiary at Paris was in
a letter from his brother, Lord Temple. The circumstances that
immediately followed are detailed in the letters of Lord Temple and Mr.
Sheridan, written on the same day, and in a letter from Mr. Fox on the
day following. The apprehension expressed by Lord Temple that Fox's
resignation would be ascribed by the public to a mean contest for
offices was not unfounded; although such a motive cannot be believed to
have influenced the mind of that statesman, the conviction of what he
felt to be his duty on this occasion being shared by Mr. Sheridan, Mr.
Burke, Lord John Cavendish, Lord Althorpe and others, who instantly
followed his example. The King's undisguised predilection for Lord
Shelburne arose from the nearer agreement of their opinions on the
American question, than existed between His Majesty and the Rockingham
section of the Cabinet, who were for an unconditional recognition of the
independence of America--a proceeding regarded by His Majesty with
aversion. The rapidity with which the changes were adopted furnished a
sufficient reason for Fox's determination not to act under Lord
Shelburne, that nobleman having accepted the appointment to the Treasury
immediately on the death of Lord Rockingham, without consultation with
his colleagues, and Lord Grantham being appointed in the same
unceremonious way to the secretaryship vacated by his Lordship. A
remarkable contradiction will be observed in the language held on this
occasion by Lord Shelburne, who is reported by Lord Temple to have
stated that he looked naturally to the Treasury, and knew no reason why
he should forego it, while to Sheridan he declared that he entered upon
the office against his wish.

LORD TEMPLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

London, July 4th, Twelve P.M. 1782.

My dear Brother,

My letters by the post have been so unfortunate, and the subject
of the present hour is so important, that I have waited all this
day for the certainty of a courier, and I am now promised that
one shall be dispatched immediately. I was in the country when I
received from Mr. Fox an express with the news of Lord
Rockingham's death, and an earnest entreaty to come to town;
which I did, and found him anxious for the future arrangements.
I told him, in the course of our conversation, that I held
myself engaged to support the measures of the body of the Whigs,
and deprecated any precipitate resolution, unless there was
reason to imagine that _measures_ would be changed. He told me
that a meeting had been held of the four friends of Lord
Rockingham; viz., the Duke of Richmond, Lord J. Cavendish,
Keppell and himself; that they had agreed to submit the Duke of
Portland's name to the King, for the Treasury, but with little
hopes of success; that he had writ to other great peers, &c., to
come to town, and wished for their opinions; that he took it for
granted that Lord Shelburne would insist upon the Treasury, and
that the King would support him in that claim; that his idea was
to quit immediately, but that others differed upon this, but
that he was to see Lord Shelburne, and should then know more.
This interview took place, and the first account I had of it was
from Lord Shelburne, who came to me in the House of Lords and
desired to tell it to me. He stated general willingness to
accommodate, and a fixed determination at all events to adhere
to every measure of reform which had been proposed, and to
facilitate Cabinet arrangements as far as could be hoped from
him; that it was natural that the Treasury should be an object
to him, that he knew no reason why he was always to forego, and
stated the indisposition of the King's mind to any other person
at the head of that board. This was attended with every
expression of civility to me, and an earnest wish that I would
not decline employment, but would engage in the King's service.
To this I made the answer which you can so easily conceive, and
told him very fairly my intention to act with the great body of
the Whigs; I proceeded to state the inconceivable difficulties
attending our situation, the necessity of union, and the certain
consequences of a breach between himself and the other great
features of the Ministry.

I can hardly give you the detail of this very long conversation.
It was very free and open on both sides, and convinced me that
he was certainly, and at all hazards, to have the situation, of
which I hardly had a doubt before. He pledged himself repeatedly
to the public measures, and to a variety of details which it is
not necessary to state, and left me with every personal
expression and many wishes that I would reconsider my answer.
The next moment, Fox came to me in the Prince's chamber, and I
had nearly as long a conversation with him; he stated his
knowledge that Lord Shelburne would succeed to Lord Rockingham,
and his idea of throwing up. I stated Lord Shelburne's promises
to measures, which I found Lord Shelburne had made to him; but
the loss of the object, which was evidently a favourite point
with him, seemed to affect him much. I repeated my apprehensions
that the people would not stand by him in his attempt to quit
upon private grounds, which from their nature would appear to be
a quarrel for offices, and not a public measure. He saw all
this, and said that it had been urged to him by several, but
that he was not _determined_. I went into the House of Lords,
where I found the Duke of Richmond, who was outrageous at the
idea of a resignation, and who went before me in all I had said
to Fox upon this subject; and you will easily conceive that this
opinion was strengthened by the most explicit speech that I ever
heard, which Lord Shelburne gave as his creed and the test of
his conduct, and which indeed seemed satisfactory to every one
who heard him.

This day has opened a new scene: the King declared his intention
of giving the Treasury to Lord Shelburne; and it was proposed to
Lord J. Cavendish to take the vacant seals, which, from variety
of reasons, Lord John declined; and notwithstanding all that the
Duke of Richmond could urge, Fox has resigned, and the King has
accepted the seals. _En nova progenies!_ Lord Shelburne keeps
the Treasury, and it is _supposed_ that Pitt is his Chancellor
of the Exchequer; Duke of Grafton, Lord Camden, Conway, Duke of
Richmond and Keppell remain, and mean to go on; who are the two
Secretaries are not known. I have had a long conversation just
now with the Duke of Richmond, who is unhappy, but determined to
go on till the first breach on fair public grounds; and wherever
or whenever he finds Lord Shelburne tripping, he has apprized
him that he will quit, and the other has agreed to it, with
every seeming profession of cordiality; and thus matters stand.

My opinion, from all whom I have seen, is that Fox has undone
himself with the public; and his most intimate friends seem of
the same opinion. I am now to request and desire of you, in the
strongest terms, not to return from France till you hear further
from me. Fox tells me, that you (being envoy) cannot come
without the King's leave; and I must entreat of you, for the
sake of the public, and of that Ministry which I trust and hope
will still stand its ground, for the great and important objects
which we had in view in March last--let me add, for your own
sake--do not spread the alarm of returning till you hear from me
again, which you certainly shall in a very short period. With
every anxious hope and wish that affection can form,

I am,
My dear brother,
Ever yours,
N. T.

I am anxious to inform you that the Duke of Richmond has pressed
me to take the Secretary of State, as named by all our Whig
friends; and I shall accept.[1] This is another reason for
wishing you to stay till a few days clear up all our doubts and
difficulties, in which I need not say how happy I shall be to
see you so, and how cordially I love and esteem you. Adieu, my
dear Tom.

[Footnote 1: This first part of the postscript is written in cypher.]

MR. SHERIDAN TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Thursday, July 4th, 1782.

My Dear Grenville,

Knowing that you very much dislike your situation, I don't know
how to call ill news what I am now going to inform you of.
Charles has this day resigned the seals; as he is much engaged,
I have undertaken to let you know this event, and make the last
exercise of our office the sending a messenger to you, as it
would certainly be unfair to lose a single hour in assisting you
in your release. I understand you cannot leave Paris without
leave from hence, as you have the King's commission; but by
sending this to you directly, it will be in your own hands to
require that leave in as peremptory terms as you please.

What relates to Lord Rockingham's death you are informed of. The
day before it happened Charles made a question in the Cabinet on
the policy of not reserving the Independence of America as a
matter of treaty and the price of a peace, but to grant it at
once unconditionally; on which he was beat. And immediately on
Lord Rockingham's death, Lord Shelburne informs them that he is
to be First Lord of the Treasury and the King's Minister, though
_against his wish_, &c., &c. They proposed the Duke of Portland,
which the King refused; and after a great deal of idle
negotiation, in which it was evident there was no power left
with our friends, the measure of to-day was determined on. Lord
John Cavendish goes out with Charles, Keppel follows; but, to
his shame, in my opinion, the _Duke of Richmond_, I believe,
will remain. Mr. Pitt joins Shelburne, and will be either
Chancellor of the Exchequer or Secretary of State. For the rest,
it is not known whether they will make up out of the old set, or
take all new. Conway also will stay. But still, those who go are
right; for there is really no other question but whether, having
lost their power, they ought to stay and lose their characters.
And so begins a new Opposition; but wofully thinned and
disconcerted, I fear. I am sure, however, that you will think
what has been done was right. Fitzpatrick is here, but returning
to Ireland; where, however, neither he nor the Duke will remain.

I write in great haste, which you must excuse. Yours ever truly,
R. B. Sheridan.

What you hear of Cornwallis having lost some transports, is a
matter of no magnitude.

MR. FOX TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Dear Grenville,

You will not wonder at my being hurried too much at this moment
to write you a detail of what has happened. I do assure you that
the thing that has given me most concern, is the sort of scrape
I have drawn you into; but I think I may depend upon your way of
thinking for forgiving me; though to say one can depend upon any
man, is a bold word, after what has passed within these few
days. I am sure, on the other hand, that you may depend upon my
eternal gratitude to you for what you have undergone on my
account, and that you always must have the greatest share in my
friendship and affection. I do not think you will think these
[less] valuable than you used to do. I have done right, I am
sure I have. The Duke of Richmond thinks very much otherwise,
and will do wrong; I cannot help it. I am sure my staying would
have been a means of deceiving the public and betraying my
party; and these are things not to be done for the sake of any
supposed temporary good. I feel that my situation in the
country, my power, my popularity, my consequence, nay, my
character, are all risked; but I have done right, and therefore
in the end it must turn out to have been wise. If this fail me,
the pillared firmament is rottenness, and earth's base built on
stubble.

Adieu. Your brother disapproves too.
Yours most affectionately,
C. J. Fox.

St. James's, July 5th, 1782.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO MR. FOX.

(Private.)

Paris, July 9th, 1782.

Dear Charles,

You apologize for writing me only a few lines; I shall write you
still fewer, and make no apology; for after what has passed, I
count every minute that the messenger is getting ready to
return, as so much time lost, however it is employed. You are
sorry you have drawn me into a scrape; I know of none, at least
none that an honest man could keep out of, or need be either
sorry or ashamed to have got into; neither do I see what you
have to regret in any part of this business, farther than the
late hour in which it was done. You know my system upon that
subject, and how firmly it was my opinion that you should not
have lost one moment, to fight the battle with advantage, which,
with or without, everybody saw must be to be fought; but, as
long as it is fought honourably, it is sure to be successful in
the end, for one day or other, right will always come right.

