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Sophisms of the Protectionists

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Title: Sophisms of the Protectionists

Author: Frédéric Bastiat

Translator: Horace White


        
Release date: December 22, 2006 [eBook #20161]

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOPHISMS OF THE PROTECTIONISTS ***




Produced by Graeme Mackreth, Curtis Weyant and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net







SOPHISMS

OF THE

PROTECTIONISTS.


BY THE LATE

M. FREDERIC BASTIAT,

_Member of the Institute of France_.

       *       *       *       *       *


Part I. Sophisms of Protection--First Series.
Part II. Sophisms of Protection--Second Series.
Part III. Spoliation and Law.
Part IV. Capital and Interest.


TRANSLATED FROM THE PARIS EDITION OF 1863.


NEW-YORK:
AMERICAN FREE TRADE LEAGUE.

1870.




Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1869, by
THE WESTERN NEWS COMPANY,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for the
Northern District of Illinois.




PREFACE.


A previous edition of this work has been published under the title of
"Essays on Political Economy, by the late M. Frederic Bastiat." When it
became necessary to issue a second edition, the Free-Trade League
offered to buy the stereotype plates and the copyright, with a view to
the publication of the book on a large scale and at a very low price.
The primary object of the League is to educate public opinion; to
convince the people of the United States of the folly and wrongfulness
of the Protective system. The methods adopted by the League for the
purpose have been the holding of public meetings and the publication of
books, pamphlets, and tracts, some of which are for sale at the cost of
publication, and others given away gratuitously.

In publishing this book the League feels that it is offering the most
effective and most popular work on political economy that has as yet
been written. M. Bastiat not only enlivens a dull subject with his wit,
but also reduces the propositions of the Protectionists to absurdities.

Free-Traders can do no better service in the cause of truth, justice,
and humanity, than by circulating this little book among their friends.
It is offered you at what it costs to print it. Will not every
Free-Trader put a copy of the book into the hands of his Protectionist
friends?

It would not be proper to close this short preface without an expression
on the part of the League of its obligation to the able translator of
the work from the French, Mr. Horace White, of Chicago.

OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN FREE-TRADE LEAGUE,
9 Nassau Street, New-York, June, 1870.




PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.


This compilation, from the works of the late M. Bastiat, is given to the
public in the belief that the time has now come when the people,
relieved from the absorbing anxieties of the war, and the subsequent
strife on reconstruction, are prepared to give a more earnest and
thoughtful attention to economical questions than was possible during
the previous ten years. That we have retrograded in economical science
during this period, while making great strides in moral and political
advancement by the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of the
freedmen, seems to me incontestable. Professor Perry has described very
concisely the steps taken by the manufacturers in 1861, after the
Southern members had left their seats in Congress, to reverse the policy
of the government in reference to foreign trade.[1] He has noticed but
has not laid so much stress as he might on the fact that while there
was no considerable public opinion to favor them, there was none at all
to oppose them. Not only was the attention of the people diverted from
the tariff by the dangers then impending, but the Republican party,
which then came into power, had, in its National Convention, offered a
bribe to the State of Pennsylvania for its vote in the Presidential
election, which bribe was set forth in the following words:

   "_Resolved_, That while providing revenue for the support of the
   General Government by duties upon imports, sound policy requires such
   an adjustment of these imposts as to encourage the development of the
   industrial interests of the whole country; and we commend that policy
   of national exchanges which secures to the workingmen liberal wages,
   to agriculture remunerative prices, to mechanics and manufacturers an
   adequate reward for their skill, labor and enterprise, and to the
   nation commercial prosperity and independence."--_Chicago Convention
   Platform_, 1860.

[Footnote 1: Elements of Political Economy, p. 461]

It is true that this resolution did not commit anybody to the doctrine
that the industrial interests of the whole country are promoted by taxes
levied upon imported property, however "adjusted," but it was
understood, by the Pennsylvanians at least, to be a promise that if the
Republican party were successful in the coming election, the doctrine of
protection, which had been overthrown in 1846, and had been in an
extremely languishing state ever since, should be put upon its legs
again. I am far from asserting that this overture was needed to secure
the vote of Pennsylvania for Mr. Lincoln in 1860, or that that State
was governed by less worthy motives in her political action than other
States. I only remark that her delegates in the convention thought such
a resolution would be extremely useful, and such was the anxiety to
secure her vote in the election that a much stronger resolution might
have been conceded if it had been required. I affirm, however, that
there was no agitation on the tariff question in any other quarter. New
England had united in passing the tariff of 1857, which lowered the
duties imposed by the act of 1846 about fifty per cent., i.e., one-half
of the previously existing scale. The Western States had not petitioned
Congress or the convention to disturb the tariff; nor had New York done
so, although Mr. Greeley, then as now, was invoking, more or less
frequently, the shade of Henry Clay to help re-establish what is deftly
styled the "American System."

The protective policy was restored, after its fifteen years' sleep,
under the auspices of Mr. Morrill, a Representative (now a Senator) from
Vermont. Latterly I have noticed in the speeches and votes of this
gentleman (who is, I think, one of the most conscientious, as he is one
of the most amiable, men in public life), a reluctance to follow to
their logical conclusion the principles embodied in the "Morrill tariff"
of 1861. His remarks upon the copper bill, during the recent session of
Congress, indicate that, in his opinion, those branches of American
industry which are engaged in producing articles sent abroad in exchange
for the products of foreign nations, are entitled to some consideration.
This is an important admission, but not so important as another, which
he made in his speech on the national finances, January 24, 1867, in
which, referring to the bank note circulation existing in the year 1860,
he said: "_And that was a year of as large production and as much
general prosperity as any, perhaps, in our history_."[2] If the year
immediately preceding the enactment of the Morrill tariff was a year of
as large production and as much general prosperity as any in our
history, of what use has the Morrill tariff been? We have seen that it
was not demanded by any public agitation. We now see that it has been of
no public utility.

[Footnote 2: Congressional Globe, Second Session Thirty-ninth Congress,
p. 724.]

In combating, by arguments and illustrations adapted to the
comprehension of the mass of mankind, the errors and sophisms with which
protectionists deceive themselves and others, M. Bastiat is the most
lucid and pointed of all writers on economical science with whose works
I have any acquaintance. It is not necessary to accord to him a place
among the architects of the science of political economy, although some
of his admirers rank him among the highest.[3] It is enough to count
him among the greatest of its expounders and demonstrators. His death,
which occurred at Pisa, Italy, on the 24th December, 1850, at the age of
49, was a serious loss to France and to the world. His works, though for
the most part fragmentary, and given to the public from time to time
through the columns of the _Journal des Economistes_, the _Journal des
Debats_, and the _Libre Echange_, remain a monument of a noble intellect
guided by a noble soul. They have been collected and published
(including the _Harmonies Economiques_, which the author left in
manuscript) by Guillaumin & Co., the proprietors of the _Journal des
Economistes_, in two editions of six volumes each, 8vo. and 12mo. When
we reflect that these six volumes were produced between April, 1844, and
December, 1850, by a young man of feeble constitution, who commenced
life as a clerk in a mercantile establishment, and who spent much of his
time during these six years in delivering public lectures, and laboring
in the National Assembly, to which he was chosen in 1848, our admiration
for such industry is only modified by the thought that if he had been
more saving of his strength, he might have rendered even greater
services to his country and to mankind.

[Footnote 3: Mr. Macleod (_Dictionary of Political Economy_, vol. I, p.
246) speaks of Bastiat's definition of Value as "the greatest revolution
that has been effected in any science since the days of Galileo."

See also Professor Perry's pamphlet, _Recent Phases of Thought in
Political Economy_, read before the American Social Science Association,
October, 1868, in which, it appears to me, that Bastiat's theory of
Rent, in announcing which he was anticipated by Mr. Carey, is too highly
praised.]

The _Sophismes Economiques_, which fill the larger portion of this
volume, were not expected by their author to outlast the fallacies which
they sought to overthrow. But these fallacies have lived longer and have
spread over more of the earth's surface than any one _a priori_ could
have believed possible. It is sometimes useful, in opposing doctrines
which people have been taught to believe are peculiar to their own
country and time, to show that the same doctrines have been maintained
in other countries and times, and have been exploded in other languages.
By what misuse of words the doctrine of Protection came to be
denominated the "American System," I could never understand. It
prevailed in England nearly two hundred years before our separation from
the mother country. Adam Smith directed the first formidable attack
against it in the very year that our independence was declared. It held
its ground in England until it had starved and ruined almost every
branch of industry--agriculture, manufactures, and commerce alike.[4] It
was not wholly overthrown until 1846, the same year that witnessed its
discomfiture in the United States, as already shown. It still exists in
a subdued and declining way in France, despite the powerful and
brilliant attacks of Say, Bastiat, and Chevalier, but its end cannot be
far distant in that country. The Cobden-Chevalier treaty with England
has been attended by consequences so totally at variance with the
theories and prophecies of the protectionists that it must soon succumb.

[Footnote 4: It is so often affirmed by protectionists that the
superiority of Great Britain in manufactures was attained by means of
protection, that it is worth while to dispel that illusion. The facts
are precisely the reverse. Protection had brought Great Britain in the
year 1842 to the last stages of penury and decay, and it wanted but a
year or two more of the same regimen to have precipitated the country
into a bloody revolution. I quote a paragraph from Miss Martineau's
"History of England from 1816 to 1854," Book VI, Chapter 5:

   "Serious as was the task of the Minister (Sir R. Peel) in every view,
   the most immediate sympathy was felt for him on account of the
   fearful state of the people. The distress had now so deepened in the
   manufacturing districts as to render it clearly inevitable that many
   must die, and a multitude be lowered to a state of sickness and
   irritability from want of food; while there seemed no chance of any
   member of the manufacturing classes coming out of the struggle at
   last with a vestige of property wherewith to begin the world again.
   The pressure had long extended beyond the interests first affected,
   and when the new Ministry came into power, there seemed to be no
   class that was not threatened with ruin. In Carlisle, the Committee
   of Inquiry reported that a fourth of the population was in a state
   bordering on starvation--actually certain to die of famine, unless
   relieved by extraordinary exertions. In the woollen districts of
   Wiltshire, the allowance to the independent laborer was not
   two-thirds of the minimum in the workhouse, and the large existing
   population consumed only a fourth of the bread and meat required by
   the much smaller population of 1820. In Stockport, more than half the
   master spinners had failed before the close of 1842; dwelling houses
   to the number of 3,000, were shut up; and the occupiers of many
   hundreds more were unable to pay rates at all. Five thousand persons
   were walking the streets in compulsory idleness, and the Burnley
   guardians wrote to the Secretary of State that the distress was far
   beyond their management; so that a government commissioner and
   government funds were sent down without delay. At a meeting in
   Manchester, where humble shopkeepers were the speakers, anecdotes
   were related which told more than declamation. Rent collectors were
   afraid to meet their principals, as no money could be collected.
   Provision dealers were subject to incursions from a wolfish man
   prowling for food for his children, or from a half frantic woman,
   with her dying baby at her breast; or from parties of ten or a dozen
   desperate wretches who were levying contributions along the street.
   The linen draper told how new clothes had become out of the question
   with his customers, and they bought only remnants and patches, to
   mend the old ones. The baker was more and more surprised at the
   number of people who bought half-pennyworths of bread. A provision
   dealer used to throw away outside scraps; but now respectable
   customers of twenty years' standing bought them in pennyworths to
   moisten their potatoes. These shopkeepers contemplated nothing but
   ruin from the impoverished condition of their customers. While
   poor-rates were increasing beyond all precedent, their trade was only
   one-half, or one-third, or even one-tenth what it had been three
   years before. In that neighborhood, a gentleman, who had retired from
   business in 1833, leaving a property worth £60,000 to his sons, and
   who had, early in the distress, become security for them, was showing
   the works for the benefit of the creditors, at a salary of £1 a week.
   In families where the father had hitherto earned £2 per week, and
   laid by a portion weekly, and where all was now gone but the sacks of
   shavings they slept on, exertions were made to get 'blue milk' for
   children to moisten their oatmeal with; but soon they could have it
   only on alternate days; and soon water must do. At Leeds the pauper
   stone-heap amounted to 150,000 tons; and the guardians offered the
   paupers 6s. per week for doing nothing, rather than 7s. 6d. per week
   for stone-breaking. The millwrights and other trades were offering a
   premium on emigration, to induce their hands to go away. At Hinckley,
   one-third of the inhabitants were paupers; more than a fifth of the
   houses stood empty; and there was not work enough in the place to
   employ properly one-third of the weavers. In Dorsetshire a man and
   his wife had for wages 2s. 6d. per week, and three loaves; and the
   ablest laborer had 6s. or 7s. In Wiltshire, the poor peasants held
   open-air meetings after work--which was necessarily after dark.
   There, by the light of one or two flaring tallow candles, the man or
   the woman who had a story to tell stood on a chair, and related how
   their children were fed and clothed in old times--poorly enough, but
   so as to keep body and soul together; and now, how they could nohow
   manage to do it. The bare details of the ages of their children, and
   what the little things could do, and the prices of bacon and bread,
   and calico and coals, had more pathos in them than any oratory heard
   elsewhere."

"But all this came from the Corn Laws," is the ready reply of the
American protectionist. The Corn Laws were the doctrine of protection
applied to breadstuffs, farm products, "raw materials." But it was not
only protection for corn that vexed England in 1842, but protection for
every thing and every body, from the landlord and the mill-owner to the
kelp gatherer. Every species of manufacturing industry had asked and
obtained protection. The nation had put in force, logically and
thoroughly, the principle of denying themselves any share in the
advantages which nature or art had conferred upon other climates and
peoples, (which is the principle of protection), and with the results so
pathetically described by Miss Martineau. The prosperity of British
manufactures dates from the year 1846. That they maintained any kind of
existence prior to that time is a most striking proof of the vitality of
human industry under the persecution of bad laws.]

As these pages are going through the press, a telegram announces that
the French Government has abolished the discriminating duties levied
upon goods imported in foreign bottoms, and has asked our government to
abolish the like discrimination which our laws have created. Commercial
freedom is making rapid progress in Prussia, Austria, Italy, and even
in Spain. The United States alone, among civilized nations, hold to the
opposite principle. Our anomalous position in this respect is due, as I
think, to our anomalous condition during the past eight or nine years,
already adverted to--a condition in which the protected classes have
been restrained by no public opinion--public opinion being too intensely
preoccupied with the means of preserving the national existence to
notice what was doing with the tariff. But evidences of a reawakening
are not wanting.

There is scarcely an argument current among the protectionists of the
United States that was not current in France at the time Bastiat wrote
the _Sophismes Economiques_. Nor was there one current in his time that
is not performing its bad office among us. Hence his demonstrations of
their absurdity and falsity are equally applicable to our time and
country as to his. They may have even greater force among us if they
thoroughly dispel the notion that Protection is an "American system."
Surely they cannot do less than this.

There are one or two arguments current among the protectionists of the
United States that were not rife in France when Bastiat wrote his
_Sophismes_. It is said, for instance, that protection has failed to
achieve all the good results expected from it, because the policy of the
government has been variable. If we could have a steady course of
protection for a sufficient period of time (nobody being bold enough to
say what time would be sufficient), and could be _assured_ of having it,
we should see wonderful progress. But, inasmuch as the policy of the
government is uncertain, protection has never yet had a fair trial. This
is like saying, "if the stone which I threw in the air had staid there,
my head would not have been broken by its fall." It would not stay
there. The law of gravitation is committed against its staying there.
Its only resting-place is on the earth. They begin by violating natural
laws and natural rights--the right to exchange services for
services--and then complain because these natural laws war against them
and finally overcome them. But it is not true that protection has not
had a fair trial in the United States. The protection has been greater
at some times than at others, that is all. Prior to the late war, all
our revenue was raised from customs; and while the tariffs of 1846 and
1857 were designated "free trade tariffs," to distinguish them from
those existing before and since, they were necessarily protective to a
certain extent.

Again, it is said that there is need of diversifying our industry--- as
though industry would not diversify itself sufficiently through the
diverse tastes and predilections of individuals--as though it were
necessary to supplement the work of the Creator in this behalf, by human
enactments founded upon reciprocal rapine. The only rational object of
diversifying industry is to make people better and happier. Do men and
women become better and happier by being huddled together in mills and
factories, in a stifling atmosphere, on scanty wages, ten hours each day
and 313 days each year, than when cultivating our free and fertile
lands? Do they have equal opportunities for mental and moral
improvement? The trades-unions tell us, No. Whatever may be the
experience of other countries where the land is either owned by absentee
lords, who take all the product except what is necessary to give the
tenant a bare subsistence, or where it is cut up in parcels not larger
than an American garden patch, it is an undeniable fact that no other
class of American workingmen are so independent, so intelligent, so well
provided with comforts and leisure, or so rapidly advancing in
prosperity, as our agriculturists; and this notwithstanding they are
enormously overtaxed to maintain other branches of industry, which,
according to the protective theory, cannot support themselves. The
natural tendency of our people to flock to the cities, where their eyes
and ears are gratified at the expense of their other senses, physical
and moral, is sufficiently marked not to need the influence of
legislation to stimulate it.

It is not the purpose of this preface to anticipate the admirable
arguments of M. Bastiat; but there is another theory in vogue which
deserves a moment's consideration. Mr. H.C. Carey tells us, that a
country which exports its food, in reality exports its soil, the foreign
consumers not giving back to the land the fertilizing elements
abstracted from it. Mr. Mill has answered this argument, upon
philosophical principles, at some length, showing that whenever it
ceases to be advantageous to America to export breadstuffs, she will
cease to do so; also, that when it becomes necessary to manure her
lands, she will either import manure or make it at home.[5] A shorter
answer is, that the lands are no better manured by having the bread
consumed in Lowell, or Pittsburgh, or even in Chicago, than in
Birmingham or Lyons. But it seems to me that Mr. Carey does not take
into account the fact that the total amount of breadstuffs exported from
any country must be an exceedingly small fraction of the whole amount
taken from the soil, and scarcely appreciable as a source of manure,
even if it were practically utilized in that way. Thus, our exportation
of flour and meal, wheat and Indian corn, for the year 1860, as compared
with the total crop produced, was as follows:

    TOTAL CROP.[6]

   Flour and Meal, bbls.    Wheat, bu.     Corn, bu.
   55,217,800               173,104,924    838,792,740

                    _Exportation._
   Flour and Meal, bbls.      Wheat, bu.     Corn, bu.
        2,845,305             4,155,153      1,314,155

      _Percentage of Exportation to Total Crop._
           5.15                  2.40            .39

This was the result for the year preceding the enactment of the Morrill
tariff. It is true that our exports of wheat and Indian corn rose in the
three years following the enactment of the Morrill tariff, from an
average of eight million bushels to an average of forty-six million
bushels, but this is contrary to the theory that high tariffs tend to
keep breadstuffs at home, and low ones to send them abroad. There is
need of great caution in making generalizations as to the influence of
tariffs on the movement of breadstuffs. Good or bad harvests in various
countries exercise an uncontrollable influence upon their movement, far
beyond the reach of any legislation short of prohibition. The market for
breadstuffs in the world is as the number of consumers; that is, of
population. It is sometimes said in the way of reproach, (and it is a
curious travesty of Mr. Carey's manure argument,) that foreign nations
_will not_ take our breadstuffs. It is not true; but if it were, that
would not be a good reason for our passing laws to prevent them from
doing so; that is, to deprive them of the means to pay for them. Every
country must pay for its imports with its exports. It must pay for the
services which it receives with the services which it renders. If
foreign nations are not allowed to render services to us, how shall we
render them the service of bread?

