Summa Theologica, Part III (Tertia Pars)
by Saint Aquinas Thomas · English · Gutenberg #19950 · 2,705,986 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: Summa Theologica, Part III (Tertia Pars)
Author: Saint Aquinas Thomas
Release date: November 28, 2006 [eBook #19950]
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/19950
Credits: Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and supplementation by David McClamrock
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART III (TERTIA PARS) ***
Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and
supplementation by David McClamrock
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
THIRD PART
["III," "Tertia Pars"]
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province
BENZIGER BROTHERS
NEW YORK
________________________
DEDICATION
To the Blessed Virgin
Mary Immaculate
Seat of Wisdom
________________________
NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION
The text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra
K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian
Classics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>. I have eliminated
unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in
transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,
Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they
appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.
Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article
number in brackets, like this:
> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]
> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?
In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger
Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text
of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in
brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first
sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it
impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference
to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari"
(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not]
impossible that anything should be created by God...."
This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers
edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the
original page numbers and headers):
* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article"
does not appear directly below the title of each article.
* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,
_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are
ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this
edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they
were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers
edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear
in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in
parentheses.
* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated
by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10."
Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in
citations to books other than the Bible.
* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers
edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the
footnote mark appeared.
* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.
* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.
* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and
at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line
for each topic.
* Titles of questions are in all caps.
Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to
the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a
defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).
_______________________
CONTENTS
THIRD PART (QQ. 1-90)
Question
1. Of the Fitness of the Incarnation
2. Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate
3. Of the Mode of Union on the Part of the Person Assuming
4. Of the Mode of Union on the Part of the Human Nature
5. Of the Parts of Human Nature Which Were Assumed
6. Of the Order of Assumption
7. Of the Grace of Christ as an Individual Man
8. Of the Grace of Christ as He Is the Head of the Church
9. Of Christ's Knowledge in General
10. Of the Beatific Knowledge of Christ's Soul
11. Of the Knowledge Imprinted or Infused on the Soul of Christ
12. Of the Acquired or Empiric Knowledge of Christ's Soul
13. Of the Power of Christ's Soul
14. Of the Defects of Body Assumed by the Son of God
15. Of the Defects of Soul Assumed by Christ
16. Of Those Things Which Are Applicable to Christ in His Being
and Becoming
17. Of Christ's Unity of Being
18. Of Christ's Unity of Will
19. Of the Unity of Christ's Operation
20. Of Christ's Subjection to the Father
21. Of Christ's Prayer
22. Of the Priesthood of Christ
23. Of Adoption as Befitting to Christ
24. Of the Predestination of Christ
25. Of the Adoration of Christ
26. Of Christ as Called the Mediator of God and Man
-- Editorial Note: St. Thomas and the Immaculate Conception
27. Of the Sanctification of the Blessed Virgin
28. Of the Virginity of the Mother of God
29. Of the Espousals of the Mother of God
30. Of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin
31. Of the Matter From Which the Saviour's Body Was Conceived
32. Of the Active Principle in Christ's Conception
33. Of the Mode and Order of Christ's Conception
34. Of the Perfection of the Child Conceived
35. Of Christ's Nativity
36. Of the Manifestation of the Newly Born Christ
37. Of Christ's Circumcision, and of the Other Legal Observances
Accomplished in Regard to the Child Christ
38. Of the Baptism of John
39. Of the Baptizing of Christ
40. Of Christ's Manner of Life
41. Of Christ's Temptation
42. Of Christ's Doctrine
43. Of the Miracles Worked by Christ, in General
44. Of Christ's Miracles Considered Specifically
45. Of Christ's Transfiguration
46. The Passion of Christ
47. Of the Efficient Cause of Christ's Passion
48. Of the Efficiency of Christ's Passion
49. Of the Effects of Christ's Passion
50. Of the Death of Christ
51. Of Christ's Burial
52. Of Christ's Descent into Hell
53. Of Christ's Resurrection
54. Of the Quality of Christ Rising Again
55. Of the Manifestation of the Resurrection
56. Of the Causality of Christ's Resurrection
57. Of the Ascension of Christ
58. Of Christ's Sitting at the Right Hand of the Father
59. Of Christ's Judiciary Power
60. What Is a Sacrament?
61. Of the Necessity of the Sacraments
62. Of the Sacraments' Principal Effect, Which Is Grace
63. Of the Other Effect of the Sacraments, Which Is a Character
64. Of the Causes of the Sacraments
65. Of the Number of the Sacraments
66. Of the Sacrament of Baptism
67. Of the Ministers by Whom the Sacrament of Baptism Is Conferred
68. Of Those Who Receive Baptism
69. Of the Effects of Baptism
70. Of Circumcision
71. Of the Preparations That Accompany Baptism
72. Of the Sacrament of Confirmation
73. Of the Sacrament of the Eucharist
74. Of the Matter of This Sacrament
75. Of the Change of Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ
76. Of the Way in Which Christ Is in This Sacrament
77. Of the Accidents Which Remain in This Sacrament
78. Of the Form of This Sacrament
79. Of the Effects of This Sacrament
80. Of the Use or Receiving of This Sacrament in General
81. Of the Use Which Christ Made of This Sacrament at Its Institution
82. Of the Minister of This Sacrament
83. Of the Rite of This Sacrament
84. Of the Sacrament of Penance
85. Of Penance as a Virtue
86. Of the Effect of Penance, As Regards the Pardon of Mortal Sin
87. Of the Remission of Venial Sin
88. Of the Return of Sins Which Have Been Taken Away by Penance
89. Of the Recovery of Virtue by Means of Penance
90. Of the Parts of Penance, in General
________________________
SUMMA THEOLOGICA
THIRD PART
["III," "Tertia Pars"]
_______________________
PROLOGUE
Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to "save His
people from their sins" (Matt. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed
unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to
the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order
to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end
of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the
consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by
Him on the human race.
Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the
sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of
immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection.
Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about
the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for
our salvation; the second, about such things as were done and
suffered by our Saviour--i.e. God incarnate.
_______________________
TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION (QQ. 1-59)
_______________________
QUESTION 1
OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION
(In Six Articles)
Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered: first, the
fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word
Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate?
(2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race?
(3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate?
(4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than
actual?
(5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the
beginning of the world?
(6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of
the world?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 1]
Whether It Was Fitting That God Should Become Incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become
incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of
goodness, it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity.
But from all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was
most fitting for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not
fitting for God to become incarnate.
Obj. 2: Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are
infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were
"to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the
head of a man" [*Horace, Ars. Poet., line 1]. But God and flesh are
infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most
composite--especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that
God should be united to human flesh.
Obj. 3: Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as evil
is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God, Who
is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting
that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.
Obj. 4: Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the
greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom
rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things.
But God--Who takes care of the whole world--the whole universe of
things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He
should be hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in
comparison with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and
that this Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the
government of the whole world to so frail a body," as Volusianus
writes to Augustine (Ep. cxxxv).
_On the contrary,_ It would seem most fitting that by visible things
the invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was
the whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Rom.
1:20): "For the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made." But, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known
at once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might
of God--"His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own
handiwork; His justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant
to be overcome by none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men
forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge
for a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is
nothing greater than for God to become incarnate . . ."
_I answer that,_ To each thing, that is befitting which belongs to it
by reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this
belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very
nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i).
Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it
belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others,
as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the
essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest
manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so
joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these
three--the Word, a soul and flesh," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should
become incarnate.
Reply Obj. 1: The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed
through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had
been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the
creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself.
But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable, should
not always be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to be,
although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been
previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him.
Reply Obj. 2: To be united to God in unity of person was not fitting
to human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it was
above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason
of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's
salvation.
Reply Obj. 3: Every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever
differs from the Creator has been established by God's wisdom, and is
ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and
incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own
goodness. And so also the evil of punishment was established by God's
justice for God's glory. But evil of fault is committed by
withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the order of
the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to
assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty,
but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault.
Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine replies (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "The
Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human
flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were,
contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe.
This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal
things . . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the
greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor,
if the passing word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by
each, is it incredible that the abiding Word of God should be
everywhere at once?" Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming
incarnate.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 2]
Whether It Was Necessary for the Restoration of the Human Race That
the Word of God Should Become Incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for the
reparation of the human race that the Word of God should become
incarnate. For since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said
(I, Q. 4, AA. 1, 2), no power was added to Him by the assumption of
flesh. Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature.
He could also have restored it without assuming flesh.
Obj. 2: Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had
fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should
satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for
God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is
more inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of
sin to man's charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act.
Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature
that the Word of God should become incarnate.
Obj. 3: Further, to revere God pertains especially to man's
salvation; hence it is written (Mal. 1:6): "If, then, I be a father,
where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" But men
revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far
beyond man's senses, hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written: "The Lord is
high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens"; and farther
on: "Who is as the Lord our God?" which pertains to reverence.
Therefore it would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should
be made like unto us by assuming flesh.
_On the contrary,_ What frees the human race from perdition is
necessary for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the
Incarnation is such; according to John 3:16: "God so loved the world
as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may
not perish, but may have life everlasting." Therefore it was
necessary for man's salvation that God should become incarnate.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in
two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is
necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end
is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for
a journey. In the first way it was not necessary that God should
become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God with
His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other
ways. But in the second way it was necessary that God should become
incarnate for the restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 10): "We shall also show that other ways were not
wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally subject; but
that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery."
Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good."
First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing
God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In
order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the
Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature,
established and founded faith." Secondly, with regard to hope, which
is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii): "Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us
how deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of
this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of
human nature?" Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly
enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What
greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love
for us?" And he afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at
least let us hasten to love in return." Fourthly, with regard to
well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a
sermon (xxii de Temp.): "Man who might be seen was not to be
followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And
therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and
Whom man might follow, might be shown to man." Fifthly, with regard
to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of
man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ's
humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): "God was
made man, that man might be made God."
So also was this useful for our _withdrawal from evil._ First,
because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor
to honor him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 17): "Since human nature is so united to God as to become one
person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man,
because they have no bodies." Secondly, because we are thereby taught
how great is man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a
place human nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared
to men as a true man." And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity
(xxi): "Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of
the Divine nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former
worthlessness." Thirdly, because, "in order to do away with man's
presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no
merits of ours went before," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17).
Fourthly, because "man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block
to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so
great," as Augustine says in the same place. Fifthly, in order to
free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be
overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ," and this was done
by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied
for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it
behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in
the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by
majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that one and the same
Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in the other--for
this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have
brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not have set an
example."
And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's
apprehension.
Reply Obj. 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of necessity,
without which we cannot attain to the end.
Reply Obj. 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two
ways--first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to
make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of
human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any
person or persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done
to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed against
God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty,
because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the
offense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act
of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of
God and man. Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient,
imperfectly--i.e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it,
even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a
mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes
some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that
satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the
satisfaction of Christ.