I suppose I need not tell you that I have answered Lord
Shelburne's letter by the official information he desires,
adding to it "my fixed purpose firmly to decline any farther
prosecution of this business, and requesting him, as speedily as
may be, to lay before His Majesty, in all duty and humility, my
earnest and unalterable prayer that he will be graciously
pleased to recal me from the commission I am honoured with at
Paris."

I write too to beg my brother to press my immediate return. I
see by his letter he knows nothing of what has passed. If you
would show him my letter to you, at my request, under the
strictest confidence, he will be apprized of the true state much
sooner than if he waits till I come, when I shall certainly tell
him; this, however, is at your own choice, if you had rather
wait till I come.

Adieu. Pray thank Sheridan for his letter. I will write the
first moment my messenger is gone. Well, what a time to be out
of England! _et Montauciel n'y était pas!_ I don't think I can
quite forgive you. No news here. They say they have taken
eighteen transports from us, but they are not yet come into
Brest.

Yours most affectionately,
T. Grenville.

MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

Paris, July 9th, 1782.

My Dearest Brother,

Your letter was given to me last night, and since I have been
able to read I never felt so much agitated. I hastily send back
the messenger, but he carries with him a letter to Lord
Shelburne, in which I formally request my immediate recal.

My dear brother, you do not know my situation, or you would see
in the first instant, as you will so soon as I can speak to you,
that if I continued at Paris, I should be the meanest and most
contemptible wretch that was ever born into the world; I should
falsify my word, I should betray my honour, I should repay the
confidence that was reposed in me with the most cowardly
treachery, I should disgrace every feeling that is honourable
and respectable between man and man. I have no choice; my
immediate return is as much a duty and obligation upon me as can
in human society be laid upon one who would not renounce the
character of a gentleman. Judge, then, of the distressful
situation I must have been in at the time of decyphering your
last lines, and judge how sacred and indispensable those
circumstances must be, that do not give me even room to hesitate
in a difficulty of so much delicacy. I love you, my dearest
brother, with the truest and sincerest affection; my pride and
ambition are ten-fold more gratified in your situation of life
than in any that could be mine; nor, so help me God! do I think
there is an interest, an advantage, present or future, that I
would not gladly sacrifice for you, if it could add one step to
your greatness; but you love me too well not to shrink at the
thought of my disgracing myself, and a fouler disgrace there
could not be, than I should inevitably incur by staying at Paris
as Minister.

One part of my difficulty you see already; it is that I dare not
write even in cypher, what would save me all the embarrassment
of this letter, and you the uneasiness of its obscurity, till I
see you. My dear brother, reflect, if it is not too late, upon
the opinions we have held in common, upon the judgment we have
formed in common, of the rectitude and integrity of some men,
and the utter and absolute want of it in others. Recollect, if
it is possible, the uneasiness that you felt, the doubt that you
expressed and I made light of, in the very last conversations we
had together. Think over all that might have happened, and be
persuaded that all has; think over the most pleasing parts of
your last letter, and be persuaded that a few plain words,
whenever I see you, will make you blot it out with indignation.
But above all, I do conjure you, in the most solemn terms, to
guard against expressing the surmises this letter may suggest to
you, and to drop no word of suspicion or jealousy till I see
you. The caution of this letter--to which I dare not add a
cypher, however it must grieve me to speak to you in the
dark--every circumstance, must show you how deeply my honour,
how much more deeply than human wisdom could apprehend, my
honour is involved in this business.

One word more, though I think every minute an hour till the
messenger is gone. Trust me till you hear me; and above all, if
you are applied to persuade me to stay, do not think of so
doing; it may make the delay of one post, and that will hurt me;
it can do no more.

God Almighty bless you, my dearest brother; a warmer affection
no man can bear you. Think of all my impatience to see you, and
do not forget that in pressing my recal, you do me a more
essential and honourable service than you know. Once more, God
bless you, my dearest brother.

* * * * *

Before Lord Temple had received this letter he had declined the
secretaryship, and accepted the appointment of Lord-Lieutenant of
Ireland, his brother, Mr. William Wyndham Grenville (afterwards Lord
Grenville) accompanying him as Chief Secretary. In the reply that
follows, Lord Temple expresses the profound sorrow he felt at his
brother's determination to resign, of which he was confessedly not in a
position to form a competent judgment.

LORD TEMPLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Pall Mall, July 12th, Eleven, P.M.

I have received your letter, my dearest brother, which has
sensibly--I need not say how sensibly--affected me. My letter to
you did not propose to decide upon the propriety of the great
question, whether you should or not continue to keep the
character in which you are now employed; of that I could be no
judge. The total and absolute ignorance in which I have
remained, since you left England, of what was passing at Paris,
and the total want of information of what was passing here, so
far as concerned your mission, make me wholly incompetent to the
question; of that you must be the judge, and I trust and hope
that your decision will stand every test. My object was solely
to prevent the possibility of your coming away precipitately,
and so far my point is gained. I will say nothing of the cruel
situation in which I stand; I feel it most bitterly, and feel it
the more because my affection to you has no bounds. I am not
Secretary at State; but think, my dearest brother, what must
have been my feelings, if I had (as was much pressed upon me
from every quarter) accepted that department to which your
negotiation was more immediately annexed, in confidence that you
would have done that for me which you have done for Mr. Fox. If
I had listened to that persuasion (and surely my heart might
have prompted me to have done so), I might have had the
mortification of finding myself in a situation which I can
hardly think of without the most violent agitation; the voice of
every one had pointed out to me that department; and every
reason, public and private, seemed to call me to it. Think this
over, my dearest brother, and tell me if the ties of private
friendship are such as would have justified you to your own
feelings for fixing upon me a disgrace, the extent of which I
shudder at.

I know, I feel, that you love me; but, great God! to what have
you exposed me! and, much as you value Mr. Fox, am I to think
(good God! after the uniform affection, which has never felt
more truly for you than at this hour) that you trust your honour
and reputation in his hands to an extent that knows no bounds;
and that the moment which calls upon you to withdraw yourself
from your situation, is that which possibly had put your brother
in that confidential public situation in which I trusted he had
stood with you in private life? I cannot dwell upon this. I
would have fought your quarrels, I would have felt with you
every reason which may have induced you to urge this recal,
possibly very prudently, justly, and honourably; but it was not
necessary to convince every member of the Cabinet, that your
honour, safe in the hands of Mr. Fox, was not so in mine. Good
God! my dearest brother, loving me as you do, and knowing how I
prize and value you, think over this picture of possibilities,
and join with me (which is all I will ever say to you on a
subject which cuts me to the very heart) in the happiness I
feel, that motives, in which I will say that considerations for
your credit, your honour, and your ease, were decisive,
determined me to reject the first and to accept a second
proposition. That die is cast; my opinion, my reputation, and my
honour are pledged to it. I will believe, because it is my only
joy at such a crisis, that your affections beat as highly to
what conduces to my honour and situation as ever I could wish;
and tell me, my dearest brother, if the whole tenor and every
hour of my life has not proved to you how I valued your
confidence, and how truly it would be my pride to consult your
advancement; and if in taking this situation I have consulted
what was most for the honour and ease of every one of my family,
if I have peculiarly consulted the possible delicacy of your
situation, and have sacrificed every favourite passion of my
heart to it, think what my present feelings are, in the
uncertainty of the extent of those sacrifices which you may
still think yourself obliged to make. The thought, my dearest
brother, distracts me; I hint it to you, but I shall not feel a
moment's happiness till I see you. My letter is dreadfully
incoherent, but it will paint to you the agitation of a mind
struggling for its dearest and nearest object--the affection of
a brother, whom from my childhood I have pressed nearest to my
heart.--I cannot go on.

I called upon Lord Shelburne the moment I had your letter, and
saw him soon after. I carefully obeyed _every injunction_, and
pressed your immediate recal. He stated the necessity of calling
a Cabinet, as he could not take it upon himself, and the King
does not return to town till Wednesday. I urged it with every
eagerness, and have prevailed that a leave of absence shall be
granted to you to come away immediately, and this to prevent
public mischief. But it is understood that you resign the
commission on your arrival here. I have prevailed that the
messenger is to return very early to-morrow morning; and most
ardently do I wish to annihilate the next eight tedious days.
Feel for me, my dear brother; consult your reason and your
affection, and let me hope that you will feel that satisfaction
which every one of my family most earnestly feels at my
acceptance of the Lieutenancy of Ireland. You know what follows,
and you will have time to think it over; but I conjure you, by
everything which you prize nearest and dearest to your heart, by
the joy I have ever felt for your welfare, by the interest I
have ever taken in your uneasiness, weigh well your
determination; it decides upon the complexion of my future
hours. I am jealous and nice of your honour more than of my own;
but think that I have staked my happiness upon this cast; and
may God direct you, my dearest brother, to the only answer which
can convince me that your esteem and affection equals that which
I have ever borne you. God ever bless you.

RESIGNED.
Mr. Fox.
Lord J. Cavendish.
Mr. Burke.
Lord Robert Spencer.
Lord Althorpe.
Lord Dungannon.
Mr. Townshend.
Mr. Montagu.
Mr. Lee.

These are all who have resigned.

APPOINTED
Lord Shelburne _Treasury._
Mr. T. Grenville ¯|
Mr. Jackson |_Ditto._
Mr. Elliott _|
Mr. Pitt _Chancellor of the Exchequer._
Mr. T. Townshend _Secretary of State, Home Department._
Lord Grantham _Ditto, Foreign Department._
Sir G. Yonge _Secretary-at-War._
Mr. Aubrey ¯|
|_Admiralty._
Mr. Pratt _|
Lord C. Spencer _Vice-Treasurer._
Colonel Barré _Paymaster._
Vacant _Treasurer of the Navy._
Ditto _Solicitor-General._
Duke of Richmond ¯|
Duke of Grafton |
Lord Camden |_Continue in their offices._
Lord Keppell |
General Conway _|

Mr. Sheridan's name should be included in the above list of
resignations. The vacancies of the Treasurership of the Navy and the
Solicitor-Generalship were respectively filled by Mr. Dundas, afterwards
Viscount Melville, and Mr. Pepper Arden, afterwards Lord Alvanley.

