Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws
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Title: Modern Atheism under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, Development, and Natural Laws
Author: James Buchanan
Release date: December 31, 2006 [eBook #20233]
Language: English
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MODERN ATHEISM
UNDER ITS FORMS OF
PANTHEISM, MATERIALISM, SECULARISM,
DEVELOPMENT, AND NATURAL LAWS.
BY
JAMES BUCHANAN, D. D., LL. D.,
DIVINITY PROFESSOR IN "THE NEW COLLEGE," EDINBURGH, AND AUTHOR
OF "THE OFFICE AND WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT," ETC.
BOSTON:
_GOULD AND LINCOLN_,
59 WASHINGTON STREET.
NEW YORK: SHELDON, BLAKEMAN & CO.,
CINCINNATI: GEORGE S. BLANCHARD.
1857.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by
_GOULD AND LINCOLN_,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of
Massachusetts.
Electro-Stereotyped by
_G. J. STILES & COMPANY_,
23 Congress Street, Boston.
PREFATORY NOTE.
The contents of this volume originally constituted about one half of a
work, entitled "Faith in God and Modern Atheism compared, in their
Essential Nature, Theoretic Grounds, and Practical Influence."
Simultaneously with the first issue of that work in Scotland, the five
principal chapters in this volume were published separately, accompanied
with the announcement that _each was complete in itself_. The hint thus
given by the author, has been acted upon by the present publishers. On
examining the whole work, it was found to be divided into four Sections.
Of these, the third was devoted exclusively to "_Modern Atheism_." It
embraced the five chapters already alluded to, together with a general
introduction and four shorter chapters. It appeared, in fact, to be a
complete treatise by itself; and it is now presented to the American
public in the conviction that such a work is peculiarly demanded by the
present state of religious opinion in this country.
The author is one of the most distinguished divines of the Free Church
of Scotland. In 1845, he was appointed Professor of Apologetic Theology
in the New College, Edinburgh; and, on the death of Dr. Chalmers, in
1847, he was translated to the Chair of Systematic Theology thus made
vacant. In the former position, it became his duty to prepare a complete
course of Lectures on Natural Religion. His work on "Faith in God," &c.,
contains, in an altered form, adapted to general readers, the substance
of those Lectures.
Respecting this work, the British press generally has spoken in the
highest terms. The distinguished geologist, Hugh Miller, says, in the
_Edinburgh Witness_: "It is one of, at once, the most readable and
solid which we have ever perused;" and the _News of the Churches_, the
organ of the Free Church, describes it as "a work of which nothing less
can be said than that, both in spirit and substance, style and argument,
it fixes irreversibly the name of its author as a leading classic in the
Christian literature of Britain." An American critic says: "His succinct
analysis of the doctrines held by the various schools of modern atheism
are admirable, and his criticisms on their doctrines original and
profound; while his arguments in defence of the Christian faith against
philosophical objectors are unsurpassed by those of any modern writer.
Clear, vigorous, logical, learned, and strong as a Titan, he fairly
vanquishes all antagonists by pure mental superiority; never
understating their views or evading their arguments, but meeting them in
all their force and _crushing_ them." Another critic says: "It is a
great argument for Theism and against Atheism, magnificent in its
strength, order, and beauty.... The style is lucid, grave, harmonious,
and every way commensurate with the dignity and importance of the
subject.... The chapter on Pantheism is admirable. Regarding it as 'the
most formidable rival of Christian Theism at the present day,' Dr.
Buchanan seems to have specially addressed himself to the task of
exposing and refuting this error. His statement of Spinoza's system is
beautifully clear."
The reader will find that there is no exaggeration in these encomiums.
Hugh Miller, always felicitous in his choice of words, has exactly
described the two leading characteristics of "Modern Atheism," by the
phrase "readable and solid." Every one who begins the book will find
himself drawn strongly onward to the end; and no one can rise from its
perusal without a conviction that it contains a weight of argument
against _all_ the forms of Atheism such as never before has been
combined in one book.
Should the reception of this volume by the public furnish sufficient
encouragement, it is the intention of the publishers to issue the
remainder of the work ("Faith in God," &c.), in uniform style.
BOSTON, _December_, 1856.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
INTRODUCTION, 9
CHAPTER I.
MODERN ATHEISM, 15
CHAPTER II.
THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT, 45
SECTION I.
THEORY OF COSMICAL DEVELOPMENT,--"THE VESTIGES," 47
SECTION II.
THEORY OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT,--"TELLIAMED,"
--PHYSIO-PHILOSOPHY, 61
SECTION III.
THEORY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,--AUGUSTE COMTE, 84
SECTION IV.
THEORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL DEVELOPMENT,--J. H. NEWMAN, 116
CHAPTER III.
THEORIES OF PANTHEISM, 129
SECTION I.
THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA, 142
SECTION II.
MATERIAL PANTHEISM, 161
SECTION III.
IDEAL PANTHEISM, 167
CHAPTER IV.
THEORIES OF MATERIALISM, 189
SECTION I.
DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM, 192
SECTION II.
PROPOSITIONS ON MATERIALISM, 207
SECTION III.
RELATIONS OF MATERIALISM TO THEOLOGY, 235
CHAPTER V.
THEORY OF GOVERNMENT BY NATURAL LAWS,--VOLNEY,--COMBE, 249
SECTION I.
THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES, 252
SECTION II.
THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN IN ITS RELATION TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 254
SECTION III.
THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, 283
CHAPTER VI.
THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, 303
CHAPTER VII.
THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM, 323
CHAPTER VIII.
THEORIES OF CERTITUDE AND SKEPTICISM, 333
CHAPTER IX.
THEORY OF SECULARISM, 361
INTRODUCTION.
A Treatise on the Being and Perfections of God, as the Creator and
Governor of the world, can scarcely be adapted to the exigencies of
modern society, unless it be framed with express reference to the
existing forms of unbelief, and the prevailing tendencies both of
philosophical thought and of popular opinion. It is quite possible,
indeed, to construct a scheme of evidence on this subject out of the
ample materials which the storehouse of nature affords, without entering
into any discussion of the questions, whether Physical or Metaphysical,
which have been raised respecting it. But this method, although it might
be sufficient for many, perhaps for most, of our readers--for all,
indeed, who come to the study of the subject with reflective but
unsophisticated minds--could scarcely be expected to meet the case or to
satisfy the wants of those who stand most in need of instruction; the
men, and especially the young men, in all educated communities, who,
imbued with the spirit of philosophical speculation, and instructed,
more or less fully, in the principles of modern science, have been led,
under the influence of certain celebrated names, to adopt opinions which
prevent them from seriously considering any theological question, and to
regard the whole subject of religion with indifference or contempt, as
one that lies beyond the possible range of science,--the only
legitimate domain of human thought. In such cases (and they are neither
few nor unimportant), it may be useful and even necessary to neutralize
those adverse presumptions or "prejudicate opinions," which prevent them
from considering the evidence to which Theism appeals, and to review the
various theories from which they spring, so as to show that they afford
no valid reason for discarding the subject, and no ground for alleging
that it is not fit _to go to proof_. It is true that we must ultimately
rely, for the establishment of our main positions, on that body of
natural and historical evidence, which depends little, if at all, on any
of the Theories of Philosophical Speculation, or even on any of the
discoveries of Physical Science; but it is equally true that the
evidence, however conclusive in itself, cannot be expected to produce
conviction unless it be candidly examined and weighed; and if there be
anything in the existing state of public opinion which leads men to
regard the whole subject with indifference or suspicion, to conceive of
it as a problem insoluble by the human faculties, and to treat Theology
as a fond fancy or a waking dream, it were surely well to examine the
grounds of such opinions, to expose their fallacy so as to counteract
their influence, and to refute those theories which prevent men from
judging of the evidence as they would on any other topic of Inductive
Inquiry. In adopting this course, we are only following the footsteps of
the profound author of the "Analogy," who finding it, he knew not how,
"to be taken for granted, by many persons, that Christianity is not so
much as a subject of inquiry," set himself, in the first instance, to
prove "that it is not, however, so clear a case that there is nothing in
it;"--this preliminary proof being designed to neutralize objections,
and to disburden the subject of all adverse presumptions, so as to be
judged on its own proper and independent merits. We are imitating, too,
the example of another sagacious writer on a kindred theme, who thought
that "Apologists had paid too little attention to the _prejudices_ of
their opponents, and had been too confident of accomplishing their
object at once, by an overpowering statement of the direct evidence,
forgetting that the influence of prejudice renders the human mind very
nearly inaccessible to both evidence and argument."[1]
If this method was ever necessary or expedient, it is peculiarly so in
the present age. Opinions are afloat in society, and are even avowed by
men of high philosophical repute, which formally exclude Theology from
the domain of human thought, and represent it as utterly inaccessible to
the human faculties. They amount to a denial, not merely of its truth,
but of its very possibility. They place it among the dreams of the
past--with the fables of the Genii, or the follies of Alchemy, or the
phantoms of Astrology. They intimate, in no ambiguous terms, not only
that Catholicism is effete, and Christianity itself dead or dying, but
that Theology of every kind, even the simplest and purest form of
Theism, must speedily vanish from the earth. Admitting that the
religious element was necessarily developed in the infancy of the
species, and that its influence was alike inevitable and salutary during
the world's minority, when it was placed provisionally "under tutors and
governors," they proclaim that mankind have outgrown the vestments which
suited them in earlier times, and that now they must "put away childish
things." That such sentiments have been publicly avowed, that they have
been proclaimed as the scientific results of speculative thought, and
that they have been widely circulated in the vehicles both of
philosophic discussion and of popular literature, will be proved by
evidence, equally sad and conclusive, in the succeeding chapters; in the
meantime we refer to them merely for the purpose of showing that, in so
far as their influence prevails, they must necessarily tend, unless
they be counteracted by some effective antidote, to generate such a
prejudice against the whole scheme of Theology, whether Natural or
Revealed, as may be expected, especially in the case of young,
inexperienced, and ardent minds, to prevent them from entertaining the
subject at all, or examining, with serious and candid interest, any kind
or amount of evidence that might be adduced in regard to it. For this
reason, we propose to review the various Theories or Systems which may
be said to embody and exhibit these prevailing tendencies, to meet our
opponents on their own chosen ground, and to subject their favorite
speculations to a rigorous and sifting scrutiny; and this, not for the
purpose of proving our fundamental position, for that must rest on its
proper and independent evidence, but simply with the view of
neutralizing the adverse presumptions which prevent many from
considering its claims, and proving that it is a subject that demands
and deserves their serious and sustained attention.
Taking a comprehensive view of European Science and Literature during
the last half century, we may discern the great currents, or chief
tendencies, of speculative thought, in so far as it bears on the
evidences and doctrines of Religion, in several distinct but closely
related systems of opinion, which, whether considered severally or
collectively, must exert, in proportion to their prevalence, a powerful
influence on the side of Atheism. These systems may be divided generally
into _two_ great classes, according as they relate to the _substance_ or
to the _evidence_ of Theism, to the _truths_ which it involves, or the
_proofs_ to which it appeals. The interval between the first and second
French Revolutions may be regarded as the season during which the
theories to which we refer were progressively developed, and ultimately
consolidated in their existing forms. The germ of each of them may have
existed before, and traces of them may be detected in the literature of
the ancient world, and even in the writings of mediæval times; nay, it
might not be too much to affirm that in the systems of Oriental
Superstition, and in the Schools of Grecian Skepticism, several of them
were more fully taught in early times than they have yet been in Modern
Europe, and that the recent attempts to reconstruct and reproduce them
in a shape adapted to the present stage of civilization, have been poor
and meagre in comparison with those more ancient efforts of
unenlightened reason. What modern system of Skepticism can rival that of
Sextus Empiricus? What code of Pantheism, French or German, can be said
to equal the mystic dreams of the Vedanta School? What godless theory of
Natural Law can compete with the Epicurean philosophy, as illustrated in
the poetry of Lucretius? The errors of these ancient systems have been
revived even amidst the light of the nineteenth century, and prevail to
an extent that may seem to justify the apprehension, frequently
expressed on the Continent of late years, of the restoration of a sort
of Semi-Paganism in Modern Europe; and it is still necessary, therefore,
for the defence of a pure Theism, to reëxamine those ancient forms of
error which have reäppeared on the scene after it might have been
supposed that they had vanished for ever. For the very tenacity with
which they cleave to the human mind, and their perpetual recurrence at
intervals along the whole course of the world's history, show that there
must be something in the wants, or at least in the weaknesses of our
nature, which induces men to tolerate and even to embrace them. But the
chief danger, as we conceive, lies in those new, or at least newly
organized, theories that have only recently received their full
development in the Inductive and Scientific pursuits which constitute
the peculiar glory of modern times; and which, commencing with the era
of Bacon and Descartes, and gradually matured by Newton, Leibnitz, and
their successors, have at length issued in the construction of a solid
fabric of Science. To Theism there is no danger in Science, in so far as
it is true, for all truth is self-consistent and harmonious; but there
may be much danger in the use that is made of it, or in the spirit in
which it is applied. In the hands of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, the
doctrine of Natural Laws was treated as an ally, not as an antagonist,
to Theology; in the hands of Comte it becomes a plea for Atheism; and
even in the hands of Combe an argument against a special Providence and
the efficacy of prayer. Here the danger is the greater just by reason of
the acknowledged truth and practical value of the Inductive Philosophy;
for its certainty is so well ascertained, and its manifold uses so
generally appreciated, that if it shall come to be regarded as
incompatible with the recognition of God and Religion, Society will soon
find itself on the verge of universal Atheism. And this is the fearful
issue to which the more recent schools of speculation are manifestly
tending. The first French Revolution was brought about by the labors of
men who fought against Christianity, at least ostensibly, under the
banner of Deism or Natural Religion; the second Revolution was
consummated under the auspices, not of a Deistic, but of an Atheistic
philosophy. The school of Voltaire and Rousseau has given place to the
school of Comte and Leroux. The difference between the two indicates a
rapid and alarming advance. It may not be apparent at first sight, or on
a superficial survey; but it will become evident to any one who compares
the two French Encyclopædias, which may be regarded as the exponents of
the reigning philosophy of the two great revolutionary eras. The first,
the Encyclopedie of D'Alembert, Voltaire, and Diderot, sought to malign
and extirpate Christianity, while it did frequent homage to Natural
Theology; the second, the "Nouvelle Encyclopedie" of Pierre Leroux and
his coadjutors, proclaims the deification of Humanity, and the
dethronement of God!
FOOTNOTES:
[1] BISHOP BUTLER, "Analogy," Preface, p. II.
DR. INGLIS, "Vindication of the Christian Faith," p. VI.
MODERN ATHEISM.
CHAPTER I.
GENERAL VIEW OF ATHEISM.
Before entering on a detailed discussion of the theories to which it
appeals, it may be useful to offer some general reflections on ATHEISM
itself, its generic nature and specific varieties, its causes and
springs, whether permanent or occasional, and its moral and social
influence, as illustrated alike by individual experience and by public
history.
By Atheism we mean any system of opinion which leads men either to
_doubt_ or to _deny_ the Existence, Providence, and Government of a
living, personal, and holy God, as the Creator and Lord of the world. In
its practical aspect, it is that state of mind which leads them to
_forget_, _disown_, or _disobey_ Him.
We are met, however, at the outset, by a previous question, _Whether
Atheism be a real or even a possible thing?_ a question which was wont
to be discussed by divines under the head, _an dentur Athei?_[2] and
which has recently been revived by the strong protestations of some
philosophic writers, who deny not only the existence, but the very
possibility of Atheism. On this point the policy which infidels have
pursued has been widely different at different times. On some occasions,
they have sought to exaggerate the number of Atheists, claiming as their
own adherents or allies a large majority of the intellectual classes, as
well as whole tribes or nations of barbarians, in order to impress the
public mind with the conviction that belief in God is neither natural
nor universal; at other times, they have sought to allay the prejudice
which avowed Atheism seldom fails to awaken, by disclaiming much that
had been imputed to them, by professing a sort of mystic reverence for
the Spirit of Nature, and by denying that their speculations involve a
disbelief in God. In following these opposite courses at different
times, they have been actuated by a politic regard to the exigencies of
their wretched cause, and have alternately adopted the one or the other,
just as it might seem, in existing circumstances, to be more expedient
either to brave or to conciliate public opinion. It is incumbent,
therefore, on every enlightened advocate of Christian Theism to exercise
a prudent discretion in the treatment of this topic, and to guard
equally against the danger either of being led to exaggerate the extent,
or of being blinded to the existence of the evil. Nor is it difficult to
discover a safe middle path between the opposite extremes: it is only
necessary to define, in the first instance, what we mean when we speak
of Theism or Atheism respectively, and then to ascertain, in the second
place, whether any, and what, parties have avowed principles which
should fairly serve to connect them with the one system or with the
other. A clear conception of the radical principle or essential nature
of Atheism is indispensable; for without this, we shall be liable, on
the one hand, to the risk of imputing Atheism to many who are not justly
chargeable with it--a fault which should be most carefully avoided;[3]
and equally liable, on the other hand, to the danger of overlooking the
wide gulf which separates Religion from Irreligion, and Theism from
Atheism. There is much room for the exercise both of Christian candor
and of critical discrimination, in forming our estimate of the
characters of men from the opinions which they hold, when these
opinions relate not to the vital truths of religion, but to collateral
topics, more or less directly connected with them. It is eminently
necessary, in treating this subject, to discriminate aright between
systems which are essentially and avowedly atheistic, and those
particular opinions on cognate topics which have sometimes been applied
in support of Atheism, but which may, nevertheless, be held by some
_salvâ fide_, and without conscious, still less avowed, Infidelity. And
hence Buddæus and other divines have carefully distinguished between the
radical principles or grounds of Atheism, and those opinions which are
often, but not invariably, associated with it.[4]
But it is equally or still more dangerous, on the other hand, to admit a
mere nominal recognition of God as a sufficient disproof of Atheism,
without inquiring what conception is entertained of His nature and
perfections; whether He be conceived of as different from, or identical
with, Nature; as a living, personal, and intelligent Being, distinct
from the universe, or as the mere sum of existing things; as a free
Creator and Moral Governor, or as a blind Destiny and inexorable Fate.
These are vital questions, and they cannot be evaded without serious
detriment to the cause of religion. A few examples will suffice to prove
our assertion. M. Cousin contends that _Atheism is impossible_, and
assigns no other reason for his conviction than this,--that the
existence of God is necessarily implied in every affirmation, and may be
logically deduced from the premises on which that affirmation
depends.[5] His reasoning may possibly be quite conclusive _in point of
logic_, in so far as it is an attempt to show that the existence of God
_ought_ to be deduced from the consciousness of thought; but it cannot
be held conclusive as to _the matter of fact_, that there is no Atheism
in the world, unless it can be further shown that all men know and
acknowledge His existence as a truth involved in, and deducible from,
their conscious experience. Yet he does not hesitate to affirm that
"every thought implies a spontaneous faith in God;" nay, he advances
further, and adds that even when the sage "denies the existence of God,
still his words imply the idea of God, and that belief in God remains
unconsciously at the bottom of his heart." Surely the denial or the
doubt of God's existence amounts to Atheism, however inconsistent that
Atheism may be with the natural laws of thought, or the legitimate
exercise of speech.