[Footnote 5: Principles of Political Economy (People's Ed.), London,
1865, page 557.]

[Footnote 6: These figures are taken from the census report for the year
1860. In this report the total production of flour and meal is given,
not in barrels, but in value. The quantity is ascertained by dividing
the total value by the average price per barrel in New York during the
year, the fluctuations then being very slight. Flour being a
manufactured article, is it not a little curious that we exported under
the "free trade tariff" twice as large a percentage of breadstuffs in
that form as we did of the "raw material," wheat?]

The first series of Bastiat's _Sophismes_ were published in 1845, and
the second series in 1848. The first series were translated in 1848, by
Mrs. D.J. McCord, and published the same year by G.P. Putnam, New York.
Mrs. McCord's excellent translation has been followed (by permission of
her publisher, who holds the copyright,) in this volume, having been
first compared with the original, in the Paris edition of 1863. A very
few verbal alterations have been made, which, however, have no bearing
on the accuracy and faithfulness of her work. The translation of the
essay on "Capital and Interest" is from a duodecimo volume published in
London a year or two ago, the name of the translator being unknown to
me. The second series of the _Sophismes_, and the essay entitled
"Spoliation and Law," are, I believe, presented in English for the first
time in these pages.

H.W.
CHICAGO, August 1, 1869.




PART I.

SOPHISMS OF PROTECTION.

FIRST SERIES.

INTRODUCTION.


My object in this little volume has been to refute some of the arguments
usually advanced against Free Trade.

I am not seeking a combat with the protectionists. I merely advance a
principle which I am anxious to present clearly to the minds of sincere
men, who hesitate because they doubt.

I am not of the number of those who maintain that protection is
supported by interests. I believe that it is founded upon errors, or, if
you will, upon _incomplete truths_. Too many fear free trade, for this
apprehension to be other than sincere.

My aspirations are perhaps high; but I confess that it would give me
pleasure to hope that this little work might become, as it were, a
_manual_ for such men as may be called upon to decide between the two
principles. When one has not made oneself perfectly familiar with the
doctrines of free trade, the sophisms of protection perpetually return
to the mind under one form or another; and, on each occasion, in order
to counteract their effect, it is necessary to enter into a long and
laborious analysis. Few, and least of all legislators, have leisure for
this labor, which I would, on this account, wish to present clearly
drawn up to their hand.

But it may be said, are then the benefits of free trade so hidden as to
be perceptible only to economists by profession?

Yes; we confess it; our adversaries in the discussion have a signal
advantage over us. They can, in a few words, present an incomplete
truth; which, for us to show that it is incomplete, renders necessary
long and uninteresting dissertations.

This results from the fact that protection accumulates upon a single
point the good which it effects, while the evil inflicted is infused
throughout the mass. The one strikes the eye at a first glance, while
the other becomes perceptible only to close investigation. With regard
to free trade, precisely the reverse is the case.

It is thus with almost all questions of political economy.

If you say, for instance: There is a machine which has turned out of
employment thirty workmen;

Or again: There is a spendthrift who encourages every kind of industry;

Or: The conquest of Algiers has doubled the commerce of Marseilles;

Or, once more: The public taxes support one hundred thousand families;

You are understood at once; your propositions are clear, simple, and
true in themselves. If you deduce from them the principle that

Machines are an evil;

That sumptuous extravagance, conquest, and heavy imposts are blessings;

Your theory will have the more success, because you will be able to base
it upon indisputable facts.

But we, for our part, cannot stop at a cause and its immediate effect;
for we know that this effect may in its turn become itself a cause. To
judge of a measure, it is necessary that we should follow it from step
to step, from result to result, until through the successive links of
the chain of events we arrive at the final effect. We must, in short,
_reason_.

But here we are assailed by clamorous exclamations: You are theorists,
metaphysicians, ideologists, utopians, men of maxims! and immediately
all the prejudices of the public are against us.

What then shall we do? We must invoke the patience and candor of the
reader, giving to our deductions, if we are capable of it, sufficient
clearness to throw forward at once, without disguise or palliation, the
true and the false, in order, once for all, to determine whether the
victory should be for Restriction or Free Trade.

I wish here to make a remark of some importance.

Some extracts from this volume have appeared in the "_Journal des
Economistes_."

In an article otherwise quite complimentary published by the Viscount de
Romanet (see _Moniteur Industriel_ of the 15th and 18th of May, 1845),
he intimates that I ask for the _suppression of custom houses_. Mr. de
Romanet is mistaken. I ask for the suppression of the _protective
policy_. We do not dispute the right of _government_ to impose taxes,
but would, if possible, dissuade _producers_ from taxing one another. It
was said by Napoleon that duties should never be a fiscal instrument,
but a means of protecting industry. We plead the contrary, and say, that
duties should never be made an instrument of reciprocal rapine; but that
they may be employed as a useful fiscal machine. I am so far from asking
for the suppression of duties, that I look upon them as the anchor on
which the future salvation of our finances will depend. I believe that
they may bring immense receipts into the treasury, and, to give my
entire and undisguised opinion, I am inclined, from the slow progress of
healthy, economical doctrines, and from the magnitude of our budget, to
hope more for the cause of commercial reform from the necessities of
the Treasury than from the force of an enlightened public opinion.




I.

ABUNDANCE--SCARCITY.


Which is the best for man or for society, abundance or scarcity?

How, it may be exclaimed, can such a question be asked? Has it ever been
pretended, is it possible to maintain, that scarcity can be the basis of
a man's happiness?

Yes; this has been maintained, this is daily maintained; and I do not
hesitate to say that the _scarcity theory_ is by far the most popular of
the day. It furnishes the subject of discussions, in conversations,
journals, books, courts of justice; and extraordinary as it may appear,
it is certain that political economy will have fulfilled its task and
its practical mission, when it shall have rendered common and
irrefutable the simple proposition that "in abundance consist man's
riches."

Do we not hear it said every day, "Foreign nations are inundating us
with their productions"? Then we fear abundance.

Has not Mr. de Saint Cricq said, "Production is superabundant"? Then he
fears abundance.

Do we not see workmen destroying and breaking machinery? They are
frightened by the excess of production; in other words, they fear
abundance.

Has not Mr. Bugeaud said, "Let bread be dear and the agriculturist will
be rich"? Now bread can only be dear because it is scarce. Then Mr.
Bugeaud lauded scarcity.

Has not Mr. d'Argout produced the fruitfulness of the sugar culture as
an argument against it? Has he not said, "The beet cannot have a
permanent and extended cultivation, because a few acres given up to it
in each department, would furnish sufficient for the consumption of all
France"? Then, in his opinion, good consists in sterility and scarcity,
evil in fertility and abundance.

"_La Presse_," "_Le Commerce_," and the majority of our journals, are,
every day, publishing articles whose aim is to prove to the chambers and
to government that a wise policy should seek to raise prices by tariffs;
and do we not daily see these powers obeying these injunctions of the
press? Now, tariffs can only raise prices by diminishing the quantity of
goods offered for sale. Then, here we see newspapers, the legislature,
the ministry, all guided by the scarcity theory, and I was correct in my
statement that this theory is by far the most popular.

How then has it happened, that in the eyes at once of laborers, editors
and statesmen, abundance should appear alarming, and scarcity
advantageous? It is my intention to endeavor to show the origin of this
delusion.

A man becomes rich, in proportion to the profitableness of his labor;
that is to say, _in proportion as he sells his productions at a high
price_. The price of his productions is high in proportion to their
scarcity. It is plain then, that, as far as regards him at least,
scarcity enriches him. Applying successively this mode of reasoning to
each class of laborers individually, the _scarcity theory_ is deduced
from it. To put this theory into practice, and in order to favor each
class of labor, an artificial scarcity is forced in every kind of
production, by prohibition, restriction, suppression of machinery, and
other analogous measures.

In the same manner it is observed that when an article is abundant it
brings a small price. The gains of the producer are, of course, less. If
this is the case with all produce, all producers are then poor.
Abundance then ruins society. And as any strong conviction will always
seek to force itself into practice, we see, in many countries, the laws
aiming to prevent abundance.

This sophism, stated in a general form, would produce but a slight
impression. But when applied to any particular order of facts, to any
particular article of industry, to any one class of labor, it is
extremely specious, because it is a syllogism which is not _false_, but
_incomplete_. And what is true in a syllogism always necessarily
presents itself to the mind, while the _incomplete_, which is a negative
quality, an unknown value, is easily forgotten in the calculation.

Man produces in order to consume. He is at once producer and consumer.
The argument given above, considers him only under the first point of
view. Let us look at him in the second character and the conclusion will
be different. We may say,

The consumer is rich in proportion as he _buys_ at a low price. He buys
at a low price in proportion to the abundance of the article in demand;
abundance then enriches him. This reasoning extended to all consumers
must lead to the _theory of abundance_!

It is the imperfectly understood notion of exchange of produce which
leads to these fallacies. If we consult our individual interest, we
perceive immediately that it is double. As _sellers_ we are interested
in high prices, consequently in scarcity. As _buyers_ our advantage is
in cheapness, or what is the same thing, abundance. It is impossible
then to found a proper system of reasoning upon either the one or the
other of these separate interests before determining which of the two
coincides and identifies itself with the general and permanent interests
of mankind.

If man were a solitary animal, working exclusively for himself,
consuming the fruit of his own personal labor; if, in a word, he did not
exchange his produce, the theory of scarcity could never have introduced
itself into the world. It would be too strikingly evident, that
abundance, whencesoever derived, is advantageous to him, whether this
abundance might be the result of his own labor, of ingenious tools, or
of powerful machinery; whether due to the fertility of the soil, to the
liberality of nature, or to an _inundation_ of foreign goods, such as
the sea bringing from distant regions might cast upon his shores. Never
would the solitary man have dreamed, in order to encourage his own
labor, of destroying his instruments for facilitating his work, of
neutralizing the fertility of the soil, or of casting back into the sea
the produce of its bounty. He would understand that his labor was a
_means_ not an _end_, and that it would be absurd to reject the object,
in order to encourage the means. He would understand that if he has
required two hours per day to supply his necessities, any thing which
spares him an hour of this labor, leaving the result the same, gives him
this hour to dispose of as he pleases in adding to his comforts. In a
word, he would understand that every step in the _saving of labor_, is a
step in the improvement of his condition. But traffic clouds our vision
in the contemplation of this simple truth. In a state of society with
the division of labor to which it leads, the production and consumption
of an article no longer belong to the same individual. Each now looks
upon his labor not as a means, but as an end. The exchange of produce
creates with regard to each object two separate interests, that of the
producer and that of the consumer; and these two interests are always
directly opposed to each other.

It is essential to analyze and study the nature of each. Let us then
suppose a producer of whatever kind; what is his immediate interest? It
consists in two things: 1st, that the smallest possible number of
individuals should devote themselves to the business which he follows;
and 2dly, that the greatest possible number should seek the articles of
his produce. In the more succinct terms of Political Economy, the supply
should be small, the demand large; or yet in other words: limited
competition, unlimited consumption.

What on the other side is the immediate interest of the consumer? That
the supply should be large, the demand small.

As these two interests are immediately opposed to each other, it follows
that if one coincides with the general interest of society the other
must be adverse to it.

Which then, if either, should legislation favor as contributing most to
the good of the community?

To determine this question, it suffices to inquire in which the secret
desires of the majority of men would be accomplished.

Inasmuch as we are producers, it must be confessed that we have each of
us anti-social desires. Are we vine-growers? It would not distress _us_
were the frost to nip all the vines in the world except our own: _this
is the scarcity theory_. Are we iron-workers? We would desire (whatever
might be the public need) that the market should offer no iron but our
own; and precisely for the reason that this need, painfully felt and
imperfectly supplied, causes us to receive a high price for _our_ iron:
_again here is the theory of scarcity_. Are we agriculturists? We say
with Mr. Bugeaud, let bread be dear, that is to say scarce, and our
business goes well: _again the theory of scarcity_.

Are we physicians? We cannot but see that certain physical
ameliorations, such as the improved climate of the country, the
development of certain moral virtues, the progress of knowledge pushed
to the extent of enabling each individual to take care of his own
health, the discovery of certain simple remedies easily applied, would
be so many fatal blows to our profession. As physicians, then, our
secret desires are anti-social. I must not be understood to imply that
physicians allow themselves to form such desires. I am happy to believe
that they would hail with joy a universal panacea. But in such a
sentiment it is the man, the Christian, who manifests himself, and who
by a praiseworthy abnegation of self, takes that point of view of the
question, which belongs to the consumer. As a physician exercising his
profession, and gaining from this profession his standing in society,
his comforts, even the means of existence of his family, it is
impossible but that his desires, or if you please so to word it, his
interests, should be anti-social.

Are we manufacturers of cotton goods? We desire to sell them at the
price most advantageous to _ourselves_. We would willingly consent to
the suppression of all rival manufactories. And if we dare not publicly
express this desire, or pursue the complete realization of it with some
success, we do so, at least to a certain extent, by indirect means; as
for example, the exclusion of foreign goods, in order to diminish the
_quantity offered_, and to produce thus by forcible means, and for our
own profits, a _scarcity_ of clothing.

We might thus pass in review every business and every profession, and
should always find that the producers, _in their character of
producers_, have invariably anti-social interests. "The shop-keeper
(says Montaigne) succeeds in his business through the extravagance of
youth; the laborer by the high price of grain; the architect by the
decay of houses; officers of justice by lawsuits and quarrels. The
standing and occupation even of ministers of religion are drawn from our
death and our vices. No physician takes pleasure in the health even of
his friends; no soldier in the peace of his country; and so on with
all."

If then the secret desires of each producer were realized, the world
would rapidly retrograde towards barbarism. The sail would proscribe
steam; the oar would proscribe the sail, only in its turn to give way to
wagons, the wagon to the mule, and the mule to the foot-peddler. Wool
would exclude cotton; cotton would exclude wool; and thus on, until the
scarcity and want of every thing would cause man himself to disappear
from the face of the globe.

If we now go on to consider the immediate interest of the _consumer_, we
shall find it in perfect harmony with the public interest, and with the
well-being of humanity. When the buyer presents himself in the market,
he desires to find it abundantly furnished. He sees with pleasure
propitious seasons for harvesting; wonderful inventions putting within
his reach the largest possible quantity of produce; time and labor
saved; distances effaced; the spirit of peace and justice diminishing
the weight of taxes; every barrier to improvement cast down; and in all
this his interest runs parallel with an enlightened public interest. He
may push his secret desires to an absurd and chimerical height, but
never can they cease to be humanizing in their tendency. He may desire
that food and clothing, house and hearth, instruction and morality,
security and peace, strength and health, should come to us without limit
and without labor or effort on our part, as the water of the stream, the
air which we breathe, and the sunbeams in which we bask, but never could
the realization of his most extravagant wishes run counter to the good
of society.

It may be said, perhaps, that were these desires granted, the labor of
the producer constantly checked would end by being entirely arrested
for want of support. But why? Because in this extreme supposition every
imaginable need and desire would be completely satisfied. Man, like the
All-powerful, would create by the single act of his will. How in such an
hypothesis could laborious production be regretted?

Imagine a legislative assembly composed of producers, of whom each
member should cause to pass into a law his secret desire as a
_producer_; the code which would emanate from such an assembly could be
nothing but systematized monopoly; the scarcity theory put into
practice.

In the same manner, an assembly in which each member should consult only
his immediate interest of _consumer_ would aim at the systematizing of
free trade; the suppression of every restrictive measure; the
destruction of artificial barriers; in a word, would realize the theory
of abundance.

It follows then,

That to consult exclusively the immediate interest of the producer, is
to consult an anti-social interest.

To take exclusively for basis the interest of the consumer, is to take
for basis the general interest.

       *       *       *       *       *

Let me be permitted to insist once more upon this point of view, though
at the risk of repetition.

A radical antagonism exists between the seller and the buyer.

The former wishes the article offered to be _scarce_, supply small, and
at a high price.

The latter wishes it _abundant_, supply large, and at a low price.

The laws, which should at least remain neutral, take part for the seller
against the buyer; for the producer against the consumer; for high
against low prices; for scarcity against abundance. They act, if not
intentionally at least logically, upon the principle that _a nation is
rich in proportion as it is in want of every thing_.

For, say they, it is necessary to favor the producer by securing him a
profitable disposal of his goods. To effect this, their price must be
raised; to raise the price the supply must be diminished; and to
diminish the supply is to create scarcity.

Let us suppose that at this moment, with these laws in full action, a
complete inventory should be made, not by value, but by weight, measure
and quantity, of all articles now in France calculated to supply the
necessities and pleasures of its inhabitants; as grain, meat, woollen
and cotton goods, fuel, etc.

Let us suppose again that to-morrow every barrier to the introduction of
foreign goods should be removed.

Then, to judge of the effect of such a reform, let a new inventory be
made three months hence.

Is it not certain that at the time of the second inventory, the
quantity of grain, cattle, goods, iron, coal, sugar, etc., will be
greater than at the first?

So true is this, that the sole object of our protective tariffs is to
prevent such articles from reaching us, to diminish the supply, to
prevent low prices, or which is the same thing, the abundance of goods.

Now I ask, are the people under the action of these laws better fed
because there is _less_ bread, _less_ meat, and _less_ sugar in the
country? Are they better dressed because there are _fewer_ goods? Better
warmed because there is _less_ coal? Or do they prosper better in their
labor because iron, copper, tools and machinery are scarce?

But, it is answered, if we are inundated with foreign goods and produce,
our coin will leave the country.

Well, and what matters that? Man is not fed with coin. He does not dress
in gold, nor warm himself with silver. What difference does it make
whether there be more or less coin in the country, provided there be
more bread in the cupboard, more meat in the larder, more clothing in
the press, and more wood in the cellar?

       *       *       *       *       *

To Restrictive Laws, I offer this dilemma:

Either you allow that you produce scarcity, or you do not allow it.

If you allow it, you confess at once that your end is to injure the
people as much as possible. If you do not allow it, then you deny your
power to diminish the supply, to raise the price, and consequently you
deny having favored the producer.

You are either injurious or inefficient. You can never be useful.




II.

OBSTACLE--CAUSE.


The obstacle mistaken for the cause--scarcity mistaken for abundance.
The sophism is the same. It is well to study it under every aspect.

Man naturally is in a state of entire destitution.

Between this state and the satisfying of his wants, there exists a
multitude of _obstacles_ which it is the object of labor to surmount. It
is interesting to seek how and why he could have been led to look even
upon these obstacles to his happiness as the cause of it.

I wish to take a journey of some hundred miles. But, between the point
of my departure and my destination, there are interposed, mountains,
rivers, swamps, forests, robbers--in a word, _obstacles_; and to conquer
these obstacles, it is necessary that I should bestow much labor and
great efforts in opposing them;--or, what is the same thing, if others
do it for me, I must pay them the value of their exertions. It is
evident that I should have been better off had these obstacles never
existed.

Through the journey of life, in the long series of days from the cradle
to the tomb, man has many difficulties to oppose him in his progress.
Hunger, thirst, sickness, heat, cold, are so many obstacles scattered
along his road. In a state of isolation, he would be obliged to combat
them all by hunting, fishing, agriculture, spinning, weaving,
architecture, etc., and it is very evident that it would be better for
him that these difficulties should exist to a less degree, or even not
at all. In a state of society he is not obliged, personally, to struggle
with each of these obstacles, but others do it for him; and he, in
return, must remove some one of them for the benefit of his fellow-men.