MR. FOX TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Dear Grenville,

I am exceedingly obliged to you for your kind letter; and
indeed, if political transactions put one out of humour with
_many_, they make one love the _few_ who do act and think right
so much better that it is some compensation. I understand a
messenger is just going, by whom I send this letter; he will
bring you others, from whence you will learn that your brother
is going Lord-Lieutenant to Ireland. If you go with him as
Secretary, I hope you will be so good as to endeavour to serve
my friend Dickson, who by this change has for the third time
missed a Bishopric.

I called upon your brother yesterday, and left with him the
letters that passed between you and me, explaining that it was
at your desire that I did so. I was very glad to have your
authority for this step, for to tell you the truth, I was very
much inclined to take it even of my own when it was supposed he
was to be my successor; now that he knows the whole of the
narration, if he still chooses (as I fear he will) to go into
this den of thieves neither you nor I have anything to answer
for. If this transaction had been withheld from him, he might
have had reason to complain of me, but much more of you. I have
not heard from him since he has been _au fait_. His expressions,
both to me personally and to the party, were so kind, that I am
far from considering him as lost; but whether he is or not, and
whatever part your situation may make it right for you to take
in politics, I shall always depend upon your friendship and
kindness to me as perfectly unalterable; and I do assure you
that this consideration is one of the things that most
contributes to keep up my spirits in this very trying situation.

Yours affectionately,
C. J. Fox.
Grafton Street, July 13th, 1782.

Lord Temple entered upon the Government of Ireland at a crisis of
serious agitation. A short time before, under the Duke of Portland's
Administration, a Bill had passed the Imperial Parliament, recognizing
in full and in the most explicit manner the sole and exclusive right of
the Parliament of Ireland to make laws for Ireland--establishing and
affirming, in fact, the perfect independence of Ireland, legislative,
judicial and commercial. This Bill had given complete satisfaction to
the popular leaders. Even the Volunteers declared themselves appeased,
and adopted final resolutions to that effect. But the factious and
jealous spirit of the Irish was subsequently disturbed by indications on
the part of the English Legislature of a disposition to depart in some
particulars from this settlement, and by the unfortunate incident of
some Irish appeals which lay over for judgment in England, the authority
to adjudicate them having been relinquished, or disavowed, by the
measure alluded to. The whole matter turned upon distinctions, but they
were sufficient to influence the distrust of the turbulent, who were
ready to seize upon any excuse for expressing their impatience of
English authority. The introduction of a singular Bill by Lord Abingdon,
having for its object the assertion of the sole and exclusive right of
Great Britain to regulate her external commerce, and that of all
countries under her sovereignty, and repealing so much of the former
Bill as took that power out of the Parliament of Great Britain and
vested it in the Parliament of Ireland, had the effect of affording an
abundant pretext to the uneasiness which was now beginning to grow up in
Ireland, and which Mr. Grattan exerted his utmost influence to dispel.
Want of confidence, also, in the sincerity of Lord Shelburne's Ministry
yielded an additional ground for national discontent. "Things were never
more unsettled than they are at present," Mr. Perry writes to Mr.
Grattan, in October, 1782; "some of the Ministry here are at open enmity
with each other, and everybody seems to distrust the head." Such was the
state of their affairs when Mr. William Wyndham Grenville came over to
London to communicate confidentially with the Government on the part of
his brother, the Lord-Lieutenant. The correspondence in which he details
from day to day the results of his interviews with Ministers, and his
observations upon the net-work of small difficulties in which he was
involved by the want of unity in the Cabinet--especially between Mr.
Townshend and Lord Shelburne on the Irish questions--is minute and
voluminous; and only a few letters have been selected from the mass to
show the course of ministerial diplomacy in reference to the equivocal
relations subsisting at that period between the two countries. They form
a running commentary upon a curious passage in Irish history; and
although the circumstances to which they relate have long been
completely disposed of, the Union having obliterated all the matters in
dispute, the insight which they give us into the detail of Cabinet
discussions, the occasional traits they bring to light of the characters
of public men, and the calm and luminous views they develope of the
distracting politics of Ireland, confer a permanent interest upon them.
Two facts, by no means unimportant, are established in these
letters--namely, the lively and judicious anxiety Lord Temple and his
brother uniformly felt in their endeavours to restore the tranquillity
of Ireland, and the impediments they met in their strenuous efforts to
preserve the faith and honour of England in her transactions with that
country.

MR. W. WYNDHAM GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

Pall Mall, Nov. 27th, 1782.

My dear Brother,

I saw Townshend on the evening of my arrival here, which was
Sunday. Lord Shelburne was then out of town, so that I was of
course obliged to state what I had to say to Townshend alone.
This I did very fully, in a conversation which lasted near two
hours, and in which, to say truth, Townshend bore a less part
than I expected and could have wished. What he did say was,
however, very fair and explicit. He expressed a strong
determination in the King's servants to give you every possible
support. He had found _no_ opportunity (as I understood him) of
convening a Cabinet on the affairs of Ireland, but had talked
separately with all the Ministers upon the subject, and found in
them no difference of opinion, except perhaps in General Conway,
whom he thought "a little influenced by his nephew's pamphlet,
and by his own natural temper, to look towards further
concession." He saw little difficulty in what you wished;
thought you best able to judge of the propriety of the moment
for such a measure; and said it was the King's opinion, as well
as his own, "that where there was not some marked difference of
opinion, the Lord-Lieutenant should be _left to himself_,
without however being _abandoned_." I stated to him pretty
strongly the effect of the ideas of changes of men and opinions
in this country. On that point, as far as related to men, I
could get little or nothing from him, although I recurred to it
more than once. At last he said that the same effects were felt
here, and would be so till Government should show a sufficient
strength and consistency in Parliament. Scarce anything more
passed on his side, except strong expressions of personal regard
to you, and a warm encomium on the Duke of Portland, and the
language held by him on your subject, and on that of the state
of Ireland.

He gave me hopes of seeing Lord Shelburne the next day; but the
great man was at his recess at Streatham, and was not visible
till yesterday. When I went to him, he began with unbounded
expressions of a determination to support you as long as he had
anything to do here. He understood that you went in great
measure at his request, and therefore he considered it as common
cause. He begged that his silence might never be construed into
indolence or timidity: the subject was never off his mind. As a
proof, he mentioned his former silence, at which you was
alarmed, and its being followed by the most explicit
declarations, in which you had professed yourself fully
satisfied. After a great deal more of such verbiage, I stated
your wish as to the dissolution. He objected strongly to the
taking so capital a step till something was decided about the
negotiation at Paris. If the war should continue, it would be
necessary to determine on some plan suited to such an event. But
if we had peace, the advantages to Government in Ireland would
be great and almost infinite. Such an event would throw the
Volunteers upon their backs, would bring back the army to that
country and to this, and would also bring the fleet into the
Channel. He dwelt very much on the great advantage of not being
obliged to meet the Parliament till October, and when I hinted
at the possible necessity of a contrary resolution, he argued
strongly, and I think satisfactorily, against such a measure. He
then concluded the conversation, expressing a perfect readiness
to hear me again more at large on the subject. Seeing that he
would not hear any more at that time, I ended with saying that I
was not commissioned to state decisively your sentiments on this
very unexpected event, but that I was sure you would feel much
disappointed if a measure which you thought so necessary was
postponed without the most serious consideration and the most
urgent reasons. His answer was, that you might depend upon it
that whatever determination was made on the subject would be
most seriously weighed, and taken on the best grounds. He then
told me that a Cabinet should be held to-day, to take the
business into consideration.

To-day I dined with him, and saw both him and Townshend after
dinner. They both stated in the strongest manner the
inconvenience of so decisive a measure whilst a subject was in
agitation, and must be decided in a very few days, on which the
whole line and plan of your Government will have to depend. For
these reasons, they said it had been judged most proper to
postpone the Cabinet till something arrived from Paris. I ended
my conversation with Lord Shelburne by saying, that in the event
of war, I did not see how, after this delay, it would be
possible to resist; and that in that light it was my duty to
discharge my commission from you, and to state my own sentiments
as far as they could have any weight, that a few days might do
more mischief in Ireland than many years would be able to
repair. _Liberari animans meam._ To this he replied, that I had
done my part fairly, and that _he would be answerable for the
event_.

After all this detail, you will possibly wish to know my
sentiments upon the subject. From the whole of Lord Shelburne's
manner, I think that he is inclined to deal very fairly by you,
for his own sake. I have no doubt, from the style of his
conversation, that he is determined, in the present situation of
things, to stand the ground against concessions, and this both
from his own opinions and those of the King. But he certainly
either does not see, or affects not to see, the situation of
Ireland in that very alarming light in which it must be viewed
by every man acquainted with it.

As to the measure of the dissolution, I think you will agree
with him, that if we were sure of the favourable event, the
delay would not prove near so prejudicial on the one hand, as it
would be advantageous on the other. And from the language he
holds, I am persuaded, and Jemmy agrees with me in opinion, that
he is convinced that they will have their peace. On the other
hand, I cannot but say, that if the war continues, we shall be
in an awkward situation. The whole depends on the greater or
less probability of peace, to which we are neither of us
competent to decide; and I have thrown, if not the disagreeable
consequences, at least the responsibility of the measure on him.

In this situation of things, I thought you would rather choose
that I should remain here to give you the very first moment of
news, and to press then a Cabinet upon the affairs of Ireland in
general, than that I should run back to you in our present
uncertainty. You will observe, that although I have rather
expressed myself to you satisfied with the affair, I have taken
infinite pains not to let it appear to them; but on the
contrary, have left Lord Shelburne in no small uneasiness about
the manner in which you may take it; so that if you should be
dissatisfied, I have by no means pledged you. If you think with
me, the whole merit of it will lay at your door.

I desired Townshend to state to the King that I was ready to
obey His Majesty's commands, if he wished to ask me any
questions. He told me to-day that the King expressed himself
perfectly ready to give me an audience _if I wished for one_.
This I thought was better declined. I shall go to the levée on
Friday, and shall be very impatient for your answer to this long
detail.

Whatever your opinion may be of the line of conduct which I have
held, I trust you will do justice to my zeal for your interests
and honour, inseparably connected as they are, and I hope will
ever remain, with my own, and to the sincere affection with
which I am,

Ever most truly yours,
W. W. G.

MR. W. W. GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

Pall Mall, Saturday, Nov. 30th, 1782.