Yet the bold paradox of COUSIN was neither an original discovery nor an
unprecedented delusion. It was taught, in a different form, but with
equal confidence, by several writers belonging to the era of the first
French Revolution. Thus HELVETIUS, in his work on MAN, says expressly:
"There is no man of understanding who does not acknowledge _an active
power in Nature; there is, therefore, no Atheist_. He is not an Atheist
who says that _motion is God_; because, in fact, motion is
incomprehensible, as we have no clear idea of it, since it does not
manifest itself but by its effects, and because by it all things are
performed in the universe. He is not an Atheist who says, on the
contrary, that _motion is not God_, because motion is not a being, but a
mode of being. They are not Atheists who maintain that motion is
essential to matter, and regard it as the invisible and moving force
that spreads itself through all its parts," "as the universal soul of
matter, and the divinity that alone penetrates its substance. Are the
philosophers of this last opinion Atheists? No; they equally acknowledge
an unknown force in the universe. Are even those who have no ideas of
God Atheists? No; because then all men would be so, because no one has a
clear idea of the Divinity."[6]
A more recent writer, the ABBÉ LAMENNAIS, is equally explicit, and very
much for the same reasons: "The Atheist himself has his own notion of
God, only he transfers it from the Creator to the creation; he ascribes
to finite, relative, and contingent being the properties of the
necessary Being; he confounds the work with the workman. Matter being,
according to him, eternal, is endowed with certain primitive,
unchangeable properties, which, having their own reason in themselves,
are themselves the reasons of all successive phenomena;" and "it matters
little whether he rejects the _name_ of God or not," or "whether he has,
or has not, an explicit knowledge of Him;" he cannot but acknowledge an
eternal First Cause.[7] And so a whole host of Pantheistic Spiritualists
will indignantly disclaim the imputation of Atheism, and even attempt to
vindicate Spinoza himself from the odious charge.[8] Nay, some of the
grossest Materialists, such as Atkinson and Martineau, while they
explicitly deny the existence of a living personal God, will affirm that
Pantheism is not Atheism.[9] Now, unquestionably, if by Theism we mean
nothing more than the recognition of an active power in nature,--such a
power as may or may not be identified with motion, and as may be
designated indifferently as the Divinity, or as the Soul of the
world,--the possibility of Atheism may be effectually excluded; but this
only serves to show the indispensable necessity of a correct definition
of the terms which are employed in this discussion, since it is
perfectly manifest that they are not used in the same sense by the
contending parties, and that consequently the disputants are not arguing
about the same thing. For Pantheism, whatever form it may assume, and
whatever language it may adopt, can be regarded in no other light than
as a system of Atheism, by all who have any definite conception of what
is meant when we either affirm or deny the existence and government of a
living, intelligent, personal God.
As Atheism has appeared in several distinct forms, it is necessary to
consider both its _generic nature_ and its _specific varieties_. It may
be defined, generally, as that state of mind which involves either _the
denial_ or _the doubt_ of the existence and government of God as an
all-perfect Being, distinct from the created universe; or which leads to
the habitual forgetfulness and wilful neglect of His claims as our
Creator, Preserver, and Lord. This state of mind, whether evinced by
words or by actions, contains in it the essence of Atheism, and it is
recognized in Scripture, in each of its two aspects, as an evil alike
natural and prevalent. The words of the Psalmist, "The fool hath said in
his heart, No God,"[10] whether they be interpreted as the expression of
an _opinion_ or of a _wish_, indicate in either case the existence of
that state of mind which has just been described, and which may issue
either in practical or speculative Atheism, according to the temperament
of individual minds, and the influences which are brought to bear upon
them. The same inspired writer has said,[11] that "The wicked through
the pride of his countenance will not seek after God; God is not in all
his thoughts;"--"He hath said in his heart, God hath forgotten; He
hideth his face; He will never see it."--"Wherefore doth the wicked
contemn God? he hath said in his heart, Thou wilt not require it;" And
these words exhibit a graphic delineation, of that state of mind in
which occasional thoughts of God are neutralized by habitual unbelief,
and the warnings of conscience silenced by the denial of a supreme moral
government. In like manner, when the apostle tells the Ephesian converts
that at one time "they were _without God_ in the world,"[12] and the
Galatians, that "when they knew not God, they did service unto them
which by nature are no gods;" when he further speaks of some as "lovers
of pleasures more than lovers of God," as "having a form of godliness,
but denying the power thereof," as "professing that they know God, but
_in works denying Him_;"[13]--in all these statements we see the generic
nature of that ungodliness which cleaves as an inveterate disease to our
fallen nature, and which, whether it appears only in the form of
practical unbelief and habitual forgetfulness, or assumes the more
daring aspect of avowed infidelity, contains in it the essence of
Atheism.
While such is its _generic nature_, we must further discriminate between
its specific varieties; for it does not always wear the same aspect, or
rest on the same grounds. It may be divided, first of all, into
_speculative_ and _practical_ Atheism: the former implying a denial, or
a doubt of the existence and government of God, either openly avowed or
secretly cherished; while the latter is perfectly compatible with a
nominal religious profession, and consists in the habitual forgetfulness
of God and of the duties which arise out of His relation to us as His
creatures and subjects. Speculative Atheism is comparatively rare;
Practical Atheism is widely prevalent, and may be justly regarded as the
grand parent sin, the universal characteristic of fallen humanity.[14]
It is not Atheism in profession, it is Atheism in practice. Those who
are chargeable with it may "profess that they _know_ God, but in works
they _deny_ Him." As distinguished from theoretical or speculative
Atheism, it is fitly termed _ungodliness_. It does not necessarily imply
either the denial or the doubt of the existence or government of God,
but consists mainly in the forgetfulness of His character and claims.
Speculative Atheism always implies habitual ungodliness; but the latter
may exist where the former has never been embraced, and has even been
openly and sincerely disclaimed. Yet such is the _connection_ between
the two, that Speculative Atheism invariably presupposes and perpetuates
practical ungodliness; and that the latter has also a tendency to
produce the former, since the habitual disregard of God in the practical
conduct of life indicates a state of mind in which men are peculiarly
exposed to the seductions of infidelity and prone to yield to them,
especially in seasons of revolutionary excitement or of prevailing
epidemic unbelief. It would be wrong to rank every ungodly man among
professed or even conscious Atheists, for he may never have denied or
even doubted the existence and government of God; yet it were equally
wrong to represent or treat him as a true believer, since he shows that,
practically, "God is not in all his thoughts;" and hence the necessity
of our _first_ distinction between [Transcriber's note: Original had
"beetween"] _theoretical_ or _speculative_, and _practical_ or
_habitual_ Atheism.
Speculative Atheism, again, is either _dogmatic_ or _skeptical_. It is
_dogmatic_, when it amounts to an affirmation, either that there is no
God, or that the question of his existence is necessarily insoluble by
the human faculties. Atheism has been distinguished from Anti-theism;
and the former has been supposed to imply merely the non-recognition of
God, while the latter asserts His non-existence. This distinction is
founded on the difference between _unbelief_ and _disbelief_;[15] and
its validity is admitted in so far as it discriminates merely between
dogmatic and skeptical Atheism. But Anti-theism is maintained, in the
strictest sense of the term, where it is affirmed either that there is
no God, or that the existence of the Supreme Being _cannot_ in any
circumstances become an object of human knowledge. In each of these
forms, Atheism is dogmatic; it denies the existence of God, or it denies
the possibility of His being known. But there is also a _skeptical_
Atheism, which does not affirm absolutely either that there is no God,
or that the knowledge of God is necessarily excluded by the limitations of
human reason, but contents itself with saying, "_non-liquet_,"--_i.e._,
with denying the sufficiency of the evidence. It answers every appeal to
that evidence by saying that, however satisfactory it may be to the minds
of some, it does not carry conviction to the minds of all, and that for
this reason it may be justly regarded as doubtful or inconclusive. These
two forms of Atheism--the Dogmatic and the Skeptical--are widely different
from each other; they rest on distinct grounds, and they require, therefore,
to be discussed separately, each on its own peculiar and independent merits.
The Dogmatic Atheist feels no force in the arguments which are directed
merely against his skeptical ally; for, strong in his own position and
confident in his ability to maintain it, he is conscious of no
speculative doubt, and affirms boldly what he unhesitatingly believes.
The Skeptical Atheist, again, feels no force in the arguments which are
directed against a Dogmatic System such as he utterly disclaims; he is
equally unwilling to affirm either that there is, or that there is not,
a God: he takes refuge in doubt, and refuses alike to affirm or to deny;
his only plea is, the want or the weakness of evidence on either side.
From this radical difference between the two forms of Speculative
Atheism, there arises a necessity for discussing each of them on its own
merits; and yet, although theoretically they may be easily
distinguished, it will be found that practically they are often
conjoined, since the same mind will often fluctuate between the two, and
shift its ground by betaking itself alternately to the one or the
other, according to the exigencies of the argument. Assail the Dogmatic
Atheist with the unanswerable statement of John Foster, that it would
require nothing less than Omniscience to warrant the denial of a God,
and he will probably defer to it so far as to admit that he cannot prove
his negative conclusion, but will add that he is not bound to do so, and
that all that can be reasonably required of him is to show that the
evidence adduced on the opposite side is insufficient to establish the
Divine existence, or that the phenomena which supply that evidence may
be as well, or more satisfactorily, explained in some other way. Assail,
in like manner, the Skeptical Atheist with the self-evident truth that,
even on his own principles, he is not entitled to assume or to act upon
the assumption, that _there is no God_, since the result of his
reasonings is _doubt_ merely, and such doubt as implies that there _may
be_ a Creator, Governor, and Judge, he will probably defer to it so far
as to admit that this is the only logical result of his system, but will
add that, where there is no conclusive evidence on either side, there
can be no moral obligation to a religious life, and no guilt in living
"without God in the world." It will be found, too, that, distinct as
these two forms of Speculative Atheism may appear to be, yet they have
often been made to rest on a common ground, and the self-same arguments
have been adduced in support of both. Thus the doctrine of Materialism,
the theory of Development, and the system of Natural Laws, have all been
applied by the Dogmatic Atheist to justify his denial of the existence
and government of God, on the ground that all the phenomena of Nature
may be accounted for without the supposition of a Supreme Mind; while
the very same doctrines or theories have been also applied by the
Skeptical Atheist to justify, not his _denial_, but his _doubt_, and to
vindicate his verdict of "_non-liquet_" on the evidence adduced. And as
the same arguments are often employed by both parties in support of
their respective views, so they make use, for the most part, of the
same objections in assailing the cause of Theism; insomuch that it would
be impossible, and even were it possible it would be superfluous, to
attempt a formal refutation of either, without discussing those more
general principles which are applicable to both. For this reason, we
propose to examine in the sequel the various theories which have been
applied in support alike of Dogmatic and of Skeptical Atheism, so as to
illustrate the grounds that are common to both, while we consider also
the distinctive peculiarities of the two systems, and more particularly
the grounds of Religious Skepticism.
Besides the radical distinction between Dogmatic and Skeptical Atheism,
we must consider the difference between _the four great leading systems_
which have been applied to account for the existing order of Nature,
without the recognition of a living, intelligent, personal God. There
are many specific varieties of Atheism; but, ultimately, they may be
reduced to _four_ classes. The _first_ system assumes and asserts the
eternal existence of THE COSMOS; that is, of the present order of
Nature, with all its laws and processes, its tribes and races, whether
of vegetable or animal life; and affirms that the world, as now
constituted, never had a beginning, and that it will never have an end.
This has been called the Aristotelian Hypothesis, because Aristotle,
while he spoke of a Supreme Mind or Reason, maintained not only the
eternity of matter, but also the eternity of "substantial forms and
qualities."
The _second_ system affirms, not the eternal existence of THE
COSMOS,--for the commencement of the existing order of Nature is
admitted to be comparatively recent,--but the eternal existence of
Matter and Motion; and attempts to account for the origin of the world
and of the races by which it is peopled, either by ascribing it, with
Epicurus, to a fortuitous concourse of atoms, or, with more modern
Speculatists, to a law of progressive development. This has been called
the Epicurean Hypothesis, because Epicurus, while nominally admitting
the existence of God, denied the creation of the world, and ascribed its
origin to atoms supposed to have been endued with motion or certain
inherent properties and powers, and to have been self-existent and
eternal.
The _third_ system affirms the coëxistence and coëternity of God and the
World; and, while it admits a distinction between the two, represents
them as so closely and necessarily conjoined, that God can be regarded
only as the Soul of the World,--superior to matter, as soul is to body,
but neither anterior to it, nor independent of it, and subject, as
matter itself is, to the laws of necessity and fate. This has been
called the Stoical System; since the Stoics, notwithstanding all their
sublime moral speculations and their frequent recognition of God, taught
that God sustains the same relation to the World as the soul of man does
to his body.
The _fourth_ system denies the distinction between God and the World,
and affirms that all is God, and God is all; that there exists only _one
substance_ in the Universe, of which all existing beings are only so
many modes or manifestations; that these beings proceed from that _one_
substance, not by creation, but by emanation; that when they disappear,
they are not destroyed, but reäbsorbed; and that thus, through endless
cycles of change, of reproduction and decay, it is one and the same
eternal being that is continually modified and manifested. This has been
called the Pantheistic Hypothesis, and it is exemplified, on a large
scale, in the speculations of the Brahmins in India, and, in Europe, in
those of Spinoza and his numerous followers.
If this be a correct analysis of Speculative Atheism, in so far as it
assumes a positive or dogmatic shape, we have only to conjoin with it
the peculiar characteristics of that which is merely Skeptical, and we
shall obtain a comprehensive view of the whole subject, which may serve
as a useful guide in the selection and treatment of the topics which
demand our chief attention in the prosecution of this inquiry.
It is necessary, however, in discussing this subject, to bear in mind
that there is a wide difference between Systems of Atheism, such as we
have briefly described, and certain doctrines which have sometimes been
associated with it, or even applied in its support or vindication. These
doctrines may have been connected, historically, with the promulgation
and defence of atheistic views; they may even seem to have a tendency
adverse to the evidence or truths of Christian Theism; but they must not
on that account be summarily characterized as atheistic, nor must those
who have at any time maintained them be forthwith classed among avowed
infidels.[16] The doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, which in the
hands of Jonathan Edwards was applied, whether consistently or
otherwise, in illustration and defence of Christian truth, became in the
hands of Collins and Godwin an associate and ally of anti-Christian
error; the doctrine of the natural Mortality of the Soul, which in the
hands of Dodwell was applied, whether consistently or otherwise, to
vindicate the peculiar privileges of the Christian Covenant, has often
been applied by infidels as a weapon of assault against the fundamental
articles of Natural Religion itself; the doctrine of Materialism, which
in the hands of Priestly was maintained, whether consistently or
otherwise, in connection with an avowed belief in God as the Creator and
Governor of the world, became in the hands of Baron D'Holbach and his
associates the corner-stone of the atheistic "System of Nature;" the
doctrine of "Natural Laws," which in the hands of Bishop Butler is so
powerfully applied in proof of a system of Divine Government, has become
in the hands of Mr. Combe a plausible pretext for denying a special
Providence and the efficacy of prayer; and the mere fact that these
doctrines have been applied to such different and even opposite uses, is
a sufficient proof of itself that they are not in their own nature
essentially atheistic, and that they should be carefully discriminated
from the systems with which they have been occasionally associated. We
are not entitled to identify them with Atheism, in the case of those by
whom Atheism is explicitly disclaimed; and yet there may be such an
apparent connection between the two, and such a tendency in the human
mind to pass from the one to the other, as may afford a sufficient
reason for examining these cognate doctrines, each on its proper merits,
for defining the sense in which they should be severally understood, for
estimating the evidence which may be adduced for or against them
individually, and for showing in what way, and to what extent, they may
have a legitimate bearing on the grounds of our Theistic belief. For
this reason, we shall bring under review, not only several systems of
avowed Atheism, but also various theories, not necessarily atheistic,
which have been applied to the support and defence of Atheism, and which
have a tendency, as thus applied, to induce an irreligious frame of
mind.
The _causes and springs of Atheism_ may easily be distinguished from
_the reasons_ on which it is founded. In the present state of human
nature, there is _a permanent cause_ which is abundantly sufficient to
account for this species of unbelief, notwithstanding all the evidence
which Nature affords of the being, perfections, and providence of God.
Our Lord explained in a single sentence the whole Philosophy of
Unbelief, when he said that "men loved the darkness rather than the
light, because their deeds are evil; for whoso doeth evil hateth the
light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved."
No thoughtful man can seriously reflect on his own conscious experience,
without discovering, in the disordered state of his moral nature, a
reason which sufficiently explains his natural aversion from God; he
finds _there_ an evidence, which he can neither overlook nor deny, of
his own personal turpitude and guilt; he is self-convinced and
self-condemned at the bar of his own conscience; he remembers with
remorse and shame many cases of actual transgression in which he
resisted the dictates of reason, and resigned himself to the dominion of
evil passions; and when, with these convictions and feelings, he is
asked to conceive of God as a living, personal Being, everywhere
present, beholding the evil and the good, whose "eyes are as a flame of
fire," and can discern "the very thoughts and intents of the heart;"
when he conceives of such a Being as his Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge,
as one who demands the homage of the heart and the obedience of the
life, and who has power to enforce His rightful claims by the sanctions
of reward and punishment, he will be sensible, in the first instance, of
an instinctive disposition to recoil from the contemplation of his
character, and a strong desire to deny, or at least to forget, His
claims; and just in proportion as the idea of God becomes more vivid, or
is more frequently presented to his mind, it will become the more
intolerable, insomuch that he will be tempted either to banish the
subject altogether from his thoughts, or, if he cannot succeed in this,
to alter and modify his view of the Divine character so as to bring it
into accordance with his own wishes, and to obtain some relief from the
fears and forebodings which it would otherwise awaken in his mind. If he
should succeed in this attempt, he will fall into one or other of two
opposite states of mind, which, however apparently different, do
nevertheless spring from the same latent source,--a state _of security_,
or a state of _servitude_. In the former, he either forgets God
altogether,--"God is not in all his thoughts;" or he conceives of Him as
"one like unto himself," indulgent to sin, and neither strict to mark
nor just to punish it: in the latter, he either "remembers God and is
troubled," or, if he would allay the remorse and forebodings of an
uneasy conscience, he has recourse to penance and mortification, to
painful sacrifices and ritual observances, in the hope, that by these he
may propitiate an offended Deity. In the one case, the conflict ends in
practical Atheism, in the other, in abject Superstition. And these two,
Atheism and Superstition, however different and even opposite they may
seem to be, are really offshoots from the same corrupt root,--"the evil
heart of unbelief which departeth from the living God." In the case of
the great majority of mankind, who are little addicted to speculative
inquiry, or to serious thought of any kind, it may be safely affirmed
that, in the absence of Revelation, they will inevitably fall into one
or other of these two extremes, or rather, that they will oscillate
alternately between the two,--in seasons of ease and prosperity living
"without God in the world," and in seasons of distress or danger
betaking themselves for relief to the rites of a superstitious worship.
The apostle describes at once the secret cause and the successive steps
of this sad degeneracy, when, speaking of the Gentiles, he says that
"when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were
thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart
was darkened; professing themselves wise, they became fools, and changed
the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to
corruptible man."--"And even as they did not like to retain God in their
knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind."[17] The secret cause
of all these evils was a latent "enmity against God,"--"they did not
_like_ to retain God in their knowledge." From this proceeded, in the
first instance, a _practical habit_ of Atheism,--"they glorified him not
as God, neither were thankful;" and from hence proceeded, in the second
instance, the gross superstition of _Polytheistic belief and
worship_,--"they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an
image made like to corruptible man,"--"they changed the truth of God
into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the
Creator, who is blessed forever."