Again it is evident, that, considering mankind as a whole, it would be
better for society that these obstacles should be as weak and as few as
possible.

But if we examine closely and in detail the phenomena of society, and
the private interests of men as modified by exchange of produce, we
perceive, without difficulty, how it has happened that wants have been
confounded with riches, and the obstacle with the cause.

The separation of occupations, which results from the habits of
exchange, causes each man, instead of struggling against all surrounding
obstacles to combat only _one_; the effort being made not for himself
alone, but for the benefit of his fellows, who, in their turn, render a
similar service to him.

Now, it hence results, that this man looks upon the obstacle which he
has made it his profession to combat for the benefit of others, as the
immediate cause of his riches. The greater, the more serious, the more
stringent may be this obstacle, the more he is remunerated for the
conquering of it, by those who are relieved by his labors.

A physician, for instance, does not busy himself in baking his bread, or
in manufacturing his clothing and his instruments; others do it for him,
and he, in return, combats the maladies with which his patients are
afflicted. The more dangerous and frequent these maladies are, the more
others are willing, the more, even, are they forced, to work in his
service. Disease, then, which is an obstacle to the happiness of
mankind, becomes to him the source of his comforts. The reasoning of all
producers is, in what concerns themselves, the same. As the doctor draws
his profits from disease, so does the ship owner from the obstacle
called _distance_; the agriculturist from that named _hunger_; the cloth
manufacturer from _cold_; the schoolmaster lives upon _ignorance_, the
jeweler upon _vanity_, the lawyer upon _quarrels_, the notary upon
_breach of faith_. Each profession has then an immediate interest in
the continuation, even in the extension, of the particular obstacle to
which its attention has been directed.

Theorists hence go on to found a system upon these individual interests,
and say: Wants are riches: Labor is riches: The obstacle to well-being
is well-being: To multiply obstacles is to give food to industry.

Then comes the statesman;--and as the developing and propagating of
obstacles is the developing and propagating of riches, what more natural
than that he should bend his efforts to that point? He says, for
instance: If we prevent a large importation of iron, we create a
difficulty in procuring it. This obstacle severely felt, obliges
individuals to pay, in order to relieve themselves from it. A certain
number of our citizens, giving themselves up to the combating of this
obstacle, will thereby make their fortunes. In proportion, too, as the
obstacle is great, and the mineral scarce, inaccessible, and of
difficult and distant transportation, in the same proportion will be the
number of laborers maintained by the various branches of this industry.

The same reasoning will lead to the suppression of machinery.

Here are men who are at a loss how to dispose of their wine-harvest.
This is an obstacle which other men set about removing for them by the
manufacture of casks. It is fortunate, say our statesmen, that this
obstacle exists, since it occupies a portion of the labor of the
nation, and enriches a certain number of our citizens. But here is
presented to us an ingenious machine, which cuts down the oak, squares
it, makes it into staves, and, gathering these together, forms them into
casks. The obstacle is thus diminished, and with it the profits of the
coopers. We must prevent this. Let us proscribe the machine!

To sift thoroughly this sophism, it is sufficient to remember that human
labor is not an _end_, but a _means_. _It is never without employment._
If one obstacle is removed, it seizes another, and mankind is delivered
from two obstacles by the same effort which was at first necessary for
one. If the labor of coopers becomes useless, it must take another
direction. But with what, it may be asked, will they be remunerated?
Precisely with what they are at present remunerated. For if a certain
quantity of labor becomes free from its original occupation, to be
otherwise disposed of, a corresponding quantity of wages must thus also
become free. To maintain that human labor can end by wanting employment,
it would be necessary to prove that mankind will cease to encounter
obstacles. In such a case, labor would be not only impossible, it would
be superfluous. We should have nothing to do, because we should be
all-powerful, and our _fiat_ alone would satisfy at once our wants and
our desires.




III.

EFFORT--RESULT.


We have seen that between our wants and their gratification many
obstacles are interposed. We conquer or weaken these by the employment
of our faculties. It may be said, in general terms, that industry is an
effort followed by a result.

But by what do we measure our well-being? By the _result_ of our effort,
or by the _effort itself_? There exists always a proportion between the
effort employed and the result obtained. Does progress consist in the
relative increase of the second or of the first term of this proportion?

Both propositions have been sustained, and in political economy opinions
are divided between them.

According to the first system, riches are the result of labor. They
increase in the same ratio as _the result does to the effort_. Absolute
perfection, of which _God_ is the type, consists in the infinite
distance between these two terms in this relation, viz., effort none,
result infinite.

The second system maintains that it is the effort itself which forms the
measure of, and constitutes, our riches. Progression is the increase of
the _proportion of the effort to the result_. Its ideal extreme may be
represented by the eternal and fruitless efforts of Sisyphus.[7]

[Footnote 7: We will therefore beg the reader to allow us in future, for
the sake of conciseness, to designate this system under the term of
_Sisyphism_.]

The first system tends naturally to the encouragement of every thing
which diminishes difficulties, and augments production,--as powerful
machinery, which adds to the strength of man; the exchange of produce,
which allows us to profit by the various natural agents distributed in
different degrees over the surface of our globe; the intellect which
discovers, experience which proves, and emulation which excites.

The second as logically inclines to every thing which can augment the
difficulty and diminish the product; as privileges, monopolies,
restrictions, prohibitions, suppression of machinery, sterility, etc.

It is well to remark here that the universal practice of men is always
guided by the principle of the first system. Every _workman_, whether
agriculturist, manufacturer, merchant, soldier, writer or philosopher,
devotes the strength of his intellect to do better, to do more quickly,
more economically,--in a word, _to do more with less_.

The opposite doctrine is in use with legislators, editors, statesmen,
men whose business is to make experiments upon society. And even of
these we may observe, that in what personally concerns _themselves_,
they act, like every body else, upon the principle of obtaining from
their labor the greatest possible quantity of useful results.

It may be supposed that I exaggerate, and that there are no true
_Sisyphists_.

I grant that in practice the principle is not pushed to its extremest
consequences. And this must always be the case when one starts upon a
wrong principle, because the absurd and injurious results to which it
leads, cannot but check it in its progress. For this reason, practical
industry never can admit of _Sisyphism_. The error is too quickly
followed by its punishment to remain concealed. But in the speculative
industry of theorists and statesmen, a false principle may be for a long
time followed up, before the complication of its consequences, only half
understood, can prove its falsity; and even when all is revealed, the
opposite principle is acted upon, self is contradicted, and
justification sought, in the incomparably absurd modern axiom, that in
political economy there is no principle universally true.

Let us see then, if the two opposite principles I have laid down do not
predominate, each in its turn;--the one in practical industry, the other
in industrial legislation.

I have already quoted some words of Mr. Bugeaud; but we must look on Mr.
Bugeaud in two separate characters, the agriculturist and the
legislator.

As agriculturist, Mr. Bugeaud makes every effort to attain the double
object of sparing labor, and obtaining bread cheap. When he prefers a
good plough to a bad one, when he improves the quality of his manures;
when, to loosen his soil, he substitutes as much as possible the action
of the atmosphere for that of the hoe or the harrow; when he calls to
his aid every improvement that science and experience have revealed, he
has, and can have, but one object, viz., _to diminish the proportion of
the effort to the result_. We have indeed no other means of judging of
the success of an agriculturist, or of the merits of his system, but by
observing how far he has succeeded in lessening the one, while he
increases the other; and as all the farmers in the world act upon this
principle, we may say that all mankind are seeking, no doubt for their
own advantage, to obtain at the lowest price, bread, or whatever other
article of produce they may need, always diminishing the effort
necessary for obtaining any given quantity thereof.

This incontestable tendency of human nature, once proved, would, one
might suppose, be sufficient to point out the true principle to the
legislator, and to show him how he ought to assist industry (if indeed
it is any part of his business to assist it at all), for it would be
absurd to say that the laws of men should operate in an inverse ratio
from those of Providence.

Yet we have heard Mr. Bugeaud in his character of legislator, exclaim,
"I do not understand this theory of cheapness; I would rather see bread
dear, and work more abundant." And consequently the deputy from Dordogne
votes in favor of legislative measures whose effect is to shackle and
impede commerce, precisely because by so doing we are prevented from
procuring by exchange, and at low price, what direct production can only
furnish more expensively.

Now it is very evident that the system of Mr. Bugeaud the deputy, is
directly opposed to that of Mr. Bugeaud the agriculturist. Were he
consistent with himself, he would as legislator vote against all
restriction; or else as farmer, he would practice in his fields the same
principle which he proclaims in the public councils. We should then see
him sowing his grain in his most sterile fields, because he would thus
succeed in _laboring much_, to _obtain little_. We should see him
forbidding the use of the plough, because he could, by scratching up the
soil with his nails, fully gratify his double wish of "_dear bread_ and
_abundant labor_."

Restriction has for its avowed object, and acknowledged effect, the
augmentation of labor. And again, equally avowed and acknowledged, its
object and effect are, the increase of prices;--a synonymous term for
scarcity of produce. Pushed then to its greatest extreme, it is pure
_Sisyphism_ as we have defined it: _labor infinite; result nothing_.

Baron Charles Dupin, who is looked upon as the oracle of the peerage in
the science of political economy, accuses railroads of _injuring
shipping_, and it is certainly true that the most perfect means of
attaining an object must always limit the use of a less perfect means.
But railways can only injure shipping by drawing from it articles of
transportation; this they can only do by transporting more cheaply; and
they can only transport more cheaply, by _diminishing the proportion of
the effort employed to the result obtained_; for it is in this that
cheapness consists. When, therefore, Baron Dupin laments the suppression
of labor in attaining a given result, he maintains the doctrine of
_Sisyphism_. Logically, if he prefers the vessel to the railway, he
should also prefer the wagon to the vessel, the pack-saddle to the
wagon, and the wallet to the pack-saddle; for this is, of all known
means of transportation, the one which requires the greatest amount of
labor, in proportion to the result obtained.

"Labor constitutes the riches of the people," said Mr. de Saint Cricq, a
minister who has laid not a few shackles upon our commerce. This was no
elliptical expression, meaning that the "results of labor constitute the
riches of the people." No,--this statesman intended to say, that it is
the _intensity_ of labor, which measures riches; and the proof of this
is, that from step to step, from restriction to restriction, he forced
on France (and in so doing believed that he was doing well) to give to
the procuring, of, for instance, a certain quantity of iron, double the
necessary labor. In England, iron was then at eight francs; in France it
cost sixteen. Supposing the day's work to be worth one franc, it is
evident that France could, by barter, procure a quintal of iron by eight
days' labor taken from the labor of the nation. Thanks to the
restrictive measures of Mr. de Saint Cricq, sixteen days' work were
necessary to procure it, by direct production. Here then we have double
labor for an identical result; therefore double riches; and riches,
measured not by the result, but by the intensity of labor. Is not this
pure and unadulterated _Sisyphism_?

That there may be nothing equivocal, the minister carries his idea still
farther, and on the same principle that we have heard him call the
intensity of labor _riches_, we will find him calling the abundant
results of labor, and the plenty of every thing proper to the satisfying
of our wants, _poverty_. "Every where," he remarks, "machinery has
pushed aside manual labor; every where production is superabundant;
every where the equilibrium is destroyed between the power of production
and that of consumption." Here then we see that, according to Mr. de
Saint Cricq, if France was in a critical situation, it was because her
productions were too abundant; there was too much intelligence, too
much efficiency in her national labor. We were too well fed, too well
clothed, too well supplied with every thing; the rapid production was
more than sufficient for our wants. It was necessary to put an end to
this calamity, and therefore it became needful to force us, by
restrictions, to work more, in order to produce less.

I also touched upon an opinion expressed by another minister of
commerce, Mr. d'Argout, which is worthy of being a little more closely
looked into. Wishing to give a death blow to the beet, he said: "The
culture of the beet is undoubtedly useful, _but this usefulness is
limited_. It is not capable of the prodigious developments which have
been predicted of it. To be convinced of this it is enough to remark
that the cultivation of it must necessarily be confined within the
limits of consumption. Double, treble if you will, the present
consumption of France, and _you will still find that a very small
portion of her soil will suffice for this consumption_. (Truly a most
singular cause of complaint!) Do you wish the proof of this? How many
hectares were planted in beets in the year 1828? 3,130, which is
1-10540th of our cultivable soil. How many are there at this time, when
our domestic sugar supplies one-third of the consumption of the country?
16,700 hectares, or 1-1978th of the cultivable soil, or 45 centiares for
each commune. Suppose that our domestic sugar should monopolize the
supply of the whole consumption, we still would have but 48,000 hectares
or 1-689th of our cultivable soil in beets."[8]

[Footnote 8: In justice to Mr. d'Argout we should say that this singular
language is given by him as the argument of the enemies of the beet. But
he made it his own, and sanctioned it by the law in justification of
which he adduced it.]

There are two things to consider in this quotation. The facts and the
doctrine. The facts go to prove that very little soil, capital, and
labor would be necessary for the production of a large quantity of
sugar; and that each commune of France would be abundantly provided with
it by giving up one hectare to its cultivation. The peculiarity of the
doctrine consists in the looking upon this facility of production as an
unfortunate circumstance, and the regarding the very fruitfulness of
this new branch of industry as a _limitation to its usefulness_.

It is not my purpose here to constitute myself the defender of the beet,
or the judge of the singular facts stated by Mr. d'Argout, but it is
worth the trouble of examining into the doctrines of a statesman, to
whose judgment France, for a long time, confided the fate of her
agriculture and her commerce.

I began by saying that a variable proportion exists in all industrial
pursuits, between the effort and the result. Absolute imperfection
consists in an infinite effort, without any result; absolute perfection
in an unlimited result, without any effort; and perfectibility, in the
progressive diminution of the effort, compared with the result.

But Mr. d'Argout tells us, that where we looked for life, we shall find
only death. The importance of any object of industry is, according to
him, in direct proportion to its feebleness. What, for instance, can we
expect from the beet? Do you not see that 48,000 hectares of land, with
capital and labor in proportion, will suffice to furnish sugar to all
France? It is then an object of _limited usefulness_; limited, be it
understood, in the _work_ which it calls for; and this is the sole
measure, according to our minister, of the usefulness of any pursuit.
This usefulness would be much more limited still, if, thanks to the
fertility of the soil, or the richness of the beet, 24,000 hectares
would serve instead of 48,000. If there were only needed twenty times, a
hundred times more soil, more capital, more labor, to _attain the same
result_--Oh! then some hopes might be founded upon this article of
industry; it would be worthy of the protection of the state, for it
would open a vast field to national labor. But to produce much with
little is a bad example, and the laws ought to set things to rights.

What is true with regard to sugar, cannot be false with regard to bread.
If therefore the usefulness of an object of industry is to be
calculated, not by the comforts which it can furnish with a certain
quantum of labor, but, on the contrary, by the increase of labor which
it requires in order to furnish a certain quantity of comforts, it is
evident that we ought to desire, that each acre of land should produce
little corn, and that each grain of corn should furnish little
nutriment; in other words, that our territory should be sterile enough
to require a considerably larger proportion of soil, capital, and labor
to nourish its population. The demand for human labor could not fail to
be in direct proportion to this sterility, and then truly would the
wishes of Messrs. Bugeaud, Saint Cricq, Dupin, and d'Argout be
satisfied; bread would be dear, work abundant, and France would be
rich--rich according to the understanding of these gentlemen.

All that we could have further to hope for, would be, that human
intellect might sink and become extinct; for, while intellect exists, it
can but seek continually to increase the _proportion of the end to the
means; of the product to the labor_. Indeed it is in this continuous
effort, and in this alone, that intellect consists.

_Sisyphism_ has then been the doctrine of all those who have been
intrusted with the regulation of the industry of our country. It would
not be just to reproach them with this; for this principle becomes that
of our ministry, only because it prevails in the chambers; it prevails
in the chambers, only because it is sent there by the electoral body;
and the electoral body is imbued with it, only because public opinion
is filled with it to repletion.

Let me repeat here, that I do not accuse such men as Messrs. Bugeaud,
Dupin, Saint Cricq, and d'Argout, of being absolutely and always
_Sisyphists_. Very certainly they are not such in their personal
transactions; very certainly each one of them will procure for himself
_by barter_, what by _direct production_ would be attainable only at a
higher price. But I maintain that they are _Sisyphists_ when they
prevent the country from acting upon the same principle.




IV.

EQUALIZING OF THE FACILITIES OF PRODUCTION.


It is said ... but, for fear of being accused of manufacturing Sophisms
for the mouths of the protectionists, I will allow one of their most
able reasoners to speak for himself.

"It is our belief that protection should correspond to, should be the
representation of, the difference which exists between the price of an
article of home production and a similar article of foreign
production.... A protecting duty calculated upon such a basis does
nothing more than secure free competition; ... free competition can
only exist where there is an equality in the facilities of production.
In a horse-race the load which each horse carries is weighed and all
advantages equalized; otherwise there could be no competition. In
commerce, if one producer can undersell all others, he ceases to be a
competitor and becomes a monopolist.... Suppress the protection which
represents the difference of price according to each, and foreign
productions must immediately inundate and obtain the monopoly of our
market."[9]

[Footnote 9: M. le Vicomte de Romanet.]

"Every one ought to wish, for his own sake and for that of the
community, that the productions of the country should be protected
against foreign competition, _whenever the latter may be able to
undersell the former_."[10]

[Footnote 10: Mathieu de Dombasle.]

This argument is constantly recurring in all writings of the
protectionist school. It is my intention to make a careful investigation
of its merits, and I must begin by soliciting the attention and the
patience of the reader. I will first examine into the inequalities which
depend upon natural causes, and afterwards into those which are caused
by diversity of taxes.

Here, as elsewhere, we find the theorists who favor protection, taking
part with the producer. Let us consider the case of the unfortunate
consumer, who seems to have entirely escaped their attention. They
compare the field of production to the _turf_. But on the turf, the race
is at once a _means and an end_. The public has no interest in the
struggle, independent of the struggle itself. When your horses are
started in the course with the single object of determining which is the
best runner, nothing is more natural than that their burdens should be
equalized. But if your object were to send an important and critical
piece of intelligence, could you without incongruity place obstacles to
the speed of that one whose fleetness would secure the best means of
attaining your end? And yet this is your course in relation to industry.
You forget the end aimed at, which is the _well-being_ of the community.

But we cannot lead our opponents to look at things from our point of
view, let us now take theirs; let us examine the question as producers.

I will seek to prove

1. That equalizing the facilities of production is to attack the
foundations of all trade.

2. That it is not true that the labor of one country can be crushed by
the competition of more favored climates.

3. That, even were this the case, protective duties cannot equalize the
facilities of production.

4. That freedom of trade equalizes these conditions as much as possible;
and

5. That the countries which are the least favored by nature are those
which profit most by freedom of trade.

I. The equalizing of the facilities of production, is not only the
shackling of certain articles of commerce, but it is the attacking of
the system of mutual exchange in its very foundation principle. For this
system is based precisely upon the very diversities, or, if the
expression be preferred, upon the inequalities of fertility, climate,
temperature, capabilities, which the protectionists seek to render null.
If Guyenne sends its wines to Brittany, and Brittany sends corn to
Guyenne, it is because these two provinces are, from different
circumstances, induced to turn their attention to the production of
different articles. Is there any other rule for international exchanges?
Again, to bring against such exchanges the very inequalities of
condition which excite and explain them, is to attack them in their very
cause of being. The protective system, closely followed up, would bring
men to live like snails, in a state of complete isolation. In short,
there is not one of its Sophisms, which if carried through by vigorous
deductions, would not end in destruction and annihilation.