My Dear Brother,

I have just been with Townshend, who sent for me on the subject
of a despatch from you, relating to the proceedings in the
King's Bench here, on an Irish cause.

I have seen Troward, the attorney concerned in the cause, and
from him have learnt, what you probably know by this time, that
the case has been argued here, and the judgment of the Court in
Ireland affirmed; so that nothing can be done in it here,
especially as the Term has been over these two days. It is
impossible not to see the use which will be made in Ireland of
this unlucky business. You say nothing in your letter to
Townshend of the Protest, nor have I heard a word on that or any
other subject from Ireland since I have been here. But I much
fear that the alarm among the Bar, upon a point which affects
their private interests as well as their national pride, will
have prevented, or in great measure impeded its being signed.
The only grounds that you can take, as far at least as I can
see, are those which I have desired Townshend to insert in his
answer. The Bill of Exceptions was certified from an Irish
Court. It has been depending eighteen months. The objection to
the jurisdiction was never started. The King's Bench in Ireland
either has been applied to or will be so next Term, to grant a
writ of possession on the affirmance of the English Court. This
will of course be denied them, and the whole English proceeding
treated as waste paper. No Judge will allow--no sheriff will
execute, any English process. No man will again be so absurd as
to subject himself to a considerable expense to obtain a
judgment of no more effect than the decisions of a Prussian
court-martial would be as to a question of property here.

Still, however, I am far from being insensible to the clamour
which will be raised, and to the advantage which will be taken
of the opinion of the Court here, that their jurisdiction still
remains, notwithstanding the Irish Act to the contrary. Possibly
you may find it necessary to hold out some solution; and perhaps
you will think the opportunity is not a bad one to cut the
ground still more decisively from under Mr. Flood's feet than
even by the proposed resolutions. What I mean is, the passing a
bill here which should in the preamble declare the repeal to
have been a renunciation of the rights formerly exercised by
this kingdom over Ireland, and should enact that _therefore_ for
the future, no writ of error, &c., &c., should be received,
signed or determined in any of the King's Courts of Justice in
this country. If this idea should please you, it might be done
immediately, and you might settle the words with Yelverton or
Burgh.

If you think this too like a concession, you might hold out the
idea of an Act to be passed in Ireland, inflicting the penalties
of a _præmunire_ against any persons seeking justice out of the
kingdom; in imitation of the old statutes against ecclesiastics
applying to the papal authority.

Lord Shelburne threw out to me the other day, but when I could
not ask him any more upon the subject, the idea of a paragraph
about Ireland in the King's Speech. I have writ to Townshend
to-day, to desire that if this idea is pursued, he will let me
see it before the words are finally determined upon. I think
such a paragraph may have a good effect; because, when re-echoed
in the addresses, it will include the three branches.

I am waiting with the most anxious expectation the decision of
the great question--peace or war? Reports are hourly circulated
on both sides, but nothing is known from any authority. I need
not say, that the moment it is known, I will send it off.

I know no more of the East India business than you will see in
the papers. I was so intent on this, that I forgot to ask
Townshend to-day about it.

I shall most probably be with you before you can answer this, as
the 5th is the day for the meeting. But if they should again
prorogue the Parliament, and wish me to stay, supposing the
point not decided, what shall I do?

Ever most affectionately yours,
W. W. G.

Townshend and Conway have both been plaguing me about Murray,
who wanted to raise a corps in the North. It seems he is an
Irishman, with considerable connexions in the North. Talbot's
inspection makes a figure in the papers.

MR. W. W. GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

(Most Secret and Private.)

Pall Mall, Monday, Dec. 2nd, 1782.

My dear Brother,

I told you, in my last letter, that Lord Shelburne had thrown
out to me the idea of a paragraph in the King's Speech on the
subject of Ireland, and that I had applied to Townshend, that I
might see it before it was decided upon. In consequence of this,
I received, through him, a message from Lord Shelburne, desiring
to see me this morning. I have just been with him. He made his
excuses to me as soon as I came in, for having appointed me at a
time when he should only be able to converse with me for _a very
short time_, as unexpected business had occurred. He then took
out the Speech, and read to me the sentence in question, which
is nearly this: The liberal spirit of your measures respecting
the commerce of Ireland, confirmed by the rest of your conduct
towards her, meets with my full approbation and concurrence; and
I should recommend to you a general revision of the trade laws
of this kingdom on the same extended principles. I own this did
not strike me as being sufficiently extensive. I mentioned the
insertion of the word rights--commerce and rights--but he did
not at all seem to give into it. He said that we were not ripe
for that; that the best thing that could be done was that we
should adhere exactly to the settlement; that it was a bond from
which we ought in no instance to depart; and that a steady
Government would enable us to stand to it in Ireland as well as
here. Above all, he said he looked to the effects of a full
confidence between you and himself, which union and concurrence
would be more important for Government than any other point
whatever--that it gave more strength than even abilities or
weight. With this I closed in, seeing it in vain to push the
other, and told him that the appearance of confidence and
support here would, I was convinced, assist you more than even
the adoption of any specific measure; that in the case of a
peace, I did not doubt that you would be sufficiently strong to
carry on your Government with ease, but that I could not answer
for the event of a continuance of the war. He answered, that the
situation of Ireland weighed very materially with him in his
wishes for peace, and that, although he never wished to shift
off responsibility, yet he trusted in your integrity and honour;
that, if he found it necessary, he should be enabled to state
that part of the subject from the best authority. To this I
thought myself justified in answering, that most certainly you
would never abandon a ground which you had already stated to
him, and which every hour made clearer to you; and that such a
consideration certainly ought to weigh with Government in making
the peace.

He then went on to say, that he had in general no doubt but that
you would find your Government easy and prosperous; he
enumerated the advantages with which you will meet the
Parliament _in October_--a settled ministry here, things
arranged in Ireland, the Parliament fully canvassed, and
possibly a peace. I said, that when I saw him before, I had
stated the possibility of your being driven to meet the
Parliament in the spring; that I had stated it as a possible
evil; and that I wished to explain to him that the necessity of
this would by no means be affected either way by the difference
between an immediate dissolution, and that which must take place
before the March assizes. To this he by no means agreed; as a
dissolution late in February would, he said, by the time the
elections were over, bring us far on towards the summer months.
He then reverted to his opinion as to the probability of your
having a smooth and easy Government. It was his idea he said,
that real commotion never was produced but by real grievances.
My answer was, that the people of Ireland did suffer real
misery, which, as was frequently the case, they would impute to
Government, however little founded such an idea would be. This,
he said, would lead us at length into a disquisition on the
state of Ireland, on which subject he intended, before I went,
to have a long conversation with me, but that he was now too
much pressed.

After this, I thought I could not, with any propriety, prolong
my visit. Since I wrote the above, I have seen Townshend. He
agrees perfectly in opinion with me, that the mention of the
commerce, with so very general a reference to the constitutional
part of the question, could produce no good effect in Ireland,
and might be made an invidious use of. He threw out the idea of
omitting the paragraph entirely; and most certainly, if Lord
Shelburne sees, or thinks he sees, any objection to being more
explicit on the subject, I know no necessity whatever for saying
a word about it. It certainly will produce debate on the affairs
of Ireland, which is much to be avoided; and in the form in
which it now stands, or indeed in any into which it could be
thrown, so as to form part of the King's Speech, it would be of
no advantage to us in Ireland, whilst it would afford ground of
cavil and objection to our enemies. In this idea, I have written
to Lord Shelburne, to desire to see him again; but as he may
possibly appoint me for to-morrow, and you must be impatient to
hear from England, I shall not detain the messenger.

With respect to that cursed cause, I hardly know what to say: it
must have set you very much afloat, particularly with the
lawyers who are interested in the question. In my last letter, I
threw out the idea of a bill in this country to prevent the
receiving or hearing Irish causes in the English courts. I have
shown to Townshend the draught of such a bill, which I enclose
to you with this letter. I believe his disposition is most real
and unaffected, to leave the management of the whole Irish
business to you, and to support you honestly and fairly in
whatever measures you adopt. But it is not difficult to see that
the whole administration and business of Government _roule sur
bien un autre pivot_. As far as one can separate Lord
Shelburne's intentions from his verbiage and professions, I
think I see a strong disposition to resist the least tendency
towards any further concession, or even to the appearance of it.
On the contrary, if any very good opportunity should offer
itself, I should think him more inclined to lessen than to
extend. He either has, or affects, an opinion very different
from that which I hold out to him with respect to the
difficulties of your Government, and exclaims even against the
possibility of your being driven from your ground. I can't say
that I think this situation between your official Minister and
the real Premier quite pleasant, because it seems to me that the
despatches of the one, however explicit, being all written
without the concurrence of the Cabinet, do not pledge the
opinions of the other, which are, after all, the only opinions
which are of any consequence.

I believe I stated to you in my last the reason which Townshend
gave to me, and which Lord Shelburne assigned to Jemmy, for not
calling a Cabinet immediately on my arrival, namely, their
unwillingness to meet them before they had news from Paris,
because they had been hitherto unanimous, and hoped to meet
Parliament so; and if they were called upon the subject of
Ireland, nobody knows what other hare might be started there,
however they might agree upon Irish affairs. You will certainly
think the mode of keeping a Cabinet unanimous, by never meeting
them at all, an excellent one; however, in the situation of
things here, I did not think it would be decent in me to
distress Government, especially as I really think the propriety
of the dissolution at this moment depends much on the event of
the business at Paris. I have therefore contented myself with an
explicit assurance from Townshend, that when news of that
arrives, which is now most anxiously expected every hour, a
Cabinet shall be held, to go into the whole line of Irish
business.

Townshend showed me his despatches on the subject of the
embargo, and of this Irish cause, both of which the King has
seen, but I believe, no one else. The idea of the resolutions
not being proposed till your wish was known, was suggested to
him by me, because, if you should be driven--and things
certainly verge towards it--to any further concession, you will
not be much assisted by those two resolutions standing on the
journals in array against you. But I believe the attention of
every one here will be so much employed by the great point of
peace or war, that there will be very little room for Irish
politics, either in the House of Commons or the House of Lords.