But, while practical Atheism and blind Superstition are the two extremes
which divide among them the great majority of mankind, there have always
been some more thoughtful and inquiring spirits, who have sought to
penetrate the mysteries of their being, and to account for the present
order of things. They have asked, and have attempted to answer, such
questions as these: What are we? what was our origin? what is our
destination? Whence came this stupendous fabric of Nature? Is it
self-existent and eternal? or did it come into being at some definite
time? If not eternal, how was it produced? by chance or by design? by
inevitable fate or by spontaneous will? Whence the order which pervades
it, and the beauty by which it is adorned? Whence, above all, the evil,
moral and physical, by which it is disfigured and cursed? And, in reply
to these thoughtful questionings, various theories have been invented to
account for the existing order of things, while not a few of the most
daring thinkers have abandoned the subject in despair, and, holding it
to be an insoluble problem, have resigned themselves to the cheerless
gloom of Skepticism. In reviewing all these speculations and theories,
we must bear in mind that their authors and advocates, although more
thoughtful and inquisitive than the great majority of mankind, were
equally subject to the same corrupting influence,--"the evil heart of
unbelief,"--and that the same cause which produced practical Atheism in
some, and abject Superstition in others, may also have operated, but
more insidiously, in producing Speculative Infidelity in the minds of
those who are more addicted to abstruse philosophical inquiries. We must
seek to get down to the root of the evil, if we would suggest or apply
an effectual remedy; we must not deal with the symptoms merely, but
search for and probe the seat of the disease; and if that be the
disordered state of our moral nature, which gives rise to fears and
forebodings as often as we think of God, no remedy will be effectual
which does not remove our distrust, suspicion, and jealousy; and no
argument, however conclusive, will have any practical power which does
not present such views of God as to make him an object of confidence,
and trust, and love. It is of vast importance that this fundamental
truth should be kept steadily in view; for, as the disordered state of
our moral nature is the rudimental source both of practical Atheism and
of popular Superstition, so it is also the prolific parent of
Speculative Infidelity in every variety of form: and as long as the
remedy is not applied to the root of the disease, the Atheist, if forced
to relinquish one theory, will only betake himself to another, and after
having gone the round of them all, will rather throw himself into the
vortex of utter and hopeless skepticism, than acknowledge a God whom he
cannot love, a Judge whom he cannot but dread. Christianity alone can
supply an effectual remedy, and it is such a remedy as is fitted to cure
alike the habitual ungodliness, the abject superstition, and the
speculative infidelity, which have all sprung from the same prolific
source. It exhibits such a view of the character and will of God as may
relieve us from the fears and forebodings of guilt, and, by revealing a
divine method of reconciliation, may place us in a position the most
favorable for a calm and dispassionate consideration of the natural
evidence in favor of His Being, Perfections, and Moral Government.
But, while the grand parent cause of all Atheism--whether practical or
speculative, dogmatic or skeptical--is to be found in the disordered
state of our own moral nature, there are other subordinate causes in
operation, which may be regarded either as _incidental occasions_, or as
_plausible pretexts_, for this form of unbelief. The internal causes are
the primary and most powerful; but there are external influences which
coöperate with these, and serve to stimulate and strengthen them. Among
the incidental occasions of Atheism, we might mention a defective,
because irreligious, education in early life, the influence of ungodly
example and profane converse, and the authority of a few great names in
literature or science which have become associated with the cause of
Infidelity; and among the plausible pretexts for Atheism we might
mention the inconsistencies of professed believers and especially of the
clergy, the divided state of the religious world, as indicated by the
multiplicity of sects, the bitterness of religious controversy, the
supposed opposition of the Church to the progress of science and the
extension of civil and religious liberty, and the gross superstitions
which have been incorporated with Christianity itself in some of the
oldest and most powerful states of Europe. These and similar topics may
be justly said to be the "loci communes of Atheism," and they are often
employed in eloquent declamation or indignant invective, so as to make a
much deeper impression, especially on young and ardent minds, than their
intrinsic weight or real argumentative value can either justify or
explain. Infidel writers have not been slow to avail themselves of these
pretexts for unbelief, in regard alike to Natural and Revealed Religion;
and have artfully identified Religion with Superstition, and
Christianity with Popery, as if there were no consistent or tenable
medium between the two. And, perhaps, of all the incidental occasions or
external inducements to Atheism, none has exerted so much influence over
reflecting minds as the wide-spread prevalence of Superstition; for
never was Atheism more general among the cultivated classes in ancient
times than in the States of Greece, whose hospitable Pantheon enclosed
the gods of all nations, and whose inhabitants were "exceedingly given
to idolatry;" and nowhere, in modern times, has Atheism been more
explicitly avowed or more zealously propagated than in those countries
of Europe which are most thoroughly subjugated to the superstitions of
the Papacy. In the graphic words of Robert Hall, "Infidelity was bred in
the stagnant marshes of corrupted Christianity."[18]
Having described the nature, evinced the reality, and referred to the
permanent and occasional causes of Atheism, we may briefly advert to
_its moral and social influence_. On this point three distinct questions
have been raised: _First_, whether Atheism be conducive to personal
happiness? _Secondly_, whether it be compatible with pure morality and
virtue? and, _thirdly_, whether it be consistent with social well-being,
with the authority of the laws, and the safety or comfort of the
community? In considering these questions, it is necessary to remember
that in no age, and in no region of the world, has Speculative Atheism
been universal, or even so prevalent as to exhibit on a large scale a
full development of its legitimate results. It has always been in a
minority, and has been continually checked, modified and controlled, by
the prevailing beliefs of society; and, whether these beliefs were
purely religious or grossly superstitious, they have exerted a powerful
influence in counteracting the native tendencies of atheistic
speculation. "The effects of Atheism," as Mr. Estlin justly observes,
"we have not yet in any great degree experienced, as the mental habits
of those who hold it in speculation were in general formed, before they
had adopted their present principles, by the imperceptible influence of
that religion which they now traduce."[19] Perhaps the nearest approach
to a state of prevailing Atheism which has ever been exhibited in the
history of the world, is to be found in France at the era of the first
Revolution, when Christianity was publicly abjured, and the goddess of
Reason substituted for the God of the Bible. But that even this fearful
outburst of impiety did not proceed from the universal prevalence of
Speculative Atheism among the great body of the people; that there still
existed in the heart of society some germs of religious feeling, and
certain instinctive or traditionary beliefs which operated as a
restraint and check even during that season of revolutionary frenzy, is
sufficiently evinced by the reaction which speedily occurred in the
public mind, and which restored Catholicism itself, as if by magic, to
its wonted supremacy; while the anti-social tendency of Atheism, in so
far as it did prevail, was strikingly attested by the fact, that the
leading actors in that fearful drama found themselves compelled to
provide for the public safety by restoring at least the forms of
religious worship, and to acknowledge that "if there were no God, it
would be necessary to invent one."--"The true light," says the eloquent
Robert Hall, "in which the French Revolution ought to be contemplated is
that of a grand experiment on human nature." "God permitted the trial to
be made. In one country, and that the centre of Christendom, Revelation
underwent a total eclipse, while Atheism, performing on a darkened
theatre its strange and fearful tragedy, confounded the first elements
of society, blended every age, rank, and sex, in indiscriminate
proscription and massacre, and convulsed all Europe to its centre, that
the imperishable memorial of these events might teach the last
generations of mankind to consider Religion as the pillar of society,
the safeguard of nations, the parent of social order, which alone has
power to curb the fury of the passions, and secure to every one his
rights; to the laborious the reward of their industry, to the rich the
enjoyment of their wealth, to nobles the preservation of their honors,
and to princes the stability of their thrones."[20]
In the case of individuals holding atheistic opinions, but living in the
midst of Christian society, the full influence of these opinions cannot
be felt, nor their effects fully developed, in the presence of those
restraints and checks which are imposed by the religious beliefs and
observances of others. We cannot estimate their influence either on the
personal happiness, or the moral character, or the social welfare of
men, without taking this circumstance into account. To arrive at even a
tolerable approximation to a correct judgment, we must endeavor to
conceive of Atheism as prevailing universally in the community, as
emancipated from all restraint, and free to develop itself without let
or hindrance of any kind, as tolerated by law, and sanctioned by public
opinion, and unopposed by any remaining forms either of domestic piety
or of public worship, as reigning supreme in every heart, and as forming
the creed of every household; and thus conceiving of it as an
inveterate, universal epidemic, we are then to inquire whether, and on
what conditions, society would in such a case be possible, and how far
the prevalence of Atheism might be expected to affect the morals and
welfare of mankind.
The question has been raised whether Atheism might not be more conducive
than religion to _the personal happiness of individuals_; and some, who
have confounded Religion with Superstition, have not hesitated to answer
that question in the affirmative. The conviction that there is no God,
and no moral government, and no state of future retribution, could it
only be steadfastly and invariably maintained, might serve, it has been
thought, to relieve the mind of many forebodings and fears which disturb
its peace, and, if it could not ensure perfect happiness, might act at
least as an opiate or sedative to a restless and uneasy conscience. In
the opinion of Epicurus and Lucretius, tranquillity of mind was the
grand practical benefit of that unbelief which they sought to inculcate
respecting the doctrine of Providence and Immortality. They frequently
affirmed that _fear_ generated superstition, and that superstition, in
its turn, deepened and perpetuated the fear from which it sprung; that
the minds of men must necessarily be overcast with anxiety and gloom as
long as they continued to believe in a moral government and a future
state; and that the only sovereign and effectual antidote to
superstitious terror is the spirit of philosophical unbelief. Similar
views are perpetually repeated in the eloquent but declamatory pages of
"The System of Nature." But the remedy proposed seems to be subject to
grave suspicion, as one that may be utterly powerless, or at the best,
exceedingly precarious; for, first of all, the fears which are supposed
to have generated Religion must have been anterior to it, and must have
arisen from some natural cause, which will continue to operate even
after Religion has been disowned. They spring, in fact, necessarily out
of our present condition as dependent, responsible, and dying creatures;
and they can neither be prevented nor cured by the mere negations of
Atheism; we can only be raised above their depressing influence by a
rational belief and well-grounded trust in the being and character of
God. Again, if the denial of a Providence and of a future state might
serve, were it associated with a full assurance of certainty, to relieve
us from _the fear_ of retribution hereafter, it must equally destroy
_all hope_ of immortality, and reduce us to the dreary prospect of
annihilation at death,--a prospect from which the soul of man
instinctively recoils, and by which his whole life would be embittered
just in proportion as he became more thoughtful and reflective. Unbelief
can operate as a sedative to fear only in so far as it is habitual,
uniform, undisturbed by any inward misgivings or apparent uncertainty;
but, in the case of men not utterly thoughtless or insensible, it is
rarely, if ever, found to possess this character. It is often shaken,
and always liable to be disquieted, by occasional convictions, which no
amount of vigilance can ward off, and no strength of resolution repress.
It is maintained only by a painful and sustained conflict, which is but
ill-concealed by the vehemence of its protestations, and often
significantly indicated by the very extravagance of its zeal. Add to
this, that Atheism itself affords no guarantee against future suffering.
It may deny a Providence here and a judgment hereafter, it may even deny
a future state of conscious existence, and take refuge in the hope of
annihilation that it may escape from the dread prospect of retribution;
but it cannot affirm the _impossibility_, it can only doubt the
_certainty_ of these things; and in their bare possibility there is
enough at once to impose an obligation to serious inquiry, and to
occasion the deepest anxiety, especially in seasons of affliction or
danger, which awaken reflective thought. "_Atheism_," said the acute but
skeptical Bayle, "_does not shelter us from the fear of eternal
suffering_." But, even if it did, what influence would it exert on our
present happiness? Would it not limit our enjoyments, by confining our
views within the narrow range of things seen and temporal? Would it not
deprive us of the loftiest hopes? Would it not repress our highest
aspirations, by interdicting the contemplation of the noblest Object of
thought, the Ideal Standard of truth and excellence, the Moral Glory of
the Universe? Would it not diminish the pleasure which we derive even
from earthly objects, and aggravate the bitterness of every trial? How
wretched must be the condition of those who are "proud of being the
offspring of chance, in love with universal disorder, whose happiness is
involved in the belief of there being no witness to their designs, and
who are at ease only because they suppose themselves _inhabitants of a
forsaken and fatherless world_!"[21] "No one in creation," said Jean
Paul, "is so alone as the denier of God: he mourns, with an orphaned
heart that has lost its great Father, by the corpse of Nature which no
World-Spirit moves and holds together, and which grows in its grave; and
he mourns by that corpse till he himself crumble off from it. The whole
world lies before him, like the Egyptian Sphynx of stone, half-buried in
the sand; and the All is the cold iron mask of a formless Eternity."[22]
But the malign influence of Atheism on personal happiness will become
more apparent, if we consider its tendency to affect the _moral springs
of action_, on which happiness mainly depends. The question whether
Atheism be compatible with moral virtue, or whether an Atheist may be a
virtuous man, is one of those that can only be answered by
discriminating aright between the different senses of the same term. In
the Christian sense of virtue, which comprehends the duties of both
tables of the Law, and includes the love of God as well as of man, it is
clear that the Atheist cannot be reputed virtuous, since he wants that
which is declared to be the radical principle of obedience, the very
spirit and substance of true morality. But, in the worldly sense of the
term, as denoting the decent observance of _relative_ duty, it is
possible that he may be so far influenced by considerations of prudence
or policy, or even by certain natural instincts and affections, as to be
just in his dealings, faithful to his word, courteous in his manners,
and obedient to the laws. But this secular, prudential morality, is as
precarious in its practical influence as it is defective in its radical
principle. Atheism saps and undermines the very foundation of Ethics.
The only law which it can recognize (if that can be called a law in any
sense which is not conceived of as the expression of a Supreme Will) is,
either the greatest happiness of the individual, or the greatest
happiness of the greatest number; but, whether it assumes the form of
_Felicitarian_ or of _Utilitarian_ calculation, it degenerates into a
process of arithmetic, and is no longer a code of morals. The
fundamental idea of DUTY is awanting, and can only be supplied from a
source which the Atheist ignores. By denying the existence of God, he
robs the universe of its highest glory, obliterates the idea of perfect
wisdom and goodness, and leaves nothing better and holier as an object
of thought than the qualities and relations of earthly things. He
degrades human nature, by doing what he can to sever the tie which binds
man to his Maker, and which connects the earth with Heaven. He
circumscribes his prospects within the narrow range of "things seen and
temporal," and thus removes every stimulus to dignity of sentiment, and
every incentive to elevation of character. His wretched creed (if a
series of cold negations may be called a creed) must be fatal to every
disinterested and heroic virtue; let it prevail, and the spirit of
self-sacrifice will give place to Epicurean indulgence, and the age of
martyrdom will return no more. Substitute Nature, or even Humanity, for
God, and the eternal standard of truth and holiness and goodness being
superseded, every moral sentiment will be blighted and obscured.
Conscience has a relation to God similar to that which a chronometer
bears to the sun. Blot the sun from the sky, and the chronometer is
useless; deny God, and conscience is powerless. And the vices which, if
not subdued, were yet curbed and restrained by the overawing sense of an
unseen omnipresent Power, will burst forth with devastating fury,
snapping asunder the feebler fetters of human law, and overleaping the
barriers of selfish prudence itself; vanity and pride, ambition and
covetousness, sensual indulgence and ferocious cruelty, will rise into
the ascendancy, and establish their dark throne on the ruins of
Religion.
If such be the natural and legitimate effect of Atheism on the personal
happiness and moral character of individuals, we can be at no loss to
discover what must be its influence on society at large. For society is
composed of individuals, and its character and welfare depend on the
aggregate sentiments of its constituent members. The question whether
Atheism might not be consistent with social well-being, with the
continued authority of the laws, and the general comfort of the
community, is answered historically by the fact, that in modern France
the Reign of Atheism was the Reign of Terror, and that in ancient Rome
its prevalence was followed by such scenes of proscription,
confiscation, and blood, as were then unparalleled in the history of the
world. The truth is that, wherever Atheism prevails, GOVERNMENT BY LAW
must give place to GOVERNMENT BY FORCE; for law needs some auxiliary
sanction; and if it be deprived of the sanction of Religion, it must
have recourse, for its own preservation, and the prevention of utter
anarchy, to the brute power of the temporal sword. It is worse than
useless to discuss, in this connection, the question, revived by
Bayle,[23] whether Atheism or Superstition should be regarded as the
worst enemy to the Commonwealth, for it has no relevancy to our present
inquiry; we are not contending for either, we are objecting to both; and
we are under no necessity of choosing the least of two evils, when we
have the option of "pure and undefined Religion." But we may observe, in
passing, that, historically it has been found possible to keep society
together, and to maintain the authority of law with a greater or less
measure of civil liberty, where Superstition has been generally
prevalent; whereas there is no instance on record of anything
approaching to national Atheism, in which government by law was not
speedily superseded by anarchy and despotism. And the reason of this
difference may be that in every system of Superstition, whether it be a
corruption of Natural or of Revealed Religion, "some faint embers of
sacred truth remain unextinguished," some convictions which still
connect man with the spiritual and the eternal, and which are
sufficient, if not to enlighten and pacify the conscience, yet to keep
alive a sense of responsibility and a fear of retribution; "certain
sparks," as Hooker calls them, "of the light of truth intermingled with
the darkness of error," which may have served a good purpose in
maintaining civil virtue and social order, although these would have
been far better secured by the prevalence of a purer faith.
There are some circumstances, of a novel and unprecedented nature, which
impart a solemn interest to our present inquiry. At the beginning of the
present century, Robert Hall, referring to the unbelief which preceded
and accompanied the first outburst of the Revolution in France,
mentioned _three_ circumstances which appeared to him to be "equally new
and alarming." He regarded it as the first attempt which had ever been
witnessed on an extensive scale to establish the principles of Atheism,
as the first attempt to popularize these principles by means of a
literature addressed and adapted to the common people, and as the first
systematic attempt to undermine the foundations, and to innovate on the
very substance of Morals.[24] But if we compare the first with the new
Encyclopedie,--the former concocted by Voltaire, D'Alembert and Diderot,
the latter by Pierre Leroux and his associates,--we shall find that
Infidelity has assumed greater hardihood, and has appeared under less
restraint in recent than in former times; while the speculations of
Comte and Crousse are as thoroughly atheistic as those of D'Holbach
himself. For, however irreligious and profane Voltaire and his
associates might be, and however devoted to their avowed object of
crushing Christ and his cause, so significantly indicated by their motto
and watchword, "Ecrasez l'Infame;"[25] yet they continued, as a party,
to advocate Deism, and seemed at least to oppose the bolder speculations
of the author of the "Systeme de la Nature." Both Voltaire and
Frederick the Great wrote in reply to its atheistic tenets.[26] But now,
in France, these tenets are openly avowed and zealously propagated. Nor
is this fatal moral epidemic confined to our continental neighbors:
there is too much reason to fear that it has infected, to some extent,
the artisans of our own manufacturing towns, and even, in some quarters,
the inhabitants of our rural districts. The Communists of France have
their analogues in the Socialists of Britain; and the periodical press,
although for the most part sound, or at least innocuous, has lent its
aid to the dissemination of the grossest infidelity which the Continent
has produced. The "Leader" gives forth Lewes's version of Comte's
Philosophy; and the "Glasgow Mechanics' Journal," a digest of his Law of
Human Progress, which is essentially atheistic.[27] Nor is indigenous
Atheism wanting. Mr. Mackay in his "Progress of the Intellect," Atkinson
and Martineau in their "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and
Development," and Mr. G. Holyoake in "The Reasoner," have sufficiently
proved that if Atheism be an exotic, it is capable of taking root and
growing up in the land of Bacon, Newton, and Boyle.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] BUDDÆI, "Theses Theologicæ de Atheismo et Superstitione," cap. I.