II. It is not true that the unequal facility of production, in two
similar branches of industry, should necessarily cause the destruction
of the one which is the least fortunate. On the turf, if one horse gains
the prize, the other loses it; but when two horses work to produce any
useful article, each produces in proportion to his strength; and because
the stronger is the more useful, it does not follow that the weaker is
good for nothing. Wheat is cultivated in every department of France,
although there are great differences in the degree of fertility existing
among them. If it happens that there be one which does not cultivate it,
it is because, even to itself, such cultivation is not useful. Analogy
will show us, that under the influence of an unshackled trade,
notwithstanding similar differences, wheat would be produced in every
kingdom of Europe; and if any one were induced to abandon entirely the
cultivation of it, this would only be, because it would _be her
interest_ to employ otherwise her lands, her capital, and her labor. And
why does not the fertility of one department paralyze the agriculture of
a neighboring and less favored one? Because the phenomena of political
economy have a suppleness, an elasticity, and, so to speak, _a
self-leveling power_, which seems to escape the attention of the school
of protectionists. They accuse us of being theorists, but it is
themselves who are theorists to a supreme degree, if being theoretic
consists in building up systems upon the experience of a single fact,
instead of profiting by the experience of a series of facts. In the
above example, it is the difference in the value of lands, which
compensates for the difference in their fertility. Your field produces
three times as much as mine. Yes. But it has cost you three times as
much, and therefore I can still compete with you: this is the sole
mystery. And observe how the advantage on one point leads to
disadvantage on the other. Precisely because your soil is more fruitful,
it is more dear. It is not _accidentally_ but _necessarily_ that the
equilibrium is established, or at least inclines to establish itself;
and can it be denied that perfect freedom in exchanges is, of all the
systems, the one which favors this tendency?

I have cited an agricultural example; I might as easily have taken one
from any trade. There are tailors at Quimper, but that does not prevent
tailors from being in Paris also, although the latter have to pay a much
higher rent, as well as higher price for furniture, workmen, and food.
But their customers are sufficiently numerous not only to re-establish
the balance, but also to make it lean on their side.

When therefore the question is about equalizing the advantages of labor,
it would be well to consider whether the natural freedom of exchange is
not the best umpire.

This self-leveling faculty of political phenomena is so important, and
at the same time so well calculated to cause us to admire the
providential wisdom which presides over the equalizing government of
society, that I must ask permission a little longer, to turn to it the
attention of the reader.

The protectionists say, Such a nation has the advantage over us, in
being able to procure cheaply, coal, iron, machinery, capital; it is
impossible for us to compete with it.

We must examine the proposition under other aspects. For the present, I
stop at the question, whether, when an advantage and a disadvantage are
placed in juxtaposition, they do not bear in themselves, the former a
descending, the latter an ascending power, which must end by placing
them in a just equilibrium.

Let us suppose the countries A and B. A has every advantage over B; you
thence conclude that labor will be concentrated upon A, while B must be
abandoned. A, you say, sells much more than it buys; B buys more than it
sells. I might dispute this, but I will meet you upon your own ground.

In the hypothesis, labor, being in great demand in A, soon rises in
value; while labor, iron, coal, lands, food, capital, all being little
sought after in B, soon fall in price.

Again: A being always selling and B always buying, cash passes from B to
A. It is abundant in A--very scarce in B.

But where there is abundance of cash, it follows that in all purchases a
large proportion of it will be needed. Then in A, _real dearness_, which
proceeds from a very active demand, is added to _nominal dearness_, the
consequence of a superabundance of the precious metals.

Scarcity of money implies that little is necessary for each purchase.
Then in B, a _nominal cheapness_ is combined with _real cheapness_.

Under these circumstances, industry will have the strongest possible
motives for deserting A, to establish itself in B.

Now, to return to what would be the true course of things. As the
progress of such events is always gradual, industry from its nature
being opposed to sudden transits, let us suppose that, without waiting
the extreme point, it will have gradually divided itself between A and
B, according to the laws of supply and demand; that is to say, according
to the laws of justice and usefulness.

I do not advance an empty hypothesis when I say, that were it possible
that industry should concentrate itself upon a single point, there must,
from its nature, arise spontaneously, and in its midst, an irresistible
power of decentralization.

We will quote the words of a manufacturer to the Chamber of Commerce at
Manchester (the figures brought into his demonstration are suppressed):

"Formerly we exported goods; this exportation gave way to that of thread
for the manufacture of goods; later, instead of thread, we exported
machinery for the making of thread; then capital for the construction
of machinery; and lastly, workmen and talent, which are the source of
capital. All these elements of labor have, one after the other,
transferred themselves to other points, where their profits were
increased, and where the means of subsistence being less difficult to
obtain, life is maintained at a less cost. There are at present to be
seen in Prussia, Austria, Saxony, Switzerland, and Italy, immense
manufacturing establishments, founded entirely by English capital,
worked by English labor, and directed by English talent."

We may here perceive, that Nature, or rather Providence, with more
wisdom and foresight than the narrow rigid system of the protectionists
can suppose, does not permit the concentration of labor, the monopoly of
advantages, from which they draw their arguments as from an absolute and
irremediable fact. It has, by means as simple as they are infallible,
provided for dispersion, diffusion, mutual dependence, and simultaneous
progress; all of which, your restrictive laws paralyze as much as is in
their power, by their tendency towards the isolation of nations. By this
means they render much more decided the differences existing in the
conditions of production; they check the self-leveling power of
industry, prevent fusion of interests, and fence in each nation within
its own peculiar advantages and disadvantages.

III. To say that by a protective law the conditions of production are
equalized, is to disguise an error under false terms. It is not true
that an import duty equalizes the conditions of production. These remain
after the imposition of the duty just as they were before. The most that
the law can do is to equalize the _conditions of sale_. If it should be
said that I am playing upon words, I retort the accusation upon my
adversaries. It is for them to prove that _production_ and _sale_ are
synonymous terms, which if they cannot do, I have a right to accuse
them, if not of playing upon words, at least of confounding them.

Let me be permitted to exemplify my idea.

Suppose that several Parisian speculators should determine to devote
themselves to the production of oranges. They know that the oranges of
Portugal can be sold in Paris at ten centimes, whilst on account of the
boxes, hot-houses, etc., which are necessary to ward against the
severity of our climate, it is impossible to raise them at less than a
franc apiece. They accordingly demand a duty of ninety centimes upon
Portugal oranges. With the help of this duty, say they, the _conditions
of production_ will be equalized. The legislative body, yielding as
usual to this argument, imposes a duty of ninety centimes on each
foreign orange.

Now I say that the _relative conditions of production_ are in no wise
changed. The law can take nothing from the heat of the sun in Lisbon,
nor from the severity of the frosts in Paris. Oranges continuing to
mature themselves _naturally_ on the banks of the Tagus, and
artificially upon those of the Seine, must continue to require for their
production much more labor on the latter than the former. The law can
only equalize the _conditions of sale_. It is evident that while the
Portuguese sell their oranges at a franc apiece, the ninety centimes
which go to pay the tax are taken from the French consumer. Now look at
the whimsicality of the result. Upon each Portuguese orange, the country
loses nothing; for the ninety centimes which the consumer pays to
satisfy the tax, enter into the treasury. There is improper
distribution, but no loss. Upon each French orange consumed, there will
be about ninety centimes lost; for while the buyer very certainly loses
them, the seller just as certainly does not gain them, for even
according to the hypothesis, he will receive only the price of
production. I will leave it to the protectionists to draw their
conclusion.

IV. I have laid some stress upon this distinction between the conditions
of production and those of sale, which perhaps the prohibitionists may
consider as paradoxical, because it leads me on to what they will
consider as a still stranger paradox. This is: If you really wish to
equalize the facilities of production, leave trade free.

This may surprise the protectionists; but let me entreat them to
listen, if it be only through curiosity, to the end of my argument. It
shall not be long. I will now take it up where we left off.

If we suppose for the moment, that the common and daily profits of each
Frenchman amount to one franc, it will indisputably follow that to
produce an orange by _direct_ labor in France, one day's work, or its
equivalent, will be requisite; whilst to produce the cost of a
Portuguese orange, only one-tenth of this day's labor is required; which
means simply this, that the sun does at Lisbon what labor does at Paris.
Now is it not evident, that if I can produce an orange, or, what is the
same thing, the means of buying it, with one-tenth of a day's labor, I
am placed exactly in the same condition as the Portuguese producer
himself, excepting the expense of the transportation? It is then certain
that freedom of commerce equalizes the conditions of production direct
or indirect, as much as it is possible to equalize them; for it leaves
but the one inevitable difference, that of transportation.

I will add that free trade equalizes also the facilities for attaining
enjoyments, comforts, and general consumption; the last an object which
is, it would seem, quite forgotten, and which is nevertheless all
important; since consumption is the main object of all our industrial
efforts. Thanks to freedom of trade, we would enjoy here the results of
the Portuguese sun, as well as Portugal itself; and the inhabitants of
Havre, would have in their reach, as well as those of London, and with
the same facilities, the advantages which nature has in a mineralogical
point of view conferred upon Newcastle.

The protectionists may suppose me in a paradoxical humor, for I go
farther still. I say, and I sincerely believe, that if any two countries
are placed in unequal circumstances as to advantages of production,
_that one of the two which is the least favored by nature, will gain
most by freedom of commerce_. To prove this, I shall be obliged to turn
somewhat aside from the form of reasoning which belongs to this work. I
will do so, however; first, because the question in discussion turns
upon this point; and again, because it will give me the opportunity of
exhibiting a law of political economy of the highest importance, and
which, well understood, seems to me to be destined to lead back to this
science all those sects which, in our days, are seeking in the land of
chimeras that social harmony which they have been unable to discover in
nature. I speak of the law of consumption, which the majority of
political economists may well be reproached with having too much
neglected.

Consumption is the _end_, the final cause, of all the phenomena of
political economy, and, consequently, in it is found their final
solution.

No effect, whether favorable or unfavorable, can be arrested permanently
upon the producer. The advantages and the disadvantages, which, from
his relations to nature and to society, are his, both equally pass
gradually from him, with an almost insensible tendency to be absorbed
and fused into the community at large; the community considered as
consumers. This is an admirable law, alike in its cause and its effects,
and he who shall succeed in making it well understood, will have a right
to say, "I have not, in my passage through the world, forgotten to pay
my tribute to society."

Every circumstance which favors the work of production is of course
hailed with joy by the producer, for its _immediate effect_ is to enable
him to render greater services to the community, and to exact from it a
greater remuneration. Every circumstance which injures production, must
equally be the source of uneasiness to him; for its _immediate effect_
is to diminish his services, and consequently his remuneration. This is
a fortunate and necessary law of nature. The immediate good or evil of
favorable or unfavorable circumstances must fall upon the producer, in
order to influence him invincibly to seek the one and to avoid the
other.

Again, when a workman succeeds in his labor, the _immediate_ benefit of
this success is received by him. This again is necessary, to determine
him to devote his attention to it. It is also just; because it is just
that an effort crowned with success should bring its own reward.

But these effects, good and bad, although permanent in themselves, are
not so as regards the producer. If they had been so, a principle of
progressive and consequently infinite _inequality_ would have been
introduced among men. This good, and this evil, both therefore pass on,
to become absorbed in the general destinies of humanity.

How does this come about? I will try to make it understood by some
examples.

Let us go back to the thirteenth century. Men who gave themselves up to
the business of copying, received for this service _a remuneration
regulated by the general rate of profits_. Among them is found one, who
seeks and finds the means of multiplying rapidly copies of the same
work. He invents printing. The first effect of this is, that the
individual is enriched, while many more are impoverished. At the first
view, wonderful as the discovery is, one hesitates in deciding whether
it is not more injurious than useful. It seems to have introduced into
the world, as I said above, an element of infinite inequality.
Guttenberg makes large profits by this invention, and perfects the
invention by the profits, until all other copyists are ruined. As for
the public,--the consumer,--it gains but little, for Guttenberg takes
care to lower the price of books only just so much as is necessary to
undersell all rivals.

But the great Mind which put harmony into the movements of celestial
bodies, could also give it to the internal mechanism of society. We will
see the advantages of this invention escaping from the individual, to
become forever the common patrimony of mankind.

The process finally becomes known. Guttenberg is no longer alone in his
art; others imitate him. Their profits are at first considerable. They
are recompensed for being the first who make the effort to imitate the
processes of the newly invented art. This again was necessary, in order
that they might be induced to the effort, and thus forward the great and
final result to which we approach. They gain much; but they gain less
than the inventor, for _competition_ has commenced its work. The price
of books now continually decreases. The gains of the imitators diminish
in proportion as the invention becomes older; and in the same proportion
imitation becomes less meritorious. Soon the new object of industry
attains its normal condition; in other words, the remuneration of
printers is no longer an exception to the general rules of remuneration,
and, like that of copyists formerly, it is only regulated _by the
general rate of profits_. Here then the producer, as such, holds only
the old position. The discovery, however, has been made; the saving of
time, labor, effort, for a fixed result, for a certain number of
volumes, is realized. But in what is this manifested? In the cheap price
of books. For the good of whom? For the good of the consumer,--of
society,--of humanity. Printers, having no longer any peculiar merit,
receive no longer a peculiar remuneration. As men,--as consumers,--they
no doubt participate in the advantages which the invention confers upon
the community; but that is all. As printers, as producers, they are
placed upon the ordinary footing of all other producers. Society pays
them for their labor, and not for the usefulness of the invention.
_That_ has become a gratuitous benefit, a common heritage to mankind.

What has been said of printing can be extended to every agent for the
advancement of labor; from the nail and the mallet, up to the locomotive
and the electric telegraph. Society enjoys all, by the abundance of its
use, its consumption; and it _enjoys all gratuitously_. For as their
effect is to diminish prices, it is evident that just so much of the
price as is taken off by their intervention, renders the production in
so far _gratuitous_. There only remains the actual labor of man to be
paid for; and the remainder, which is the result of the invention, is
subtracted; at least after the invention has run through the cycle which
I have just described as its destined course. I send for a workman; he
brings a saw with him; I pay him two francs for his day's labor, and he
saws me twenty-five boards. If the saw had not been invented, he would
perhaps not have been able to make one board, and I would have paid him
the same for his day's labor. The _usefulness_ then of the saw, is for
me a gratuitous gift of nature, or rather it is a portion of the
inheritance which, _in common_ with my brother men, I have received from
the genius of my ancestors. I have two workmen in my field; the one
directs the handle of a plough, the other that of a spade. The result of
their day's labor is very different, but the price is the same, because
the remuneration is proportioned, not to the usefulness of the result,
but to the effort, the labor given to attain it.

I invoke the patience of the reader, and beg him to believe, that I have
not lost sight of free trade: I entreat him only to remember the
conclusion at which I have arrived: _Remuneration is not proportioned to
the usefulness of the articles brought by the producer into the market,
but to the labor_.[11]

[Footnote 11: It is true that labor does not receive a uniform
remuneration; because labor is more or less intense, dangerous,
skillful, etc. Competition establishes for each category a price
current; and it is of this variable price that I speak.]

I have so far taken my examples from human inventions, but will now go
on to speak of natural advantages.

In every article of production, nature and man must concur. But the
portion of nature is always gratuitous. Only so much of the usefulness
of an article as is the result of human labor becomes the object of
mutual exchange, and consequently of remuneration. The remuneration
varies much, no doubt, in proportion to the intensity of the labor, of
the skill which it requires, of its being _à propos_ to the demand of
the day, of the need which exists for it, of the momentary absence of
competition, etc. But it is not the less true in principle, that the
assistance received from natural laws, which belongs to all, counts for
nothing in the price.

We do not pay for the air we breathe, although so useful to us, that we
could not live two minutes without it. We do not pay for it, because
Nature furnishes it without the intervention of man's labor. But if we
wish to separate one of the gases which compose it, for instance, to
fill a balloon, we must take some trouble and labor; or if another takes
it for us, we must give him an equivalent in something which will have
cost us the trouble of production. From which we see that the exchange
is between troubles, efforts, labors. It is certainly not for hydrogen
gas that I pay, for this is every where at my disposal, but for the work
that it has been necessary to accomplish in order to disengage it; work
which I have been spared, and which I must refund. If I am told that
there are other things to pay for; as expense, materials, apparatus; I
answer, that still in these things it is the work that I pay for. The
price of the coal employed is only the representation of the labor
necessary to dig and transport it.

We do not pay for the light of the sun, because Nature alone gives it to
us. But we pay for the light of gas, tallow, oil, wax, because here is
labor to be remunerated;--and remark, that it is so entirely labor and
not utility to which remuneration is proportioned, that it may well
happen that one of these means of lighting, while it may be much more
effective than another, may still cost less. To cause this, it is only
necessary that less human labor should be required to furnish it.

When the water-carrier comes to supply my house, were I to pay him in
proportion to the _absolute utility_ of the water, my whole fortune
would not be sufficient. But I pay him only for the trouble he has
taken. If he requires more, I can get others to furnish it, or finally
go and get it myself. The water itself is not the subject of our
bargain; but the labor taken to get the water. This point of view is so
important, and the consequences that I am going to draw from it so
clear, as regards the freedom of international exchanges, that I will
still elucidate my idea by a few more examples.

The alimentary substance contained in potatoes does not cost us very
dear, because a great deal of it is attainable with little work. We pay
more for wheat, because, to produce it Nature requires more labor from
man. It is evident that if Nature did for the latter what she does for
the former, their prices would tend to the same level. It is impossible
that the producer of wheat should permanently gain more than the
producer of potatoes. The law of competition cannot allow it.

If by a happy miracle the fertility of all arable lands were to be
increased, it would not be the agriculturist, but the consumer, who
would profit by this phenomenon; for the result of it would be,
abundance and cheapness. There would be less labor incorporated into an
acre of grain, and the agriculturist would be therefore obliged to
exchange it for a less labor incorporated into some other article. If,
on the contrary, the fertility of the soil were suddenly to deteriorate,
the share of Nature in production would be less, that of labor greater,
and the result would be higher prices. I am right then in saying that it
is in consumption, in mankind, that at length all political phenomena
find their solution. As long as we fail to follow their effects to this
point, and look only at _immediate_ effects, which act but upon
individual men or classes of men _as producers_, we know nothing more of
political economy than the quack does of medicine, when, instead of
following the effects of a prescription in its action upon the whole
system, he satisfies himself with knowing how it affects the palate and
the throat.

The tropical regions are very favorable to the production of sugar and
coffee; that is to say, Nature does most of the business and leaves but
little for labor to accomplish. But who reaps the advantage of this
liberality of Nature? Not these regions, for they are forced by
competition to receive simply remuneration for their labor. It is
mankind who is the gainer; for the result of this liberality is
_cheapness_, and cheapness belongs to the world.

Here in the temperate zone, we find coal and iron ore, on the surface of
the soil; we have but to stoop and take them. At first, I grant, the
immediate inhabitants profit by this fortunate circumstance. But soon
comes competition, and the price of coal and iron falls, until this gift
of Nature becomes gratuitous to all, and human labor is only paid
according to the general rate of profits.

Thus natural advantages, like improvements in the process of production,
are, or have a constant tendency to become, under the law of
competition, the common and _gratuitous_ patrimony of consumers, of
society, of mankind. Countries therefore which do not enjoy these
advantages, must gain by commerce with those which do; because the
exchanges of commerce are between _labor and labor_; subtraction being
made of all the natural advantages which are combined with these labors;
and it is evidently the most favored countries which can incorporate
into a given labor the largest proportion of these _natural advantages_.
Their produce representing less labor, receives less recompense; in
other words, is _cheaper_. If then all the liberality of Nature results
in cheapness, it is evidently not the producing, but the consuming
country, which profits by her benefits.