Reply Obj. 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in
consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is
increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary,
inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly
drew us to know Him.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 3]
Whether, If Man Had Not Sinned, God Would Have Become Incarnate?
Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would
still have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also
remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other
things are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides
absolution from sin"; and these were discussed above (A. 2).
Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to
perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect.
But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is
finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the
Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power
manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely
distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is
God. And in this work especially the universe would seem to be
perfected, inasmuch as the last creature--viz. man--is united to the
first principle--viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God
would have become incarnate.
Obj. 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace
by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is
the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature
would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld
from human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had
not sinned, God would have become incarnate.
Obj. 4: Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said of
Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power."
Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God
should become incarnate, in order to fulfil God's predestination.
Obj. 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the
first man, as is plain from Gen. 2:23. "This now is bone of my
bones," etc. which the Apostle says is "a great sacrament . . . in
Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could
not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the
angels could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18).
Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become
incarnate.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2),
expounding what is set down in Luke 19:10, "For the Son of Man is
come to seek and to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had
not sinned, the Son of Man would not have come." And on 1 Tim. 1:15,
"Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners," a gloss says,
"There was no cause of Christ's coming into the world, except to save
sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need
of medicine."
_I answer that,_ There are different opinions about this question.
For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would
have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our
assent ought rather to be given to this opinion.
For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's
due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the
Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us.
Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first
man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in
accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was
ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed,
the Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not
limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become
incarnate.
Reply Obj. 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the
preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had
not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine
wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness
of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But
because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it
was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things
should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on John 1:14, "And
the Word was made flesh," St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had
blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the
vices of the flesh."
Reply Obj. 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode of
production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the
perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural
manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to
God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.
Reply Obj. 3: A double capability may be remarked in human nature:
one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always
fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural
capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine power,
which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of
pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities,
otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this
is false, as stated above (I, Q. 105, A. 6). But there is no reason
why human nature should not have been raised to something greater
after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater
good therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded,
grace did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal
candle, we say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a
Redeemer!"
Reply Obj. 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future
things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be
brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the
work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.
Reply Obj. 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one
to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the
Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being
fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect
knows the cause.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 4]
Whether God Became Incarnate in Order to Take Away Actual Sin, Rather
Than to Take Away Original Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for
actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the
sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God
became incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin;
for the lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says
(Contra Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is
chiefly directed to taking away actual sins.
Obj. 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but merely
pain of loss, as has been shown (I-II, Q. 87, A. 5). But Christ came
to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction for
sins--and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the
beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away
actual sin rather than original sin.
Obj. 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 3):
"This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the
benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as
though they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of
himself alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: 'Christ . . . loved
me and delivered Himself for me.'" But our individual sins are actual
sins; for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have
this conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual
sins.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of
God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world."
_I answer that,_ It is certain that Christ came into this world not
only to take away that sin which is handed on originally to
posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added
to it; not that all are taken away (and this is from men's fault,
inasmuch as they do not adhere to Christ, according to John 3:19:
"The light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than
the light"), but because He offered what was sufficient for blotting
out all sins. Hence it is written (Rom. 5:15-16): "But not as the
offense, so also the gift . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto
condemnation, but grace is of many offenses unto justification."
Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ
come to blot it out. But "greater" is said in two ways: in one way
"intensively," as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and
in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more
of the nature of voluntary, as has been shown (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1). In
another way a thing is said to be greater "extensively," as whiteness
on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way
original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater
than any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this
respect Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch
as "the good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an
individual," as is said _Ethic._ i, 2.
Reply Obj. 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of sin.
Reply Obj. 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be meted
out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst,
death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from
original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for
original sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume
death and the like in Himself.
Reply Obj. 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6): "The
Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's
gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world,
but that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For
what does it matter that they are given to others, if what are given
to you are as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to
another than yourself?" And hence, although a man ought to account
Christ's gifts as given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them
not to be given to others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to
wipe away the sin of the whole nature rather than the sin of one
person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed in each one
as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on account of the union of
charity, what is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by
each one.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 5]
Whether It Was Fitting That God Should Become Incarnate in the
Beginning of the Human Race?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become
incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the
Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to
Eph. 2:4, 5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding
charity wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins,
hath quickened us together in Christ." But charity does not tarry in
bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to
Prov. 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow
I will give to thee, when thou canst give at present." Therefore God
ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought
thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): "Christ Jesus came into
this world to save sinners." But more would have been saved had God
become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the
various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in
their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate
at the beginning of the human race.
Obj. 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the work
of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as
Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to
have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the
Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to John 1:14:
"The Word was made flesh"; and afterwards it is added: "Full of grace
and truth." Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the
beginning of the human race.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 4:4): "But when the fulness of
the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the
law": upon which a gloss says that "the fulness of the time is when
it was decreed by God the Father to send His Son." But God decreed
everything by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most
fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate
at the beginning of the human race.
_I answer that,_ Since the work of the Incarnation is principally
ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it
is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at
the beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given
only to the sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Matt. 9:12, 13): "They
that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . .
For I am not come to call the just, but sinners."
Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after
sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin, which had come of
pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might
be humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the
words in Gal. 3:19, "Being ordained by angels in the hand of a
mediator," a gloss says: "With great wisdom was it so ordered that
the Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man's fall. For
first of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of
his will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when
he failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of
the law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that
having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and
beseech the aid of grace."
Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we
proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1
Cor. 15:46, 47): "Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that
which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first
man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly."
Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the
words (Gal. 4:4), "But when the fulness of the time was come," a
gloss says: "The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous
was the band of heralds who ought to have preceded him."
Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time,
for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence
(Luke 18:8) it is written: "But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh,
shall He find think you, faith on earth?"
Reply Obj. 1: Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a
friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state
of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the
very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt
rather than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human
race the remedy of the Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should
despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize their
disease.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan., Ep.
cii), saying (Q. 2) that "Christ wished to appear to man and to have
His doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were who
would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel was
not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so bear
themselves towards His preaching as not to believe in His corporeal
presence, even were He to raise the dead." But the same Augustine,
taking exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia ix),
says: "How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not
believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would
not have believed had they been wrought, when God Himself bears
witness that they would have done penance with great humility if
these signs of Divine power had been wrought in their midst?" And he
adds in answer (De Perseverantia xi): "Hence, as the Apostle says
(Rom. 9:16), 'it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth,
but of God that showeth mercy'; Who (succors whom He will of) those
who, as He foresaw, would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst
them, (while others) He succors not, having judged them in His
predestination secretly yet justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly
believe His mercy to be with those who are set free, and His truth
with those who are condemned." [*The words in brackets are not in the
text of St. Augustine].
Reply Obj. 3: Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time and
nature, in things that are different (for what brings others to
perfection must itself be perfect); but in one and the same,
imperfection is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus
the eternal perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection
of human nature; but the latter's ultimate perfection in union with
God follows.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 1, Art. 6]
Whether the Incarnation Ought to Have Been Put Off Till the End of
the World?
Objection 1: It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to
have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps.
91:11): "My old age in plentiful mercy"--i.e. "in the last days," as
a gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time
of mercy, according to Ps. 101:14: "For it is time to have mercy on
it." Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the
end of the world.
Obj. 2: Further, as has been said (A. 5, ad 3), in the same subject,
perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore, what is
most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest
perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because "in
Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead
should dwell," as the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore
the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
Obj. 3: Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by two.
But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was sufficient
for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for
Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation
ought to have been put off till the end of the world.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Hab. 3:2): "In the midst of the
years Thou shalt make it known." Therefore the mystery of the
Incarnation which was made known to the world ought not to have been
put off till the end of the world.
_I answer that,_ As it was not fitting that God should become
incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting
that the Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And
this is shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature.
For, as it has been said (A. 5, ad 3), perfection precedes
imperfection in time in one way, and contrariwise in another way
imperfection precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect
from being imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in time,
whereas in that which is the efficient cause of perfection,
perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work of the
Incarnation both concur; for by the Incarnation human nature is
raised to its highest perfection; and in this way it was not becoming
that the Incarnation should take place at the beginning of the human
race. And the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection
of human nature, according to John 1:16: "Of His fulness we have all
received"; and hence the work of the Incarnation ought not to have
been put off till the end of the world. But the perfection of glory
to which human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate
will be at the end of the world.
Secondly, from the effect of man's salvation; for, as is said _Qq.
Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 83,_ "it is in the power of the Giver to have
pity when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was
fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by
the feebleness of the human race men's knowledge of God began to grow
dim and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a
standard of the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and
later on when reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in
writing; and because the gentiles despised it and would not take it
upon themselves, and they who received it would not keep it, being
touched with pity, God sent His Son, to grant to all remission of
their sin and to offer them, justified, to God the Father." But if
this remedy had been put off till the end of the world, all knowledge
and reverence of God and all uprightness of morals would have been
swept away from the earth.
Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine
power, which has saved men in several ways--not only by faith in some
future thing, but also by faith in something present and past.
Reply Obj. 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which leads us
to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown the
human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as
Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be
compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength
and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age--i.e.
the sixth age--on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came
in the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together
in a body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account
of quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine
says elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that
the Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the
highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth."
But in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that
Christ came in the sixth age--i.e. in the old age--of the human race.
Reply Obj. 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not as
merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection,
but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been
said.
Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says on John 3:11, "For God sent not His
Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are two
comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the second,
to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have
perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God."
Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in
mercy till the end of the world.
_______________________
QUESTION 2
OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE
(In Twelve Articles)
Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and,
first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the
nature assumed.
Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?
(2) Whether it took place in the Person?
(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?
(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the
Incarnation?
(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?
(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?
(7) Whether the union itself is something created?
(8) Whether it is the same as assumption?
(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?
(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about
by grace?
(11) Whether any merits preceded it?
(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 1]
Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word Took Place in the Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took
place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the
Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): "We must understand not two
natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God"; and this could
not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union
of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.
Obj. 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and the
flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form a
certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.
Obj. 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other
unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the Divine
and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other; for
Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii,
act. 1) that the Divine nature "is incarnate"; and Gregory Nazianzen
says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature is "deified," as
appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11). Therefore from two
natures one seems to have resulted.
_On the contrary,_ It is said in the declaration of the Council of
Chalcedon: "We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten
Son of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without
change, without division, without separation--the distinction of
natures not having been taken away by the union." Therefore the union
did not take place in the nature.
_I answer that,_ To make this question clear we must consider what is
"nature." Now it is to be observed that the word "nature" comes from
nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the
begetting of living beings, which is called "birth" or "sprouting
forth," the word "natura" meaning, as it were, "nascitura."
Afterwards this word "nature" was taken to signify the principle of
this begetting; and because in living things the principle of
generation is an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was further
employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the
Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "nature is the principle of motion
in that in which it is essentially and not accidentally." Now this
principle is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called
nature, and sometimes matter. And because the end of natural
generation, in that which is generated, is the essence of the
species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species
is called the "nature." And thus Boethius defines nature (De Duab.