[3] J. C. WOLFIUS, "De Atheismi falso Suspectis."
[4] BUDDÆI, "Theses Theologicæ," cap. III., "De dogmatibus quæ cum
Atheismo conjuncta sunt, aut ad eum ducunt," p. 240.
[5] COUSIN, "Introduction Generale a l'Histoire de la Philosophie," I.
169:--"Que toute pensée implique une foi spontanée à Dieu, et qu'il n'y
a pas d'Atheisme naturel. Croit-il qu'il existe, par exemple? S'il croit
çela, çela me suffit,"--"il a donc foi au principe de la pensée;--or la
est Dieu,"--"Selon moi, toute parole prononcée avec confiance, n'est pas
moins qu'une profession de la foi a la pensée,--a la raison en
soi,--c'est a dire a Dieu."
[6] M. HELVETIUS, "Treatise on Man, his Intellectual Faculties and
Education: translated by W. Hooper, M. D.," I. 247.
[7] M. LAMENNAIS, "Esquisse d'une Philosophie," I. 95.
[8] "Spinoza is a God-intoxicated man."--NOVALIS, quoted in T. Carlyle's
Essays, II. 43.
[9] "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development, by H. G.
ATKINSON and HARRIET MARTINEAU," p. 241.
[10] Psalm 14: 1; 53: 1.
[11] Psalm 10: 4, 11, 13.
[12] Eph. 2: 12, [Greek: Atheoi en tô kosmô].
[13] Gal. 4: 8; 2 Tim. 3: 4; Titus 1: 16.
[14] ESTLIN, "Discourse on Atheism," pp. 8, 19, 28. DR. CHALMERS,
"Institutes," I. 375.
[15] DR. CHALMERS, Works, "Natural Theology," I. 58. "The Reasoner,"
edited by HOLYOAKE, XI. 15, 232.
[16] ROBERT HALL'S Works, I. 58.
[17] Romans 1: 21, 28.
[18] HALL'S "Works," I. 128.
[19] ESTLIN'S "Discourse," p. 57.
[20] ROBERT HALL, "Modern Infidelity Considered," I. 38, 67.
[21] ROBERT HALL on Modern Infidelity, I. 70.
[22] T. CARLYLE, "Essays," II. 142.
[23] P. BAYLE, "Pensées diverses Ecrites à un Docteur de Sorbonne a
l'Occasion de la _Comète_," 4 vols. Also his "Reponse aux Questions d'un
Provincial," II. 688, IV. 101, 112.
[24] HALL on Modern Infidelity, I. 59, 64.
[25] ABBÉ [TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: ORIGINAL HAD "ABBE"] BARRUEL, "Memoires
pour servir a l'Histoire du Jacobinisme," I. 31, 131, 135, 184, 357.
[26] ABBÉ BARRUEL, "Memoires pour servir a l'Histoire du Jacobinisme,"
I. 22, II. 190, 193.
[27] "The Leader;" a series of articles on Comte's Philosophy, by G. H.
LEWES, April 7, 10, 17, etc., etc., 1852.--"The Glasgow Mechanics'
Journal."
CHAPTER II.
THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT.
There have been various applications of the general principle of
Development, by means of which an attempt has been made to explain the
origin of all things by Natural Laws, so as to exclude the necessity of
any Divine interposition, either for the creation of the world, or for
the introduction and establishment of Christianity itself. It has been
applied, first, to explain the origin of worlds and planetary systems,
by showing that, certain specified conditions being presupposed, there
are fixed mechanical laws which might sufficiently account for the
production of the earth and of the other planets and satellites of our
Solar System, without any special interposition of Divine power at the
commencement of the existing order of things. It has been applied,
secondly, to explain the origin of the various tribes or races of
vegetable and animal life, and especially the production of the human
race, by showing that the existing types may have sprung, by a process
of gradual development, from inferior races previously existing, and
that these again may have been produced by the action of chemical agents
in certain favorable conditions. It has been applied, thirdly, to
explain all the most important phenomena of Human History, and to
illustrate the law which is supposed to determine and regulate the
progressive course of civilization, so as to account, on natural
principles, for the origin and prevalence of the various forms of
Religion, and even for the introduction, in its appointed season, of
Christianity itself, without having recourse to anything so utterly
unphilosophical as the idea of a Divine Revelation, or the supposition
of supernatural agency. And it has been applied, fourthly, to explain
the order, and to vindicate the use, of those additions both to the
doctrines and rites of primitive Christianity, which Protestants have
denounced as _corruptions_, but which Popish and Tractarian writers
defend as _developments_, of the system that was originally deposited,
like a prolific germ or seed, in the bosom of the Catholic Church.
It is the more necessary to examine the various forms of this theory,
because unquestionably it can appeal to not a few _natural analogies_,
which may serve, on a superficial view, to give it the aspect of
verisimilitude. For many of the most signal works of God have been
manifestly framed on the principle of gradual growth, and matured by a
process of progressive development. We see in the natural world a small
seed deposited in the earth, which, under the agency of certain suitable
influences, germinates and springs up, producing first a tender shoot,
then a stem, and branches, and leaves, and blossoms, and fruit; and
every herb or tree, "having seed in itself," makes provision for the
repetition of the same process, and the perpetuation and indefinite
increase of its kind. The same law is observed in the animal kingdom,
where a continuous race is produced from a single pair. And even in the
supernatural scheme of Revelation itself, the truth was gradually
unfolded in a series of successive dispensations; the First Promise
being the germ, which expanded as the Church advanced, until it reached
its full development in the Scriptures of the New Testament. These and
similar instances may suffice to show that, both in the natural and
supernatural Providence of God, He has been pleased to act on the
principle of _gradual and progressive_, as contradistinguished from that
of _instant and perfect_ production; and they may seem, at first sight,
to afford some natural analogies in favor of the radical idea on which
the various modern Theories _of_ Development are based. In such
circumstances it would be an unwise and dangerous course either to
overlook the palpable facts which Nature and Revelation equally attest,
or to deny that they may afford signal manifestations of the manifold
wisdom of God. Nor is it necessary for any enlightened advocate of
Theism to betake himself to these expedients; he may freely admit the
existence of _such_ cases of gradual development, he may even appeal to
them as illustrative of the order of Nature, and the design which that
order displays; and the only question which he is at all concerned to
discuss amounts in substance to this: Whether the method of production
which is pursued in the _ordinary course_ of Nature can account for the
_original commencement_ of the present system of things?
But the state of the question, and the right application of the
argument, may be best illustrated by considering each of the _four_
forms of the theory separately and in succession.
SECTION I.
THEORY OF _COSMICAL_ DEVELOPMENT, OR OF THE PRODUCTION OF WORLDS AND
PLANETARY SYSTEMS BY NATURAL LAW.--"THE VESTIGES."
The doctrine of a Nebular Cosmogony was first suggested by some
observations of the elder Herschell on those cloud-like appearances
which may be discerned in various parts of the heavens by the aid of the
telescope, or even, in some cases, by the naked eye. It assumed a more
definite form in the hands of La Place, although even by him it was
offered, not as an ascertained discovery of science, but simply as a
hypothetical explanation of the way in which the production of the
planets and their satellites _might_ possibly be accounted for _by_ the
operation of the known laws of Nature.
The explanation of the whole theory may be best understood by dividing
it into two parts: the _first_ being that which attempts to account for
the formation of planets and satellites, _on the assumption of the
existence of a central sun_, and _of certain other specified
conditions_; the _second_ being that which undertakes to account for the
formation of the sun itself, on the assumption of the existence of _a
diffused nebulous matter_ in space, or, as it has been aptly called, "a
universal Fire-Mist."[28]
When the theory is limited to the explanation of the origin of the
planets and their satellites, the original condition of our solar system
is assumed to have been widely different from what it now is; the sun is
supposed to have existed for a time alone, to have revolved upon his
axis, and to have been surrounded with an atmosphere expanded by intense
heat, and extending far beyond the limits of our system as it now
exists. This solar atmosphere revolved, like the sun itself, around its
axis; but its heat, constantly radiated into sidereal space, gradually
diminished, and the atmosphere being contracted in proportion as it
cooled, the rapidity of its rotation was accelerated, until it reached
the point at which the central attraction was overcome by the
centrifugal force, and then a zone of vapor would be detached or thrown
off, which might either retain its form as a nebulous ring, like the
ring of Saturn, or first breaking into fragments, from some want of
continuity in its structure, and afterwards coalescing into one mass,
might be condensed into a planet as the vapor continued to cool. These
rings or planets, thus detached from the central atmospheric mass, would
continue to revolve, in virtue of the force originally impressed upon
them, and their motion would be nearly circular, in the same plane and
in the same direction with that of the sun. The first planet, so
formed, must have been that at the extreme limit of our solar system;
the second the next in point of remoteness from the centre, and so on;
each resulting from the operation of the same natural laws, and emerging
into distinct existence at that precise point in the gradual cooling and
contraction of the atmosphere at which the centrifugal became stronger
than the centripetal force. But each planet might also be subjected to
the same process of cooling and contracting, and might therefore throw
off, under the operation of the same mechanical laws, zones of vapor
more or less dense, which might consolidate into moons or satellites,
and which should also revolve, like the planets, round their primary.
Thus, Uranus has six satellites, and Saturn seven; while the latter has
also thrown off two zones so perfectly uniform in their internal
structure that they remain unbroken, and constitute a double ring around
the planet.
In this _first_ form of the theory, which assumes the existence of the
sun and its atmosphere, and the rotation of both round an axis, La Place
sought to give a scientific form to the speculations of Sir William
Herschell on the condensation of Nebulæ, by proving simply the
_dynamical possibility_ of the formation of a planetary system by such
means, according to the known laws of matter and motion; but he did not
affirm the scientific certainty of his conjecture, and far less the
actual production of the solar system in this way. He has been followed
by M. Comte, who has attempted to furnish, if not a complete
demonstration, at least a plausible mathematical verification, of the
hypothesis.[29] Utterly excluding all supernatural agency in the work of
creation, he equally excludes from the problem which he attempts to
solve, the origin of the sun and its atmosphere; and confining himself
to the task of accounting, in the way not of demonstrative certainty,
but merely of plausible hypothesis, for the formation of the planets and
satellites of our solar system, he conceives the theory of La Place to
be susceptible of such a numerical verification as is sufficient to give
it a high degree of verisimilitude. Assuming that the periodic time of
each planet must be equal to that of the portion of the solar atmosphere
of which it was formed at the era when it was thrown off, and combining
the theorems of Huygens on the measure of centrifugal forces with
Newton's law of gravitation, he establishes a simple equation between
the time of the rotation of each zone or section of the solar
atmosphere, and the distance of the corresponding planets. On applying
this equation to the various bodies of our system, he found that the
periodic time of the moon agrees, at least within the tenth of a day,
with the duration of the earth's revolution, when her atmosphere is
supposed to have extended to the moon; and that the periodic times of
the planets maintain a similar correspondence with what must have been
the duration of the solar revolution when they were severally thrown off
from its atmosphere. It is the less necessary, however, to enter on a
detailed exposition of his argument, because he admits that it can
afford at the utmost only a probable proof of an hypothesis; and
further, because it is expressly limited to the production of the
planets and their satellites, while not only is the existence of the
solar atmosphere presupposed, but also its existence in _a certain
state_, and with _several determinate conditions_; while no account
whatever is given of the origin either of the sun or its atmosphere, and
none of the laws or conditions on which the whole process of development
is confessedly dependent.
But the author of "The Vestiges" takes a much wider range, and attempts
a more arduous task. He seeks to account for the origin both of suns and
of solar systems by the agency of natural laws. Not content with the
more limited form of the theory, which M. Comte holds to be the only
legitimate or practical object of scientific treatment, he holds that
the origin of the sun itself, and the _forms_, the _positions_, the
_relations_, and the _motions_, of all the heavenly bodies, may be
accounted for by supposing a previous state of matter, fluid or
gasiform, subject only to the law of gravitation. The Nebular Cosmogony,
which is well characterized by himself as his "version of _the romance
of Nature_," is based on the assumption that "the nebulous matter of
space, previously to the formation of stellar and planetary bodies, must
have been a universal FIRE-MIST,"[30] in other words, a diffused
luminous vapor, intensely hot, which might be gradually condensed into a
fluid, and then into a solid state, by losing less or more of its heat.
The existence of such a luminous matter being assumed, and it being
further supposed that it was not entirely uniform or homogeneous, but
that it existed in various states of condensation, and that it had
"certain nuclei established in it which might become centres of
aggregation for the neighboring diffused matter,"--the author attempts
to show that on such centres a rotatory motion would be established
wherever, as was the most likely case, there was any obliquity in the
lines of direction in which the opposing currents met each other; that
this motion would increase as the agglomeration proceeded; that at
certain intervals the centrifugal force, acting on the remoter part of
the rotating mass, would overcome the agglomerating force; and that a
series of rings would thus be left apart, each possessing the motion
proper to itself at the crisis of separation. These, again, would only
continue in their annular form, if they were entirely uniform in their
internal structure. There being many chances against this, they would
probably break up in the first instance, and be thereafter "agglomerated
into one or several masses, which would become representatives of the
primary mass, and perhaps give rise to a progeny of inferior masses." In
support of this theory, reference is made to the existence, at the
present moment, of certain cloud-like nebulæ, or masses of diffused
luminous matter, exhibiting a variety of appearances, as if they were in
various degrees of condensation, and which are described as "solar
systems in the process of being formed" out of a previous condition of
matter. And the observations of M. Plateau, of Ghent, are adduced as
affording an experimental verification of some parts of the theory, and,
especially, as serving to explain the spherical form of the planets, the
flattening at the poles, and the swelling out at the equator.
It does not belong to our proper province, nor is it necessary for our
present purpose, to discuss the merits of this theory, considered as a
question of science. This has been already done, with various degrees of
ability, but with unwonted unanimity, by some of the ablest men of the
age,--by Whewell, Sedgwick and Mason, in England, by Sir David Brewster
and Mr. Miller, in Scotland, and by Professor Dod and President
Hitchcock, in America.[31] But, viewing it simply in its relation to the
Theistic argument, we conceive that the adverse presumption which it may
possibly generate in some minds against the evidence of Natural
Theology, will be effectually neutralized by establishing the following
positions:
That it is _a mere hypothesis_, and one which, from the very nature of
the case, is incapable of being proved by such evidence as is necessary
to establish _a matter of fact_.
That the progress of scientific discovery, so far from tending to
verify and confirm, has served rather to disprove and invalidate the
fundamental assumption on which it rests.
That even were it admitted, either as a possible, or probable, or
certain explanation of the origin of the present planetary systems, it
would not necessarily destroy the evidence of Theology, nor establish on
its ruins the cause of Atheism.
Each of these positions may be conclusively established, and the three
combined constitute a complete answer to the theory of Development, in
so far as it has been applied in the support or defence of Atheism.
1. That it is a mere hypothesis or conjecture, designed, not to
establish the _historical fact_, but to explain merely the _dynamical
possibility_ of the production of the planetary bodies by the operation
of known natural laws, must be admitted, I think, even by its most
enthusiastic admirers. It might have seemed, indeed, to have something
like a basis of fact to rest upon, had the conception of the elder
Herschell been verified, when he announced the existence of a nebulous
fluid, capable of being distinguished, by certain well-defined marks,
from unresolved clusters of stars; but even then it presupposed so many
postulates, which could in no way be established by experimental or
historical evidence, that it could scarcely be regarded in any other
light than as an ingenious speculation or a splendid conjecture. For,
let it be considered, first of all, that the theory proceeds on the
assumption of the existence and wide diffusion of a nebulous fluid of
whose reality there is no actual proof; secondly, that it necessarily
requires, also, the supposed existence of certain favorable conditions;
and, thirdly, the operation of certain invariable laws; and it will be
manifest at once that it is purely hypothetical throughout, and that it
includes a variety of topics which never have been, and never can be
made the subjects of experimental verification. For it postulates, in
the words of an acute writer, "the establishment of nuclei in the body
of the elemental mass, as well as the action of heat on its substance,
and then seeks to explain the concentration of the nebulous particles
into these nuclei by the force of gravitation, the rotation of the
bodies so produced by the confluence of the nebulous fluid, the
separation of a portion of the outer surface of these revolving masses
in the form of rings, the disruption of these rings, and the subsequent
recomposition of their fragments into separate spheres, answering to the
planets and satellites of our system."[32] But even were the existence
of a nebulous fluid admitted, we have no access to know what was its
internal structure; we cannot determine whether it was uniform and
homogeneous throughout, or whether it contained nuclei which might
become centres of aggregation; we have no means of estimating the
intensity of the heat which belonged to it, or of calculating the
process by which it was dispersed, so as to occasion the condensation of
successive portions of the mass. No eye ever saw the separation of any
part of it in the form of a ring, or the disruption of that ring, or the
subsequent recomposition of its fragments into a solid sphere. And even
had all this been matter, not of mere conjecture, but of actual
observation, it would still have left much to be explained which can
only be accounted for by ascribing it to a designing Intelligent Cause.
2. The progress of scientific discovery, so far from tending to verify,
has served rather to invalidate the fundamental assumption on which the
whole theory depends. That assumption was the existence of a Nebulous
Fluid or Fire-Mist, capable of being distinguished, by certain
characteristic marks, from unresolved nebulæ or clusters of stars. The
existence of any such fluid has become more and more doubtful, in
proportion as astronomers have been enabled, with the aid of larger and
better constructed telescopes, to resolve several nebulæ which had
previously defied the power of less perfect instruments. We do not
affirm that every cluster has been already resolved, nor is it necessary
for the purposes of our argument to suppose that, at any future time,
this stupendous achievement is likely to be effected; for it is a very
obvious consideration, that just in proportion as our telescopic powers
are enlarged so as to enable us to resolve many of the nearer nebulæ,
they must also bring within the range of our extended vision _others_
more remote and hitherto unperceived, which may continue to exhibit the
same cloud-like appearance as the former, until, by a new improvement of
the telescope, we may succeed in separating them into distinct stars;
and even then the march of discovery is not ended,--we may reasonably
expect that with every fresh increase of telescopic vision, new clusters
will be brought into view, and new clouds appear in the utmost verge of
the horizon. But, unquestionably, the progress which has already been
made in this direction affords a strong presumption in favor of the
idea, that the apparent nebulosity of those masses which still appear,
even to our best telescopes, as cloud-like vapors, is to be ascribed
rather to the imperfection of our instruments than to any difference
between them and such as have been already resolved. Sir John Herschell,
a high authority in such a case, tells us that "we have every reason to
believe, at least in the generality of cases, that a nebula is nothing
more than a cluster of stars."[33] Sir David Brewster is equally
explicit: "It was certainly a rash generalization to maintain that
nebulæ differed essentially from clusters of stars, because existing
telescopes could not resolve them. The very first application of Lord
Rosse's telescopes to the heavens overturned the hypothesis; and with
such unequivocal facts as that instrument has brought to light, we
regard it as a most unwarrantable assumption to suppose that there are
in the heavenly spaces any masses of matter different from solid bodies,
composing planetary systems."[34] And Professor Nichol, while he
gracefully acknowledges that he has "somewhat altered the views which he
formerly gave to the public, as the highest then known and generally
entertained, regarding the structure of the heavens," states, as the
result of more mature reflection, that "the supposed distribution of a
self-luminous fluid, in separate patches, through the heavens, has,
beyond all doubt, been proved fallacious by that most remarkable of
telescopic achievements,--the resolution of the great nebula in Orion
into a superb cluster of stars; and that this discovery necessitates
important changes in previous speculations on Cosmogony."[35]
In short, Lord Rosse's observations at Parsonstown have conclusively
proved that what appeared to be a nebula was in reality a cluster of
stars; and while they still leave many nebulæ unresolved, they afford a
strong warrant for believing that discoveries in the same direction
might be indefinitely extended in proportion to the increase of
telescopic power.