Hence we may see the enormous absurdity of the consuming country, which
rejects produce precisely because it is cheap. It is as though we should
say: "We will have nothing of that which Nature gives you. You ask of
us an effort equal to two, in order to furnish ourselves with articles
only attainable at home by an effort equal to four. You can do it
because with you Nature does half the work. But we will have nothing to
do with it; we will wait till your climate, becoming more inclement,
forces you to ask of us a labor equal to four, and then we can treat
with you _upon an equal footing_."

A is a favored country; B is maltreated by Nature. Mutual traffic then
is advantageous to both, but principally to B, because the exchange is
not between _utility_ and _utility_, but between _value_ and _value_.
Now A furnishes a greater _utility in a similar value_, because the
_utility_ of any article includes at once what Nature and what labor
have done; whereas the _value_ of it only corresponds to the portion
accomplished by labor. B then makes an entirely advantageous bargain;
for by simply paying the producer from A for his labor, it receives in
return not only the results of that labor, but in addition there is
thrown in whatever may have accrued from the superior bounty of Nature.

We will lay down the general rule.

Traffic is an exchange of _values_; and as value is reduced by
competition to the simple representation of labor, traffic is the
exchange of equal labors. Whatever Nature has done towards the
production of the articles exchanged, is given on both sides
_gratuitously_; from whence it necessarily follows, that the most
advantageous commerce is transacted with those countries which are the
most favored by Nature.

       *       *       *       *       *

The theory of which I have attempted, in this chapter, to trace the
outlines, would require great developments. But perhaps the attentive
reader will have perceived in it the fruitful seed which is destined in
its future growth to smother Protection, at once with Fourierism, Saint
Simonism, Commonism, and the various other schools whose object is to
exclude the law of COMPETITION from the government of the world.
Competition, no doubt, considering man as producer, must often interfere
with his individual and _immediate_ interests. But if we consider the
great object of all labor, the universal good, in a word, _Consumption_,
we cannot fail to find that Competition is to the moral world what the
law of equilibrium is to the material one. It is the foundation of true
Commonism, of true Socialism, of the equality of comforts and condition,
so much sought after in our day; and if so many sincere reformers, so
many earnest friends to the public rights, seek to reach their end by
commercial _legislation_, it is only because they do not yet understand
_commercial freedom_.




V.

OUR PRODUCTIONS ARE OVERLOADED WITH TAXES.


This is but a new wording of the last Sophism. The demand made is, that
the foreign article should be taxed, in order to neutralize the effects
of the tax, which weighs down national produce. It is still then but the
question of equalizing the facilities of production. We have but to say
that the tax is an artificial obstacle, which has exactly the same
effect as a natural obstacle, i.e. the increasing of the price. If this
increase is so great that there is more loss in producing the article in
question than in attracting it from foreign parts by the production of
an equivalent value, let it alone. Individual interest will soon learn
to choose the lesser of two evils. I might refer the reader to the
preceding demonstration for an answer to this Sophism; but it is one
which recurs so often in the complaints and the petitions, I had almost
said the demands, of the protectionist school, that it deserves a
special discussion.

If the tax in question should be one of a special kind, directed against
fixed articles of production, I agree that it is perfectly reasonable
that foreign produce should be subjected to it. For instance, it would
be absurd to free foreign salt from impost duty; not that in an
economical point of view France would lose any thing by it; on the
contrary, whatever may be said, principles are invariable, and France
would gain by it, as she must always gain by avoiding an obstacle
whether natural or artificial. But here the obstacle has been raised
with a fiscal object. It is necessary that this end should be attained;
and if foreign salt were to be sold in our market free from duty, the
treasury would not receive its revenue, and would be obliged to seek it
from some thing else. There would be evident inconsistency in creating
an obstacle with a given object, and then avoiding the attainment of
that object. It would have been better at once to seek what was needed
in the other impost without taxing French salt. Such are the
circumstances under which I would allow upon any foreign article a duty,
_not protecting_ but fiscal.

But the supposition that a nation, because it is subjected to heavier
imposts than those of another neighboring nation, should protect itself
by tariffs against the competition of its rival, is a Sophism, which it
is now my purpose to attack.

I have said more than once, that I am opposing only the theory of the
protectionists, with the hope of discovering the source of their errors.
Were I disposed to enter into controversy with them, I would say: Why
direct your tariffs principally against England and Belgium, both
countries more overloaded with taxes than any in the world? Have I not
a right to look upon your argument as a mere pretext? But I am not of
the number of those who believe that prohibitionists are guided by
interest, and not by conviction. The doctrine of Protection is too
popular not to be sincere. If the majority could believe in freedom, we
would be free. Without doubt it is individual interest which weighs us
down with tariffs; but it acts upon conviction.

The State may make either a good or a bad use of taxes; it makes a good
use of them when it renders to the public services equivalent to the
value received from them; it makes a bad use of them when it expends
this value, giving nothing in return.

To say in the first case that they place the country which pays them in
more disadvantageous conditions for production, than the country which
is free from them, is a Sophism. We pay, it is true, twenty millions for
the administration of justice, and the maintenance of the police, but we
have justice and the police; we have the security which they give, the
time which they save for us; and it is most probable that production is
neither more easy nor more active among nations, where (if there be
such) each individual takes the administration of justice into his own
hands. We pay, I grant, many hundred millions for roads, bridges,
ports, railways; but we have these railways, these ports, bridges and
roads, and unless we maintain that it is a losing business to establish
them, we cannot say that they place us in a position inferior to that of
nations who have, it is true, no taxes for public works, but who
likewise have no public works. And here we see why (even while we accuse
internal taxes of being a cause of industrial inferiority) we direct our
tariffs precisely against those nations which are the most taxed. It is
because these taxes, well used, far from injuring, have ameliorated the
_conditions of production_ to these nations. Thus we again arrive at the
conclusion that the protectionist Sophisms not only wander from, but are
the contrary--the very antithesis of truth.

As to unproductive imposts, suppress them if you can; but surely it is a
most singular idea to suppose, that their evil effect is to be
neutralized by the addition of individual taxes to public taxes. Many
thanks for the compensation! The State, you say, has taxed us too much;
surely this is no reason why we should tax each other!

A protective duty is a tax directed against foreign produce, but which
returns, let us keep in mind, upon the national consumer. Is it not then
a singular argument to say to him, "Because the taxes are heavy, we will
raise prices higher for you; and because the State takes a part of your
revenue, we will give another portion of it to benefit a monopoly?"

But let us examine more closely this Sophism so accredited among our
legislators; although, strange to say, it is precisely those who keep up
the unproductive imposts (according to our present hypothesis) who
attribute to them afterwards our supposed inferiority, and seek to
re-establish the equilibrium by further imposts and new clogs.

It appears to me to be evident that protection, without any change in
its nature and effects, might have taken the form of a direct tax,
raised by the State, and distributed as a premium to privileged
industry.

Let us admit that foreign iron could be sold in our market at eight
francs, but not lower; and French iron at not lower than twelve francs.

In this hypothesis there are two ways in which the State can secure the
national market to the home producer.

The first, is to put upon foreign iron a duty of five francs. This, it
is evident, would exclude it, because it could no longer be sold at less
than thirteen francs; eight francs for the cost price, five for the tax;
and at this price it must be driven from the market by French iron,
which we have supposed to cost twelve francs. In this case the buyer,
the consumer, will have paid all the expenses of the protection given.

The second means would be to lay upon the public a tax of five francs,
and to give it as a premium to the iron manufacturer. The effect would
in either case be equally a protective measure. Foreign iron would,
according to both systems, be alike excluded; for our iron manufacturer
could sell at seven francs, what, with the five francs premium, would
thus bring him in twelve. While the price of sale being seven francs,
foreign iron could not obtain a market at eight.

In these two systems the principle is the same; the effect is the same.
There is but this single difference; in the first case the expense of
protection is paid by a part, in the second by the whole of the
community.

I frankly confess my preference for the second system, which I regard as
more just, more economical and more legal. More just, because, if
society wishes to give bounties to some of its members, the whole
community ought to contribute; more economical, because it would banish
many difficulties, and save the expenses of collection; more legal,
lastly, because the public would see clearly into the operation, and
know what was required of it.

But if the protective system had taken this form, would it not have been
laughable enough to hear it said, "We pay heavy taxes for the army, the
navy, the judiciary, the public works, the schools, the public debt,
etc. These amount to more than a thousand million. It would therefore be
desirable that the State should take another thousand million, to
relieve the poor iron manufacturers; or the suffering stockholders of
coal mines; or those unfortunate lumber dealers, or the useful
codfishery."

This, it must be perceived, by an attentive investigation, is the result
of the Sophism in question. In vain, gentlemen, are all your efforts;
you cannot _give money_ to one without taking it from another. If you
are absolutely determined to exhaust the funds of the taxable community,
well; but, at least, do not mock them; do not tell them, "We take from
you again, in order to compensate you for what we have already taken."

It would be a too tedious undertaking to endeavor to point out all the
fallacies of this Sophism. I will therefore limit myself to the
consideration of it in three points.

You argue that France is overburthened with taxes, and deduce thence the
conclusion that it is necessary to protect such and such an article of
produce. But protection does not relieve us from the payment of these
taxes. If, then, individuals devoting themselves to any one object of
industry, should advance this demand: "We, from our participation in the
payment of taxes, have our expenses of production increased, and
therefore ask for a protective duty which shall raise our price of
sale;" what is this but a demand on their part to be allowed to free
themselves from the burthen of the tax, by laying it on the rest of the
community? Their object is to balance, by the increased price of their
produce, the amount which _they_ pay in taxes. Now, as the whole amount
of these taxes must enter into the treasury, and the increase of price
must be paid by society, it follows that (where this protective duty is
imposed) society has to bear, not only the general tax, but also that
for the protection of the article in question. But it is answered, let
_every thing_ be protected. Firstly, this is impossible; and, again,
were it possible, how could such a system give relief? _I_ will pay for
you, _you_ will pay for me; but not the less, still there remains the
tax to be paid.

Thus you are the dupes of an illusion. You determine to raise taxes for
the support of an army, a navy, the church, university, judges, roads,
etc. Afterwards you seek to disburthen from its portion of the tax,
first one article of industry, then another, then a third; always adding
to the burthen of the mass of society. You thus only create interminable
complications. If you can prove that the increase of price resulting
from protection, falls upon the foreign producer, I grant something
specious in your argument. But if it be true that the French people paid
the tax before the passing of the protective duty, and afterwards that
it has paid not only the tax, but the protective duty also, truly I do
not perceive wherein it has profited.

But I go much further, and maintain that the more oppressive our taxes
are, the more anxiously ought we to open our ports and frontiers to
foreign nations, less burthened than ourselves. And why? In order that
we may share with them, as much as possible, the burthen which we bear.
Is it not an incontestable maxim in political economy, that taxes must,
in the end, fall upon the consumer? The greater then our commerce, the
greater the portion which will be reimbursed to us, of taxes
incorporated in the produce, which we will have sold to foreign
consumers; whilst we, on our part, will have made to them only a lesser
reimbursement, because (according to our hypothesis) their produce is
less taxed than ours.

Again, finally, has it ever occurred to you to ask yourself, whether
these heavy taxes which you adduce as a reason for keeping up the
prohibitive system, may not be the result of this very system itself? To
what purpose would be our great standing armies, and our powerful
navies, if commerce were free?




VI.

BALANCE OF TRADE.


Our adversaries have adopted a system of tactics, which embarrasses us
not a little. Do we prove our doctrine? They admit the truth of it in
the most respectful manner. Do we attack their principles? They abandon
them with the best possible grace. They only ask that our doctrine,
which they acknowledge to be true, should be confined to books; and that
their principles, which they allow to be false, should be established in
practice. If we will give up to them the regulation of our tariffs, they
will leave us triumphant in the domain of theory.

"Assuredly," said Mr. Gauthier de Roumilly, lately, "assuredly no one
wishes to call up from their graves the defunct theories of the balance
of trade." And yet Mr. Gauthier, after giving this passing blow to
error, goes on immediately afterwards, and for two hours consecutively,
to reason as though this error were a truth.

Give me Mr. Lestiboudois. Here we have a consistent reasoner! a logical
arguer! There is nothing in his conclusions which cannot be found in his
premises. He asks nothing in practice which he does not justify in
theory. His principles may perchance be false, and this is the point in
question. But he has a principle. He believes, he proclaims aloud, that
if France gives ten to receive fifteen, she loses five; and surely, with
such a belief, nothing is more natural than that he should make laws
consistent with it.

He says: "What it is important to remark, is, that constantly the amount
of importation is augmenting, and surpassing that of exportation. Every
year France buys more foreign produce, and sells less of its own
produce. This can be proved by figures. In 1842, we see the importation
exceed the exportation by two hundred millions. This appears to me to
prove, in the clearest manner, that national labor _is not sufficiently
protected_, that we are provided by foreign labor, and that the
competition of our rivals _oppresses_ our industry. The law in question,
appears to me to be a consecration of the fact, that our political
economists have assumed a false position in declaring, that in
proportion to produce bought, there is always a corresponding quantity
sold. It is evident that purchases may be made, not with the habitual
productions of a country, not with its revenue, not with the results of
actual labor, but with its capital, with the accumulated savings which
should serve for reproduction. A country may spend, dissipate its
profits and savings, may impoverish itself, and by the consumption of
its national capital, progress gradually to its ruin. _This is
precisely what we are doing. We give, every year, two hundred millions
to foreign nations_."

Well! here, at least, is a man whom we can understand. There is no
hypocrisy in this language. The balance of trade is here clearly
maintained and defended. France imports two hundred millions more than
she exports. Then France loses two hundred millions yearly. And the
remedy? It is to check importation. The conclusion is perfectly
consistent.

It is, then, with Mr. Lestiboudois that we will argue, for how is it
possible to do so with Mr. Gauthier? If you say to the latter, the
balance of trade is a mistake, he will answer, So I have declared it in
my exordium. If you exclaim, But it is a truth, he will say, Thus I have
classed it in my conclusions.

Political economists may blame me for arguing with Mr. Lestiboudois. To
combat the balance of trade, is, they say, neither more nor less than to
fight against a windmill.

But let us be on our guard. The balance of trade is neither so old, nor
so sick, nor so dead, as Mr. Gauthier is pleased to imagine; for all the
legislature, Mr. Gauthier himself included, are associated by their
votes with the theory of Mr. Lestiboudois.

However, not to fatigue the reader, I will not seek to investigate too
closely this theory, but will content myself with subjecting it to the
experience of facts.

It is constantly alleged in opposition to our principles, that they are
good only in theory. But, gentlemen, do you believe that merchants'
books are good in practice? It does appear to me that if there is any
thing which can have a practical authority, when the object is to prove
profit and loss, that this must be commercial accounts. We cannot
suppose that all the merchants of the world, for centuries back, should
have so little understood their own affairs, as to have kept their books
in such a manner as to represent gains as losses, and losses as gains.
Truly it would be easier to believe that Mr. Lestiboudois is a bad
political economist.

A merchant, one of my friends, having had two business transactions,
with very different results, I have been curious to compare on this
subject the accounts of the counter with those of the custom-house,
interpreted by Mr. Lestiboudois with the sanction of our six hundred
legislators.

Mr. T... despatched from Havre a vessel, freighted, for the United
States, with French merchandise, principally Parisian articles, valued
at 200,000 francs. Such was the amount entered at the custom-house. The
cargo, on its arrival at New Orleans, had paid ten per cent. expenses,
and was liable to thirty per cent. duties; which raised its value to
280,000 francs. It was sold at twenty per cent. profit on its original
value, which being 40,000 francs, the price of sale was 320,000 francs,
which the assignee converted into cotton. This cotton, again, had to
pay for expenses of transportation, insurance, commissions, etc., ten
per cent.: so that when the return cargo arrived at Havre, its value had
risen to 352,000 francs, and it was thus entered at the custom-house.
Finally, Mr. T... realized again on this return cargo twenty per cent.
profits; amounting to 70,400 francs. The cotton thus sold for the sum of
422,400 francs.

If Mr. Lestiboudois requires it, I will send him an extract from the
books of Mr. T... He will there see, _credited_ to the account of
_profit and loss_, that is to say, set down as gained, two sums; the one
of 40,000, the other of 70,000 francs, and Mr. T ... feels perfectly
certain that as regards these, there is no mistake in his accounts.

Now what conclusion does Mr. Lestiboudois draw from the sums entered
into the custom-house, in this operation? He thence learns that France
has exported 200,000 francs, and imported 352,000; from whence the
honorable deputy concludes "_that she has spent, dissipated the profits
of her previous savings; that she is impoverishing herself and
progressing to her ruin; and that she has squandered on a foreign
nation_ 152,000 _francs of her capital_."

Some time after this transaction, Mr. T... despatched another vessel,
again freighted with domestic produce, to the amount of 200,000 francs.
But the vessel foundered after leaving the port, and Mr. T ... had only
farther to inscribe on his books two little items, thus worded:

"_Sundries due to X_, 200,000 francs, for purchase of divers articles
despatched by vessel N.

"_Profit and loss due to sundries, 200,000 francs, for final and total
loss of cargo._"

In the meantime the custom-house inscribed 200,000 francs upon its list
of _exportations_, and as there can of course be nothing to balance this
entry on the list of _importations_, it hence follows that Mr.
Lestiboudois and the Chamber must see in this wreck _a clear profit_ to
France of 200,000 francs.

We may draw hence yet another conclusion, viz.: that according to the
Balance of Trade theory, France has an exceedingly simple manner of
constantly doubling her capital. It is only necessary, to accomplish
this, that she should, after entering into the custom-house her articles
for exportation, cause them to be thrown into the sea. By this course,
her exportations can speedily be made to equal her capital; importations
will be nothing, and our gain will be, all which the ocean will have
swallowed up.

You are joking, the protectionists will reply. You know that it is
impossible that we should utter such absurdities. Nevertheless, I
answer, you do utter them, and what is more, you give them life, you
exercise them practically upon your fellow citizens, as much, at least,
as is in your power to do.

The truth is, that the theory of the Balance of Trade should be
precisely _reversed_. The profits accruing to the nation from any
foreign commerce should be calculated by the overplus of the
importation above the exportation. This overplus, after the deduction of
expenses, is the real gain. Here we have the true theory, and it is one
which leads directly to freedom in trade. I now, gentlemen, abandon you
this theory, as I have done all those of the preceding chapters. Do with
it as you please, exaggerate it as you will; it has nothing to fear.
Push it to the farthest extreme; imagine, if it so please you, that
foreign nations should inundate us with useful produce of every
description, and ask nothing in return; that our importations should be
_infinite_, and our exportations _nothing_. Imagine all this, and still
I defy you to prove that we will be the poorer in consequence.




VII.

PETITION FROM THE MANUFACTURERS OF CANDLES, WAX-LIGHTS, LAMPS,
CHANDELIERS, REFLECTORS, SNUFFERS, EXTINGUISHERS; AND FROM THE PRODUCERS
OF TALLOW, OIL, RESIN, ALCOHOL, AND GENERALLY OF EVERY THING USED FOR
LIGHTS.


_To the Honorable the Members of the Chamber of Deputies:_

"GENTLEMEN,--You are in the right way: you reject abstract theories;
abundance, cheapness, concerns you little. You are entirely occupied
with the interest of the producer, whom you are anxious to free from
foreign competition. In a word, you wish to secure the _national market_
to _national labor_.