I asked Townshend, an hour ago, whether there was anything from
Paris; and he told me explicitly that they knew nothing at all,
but was in most anxious expectation. The Parliament certainly
meets on Thursday. I think, from the style of their language,
and particularly from Lord Shelburne's trying to make me pledge
you to it, that they are confident of a peace; and certainly, if
they have it not, their situation is very precarious, to say no
more of it. If they do meet Parliament with a peace, I am
persuaded they will stand their ground. The country gentlemen
hold in general rather a friendly language than otherwise. I
shall certainly now stay over Thursday; but after that, get back
to you as soon as I can.

Lord Mahon has been with me, and is outrageous about the Duke of
Leinster. He wanted me to engage that Government would give them
land if the other offers failed; but I begged to decline.

I have received the enclosed from Talbot, and have also sent you
my answer, which you will forward or not, as you think right.

Lord Nugent is out of all patience with you for not answering
his letter. Adieu.

Believe me,
Ever most affectionately yours,
W. W. G.

I have not given you the words of the Speech exactly, but
nearly. Yorke and Banks move in the House of Commons; Lord
Carmarthen and ---- in the House of Lords.

You will probably think it right to write to Lord Shelburne,
stating the difficulties of your situation at full length;
because I think his idea of ease and smoothness ought by no
means to remain uncontradicted. If you do that, I should think
it would not be amiss to say something about a peace, for he
evidently meant that I should have pledged you to that, and to
acknowledge his professions, which have been boundless and
unlimited.

I should think it would be also an act of real justice to
Townshend to say something to him about his conduct towards you,
which I think as honourable and friendly as possible. If one
could but join the power of the one with the integrity of the
other!

What answer will you give about your stopping the English
recruiting parties _car l'on est un peu choqué là-dessus_?

MR. W. W. GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

Pall Mall, Dec. 5th, Eleven at Night.

My dear Brother,

In consequence of their having altered their minds about
Ireland, I was summoned to give my opinion. I think the words as
they stand now are sufficiently strong, and they passed to-night
without the least animadversion: "The liberal principles adopted
by you with respect to the rights and commerce of Ireland, do
you the highest honour, and must, I trust, ensure that harmony
which ought ever to subsist between the two kingdoms."

We have had no division to-night. The speakers, Lord N., Fox,
Burke, Townshend and Pitt.

Lord N. uncommonly well, holding off from both sides. Fox and
Pitt both worse than usual. The chief debate about peace. The
giving up Gibraltar was thrown out by Banks, and strongly
objected to by Lord N., Burke, and Fox.

Johnstone made an attack upon Lord Howe, which was as ill
received as it deserved to be. I would have sent you a copy of
the King's Speech, but it is so uncommonly long, that it is not
out yet. It is utterly impossible to travel through the great
variety of matter which it comprehends. Remarkably full house.

Bulkeley was in the House of Lords; says that Shelburne
acquitted himself very well. Lord Stormont attacked him about
the Independence. He defended it as the wish of the people. Lord
Fitzgerald spoke but badly. No division there.

Ever yours,
W. W. G.

Keith Stewart answered Johnstone, defending Lord Howe very
warmly. Everybody who spoke after Johnstone reprobated him. Duke
of Richmond attacked Lord Sandwich.

MR. W. W. GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

Pall Mall, Saturday, Dec. 7th, 1782.

My dear Brother,

I received your packet late on Thursday night, or rather, I
believe, early on Friday morning. As soon as I was up I sent the
enclosed letter to Lord Shelburne and to Townshend. I received
from Lord Shelburne an answer appointing me in an hour's time.

When I went there, after waiting a considerable time (which I
can easily excuse when I reflect upon the business of this
moment), I was shown into a room, where he was with Townshend.
It is difficult for me to say whether I was more surprised or
mortified at his telling me, as soon as I came in, that he could
only see me for a minute or two. He then entered upon the
subject of your letter, by saying that he had not read Mr.
Townshend's despatches, but only your letter to himself and the
bill which you enclosed to Townshend. With respect to the bill,
he said nothing could be done without consulting the Chancellor
and the other lawyers of the Cabinet; that I must see the
Chancellor, and explain the business to him; that the rendering
a judgment null might be objected to. I answered that I was
persuaded _that_ was the part on which you was least bent, and
that you would be fully satisfied if the enacting clause went
only to prevent any future decisions, provided the preamble
expressed the principle. To this he said, that it was impossible
to go on if everything of this sort made a necessity for new
measures, and that when a ground was once taken, it ought to be
stood to. My answer was, that your ground was very materially
changed, and that this overturned the only reasoning upon which
you had been able to go on at all, namely, the pledging your own
personal faith, and the honour of Government here, that the
repeal of the G. I. was considered as a renunciation on the part
of Great Britain of all legislation and jurisdiction. He asked
whether I meant external as well as internal? I said,
undoubtedly. He said, that he had understood from your
conversation before you went, "that you meant to make your stand
upon the external legislation;" and for this he appealed to
Townshend, who said he had understood the same. It was
impossible for me to contradict this, as it referred to
conversations to which I was no party. He said that he thought
you was reasonable upon the subject of the dissolution, and that
this other business was not to be taken up suddenly. I asked
what then he wished me to do. He told me to wait upon the
Chancellor. I objected that the question was not a legal one,
but wholly political. I urged the consequences of delay. Still,
however, I could get no answer from him, but only that I must go
to the Chancellor; and at last he grew so impatient as to leave
the room while I was talking, and to tell Townshend that he
might find him in his (Lord Shelburne's) office. The whole
conversation did not last above four or five minutes at the
utmost. I turned to Townshend, and asked him if he thought it
possible that the Government of Ireland could go on in this
manner. He pressed me to go to the Chancellor, and said that he
could tell me, _en ami_, that I should do more good there in
three minutes than I could do elsewhere in as many hours.

By the way, I must say here, that by some inaccuracy I must have
explained myself very ill to you about Townshend, who seems to
me to have acted the most friendly and honest part towards you
in the course of the whole business, and who has sacrificed his
time to me for an hour or an hour and a half for several days;
while during the fortnight I have now been here, I have not seen
Lord Shelburne for twenty minutes in the whole.

I have been very particular in detailing the above conversation
to you, because I think it opens two things of infinite
importance to your personal comfort and your personal honour. I
think it extremely plain that the object of Lord Shelburne is to
gain time, and that let me press ever so eagerly, _which I shall
not fail to do_, still I am not to expect any final answer till
the negotiation is settled, and the peace, which they evidently
look upon as certain, is secured and announced. What effect
these delays may have in Ireland, and what appearance this state
of uncertainty must bear to those who know the proposal you have
made, you are best able to judge, but I know enough of it to be
very much alarmed. But the second consideration affects me much
more, as I think it affects your honour, and my own as involved
with it. What I mean is this: I threw out to you in my former
letters that Lord Shelburne appears to me much more disposed to
narrow than to extend the rights and concessions yielded to
Ireland by Great Britain. I think when you compare the evident
reluctance he showed to agree to the resolutions first proposed;
his telling me that he had thought of a paragraph in the King's
Speech to do instead of them; his then showing me a paragraph
relating merely to commercial advantages, and his telling me we
were not ripe for the word rights; when you compare all this
with his evident dislike to this bill, and with the expression
stated above about external legislation, it is not very
difficult to collect that he means to do nothing till we have
peace, and when we have, he means, to use his own expression, to
make the stand upon that point.

Possibly I may agree with him, that it might have been well for
the general interest of the empire if that ground had originally
been explained, decisively taken and maintained. But I am sure I
know too well the situation of that country and of this, to
think that it can now be held out without the most fatal
consequences to both; and I think I know your feelings too well
to imagine that you will suffer yourself to be made an
instrument of deceiving any man or body of men whatever, still
less a whole country, especially in contradiction to the
language which you have invariably held, at least as far as I
can recollect (ever since you accepted of your situation), both
to people in Ireland and to Government here, that the repeal was
a complete renunciation.

It is a singular pleasure to me to observe how exactly our ideas
have hitherto corresponded since I left you; so that while you
have been taking your measures in Ireland, I have been
recommending the same to you from hence. If they should continue
to do so in this instance, the line of conduct which I apprehend
would be proper for us to adopt on our different posts is this.
I am to see the Chancellor to-morrow, and immediately upon
leaving him mean to write to Lord Shelburne, pressing him again
most eagerly to allow me an opportunity of stating to him _at
length_ what I have in commission to say to him from you. If he
should comply, I will then go into the whole state of Ireland;
will mention to him the credit which ought to be given to
representations proceeding from you, in preference to those of
interested individuals; will enlarge upon the necessity of
decision; and will press that a Cabinet may be held in
performance of Townshend's promise to me. In the meantime, I
should think you would do well to write a letter to Townshend,
stating your ideas upon the necessity of good faith, and the
impossibility of resistance, even upon the ground of simple
repeal, still more upon the more narrow one of external
legislation; and desiring an explicit answer _from the Cabinet_
on these points. This, if you would entrust me with it, I would
suppress in case the Cabinet should have met and come to any
satisfactory decision; and if not, I would deliver it to
Townshend, with every personal expression to him of regard, &c.,
&c.

The advantages which I propose by this conduct, and the mode of
reasoning upon which I support it, are as follows: In the first
place, if it is really their intention to reserve the external
legislation, the sooner you know it, and are able to wash your
hands of it completely, by returning to England, the more
popular you will be in Ireland, and the better ground you will
have here, both to your own conscience, and as a man who may be
called upon to defend his conduct. You will observe that I take
it for granted you agree with me as to the utter impossibility
of ever exercising such a right, and the impolicy as well as bad
faith of reserving it, to become, like the tea-duty, a ground
for contest and ill-blood; without the possibility of advantage.
Lord Shelburne seems to imagine that by a peace he should be
able to enforce it; you know the contrary, and that the hearts
and voices, and even hands, not of the Volunteers only, but of
the people, and even of Parliament, would be against it. And
with what face, supposing the thing in itself practicable and
honest, could we maintain that ground, after having repeatedly
stated the contrary, and pledged ourselves to it in resolutions,
and now in a bill offered under your recommendation for the
English Parliament? In this event, therefore, I think that by an
immediate resignation you will have satisfied your own feelings,
and at the same time found an honourable solution to a very
unpleasant situation--unpleasant from the situation of things
there, and possibly not less so from the complexion of affairs
here.