3. But even were the Nebular Hypothesis admitted, and were the Theory of
Development by Natural Laws conceived to afford a satisfactory
explanation of the origin of the planetary systems, it would not follow,
as a necessary consequence, that the peculiar evidence of Theism--that
on which it mainly depends, and to which it makes its most confident
appeal--would be thereby destroyed, or even diminished. The only
legitimate result of such a doctrine would seem to be, that we must
distinguish aright between a work of _Mediate_, and a work of
_Immediate_ Creation. In the Bible each of these is distinctly
recognized. We have a specimen of the one in the creation of the first
man by the direct agency of Divine power; we have a specimen of the
other in the creation, less direct but equally real, of all his natural
posterity, through the medium of ordinary generation. Men do not cease
to be the _creatures_ of God because they are born of their parents, in
virtue of that creative word, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish
the earth;" and hence children are admonished "to remember _their
Creator_ in the days of their youth."[36] The work of creation is
equally real and equally Divine, whether it be effected _mediately_ or
_immediately_, with or without the intervention of means, by the direct
and instantaneous exertion of Almighty power, or by the gradual and
successive operation of second causes acting according to established
laws. In the ordinary course of Providence, the method of mediate
production, gradual growth, and progressive development, may be observed
in innumerable instances; but it can never be justly held to exclude, or
even to obscure, the evidence of a presiding Intelligence and a
supernatural Power. On the contrary, it may serve rather to enhance that
evidence; since the very arrangements and provisions which have been
made with a view to the reproduction of every thing after its kind, may
bear on them the legible impress of a designing Mind and an ordaining
Will. Thus, year by year continually, the whole inhabitants of the world
are supported by the fruits of harvest, which are produced and matured
under the action of natural laws; yet every intelligent Theist ascribes
the result ultimately to the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, and
sees in the very processes by which it is brought to pass some of the
most signal proofs of these Divine perfections.
Now, as this method is followed in the work of Providence, which may be,
and often has been, described as a _continuous creation,_ and yet has no
tendency to destroy, or even to diminish, the evidence of a presiding
Intelligence in Nature, so no good reason can be assigned why it _might_
not also have been adopted in the production of planets and astral
systems, if so it had seemed good to Supreme Wisdom. If this method was
adopted for the propagation of plants and animals, no reason can be
given why it might not also have been adopted for the production of
planets and moons; nor would it in the latter case, any more than in the
former, impair the evidence of God's creative wisdom and power. For,
suppose it be possible that, by a marvellous process of self-evolution,
the material elements of Nature might assume new forms, so as to
originate a succession of new worlds and new planetary systems, without
the _immediate_ or _direct_ interposition of a Supernatural Will;
suppose that the earth and the other bodies now belonging to our own
system, were generated out of a prior condition of matter, existing in a
gasiform state and diffused through space as a Fire-Mist, subject to the
ordinary action of heat and gravitation; suppose, in short, that there
were LAWS FOR THE GENERATION OF WORLDS in the larger cycles of time,
just as there ARE LAWS FOR THE GENERATION OF ANIMALS in the short ages
of terrestrial life;--would a provision for such a succession of
marvellous developments necessarily destroy, or even impair, the
evidence for the being and perfections of God? Does the generation of
the animated tribes diminish the evidence of design in the actual
constitution of the world? And why should a similar provision, if any
such were found to exist, for the generation of stars and systems, be
regarded in any other light than as an exhibition, on a still larger
scale, of "the manifold wisdom of God?"
Let it ever be remembered that the Theistic argument depends, not on
_the mode of production_, but on _the character of the resulting
product_. The world may have been produced mediately or immediately,
with or without the operation of natural laws; but if it exhibit such an
arrangement of parts, such an adaptation of means to ends, or such a
combination of collocations and adjustments, as enables us at once to
discern the distinctive marks of intelligent design, the evidence cannot
be diminished, it may even be possibly enhanced, by the method of
production. Provision is made, doubtless, for the growth and development
of the eye, the ear, and the hand, in the human foetus, and the
process by which they are gradually formed is regulated by natural laws.
But the resulting products are so exquisitely constructed, so admirably
adapted to the elements of nature, and so evidently designed for the
uses of life, that they irresistibly suggest the idea of wise and
benevolent contrivances; and this idea is as strong and clear as it
could have been had they been produced instantaneously by the _direct_
act of creative power. And so of the planets and astral systems: they
may have been generated, that is, produced, in a way of natural
development; yet the resulting products are such as to evince the
supreme wisdom and beneficence which presided over their formation. But
even this is not all. Let us suppose, further, that Philosophy may yet
reach its extreme, and, as we humbly conceive, unattainable limit; let
us suppose that it may succeed in decomposing all the chemical elements
now known, by resolving them into ONE primary basis; let us even suppose
that it may succeed in reducing all the subordinate laws of Nature into
ONE supreme and universal law; still the development of such a system as
we see around us out of such materials, and by such means, would not be
necessarily exclusive of the idea of God, but might afford evidence of a
Supreme Mind, creating, combining, and controlling all things for the
manifestation of His adorable perfections.
We have thus seen that the Theory of Cosmical Development is a mere
hypothesis, incapable of experimental or historical proof; that the
recent progress of scientific discovery has tended to disprove the
fundamental assumption on which it rests; and that, even were it
admitted as a possible, or, still more, as a plausible explanation of
the origin of planets and astral systems, it would not serve to destroy,
and scarcely, if at all, to diminish the evidence of Theism.
The last of these positions, if well established, might seem to
supersede the necessity of discussing the hypothesis at all in
connection with our present theme. But such a discussion of it as has
been offered may be useful to those--and they are not a few--who,
superficially acquainted with Science in its more popular form, are
exposed to the danger of being seduced by the authority of a few
distinguished names which have unfortunately become identified with the
cause of Atheism. For, while the author of "The Vestiges" repudiates the
atheistic conclusions which some have deduced from his hypothesis, M.
COMTE boldly avows his creed in the following revolting terms: "To minds
unacquainted with the study of the heavenly bodies, Astronomy has still
the reputation of being a science eminently religious, as if the famous
verse, 'Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei' ('The heavens declare the glory OF
GOD'), had preserved all its force." And, he adds, in a note, "At
present, to minds that have been early familiarized with the true
astronomical philosophy, the heavens declare _no other glory_ than that
of Hipparchus, Kepler, Newton, and all those who have contributed to the
establishment of their laws!" The _reader_ of these laws may become
illustrious, but the Maker of them must be utterly ignored!
SECTION II.
THEORY OF _PHYSIOLOGICAL_ DEVELOPMENT; OR THE PRODUCTION OF VEGETABLE
AND ANIMAL RACES BY NATURAL LAW.--"TELLIAMED."--PHYSIO-PHILOSOPHY.
The Theory of Development has been applied not only to explain the
origin of worlds and of astral systems in the sky, but also to account
for the origin of the various tribes of vegetable and animal life which
exist on the earth itself. There is nothing, indeed, in any of the
kingdoms of Nature that may not be included in it, since the formation
of all material bodies, organic or inorganic, is supposed to be
sufficiently accounted for by the sole action of Chemical or Mechanical
laws. The wide range of this theory is strikingly illustrated by the
words of one whose powers of observation have added some interesting
discoveries to Natural History, but whose speculations on the origin of
Nature resemble the distempered ravings of lunacy, rather than the
mature results of philosophic thought "Physio-philosophy has to show,"
says Dr. Oken, "how, and in accordance indeed with what laws, the
Material took its origin, and, therefore, how something took its
existence from nothing. It has to portray the first periods of _the
world's development from nothing_; how the elements and heavenly bodies
originated; in what method, _by self-evolution_ into higher and manifold
forms, they separated into minerals, became finally organic, and, in
man, attained self-consciousness.... Physio-philosophy is, therefore,
_the generative history of the world_; or, in general terms, the history
of Creation, a name under which it was taught by the most ancient
philosophers, namely, as Cosmogony. From its embracing the Universe, it
is plainly the Genesis of Moses!"[37]
It will be observed that this strange speculation goes far beyond the
comparatively modest conjecture of La Place. It postulates _nothing_,
and undertakes to account for _everything_. In flagrant opposition to
the old atheistic maxim, "Ex nihilo, nihil," it boldly affirms, "Ex
nihilo, omnia." It speaks, indeed, of "laws in accordance with which the
world took its origin;" but these laws must be as abstract as those of
Mathematics, since they existed before matter itself; nay, more
abstract, or, rather, more inconceivable still, since they existed, it
would seem, even before Mind! Dr. Oken attempts to explain the
production of the world from nothing by comparing it to the evolution of
Arithmetical and Mathematical Science, out of the fundamental conception
of _zero_! But, waiving this, we shall direct our attention to the only
points in this theory which, in the existing state of speculative
thought, can be held to have any practical interest in connection with
our great theme.
That theory attempts to account for the production both of the FLORA and
the FAUNA of the natural world by _the process of Development_ rather
than by _the miracle of Creation_. It proceeds on the assumption, akin
to that of Epicurus, that atoms or monads alone existed in the first
instance; and that from these were derived, under the action of natural
law and by a process of gradual development, all existing substances and
beings, whether organic or inorganic, mineral, vegetable, or animal. "No
organism has been created," says Dr. Oken, "of larger size than an
infusorial point. No organism is, nor ever has one been created, which
is not microscopic. Whatever is larger has not been created, but
developed. Man has not been created, but developed." On this fundamental
assumption the whole theory is based. But we must carefully distinguish
between the Atomic Theory and the application which is here made of it.
The recent discoveries of Chemistry, by which all material compounds
have been decomposed into their constituent elements, amounting to
little more than fifty substances, which are either the primary or the
proximate bases of all existing bodies, and the marvellous
transformations which these elementary principles undergo, in respect
alike of form, of density, of solidity, and of magnitude, under the
action of natural laws,--may serve to make it credible that there is no
_a priori_ impossibility in the assumption on which the Atomic Theory
depends. Had it been the will of God to call into being the various
vegetable and animal races in the way of gradual evolution out of these
primary monads, no enlightened Theist will presume to say that it was
either impossible, or inconsistent with His wisdom to do so. It must be
observed, however, that the natural analogies which have sometimes been
appealed to in support of this hypothesis, labor under a grievous defect
when they are applied to account for the origin of the existing races,
and that they are extended far beyond their legitimate limits when they
are supposed to prove that these races might begin to be without any
direct interposition of creative power. For, while the oak may spring
from an acorn, and the largest animal from a microscopic monad, yet
within the whole range of our experience both in the vegetable and
animal kingdoms, _the seed is produced by the organism_, and necessarily
presupposes it; whence it follows, either that there must have been an
eternal succession of organisms producing seed, and thereby perpetuating
the race, or if this be inconceivable, still more if it can be disproved
by geological or historical evidence, then that the analogy of our
present experience leads us up, not to "an infusorial point" or
"microscopic monad," but to a primary living organism as the
commencement of each existing tribe. In the words of Dr. Barclay, "It
will not be easy, on any principles exclusive of the vital, to answer
these questions, What was the origin of the first egg, or what was the
origin of the first bird? For where is the egg that comes not from a
bird, and where is the bird that comes not from an egg? To the mere
materialists, who exclude every species of vitality but that from
organism, this problem is nearly as embarrassing as the origin of the
Universe itself."[38]
If these views be correct, all the natural analogies would lead us to
acquiesce, as Dr. Barclay did, in the Mosaic narrative as the most
philosophical account of the commencement of the present order of
things. It traces up every race to a primary organism, endowed with
reproductive powers; for it tells us, in regard to the FLORA, that God
said, "Let the earth bring forth grass, _the herb yielding seed_, and
the fruit-tree yielding fruit _after his kind_, whose _seed is in
itself_, upon the earth; and it was so." And it tells us, with regard to
the FAUNA, that God said, "Let the waters bring forth abundantly the
moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth in
the open firmament of heaven. And God created great whales, and every
living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly,
_after their kind_, and every winged fowl _after his kind_. And God
blessed them, saying, _Be fruitful, and multiply_, and fill the waters
in the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth."
Here the distinction between different genera and species, and the
provision that was made for the perpetuation of different races, are
prominently presented; while the production, in the first instance, not
of an "infusorial point" or "microscopic monad," but of a living
organism capable of multiplying its kind, is expressly declared; and
every race is traced up to that primary organism, in perfect consistency
with the only law, whether of vegetable or animal reproduction, which is
known to be in operation at the present day. And _this_ law of
reproduction, so far from being exclusive of a primary act of Creation,
seems to presuppose and require it; for there must be a living organism
before there can be vital transmission. But the theory of Physiological
Development proceeds on a totally different supposition,--a supposition
for the truth of which we have not only no historical evidence, but not
even the slightest _analogical presumption_, since we have no instance
of development anywhere except from a germ or seed, produced by an
organism preëxisting in a state of maturity.
But the exigencies of that theory demand a wide departure from all the
familiar lessons of experience; and hence recourse has been had to a
series of the wildest and most extravagant conjectures, such as may well
justify the opinion of those who have held that the creed of certain
philosophers makes a much larger demand on human credulity than that of
almost any section of the Christian Church. For, according to that
theory, the origin of the FLORA is first accounted for by the action of
some element--probably electricity--on a certain _mucus_, which is
supposed to be generated at those points where the ocean comes into
contact with the earth and air; that is, on the shore of the sea at low
water mark. MAILLET had broached the idea of the marine origin of all
our present "herbs, plants, roots, and grains,"[39] at a period when the
Universal Ocean, of which Leibnitz said so much, was still the creed of
some speculative minds; but it has been more recently revived, and
exhibited in greater detail, though not with stronger evidence, by some
writers of our own age. Thus Dr. Oken tells us that "all life is from
the sea;" that "when the sea organism, by self-elevation, succeeds in
attaining into form, there issues forth from it a higher organism;" and
that "the first organic forms, whether plants or animals, emerged from
the shallow parts of the sea." And so the author of "The Vestiges"
attempts to show that new races, both of plants and animals, marine and
terrestrial, may be accounted for, without any act of immediate
creation, by a change or transmutation of species resulting from the
agency of natural causes. "There is," as he tells us, "another set of
phenomena presented in the course of our history; the coming into
existence, namely, of a long suite of living things, vegetable and
animal, terminating in the families which we still see occupying the
surface. The question arises,--In what manner has this set of phenomena
originated? Can we touch at, and rest for a moment on, the possibility
of plants and animals having likewise been produced in the way of
Natural Law, thus assigning but one class of causes for everything
revealed to our sensual observation? Or are we at once to reject this
idea, and remain content either to suppose that creative power here
acted in a different way, or to believe, unexaminingly, that the inquiry
is one beyond our powers?"[40] In reply to these questions, he proceeds
to show that "there is a balance of probability from actual evidence in
favor of _an organic creation by law_," and that "in tracing the actual
history of organic beings upon the earth," as revealed by Geology, we
find that "these came not at once, as they might have been expected to
do if produced by some special act, or even some special interposition
of will, on the part of the Deity; they came in a long-continued
succession, in the order, as we shall afterwards see more convincingly,
of progressive organization, grade following grade, till, from an humble
starting-point in both kingdoms, the highest forms were realized." Such
is his general principle; and, without entering into the details, we may
sum up his general argument by saying, in the words of another,[41]
that, according to his theory, "dulse and hen-ware became, through a
very wonderful metamorphosis, cabbage and spinach; that kelp-weed and
tangle bourgeoned into oaks and willows; and that slack, rope-weed, and
green-raw, shot up into mangel-wurzel, rye-grass, and clover." So much
for the FLORA; and now for the _Fauna_, and the transition from the one
to the other. His views are thus exhibited by Sir David Brewster: "The
electric spark, escaping from the wild elements around it, struck life
into an elementary and reproductive germ, and sea-plants, the food of
animals, first decked the rude pavement of the ocean. The lichen and the
moss reared their tiny fronds on the first rocks that emerged from the
deep; land-plants, evolving the various forms of fruit and flower, next
arose,--the Upas and the bread-fruit tree, the gnarled oak and the lofty
cedar. Animal life appeared when the granary of nature was ready with
its supplies. A globule, having a new globule forming within itself,
which is the fundamental form of organic being, may be produced in
albumen by electricity; and as such globules may be identical with
living and reproductive cells, we have the earliest germ of organic
life, the first cause of all the species of animated nature which people
the earth, the ocean, and the air. Born of electricity and albumen, the
simple monad is the first living atom; the microscopic animalcules, the
snail, the worm, the reptile, the fish, the bird, and the quadruped, all
spring from its invisible loins. The human similitude at last appears in
the character of the monkey; the monkey rises into the baboon, the
baboon is exalted to the ourang-outang, and the chimpanzee, with a more
human toe and shorter arms, gives birth to man."[42]
The remarks which were offered, in the previous section, on Cosmical
Development, are equally applicable, _mutatis mutandis_, to this other
form of the doctrine of Creation by Natural Law. It might be shown, with
reference to the supposed generation of plants and animals, just as it
was then shown with reference to the generation of planets and astral
systems, first, that the theory rests upon a mere hypothesis, which is
utterly unsupported by experimental evidence; secondly, that the
progress of science has hitherto afforded no ground to believe that the
transmutation of species is provided for under the established
constitution of nature; and, thirdly, that even were the theory
admitted, it would not destroy the evidence of Theism, any more than the
propagation of plants and animals under the existing system, which, so
far from excluding or impairing, serves rather to enhance and illustrate
the proof of creative wisdom and power. In support of this last
position, we might adduce the testimony of the author of "The Vestiges"
himself; for, referring to the idea that "to presume a creation of
living beings by the intervention of law" is equivalent to "superseding
the whole doctrine of the Divine authorship of organic nature," he takes
occasion to say, "Were this true, it would form a most important
objection to the Law theory; but I think it is not only not true, but
the reverse of the truth. As formerly stated, the whole idea of law
relates only to the mode in which the Deity is pleased to manifest His
power in the natural world. It leaves the absolute fact of His
authorship of and supremacy over Nature precisely where it was." He
adds, in the words of Dr. Buckland, "Such an aboriginal constitution, so
far from superseding an Intelligent Agent, would only exalt our
conceptions of the consummate skill and power that could comprehend such
an infinity of future uses under future systems, in the original
groundwork of His Creation."[43]
But, without enlarging on those general considerations which were
formerly stated, and which admit of an easy and obvious application to
this _second_ form of the theory, we shall offer a few remarks bearing
directly on its distinctive peculiarities, and directed to the exposure
of its radical defects.
The theory rests on two very precarious foundations: the assumption of
_spontaneous generation_, on the one hand, and the assumption of a
_transmutation of species_ on the other. Each of these assumptions is
necessarily involved in any attempt to account for the origin of the
vegetable and animal races by natural law, without direct Divine
interposition. For if, after the first organism was brought into being,
the production of every subsequent type may be accounted for simply by a
transmutation of species, yet the production of the original organism
itself, or the first commencement of life in any form, must necessarily
be ascribed either to a creative act or to spontaneous generation. A new
product is supposed to have come into being, differing from any that
ever existed before it, in the possession of vital and reproductive
powers; and this product can only be ascribed, if Creation be denied, to
the spontaneous action of some element, such as Electricity, on mucus or
albumen. In this sense the doctrine of spontaneous generation seems to
be necessarily involved in the first step of the process of Development,
and is, indeed, indispensable, if any account is to be given of the
origin of vegetable and animal life; but in the subsequent steps of the
same process it is superseded by a supposed transmutation of species,
whereby a lower form of life is said to rise into a higher, and an
inferior passes into a more perfect organism.