"We come now to offer you an admirable opportunity for the application
of your----what shall we say? your theory? no, nothing is more
deceiving than theory;--your doctrine? your system? your principle? But
you do not like doctrines; you hold systems in horror; and, as for
principles, you declare that there are no such things in political
economy. We will say then, your practice; your practice without theory,
and without principle.

"We are subjected to the intolerable competition of a foreign rival, who
enjoys, it would seem, such superior facilities for the production of
light, that he is enabled to _inundate_ our _national market_ at so
exceedingly reduced a price, that, the moment he makes his appearance,
he draws off all custom from us; and thus an important branch of French
industry, with all its innumerable ramifications, is suddenly reduced to
a state of complete stagnation. This rival, who is no other than the
sun, carries on so bitter a war against us, that we have every reason to
believe that he has been excited to this course by our perfidious
neighbor England. (Good diplomacy this, for the present time!) In this
belief we are confirmed by the fact that in all his transactions with
this proud island, he is much more moderate and careful than with us.

"Our petition is, that it would please your honorable body to pass a law
whereby shall be directed the shutting up of all windows, dormers,
sky-lights, shutters, curtains, vasistas, oeil-de-boeufs, in a word, all
openings, holes, chinks and fissures through which the light of the sun
is used to penetrate into our dwellings, to the prejudice of the
profitable manufactures which we flatter ourselves we have been enabled
to bestow upon the country; which country cannot, therefore, without
ingratitude, leave us now to struggle unprotected through so unequal a
contest.

"We pray your honorable body not to mistake our petition for a satire,
nor to repulse us without at least hearing the reasons which we have to
advance in its favor.

"And first, if, by shutting out as much as possible all access to
natural light, you thus create the necessity for artificial light, is
there in France an industrial pursuit which will not, through some
connection with this important object, be benefited by it?

"If more tallow be consumed, there will arise a necessity for an
increase of cattle and sheep. Thus artificial meadows must be in greater
demand; and meat, wool, leather, and above all, manure, this basis of
agricultural riches, must become more abundant.

"If more oil be consumed, it will cause an increase in the cultivation
of the olive-tree. This plant, luxuriant and exhausting to the soil,
will come in good time to profit by the increased fertility which the
raising of cattle will have communicated to our fields.

"Our heaths will become covered with resinous trees. Numerous swarms of
bees will gather upon our mountains the perfumed treasures, which are
now cast upon the winds, useless as the blossoms from which they
emanate. There is, in short, no branch of agriculture which would not be
greatly developed by the granting of our petition.

"Navigation would equally profit. Thousands of vessels would soon be
employed in the whale fisheries, and thence would arise a navy capable
of sustaining the honor of France, and of responding to the patriotic
sentiments of the undersigned petitioners, candle merchants, etc.

"But what words can express the magnificence which _Paris_ will then
exhibit! Cast an eye upon the future and behold the gildings, the
bronzes, the magnificent crystal chandeliers, lamps, reflectors and
candelabras, which will glitter in the spacious stores, compared with
which the splendor of the present day will appear trifling and
insignificant.

"There is none, not even the poor manufacturer of resin in the midst of
his pine forests, nor the miserable miner in his dark dwelling, but who
would enjoy an increase of salary and of comforts.

"Gentlemen, if you will be pleased to reflect, you cannot fail to be
convinced that there is perhaps not one Frenchman, from the opulent
stockholder of Anzin down to the poorest vendor of matches, who is not
interested in the success of our petition.

"We foresee your objections, gentlemen; but there is not one that you
can oppose to us which you will not be obliged to gather from the works
of the partisans of free trade. We dare challenge you to pronounce one
word against our petition, which is not equally opposed to your own
practice and the principle which guides your policy.

"Do you tell us, that if we gain by this protection, France will not
gain, because the consumer must pay the price of it?

"We answer you:

"You have no longer any right to cite the interest of the consumer. For
whenever this has been found to compete with that of the producer, you
have invariably sacrificed the first. You have done this to _encourage
labor_, to _increase the demand for labor_. The same reason should now
induce you to act in the same manner.

"You have yourselves already answered the objection. When you were told:
The consumer is interested in the free introduction of iron, coal, corn,
wheat, cloths, etc., your answer was: Yes, but the producer is
interested in their exclusion. Thus, also, if the consumer is interested
in the admission of light, we, the producers, pray for its
interdiction.

"You have also said, the producer and the consumer are one. If the
manufacturer gains by protection, he will cause the agriculturist to
gain also; if agriculture prospers, it opens a market for manufactured
goods. Thus we, if you confer upon us the monopoly of furnishing light
during the day, will as a first consequence buy large quantities of
tallow, coals, oil, resin, wax, alcohol, silver, iron, bronze, crystal,
for the supply of our business; and then we and our numerous contractors
having become rich, our consumption will be great, and will become a
means of contributing to the comfort and competency of the workers in
every branch of national labor.

"Will you say that the light of the sun is a gratuitous gift, and that
to repulse gratuitous gifts, is to repulse riches under pretence of
encouraging the means of obtaining them?

"Take care,--you carry the death-blow to your own policy. Remember that
hitherto you have always repulsed foreign produce, _because_ it was an
approach to a gratuitous gift, and _the more in proportion_ as this
approach was more close. You have, in obeying the wishes of other
monopolists, acted only from a _half-motive_; to grant our petition
there is a much _fuller inducement_. To repulse us, precisely for the
reason that our case is a more complete one than any which have preceded
it, would be to lay down the following equation: + × + =-; in other
words, it would be to accumulate absurdity upon absurdity.

"Labor and Nature concur in different proportions, according to country
and climate, in every article of production. The portion of Nature is
always gratuitous; that of labor alone regulates the price.

"If a Lisbon orange can be sold at half the price of a Parisian one, it
is because a natural and gratuitous heat does for the one, what the
other only obtains from an artificial and consequently expensive one.

"When, therefore, we purchase a Portuguese orange, we may say that we
obtain it half gratuitously and half by the right of labor; in other
words, at _half price_ compared to those of Paris.

"Now it is precisely on account of this _demi-gratuity_ (excuse the
word) that you argue in favor of exclusion. How, you say, could national
labor sustain the competition of foreign labor, when the first has every
thing to do, and the last is rid of half the trouble, the sun taking the
rest of the business upon himself? If then the _demi-gratuity_ can
determine you to check competition, on what principle can the _entire
gratuity_ be alleged as a reason for admitting it? You are no logicians
if, refusing the demi-gratuity as hurtful to human labor, you do not _à
fortiori_, and with double zeal, reject the full gratuity.

"Again, when any article, as coal, iron, cheese, or cloth, comes to us
from foreign countries with less labor than if we produced it ourselves,
the difference in price is a _gratuitous gift_ conferred upon us; and
the gift is more or less considerable, according as the difference is
greater or less. It is the quarter, the half, or the three-quarters of
the value of the produce, in proportion as the foreign merchant requires
the three-quarters, the half, or the quarter of the price. It is as
complete as possible when the producer offers, as the sun does with
light, the whole in free gift. The question is, and we put it formally,
whether you wish for France the benefit of gratuitous consumption, or
the supposed advantages of laborious production. Choose, but be
consistent. And does it not argue the greatest inconsistency to check as
you do the importation of coal, iron, cheese, and goods of foreign
manufacture, merely because and even in proportion as their price
approaches _zero_, while at the same time you freely admit, and without
limitation, the light of the sun, whose price is during the whole day at
_zero_?"




VIII.

DISCRIMINATING DUTIES.


A poor laborer of Gironde had raised, with the greatest possible care
and attention, a nursery of vines, from which, after much labor, he at
last succeeded in producing a pipe of wine, and forgot, in the joy of
his success, that each drop of this precious nectar had cost a drop of
sweat to his brow. I will sell it, said he to his wife, and with the
proceeds I will buy thread, which will serve you to make a _trousseau_
for our daughter. The honest countryman, arriving in the city, there met
an Englishman and a Belgian. The Belgian said to him, Give me your wine,
and I in exchange, will give you fifteen bundles of thread. The
Englishman said, Give it to me, and I will give you twenty bundles, for
we English can spin cheaper than the Belgians. But a custom-house
officer standing by, said to the laborer, My good fellow, make your
exchange, if you choose, with the Belgian, but it is my duty to prevent
your doing so with the Englishman. What! exclaimed the countryman, you
wish me to take fifteen bundles of Brussels thread, when I can have
twenty from Manchester? Certainly; do you not see that France would be a
loser, if you were to receive twenty bundles instead of fifteen? I can
scarcely understand this, said the laborer. Nor can I explain it, said
the custom-house officer, but there is no doubt of the fact; for
deputies, ministers, and editors, all agree that a people is
impoverished in proportion as it receives a large compensation for any
given quantity of its produce. The countryman was obliged to conclude
his bargain with the Belgian. His daughter received but three-fourths of
her _trousseau_; and these good folks are still puzzling themselves to
discover how it can happen that people are ruined by receiving four
instead of three; and why they are richer with three dozen towels
instead of four.




IX.

WONDERFUL DISCOVERY!


At this moment, when all minds are occupied in endeavoring to discover
the most economical means of transportation; when, to put these means
into practice, we are leveling roads, improving rivers, perfecting
steamboats, establishing railroads, and attempting various systems of
traction, atmospheric, hydraulic, pneumatic, electric, etc.,--at this
moment when, I believe, every one is seeking in sincerity and with
ardor the solution of this problem--

"_To bring the price of things in their place of consumption, as near as
possible to their price in that of production_"--

I would believe myself acting a culpable part towards my country,
towards the age in which I live, and towards myself, if I were longer to
keep secret the wonderful discovery which I have just made.

I am well aware that the self-illusions of inventors have become
proverbial, but I have, nevertheless, the most complete certainty of
having discovered an infallible means of bringing the produce of the
entire world into France, and reciprocally to transport ours, with a
very important reduction of price.

Infallible! and yet this is but a single one of the advantages of my
astonishing invention, which requires neither plans nor devices, neither
preparatory studies, nor engineers, nor machinists, nor capital, nor
stockholders, nor governmental assistance! There is no danger of
shipwrecks, of explosions, of shocks, of fire, nor of displacement of
rails! It can be put into practice without preparation from one day to
another!

Finally, and this will, no doubt, recommend it to the public, it will
not increase taxes one cent; but the contrary. It will not augment the
number of government functionaries, nor the exigencies of government
officers; but the contrary. It will put in hazard the liberty of no one;
but the contrary.

I have been led to this discovery not from accident, but observation,
and I will tell you how.

I had this question to determine:

"Why does any article made, for instance, at Brussels, bear an increased
price on its arrival at Paris?"

It was immediately evident to me that this was the result of _obstacles_
of various kinds existing between Brussels and Paris. First, there is
_distance_, which cannot be overcome without trouble and loss of time;
and either we must submit to these in our own person, or pay another for
bearing them for us. Then come rivers, swamps, accidents, heavy and
muddy roads; these are so many _difficulties_ to be overcome; in order
to do which, causeways are constructed, bridges built, roads cut and
paved, railroads established, etc. But all this is costly, and the
article transported must bear its portion of the expense. There are
robbers, too, on the roads, and this necessitates guards, a police, etc.

Now, among these _obstacles_, there is one which we ourselves have
placed, and that at no little expense, between Brussels and Paris. This
consists of men planted along the frontier, armed to the teeth, whose
business it is to place _difficulties_ in the way of the transportation
of goods from one country to another. These men are called custom-house
officers, and their effect is precisely similar to that of steep and
boggy roads. They retard and put obstacles in the way of transportation,
thus contributing to the difference which we have remarked between the
price of production and that of consumption; to diminish which
difference as much as possible, is the problem which we are seeking to
resolve.

Here, then, we have found its solution. _Let our tariff be diminished._
We will thus have constructed a Northern Railroad which will cost us
nothing. Nay, more, we will be saved great expenses, and will begin from
the first day to save capital.

Really, I cannot but ask myself, in surprise, how our brains could have
admitted so whimsical a piece of folly, as to induce us to pay many
millions to destroy the _natural obstacles_ interposed between France
and other nations, only at the same time to pay so many millions more in
order to replace them by _artificial obstacles_, which have exactly the
same effect; so that the obstacle removed, and the obstacle created,
neutralize each other; things go on as before, and the only result of
our trouble, is, a double expense.

An article of Belgian production is worth at Brussels twenty francs,
and, from the expenses of transportation, thirty francs at Paris. A
similar article of Parisian manufacture costs forty francs. What is our
course under these circumstances?

First, we impose a duty of at least ten francs on the Belgian article,
so as to raise its price to a level with that of the Parisian; the
government withal, paying numerous officials to attend to the levying of
this duty. The article thus pays ten francs for transportation, ten for
the tax.

This done, we say to ourselves: Transportation between Brussels and
Paris is very dear; let us spend two or three millions in railways, and
we will reduce it one-half. Evidently the result of such a course will
be to get the Belgian article at Paris for thirty-five francs, viz:

   20 francs--price at Brussels.
   10   "     duty.
    5   "     transportation by railroad.
   --
   35 francs--total, or market price at Paris.

Could we not have attained the same end by lowering the tariff to five
francs? We would then have--

   20 francs--price at Brussels.
    5   "     duty.
   10   "     transportation on the common road.
   --
   35 francs--total, or market price at Paris.

And this arrangement would have saved us the 200,000,000 spent upon the
railroad, besides the expense saved in custom-house surveillance, which
would of course diminish in proportion as the temptation to smuggling
would become less.

But it is answered, the duty is necessary to protect Parisian industry.
So be it; but do not then destroy the effect of it by your railroad.

For if you persist in your determination to keep the Belgian article on
a par with the Parisian at forty francs, you must raise the duty to
fifteen francs, in order to have:--

   20 francs--price at Brussels.
   15   "     protective duty.
    5   "     transportation by railroad.
   --
   40 francs--total, at equalized prices.

And I now ask, of what benefit, under these circumstances, is the
railroad?

Frankly, is it not humiliating to the nineteenth century, that it should
be destined to transmit to future ages the example of such puerilities
seriously and gravely practiced? To be the dupe of another, is bad
enough; but to employ all the forms and ceremonies of legislation in
order to cheat one's self,--to doubly cheat one's self, and that too in
a mere mathematical account,--truly this is calculated to lower a little
the pride of this _enlightened age_.




X.

RECIPROCITY.


We have just seen that all which renders transportation difficult, acts
in the same manner as protection; or, if the expression be preferred,
that protection tends towards the same result as obstacles to
transportation.

A tariff may then be truly spoken of, as a swamp, a rut, a steep hill;
in a word, an _obstacle_, whose effect is to augment the difference
between the price of consumption and that of production. It is equally
incontestable that a swamp, a bog, etc., are veritable protective
tariffs.

There are people (few in number, it is true, but such there are) who
begin to understand that obstacles are not the less obstacles, because
they are artificially created, and that our well-being is more advanced
by freedom of trade than by protection; precisely as a canal is more
desirable than a sandy, hilly, and difficult road.

But they still say, this liberty ought to be reciprocal. If we take off
our taxes in favor of Spain, while Spain does not do the same towards
us, it is evident that we are duped. Let us then make _treaties of
commerce_ upon the basis of a just reciprocity; let us yield where we
are yielded to; let us make the _sacrifice_ of buying that we may
obtain the advantage of selling.

Persons who reason thus, are (I am sorry to say), whether they know it
or not, governed by the protectionist principle. They are only a little
more inconsistent than the pure protectionists, as these are more
inconsistent than the absolute prohibitionists.

I will illustrate this by a fable.

STULTA AND PUERA (FOOL-TOWN AND BOY-TOWN).

There were, it matters not where, two towns, _Stulta_ and _Puera_, which
at great expense had a road built which connected them with each other.
Some time after this was done, the inhabitants of _Stulta_ became
uneasy, and said: _Puera_ is overwhelming us with its productions; this
must be attended to. They established therefore a corps of
_Obstructors_, so called because their business was to place obstacles
in the way of the wagon trains which arrived from _Puera_. Soon after,
_Puera_ also established a corps of Obstructors.

After some centuries, people having become more enlightened, the
inhabitants of _Puera_ began to discover that these reciprocal obstacles
might possibly be reciprocal injuries. They sent therefore an ambassador
to _Stulta_, who (passing over the official phraseology) spoke much to
this effect: "We have built a road, and now we put obstacles in the way
of this road. This is absurd. It would have been far better to have left
things in their original position, for then we would not have been put
to the expense of building our road, and afterwards of creating
difficulties. In the name of _Puera_, I come to propose to you, not to
renounce at once our system of mutual obstacles, for this would be
acting according to a theory, and we despise theories as much as you do;
but to lighten somewhat these obstacles, weighing at the same time
carefully our respective _sacrifices_." The ambassador having thus
spoken, the town of _Stulta_ asked time to reflect; manufacturers,
agriculturists were consulted; and at last, after some years'
deliberation, it was declared that the negotiations were broken off.

At this news, the inhabitants of _Puera_ held a council. An old man (who
it has always been supposed had been secretly bribed by _Stulta_) rose
and said: "The obstacles raised by _Stulta_ are injurious to our sales;
this is a misfortune. Those which we ourselves create, injure our
purchases; this is a second misfortune. We have no power over the first,
but the second is entirely dependent upon ourselves. Let us then at
least get rid of one, since we cannot be delivered from both. Let us
suppress our corps of _Obstructors_, without waiting for _Stulta_ to do
the same. Some day or other she will learn to understand better her own
interests."

A second counselor, a man of practice and of facts, uncontrolled by
theories and wise in ancestral experience, replied: "We must not listen
to this dreamer, this theorist, this innovator, this utopian, this
political economist, this friend to _Stulta_. We would be entirely
ruined if the embarrassments of the road were not carefully weighed and
exactly equalized, between _Stulta_ and _Peura_. There would be more
difficulty in going than in coming; in exportation than in importation.
We would be, with regard to _Stulta_, in the inferior condition in which
Havre, Nantes, Bordeaux, Lisbon, London, Hamburg, and New Orleans, are,
in relation to cities placed higher up the rivers Seine, Loire, Garonne,
Tagus, Thames, the Elbe, and the Mississippi; for the difficulties of
ascending must always be greater than those of descending rivers. (A
voice exclaims: 'But the cities near the mouths of rivers have always
prospered more than those higher up the stream.') This is not possible.
(The same voice: 'But it is a fact.') Well, they have then prospered
_contrary to rule_." Such conclusive reasoning staggered the assembly.
The orator went on to convince them thoroughly and conclusively by
speaking of national independence, national honor, national dignity,
national labor, overwhelming importation, tributes, ruinous competition.
In short, he succeeded in determining the assembly to continue their
system of obstacles, and I can now point out a certain country where you
may see road-builders and _Obstructors_ working with the best possible
understanding, by the decree of the same legislative assembly, paid by
the same citizens; the first to improve the road, the last to embarrass
it.




XI.

ABSOLUTE PRICES.


If we wish to judge between freedom of trade and protection, to
calculate the probable effect of any political phenomenon, we should
notice how far its influence tends to the production of _abundance or
scarcity_, and not simply of _cheapness or dearness_ of price. We must
beware of trusting to _absolute prices_, it would lead to inextricable
confusion.

Mr. Mathieu de Dombasle, after having established the fact that
protection raises prices, adds:

"The augmentation of price increases the expenses of life, and
consequently the price of labor, and every one finds in the increase of
the price of his produce the same proportion as in the increase of his
expenses. Thus, if every body pays as consumer, every body receives also
as producer."

It is evident that it would be easy to reverse the argument and say: If
every body receives as producer, every body must pay as consumer.