Nat.): "Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference,
"--i.e. which perfects the specific definition. But we are now
speaking of nature as it signifies the essence, or the "what-it-is,"
or the quiddity of the species.
Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union
of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made
of two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which
remain in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form
is composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones
brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition;
and a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and
fashioned to a figure. And in this way some said the union was by
manner of confusion (which is without order) or by manner of
commensuration (which is with order). But this cannot be. First,
because neither composition nor order nor figure is a substantial
form, but accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of the
Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will be
disproved later on (A. 6). Secondly, because thereby we should not
have an absolute unity, but relative only, for there remain several
things actually. Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature,
but an art, as the form of a house; and thus one nature would not be
constituted in Christ, as they wish.
Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but
changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way
some have said that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by
manner of combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine
Nature is altogether immutable, as has been said (I, Q. 9, AA. 1, 2),
hence neither can it be changed into something else, since it is
incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it
cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same
species with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from
any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature
neither with His Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there
can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of one of
them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon
of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the
human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone
would remain.
Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but
imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers
members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation.
First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its
specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures
cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as
the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal;
nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot
be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it
would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be
communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs.
Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in
the Divine Nature: since any difference varies the species, as unity
varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).
Reply Obj. 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod
(i.e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: "If anyone
proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not
receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human
natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ
results, but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or
substance of the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be
anathema." Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results;
but that the Nature of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in
Person.
Reply Obj. 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of nature
and person--results in each individual--of nature inasmuch as the
soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one
nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from
matter and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the
Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved (I, Q. 3,
A. 8). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there
is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the
likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.
Reply Obj. 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 11), the
Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh
personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the
flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15, 17),
not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties
still remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch
as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes
God.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 2]
Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word Took Place in the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did
not take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct
from His Nature, as we said (I, Q. 39, A. 1). If, therefore, the
union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not
take place in the person.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ's human nature has no less dignity than ours.
But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above (I, Q. 29, A.
3, ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its proper personality,
much more reason was there that Christ's should have its proper
personality.
Obj. 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an
individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed
an individual human nature, for "universal human nature does not
exist of itself, but is the object of pure thought," as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ
has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place
in the person.
_On the contrary,_ We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act.
5): "We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided
into two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word
of God." Therefore the union took place in the person.
_I answer that,_ Person has a different meaning from "nature." For
nature, as has been said (A. 1), designates the specific essence
which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be
added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no
need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature
(which is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every
individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its
nature. Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does
not belong to the notion of the species, viz. accidents and
individuating principles, which appears chiefly in such as are
composed of matter and form. Hence in such as these the nature and
the suppositum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly
separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature, and in
addition certain other things outside the notion of the species.
Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature as
its formal part to perfect it; and consequently in such as are
composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the
suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But if
there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its
nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really
distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is
called "nature" as it is an essence, and a suppositum as it is
subsisting. And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a
person in rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing
else than "an individual substance of rational nature," according to
Boethius. Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in
person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human
nature is not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united
to Him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away
with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as
the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to
His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person
of the Word, and not in the nature.
Reply Obj. 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really
distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above,
inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something
subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that
the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives
therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human
nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in the
nature.
Reply Obj. 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a
thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and
perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by
the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something
nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature
of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that
in us, being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in
Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the
species belongs to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in
man, on account of its union with the nobler form which perfects the
species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form
which perfects.
Reply Obj. 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in
general, but _in atomo_"--that is, in an individual--as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of
God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every
individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a
person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which
exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates,
although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does
not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the
whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a "person" being defined
as "an individual substance," for the hand is not a complete
substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human
nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not
its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in
something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the
union took place in the person.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 3]
Whether the Union of the Word Incarnate Took Place in the Suppositum
or Hypostasis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did
not take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says
(Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): "Both the Divine and human substance are
one Son of God, but they are one thing (_aliud_) by reason of the
Word and another thing (_aliud_) by reason of the man." And Pope Leo
says in his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): "One of these is glorious
with miracles, the other succumbs under injuries." But "one"
(_aliud_) and "the other" (_aliud_) differ in suppositum. Therefore
the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.
Obj. 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a "particular
substance," as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in
Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of
the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these.
Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis
of the Word.
Obj. 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any
genus or species, as is plain from the First Part (Q. 3, A. 5). But
Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of
man; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "Within the limits of our
nature He came, Who far surpasses the whole order of nature
supersubstantially." Now nothing is contained under the human species
unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore in Christ
there is another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word of
God; and hence the same conclusion follows as above.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4, 5): "In
our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis."
_I answer that,_ Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to
person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ,
held, nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another
of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in
the hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous.
First, because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature,
viz. rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), "a
person is an individual substance of rational nature"; and hence it
is the same to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper
hypostasis and a proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this,
condemned both in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying:
"If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two
subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For by the
incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, God the Word, the Holy
Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence." Now
"subsistence" is the same as the subsisting thing, which is proper to
hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly,
because if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something in
which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a
property pertaining to dignity; according as it is said by some that
a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to
dignity." If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not
in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only took place in
regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of
the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in these terms:
"If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in the one
Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or
power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be
anathema." Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed
the operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to
the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is
risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be
a suppositum, because he underlies (_supponitur_) whatever belongs to
man and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any
hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows
that whatever pertains to man is verified of some other than the
Word, e.g. that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was
buried. And this, too, was condemned with the approval of the Council
of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) in these words: "If anyone ascribes to
two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and
apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or
by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the
man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if
they could be used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father,
let him be anathema." Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long
since by the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases,
or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the
hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is
said: "If anyone does not confess that the Word was united to flesh
in subsistence, and that Christ with His flesh is both--to wit, God
and man--let him be anathema."
Reply Obj. 1: As accidental difference makes a thing "other"
(_alterum_), so essential difference makes "another thing" (_aliud_).
Now it is plain that the "otherness" which springs from accidental
difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in
created things, since the same thing numerically can underlie
different accidents. But it does not happen in created things that
the same numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence
just as when we speak of "otherness" in regard to creatures we do not
signify diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental
forms, so likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another
thing, we do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but
diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to
Chelidonius (Ep. ci): "In the Saviour we may find one thing and
another, yet He is not one person and another. And I say 'one thing
and another'; whereas, on the contrary, in the Trinity we say one
Person and another (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not
one thing and another."
Reply Obj. 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in
every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with
something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand
or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a
particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or
suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz.
the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with
which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.
Reply Obj. 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a genus
or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation, but
on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in
composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we
say that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature
assumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 4]
Whether After the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ Is
Composite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is not
composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or
hypostasis of the Word, as appears from what has been said (A. 2).
But in the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from
First Part (Q. 39, A. 1). Therefore since the Nature of the Word is
simple, as was shown above (I, Q. 3, A. 7), it is impossible that the
Person of Christ be composite.
Obj. 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine
Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part
implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible
that the Person of Christ be composed of two natures.
Obj. 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem to be
homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed.
Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures,
it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the
union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to
A. 2.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4, 5), "In
the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis
composed from both."
_I answer that,_ The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in
two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple,
even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or
hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the
Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one
subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of
subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch
as one being subsists in two.
And thereby the solution to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: This composition of a person from natures is not
so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that
in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not verified in every composition, that
the thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only
in the parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed
solely of continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and
body, and neither of these is an animal.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 5]
Whether in Christ There Is Any Union of Soul and Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul
and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a
human hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in
Christ, it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But
this was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal.
Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the
hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to AA. 2, 3.
Obj. 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the nature
of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that
"we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ."
Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose
of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by the
Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life.
Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body.
_On the contrary,_ The body is not said to be animated save from its
union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated,
as the Church chants: "Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born
of a Virgin" [*Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore
in Christ there was a union of soul and body.
_I answer that,_ Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as
being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. 2:7),
"being made in the likeness of a man." Now it belongs essentially to
the human species that the soul be united to the body, for the form
does not constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the
act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which
nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the
soul was united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it
destroys the truth of Christ's humanity.
Reply Obj. 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of weight
with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ, viz.
lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or
hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body
in mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men
because the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by
themselves. But in Christ they are united together, so as to be
united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of
them. And hence from the union of the soul and body in Christ a new
hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is
united to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it
therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in Christ is of
less effect than in us, for its union with something nobler does not
lessen but increases its virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul
in animals constitutes the species, as being considered the ultimate
form, yet it does not do so in man, although it is of greater effect
and dignity, and this because of its union with a further and nobler
perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above (A. 2, ad
2).
Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two ways:
First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one
individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only
inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and
considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all
individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it
exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He
would not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said
that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists
conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son of God would
not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Luke 24:39), "A
spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have." Neither can
it be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all
the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed
all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature _in atomo,_ i.e. in an
individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is a suppositum
or a person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son of God.
Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to
human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature
(viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two
natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third
something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would
become predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he
adds: "For there was not generated, neither will there ever be
generated, another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in
the Godhead and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man."
Reply Obj. 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one the
effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the principle
of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since "in
living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (De Anima
ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise the
body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the
Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 6]
Whether the Human Nature Was United to the Word of God Accidentally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the
Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son
of God, that He was "in habit found as a man." But habit is
accidentally associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit
be taken for one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality.
Therefore human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being
comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can come
or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to
Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it
came to Him accidentally.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the
essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a
substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the
Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not
take place in the nature, as was said above (A. 1). Hence the human
nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God.
Obj. 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human
nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the
instrument of the Godhead." Therefore it seems that the human nature
was united to the Son of God accidentally.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates,
not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being.
If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say
Christ is man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or
quantity, or some other mode of being, which is contrary to the
Decretal of Pope Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since
Christ is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some
to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a substance?"
_I answer that,_ In evidence of this question we must know that two
heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the
two natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches
and Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature
resulted, so that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures
(which were distinct before the union), but not "in" two natures (the
distinction of nature coming to an end after the union). The second
was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated
the persons. For they held the Person of the Son of God to be
distinct from the Person of the Son of man, and said these were
mutually united: first, "by indwelling," inasmuch as the Word of God
dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, "by unity of intention,"
inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement with the will
of the Word of God; thirdly, "by operation," inasmuch as they said
the man was the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, "by
greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of God
was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His union with the
Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation," i.e. communication of names,
inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the Son of God. Now it is
plain that these modes imply an accidental union.
But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies,
through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in
Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that
a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his
conception assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion
set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of
keeping the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not
united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate, and
were united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons
might not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the
Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).
But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the
first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in
Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above (A.
3). And if stress is laid on the word "person," we must have in mind
that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the unity
of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II,
coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds
"one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and
Nestorius foolishly wrote." But the other opinion falls into the
error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is
no difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man
Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by
putting on man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it
says something worse than Nestorius--to wit, that the soul and body
are not united.
Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid
positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place
in the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but
midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council
(Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the unity may
be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of
Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came
together" (i.e. destroying both natures), "confess a union by
mingling; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining
division, introduce a union of purpose. But the Holy Church of God,
rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union of
the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which is in subsistence."
Therefore it is plain that the second of the three opinions,
mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one hypostasis
of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article of
Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds two
hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not to
be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils.
Reply Obj. 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): "Examples
need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is wholly
similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in Divine
things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in the
Theology," i.e. in the Godhead of Persons, "and in the Dispensation,"
i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human nature in Christ
is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment, not indeed in regard to
accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the human
nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is
changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it
on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the
garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is
ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq.
83, qu. 73).
Reply Obj. 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the being
comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the
complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the
soul which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed
unto the same being, so that the body has vital being through the
soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is
other than the being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of
God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person;
while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were
assumed unto one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the
body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch
as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not
accidentally united to the Son of God.
Reply Obj. 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now substance,
as is plain from _Metaph._ v, 25, is taken in two ways: first, for
essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis--hence the
union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that it
is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in
the nature.
Reply Obj. 4: Not everything that is assumed as an instrument
pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the
case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into
the unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the
body of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human
nature was assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into
the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that
the man was really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril
says (Epist. ad Monach. Aegyptii): "The Scripture does not affirm
that this Emmanuel," i.e. Christ, "was assumed for the office of an
instrument, but as God truly humanized," i.e. made man. But Damascene
held that the human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to
the unity of the hypostasis.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 7]
Whether the Union of the Divine Nature and the Human Is Anything
Created?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human
natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in
God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for
God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the
union is not anything created.
Obj. 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the end
of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union is
terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be
judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which
is not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.
Obj. 3: Further, "That which is the cause of a thing being such is
still more so" (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on
account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing
created, but the Creator.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now
this union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the
union is something created.
_I answer that,_ The union of which we are speaking is a relation
which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch
as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was
said above (I, Q. 13, A. 7), every relation which we consider between
God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the
relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but
only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change
in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking
is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the
human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must
say it is something created.
Reply Obj. 1: This union is not really in God, but only in our way of
thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the
creature is really united to God without any change in Him.
Reply Obj. 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion,
depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere
save in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a
created being.
Reply Obj. 3: A man is called Creator and is God because of the
union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it
does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because
that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its
relation.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 8]
Whether Union Is the Same As Assumption?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For
relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term
of assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine
hypostasis. Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not
different.
Obj. 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing
seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what
is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and
passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming
and the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption.
Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "Union is
one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation,
and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and
humanation determine the end of copulation." But likewise assumption
does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that
union is the same as assumption.
_On the contrary,_ The Divine Nature is said to be united, not
assumed.
_I answer that,_ As was stated above (A. 7), union implies a certain
relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they come
together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are
brought about by some change; and change consists in action and
passion. Hence the _first_ and principal difference between
assumption and union must be said to be that union implies the
relation: whereas assumption implies the action, whereby someone is
said to assume, or the passion, whereby something is said to be
assumed. Now from this difference another _second_ difference arises,
for assumption implies _becoming,_ whereas union implies _having
become,_ and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united, but
the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. For the human nature is
taken to be in the terminus of assumption unto the Divine hypostasis
when man is spoken of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of
God, Who assumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human nature,
considered in itself, i.e. in the abstract, is viewed as assumed; and
we do not say the Son of God is human nature. From this same follows
a _third_ difference, which is that a relation, especially one of
equiparance, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas
action and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the
patient, and to different termini. And hence assumption determines
the term whence and the term whither; for assumption means a taking
to oneself from another. But union determines none of these things.
Hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united
with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to
be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the human nature is
joined to the Divine personality, so that the Divine Person subsists
in human nature.
Reply Obj. 1: Union and assumption have not the same relation to the
term, but a different relation, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: What unites and what assumes are not the same. For
whatsoever Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person
of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself;
and hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the
united and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is
said to be united, but not assumed.
Reply Obj. 3: Assumption determines with whom the union is made on
the part of the one assuming, inasmuch as assumption means taking
unto oneself (_ad se sumere_), whereas incarnation and humanation
(determine with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing
assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus assumption differs
logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation.
_______________________
NINTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 9]
Whether the Union of the Two Natures in Christ Is the Greatest of All
Unions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the two natures in
Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls
short of the unity of what is one, since what is united is by
participation, but one is by essence. Now in created things there are
some that are simply one, as is shown especially in unity itself,
which is the principle of number. Therefore the union of which we are
speaking does not imply the greatest of all unions.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater the distance between things united, the
less the union. Now, the things united by this union are most
distant--namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are
infinitely apart. Therefore their union is the least of all.
Obj. 3: Further, from union there results one. But from the union of
soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature;
whereas from the union of the Divine and human nature there results
what is one in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is
greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and hence the
union of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that "man is in
the Son of God, more than the Son in the Father." But the Son is in
the Father by unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of
the Incarnation. Therefore the union of the Incarnation is greater
than the unity of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the
greatest union; and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the
greatest unity.
_I answer that,_ Union implies the joining of several in some one
thing. Therefore the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two
ways: first, in regard to the things united; secondly, in regard to
that in which they are united. And in this regard this union has a
pre-eminence over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person,
in which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it has no
pre-eminence in regard to the things united.
Reply Obj. 1: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than
numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a
Divine Person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received
into another by participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having
in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it
is not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity,
which is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things
numbered. And hence in this respect the union of the Incarnation is
higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine
Person, and not by reason of the human nature, which is not the unity
of the Divine Person, but is united to it.
Reply Obj. 2: This reason regards the things united, and not the
Person in Whom the union takes place.
Reply Obj. 3: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than the
unity of person and nature in us; and hence the union of the
Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us.
And because what is urged in the argument "on the contrary" rests
upon what is untrue--namely, that the union of the Incarnation is
greater than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence--we must say
to the authority of Augustine that the human nature is not more in
the Son of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But
the man in some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the
Father--namely, inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I
say "man," meaning Christ, and when I say "Son of God"; whereas it is
not the same suppositum of Father and Son.
_______________________
TENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 10]
Whether the Union of the Incarnation Took Place by Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation did not
take place by grace. For grace is an accident, as was shown above
(I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). But the union of the human nature to the Divine
did not take place accidentally, as was shown above (A. 6). Therefore
it seems that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by
grace.
Obj. 2: Further, the subject of grace is the soul. But it is written
(Col. 2:9): "In Christ [Vulg.: 'Him'] dwelleth all the fulness of the
Godhead corporeally." Therefore it seems that this union did not take
place by grace.
Obj. 3: Further, every saint is united to God by grace. If,
therefore, the union of the Incarnation was by grace, it would seem
that Christ is said to be God no more than other holy men.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "By the same
grace every man is made a Christian, from the beginning of his faith,
as this man from His beginning was made Christ." But this man became
Christ by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union was by
grace.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 1), grace is
taken in two ways:--first, as the will of God gratuitously bestowing
something; secondly, as the free gift of God. Now human nature stands
in need of the gratuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to
God, since this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human
nature is lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as the
saints know and love God; secondly, by personal being, and this mode
belongs exclusively to Christ, in Whom human nature is assumed so as
to be in the Person of the Son of God. But it is plain that for the
perfection of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit,
whereas that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take
place by means of a habit.
And hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of God
gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or
acceptable to Him, the union of the Incarnation took place by grace,
even as the union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But
if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the
human nature is united to the Divine Person may be called a grace,
inasmuch as it took place without being preceded by any merits--but
not as though there were an habitual grace, by means of which the
union took place.
Reply Obj. 1: The grace which is an accident is a certain likeness of
the Divinity participated by man. But by the Incarnation human nature
is not said to have participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but
is said to be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the
Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated likeness of
it.
Reply Obj. 2: Habitual grace is only in the soul; but the grace, i.e.
the free gift of God, of being united to the Divine Person belongs to
the whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence
it is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally in
Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely to the soul,
but to the body also. Although it may also be said that it dwelt in
Christ corporeally, i.e. not as in a shadow, as it dwelt in the
sacraments of the old law, of which it is said in the same place
(Col. 2:17) that they are the "shadow of things to come but the body
is Christ" [Vulg.: 'Christ's'], inasmuch as the body is opposed to
the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to have dwelt in
Christ corporeally, i.e. in three ways, just as a body has three
dimensions: first, by essence, presence, and power, as in other
creatures; secondly, by sanctifying grace, as in the saints; thirdly,
by personal union, which is proper to Christ.
Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because the union of
the Incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone, but in
subsistence or person.
_______________________
ELEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 11]
Whether Any Merits Preceded the Union of the Incarnation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation followed
upon certain merits, because upon Ps. 32:22, "Let Thy mercy, o Lord,
be upon us, as," etc. a gloss says: "Here the prophet's desire for
the Incarnation and its merited fulfilment are hinted at." Therefore
the Incarnation falls under merit.
Obj. 2: Further, whoever merits anything merits that without which it
cannot be. But the ancient Fathers merited eternal life, to which
they were able to attain only by the Incarnation; for Gregory says
(Moral. xiii): "Those who came into this world before Christ's
coming, whatsoever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could
not, on being divested of the body, at once be admitted into the
bosom of the heavenly country, seeing that He had not as yet come
Who, by His own descending, should place the souls of the righteous
in their everlasting seat." Therefore it would seem that they merited
the Incarnation.
Obj. 3: Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung that "she merited
to bear the Lord of all" [*Little Office of B. V. M., Dominican Rite,
Ant. at Benedictus], and this took place through the Incarnation.
Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): "Whoever can
find merits preceding the singular generation of our Head, may also
find merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us His members."
But no merits preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: "Not
by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His
mercy He saved us, by the laver of regeneration." Therefore no merits
preceded the generation of Christ.
_I answer that,_ With regard to Christ Himself, it is clear from the
above (A. 10) that no merits of His could have preceded the union.
For we do not hold that He was first of all a mere man, and that
afterwards by the merits of a good life it was granted Him to become
the Son of God, as Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning
of His conception this man was truly the Son of God, seeing that He
had no other hypostasis but that of the Son of God, according to Luke
1:35: "The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son
of God." And hence every operation of this man followed the union.
Therefore no operation of His could have been meritorious of the
union.
Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever have merited this
union condignly: first, because the meritorious works of man are
properly ordained to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and
consists in the full enjoyment of God. Whereas the union of the
Incarnation, inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the
union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the act of the soul
in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Secondly,
because grace cannot fall under merit, for the principle of merit
does not fall under merit; and therefore neither does grace, for it
is the principle of merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation
fall under merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to
John 1:17: "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Thirdly, because
the Incarnation is for the reformation of the entire human nature,
and therefore it does not fall under the merit of any individual man,
since the goodness of a mere man cannot be the cause of the good of
the entire nature. Yet the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation
congruously by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God
should harken to those who obeyed Him.