But we have no experience either of spontaneous generation on the one
hand, or of a transmutation of species on the other. Observation has not
discovered, nor has history recorded, an authentic example of either. In
regard to the _first_, the author of "The Vestiges" anticipates this
objection, and attempts to answer it. The objection is, that "a
transition from the inorganic to the organic, such as we must suppose to
have taken place in the early geological ages, is no ordinary cognizable
fact of the present time upon earth; structure, form, life, _are never
seen_ to be imparted to the insensate elements; the production of the
humblest plant or animalcule, otherwise than as a repetition of some
parental form, is not one of the possibilities of science."[44] Such is
the objection; and how does he attempt to answer it? He endeavors to
show, first, that the work of creation having been _for the most part_
accomplished thousands of years ago, we have no reason to expect that
the origination of life and species should be _conspicuously
exemplified_ in the present day; secondly, that the comparative
infrequency, or even the entire absence, of such phenomena _now_ would
be no valid reason for believing that they have _never_ been exhibited
heretofore, if, on other grounds, the doctrine of 'natural creation' or
'life-creating laws' can be rendered probable; and, thirdly, that even
in our own times there ARE facts which seem to indicate the reality, or
at least the possibility, of "the primitive imparting of life and form
to inorganic elements."[45]
Now, to this elaborate argument in favor of _spontaneous generation,_ or
the production of life by natural law, we answer, in the first place,
that the mere fact of its being adduced in connection with the Theory of
Development affords a conclusive proof that it is indispensable to the
maintenance of that theory, that the hypothesis would be incomplete
without it, and that no account can be given of creation by the mere
doctrine of a _transmutation of species_. It is the more necessary to
make this remark, because not a few who embrace the latter doctrine
affect to disown the former, and seek to keep it out of view. But the
one is as necessary as the other to a complete theory of Natural
Development. The author of "The Vestiges" felt this, and virtually
acknowledges it when he undertakes the task of vindicating the
credibility of spontaneous generation. But we answer, in the second
place, that the method in which he performs his self-imposed task is
singularly curious, and not a little instructive. He had, it must be
owned, a difficult game to play. The general theory of "The Vestiges"
is founded on the fact that, in the ordinary course of Nature, the races
of plants and animals are perpetuated by propagation, according to
established Natural Laws,--a fact which might seem to afford a strong
analogical argument in favor of the supposition that the same order of
Nature is maintained also in the few apparently exceptional cases in
which, from our defective knowledge, we are unable to trace the
connection between the parent and the product. And yet the author
evinces no little anxiety to make out a case in favor of "a
non-generative origin of life even at the present day;" and he appeals
to a class of facts, confessedly obscure, which have not been, as he
thinks, satisfactorily accounted for by the law which usually regulates
the production of organic beings. He refers us to the speculations of
Dr. Allen Thomson on the primitive production of Infusoria,[46] to the
facts which modern science, aided by the microscope, has discovered
respecting the Entozoa, or the creatures which live within the bodies of
others, and, above all, to the experiments of Mr. Crosse and Mr. Weekes,
which seemed to result in the production of a small species of insect
(_Acarus Crossii_) from the action of a voltaic battery on a saturated
solution of the silicate of potash, or the nitrate of copper, or the
ferrocyanate of potassium. The reason of his anxiety to avail himself of
these cases is evident. The exigencies of his theory demanded a method
of accounting for the primary origin of life different from any that can
be found in the common process of propagation. He saw clearly enough
that his main argument, founded, as it was, on the law of hereditary
transmission, could not account for the production of the first
organism; and that, if he would avoid either the doctrine of _Immediate
Creation_, which is so offensive to him, or the idea of _Eternal
Generation_, which is utterly excluded by the clearest lessons of Fossil
Geology, he must have recourse to the hypothesis of _Spontaneous
Generation_. Hence he attempts to account for the commencement of new
species both of plants and animals, in the course of the world's
history, by a transmutation of species; while, for the origin of the
first species, he has recourse to the same law of Development, but
acting in widely different circumstances, and giving rise to what he
calls "aboriginal generation," whereby the inorganic passes into the
organic, and life, form, and structure, are imparted to hitherto inert
materials by the action of Electricity on mucus or albumen. To
accomplish this twofold purpose, he felt it necessary to insist, in the
first instance, on the ordinary law of generation as the established
order of _mediate_ creation; while he found it equally necessary, in the
second place, to insist on those apparently exceptional cases in which
the connection between the germ and the product has hitherto eluded
philosophical research,--and this for the purpose of showing that the
original production of plants and animals was _not similar_ to the
ordinary method of their propagation in any other respect than this,
that in both cases the result is brought about by Natural Laws, without
the direct interposition of any supernatural cause.
Now, in so far as his argument is founded on the principle of
analogy,--and it is on this principle that it proceeds throughout,--we
submit that it is radically vicious, and utterly inconclusive. For the
vast majority of cases in which the commencement of life and
organization falls under our notice being confessedly those, not of
primary production, but of mediate reproduction, it is reasonable to
believe that the same law governs all cases alike, whether we have been
able or not to trace the origin of life to the principle of propagation,
the few apparent exceptions being sufficiently accounted for by our
imperfect knowledge of the causes and conditions on which they depend.
Besides, the argument from analogy in favor of a primary production of
life by natural causes, in so far as it is founded on the present law
of hereditary transmission, is radically defective, since the two cases
are widely different; the one presupposing _a primary organism of the
same kind_, from which others are evolved by a law of natural
succession, the other exhibiting life as a new product, resulting not
from any prior organism, but from the action of _causes of a totally
different kind_, which are not known to be capable of giving birth
either to vegetable or animal organisms under the actual constitution of
Nature.
But suppose, even, that the _Acarus Crossii_ were admitted to be a real
product of Galvanic action on the silicate of potash, and an undeniable
instance of "a non-generative origin of life," how would the
illustrative example accord with the author's general theory? It might
afford a specimen of aboriginal production; but how would it fit in with
his favorite doctrine of _a gradual and progressive advancement_ from
the lower to the higher forms of organization? The _Acarus_, at first
supposed to be a new and hitherto unknown creature, is now acknowledged
to be one of a very familiar species,--a species which may have
deposited its ova, and propagated its kind, since the commencement of
the present order of things, and whose eggs might very well resist the
action even of nitrate of copper, since the creature itself could live
in that poisonous mixture. Moreover, it belongs, in point of
organization, to one of the highest orders of organisms; not to the
_radiata_, not to the _mollusca_, but to the highest type of the
_articulata_, the nearest to the _vertebrata_. Had it been a monad,--a
mere living cell,--which Galvanism evolved from the solution, and had
this primary product developed itself afterwards in various forms,
according to the ascending scale of a progressively improving
organization, it might have accorded admirably with the twofold doctrine
of spontaneous generation and transmutation of species; but,
unfortunately, the first process is so perfect, in the present instance,
as to leave little room for the second, and we are almost tempted to
hope that perhaps the clumsy and troublesome expedient of a
transmutation of species may yet be superseded by the discovery of some
method,--we know not what,--whereby not only the _articulata_, but the
_vertebrata_, and even Man himself, may be immediately produced by some
new combination of Nature's elemental laws![47]
We have given prominence, in the first instance, to the doctrine of
"spontaneous" or "aboriginal" production, because it constitutes an
indispensable part of the Theory of Development, and because we believe
that, were this clearly understood, that theory would soon sink into
general discredit or total oblivion, like the kindred speculations of
Anaximander and Anaxagoras, of the old Ionic School. The experiments of
Ehrenberg, instituted with the view of testing the doctrine of
spontaneous generation, may be said to have decided the whole question.
They did not succeed, indeed, in explaining every apparently exceptional
case, for some of the facts are still obscure, and will probably
continue to be so, notwithstanding every extension of microscopic power,
just as, in the analogous case of the Nebulæ, the increase of telescopic
power has enabled us to resolve not a few of them into clusters of
stars, while it has served to bring others yet unresolved within the
range of our vision. But they were sufficient, at least, to show that,
as far as our clear knowledge extends, the one uniform law, "_Omne vivum
ex ovo_," universally prevails, and that the whole analogy of Nature, in
so far as its constitution has been ascertained, is adverse to the
doctrine of spontaneous generation. Ehrenberg detected the minute germs
of vegetable mould, and the ova of some of the smallest animalcules; and
when it is considered that these germs and ova are so tenacious of
vitality that certain prolific seeds have come down to us from the age
of the Pharaohs in the wrappings of the Egyptian mummies,--that they are
widely diffused in the air and the waters, insomuch that no sooner does
a coral reef appear above the level of the sea than it is forthwith
covered with herbage by means of seeds wafted by the winds or deposited
by the waves,--and that it is almost impossible to exclude them by any
artificial expedient, since they are capable of resisting the action of
boiling water and even of alcohol itself,--it cannot, we think, be
denied that the few cases which still remain obscure or unexplained may
be, at least, _probably_ accounted for in accordance with the same
natural law which is found to be invariably established in every
department to which our clear knowledge extends.
In regard, again, to the supposed "transmutation of species," we are
equally warranted in affirming that it is destitute of all experimental
evidence, and unsupported even by any natural analogy. As the doctrine
of spontaneous generation stands opposed to the maxim that _organic life
can be produced only by organic life_, so the doctrine of a
transmutation of species stands opposed to the equally certain maxim
that _like produces like, both in the vegetable and animal kingdoms_.
Cuvier has demonstrated, with reference to the birds and reptiles
preserved in Egypt, an entire fixity and uniformity of species, in
every, even the least, particular, for at least three thousand
years.[48] In the actual course of Nature we see no tendency to change;
nay, a barrier seems to have been erected in the constitution of Nature
itself to prevent the possible confusion of races by promiscuous
intercourse, through that provision which renders the mule incapable of
reproduction. No plant has ever been found in a state of transition from
a lower to a higher form; no instance has ever been produced of one of
the algæ being transmuted into the lowest form of terrestrial
vegetation; nor of a small gelatinous body developing itself into a
fish, a bird, or a beast; nor of an ourang-outang rising into a man.[49]
It is true, indeed, that "there is a capacity in all species to
accommodate themselves, to a certain extent, to a change of external
circumstances, this extent varying greatly according to the species.
There may thus arise changes of appearance or structure, and some of
these changes are transmissible to the offspring; but the mutations thus
superinduced are _governed by constant laws and confined within certain
limits_. Indefinite divergence from the original type is not possible,
and the extreme limit of possible variation may usually be reached in a
short period of time; in short, species have a real existence in Nature,
and a transformation from one to another does not exist."[50]
The whole science of Natural History is based on the existence of
distinct species, capable of being discriminated from each other by
certain characteristic marks; and the whole art of the agriculturist and
the stockbreeder proceeds on the assumption of a law, invariable in its
operation, whereby "like produces like in the vegetable and animal
worlds." The instances to which the author of "The Vestiges" refers in
support of his theory are utterly frivolous when opposed to the copious
inductions to which they are opposed; and they may all be explained
consistently with the _law of variation within definite limits_, as
stated by Dr. Whewell, or by our ignorance of all the conditions
involved in each particular case. Nor is his argument founded on the
limited range of our observation, even with its singular illustration
derived from Mr. Babbage's calculating engine, fitted to diminish, in
the slightest degree, our confidence in the general results of these
inductions; for, not to mention that it amounts to nothing more than an
appeal from what we do know to what we do not know, from knowledge to
ignorance, from the certainties of science to the mere possibilities of
conjecture, it has been well shown by Mr. Miller, that our range of
observation is not so limited as the author of "The Vestiges" would have
us to believe, since "_extent of space_ is, in a matter of this kind,
equivalent to _duration of time_. For, although no man has lived five
hundred years, so as to observe the gradual development of the oak from
the acorn in its various stages of progress, yet every man who can
survey five hundred yards of an English forest, can see the oak in every
stage of its growth, and need have no doubt as to the law of its
progressive development. And so, had there really been such a
transmutation of species as is contended for, we might expect to find,
somewhere on the vastly extended sea coasts of our islands and
continents, some specimens of plants or animals in a state of transition
from the lower to the higher forms."
We are told, indeed, in answer to this argument, that Mr. Babbage's
engine produces numbers according to a certain law up to a particular
point, and then, most unexpectedly, perhaps even unaccountably, the law
of the series is changed, and the next term exhibits a striking
departure from the order previously followed; and so, it is argued, it
may be in nature. Each organism may propagate after its kind for immense
periods, so as to give the impression of this being an invariable law;
but at a certain stage the order may change, and the next term in the
series may differ from all that went before it. The argument--if it can
be called an argument--amounts to this: Mr. Babbage's machine produces a
_series of numbers, and of numbers only_, but according to different
laws of succession; _ergo_, Nature may produce in the same way, and with
similar variations, _different races of plants and animals_. The
argument would have been perfect if the engine had produced _something
else than numbers_; if, as Professor Dod supposes, "while watching Mr.
Babbage's machine, presenting to us successive numbers by the revolution
of its plates, we should suddenly see one of those plates resolving
itself into types, and these types arranging themselves in the order of
a page of 'Paradise Lost,' or even of 'The Vestiges of Creation;'--in
such a case, there might have been something in the argument; but even
then, the withering question remains, Is there any man in his senses who
would not immediately conclude that _some new cause was now at work_?"
In short, in so far as the _facts of the case_ are concerned, there is
not only no known instance either of "spontaneous generation" or of
"transmutation of species," but there is not even any natural analogy
that can give the theory the slightest aspect of verisimilitude. The
author of "The Vestiges" thinks that a presumption in its favor may be
derived from "the analogy of the inorganic world,"--in other words, from
the supposed conversion of nebulæ into planets and astral systems by the
operation of natural causes; but this analogy has been conclusively set
aside by disproving the hypothesis on which it depends. He further
thinks that a favorable presumption may be derived from "the analogy of
the organic world,"--in other words, from the process of propagation by
which the races of plants and animals are perpetuated; but the
presumption thence derived, so far from being favorable, is directly
opposed to his theory, since all the facts which come under our
cognizance in every department of Nature serve only to establish the two
great maxims of Natural History,--that _organic life can spring only
from organic life_, and that _like produces like, both in the vegetable
and animal world_.
If we have succeeded in disposing of _the facts of the case_, we shall
have little difficulty in exposing _the fallacy of the principles_ which
are involved in the author's speculations on this subject. It is of
fundamental importance, in this inquiry, to form a clear and correct
conception of the precise point at issue, and of the two alternatives
between which we are called to make our choice. It has been well said
that "the great antagonist points in the array of the opposite lines are
simply the LAW of Development _versus_ the MIRACLE of Creation."[51] And
the author of "The Vestiges" virtually acknowledges this to be the real
state of the question, when he says that "if we can see no _natural_
origin for species, a _miraculous_ one must be admitted."[52] Now, the
grand alternative being Creation by Miracle or Creation by Law, that is,
Creation by a Natural or by a Supernatural cause, we affirm that it is
utterly presumptuous and unphilosophical to represent the one as less
worthy of God, or more derogatory to His infinite perfections, than the
other. Yet the author does not hesitate to say that the _natural_ ought
to be preferred to the _miraculous_ method of accounting for the origin
both of planets and of their inhabitants, for this among other reasons,
that the latter would be derogatory to the wisdom and power of the Most
High. His words are remarkable: "The Eternal Sovereign arranges a solar
or an astral system by dispositions imparted primordially to matter; He
causes, by the same majestic means, vast oceans to form and continents
to rise, and all the grand meteoric agencies to proceed in ceaseless
alternation, so as to fit the earth for a residence of organic beings.
But when, in the course of these operations, fuci and corals are to be
for the first time placed in those oceans, a particular interference of
the Divine power is required; and this special attention is needed
whenever a new family of organisms is to be introduced,--a new fiat for
fishes, another for reptiles, a third for birds; nay, taking up the
present views of Geologists as to species, such an event as the
commencement of a certain cephalopod, one with a few new nodulosites and
corrugations upon its shell, would, on this theory, require the
particular care of that same Almighty who willed at once the whole means
by which infinity was replenished with its worlds?" ... "Is it
conceivable, as a fitting mode of exercise for Creative Intelligence,
that it should be constantly paying a special attention to the creation
of species, as they may be required in each situation throughout those
worlds at particular times? Is such an idea accordant with our general
conception of the dignity, not to speak of the power, of the Great
Author?" ... "It would be distressing to be compelled to picture the
power of God as put forth _in any other manner_ than in those slow,
mysterious, universal laws which have so plainly an eternity to work
in."[53]
Such is the author's presumptuous decision on a matter which is far "too
high for him." We offer the following remarks upon it:
_First_ of all, let it be observed that, unless on the principle of
absolute Atheism, which he professes to repudiate, he cannot but
acknowledge that _once_, at least, the power of God must have been put
forth _in another manner_ than "in those slow, mysterious, universal
laws" of which he speaks; and that, even if he could succeed in
disproving "repeated interferences of creative power," he could in
nowise dispense with a primitive act of direct, immediate, supernatural
creation, since he does not profess to believe in the eternal existence
of matter and its laws. We find, indeed, that even in the subsequent
acts of a continuous, but mediate creation, he is compelled to
acknowledge a supernatural power as acting, in each individual case,
according to established natural laws; for he says expressly, "There
cannot be _an inherent intelligence in these laws_; the intelligence
appears _external to the laws_, something of which the laws are but as
the expression of the will and power. If this be admitted, the laws
cannot be regarded as primary or independent causes of the phenomena of
the physical world. We come, in short, to a being beyond Nature,--its
Author, its God." ... "When we speak of Natural Law, we only speak of
_the mode in which the Divine power is exercised_; it is but another
phrase for _the action of the ever-present and sustaining God_."[54] It
is admitted, then, _first_, that there must have been a primary act of
creation, in the highest and strictest sense, by a direct and immediate
interposition of Divine power, at the commencement of created existence;
and, _secondly_, that, even in the continuous work of creation, which is
supposed to have been subsequently carried on after the method of
development by established natural laws, Divine agency is still equally
real, although it is differently manifested, and is indispensably
necessary to account for the resulting products. Now, can it be
reasonably asserted that the direct and immediate creation of such a
being as Man would be more derogatory to the wisdom and power of God
than the primordial production of "a universal Fire-Mist," or even of
"electricity and albumen?" or, will it be pretended that immediate
creation of molluscs as molluscs, of fishes as fishes, of reptiles as
reptiles, would be less worthy of the great Author of Nature than the
establishment of a system which _must_ in due time give them birth, and
that, too, not without the concurrence and coöperation of the Divine
will; for "natural law is but another phrase for _the action_ of the
ever-present and sustaining God?"