If, on the other hand, this measure drives them into an
immediate acquiescence with your proposals, you will certainly
stand in a much pleasanter situation in Ireland, especially as a
peace will give you a fair ground for dissolving the Fencibles,
if you think proper, without ever coming to Parliament to vote
money for them. The advantages which we shall have from putting
an end to this almost intolerable scene of delay and temporizing
are obvious; and if the measure comes from Townshend, and is
seconded by me, as I shall propose, it will give you all the
credit of the adherence to good faith, &c., &c., instead of its
being forced upon Government, as it will otherwise be, by Lord
Beauchamp, or Commodore Johnstone, or any person disposed to do
mischief.

I have said that
O. l Fo2c TolB 3Fo3 the complexion of affairs here makes

evident intention
it more unpleasant. Lord Shelburne's c21bc93 193c931m9 is

make cyphers colleagues
to 70Ic aw6FckT of his amddcol2ct. Rayneval's arrival at his

not known
house at eight in the morning was 9m3 I9ms9 to Townshend

till twelve, nor to others till after four.
3ldd 3scd2c, 9mk 3m any of the m3Fckt 3ldd oE3ck Em2k.

They be much pleased, they mean
3fcw cannot hc 72af 6dcotch, but sill it is imagined 3fcw 7co9

to remain.
3m k370l9. I have had no opportunity of speaking about the

Vice-Treasurership since your last letter; I had spoke before.

will observe Barré's place is kept
You sldd mhtck2c Hokkct 6doac lt also Ic63 open.[1]

_Quorsum hæc tendunt_, God only knows.
Ever yours,
W. W. G.

[Footnote 1: Portions of numerous letters in the correspondence
contained in these volumes are written in cypher. The above passage is
given merely as a specimen, which will be sufficient to show the
character of the cypher.]

MR. W. W. GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

Pall Mall, Sunday, Dec. 15th, 1782.

My dear Brother,

I am just returned from Lord Shelburne's. He appointed me
yesterday to be with him this morning, and I have had a pretty
long conversation with him on the subject of Ireland. But it was
for the most part so very general, that it is not easy to reduce
it to writing.

I began by stating under two distinct heads the original object
of my being sent here, and what had since happened. First, that
I had been commissioned to explain the grounds on which you had
wished to stand against further concessions, your reasons for
imagining it doubtful whether that ground could be maintained,
and your certain conviction that it could be done only by an
immediate dissolution of Parliament. The second point I said
was, that, by what had since happened, you apprehended that
something further was made necessary, and this was the more
evident from the manner in which every one had taken up the
business in Ireland.

These two points, of course, led us into a very wide field of
conversation. As to the dissolution, I said you certainly would
not press the Ministry for any more on the subject, than that,
even with a peace, and a remedy to the business of the King's
Bench, it should not be delayed beyond the end of January. The
great object, he said, was at all events not to meet till
October. My answer was, that to you, who were personally to meet
the difficulties of an earlier meeting, they certainly would
appear quite as strong as they could to him sitting at a
distance and speculating upon them. It was therefore by no means
a thing to be wished by you, but an evil which circumstances
might render necessary. This led me to a mention of several
causes of discontent which might arise or be sought for, and
which could only be prevented by the Irish Parliament; such as
an infringement, for instance, of the East India monopoly. We
went, at different periods of the conversation, a good deal into
this business. He threw out an idea, which he said had been
often mentioned, and for which a foundation was certainly laid
in the last resolution of the English Houses on Irish affairs,
if we chose to pursue it. This was the fixing, by a sort of
treaty, a commercial system between the two countries, and a
proportionable contribution to be paid by Ireland for the
general protection of the empire.

When I mentioned the objection to this, founded on the
impossibility that Ireland could in her present situation
contribute such a quota as would hereafter be even infinitely
too small for her share, he answered it by stating the
possibility of having a tax on some particular article or
description of articles applicable to this purpose, which might
be so fixed as to be small at present, very small if necessary,
but which might increase with the wealth and commerce of
Ireland. On this idea of a settlement, our conversation dwelt a
good deal. I expressed my opinion that it would be, in many
points of view, a measure of dignity and weight, and
particularly advantageous to both countries, as it would leave
no ground of contest unexplained. But at the same time I thought
the present moment unfavourable for such a step, because it
ought not to be taken till Government in Ireland recovered its
energy; otherwise, I stated that the wildest idea that could be
broached in a newspaper would be adopted by those in whom the
real Government of the country resides at the present moment;
that, till the Volunteers have in some degree subsided, your
Government could only subsist by expedients, painful as such an
idea must be to your feelings. I stated also, that if this was
to be held out to the country as the satisfaction and security
to which they were to look, it would set all their heads afloat
forming systems of trade and government; and that it would make
the spring meeting absolutely necessary, from the impatience it
would excite and the necessity of its being done by Parliament.

From this we went into the present situation of your Government.
Upon this he desired to explain himself, and that I would state
to you that he was _inclined to think_, not that he _thought_,
your Government would go on more easily there than you expected.
He alluded to De Retz's maxim: "_Le peuple ne se soulève jamais
que quand on l'opprime_." To the truth of this I agreed
perfectly, but said that the people there are really oppressed,
and miserable to a degree I had not at all conceived till I went
into the country. That nothing was more usual than for the
people to mistake the cause of grievances which they really
feel, and that this I apprehended to be the case there. In that
case, he said, the remedy was at hand; for that an extended
commerce and the wisdom of internal regulations, would relieve
the evil, and be a pleasant task to your Government. I answered
that such remedies must be gradual, while the situation of
Ireland was pressing at this moment; and that perhaps nothing
had contributed more to the discontents now prevalent, than the
foolish expectations of wealth to be poured like a torrent into
the country by a free trade. To this he agreed, but said that
laws might certainly be devised by which such remedies might be
brought forward and hastened. Then he went into the nature of
absentee laws. Direct absentee taxes were, he said, highly
objectionable, but many things might be thought of which would
produce the effect so reasonably to be wished, that the money
arising from land in Ireland should not be spent elsewhere. All
methods to raise the value of that land would operate to that
effect; because, when the person residing in England saw the
means of getting an equivalent, he would certainly prefer an
estate at his own door to one in Ireland. Still, however, this
would be gradual.

With respect to the Volunteer force, he apprehended less
embarrassment from them, because he could not believe that five
thousand of them would ever bring themselves to march ten miles
together. I said, perhaps not, but that they had each the means
of resisting the execution of any law they disliked in their own
places of residence; whilst your whole army did not amount,
without the Provincials, to six thousand men. And in time of
peace, the Provincials were to be disbanded, and only twelve
thousand men could be brought back upon the establishment. He
asked whether the Provincials could not be made permanent. I
said, I apprehended not, and that possibly the attempt would not
be wise; for that, although you had, by the most determined
perseverance and by an unremitted firmness, carried the point
with respect to their being raised, yet I thought that would be
sufficient to show the steadiness of Government, without seeking
unnecessary grounds of discontent.

There were many other general heads of Irish Government touched
upon in the course of the conversation, which I do not now
remember. He spoke to the reports about the situation of English
Government. I never heard any man, in the whole course of my
life, affirm any one thing more distinctly, positively, and
unequivocally, than he did, when he told me that Government were
upon a sure foundation here. He said that I was too wise to
expect him to explain to me upon what grounds he said this, but
that it was upon sure grounds; that there was a moral certainty,
and as a rational man he proceeded upon it. This language is the
more extraordinary, because the opinion of the world in general,
I might say of almost every man in London, is directly the
reverse. Either, therefore, Lord Shelburne is (not a dissembler,
but) the most abandoned and direct liar upon the face of the
earth, or he is deceived himself, too grossly to be imagined, or
the whole world besides is deceived. Which of these is the case,
time will show, and that only; but I cannot bring myself to
imagine that the first is. That he wishes you should believe him
secure, I can easily imagine, and that he wishes it very
strongly; but that he should therefore be induced to pledge
himself to so direct a falsehood, which he must know it was my
business to repeat to you, and yours to act upon, and which the
event of a few weeks must demonstrate to be false if it is so,
exceeds my utmost power of belief. That the Duke of Richmond
thinks as Lord Shelburne has expressed himself to me, is, I
apprehend, most probable, from the very strong compliments he
paid him and the flattering language he held to him in the House
of Lords on Friday. But this is mere conjecture. What is
certain, on the other hand, is that the explanation given by him
in the House of Lords of the American treaty does not tally with
that of Pitt, Townshend and Conway in the House of Commons, to
which nevertheless the three last have positively pledged their
faith and honour, that the Cabinet has been postponed because
Lord Shelburne was afraid to meet them, and that the report of
the day is that Lord Shelburne was outvoted there upon the
question of Gibraltar.

After we had gone over a great deal of conversation on these
subjects for above an hour and a half, he said that we seemed to
agree about all the points on which we had touched. I then
mentioned the two main objects--the Dissolution, and the Bill of
Satisfaction. To the dissolution, he said he imagined no
difficulty would be made to-day in the Cabinet which was to be
held; as to the other point, he saw much more objection. It cut
up the principle on which our stand had been made. People were
not ripe in England to go into the whole question again. The
moment a bill of that sort was proposed in the House of Commons,
every man would have to give his opinion on the effect of the
repeal, on the legal question, and on the right of internal and
external legislation. There never was a debate on Irish
questions in England that was not misrepresented; and this,
together with the acknowledgment of the principle of the
insufficiency of what was done last year, would put Mr. Flood on
excellent ground. To many of these objections I could not but
subscribe, for they strike me very strongly. I wished to know
from him his idea on the external legislation. He said he had
understood you, when you left England, that you was determined
never to cede that. I said, that as his Lordship referred to
conversations to which I was no party, I could only say that I
had understood you very differently. The distinction between
external and internal, he said, was a bad one, as applied to
Ireland. It was applied by Fox, who took it from Lord Chatham,
by whom it had been adopted, for want of a better expression, in
the case of America. I said, the distinction I made was a clear
one--that England could, in her own ports, restrain as she
pleased the commerce of Ireland; but that it was not in the
power of Government, after what had been done (whether wisely or
not), to enforce any English Act which was to be executed in
Ireland. He said, that this brought us back to the idea of a
settlement; and that he should be curious, and indeed it was
necessary to the subject, to know what questions about English
Acts concerning trade, and what other commercial points would
come into discussion in such a settlement. At the same time, he
said, the subject was one of those which required conversing
with people of information, and which, nevertheless, if any one
was consulted upon it, would set the heads of every one afloat.
However, he wished I would turn my thoughts to it, and let him
see the principal points. I then pressed him again upon the head
of your Bill; I thought it right to say that I was satisfied on
every other head, but that this pressed strongly on my mind. All
I wished was, that he would allow me to state to you the
difficulties, such as he had mentioned them; but at the same
time, to say, that they were overbalanced by an absolute
necessity. He said, that he would not suppose that they could be
overbalanced.