And thereby the reply to the First Objection is manifest.
Reply Obj. 2: It is false that under merit falls everything without
which there can be no reward. For there is something pre-required not
merely for reward, but also for merit, as the Divine goodness and
grace and the very nature of man. And again, the mystery of the
Incarnation is the principle of merit, because "of His fulness we all
have received" (John 1:16).
Reply Obj. 3: The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the
Lord of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because by the
grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and
holiness, which fitted her to be the Mother of God.
_______________________
TWELFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 12]
Whether the Grace of Union Was Natural to the Man Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of union was not natural to
the man Christ. For the union of the Incarnation did not take place
in the nature, but in the Person, as was said above (A. 2). Now a
thing is denominated from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought
rather to be called personal than natural.
Obj. 2: Further, grace is divided against nature, even as gratuitous
things, which are from God, are distinguished from natural things,
which are from an intrinsic principle. But if things are divided in
opposition to one another, one is not denominated by the other.
Therefore the grace of Christ was not natural to Him.
Obj. 3: Further, natural is that which is according to nature. But
the grace of union is not natural to Christ in regard to the Divine
Nature, otherwise it would belong to the other Persons; nor is it
natural to Him according to the human nature, otherwise it would
belong to all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore
it would seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to Christ.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): "In the
assumption of human nature, grace itself became somewhat natural to
that man, so as to leave no room for sin in Him."
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), nature
designates, in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing.
Hence natural may be taken in two ways: first, for what is only from
the essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to
mount; secondly, we call natural to man what he has had from his
birth, according to Eph. 2:3: "We were by nature children of wrath";
and Wis. 12:10: "They were a wicked generation, and their malice
natural." Therefore the grace of Christ, whether of union or
habitual, cannot be called natural as if caused by the principles of
the human nature of Christ, although it may be called natural, as if
coming to the human nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine
Nature. But these two kinds of grace are said to be natural to
Christ, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since from the
beginning of His conception the human nature was united to the Divine
Person, and His soul was filled with the gift of grace.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the union did not take place in the nature,
yet it was caused by the power of the Divine Nature, which is truly
the nature of Christ, and it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the
beginning of His nativity.
Reply Obj. 2: The union is not said to be grace and natural in the
same respect; for it is called grace inasmuch as it is not from
merit; and it is said to be natural inasmuch as by the power of the
Divine Nature it was in the humanity of Christ from His nativity.
Reply Obj. 3: The grace of union is not natural to Christ according
to His human nature, as if it were caused by the principles of the
human nature, and hence it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless,
it is natural to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the
_property_ of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by the Holy
Ghost, so that He might be the natural Son of God and of man. But it
is natural to Him in regard to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the
Divine Nature is the active principle of this grace; and this belongs
to the whole Trinity--to wit, to be the active principle of this
grace.
_______________________
QUESTION 3
OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON ASSUMING
(In Eight Articles)
We must now consider the union on the part of the Person assuming,
and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether to assume is befitting to a Divine Person?
(2) Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature?
(3) Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?
(4) Whether one Person can assume without another?
(5) Whether each Person can assume?
(6) Whether several Persons can assume one individual nature?
(7) Whether one Person can assume two individual natures?
(8) Whether it was more fitting for the Person of the Son of God to
assume human nature than for another Divine Person?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 1]
Whether It Is Befitting for a Divine Person to Assume?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to a Divine
Person to assume a created nature. For a Divine Person signifies
something most perfect. Now no addition can be made to what is
perfect. Therefore, since to assume is to take to oneself, and
consequently what is assumed is added to the one who assumes, it does
not seem to be befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created
nature.
Obj. 2: Further, that to which anything is assumed is communicated in
some degree to what is assumed to it, just as dignity is communicated
to whosoever is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a
person to be incommunicable, as was said above (I, Q. 29, A. 1).
Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume, i.e. to
take to Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, person is constituted by nature. But it is repugnant
that the thing constituted should assume the constituent, since the
effect does not act on its cause. Hence it is not befitting to a
Person to assume a nature.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum
ii): "This God, i.e. the only-Begotten one, took the form," i.e. the
nature, "of a servant to His own Person." But the only-Begotten God
is a Person. Therefore it is befitting to a Person to take, i.e. to
assume a nature.
_I answer that,_ In the word "assumption" are implied two things,
viz. the principle and the term of the act, for to assume is to take
something to oneself. Now of this assumption a Person is both the
principle and the term. The principle--because it properly belongs to
a person to act, and this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine
action. Likewise a Person is the term of this assumption, because, as
was said above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2), the union took place in the Person,
and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to assume a nature is
most properly befitting to a Person.
Reply Obj. 1: Since the Divine Person is infinite, no addition can be
made to it: Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]:
"We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to
addition"; just as in the union of man with God, nothing is added to
God by the grace of adoption, but what is Divine is united to man;
hence, not God but man is perfected.
Reply Obj. 2: A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch
as It cannot be predicated of several supposita, but nothing prevents
several things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not
contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist
in several natures, for even in a created person several natures may
concur accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quantity and
quality. But this is proper to a Divine Person, on account of its
infinity, that there should be a concourse of natures in it, not
accidentally, but in subsistence.
Reply Obj. 3: As was said above (Q. 2, A. 1), the human nature
constitutes a Divine Person, not simply, but forasmuch as the Person
is denominated from such a nature. For human nature does not make the
Son of Man to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be
man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is constituted
simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said to assume the Divine
Nature, but to assume the human nature.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 2]
Whether It Is Befitting to the Divine Nature to Assume?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to the Divine
Nature to assume. Because, as was said above (A. 1), to assume is to
take to oneself. But the Divine Nature did not take to Itself human
nature, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said
above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine
Nature to assume human nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the Divine Nature is common to the three Persons.
If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume, it
consequently is befitting to the three Persons; and thus the Father
assumed human nature even as the Son, which is erroneous.
Obj. 3: Further, to assume is to act. But to act befits a person, not
a nature, which is rather taken to be the principle by which the
agent acts. Therefore to assume is not befitting to the nature.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius) says (De Fide ad Petrum
ii): "That nature which remains eternally begotten of the Father"
(i.e. which is received from the Father by eternal generation) "took
our nature free of sin from His Mother."
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), in the word assumption two
things are signified--to wit, the principle and the term of the
action. Now to be the principle of the assumption belongs to the
Divine Nature in itself, because the assumption took place by Its
power; but to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the
Divine Nature in itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is
considered to be. Hence a Person is primarily and more properly said
to assume, but it may be said secondarily that the Nature assumed a
nature to Its Person. And after the same manner the Nature is also
said to be incarnate, not that it is changed to flesh, but that it
assumed the nature of flesh. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii,
6): "Following the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the
Nature of God is incarnate."
Reply Obj. 1: "Oneself" is reciprocal, and points to the same
suppositum. But the Divine Nature is not a distinct suppositum from
the Person of the Word. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took
human nature to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to
Itself. But although the Father takes human nature to the Person of
the Word, He did not thereby take it to Himself, for the suppositum
of the Father and the Son is not one, and hence it cannot properly be
said that the Father assumes human nature.
Reply Obj. 2: What is befitting to the Divine Nature in Itself is
befitting to the three Persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like.
But to assume belongs to It by reason of the Person of the Word, as
was said above, and hence it is befitting to that Person alone.
Reply Obj. 3: As in God _what is_ and _whereby it is_ are the same,
so likewise in Him _what acts_ and _whereby it acts_ are the same,
since everything acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the Divine
Nature is both that whereby God acts, and the very God Who acts.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 3]
Whether the Nature Abstracted from the Personality Can Assume?
Objection 1: It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our
mind, the Nature cannot assume. For it was said above (A. 1) that it
belongs to the Nature to assume by reason of the Person. But what
belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other
is removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color, without
color cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be mentally
abstracted, the Nature cannot assume.
Obj. 2: Further, assumption implies the term of union, as was said
above (A. 1). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but only
in the Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the
Divine Nature cannot assume.
Obj. 3: Further, it has been said above (I, Q. 40, A. 3) that in the
Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains. But the
one who assumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is
abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume.
_On the contrary,_ In the Godhead Personality signifies a personal
property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, Filiation and
Procession, as was said above (I, Q. 30, A. 2). Now if we mentally
abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of God, by which
the Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Luke 1:37): "No word
shall be impossible with God." Therefore it seems that if the
Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still assume.
_I answer that,_ The intellect stands in two ways towards God. First,
to know God as He is, and in this manner it is impossible for the
intellect to circumscribe something in God and leave the rest, for
all that is in God is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as
regards these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since they
are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the
same time. Secondly, the intellect stands towards God, not indeed as
knowing God as He is, but in its own way, i.e. understanding
manifoldly and separately what in God is one: and in this way our
intellect can understand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the
like, which are called essential attributes, without understanding
Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if
we abstract Personality by our intellect, we may still understand the
Nature assuming.
Reply Obj. 1: Because in God _what is,_ and _whereby it is,_ are one,
if any one of the things which are attributed to God in the abstract
is considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will still be
something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is an
intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on
account of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we
mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in
our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and as a Person. And in
this way It may be understood to assume human nature by reason of Its
subsistence or Personality.
Reply Obj. 2: Even if the personal properties of the three Persons
are abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in our
thoughts the one Personality of God, as the Jews consider. And the
assumption can be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in
the Person of the Word.
Reply Obj. 3: If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is said
that nothing remains by way of resolution, i.e. as if the subject of
the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can
think of in God is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However,
some of the things predicated of God can be understood without
others, not by way of resolution, but by the way mentioned above.
_______________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 4]
Whether One Person Without Another Can Assume a Created Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that one Person cannot assume a created
nature without another assuming it. For "the works of the Trinity are
inseparable," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxviii). But as the
three Persons have one essence, so likewise They have one operation.
Now to assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to one
without belonging to another.
Obj. 2: Further, as we say the Person of the Son became incarnate, so
also did the Nature; for "the whole Divine Nature became incarnate in
one of Its hypostases," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6). But
the Nature is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption
is.
Obj. 3: Further, as the human nature in Christ is assumed by God, so
likewise are men assumed by Him through grace, according to Rom.
14:3: "God hath taken him to Him." But this assumption pertains to
all the Persons; therefore the first also.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that the mystery of
the Incarnation pertains to "discrete theology," i.e. according to
which something "distinct" is said of the Divine Persons.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), assumption implies two
things, viz. the act of assuming and the term of assumption. Now the
act of assumption proceeds from the Divine power, which is common to
the three Persons, but the term of the assumption is a Person, as
stated above (A. 2). Hence what has to do with action in the
assumption is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the
nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as not to
belong to another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to
be united to the one Person of the Son.