But, while we hold that there is no good ground for an affirmative
answer to these questions, we would carefully guard against rushing to
the opposite extreme, and affirming, either that the production of new
races by the method of natural law was, on _a priori_ grounds,
impossible, or that God might not have adopted that method, had He so
pleased, in perfect consistency with the manifestation of His wisdom and
power. We see that He has done so, under the actual constitution of
Nature, so far as the production of _individuals_ is concerned; we see
not why a similar provision might not have been made for the production
of _genera and species_. In either way His power and His wisdom might
have been displayed. But, when we are told that the one is derogatory to
the Divine Majesty, and the other alone consistent with the loftiest
views of His perfections, we denounce the whole speculation as one that
is alike presumptuous and unphilosophical, on the simple but conclusive
ground that we are in no degree competent judges of the best method
either of creating or of governing the world. Had we been asked to say
whether it was likely that, under the rule of infinite wisdom and
almighty power, certain insects, reptiles, and fishes, that are
unattractive to the eye, and loathsome to the fastidious taste of many,
could find a place at all among the works of God, we might have thought
it improbable that they should be created; but they exist
notwithstanding, and the fact of their existence is enough to silence
all our presumptive reasonings. And surely it is not less--it is much
more--presumptuous to affirm that, existing as they do, they could not
have been brought into being, without disparagement to Divine wisdom,
otherwise than by the action of established laws, or by a process of
natural development; as if it were unworthy of God to _produce_ that for
whose production He confessedly did make _provision_.
But, further, we see here very strikingly exemplified the tendency of
such speculations to _exclude God from all real, active, and direct
connection with His works_. The dominion of Natural Law, which, as we
shall afterwards see, is held by M. Comte and Mr. Combe to exclude the
doctrine of a special Providence and the efficacy of prayer, is here
extended, by the author of "The Vestiges," so as to be exclusive also of
any direct Divine interposition in the work of Creation itself, other
than what may have been implied in the aboriginal production of matter
and its laws, or in the subsequent concurrence of His will with the
action of these laws in the established order of Nature.
We have said that the Theory of Development, as expounded in "The
Vestiges," is not necessarily atheistic, partly because the author
professedly disclaims Atheism, and partly also because, in strict logic,
it might still be possible, even on the basis of that theory, considered
simply in itself and apart from the speculations with which it has been
associated, to construct, from the actual phenomena of Nature, a valid
proof for the being and attributes of God. And yet we have thought it
necessary to advert to it as one of the recent speculations of science,
because, whatever may be its _professed aim_, its _practical tendency_
is unquestionably hostile to the influence of religious truth. It will
be found, in the great majority of cases, and especially in the case of
ardent youthful minds, that this theory, when it is embraced as an
article of their philosophic creed, is, to all practical purposes,
tantamount to Atheism. For not to insist on the consideration, so
forcibly stated by others,[55] that the natural argument for the
Immortality of Man, or for the doctrine of a Future Life, as implying
distinct individuality and continued self-consciousness, must be
materially weakened, if not entirely neutralized, by a theory of
development which traces the human lineage up through the monkeys and
fishes to albumen impregnated by electricity, or, further still, to a
diffused Nebula or universal Fire-Mist,--we think that the Sensational
and Materialistic speculations with which the work abounds have a
tendency to weaken the evidence for a living, personal, spiritual God,
as the Creator and Moral Governor of the world, and to diminish that
reverence, confidence, and love, which these aspects of His character
alone can inspire. The system of Epicurus, although it contained a
formal recognition of a First Cause, has always been held to be
practically atheistic, simply because it removed God from the active
superintendence of the affairs of the world, and excluded the doctrine
of a special providence and of a moral government. It was held, in the
words of Cicero, "Epicurum verbis reliquisse Deos,--re sustulisse."[56]
And so, in "The Vestiges," Natural Law is substituted for Supernatural
Interposition, not only in the common course of Providence, but in the
stupendous work of Creation itself.
SECTION III.
THEORY OF _SOCIAL_ OR _HISTORICAL_ DEVELOPMENT.--AUGUSTE COMTE.
It might have been thought that the principle of Development had
exhausted its powers, and achieved its highest triumphs, when it had
been applied successively to account, first, for the creation of planets
and astral systems, and, secondly, for the production of vegetable and
animal life; and that little could remain for it to do after it had
succeeded in tracing the genealogy of MAN back, in a direct line through
many generations, to the nebulous matter or luminous Fire-Mist which was
diffused at the beginning of time throughout the Universe. But, on a
more careful study of its last and highest product,--MAN, with his
intellectual and moral nature, his religious beliefs, his social
history, and his immortal hopes,--it seemed as if there were still some
phenomena which remained to be accounted for, some facts of palpable
reality and great magnitude which had not yet been adequately explained.
The mental faculties and their operations, the moral laws that are
universally recognized and appealed to, the social institutions which
have been established, the religious beliefs and feelings which have
generally prevailed, and the rites of worship which have been observed
in all ages and climes, were so widely different from the phenomena of
mere vegetable or animal life, that they seemed to demand a distinct
account of their origin; and it might not be apparent, at first sight,
how they could be reduced under the same all-pervading law by which the
planets were formed, so as to exclude all idea of Divine supernatural
interposition. This Herculean task was fearlessly undertaken, however,
by M. AUGUSTE COMTE, and it has been elaborated with singular ability in
his ponderous work, the "Cours de Philosophie Positive."
M. Comte's Course of Positive Philosophy began to be delivered at Paris
in the winter of 1829-30, and was completed in its published form in
1842-43. It comprehends a general outline of all the branches of
Inductive Science, and of the relations which they bear to each other;
and they are expounded in a style singularly copious, clear, and
forcible. He has acquired, in consequence, a high reputation as a
philosophical thinker, and has already found, in our own country, some
able allies, and not a few enthusiastic admirers. The "System of Logic,"
by John Stuart Mill, and "The Biographical History of Philosophy," by
G. H. Lewes, are avowedly indebted to his speculations for some of their
most characteristic contents; while the outline of his theory has been
presented to the more popular class of readers in England through the
columns of "The Leader," and in Scotland through those of "The Glasgow
Mechanics' Journal."
It is not my intention, nor is it necessary for my present purpose, to
offer any remarks on the strictly scientific portion of his voluminous
work. I shall confine myself exclusively to those speculations which
bear, more or less directly, on the great cause of Natural and Revealed
Religion, selecting them from all the various parts of his work, and
exhibiting them, in one comprehensive view, as a compact theory of
absolute and avowed Atheism.
The fundamental idea of his system is a supposed "law of the development
of human thought," which regulates and determines the whole progress of
the species in the acquisition of knowledge. This law is announced with
the air of a man who has made a great discovery, and who is entitled, in
consequence, to be regarded both as an original thinker, and as a
benefactor to the world. "I believe," he says, "that I have discovered a
grand fundamental law,"--"the fundamental law of the development of the
human mind;" ... "the grand law which I have indicated in the first part
of my system of Positive Politics, ... where I have divulged, for the
first time, the discovery of this law."[57] Now, what, it may be asked,
is this marvellous discovery, which bids so fair both to immortalize its
author and to enlighten the world? It is stated briefly in the _first_,
and illustrated at greater length in the _fourth_ and following volumes
of his work. The general outline of his theory is thus sketched: "That
law consists in this,--that each one of our leading conceptions, every
branch of our knowledge, passes successively through _three different
theoretic states_: the state theological or fictitious, the state
metaphysical or abstract, and the state scientific or positive. In other
words, the human mind, by its nature, employs successively, in each of
its researches, three methods of philosophizing, whose character is
essentially different, and even _radically opposed_: first, the
Theological method; then, the Metaphysical; and, last of all, the
Positive. Hence three systems of Philosophies, which _mutually exclude
each other_. The first is the necessary starting-point of the human
mind; the third is its fixed, ultimate state; the second is purely
provisional, and destined merely to serve as an intermediate stage."[58]
These are the _three_ great stages through which the collective mind of
Humanity must necessarily pass in its progressive advancement towards a
perfect knowledge of truth; but of these three, the _first_, or the
Theological Epoch, is again subdivided, and exhibited as commencing with
Fetishism, then advancing to Polytheism, and finally consummated in
Monotheism.
FETISHISM is supposed to have been the first form of the Theological
Philosophy; and it is described as consisting in the ascription of a
life and intelligence essentially analogous to our own to every existing
object, of whatever kind, whether organic or inorganic, natural or
artificial. It is traced to a primitive tendency, supposed to exist
equally in man and in the lower animals, to conceive of all external
objects as animated, and to ascribe to them the same, or similar, powers
and feelings with those which belong to the living tribes
themselves.[59] "Let an infant, for example, or a savage, on the one
hand, and, on the other hand, a dog or a monkey, behold a watch for the
first time, there will doubtless be no immediate profound difference,
unless in respect to the manner of representing it, between the
spontaneous conception which will represent to the one and the other
that admirable product of human industry as a sort of veritable animal,
having its own peculiar tastes and inclinations; whence results,
consequentially, in this respect, a Fetishism fundamentally common to
both, the former only having the exclusive privilege of being able
ultimately to get out of it." This instinctive and spontaneous
belief--the natural, and, indeed, the necessary result of a tendency
inherent in living beings--is conceived to have been an indispensable
and a most useful provision for the primeval state of man, and to have
exerted a highly salutary influence on the progressive development of
human thought. It is contrasted with the subsequent but more advanced
stage of Polytheism;[60] and the latter is held to denote a spontaneous
belief in supernatural beings, distinct from and even independent of
matter, since it is passively subject to their will; while the former
considers matter itself as animated, and has no idea of any higher or
more spiritual form of being. It is further supposed that idolatry,
properly so called, belongs to Fetishism only, and not at all to
Polytheism, for this singular, but not very conclusive reason, among
others, that if Polytheism be justly chargeable with idolatry because it
recognizes many wills superior to Nature and having power over it,
Catholicism would be equally liable to the same charge in respect of the
homage which it renders to saints and angels![61]
But Fetishism is only the initial step in the process of our
intellectual development; and it passes into Polytheism, not suddenly
and _per salium_, but slowly and gradually, through the intermediate
stage of "_Astrolatrie_," or the worship of the heavenly bodies. The
mind is imperceptibly divested of the idea that everything around it is
animated, and, by a process of real, but as yet imperfect
generalization, it rises from Fetishism to Polytheism; in which latter
system of belief an order of powers superior to Nature is recognized,
while as yet there is no conception of a supreme and all-perfect Mind.
The Polytheistic system, which prevailed so universally in the ancient
world, and which still prevails among Heathen nations, is supposed to
have been, not a _declension_ from a purer and better state, not a
_corruption_ either of natural or revealed religion, but _a step in
advance_ of the primary faith of mankind, a result of growing
intelligence, a vast and most beneficial change in the right direction.
It was the first great product of the metaphysical spirit, the result of
an early but imperfect generalization; it constituted the principal era
of the theological history of mankind; it was admirably adapted, and,
indeed, indispensably necessary, to the exigencies of society at the
time when it prevailed; it was more intensely religious than Monotheism
itself, since it brought man habitually into contact with a multitude of
gods, whose symbols were always present and visible to the eye, while it
exerted a wholesome influence on Science, on Poetry, on Industry, on
Morals, and, indeed, on the whole process of man's mental and social
development.[62]
But Polytheism, although indispensable and salutary as a provisional
belief, was not destined to be permanent; it was to be superseded in due
time, at least in the case of the _élite_ of humanity, by the higher and
still more abstract system of Monotheism, which is regarded as the
natural and inevitable product of human intelligence, independently of
all supernatural teaching, at a certain stage of its development. But
here, as in the former instance, the change is not effected suddenly;
the human mind advances gradually from Polytheism to Monotheism, through
the intermediate stage of the idea of Immutability or Destiny,--an idea
suggested partly by the study of the invariable order of Nature, and
partly by the irresistible domination of one great temporal power, such
as the iron empire of Rome.[63] Historically, indeed, Monotheism is said
to have spread in Europe through the Jews, who derived it from Egypt;
but it is added that, had there been no Jews, others would have given
birth to a system so necessary for the development of human thought. The
prevalence of Monotheism, for a limited time, was useful, and even
necessary, as the natural result of the great law of human progress,
and the indispensable precursor of a new and brighter era; but it was
temporary and provisional merely,--a stage in the onward march of
development, not the ultimate landing-place of human thought. It is
conceived to be radically incompatible with the recognition of
invariable natural laws, and even with the exercise of the industrial
arts.[64] It is, however, the last and highest form of the Theological
Philosophy; and, having reached this stage, the human mind necessarily
advances beyond it, until it arrives at a point where all theology
disappears, and where it is entirely and forever emancipated from all
the beliefs, the hopes, and the fears which have any reference to an
invisible spiritual world.
The ultimate goal of speculative thought is "the Positive Philosophy,"
which treats only of the Facts of Nature, and of their coördination
under general laws, to the utter exclusion of all supernatural powers,
and of all knowledge of causes, whether _efficient_ or _final_. But this
goal cannot be reached, it seems, by a sudden or abrupt transition from
the Theological to the Atheistic creed. There must be an intermediate
stage,--the era, in short, of Metaphysics,--during which the process of
Criticism will operate as a solvent on all previous beliefs, and by
producing Skepticism, in the first instance, in regard to all other
systems, will tend at length to concentrate the attention of mankind
exclusively on the truths of Inductive Science. The Metaphysical
Philosophy is held to be the necessary, but temporary stage of
transition from the theological to the positive method in science. It is
destined to supersede the one, and to introduce the other. It is
conceived to be equally at variance with both; and the era of its
ascendency is described as a critical, destructive, revolutionary age,
useful only as it delivers mankind from the shackles of former beliefs,
and prepares them for the adoption of a new and purely natural system
of thought. During this era of decomposition there will commence the
reconstruction of human opinion on new and more solid foundations; and
the transition from Monotheism to Positive Science will be the greatest
achievement of the race, greater far than the advancement from Fetishism
to Polytheism, or even from Polytheism to Monotheism itself. The
culminating point of human progress is absolute and universal
Atheism.[65]
Surely such a prospect may well arrest the most thoughtless, and prompt
them to inquire, with some measure of moral earnestness, What _is_ this
Positive Philosophy, this ultimate landing-place of human thought, this
final goal of human progress? Is it nothing else than the Inductive
Science of Bacon, but under a new and less attractive name? or is it a
philosophy radically different from it, and entitled, therefore, to be
regarded as an original method? The author tells us that he might have
called it "Natural Science," or "the Philosophy of Nature," since it
treats of Facts and their Laws; but that he had been induced to prefer
the distinctive title of _positive_, as one better fitted to mark the
contrast between it and the _negative_ character of those metaphysical
and theological systems which it is destined to supersede. And yet it
will be found that, in so far as it differs at all from the Inductive
Science of Bacon, it is purely _negative_, since its chief
characteristic is the negation of all Theology, and the entire exclusion
from the domain of human knowledge, of Causes, whether efficient or
final. It _adds_ nothing to the sum of human thought which might not be
reached by Bacon's method; it only _subtracts_ whatever has reference to
the Divine and Supernatural, and especially everything connected with
the theory of Causation. It makes no new contribution to the general
stock, unless, indeed, it be the hitherto unknown law of development
which is supposed to regulate and determine the progress of humanity
from primeval Fetishism to ultimate Atheism; and it takes away Theology,
with all its ennobling beliefs and blessed hopes, not by grappling with
and solving, but by merely discarding the problem both of the origin and
end of the world.
That this is a correct account of the new theory is evident from his own
words: "The fundamental character of the Positive Philosophy is, to
regard all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural _laws_, the
precise discovery of which, and their reduction to the least possible
number, is the end of all our efforts; while we regard the investigation
of what are called _causes_, whether first or final, as absolutely
_inaccessible and void of sense for us_." ... "We have no pretension to
expound the producing causes of the phenomena, for in that we can never
do more than push back the difficulty; we seek only to analyze with
exactitude the circumstances of their production, and to connect them
with one another by the normal relations of _succession and
similitude_."--"In the positive state of science, the human mind,
acknowledging the impossibility of obtaining absolute knowledge,
abandons the search after the _origin and destination_ of the universe,
and the knowledge of the secret _causes_ of phenomena."[66]
It is thus plainly announced that the Positive Philosophy is the science
of facts and their laws, exclusive of all reference to causes, efficient
or final; and it is even admitted that Theology could not be excluded,
were it deemed legitimate or possible for the human mind to investigate
the causes of phenomena.
Viewing the theory in this light, we submit the following remarks as a
sufficient antidote to this daring but impotent attempt to exclude
Theology from the domain of human knowledge.
1. It is worthy of notice how completely the Infidel party have shifted
their ground and changed their tactics since the era of the first French
Revolution; and how utterly inconsistent are the arguments of M. Comte
and the Positive School with those of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists.
Formerly, Religion was wont to be ascribed to priestcraft; it was
supposed to have been invented by fraud, supported by falsehood, and
professed in hypocrisy; and the Church, but especially the hierarchy of
Rome, was the object of incessant ridicule or malignant abuse. But now,
Religion is discovered to be the natural, necessary, and salutary result
of the legitimate action of the human faculties in the earlier stages of
their development, the initial impellent of social progress, the
indispensable condition of advancing civilization; and, on the broad,
general principle that sincerity of conviction is essential to
wide-spread success, the theory which ascribes its origin to the fraud
or the policy, whether of kings, or priests, or fanatics, is scouted as
a mere delirium of Voltaire, or as one of those revolutionary prejudices
of his disastrous era which were alike irrational and injurious. And the
Church, so far from being ridiculed or maligned, is lauded above measure
as the highest extant product of _human_ wisdom; Catholicism is even
preferred to Christianity itself, as a manifest improvement on the more
primitive form of faith and worship; it is declared to be the
indispensable basis of the future reorganization of society, which, when
it shall have been freed from all theological influence, its only point
of weakness, will still survive, with its separate speculative class,
its imposing public forms, and its splendid hierarchy,--an Atheistic
society, but still Catholic and One.[67] The change, in this respect,
between the opinions which prevailed, respectively, at the era of the
_first_ and that of the _second_ Revolution, is at once striking and
instructive. It shows how variable and vacillating is the wretched creed
of Infidelity, and how the firm maintenance of truth will eventually
compel the homage, even where it may not succeed in carrying the
convictions, of speculative minds. That Religion in all its successive
forms, from the rudest Fetishism up to the sublimest Christian
Monotheism, has been the natural and genuine product of human
intelligence, working ever onward and upward to a still higher stage of
development,--that its existence was inevitable, and its influence, on
the whole, highly beneficial,--and that, even when it shall have passed
away, society will still be largely indebted to it for the impulse, yet
unspent, which it has imparted to the cause of civilization and
progress,--all this is admitted and even maintained by M. Comte, in
direct and often derisive opposition to the theorists who once ascribed
its origin to fraud, and its prevalence to priestcraft; nay, he elevates
it to the rank of a primordial and indispensable element of human
progress, a necessary and legitimate result of the great law of human
development. We know of no parallel instance of a change of opinion so
great and sudden, unless it be the marvellous transition of certain
modern Rationalists who were wont to ridicule the doctrine of the
Trinity as absurd and incomprehensible, but who have now arrived at the
conclusion that it is the fundamental law of human thought![68]
Still, with all this outward homage to Religion, considered as a mere
matter of history, the theory of M. Comte is essentially and even
avowedly Atheistic. It is mainly designed to account for the origin of
all Religion, whether Natural or Revealed, without having recourse to
the supposition either of the existence of God, or of his interposition
at any time in the affairs of men. He seems to have proposed to himself
a twofold object: _first_, to account for the prevalence of the various
forms of natural religion and superstition, without recognizing any
valid evidence for the existence of supernatural powers; and,
_secondly_, to account for the origin of Judaism and Christianity, or,
as he calls it, of Monotheism, without recognizing the reality of any
Divine Revelation. And he attempts to accomplish _both_ objects by means
of the same law--a law of development which, in primitive times,
produced Fetishism--which then produced Polytheism; then Monotheism;
then the Metaphysical transition era, during which all Theology is
undergoing a process of disintegration and decay; and, last of all (the
noblest, because the latest, birth of time), the Positive Philosophy,
under whose predicted ascendancy all Theology must die and be buried in
everlasting oblivion. His theory is not merely Anti-Protestant, although
it is bitterly so;[69] nor merely Anti-Christian, as opposed to all
Revelation; but it is Anti-Theological, as opposed to all Religion. It
proposes to eliminate Theology from the scheme of our knowledge, by
showing that it is utterly inaccessible to our faculties, and neither
necessary to society nor useful to morals.[70] It anticipates the time,
as being near at hand, when it shall have no existence, save on the
historic page.