While I write this, I receive your despatches of the 12th
instant. I have immediately enclosed your letter to Townshend,
with one from myself, of which I send you a copy, and wait his
answer with impatience. I was going on, when I was interrupted
by your letters, to state to you, that my conversation with Lord
Shelburne closed with his saying that the difficulties were
capital, and that he could not believe that they could be
overbalanced. I then observed, that a Cabinet was, I understood,
to be held to-day. He said yes, and at eleven, and that it was
then half-past ten, and therefore I must excuse him. As I had
been there above an hour and a half, I could not with any
propriety stay any longer.

According to Townshend's directions to me last night, I staid at
home the whole morning, under the idea that I was to be sent
for, as it was so directed in the King's approbation for the
Cabinet being held, which Townshend showed me. Why this was not
done, whether the Cabinet has not been held, or whether Lord
Shelburne thought he had received information enough for all, I
cannot pretend to say. It is certainly unnecessary for me to
observe, that the whole of this magnificent idea about a
settlement was most probably intended to draw your attention off
from the Bill you have proposed. I could do no otherwise than
acquiesce in sending it over to you, as I had already stated my
belief, confirmed so fully by your authority, that your proposal
was necessary, and to the adoption of it, on this ground, I
meant, if I could, to have pledged him by my last question; and
although he did not accede to what I then asked, yet I think I
should not have been justified in not agreeing to state to you
his objections--which certainly have their weight, especially as
he proposed an expedient in the room of yours, though
insufficient and improper for the reasons which, as I told you
above, I mentioned to him. I forgot to state in its proper place
that I reminded him of the danger which was almost inevitable,
that some enemy to Government would take the business up, if not
immediately done by Ministry themselves.

Half-past Eleven, P.M.

I have just received the enclosed answer from Townshend; and
though it contains nothing, yet I cannot but feel too much for
your impatience to delay till Wednesday night the acknowledging
your despatches, and the assuring you that there shall be no
remissness whatever on my part to follow up this business as
much as possible, and to press it forward in this strange scene
of procrastination. Nothing can make me happier than your
approbation of my conduct, and your kind disposition to trust so
much to that most unfeigned affection with which I am,

My dearest brother,
Ever yours,
W. W. Grenville.

P.S.--I mean to-morrow to write to Lord Shelburne, stating that
you have sent over a fresh despatch to Mr. Townshend, and
referring him to that for the absolute necessity of adopting
your proposal, which still leaves room for his settlement, if it
is thought proper and expedient. The one will remove the present
difficulty, the other prevent the rise of any fresh source of
discord. But how far the latter can or ought at this time to be
taken up, is with me very doubtful. If I get on Wednesday such
an answer as I wish, you shall see me very soon.

MR. W. W. GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

Pall Mall, Dec. 20th, 1782.

My dear Brother,

I am still unable to send you any final answer, although I must
confess that I think we approach much nearer to it than we have
done yet.

The Cabinet met yesterday. As I was not quite satisfied with
what I had said the day before on the subject of recognition,
and of the preamble, I thought it better to put a few words to
paper, and to send them to Townshend. I enclose a copy of that
paper and the letter which went with it. They were delivered to
Townshend during the Cabinet. I heard nothing at all from him
last night.

This morning I was surprised and shocked--and I cannot say which
I was most--by seeing in the papers the conversation which had
passed in the House on the subject of Ireland, of which
Fitzpatrick, though it was evidently a concerted thing, had not
thought proper to give me any notice whatever. I immediately
resolved to say something about it in the House to-day.
Accordingly I sent a note to Townshend, desiring to be allowed
to wait upon him in the morning. I told him my intention, and
questioned him upon the subject of the Cabinet. He showed me,
what (he said) was not properly a minute, but a memorandum taken
there. I could not copy that, but as soon as I came home I
endeavoured to recollect it, and believe the enclosed is very
near the words. This I said immediately was only losing time,
and that it was very useless for him to trouble himself with
writing such a despatch, as I would take upon myself to make
your answer to the two points it contained: First, that the bill
you had sent over was drawn expressly to avoid the question of
what _had been_ the right, as it declared only what _is_ now the
right; and that if there was to be any reservation as to its
being now the right, I would only say that this would be the
most disgraced country in Europe. As to the other point, I knew
perfectly that every step you had taken was with a full
knowledge of the circumstances of the case, because I had sent
them over to you myself a few days after my arrival in London.
That being the case, Townshend said he would not write, but
state these things to the Cabinet, which was to meet again
either to-morrow or the next day; I do not positively remember
which. I then stated to him what I meant to say to-day, in which
he acquiesced. He told me General Conway wished to see me, as he
thought that he had struck out an idea which might answer
effectually; and he showed me a few words which were to explain
this idea. They were in the form of a resolution, and went only
to say, that Great Britain had, by the repeal, renounced all
thoughts of exercising any right to make laws to bind Ireland.
You may easily guess the answer which I made to this.

From Townshend I went to Conway. Him I found very strongly
impressed with Lord B.'s ideas about renunciation, complete
satisfaction, and the effect of a declaratory law, and of the
repeal of it, which, he said, left things as they were before. I
combated all this very strongly, and at last got him to
acquiesce in the idea of a recognition, provided that the words
were such as not to imply that England _never had_ the right. I
said that I conceived, as this was merely a point of honour, and
not a reservation of anything to be exercised in future, that
all that Government could desire was to use such words as should
not _necessarily_ imply that the right never existed; that this
was expressly the description of the words in your bill, which
were so drawn as to go only to present right, and yet so as to
be very satisfactory to Ireland. In all this he acquiesced, and
then wished that some notice might be given in the "Dublin
Gazette;" that the cause had only been heard because it was
pending before; and that after the holidays, something
satisfactory would be done. I answered as to the first, that
after the opinion delivered privately by the Chancellor, and in
the House of Commons, as I had understood, by the
Attorney-General, that even a new cause could not be rejected by
the Judges, such a ground would be a very bad one to take. To
this he agreed. As to the other point, I said that it was my
intention to state it in the House of Commons, which I
apprehended would answer nearly the same purpose. He assented to
this also, and so I left him. I then went to the House of
Commons; there I saw Townshend, and asked him what day the
Parliament was to meet after Christmas, because I thought it
would give more solemnity if I gave notice for a particular day,
and moved for a call on that day; and that the earlier it was,
the better it would be. He said they met on the 21st. I proposed
that day, and he agreed. Hartley rose at the same time with me,
and being called to, moved for a call on the 22nd. I then got up
and said, that if I had not been prevented, I was going to have
moved it for the 21st; but I would now trouble the House only to
give notice that on that day a very important business would be
brought before them on the subject of Ireland; that I had
understood that a conversation had taken place the day before on
that subject; that I lamented exceedingly that I had been so
unfortunate as to be absent at that time, because if I had been
there I should have thought it my duty to have stated to the
House, in justice to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, that the
business in question had been submitted by you to the
consideration of Government, and had been in the contemplation
of the King's servants a considerable time before any notice had
been given of a motion to be made upon it by a noble Lord in the
House; that I wished further, in justice to you, to say, that
"there was no man in either kingdom more decidedly of opinion
that the good faith of Great Britain was solemnly pledged to
Ireland, by the repeal of the 6th Geo. I., in the last sessions,
upon the avowed and explained principle of putting an end to
every idea of legislation and jurisdiction over that kingdom;
and that there was no man more eagerly desirous than you, that
that faith so pledged, and upon that principle so explained,
should be religiously adhered to and maintained, as the national
honour and national interest required it should be maintained,
sacred and inviolable."

This brought up Lord Beauchamp, who began by assuring and
protesting that the part he had taken was upon the best motives,
&c., &c. He then went into the question of the writ of error,
how far it could have been rejected, and how useless it was in
Ireland, &c., &c. He then said that it was a point of
parliamentary fairness, that when one person had given notice of
a motion, it should be left to him, and not taken up in the
meantime by any other person.

I answered, that as to the noble Lord's motives, he must do me
the justice to say that _I_ had been perfectly silent on that
head. That with respect to the question about the writ of error,
neither did I conceive this to be a proper time for that
discussion. But that with regard to parliamentary fairness, I
did not imagine that His Majesty's Government would think
themselves justified in postponing so important a question, and
which would have been brought on before the recess if there had
been time, merely because the noble Lord meant to move something
about it at a distant day.

This ended the conversation on the subject; except that I added
that the noble Lord had misunderstood me when he imagined that
_I_ was to move the business on the 21st, as I _apprehended_
that it was the intention of Government to do it.

I cannot help thinking that by this, which has been done
entirely without the concurrence or even knowledge of Lord
Shelburne, we have gained a great point. By giving such a
notice, speaking from the Treasury bench in the hearing of, and
backed by Townshend and Pitt, I have most undoubtedly pledged
Government to do something on that day. If that is short of your
wishes, see in what a situation they stand; if not, you are
landed. In the meantime the notice and the explicit declaration
made in your name must surely be infinitely useful to you in
Ireland.

I wait with great impatience the final decision of the Cabinet.
Conway's expression was, that he conceived there was no
objection to any preamble which had not a retrospect. If we can
convince them that ours has none, or frame one not quite so
strong, but very near it, think what ground we stand upon, in
having obtained something stronger and more advantageous to the
interests of Ireland than any renunciation whatever. "For this
we must thank" Mansfield, who has certainly extricated us from a
scene of considerable difficulty.

If it could be done without great inconvenience to you in
Ireland, I should be very desirous either of coming back here,
in case I get away soon enough, or if not, of staying here till
the 21st; because I am convinced my presence here is of infinite
moment, to prevent their being frightened at the time into any
weakening of the preamble, and to goad them on to do something.
For you see, even in this case, the objection was not so much to
the taking any particular step, as to the doing anything at all;
and when forced to that, and driven from their intrenchments of
indolence and delay, you see how much they are inclined to take
the measures you wish. But this shall be decided by your wishes
on the subject, unless I should set out before I receive them.