Reply Obj. 1: This reason regards the operation, and the conclusion
would follow if it implied this operation only, without the term,
which is a Person.
Reply Obj. 2: The Nature is said to be incarnate, and to assume by
reason of the Person in Whom the union is terminated, as stated above
(AA. 1, 2), and not as it is common to the three Persons. Now "the
whole Divine Nature is" said to be "incarnate"; not that It is
incarnate in all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to
the perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as
Damascene explains there.
Reply Obj. 3: The assumption which takes place by the grace of
adoption is terminated in a certain participation of the Divine
Nature, by an assimilation to Its goodness, according to 2 Pet. 1:4:
"That you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature"; and hence this
assumption is common to the three Persons, in regard to the principle
and the term. But the assumption which is by the grace of union is
common on the part of the principle, but not on the part of the term,
as was said above.
_______________________
FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 5]
Whether Each of the Divine Persons Could Have Assumed Human Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that no other Divine Person could have
assumed human nature except the Person of the Son. For by this
assumption it has been brought about that God is the Son of Man. But
it was not becoming that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should
be said to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the
Divine Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Ghost could not have
assumed flesh.
Obj. 2: Further, by the Divine Incarnation men have come into
possession of the adoption of sons, according to Rom. 8:15: "For you
have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit
of adoption of sons." But sonship by adoption is a participated
likeness of natural sonship which does not belong to the Father nor
the Holy Ghost; hence it is said (Rom. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew
He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His
Son." Therefore it seems that no other Person except the Person of
the Son could have become incarnate.
Obj. 3: Further, the Son is said to be sent and to be begotten by the
temporal nativity, inasmuch as He became incarnate. But it does not
belong to the Father to be sent, for He is innascible, as was said
above (I, Q. 32, A. 3; First Part, Q. 43, A. 4). Therefore at least
the Person of the Father cannot become incarnate.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever the Son can do, so can the Father and the
Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the three Persons would not be
one. But the Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father
and the Holy Ghost were able to become incarnate.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (AA. 1, 2, 4), assumption implies
two things, viz. the act of the one assuming and the term of the
assumption. Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the
term is a Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly
in all the Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to
all the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now
whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can
terminate its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in
rational powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them.
Therefore the Divine power could have united human nature to the
Person of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the
Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy
Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the Son.
Reply Obj. 1: The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to be the
Son of Man, does not constitute His Person, as does the eternal
Sonship; but is something following upon the temporal nativity.
Hence, if the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy
Ghost in this manner, there would be no confusion of the Divine
Persons.
Reply Obj. 2: Adoptive sonship is a certain participation of natural
sonship; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the Father,
Who is the principle of natural sonship, and by the gift of the Holy
Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal. 4:6:
"God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying, Abba,
Father." And therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we
receive adoptive sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so
likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have received
adoptive sonship from Him, as from the principle of the natural
sonship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond of Father
and Son.
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to eternal
birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the Son of
God is said to be sent in regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as He
is from another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for
the nature of mission.
_______________________
SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 6]
Whether Several Divine Persons Can Assume One and the Same Individual
Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one
and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would
either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine
Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human
nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there
be only one man, for one man is "this man," which signifies one
person; and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be
destroyed, which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three
Persons can take one human nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of Person,
as has been said above (A. 2). But the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost
are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot assume one
human nature.
Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4), and
Augustine (De Trin. i, 11, 12, 13), that from the Incarnation of God
the Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of
the Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to
assume one human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of
each of the three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely,
what was said of the man could be said of each of the three Persons.
Therefore what is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would
be said of the man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God;
and this could not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three
Persons should assume one human nature.
_On the contrary,_ The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But
the three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they
can also subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human
nature be assumed by the three Persons.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 2, A. 5, ad 1), by the union
of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new
hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or
hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the
human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the
characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude
another from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same
Person. Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation "the whole
reason of the deed is the power of the doer," as Augustine says (Ep.
ad Volusianum cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality
of the Divine Person assuming, and not according to the quality of
the human nature assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or
three Divine Persons should assume one human nature, but it would be
impossible for them to assume one human hypostasis or person; thus
Anselm says in the book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that
"several Persons cannot assume one and the same man to unity of
Person."
Reply Obj. 1: In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one human
nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man,
because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say
the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so
it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human
nature. Nor would "one" imply unity of person, but unity in human
nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons
were one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying
that men, who are many simply, are in some respect one, e.g. one
people, and as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): "The Spirit of God
and the spirit of man are by nature different, but by inherence one
spirit results," according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the
Lord is one spirit."
Reply Obj. 2: In this supposition the human nature would be assumed
to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of each
Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with
each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each
Person by assumption.
Reply Obj. 3: In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results a
communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because
whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person
subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may
apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be
predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the
Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.
But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own
Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost
on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain.
Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the
man was unbegotten, inasmuch as "man" stood for the Person of the
Father. But if one were to go on to say, "The man is unbegotten; the
Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten," it would be the fallacy
of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is
unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude
that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 7]
Whether One Divine Person Can Assume Two Human Natures?
Objection 1: It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume two
human natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of the
Incarnation has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine
Person, as is plain from what has been stated above (Q. 2, AA. 3, 6).
Therefore, if we suppose one Person to assume two human natures,
there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species;
which would seem to imply a contradiction, for the nature of one
species is only multiplied by distinct supposita.
Obj. 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the
Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have
one human nature; neither could it be said that there were several,
for several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there
would be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is
impossible.
Obj. 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole Divine
Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i.e. to every part of
it, for Christ is "perfect God and perfect man, complete God and
complete man," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two
human natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul
of one would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two
bodies would be together, which would give rise to confusion of
natures. Therefore it is not possibly for one Divine Person to assume
two human natures.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son
do. But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human
nature distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing
is the power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of
the Son. Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can
assume another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed.
_I answer that,_ What has power for one thing, and no more, has a
power limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite,
nor can it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said
that a Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to
assume another. For it would seem to follow from this that the
Personality of the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human
nature as to be unable to assume another to its Personality; and this
is impossible, for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any
creature. Hence it is plain that, whether we consider the Divine
Person in regard to His power, which is the principle of the union,
or in regard to His Personality, which is the term of the union, it
has to be said that the Divine Person, over and beyond the human
nature which He has assumed, can assume another distinct human nature.
Reply Obj. 1: A created nature is completed in its essentials by its
form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter. And
hence, if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new
suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the
multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation
the union of form and matter, i.e. of soul and body, does not
constitute a new suppositum, as was said above (A. 6). Hence there
can be a numerical multitude on the part of the nature, on account of
the division of matter, without distinction of supposita.
Reply Obj. 2: It might seem possible to reply that in such a
hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the
two natures, just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be
called one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said
above (A. 6, ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we
must use words according to the purpose of their signification, which
is in relation to our surroundings. Consequently, in order to judge
of a word's signification or co-signification, we must consider the
things which are around us, in which a word derived from some form is
never used in the plural unless there are several supposita. For a
man who has on two garments is not said to be "two persons clothed,"
but "one clothed with two garments"; and whoever has two qualities is
designated in the singular as "such by reason of the two qualities."
Now the assumed nature is, as it were, a garment, although this
similitude does not fit at all points, as has been said above (Q. 2,
A. 6, ad 1). And hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human
natures, He would be called, on account of the unity of suppositum,
one man having two human natures. Now many men are said to be one
people, inasmuch as they have some one thing in common, and not on
account of the unity of suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine
Persons were to assume one singular human nature, they would be said
to be one man, as stated (A. 6, ad 1), not from the unity of
suppositum, but because they have some one thing in common.
Reply Obj. 3: The Divine and human natures do not bear the same
relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related
first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity;
and afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine Person,
inasmuch as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed
that the nature is the Person, but that the Person of God subsists in
human nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but is not His
manhood. And hence, in order that the human nature may be assumed by
the Divine Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a personal
union with the whole nature assumed, i.e. in all its parts. Now in
the two natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the
Divine Person, nor would one assume the other. Hence it would not be
necessary for one of them to be altogether united to the other, i.e.
all the parts of one with all the parts of the other.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 8]
Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than
any other Divine Person should assume human nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son
of God should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Ghost. For
by the mystery of the Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge
of God, according to John 18:37: "For this was I born, and for this
came I into the world, to give testimony to the truth." But by the
Person of the Son of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back
from the true knowledge of God, since they referred to the very
Person of the Son what was said of the Son in His human nature, as
Arius, who held an inequality of Persons, according to what is said
(John 14:28): "The Father is greater than I." Now this error would
not have arisen if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, for
no one would have taken the Father to be less than the Son. Hence it
seems fitting that the Person of the Father, rather than the Person
of the Son, should have become incarnate.
Obj. 2: Further, the effect of the Incarnation would seem to be, as
it were, a second creation of human nature, according to Gal. 6:15:
"For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor
uncircumcision, but a new creature." But the power of creation is
appropriated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more
becoming to the Father than to the Son to become incarnate.
Obj. 3: Further, the Incarnation is ordained to the remission of
sins, according to Matt. 1:21: "Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For
He shall save His people from their sins." Now the remission of sins
is attributed to the Holy Ghost according to John 20:22, 23: "Receive
ye the Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven
them." Therefore it became the Person of the Holy Ghost rather than
the Person of the Son to become incarnate.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1): "In the
mystery of the Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made
known: the wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most
heavy debt; the power, for He made the conquered conquer." But power
and wisdom are appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Cor. 1:24:
"Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God." Therefore it was
fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate.
_I answer that,_ It was most fitting that the Person of the Son
should become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as
are similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is
the Word of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures,
because the word of the craftsman, i.e. his concept, is an exemplar
likeness of whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is
His eternal concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And
therefore as creatures are established in their proper species,
though movably, by the participation of this likeness, so by the
non-participated and personal union of the Word with a creature, it
was fitting that the creature should be restored in order to its
eternal and unchangeable perfection; for the craftsman by the
intelligible form of his art, whereby he fashioned his handiwork,
restores it when it has fallen into ruin. Moreover, He has a
particular agreement with human nature, since the Word is a concept
of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man's wisdom is derived. And
hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper perfection, as
he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the disciple is
instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is said
(Ecclus. 1:5): "The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom."
And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting that
the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature.
Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the
union, which is the fulfilling of predestination, i.e. of such as are
preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on
sons, according to Rom. 8:17: "If sons, heirs also." Hence it was
fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this
likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same
chapter (Rom. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to
be made conformable to the image of His Son."
Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our
first parent, for which the Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the
first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of
the serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence
it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led
back to God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst
for knowledge.
Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse, since
it even abuses God's goodness, according to Rom. 2:4: "Or despisest
thou the riches of His goodness?" Hence, even if the Person of the
Father had become incarnate, men would have been capable of finding
an occasion of error, as though the Son were not able to restore
human nature.