Now, what does this prove? Nothing whatever, unless it be that
protection _transfers_ riches, uselessly and unjustly. Robbery does the
same.

Again, to prove that the complicated arrangements of this system give
even simple compensation, it is necessary to adhere to the
"_consequently_" of Mr. de Dombasle, and to convince one's self that the
price of labor rises with that of the articles protected. This is a
question of fact, which I refer to Mr. Moreau de Jonnès, begging him to
examine whether the rate of wages was found to increase with the stock
of the mines of Anzin. For my own part I do not believe in it, because I
think that the price of labor, like every thing else, is governed by the
proportion existing between the supply and the demand. Now I can
perfectly well understand that _restriction_ will diminish the supply of
coal, and consequently raise its price; but I do not as clearly see that
it increases the demand for labor, thereby raising the rate of wages.
This is the less conceivable to me, because the sum of labor required
depends upon the quantity of disposable capital; and protection, while
it may change the direction of capital, and transfer it from one
business to another, cannot increase it one penny.

This question, which is of the highest interest, we will examine
elsewhere. I return to the discussion of _absolute prices_, and declare
that there is no absurdity which cannot be rendered specious by such
reasoning as that of Mr. de Dombasle.

Imagine an isolated nation possessing a given quantity of cash, and
every year wantonly burning the half of its produce. I will undertake to
prove by the theory of Mr. de Dombasle that this nation will not be the
less rich in consequence of such a procedure.

For, the result of the conflagration must be, that every thing would
double in price. An inventory made before this event would offer exactly
the same nominal value, as one made after it. Who then would be the
loser? If John buys his cloth dearer, he also sells his corn at a higher
price; and if Peter makes a loss on the purchase of his corn, he gains
it back by the sale of his cloth. Thus "every one finds in the increase
of the price of his produce, the same proportion as in the increase of
his expenses; and thus if every body pays as consumer, every body also
receives as producer."

All this is nonsense. The simple truth is: that whether men destroy
their corn and cloth by fire or by use, the effect is the same _as
regards price_, but not _as regards riches_, for it is precisely in the
enjoyment of the use, that riches--in other words, comfort,
well-being--exist.

Protection may, in the same way, while it lessens the abundance of
things, raise their prices, so as to leave each individual as rich,
_numerically speaking_, as when unembarrassed by it. But because we put
down in an inventory three hectolitres of corn at 20 francs, or four
hectolitres at 15 francs, and sum up the nominal value of each at 60
francs, does it thence follow that they are equally capable of
contributing to the necessities of the community?

To this view of consumption, it will be my continual endeavor to lead
the protectionists; for in this is the end of all my efforts, the
solution of every problem. I must continually repeat to them that
restriction, by impeding commerce, by limiting the division of labor, by
forcing it to combat difficulties of situation and temperature, must in
its results diminish the quantity produced by any fixed quantum of
labor. And what can it benefit us that the smaller quantity produced
under the protective system bears the same _nominal value_ as the
greater quantity produced under the free trade system? Man does not live
on _nominal values_, but on real articles of produce; and the more
abundant these articles are, no matter what price they may bear, the
richer is he.




XII.

DOES PROTECTION RAISE THE RATE OF WAGES?


Workmen, your situation is singular! you are robbed, as I will presently
prove to you.... But no; I retract the word; we must avoid an
expression which is violent; perhaps indeed incorrect; inasmuch as this
spoliation, wrapped in the sophisms which disguise it, is practiced, we
must believe, without the intention of the spoiler, and with the consent
of the spoiled. But it is nevertheless true that you are deprived of the
just compensation of your labor, while no one thinks of causing
_justice_ to be rendered to you. If you could be consoled by noisy
appeals to philanthropy, to powerless charity, to degrading alms-giving,
or if high-sounding words would relieve you, these indeed you can have
in abundance. But _justice_, simple _justice_--nobody thinks of
rendering you this. For would it not be _just_ that after a long day's
labor, when you have received your little wages, you should be permitted
to exchange them for the largest possible sum of comforts that you can
obtain voluntarily from any man whatsoever upon the face of the earth?

Let us examine if _injustice_ is not done to you, by the legislative
limitation of the persons from whom you are allowed to buy those things
which you need; as bread, meat, cotton and woolen cloths, etc.; thus
fixing (so to express myself) the artificial price which these articles
must bear.

Is it true that protection, which avowedly raises prices, and thus
injures you, raises proportionably the rate of wages?

On what does the rate of wages depend?

One of your own class has energetically said: "When two workmen run
after a master, wages fall; when two masters run after a workman, wages
rise."

Allow me, in more laconic phrase, to employ a more scientific, though
perhaps a less striking expression: "The rate of wages depends upon the
proportion which the supply of labor bears to the demand."

On what depends the _demand_ for labor?

On the quantity of disposable national capital. And the law which says,
"such or such an article shall be limited to home production and no
longer imported from foreign countries," can it in any degree increase
this capital? Not in the least. This law may withdraw it from one
course, and transfer it to another; but cannot increase it one penny.
Then it cannot increase the demand for labor.

While we point with pride to some prosperous manufacture, can we answer,
from whence comes the capital with which it is founded and maintained?
Has it fallen from the moon? or rather is it not drawn either from
agriculture, or navigation, or other industry? We here see why, since
the reign of protective tariffs, if we see more workmen in our mines and
our manufacturing towns, we find also fewer sailors in our ports, and
fewer laborers and vine-growers in our fields and upon our hillsides.

I could speak at great length upon this subject, but prefer illustrating
my thought by an example.

A countryman had twenty acres of land, with a capital of 10,000 francs.
He divided his land into four parts, and adopted for it the following
changes of crops: 1st, maize; 2d, wheat; 3d, clover; and 4th, rye. As he
needed for himself and family but a small portion of the grain, meat,
and dairy-produce of the farm, he sold the surplus and bought oil, flax,
wine, etc. The whole of his capital was yearly distributed in wages and
payments of accounts to the workmen of the neighborhood. This capital
was, from his sales, again returned to him, and even increased from year
to year. Our countryman, being fully convinced that idle capital
produces nothing, caused to circulate among the working classes this
annual increase, which he devoted to the inclosing and clearing of
lands, or to improvements in his farming utensils and his buildings. He
deposited some sums in reserve in the hands of a neighboring banker, who
on his part did not leave these idle in his strong box, but lent them to
various tradesmen, so that the whole came to be usefully employed in the
payment of wages.

The countryman died, and his son, become master of the inheritance, said
to himself: "It must be confessed that my father has, all his life,
allowed himself to be duped. He bought oil, and thus paid _tribute_ to
Province, while our own land could, by an effort, be made to produce
olives. He bought wine, flax, and oranges, thus paying _tribute_ to
Brittany, Medoc, and the Hiera islands very unnecessarily, for wine,
flax and oranges may be forced to grow upon our own lands. He paid
tribute to the miller and the weaver; our own servants could very well
weave our linen, and crush our wheat between two stones. He did all he
could to ruin himself, and gave to strangers what ought to have been
kept for the benefit of his own household."

Full of this reasoning, our headstrong fellow determined to change the
routine of his crops. He divided his farm into twenty parts. On one he
cultivated the olive; on another the mulberry; on a third flax; he
devoted the fourth to vines, the fifth to wheat, etc., etc. Thus he
succeeded in rendering himself _independent_, and furnished all his
family supplies from his own farm. He no longer received any thing from
the general circulation; neither, it is true, did he cast any thing into
it. Was he the richer for this course? No, for his land did not suit the
cultivation of the vine; nor was the climate favorable to the olive. In
short, the family supply of all these articles was very inferior to what
it had been during the time when the father had obtained them all by
exchange of produce.

With regard to the demand for labor, it certainly was no greater than
formerly. There were, to be sure, five times as many fields to
cultivate, but they were five times smaller. If oil was raised, there
was less wheat; and because there was no more flax bought, neither was
there any more rye sold. Besides, the farmer could not spend in wages
more than his capital, and his capital, instead of increasing, was now
constantly diminishing. A great part of it was necessarily devoted to
numerous buildings and utensils, indispensable to a person who
determines to undertake every thing. In short, the supply of labor
continued the same, but the means of paying becoming less, there was,
necessarily, a reduction of wages.

The result is precisely similar, when a nation isolates itself by the
prohibitive system. Its number of industrial pursuits is certainly
multiplied, but their importance is diminished. In proportion to their
number, they become less productive, for the same capital and the same
skill are obliged to meet a greater number of difficulties. The fixed
capital absorbs a greater part of the circulating capital; that is to
say, a greater part of the funds destined to the payment of wages. What
remains, ramifies itself in vain, the quantity cannot be augmented. It
is like the water of a pond, which, distributed in a multitude of
reservoirs, appears to be more abundant, because it covers a greater
quantity of soil, and presents a larger surface to the sun, while we
hardly perceive that, precisely on this account, it absorbs, evaporates,
and loses itself the quicker.

Capital and labor being given, the result is, a sum of production,
always the less great, in proportion as obstacles are numerous. There
can be no doubt that protective tariffs, by forcing capital and labor to
struggle against greater difficulties of soil and climate, must cause
the general production to be less, or, in other words, diminish the
portion of comforts which would thence result to mankind. If, then,
there be a general diminution of comforts, how, workmen, can it be
possible that _your_ portion should be increased? Under such a
supposition, it would be necessary to believe that the rich, those who
made the law, have so arranged matters, that not only they subject
themselves to their own proportion of the general loss, but taking the
whole of it upon themselves, that they submit also to a further loss, in
order to increase your gains. Is this credible? Is this possible? It is,
indeed, a most suspicious act of generosity, and if you act wisely, you
will reject it.




XIII.

THEORY--PRACTICE.


Partisans of free trade, we are accused of being theorists, and not
relying sufficiently upon practice.

What a powerful argument against Mr. Say (says Mr. Ferrier,) is the long
succession of distinguished ministers, the imposing league of writers
who have all differed from him; and Mr. Say is himself conscious of
this, for he says: "It has been said, in support of old errors, that
there must necessarily be some foundation for ideas so generally adopted
by all nations. Ought we not, it is asked, to distrust observations and
reasoning which run counter to every thing which has been looked upon as
certain up to this day, and which has been regarded as undoubted by so
many who were to be confided in, alike on account of their learning and
of their philanthropic intentions? This argument is, I confess,
calculated to make a profound impression, and might cast a doubt upon
the most incontestable facts, if the world had not seen so many
opinions, now universally recognized as false, as universally maintain,
during a long series of ages, their dominion over the human mind. The
day is not long passed since all nations, from the most ignorant to the
most enlightened, and all men, the wisest as well as the most
uninformed, admitted only four elements. Nobody dreamed of disputing
this doctrine, which is, nevertheless, false, and to-day universally
decried."

Upon this passage Mr. Ferrier makes the following remarks:

"Mr. Say is strangely mistaken, if he believes that he has thus answered
the very strong objections which he has himself advanced. It is natural
enough that, for ages, men otherwise well informed, might mistake upon a
question of natural history; this proves nothing. Water, air, earth, and
fire, elements or not, were not the less useful to man.... Such errors
as this are of no importance. They do not lead to revolutions, nor do
they cause mental uneasiness; above all, they clash with no interests,
and might, therefore, without inconvenience, last for millions of years.
The physical world progresses as though they did not exist. But can it
be thus with errors which affect the moral world? Can it be conceived
that a system of government absolutely false, consequently injurious,
could be followed for many centuries, and among many nations, with the
general consent of well-informed men? Can it be explained how such a
system could be connected with the constantly increasing prosperity of
these nations? Mr. Say confesses that the argument which he combats is
calculated to make a profound impression. Most certainly it is; and
this impression remains; for Mr. Say has rather increased than
diminished it."

Let us hear Mr. de Saint Chamans.

"It has been only towards the middle of the last, the eighteenth
century, when every subject and every principle have without exception
been given up to the discussion of book-makers, that these furnishers of
_speculative_ ideas, applied to every thing and applicable to nothing,
have begun to write upon the subject of political economy. There existed
previously a system of political economy, not written, but _practiced_
by governments. Colbert was, it is said, the inventor of it; and Colbert
gave the law to every state of Europe. Strange to say, he does so still,
in spite of contempt and anathemas, in spite too of the discoveries of
the modern school. This system, which has been called by our writers the
_mercantile system_, consisted in ... checking by prohibition or import
duties such foreign productions as were calculated to ruin our
manufactures by competition.... This system has been declared, by all
writers on political economy, of every school,[12] to be weak, absurd,
and calculated to impoverish the countries where it prevails. Banished
from books, it has taken refuge in _the practice_ of all nations,
greatly to the surprise of those who cannot conceive that in what
concerns the wealth of nations, governments should, rather than be
guided by the wisdom of authors, prefer the _long experience_ of a
system, etc.... It is above all inconceivable to them that the French
government ... should obstinately resist the new lights of political
economy, and maintain in its _practice_ the old errors, pointed out by
all our writers.... But I am devoting too much time to this mercantile
system, which, unsustained by writers, _has only facts_ in its favor!"

[Footnote 12: Might we not say: It is a powerful argument against
Messrs. Ferrier and de Saint Chamans, that all writers on political
economy, of _every school_, that is to say, all men who have studied the
question, come to this conclusion: After all, freedom is better than
restriction, and the laws of God wiser than those of Mr. Colbert.]

Would it not be supposed from this language that political economists,
in claiming for each individual the _free disposition of his own
property_, have, like the Fourierists, stumbled upon some new, strange,
and chimerical system of social government, some wild theory, without
precedent in the annals of human nature? It does appear to me, that, if
in all this there is any thing doubtful, and of fanciful or theoretic
origin, it is not free trade, but protection; not the operating of
exchanges, but the custom-house, the duties, imposed to overturn
artificially the natural order of things.

The question, however, is not here to compare and judge of the merits of
the two systems, but simply to know which of the two is sanctioned by
experience.

You, Messrs. monopolists, maintain that _facts_ are for you, and that we
on our side have only _theory_.

You even flatter yourselves that this long series of public acts, this
old experience of Europe which you invoke, appeared imposing to Mr. Say;
and I confess that he has not refuted you, with his habitual sagacity.

I, for my part, cannot consent to give up to you the domain of _facts_;
for while on your side you can advance only limited and special facts,
_we_ can oppose to them universal facts, the free and voluntary acts of
all men.

What do _we_ maintain? and what do _you_ maintain?

We maintain that "it is best to buy from others what we ourselves can
produce only at a higher price."

You maintain that "it is best to make for ourselves, even though it
should cost us more than to buy from others."

Now gentlemen, putting aside theory, demonstration, reasoning, (things
which seem to nauseate you,) which of these assertions is sanctioned by
_universal practice_?

Visit our fields, workshops, forges, stores; look above, below, and
around you; examine what is passing in your own household; observe your
own actions at every moment, and say which principle it is, that directs
these laborers, workmen, contractors, and merchants; say what is your
own personal _practice_.

Does the agriculturist make his own clothes? Does the tailor produce the
grain which he consumes? Does not your housekeeper cease to make her
bread at home, as soon as she finds it more economical to buy it from
the baker? Do you lay down your pen to take up the blacking-brush in
order to avoid paying tribute to the shoe-black? Does not the whole
economy of society depend upon a separation of occupations, a division
of labor, in a word, upon mutual exchange of production, by which we,
one and all, make a calculation which causes us to discontinue direct
production, when indirect acquisition offers us a saving of time and
labor.

You are not then sustained by _practice_, since it would be impossible,
were you to search the world, to show us a single man who acts according
to your principle.

You may answer that you never intended to make your principle the rule
of individual relations. You confess that it would thus destroy all
social ties, and force men to the isolated life of snails. You only
contend that it governs _in fact_, the relations which are established
between the agglomerations of the human family.

We say that this assertion too is erroneous. A family, a town, county,
department, province, all are so many agglomerations, which, without any
exception, all _practically_ reject your principle; never, indeed, even
think of it. Each of these procures by barter, what would be more
expensively procured by production. Nations would do the same, did you
not _by force_ prevent them.

We, then, are the men who are guided by practice and experience. For to
combat the interdict which you have specially put upon some
international exchanges, we bring forward the practice and experience of
all individuals, and of all agglomerations of individuals, whose acts
being voluntary, render them proper to be given as proof in the
question. But you, on your part, begin by _forcing_, by _hindering_, and
then, adducing forced or forbidden acts, you exclaim: "Look; we can
prove ourselves justified by example!"

You exclaim against our _theory_, and even against _all theory_. But are
you certain, in laying down your principles, so antagonistic to ours,
that you too are not building up theories? Truly, you too have your
theory; but between yours and ours there is this difference:

Our theory is formed upon the observation of universal _facts_,
universal sentiments, universal calculations and acts. We do nothing
more than classify and arrange these, in order to better understand
them. It is so little opposed to practice, that it is in fact only
_practice explained_. We look upon the actions of men as prompted by the
instinct of self-preservation and of progress. What they do freely,
willingly,--this is what we call _Political Economy_, or economy of
society. We must repeat constantly that each man is _practically_ an
excellent political economist, producing or exchanging, as his advantage
dictates. Each by experience raises himself to the science; or rather
the science is nothing more than experience, scrupulously observed and
methodically expounded.

But _your_ theory is _theory_ in the worst sense of the word. You
imagine procedures which are sanctioned by the experience of no living
man, and then call to your aid constraint and prohibition. You cannot
avoid having recourse to force; because, wishing to make men produce
what they can _more advantageously_ buy, you require them to give up an
advantage, and to be led by a doctrine which implies contradiction even
in its terms.

I defy you too, to take this doctrine, which by your own avowal would be
absurd in individual relations, and apply it, even in speculation, to
transactions between families, towns, departments, or provinces. You
yourselves confess that it is only applicable to internal relations.

Thus it is that you are daily forced to repeat:

"Principles can never be universal. What is _well_ in an individual, a
family, commune, or province, is _ill_ in a nation. What is good in
detail--for instance: purchase rather than production, where purchase is
more advantageous--is _bad_ in a society. The political economy of
individuals is not that of nations;" and other such stuff, _ejusdem
farinæ_.

And all this for what? To prove to us, that we consumers, we are your
property! that we belong to you, soul and body! that you have an
exclusive right on our stomachs and our limbs! that it is your right to
feed and dress us at your own price, however great your ignorance, your
rapacity, or the inferiority of your work.

Truly, then, your system is one not founded upon practice; it is one of
abstraction--of extortion.




XIV.

CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES.


There is one thing which embarrasses me not a little; and it is this:

Sincere men, taking upon the subject of political economy the point of
view of producers, have arrived at this double formula:

"A government should dispose of consumers subject to its laws in favor
of home industry."

"It should subject to its laws foreign consumers, in order to dispose of
them in favor of home industry."

The first of the formulas is that of _Protection_; the second that of
_Outlets_.

Both rest upon this proposition, called the _Balance of Trade_, that

"A people is impoverished by importations and enriched by exportations."

For if every foreign purchase is a _tribute paid_, a loss, nothing can
be more natural than to restrain, even to prohibit importations.

And if every foreign sale is a _tribute received_, a gain, nothing more
natural than to create _outlets_, even by force.

_Protective System; Colonial System._--These are only two aspects of the
same theory. To _prevent_ our citizens from buying from foreigners, and
to _force_ foreigners to buy from our citizens. Two consequences of one
identical principle.

It is impossible not to perceive that according to this doctrine, if it
be true, the welfare of a country depends upon _monopoly_ or domestic
spoliation, and upon _conquest_ or foreign spoliation.

Let us take a glance into one of these huts, perched upon the side of
our Pyrenean range.