I say nothing of the dissolution; I have not, however, lost
sight of that, and will press it to-morrow; but I thought the
other the more important point, having so fine an opening, which
I trust you will think I have not neglected.

D'Ivernois is come. He was with me this morning, and comes again
to-morrow. He says the business goes on at Geneva far better
than he could have expected, owing to the Constitution which the
mediating powers have given them, which appears truly, what he
states it, worse than that of Venice.

Believe me, my dear brother,
Ever most affectionately yours,
W. W. G.

MR. W. W. GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

Pall Mall, Dec. 23rd, 1782.

My dear Brother,

When I wrote last to you, I expressed considerable hopes that
this tedious business was drawing near to a conclusion, and that
Government here would at last consent to grant the happiness and
peace of Great Britain and Ireland, to solicitations that I
should have been ashamed to have employed for any private
object, however near to me. These hopes are, I must confess,
weakened by my conversation of this morning with Townshend. I
can plainly see that he is himself personally disposed to comply
with your wishes. I can as plainly see that a greater and more
powerful minister sets himself against them.

Dec. 24th, 1782.

So far I had written yesterday, when I resolved to delay writing
further to you till to-day, on account of the promise which
Townshend gave me that he would see Lord Shelburne last night,
and press him upon the subject.

I have been with Townshend again this morning, and yet have
nothing like a decided answer to give you. He told me that
Thurlow made the most difficulty, but that Dunning seems to be
entirely with us. Yesterday he said that Shelburne talked much
of the advantages of holding high language. What the tenor of
Conway's language was, I have stated to you before. Of the rest
I know nothing. I own I am rather in doubt whether Lord
Shelburne acts upon a system of resuming, or only of gaining
time; neither of them is very pleasant or flattering to you.

Townshend appears to me to be most heartily and sincerely with
you; nothing can be more explicit than his language was to that
point. He complained of irresponsible Cabinet Ministers, and
seemed to throw it upon that. I then stated your impatience,
what you must feel, and asked how you could go on? I took out of
my pocket your three letters to me, of the 12th and 14th
instant, and read him such extracts as I thought would _express_
your opinion and your impatience, and would pretty strongly
_imply_ though not _express_ your determination upon the subject
of resigning. He took the hint, and said that he could not
wonder at any resolution you might take, and that he had told
the Cabinet so. To this I answered, that it was right for me not
to conceal from _him_ (though I did not mean it as a _formal_
declaration), that you certainly would not stay a moment there,
if you found the proposal of a Bill of recognition either
negatived or put off longer. He repeated that he could not
wonder at it. He then charged me with a commission to write to
you this evening, and to say that although nothing was yet done,
he would labour to the utmost of his power that your wishes
should be complied with, and that he hoped to bring the business
to a conclusion _in a very few days_; that in the meantime he
thought that his writing an official despatch, which should not
be explicit, would be by no means pleasant to you. In this I
agreed most fully.

The difficulty, he told me, lay in bringing them to think of
anything but the peace, by which you see that business is still
_en train_.

This consideration makes me less eager than I should otherwise
be to cut the matter short. I continue to think, that if they
are sufficiently pressed, you will carry your point; because I
am fully persuaded they will not push you to the wall. In the
meantime they feel the situation into which the notice for the
House of Commons has thrown them; for Townshend expressed his
satisfaction at it to-day, and said it lay a necessity on
Government to do something.

While I am writing this, I receive your letters of the 21st. The
despatch will, I think, have a good effect in pressing the thing
forward, and assisting the exertions which I sincerely believe
Townshend will make. At the same time, as it must now be the
27th at soonest before you can receive this letter, which leaves
everything exactly where my last despatches to you did, I should
think upon the receipt of it you would do well to write a letter
to Townshend, rather demanding than requesting an immediate
answer.

What I mean is (if you should approve of the idea), that you
should say, "that after having so repeatedly stated the grounds
of your proposal, to which you can now add nothing," (because
any reasoning of yours brings on more discussion) "except that
every day gives fresh force to them, you have nothing left but
to request, as your situation entitles you to do, that you may
at last have an immediate and explicit answer, in order that on
the one hand you may not disgrace your personal honour and the
faith of Great Britain by continuing to pledge them to
assurances which are not to be performed, nor on the other hand
appear by remaining in your situation without a favourable
answer, to countenance a system which your own mind informs you
to be at once unjust and impracticable." If you think the
expressions too strong, or not sufficiently so, you will weaken
or aggravate them; but I am very impatient to receive some such
letter, which shall _not_ enter into reasons or discussion on a
subject so completely exhausted, but shall manifest your own
intention, which I am convinced will operate more strongly than
all the argument in the world.

You will perhaps say that I have already in my possession such a
paper. But I must own I feel great difficulty in fixing the
exact moment when to make use of it, and when to say that I can
no longer in justice to you give credit to assurances of an
immediate determination so often repeated and so often found
fallacious. With you, who have received none such, there is no
such difficulty. Besides, the letter in my hands can only
operate as an actual resignation on your behalf, and authorized
by you; whereas the letter from you, which I propose, would
operate as a threat, and by that means prevent, I believe, the
event itself; or if not, it would at least convince your
feelings, as well as mine, most unequivocally of the absolute
necessity for taking such a measure, as the only one by which
you could preserve either integrity of character or uprightness
of conduct. Such a letter might, if the winds do not prevent it,
be here in a week from this day; and before that time I am most
thoroughly convinced I shall receive not a single word further
than I have already. With such a letter to deliver to Townshend,
I should think myself authorized to _demand_ a Cabinet; or if I
could not obtain that, to make use of your former letter, and
desire from you that I might see the King, to state to him your
sense of the impracticability of such a system, and of the
certainty that Government will be compelled in October to make
concessions without gaining any advantage by them, infinitely
greater than what would in January conciliate the affections of
all Ireland.

One way or other, this business does most certainly draw to a
conclusion. I allow, by this proposal, one week more for them to
take their resolution. If they delay it beyond that, it is in
effect the most mortifying and the most insulting way of
refusing it that they could have adopted; and as such I think
you would do right to state it in your letter. But whichever way
it terminates, I think we shall derive the greatest advantage
from Townshend's having authorized me to promise that on the
21st something should be done in the English House of Commons,
and having sat by and acquiesced in my saying that _that_
something would, I _apprehended_, be brought forward by
Government. If it is not, I think I need not say what a
situation they stand in; and what ours will be--how much better
than if nothing had been said. On the other hand, if they do
authorize me to bring forward, or bring forward themselves, on
that day, a satisfactory Bill, we shall derive much more
advantage to Government from having given an early notice of it,
and much more personal credit from its coming through my mouth
from you, than if it had been done only by the Minister, and
kept back till the 21st.

I have had no communication with Lord Shelburne, nor have I
either seen or heard from him since I spoke in the House of
Commons. I mean, however, to-morrow to write to him on the
strength of having received fresh despatches from you, and to
press him in the strongest manner, that _the Bill to be_
proposed on the 21st, may be such as will satisfy your wishes by
satisfying the people of Ireland. What the new reason for delay
will be, God knows. In the meantime is it not inconceivable that
a man will hazard so much, in every sense of the word, so much
credit as a Minister, so much in point of character, and so much
in point of weight and support to his administration, without
its being possible for one to discover any one object under
Heaven which he is to gain by the delay? Possibly such a letter
as I wish from you may succeed in bringing him to his senses; if
not, I am sure the sooner your hands are washed of it the
better; for if the rest of your administration in Ireland is to
go on in the same manner, and you are to be left for months
together without knowing whether Government here will expressly
support or expressly contradict you, and all this only that they
may gain time, without having anything further to gain, such a
situation is neither suited for such tempers as we have, nor for
such characters as I hope we shall ever preserve together.

The real grievance seems to be, what did hang as a dead weight
upon the last administration till it pulled it down, and what
must hang as the same dead weight upon this--I mean a Cabinet of
eleven. If these are disunited, there are not wanting, even
among themselves, men to publish it to the world; and how is it
possible that they should be otherwise, except by the means of
that delightful expedient which I stated to you once before, and
which was again alluded to in yesterday's conversation. I should
hope, however, that the appearance of your resolution will put
an end to this scene of procrastination, disgraceful to you and
dangerous to the country; if it does not, I am sure the
resolution itself is most absolutely necessary to vindicate us
to ourselves, as well as to others, from the consequences which
we both foresee.

In the meantime, my dear brother, I cannot close this letter
without expressing to you the extreme pleasure and satisfaction
which I feel when, after having confided so much to my
discretion, you express yourself satisfied that, however
unsuccessful I may have been, the failure of my endeavours to
procure this long-expected answer has not been owing to any want
of zeal or judgment in me, but to those to whom the consequences
are really to be imputed, and who have on that account already
made themselves most deeply responsible both to God and their
country.

Believe me, my dear brother,
Ever most sincerely and affectionately yours,
W. W. G.

D'Ivernois is here, and going over almost immediately to Ireland
with two other _commissaires_.

If any decision should drop from the skies before I receive your
letter to Townshend, I will suppress it entirely.

MR. W. W. GRENVILLE TO LORD TEMPLE.

Pall Mall, Dec. 25th, 1782.

My dear Brother,

All the effect which I hoped for by the official despatch has
been produced by the confidential communication. Townshend has
had this morning a long conversation with Lord Shelburne, the
result of which is a compliance with your wishes. But this will
be done by an official despatch, and not by a Cabinet minute, as
they cannot venture to meet a Cabinet upon it. Still, however, I
think that is sufficient for you--sufficient to authorize you in
present, and to justify you in future. I write this in great
haste, in order if possible to prevent the measure which I
recommended in my last.

Thurlow will probably oppose it in that House. They talk of
altering the bill, _but not materially_. I put the question
explicitly, whether it was to contain a recognition, and was
answered that it should. Townshend asked me whether you would be
likely to pledge yourself that this should satisfy, as he
thought that might possibly be expected. I said it could not be
expected that you should _pledge_ yourself for madmen, but that
you certainly _hoped_. He then said that it would take a day or
two to prepare and send in circulation the despatch, and hoped
this would make no material difference. I said certainly not, if
I was allowed to state this conversation to you. To this he
agreed. Then I mentioned the dissolution. He said that you
seemed to agree that this would take effect much better with the
news of a peace, and that (he might tell me confidentially) this
must be decided within three days, unless something very
unforeseen happens.

On this idea I wait here a few days long

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