Reply Obj. 2: The first creation of things was made by the power of
God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation ought to
have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God the
Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation
according to 2 Cor. 5:19: "For God indeed was in Christ reconciling
the world to Himself."
Reply Obj. 3: To be the gift of the Father and the Son is proper to
the Holy Ghost. But the remission of sins is caused by the Holy
Ghost, as by the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to man's
justification that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift the
Holy Ghost is.
_______________________
QUESTION 4
OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About
which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of
God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.
Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a
threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature;
secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order
of the assumption.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any
other nature?
(2) Whether He assumed a person?
(3) Whether He assumed a man?
(4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature
abstracted from all individuals?
(5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all
its individuals?
(6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any
man begotten of the stock of Adam?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 1]
Whether Human Nature Was More Assumable by the Son of God Than Any
Other Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that human nature is not more capable of
being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine
says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): "In deeds wrought miraculously the
whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer." Now the power of
God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is
not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite.
Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any
other creature.
Obj. 2: Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the
Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated (Q. 3, A. 8). But
as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in
irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the
irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature.
Obj. 3: Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect
likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.;
xxxiv in Ev.), where he introduces Ezech. 28:12: "Thou wast the seal
of resemblance." And sin is found in angels, even as in man,
according to Job 4:18: "And in His angels He found wickedness."
Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the
nature of man.
Obj. 4: Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the
more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole
universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human
nature. Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed
than human nature.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten
Wisdom: "My delights were to be with the children of men"; and hence
there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with
human nature.
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of
being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken
with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to
what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a
creature with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is
said to be assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now
this fitness in human nature may be taken from two things, viz.
according to its dignity, and according to its need. According to its
dignity, because human nature, as being rational and intellectual,
was made for attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation,
viz. by knowing and loving Him. According to its need--because it
stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now
these two things belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational
creature the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature
the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only
human nature was assumable.
Reply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to their
proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their
first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not
that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the
proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be
not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God,
but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no
capability for this.
Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of image is found in human nature,
forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through
its own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace
regards only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the
creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which
such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For
what does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as
a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is
much less fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more
perfect is the union with God in personal being than the union by
operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the
union with God by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in
personal being.
Reply Obj. 3: Some say that angels are not assumable, since they are
perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation,
inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption; hence
they cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their
personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the
incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one
assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the
creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the
fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed. For God by producing
a new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and
in this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was
said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although
the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is
irremediable, as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 4: The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of
one person or suppositum, but of something which is one by position
or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of assumption, as
was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of
being assumed.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 2]
Whether the Son of God Assumed a Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "assumed
human nature _in atomo,"_ i.e. in an individual. But an individual in
rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab.
Nat.). Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Son
of God "assumed what He had sown in our nature." But He sowed our
personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent
III [*Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that
"the Person of God absorbed the person of man." Therefore it would
seem that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum
ii) that "God assumed the nature, not the person, of man."
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is
taken into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the
assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion.
Now a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption;
rather, it is the term of the assumption, as was said (Q. 3, AA. 1,
2). For if it were presupposed, it must either have been
corrupted--in which case it was useless; or it remains after the
union--and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and the
other assumed, which is false, as was shown above (Q. 2, A. 6). Hence
it follows that the Son of God nowise assumed a human person.
Reply Obj. 1: The Son of God assumed human nature _in atomo,_ i.e. in
an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the
Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was
assumed.
Reply Obj. 2: Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature
assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of
the human nature but through the addition of something which is above
human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person.
Reply Obj. 3: Absorption does not here imply the destruction of
anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have
been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine
Person, the human nature would have had its own personality; and in
this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person "absorbed
the person," inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the
human nature from having its personality.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 3]
Whether the Divine Person Assumed a Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For
it is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and
taken to Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says
(De Agone Christ. xi): "The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore
things human."
Obj. 2: Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the Son
of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man.
Obj. 3: Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the
men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any
other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed.
_On the contrary,_ Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which
is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: "We believe in our Lord Jesus
Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and
Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is
another besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that
there be another besides Him."
_I answer that,_ As has been said above (A. 2), what is assumed is
not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption.
Now it was said (Q. 3, AA. 1, 2) that the individual to Whom the
human nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is
the term of the assumption. Now this word "man" signifies human
nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 4, 11), this word God signifies Him Who has human nature.
And hence it cannot properly be said that the Son assumed a man,
granted (as it must be, in fact) that in Christ there is but one
suppositum and one hypostasis. But according to such as hold that
there are two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly
and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man. Hence the
first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants that a man was
assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was said above (Q. 2, A.
6).
Reply Obj. 1: These phrases are not to be taken too literally, but
are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy doctors;
so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was
assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this--that the Son
of God is man.
Reply Obj. 2: The word "man" signifies human nature in the concrete,
inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot say a
suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.
Reply Obj. 3: The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed, but the
man whose nature He assumed.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 4]
Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed Human Nature Abstracted
from All Individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of
human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it
is said of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is "the Saviour of all men,
especially of the faithful." But nature as it is in individuals
withdraws from its universality. Therefore the Son of God ought to
have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.
Obj. 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed
to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the
Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing (_per se_) man, which,
according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its
individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.
Obj. 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in
the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above (A.
3). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in
individuals, as is plain from what has been said (A. 3). Therefore
the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from
individuals.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the
Word Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought;
for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious
Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from
individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not
exist in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11).
Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is
separated from individuals.
_I answer that,_ The nature of man or of any other sensible thing,
beyond the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two
ways: first, as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the
Platonists held; secondly, as existing in an intellect either human
or Divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves
(Metaph. vii, 26, 27, 29, 51), because sensible matter belongs to the
specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition,
as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence human nature
cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were
subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that it should be
assumed by the Word of God. First, because this assumption is
terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common
form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because to a
common nature can only be attributed common and universal operations,
according to which man neither merits nor demerits, whereas, on the
contrary, the assumption took place in order that the Son of God,
having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a
nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the
Son of God assumed human nature in order to show Himself in men's
sight, according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was seen upon earth,
and conversed with men."
Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of
God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other
than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be
in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of
God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this
would mean nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human
nature; and thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a
false understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be
anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11).
Reply Obj. 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of all,
not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to the
nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause,
whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human
salvation.
Reply Obj. 2: Self-existing (_per se_) man is not to be found in
nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists
held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only
in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be
assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.
Reply Obj. 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete,
as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless
it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an
individual.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 5]
Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed Human Nature in All
Individuals?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed
human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by
itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature
belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that
human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its
supposita.
Obj. 2: Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine Love;
hence it is written (John 3:16): "God so loved the world as to give
His only-begotten Son." But love makes us give ourselves to our
friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to
assume several human natures, as was said above (Q. 3, A. 7), and
with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to
assume human nature in all its supposita.
Obj. 3: Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the shortest
manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all men had
been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to lead
many to the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. 4:5 (cf. Heb. 2:10).
Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all its
supposita.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the
Son of God "did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He
assume all its hypostases."
_I answer that,_ It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by
the Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of
supposita of human nature, which are natural to it, would have been
taken away. For since we must not see any other suppositum in the
assumed nature, except the Person assuming, as was said above (A. 3),
if there was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow
that there was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the
Person assuming. Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to
the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of
many brethren, according to the human nature, even as He is the
First-born of all creatures according to the Divine, for then all men
would be of equal dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one
Divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature,
so that on both sides unity might be found.
Reply Obj. 1: To be assumed belongs to the human nature of itself,
because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it belongs
to the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not, however,
that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential
principles, or as its natural property in which manner it would
belong to all its supposita.
Reply Obj. 2: The love of God to men is shown not merely in the
assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in
human nature for other men, according to Rom. 5:8: "But God
commendeth His charity towards us; because when as yet we were
sinners . . . Christ died for us," which would not have taken place
had He assumed human nature in all its supposita.
Reply Obj. 3: In order to shorten the way, which every skilful
workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence
it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 4, Art. 6]
Whether It Was Fitting for the Son of God to Assume Human Nature of
the Stock of Adam?
Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God
to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says
(Heb. 7:26): "For it was fitting that we should have such a high
priest . . . separated from sinners." But He would have been still
further separated from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the
stock of Adam, a sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have
assumed human nature of the stock of Adam.
Obj. 2: Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what is
from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He
ought to have assumed it in Adam himself.
Obj. 3: Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews, as
a gloss says on Gal. 2:15: "For we by nature are Jews, and not of the
Gentiles, sinners." Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from
sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than
from the stock of Abraham, who was just.
_On the contrary,_ (Luke 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back
to Adam.
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): "God was able
to assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by
his sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better
to assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish
the enemy of the human race." And this for three reasons: First,
because it would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should
make amends; and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted
should be assumed that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the
whole nature. Secondly, it pertains to man's greater dignity that the
conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the
devil. Thirdly, because God's power is thereby made more manifest,
since, from a corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was
raised to such might and glory.
Reply Obj. 1: Christ ought to be separated from sinners as regards
sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature which He
came to save, and in which "it behooved Him in all things to be made
like to His brethren," as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:17). And in this
is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed from
a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity.
Reply Obj. 2: As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came to
take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which
Adam was subject, whom Christ "brought out of his sin," as is written
(Wis. 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need
cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover
is immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself
unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human
nature in Adam himself.
Reply Obj. 3: Since Christ ought especially to be separated from
sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it was
fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men should
stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness
should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ
was to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in
Abraham, who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and
circumcision, as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is
written (Gen. 17:11).
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QUESTION 5
OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH WERE ASSUMED
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?
(2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body, i.e. one of
flesh and blood?
(3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul?
(4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 5, Art. 1]
Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed a True Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true
body. For it is written (Phil. 2:7), that He was "made in the
likeness of men." But what is something in truth is not said to be in
the likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true
body.
Obj. 2: Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the
dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ.) that "the
glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the
assumption lessen the higher." But it pertains to the dignity of God
to be altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by
the assumption God was not united to a body.
Obj. 3: Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But the
apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the
manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in
the imagination, as is plain from Isa. 60:1: "I saw the Lord
sitting," etc. Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of
God in the world was not in a real body, but only in imagination.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): "If the body
of Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us,
He is not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was
not a phantom." Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.
_I answer that,_ As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was
not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His
body was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the
essence of human nature to which it pertains to have a true body.
Therefore granted, as already proved (Q. 4, A. 1), that it was
fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, He must
consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken
from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body
was not real but imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of
those things which the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in
very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it would also follow
that the real salvation of man has not taken place; since the effect
must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is taken from
the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom it did not become to have
anything fictitious in His work, since He is the Truth. Hence our
Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Luke 24:37, 39), when the
disciples, "troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit,"
and not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch,
saying: "Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as
you see Me to have."
Reply Obj. 1: This likeness indicates the truth of the human nature
in Christ--just as all that truly exist in human nature are said to
be like in species--and not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of
this the Apostle subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became "obedient unto
death, even to the death of the cross"; which would have been
impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness.