The father of a family has received the little wages of his labor; but
his half-naked children are shivering before a biting northern blast,
beside a fireless hearth, and an empty table. There is wool, and wood,
and corn, on the other side of the mountain, but these are forbidden to
them; for the other side of the mountain is not France. Foreign wood
must not warm the hearth of the poor shepherd; his children must not
taste the bread of Biscay, nor cover their numbed limbs with the wool of
Navarre. It is thus that the general good requires!

The disposing by law of consumers, forcing them to the support of home
industry, is an encroachment upon their liberty, the forbidding of an
action (mutual exchange) which is in no way opposed to morality! In a
word, it is an act of _injustice_.

But this, it is said, is necessary, or else home labor will be arrested,
and a severe blow will be given to public prosperity.

Thus then we must come to the melancholy conclusion, that there is a
radical incompatibility between the Just and the Useful.

Again, if each people is interested in _selling_, and not in _buying_, a
violent action and reaction must form the natural state of their mutual
relations; for each will seek to force its productions upon all, and all
will seek to repulse the productions of each.

A sale in fact implies a purchase, and since, according to this
doctrine, to sell is beneficial, and to buy injurious, every
international transaction must imply the benefiting of one people by the
injuring of another.

But men are invincibly inclined to what they feel to be advantageous to
themselves, while they also, instinctively resist that which is
injurious. From hence then we must infer that each nation bears within
itself a natural force of expansion, and a not less natural force of
resistance, which are equally injurious to all others. In other words,
antagonism and war are the _natural_ state of human society.

Thus then the theory in discussion resolves itself into the two
following axioms. In the affairs of a nation,

Utility is incompatible with the internal administration of justice.

Utility is incompatible with the maintenance of external peace.

Well, what embarrasses and confounds me is, to explain how any writer
upon public rights, any statesman who has sincerely adopted a doctrine
of which the leading principle is so antagonistic to other incontestable
principles, can enjoy one moment's repose or peace of mind.

For myself, if such were my entrance upon the threshold of science, if I
did not clearly perceive that Liberty, Utility, Justice, and Peace, are
not only compatible, but closely connected, even identical, I would
endeavor to forget all I have learned; I would say:

"Can it be possible that God can allow men to attain prosperity only
through injustice and war? Can he so direct the affairs of mortals, that
they can only renounce war and injustice by, at the same time,
renouncing their own welfare?

"Am I not deceived by the false lights of a science which can lead me to
the horrible blasphemy implied in this alternative, and shall I dare to
take it upon myself to propose this as a basis for the legislation of a
great people? When I find a long succession of illustrious and learned
men, whose researches in the same science have led to more consoling
results; who, after having devoted their lives to its study, affirm that
through it they see Liberty and Utility indissolubly linked with Justice
and Peace, and find these great principles destined to continue on
through eternity in infinite parallels, have they not in their favor the
presumption which results from all that we know of the goodness and
wisdom of God as manifested in the sublime harmony of material creation?
Can I lightly believe, in opposition to such a presumption and such
imposing authorities, that this same God has been pleased to put
disagreement and antagonism in the laws of the moral world? No; before I
can believe that all social principles oppose, shock and neutralize each
other; before I can think them in constant, anarchical and eternal
conflict; above all, before I can seek to impose upon my fellow-citizens
the impious system to which my reasonings have led me, I must retrace my
steps, hoping, perchance, to find some point where I have wandered from
my road."

And if, after a sincere investigation twenty times repeated, I should
still arrive at the frightful conclusion that I am driven to choose
between the Desirable and the Good, I would reject the science, plunge
into a voluntary ignorance, above all, avoid participation in the
affairs of my country, and leave to others the weight and responsibility
of so fearful a choice.




XV.

RECIPROCITY AGAIN.


Mr. de Saint Cricq has asked: "Are we sure that our foreign customers
will buy from us as much as they sell us?"

Mr. de Dombasle says: "What reason have we for believing that English
producers will come to seek their supplies from us, rather than from any
other nation, or that they will take from us a value equivalent to their
exportations into France?"

I cannot but wonder to see men who boast, above all things, of being
_practical_, thus reasoning wide of all practice!

In practice, there is perhaps no traffic which is a direct exchange of
produce for produce. Since the use of money, no man says, I will seek
shoes, hats, advice, lessons, only from the shoemaker, the hatter, the
lawyer, or teacher, who will buy from me the exact equivalent of these
in corn. Why should nations impose upon themselves so troublesome a
restraint?

Suppose a nation without any exterior relations. One of its citizens
makes a crop of corn. He casts it into the _national_ circulation, and
receives in exchange--what? Money, bank bills, securities, divisible to
any extent, by means of which it will be lawful for him to withdraw when
he pleases, and, unless prevented by just competition from the national
circulation, such articles as he may wish. At the end of the operation,
he will have withdrawn from the mass the exact equivalent of what he
first cast into it, and in value, _his consumption will exactly equal
his production_.

If the exchanges of this nation with foreign nations are free, it is no
longer into the _national_ circulation but into the _general_
circulation that each individual casts his produce, and from thence his
consumption is drawn. He is not obliged to calculate whether what he
casts into this general circulation is purchased by a countryman or by a
foreigner; whether the notes he receives are given to him by a Frenchman
or an Englishman, or whether the articles which he procures through
means of this money are manufactured on this or the other side of the
Rhine or the Pyrenees. One thing is certain; that each individual finds
an exact balance between what he casts in and what he withdraws from the
great common reservoir; and if this be true of each individual, it is
not less true of the entire nation.

The only difference between these two cases is, that in the last, each
individual has open to him a larger market both for his sales and his
purchases, and has, consequently, a more favorable opportunity of making
both to advantage.

The objection advanced against us here, is, that if all were to combine
in not withdrawing from circulation the produce from any one individual,
he, in his turn, could withdraw nothing from the mass. The same, too,
would be the case with regard to a nation.

Our answer is: If a nation can no longer withdraw any thing from the
mass of circulation, neither will it any longer cast any thing into it.
It will work for itself. It will be obliged to submit to what, in
advance, you wish to force upon it, viz., _Isolation_. And here you have
the ideal of the prohibitive system.

Truly, then, is it not ridiculous enough that you should inflict upon it
now, and unnecessarily, this system, merely through fear that some day
or other it might chance to be subjected to it without your assistance?




XVI.

OBSTRUCTED RIVERS PLEADING FOR THE PROHIBITIONISTS.


Some years since, being at Madrid, I went to the meeting of the Cortes.
The subject in discussion was a proposed treaty with Portugal, for
improving the channel of the Douro. A member rose and said: If the Douro
is made navigable, transportation must become cheaper, and Portuguese
grain will come into formidable competition with our _national labor_. I
vote against the project, unless ministers will agree to increase our
tariff so as to re-establish the equilibrium.

Three months after, I was in Lisbon, and the same question came before
the Senate. A noble Hidalgo said: Mr. President, the project is absurd.
You guard at great expense the banks of the Douro, to prevent the influx
into Portugal of Spanish grain, and at the same time you now propose, at
great expense, _to facilitate such an event_. There is in this a want of
consistency in which I can have no part. Let the Douro descend to our
Sons as we have received it from our Fathers.




XVII.

A NEGATIVE RAILROAD.


I have already remarked that when the observer has unfortunately taken
his point of view from the position of producer, he cannot fail in his
conclusions to clash with the general interest, because the producer, as
such, must desire the existence of efforts, wants, and obstacles.

I find a singular exemplification of this remark in a journal of
Bordeaux.

Mr. Simiot puts this question:

Ought the railroad from Paris into Spain to present a break or terminus
at Bordeaux?

This question he answers affirmatively. I will only consider one among
the numerous reasons which he adduces in support of his opinion.

The railroad from Paris to Bayonne ought (he says) to present a break or
terminus at Bordeaux, in order that goods and travelers stopping in this
city should thus be forced to contribute to the profits of the boatmen,
porters, commission merchants, hotel-keepers, etc.

It is very evident that we have here again the interest of the agents of
labor put before that of the consumer.

But if Bordeaux would profit by a break in the road, and if such profit
be conformable to the public interest, then Angoulème, Poictiers, Tours,
Orleans, and still more all the intermediate points, as Ruffec,
Châtellerault, etc., etc., would also petition for breaks; and this too
would be for the general good and for the interest of national labor.
For it is certain, that in proportion to the number of these breaks or
termini, will be the increase in consignments, commissions, lading,
unlading, etc. This system furnishes us the idea of a railroad made up
of successive breaks; _a negative railroad_.

Whether or not the Protectionists will allow it, most certain it is,
that the _restrictive principle_ is identical with that which would
maintain _this system of breaks_: it is the sacrifice of the consumer to
the producer, of the end to the means.




XVIII.

"THERE ARE NO ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLES."


The facility with which men resign themselves to ignorance in cases
where knowledge is all-important to them, is often astonishing; and we
may be sure that a man has determined to rest in his ignorance, when he
once brings himself to proclaim as a maxim that there are no absolute
principles.

We enter into the legislative halls, and find that the question is, to
determine whether the law will or will not allow of international
exchanges.

A deputy rises and says, If we tolerate these exchanges, foreign nations
will overwhelm us with their produce. We will have cotton goods from
England, coal from Belgium, woolens from Spain, silks from Italy, cattle
from Switzerland, iron from Sweden, corn from Prussia, so that no
industrial pursuit will any longer be possible to us.

Another answers: Prohibit these exchanges, and the divers advantages
with which nature has endowed these different countries, will be for us
as though they did not exist. We will have no share in the benefits
resulting from English skill, or Belgian mines, from the fertility of
the Polish soil, or the Swiss pastures; neither will we profit by the
cheapness of Spanish labor, or the heat of the Italian climate. We will
be obliged to seek by a forced and laborious production, what, by means
of exchanges, would be much more easily obtained.

Assuredly one or other of these deputies is mistaken. But which? It is
worth the trouble of examining. There lie before us two roads, one of
which leads inevitably to _wretchedness_. We must choose.

To throw off the feeling of responsibility, the answer is easy: There
are no absolute principles.

This maxim, at present so fashionable, not only pleases idleness, but
also suits ambition.

If either the theory of prohibition, or that of free trade, should
finally triumph, one little law would form our whole economical code. In
the first case this would be: _foreign trade is forbidden_; in the
second: _foreign trade is free_; and thus, many great personages would
lose their importance.

But if trade has no distinctive character, if it is capriciously useful
or injurious, and is governed by no natural law, if it finds no spur in
its usefulness, no check in its inutility, if its effects cannot be
appreciated by those who exercise it; in a word, if it has no absolute
principles,--oh! then it is necessary to deliberate, weigh, and regulate
transactions, the conditions of labor must be equalized, the level of
profits sought. This is an important charge, well calculated to give to
those who execute it, large salaries, and extensive influence.

Contemplating this great city of Paris, I have thought to myself: Here
are a million of human beings who would die in a few days, if provisions
of every kind did not flow in towards this vast metropolis. The
imagination is unable to calculate the multiplicity of objects which
to-morrow must enter its gates, to prevent the life of its inhabitants
from terminating in famine, riot, or pillage. And yet at this moment all
are asleep, without feeling one moment's uneasiness, from the
contemplation of this frightful possibility. On the other side, we see
eighty departments who have this day labored, without concert, without
mutual understanding, for the victualing of Paris. How can each day
bring just what is necessary, nothing less, nothing more, to this
gigantic market? What is the ingenious and secret power which presides
over the astonishing regularity of such complicated movements, a
regularity in which we all have so implicit, though thoughtless, a
faith; on which our comfort, our very existence depends? This power is
an _absolute principle_, the principle of freedom in exchanges. We have
faith in that inner light which Providence has placed in the heart of
all men; confiding to it the preservation and amelioration of our
species; _interest_, since we must give its name, so vigilant, so
active, having so much forecast when allowed its free action. What would
be your condition, inhabitants of Paris, if a minister, however superior
his abilities, should undertake to substitute, in the place of this
power, the combinations of his own genius? If he should think of
subjecting to his own supreme direction this prodigious mechanism,
taking all its springs into his own hand, and deciding by whom, how, and
on what conditions each article should be produced, transported,
exchanged and consumed? Ah! although there is much suffering within your
walls; although misery, despair, and perhaps starvation, may call forth
more tears than your warmest charity can wipe away, it is probable, it
is certain, that the arbitrary intervention of government would
infinitely multiply these sufferings, and would extend among you the
evils which now reach but a small number of your citizens.

If then we have such faith in this principle as applied to our private
concerns, why should we not extend it to international transactions,
which are assuredly less numerous, less delicate, and less complicated?
And if it be not necessary for the prefect of Paris to regulate our
industrial pursuits, to weigh our profits and our losses, to occupy
himself with the quantity of our cash, and to equalize the conditions of
our labor in internal commerce, on what principle can it be necessary
that the custom-house, going beyond its fiscal mission, should pretend
to exercise a protective power over our external commerce?




XIX.

NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.


Among the arguments advanced in favor of a restrictive system, we must
not forget that which is drawn from the plea of _national independence_.

"What will we do," it is asked, "in case of war, if we are at the mercy
of England for our iron and coal?"

The English monopolists, on their side, do not fail to exclaim: "What
will become of Great Britain in case of war if she depends upon France
for provisions?"

One thing appears to be quite lost sight of, and this is, that the
dependence which results from commercial transactions, is a _reciprocal_
dependence. We can only be dependent upon foreign supplies, in so far as
foreign nations are dependent upon us. This is the essence of _society_.
The breaking off of natural relations places a nation, not in an
independent position, but in a state of isolation.

And remark that the reason given for this isolation, is that it is a
necessary provision for war, while the act is itself a commencement of
war. It renders war easier, less burdensome, and consequently less
unpopular. If nations were to one another permanent outlets for mutual
produce; if their respective relations were such that they could not be
broken without inflicting the double suffering of privation and of
over-supply, there could then no longer be any need of these powerful
fleets which ruin, and these great armies which crush them; the peace of
the world could no more be compromised by the whim of a Thiers or a
Palmerston, and wars would cease, from want of resources, motives,
pretexts, and popular sympathy.

I know that I shall be reproached (for it is the fashion of the day) for
placing interest, vile and prosaic interest, at the foundation of the
fraternity of nations. It would be preferred that this should be based
upon charity, upon love; that there should be in it some self-denial,
and that clashing a little with the material welfare of men, it should
bear the merit of a generous sacrifice.

When will we have done with such puerile declamations? We contemn, we
revile _interest_, that is to say, the good and the useful, (for if all
men are interested in an object, how can this object be other than good
in itself?) as though this interest were not the necessary, eternal, and
indestructible mover, to the guidance of which Providence has confided
human perfectibility! One would suppose that the utterers of such
sentiments must be models of disinterestedness; but does the public not
begin to perceive with disgust, that this affected language is the stain
of those pages for which it oftenest pays the highest price?

What! because comfort and peace are correlative, because it has pleased
God to establish so beautiful a harmony in the moral world, you would
blame me when I admire and adore his decrees, and for accepting with
gratitude his laws, which make justice a requisite for happiness! You
will consent to have peace only when it clashes with your welfare, and
liberty is irksome if it imposes no sacrifices! What then prevents you,
if self-denial has so many charms, from exercising it as much as you
desire in your private actions? Society will be benefited by your so
doing, for some one must profit by your sacrifices. But it is the height
of absurdity to wish to impose such a principle upon mankind generally;
for the self-denial of all, is the sacrifice of all. This is evil
systematized into theory.

But, thanks be to Heaven! these declamations may be written and read,
and the world continues nevertheless to obey its great mover, its great
cause of action, which, spite of all denials, is _interest_.

It is singular enough, too, to hear sentiments of such sublime
self-abnegation quoted in support even of Spoliation; and yet to this
tends all this pompous show of disinterestedness! These men so
sensitively delicate, that they are determined not to enjoy even peace,
if it must be propped by the vile _interest_ of men, do not hesitate to
pick the pockets of other men, and above all of poor men. For what
tariff protects the poor? Gentlemen, we pray you, dispose as you please
of what belongs to yourselves, but let us entreat you to allow us to
use, or to exchange, according to our own fancy, the fruit of our own
labor, the sweat of our own brows. Declaim as you will about
self-sacrifice; that is all pretty enough; but we beg of you, do not at
the same time forget to be honest.




XX.

HUMAN LABOR--NATIONAL LABOR.


Destruction of machinery--prohibition of foreign goods. These are two
acts proceeding from the same doctrine.

We do meet with men who, while they rejoice over the revelation of any
great invention, favor nevertheless the protective policy; but such men
are very inconsistent.

What is the objection they adduce against free trade? That it causes us
to seek from foreign and more easy production, what would otherwise be
the result of home production. In a word, that it injures domestic
industry.

On the same principle, can it not be objected to machinery, that it
accomplishes through natural agents what would otherwise be the result
of manual labor, and that it is thus injurious to human labor?

The foreign laborer, enjoying greater facilities of production than the
French laborer, is, with regard to the latter, a veritable _economical
machine_, which crushes him by competition. Thus, a piece of machinery
capable of executing any work at a less price than could be done by any
given number of hands, is, as regards these hands, in the position of a
_foreign competitor_, who paralyzes them by his rivalry.

If then it be judicious to protect _home labor_ against the competition
of _foreign labor_, it cannot be less so to protect _human labor_
against _mechanical labor_.

Whoever adheres to the protective system, ought not, if his brain be
possessed of any logical powers, to stop at the prohibition of foreign
produce, but should extend this prohibition to the produce of the loom
and of the plough.

I approve therefore of the logic of those who, whilst they cry out
against the _inundation_ of foreign merchandise, have the courage to
declaim equally against the _excessive production_ resulting from the
inventive power of mind.

Of this number is Mr. de Saint Chamans. "One of the strongest arguments,
(says he) which can be adduced against free trade, and the too extensive
employment of machines, is, that many workmen are deprived of work,
either by foreign competition, which depresses manufactures, or by
machinery, which takes the place of men in workshops."

Mr. de St. Chamans saw clearly the analogy, or rather the identity which
exists between _importation_ and _machinery_, and was, therefore, in
favor of proscribing both. There is some pleasure in having to do with
intrepid arguers, who, even in error, thus carry through a chain of
reasoning.

But let us look at the difficulty into which they are here led.

If it be true, _à priori_, that the domain of _invention_, and that of
_labor_, can be extended only to the injury of one another, it would
follow that the fewest _workmen_ would be employed in countries
(Lancashire, for instance) where there is the most _machinery_. And if
it be, on the contrary, proved, that machinery and manual labor coexist
to a greater extent among rich nations than among savages, it must
necessarily follow, that these two powers do not interfere with one
another.

I cannot understand how a thinking being can rest satisfied with the
following dilemma:

Either the inventions of man do not injure labor; and this, from general
facts, would appear to be the case, for there exists more of both among
the English and the French, than among the Sioux and the Cherokees. If
such be the fact, I have gone upon a wrong track, although unconscious
at what point. I have wandered from my road, and I would commit high
treason against humanity, were I to introduce such an error into the
legislation of my country.

Or else the results of the inventions of mind limit manual labor, as
would appear to be proved from limited facts; for every day we see some
machine rendering unnecessary the labor of twenty, or perhaps a hundred
workmen. If this be the case, I am forced to acknowledge, as a fact,
the existence of a flagrant, eternal, and incurable antagonism between
the intellectual and the physical power of man; between his improvement
and his welfare. I cannot avoid feeling that the Creator should have
bestowed upon man either reason or bodily strength; moral force, or
brutal force; and that it has been a bitter mockery to co

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