2. This Atheistic theory rests entirely on a supposed discovery of M.
Comte,--the discovery of _a law of human development_, which serves at
once to account for the origin and prevalence of Theological beliefs in
the past, and to insure their utter disappearance in the future; a law
which, like the magician's wand, can raise the apparition, and then lay
it again! Now, of this law we affirm and undertake to prove that it is
_utterly groundless_; that it has no solid basis of evidence on which it
can be established; that it is contradicted by the history of the
world, and opposed to our own experience at the present day.
It can scarcely be imagined that a man accustomed, as M. Comte has been,
to the severe pursuits of Science, could give publicity to a law of this
kind, and claim the credit of a great original discovery, without having
some plausible reasons to plead for it; and he does assign certain
reasons for his belief, which are, it may be safely affirmed, as
frivolous and inconclusive as any that have ever been offered in support
of the most baseless revery. They may be reduced to THREE; the _first_,
derived from our cerebral organization; the _second_, from the history
of a certain portion of our species; the _third_, from the analogy of
our individual experience.[71]
He founds, in the first instance, on our _cerebral organization_. He is
an ardent admirer of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, and has no scruple in
avowing himself a decided Materialist. It is unnecessary here to enter
on a discussion of Materialism, or even of Phrenology,--that will be
done hereafter; in the mean time it is enough merely to indicate the
fact that the theory proceeds on that ground, and then to inquire _how
the fundamental law of Development is deduced from it_. How does the
theory of Materialism, or even of Phrenology, were it assumed on the one
side and admitted on the other, contribute to the establishment or
verification of that law? Suppose it to be conceded that every mental
faculty or propensity has a distinct cerebral organ, or, more generally,
that the brain may be divided into three parts, representing,
respectively, the animal propensities, the more elevated sentiments, and
the intellectual faculties; could it be rationally inferred from this
concession that human nature must necessarily develop itself after a
certain order or method, and especially in the precise way that is
indicated in M. Comte's law? Would it prove that Man must needs pass,
in the process of his mental and social development, through _three_
distinct and successive stages,--the preparatory Theological state, the
transitory Metaphysical state, and the final Positive state? Would it
prove that Religion must first exist as Fetishism, then as Polytheism,
then as Monotheism, and thereafter disappear from the earth altogether
on the advent of M. Comte? He seems to think that there is a real
connection between the cerebral theory and his great fundamental law;
but it is not easy for a common reader to discern or to explain it.
Considering the cranium, according to what he conceives to be the true
anatomical theory, as simply a prolongation of the vertebral
column,--the primitive centre of the whole nervous system,--he argues
that the functions, intellectual and emotional, which are proper to the
upper and anterior parts of it, are less energetic than the animal
propensities, whose organs lie in the lower and posterior region, just
in proportion as they are further removed from the spine; and that, for
this reason, the latter must first come into action, then the
intermediate organs of sentiment, and, last of all, the intellectual
powers. And this doctrine he applies to the verification both of his
otherwise admirable classification of the Sciences, and of his far more
doubtful law of human development. We conceive that if it were
applicable at all to the problem of human progress, it might possibly be
applied to indicate the probable development of an _individual mind_, in
the successive stages of infancy, youth, and manhood; but that it does
not admit of the same application to _the history of the race_,
otherwise than by the aid of a very fanciful analogy. We have no faith
in the _a priori_ methods of constructing the chart of human history,
and tracing the necessary course of social progress, which have recently
become so popular in Germany and France. We cannot, with M. Comte,
undertake to solve the problem,--Given three lobes of the brain,
representing the propensities, affections, and intellectual powers, but
differing from each other in size and situation, what will be the future
history of the race,--religious, æsthetic, industrial, metaphysical,
social? We cannot, with M. Cousin, undertake to solve the
problem,--Given three terms, the finite, the infinite, and the relation
between the two, what will be the development of human thought, first,
in the experience of individuals, and, secondly, in the history of
society?[72] All such problems are too high for us. The history of the
human race must be ascertained from the authentic records and extant
monuments of the past, not constructed by theories, or divined by _a
priori_ speculations.
But M. Comte does appeal, in the second instance, to history in
confirmation of his views. He is far from affirming, however, that the
progress of the race, under the operation of his great law of
development, has been either uniform or invariable; on the contrary, he
admits, with regard to India, China, and other nations, comprising
probably the majority of mankind, whose state, intellectually and
socially, has been stationary for ages, that they afford little or no
evidence in support of his theory; and for this, among other reasons, he
confines himself to the history of what he calls the _élite_, or
advanced guard of humanity, and in this way makes it a very "_abstract_"
history indeed![73] Beginning with Greece, as the representative of
ancient civilization, and surveying the history of the Roman empire, and
of its successors in Western Europe, he endeavors to show that the
actual progress of humanity has been, on the whole, in conformity with
his general law. He gives no historical evidence, however, of the
prevalence of Fetishism in primitive times; _that_ is an inference
merely, depending partly on his theory of cerebral organization, and
partly on the assumption that in the savage state, which is
gratuitously supposed to have been the primitive condition of man,
there must have been a tendency to regard every object, natural or
artificial, as endowed with life and intelligence. Polytheism, again, he
conceives to have been a step in advance, an improvement on the
preëxisting state of things, instead of being, as it really was, a
declension from a purer and better faith, an aberration from the light
of Nature, not less than from the lessons of Revelation. He conceives
Monotheism, whether as taught, to the Jews by Moses, or to the world at
large by Christ and his apostles, to have been the natural product of
man's unaided intelligence; and he assumes this, without making a single
reference to the supernatural events by which its publication, in either
instance, is said to have been accompanied, or to the sacred books in
which they are recorded; nay, he does not even name the Founder of the
Christian faith, otherwise than by describing him as "the founder, real
or imaginary, of this great religious system."[74]
In treating, again, of the Critical or destructive system of
Metaphysics, and of the Positive or reconstructive system of the New
Philosophy, he adduces no evidence to show that _the same element_ is
negatived by the one and restored by the other; on the contrary, were
his statement true in all respects, it would only serve to prove that
the Theological element, which is slowly dissipated by Metaphysics, is
formally and finally abjured by Positivism. He assumes and asserts, on
very insufficient grounds, that there is a real, radical, and necessary
contrariety between the facts and laws of Science and the first
principles of Theology, whether natural or revealed; and he anticipates,
therefore, that in proportion as Science advances, Theology must recede,
and ultimately quit the field. He ought to have known that there are
minds in every part of Europe as thoroughly scientific as his own, and
as deeply imbued with the spirit of modern Inductive Philosophy, who,
so far from seeing any discordance between the results of scientific
inquiry and the fundamental truths of Theology, are in the habit of
appealing to the former in proof or illustration of the latter; and who,
the further they advance in the study of the works of Nature, are only
the more confirmed in their belief of a Creative Intelligence and a
Governing Power. It may be that, in his own immediate circle at Paris,
there is a tendency towards Atheism; but, assuredly, no such tendency
exists in the highest and most scientific minds of modern Europe. The
faith of Bacon, Newton, and Boyle, of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Pascal,
in regard to the first principles of Theology, is still the prevailing
creed of the Sedgwicks, the Whewells, the Herschells, and the Brewsters
of the present day.
The only plausible part of his Historical Survey, and that which, in our
apprehension, is the most likely to make some transient impression on
the popular mind, is his elaborate attempt to show, with regard to each
branch of Science, in detail, that it was enveloped during its infancy
in a cloud of superstition; and that just in proportion as the light
shone more clearly, or was more distinctly discerned, the cloud was
gradually dissipated and dispersed, until, one after another, they were
all emancipated from their supposed connection with supernatural causes,
and reduced under fixed natural laws. Confounding Theology with
Superstition, or failing, at least, to discriminate duly between the
two, M. Comte draws a vivid picture of the successive inroads which
Science has made on the consecrated domain of Religion, and represents
the one as receding just in proportion as the other advances. For as the
darkness disappears before the rising sun, whose earliest rays gild only
the loftier mountain peaks, but whose growing brightness spreads over
the lowly valleys and penetrates the deepest recesses of nature, so
Theology gradually retires before the advance of Science, which first
conquers and brings under the rule of natural law the simplest and
least complicated branches, such as Mechanics and Astronomy; then
attacks the more complex, such as Chemistry and Physiology; and, last of
all, advances to the assault of the most difficult, such as Ethics and
Sociology; until, having emancipated each of them successively from
their previous connection with supernatural beliefs, it effects the
entire elimination of Theology, first from the philosophic, and
afterwards from the popular creed of mankind. M. Comte conceives that
the religious spirit has been steadily decreasing throughout the whole
course of human development, from the time when it was universal, in the
form of Fetishism, till it reached its most abstract, but least
influential form in Monotheism; and that now the period of its decline
and fall has arrived, when it is subjected to the powerful solvent of a
Metaphysical and Skeptical Philosophy, and when its ultimate extinction
is certain under the action of Positive Science.
We deem this by far the most dangerous, because it is the most plausible
part of his speculations; so plausible that, even where his reasonings
in support of it may fail to carry the full conviction of the
understanding, they may yet leave behind them a certain impression
unfavorable to faith in Divine things, since they appeal to many
palpable facts in the history of Science, too well attested to be
doubted, and too important to be overlooked. The theory itself--whatever
may be thought of the peculiar form which it has assumed in the hands of
M. Comte--cannot be regarded, in its main and essential features, as one
of his original discoveries; for the general idea on which it rests had
been announced with equal brevity and precision by the celebrated LA
PLACE: "Let us survey the history of the progress of the human mind and
of its errors; we shall there see _final causes constantly pushed back
to the boundaries of its knowledge_. These causes, which Newton pushed
back to the limits of the solar system, were, even in his time, placed
in the atmosphere to explain meteoric appearances. They are nothing
else, therefore, in the eyes of a philosopher, than _the expression of
our ignorance of the true causes_." Supposing this to be a correct
account of the fact, the inference which M. Comte deduces from it might
seem to follow very much as a matter of course,--the inference, viz.,
that in proportion as Science advances and succeeds in subjecting one
department of Nature after another to fixed and invariable laws,
Theology, or the doctrine of Final Causes, must necessarily recede
before it, and, at length, disappear altogether, when human knowledge
has reached its highest ultimate perfection. But is it a correct account
of the fact? Is it true that the doctrine of Final Causes is less
generally admitted, or more dubiously maintained, in regard to those
sciences which have already reached their maturity, than in regard to
those other sciences which are still comparatively in their infancy? Or
is it true that it has lost instead of gaining ground by the progress of
scientific discovery, so as to occupy a narrower space and to hold a
more precarious footing, _now_, than it did in the earlier ages of
ignorance and superstition? Did Final Causes disappear from the view of
Newton when he discovered the law which regulates the movements of the
heavenly bodies? Did Galen or did Paley discard them when they surveyed
the human frame in the light of scientific anatomy? or Harvey, when,
impelled and guided by this doctrine as his governing principle, he
discovered the circulation of the blood? In what departments of Nature,
and in what branches of Science, does the Theistic philosopher or the
Christian divine find the clearest and strongest proofs of order,
adaptation, and adjustment? Is it not in those very departments of
Nature whose laws have been most fully ascertained? in those very
branches of Science which have been most thoroughly matured? Did we
believe Comte and La Place, we should expect to find that the doctrine
of Final Causes and the science of Theology could now find no footing in
the domain of Astronomy, of Physics, or of Chemistry, since in these
departments the phenomena have been reduced, by many successive
discoveries, to rigorous general laws; and that they could only survive
for a brief time by taking refuge in the yet unconquered territory of
Meteorology, Biology, and Social Science. But is it so? Examine the
Series of Bridgewater Treatises, or any other recent philosophical
exposition of the Evidence of Natural Theology, and it will be apparent,
on the most cursory review, that in point of fact the arguments and
illustrations are derived almost entirely from _the more advanced
sciences_; and that, so far from receding or threatening to disappear,
Final Causes have only become more prominent and more striking in
proportion as inquiring men have succeeded in removing the vail from any
department of Nature.
It were easy, indeed, to cull from the records of the past many facts
which might seem to give a plausible aspect to the theory of M. Comte.
We might be told of the early history of Astronomy, when the astrologer
gazed upon the heavens with a superstitious eye, and spoke of the mystic
influence of the planets, and constructed the horoscope for the
calculation of nativities and the prediction of future events. We might
be told of the early history of Anatomy, when, from the entrails of
birds and animals, the _haruspex_ prognosticated the fate of empires and
the fortunes of battle. We might be told of the early history of
Chemistry, when alchemists sought in their concoctions a panacea for all
human evils, and in their crucibles an alkalest or universal menstruum.
We might be told of the early history of Zoölogy, when the augur watched
the flight, the singing, the feeding of birds, and applied them to the
purposes of divination. We might be told of Aëromancy as the earliest
form of Meteorology, and of Geomancy as the earliest form of
Geology.[75] And we might be told of the popular superstitions which
lingered, till a very recent period, among the peasantry of our own
country, and which are now gradually disappearing in proportion as the
light of Religion and Science is diffused.[76] These facts, which appear
on the surface of human history, do unquestionably prove that _there has
been a process of gradual advancement_, by which each of the sciences
has been, in succession, purged of its earlier errors, and placed on a
more solid and enduring basis. But they prove nothing more than this:
they do _not_ prove that these sciences must ultimately supersede
Theology, or that they have a necessary tendency towards Atheism. On the
contrary, we hold that they afford a valid presumption from analogy on
the other side. For suppose, even, that Religion, following the same law
of development which determines the progress of every other branch of
human knowledge, had become incorporated, in its earlier stages, with
many fond and foolish superstitions, the analogy of the other sciences
would lead us to conclude that, just as the reveries of Astrology had
passed away and given place to a solid system of Astronomy,--and as the
vain speculations of Alchemy had been superseded by the useful
discoveries of Chemistry,--and as the arts of Augury and Divination had
finally issued in the inductive science of true Natural History,--so
Theology might also purge itself from the fond conceits which had been
for a time incorporated with it, and still survive, after all
superstition had passed away, as a sound and fruitful branch of the tree
of knowledge.
This is not the precise light, however, in which M. Comte regards
Theology, He does not speak of it as _a distinct and independent
science_, but rather as _a method of Philosophy_, which has been applied
to the explanation of _all_ the departments of Nature; and, viewed in
this light, he objects to it on the ground that Positive Science
peremptorily demands the elimination of all causes, efficient and final,
and, consequently, the exclusion of all reference to God, or to any
supernatural power, in connection with the laws either of the material
or moral world. This is the fundamental basis of his theory. It is
assumed that the recognition of natural laws is incompatible with the
belief in supernatural powers, and that these laws must be invariable
and independent of any superior will. Hence the supposed antagonism
between Theology and Physical Science, which is strongly affirmed by M.
Comte[77]; as if the laws of Nature could not exist unless they were
independent of the Divine will, or as if the arts of industry could not
be pursued, on the supposition of a Providence, without sacrilegious
presumption. The laws for which he contends must have had no author to
establish, and can have no superior will to control them; they had no
beginning, and can have no end; they cannot be reversed, suspended, or
interfered with; they are necessary, immutable, and eternal, not
subordinate to God, but independent of Him; they are, in short, nothing
less than Destiny or Fate, the same that Cudworth describes as the
Democritic, Physiological, or Atheistic Fate, which consists in "the
material necessity of all things without a God."[78] Now, we have no
jealousy of natural laws. We believe in their existence; we believe,
also, in their regular operation in the ordinary course of Nature; but
we deny that they must needs be _independent_ of a supreme will, and
affirm that, being subordinate to that will, they are not necessarily
_invariable_. They are expressly recognized and cordially maintained by
divines, not less than by men of science; but in such a sense as to be
perfectly compatible both with the doctrine of a primitive creation, and
also with the possibility of a subsequent miraculous interposition. The
Westminster Divines explicitly declare that "God, the First Cause, by
His providence, ordereth all things to fall out _according to the nature
of second causes_, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;" and
that "in His ordinary providence, He maketh use of means, but is free to
act without, above, and against them at His pleasure."[79] But M. Comte
will have no laws, however regular, unless they be also invariable, and
independent of any superior will. And, doubtless, if this were the sense
in which Science has established the doctrine of natural laws, it would
be at direct variance with Theology, both Natural and Revealed; and the
antagonism between the two might afford some ground for the belief that,
sooner or later, Theology must quit the field. But it is not the
existence of these natural laws, nor even their regular operation in the
common course of Providence, that is hostile to our religious
beliefs,--it is only the supposition that they are unoriginated,
independent, and invariable; and to assume this without proof, as if it
were a self-evident or axiomatic truth, or to apply it in a process of
historical deduction respecting either the past development or the
future prospects of the race, is such a shameless begging of the whole
question,--that we know of no parallel to it except in the kindred
speculations of Strauss, who assumes the same radical principle, and
gravely tells us that whatever is supernatural must needs be
unhistorical.[80]
There is absolutely no evidence, properly historical, that there is any
necessary tendency in the recognition of established natural laws to
supersede Theology, or to introduce an era of universal Atheism. Some
such tendency might exist were these laws conceived of as necessary,
independent, and invariable. But this hypothesis, equally
unphilosophical and irreligious, is not and never has been maintained
by the great body of Inductive inquirers, who see no contradiction
either between the established order of Nature and the supposition of
its Divine origin, or between the operation of natural laws and the
recognition of a supreme, superintending Providence. Nor should it be
forgotten, in this connection, that the evidence in favor of Theism
depends not so much on _the mere laws_ as on _the dispositions and
adjustments_ that are observable in Nature.[81] There is, therefore, no
historical proof to establish the supposed law of human development, and
no rational ground to expect that the progress of Inductive Science will
ever supplant or supersede Theology. It is true that Theology, although
a distinct and independent science, is so comprehensive in its range
that it gathers its proofs and illustrations from _every_ department of
Nature, and that, were it excluded from any one of these, it might, for
the same reason, be excluded from all the rest; but it is not true that
there is any real or necessary antagonism between the laws of Nature and
the prerogatives of God. On the contrary, let our knowledge advance
until _all_ the phenomena both of the Material and Moral worlds shall be
reduced under so many general laws, even then Superstition might
disappear, but Theology would remain, and would only receive fresh
accessions of evidence and strength, in proportion as the wise order of
Nature is more fully unfolded, and its most hidden mysteries disclosed.
We scarcely know whether it is needful to advert at all to the argument
in favor of his theory which M. Comte founds on _the analogy of
individual experience_. It is a transparent fallacy. He tells us that
the race is, like an individual man, Religious in infancy, Metaphysical
in youth, and Positive--that is, Scientific, without being Religious--in
mature manhood.[82] Now, this analogical argument, to have any
legitimate weight, must proceed on the assumption of two facts. The
first is, that the law of individual development commences, in the case,
at least, of all who belong to the _élite_ of humanity, with Theology,
and terminates in Atheism; and the second is, that the individual is, in
this respect, the type or pattern of his race, and that the experience
of the one is only an outline
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