Reply Obj. 2: By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of God
is nowise lessened. Hence Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad
Petrum ii): "He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that
He might become a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the
form of God." For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to
become the form of a body, which is repugnant to the Divine
simplicity and purity--for this would be to assume a body to the
unity of the nature, which is impossible, as is plain from what has
been stated above (Q. 2, A. 1): but, the natures remaining distinct,
He assumed a body to the unity of Person.
Reply Obj. 3: The figure ought to correspond to the reality as
regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For
if they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness
but the reality itself, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26).
Hence it was more fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament
should be in appearance only, being figures; and that the apparition
of the Son of God in the world should be in a real body, being the
thing prefigured by these figures. Hence the Apostle says (Col.
2:17): "Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is
Christ's."
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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 5, Art. 2]
Whether the Son of God Ought to Have Assumed a Carnal or Earthly Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly,
but a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:41): "The first
man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly."
But the first man, i.e. Adam, was of the earth as regards his body,
as is plain from Gen. 1. Therefore the second man, i.e. Christ, was
of heaven as regards the body.
Obj. 2: Further, it is said (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood shall
not [Vulg.: 'cannot'] possess the kingdom of God." But the kingdom of
God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in
Him, but rather a heavenly body.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But of
all bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behooved Christ
to assume such a body.
_On the contrary,_ our Lord says (Luke 24:39): "A spirit hath not
flesh and bones, as you see Me to have." Now flesh and bones are not
of the matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior
elements. Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a
carnal and earthly body.
_I answer that,_ By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ
was not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a
heavenly body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature
of Christ would not have been maintained had His body been an
imaginary one, such as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have
been maintained if we supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a
heavenly body. For since the form of man is a natural thing, it
requires determinate matter, to wit, flesh and bones, which must be
placed in the definition of man, as is plain from the Philosopher
(Metaph. vii, 39). Secondly, because this would lessen the truth of
such things as Christ did in the body. For since a heavenly body is
impassible and incorruptible, as is proved De Coel. i, 20, if the Son
of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would not have truly hungered
or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His passion and death.
Thirdly, this would have detracted from God's truthfulness. For since
the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He had a carnal and
earthly body, the manifestation would have been false, had He had a
heavenly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said: "The Son of
God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin's body, and not bringing it
with Him from heaven."
Reply Obj. 1: Christ is said in two ways to have come down from
heaven. First, as regards His Divine Nature; not indeed that the
Divine Nature ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be
here below in a new way, viz. by His assumed nature, according to
John 3:13: "No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended
from heaven, the Son of Man, Who is in heaven."
Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of
the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was
formed by a heavenly power, i.e. by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine,
explaining the passage quoted, says (Ad Orosium [*Dial. Qq. lxv, qu.
4, work of an unknown author]): "I call Christ a heavenly man because
He was not conceived of human seed." And Hilary expounds it in the
same way (De Trin. x).
Reply Obj. 2: Flesh and blood are not taken here for the substance of
flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which was not in
Christ as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a punishment;
thus, for a time, it was in Christ, that He might carry through the
work of our redemption.
Reply Obj. 3: It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have raised
a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General
Council of Ephesus (P. II, Act. I) we read the saying of St.
Theophilus: "Just as the best workmen are esteemed not merely for
displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because
by making use of the poorest clay and commonest earth, they show the
power of their craft; so the best of all workmen, the Word of God,
did not come down to us by taking a heavenly body of some most
precious matter, but shewed the greatness of His skill in clay."
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 5, Art. 3]
Whether the Son of God Assumed a Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul.
For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (John
1:14): "The Word was made flesh"--no mention being made of a soul.
Now it is not said that "the Word was made flesh" as if changed to
flesh, but because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have
assumed a soul.
Obj. 2: Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to quicken
it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it would
seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Ps. 35:10): Lord, "with
Thee is the fountain of life." Therefore it would seem altogether
superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But
"God and nature do nothing uselessly," as the Philosopher says (De
Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have
assumed a soul.
Obj. 3: Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the
common nature, which is the human species. But "in the Lord Jesus
Christ we are not to look for a common species," as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): "Let us not
hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word
of God; and take 'the Word was made flesh' to mean that the man had
no soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh."
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69, 55), it was first
of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of
God assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took
the place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that
there were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul
and body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot
hold, for three reasons. First, because it is counter to the
authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul,
Matt. 26:38: "My soul is sorrowful even unto death"; and John 10:18:
"I have power to lay down My soul [_animam meam:_ Douay: 'My life']."
But to this Apollinaris replied that in these words soul is taken
metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the Old Testament of
the soul of God (Isa. 1:14): "My soul hateth your new moons and your
solemnities." But, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the
Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry.
Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, slept
and was weary shows that He had a true human body: otherwise, if
these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the
Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined.
For it is one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and
another that historical events were related in very truth by the
Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the
Incarnation, which is man's liberation. For Augustine [*Vigilius
Tapsensis] argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): "If the Son of God in
taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness,
and trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable
to Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He
reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He
cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of
these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call
Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God
of all, if He has not made our soul. And as regards the other two
reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no
place is given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the
cause of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin of wilful
transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment
of the habit of reason? Or how can His generosity be known to any one
who says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you
look at its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than
the body: but if at the sin of transgression, on account of its
intelligence it is worse than the body. Now I know and declare that
Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt that He is most
loving; and because of the first of these He did not despise what was
better and more capable of prudence; and because of the second He
protected what was most wounded." Thirdly, this position is against
the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man
receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent,
there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from
the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; _Metaph._ vii, 34).
Reply Obj. 1: When we say, "The Word was made flesh," "flesh" is
taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, "The Word was made
man," as Isa. 40:5: "All flesh together shall see that the mouth of
the Lord hath spoken." And the whole man is signified by flesh,
because, as is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became
visible by flesh; hence it is subjoined: "And we saw His glory." Or
because, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), "in all that union
the Word is the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence,
wishing to commend the love of God's humility to us, the Evangelist
mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it
is less than the Word and nobler than flesh." Again, it was
reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the
Word, was less assumable, as it would seem.
Reply Obj. 2: The Word is the fountain of life, as the first
effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of
the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence
from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded
that the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may
be concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to say that
in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul coming
to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a
common species, i.e. a third something resulting from the Godhead and
the humanity.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 4]
Whether the Son of God Assumed a Human Mind or Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human
mind or intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not
required. But man is made to God's image, as regards his mind, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Hence, since in Christ there was
the presence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human
mind.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word of
God, Who is "the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into
this world," as is written John 1:9, is compared to the mind as the
greater light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it
were a lamp enkindled by the First Light (Prov. 20:27): "The spirit
of a man is the lamp of the Lord." Therefore in Christ Who is the
Word of God, there is no need of a human mind.
Obj. 3: Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God is
called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing
carnal, either in its substance or in its act, for it is not the act
of a body, as is proved _De Anima_ iii, 6. Hence it would seem that
the Son of God did not assume a human mind.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum
xiv): "Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has
true flesh and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His
flesh He says (Luke 24:39): 'Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not
flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.' And He proves that He has a
soul, saying (John 17): 'I lay down My soul [Douay: 'life'] that I
may take it again.' And He proves that He has an intellect, saying
(Matt. 11:29): 'Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.'
And God says of Him by the prophet (Isa. 52:13): 'Behold my servant
shall understand.'"
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49, 50), "the
Apollinarists thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning
the soul of Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh
alone, without a soul; and on being overcome on this point by the
Gospel witness, they went on to say that the mind was wanting to
Christ's soul, but that the Word supplied its place." But this
position is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding. First,
because it runs counter to the Gospel story, which relates how He
marveled (as is plain from Matt. 8:10). Now marveling cannot be
without reason, since it implies the collation of effect and cause,
i.e. inasmuch as when we see an effect and are ignorant of its cause,
we seek to know it, as is said _Metaph._ i, 2. Secondly, it is
inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation, which is the
justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of
sin nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence it was
especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God assumed a body and an
intellectual and rational soul," and adds afterwards: "The whole was
united to the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for
what was not assumed is not curable." Thirdly, it is against the
truth of the Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the
soul as matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it
is not perfected by human, i.e. a rational soul. And hence if Christ
had had a soul without a mind, He would not have had true human
flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal
soul by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80)
that from this error it would have followed that the Son of God "took
an animal with the form of a human body," which, again, is against
the Divine truth, which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth.
Reply Obj. 1: Where a thing is by its presence, its image is not
required to supply the place of the thing, as where the emperor is
the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing
is required together with its presence, that it may be perfected by
the presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected
by the impression of the seal, and as the image of man is reflected
in the mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human
mind it was necessary that the Word should unite it to Himself.
Reply Obj. 2: The greater light dims the lesser light of another
luminous body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the light of
the body illuminated--at the presence of the sun the light of the
stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the
intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light
of the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of
man is perfected rather than overshadowed.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the intellective power is not the act of a
body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form
of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it
may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a
better disposed body should correspond to it.
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QUESTION 6
OF THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTION
(In Six Articles)
We must now consider the order of the foregoing assumption, and under
this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the
soul?
(2) Whether He assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit or
mind?
(3) Whether the soul was assumed previous to the flesh?
(4) Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word previous to
being united to the soul?
(5) Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of
the parts?
(6) Whether it was assumed through the medium of grace?
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 1]
Whether the Son of God Assumed Flesh Through the Medium of the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh
through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God
is united to human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the
mode whereby He is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures
immediately by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is
the Son of God united to flesh without the medium of the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God in
unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to
the human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human
body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the
hypostasis than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of
individuation, which is implied in the word "hypostasis," would seem
to be matter. Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the
medium of the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, take away the medium and you separate what were
joined by the medium; for example, if the superficies be removed
color would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the
medium of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the
body by death, yet there still remained the union of the Word to the
flesh, as will be shown (Q. 50, AA. 2, 3). Hence the Word was not
joined to flesh through the medium of the soul.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvi): "The
greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and
through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something
higher."
_I answer that,_ A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end.
Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now
there is a twofold order: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in
the mystery of the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the
order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to
Himself at the same time, as will appear (Q. 30, A. 3). An order of
nature between things may be taken in two ways: first, as regards
rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God;
secondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is
midway between the first cause and the last effect. And this second
order follows the first to some extent; for as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. xiii), God acts upon the more remote substances through the
less remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is
found to be midway between God and flesh; and in this way it may be
said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the medium
of the soul. But even as regards the second order of causality the
soul is to some extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of
God. For the flesh would not have been assumable, except by its
relation to the rational soul, through which it becomes human flesh.
For it was said above (Q. 4, A. 1) that human nature was assumable
before all others.
Reply Obj. 1: We may consider a twofold order between creatures and
God: the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and
depending on Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on
account of the infinitude of His power God touches each thing
immediately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is
in all things by essence, presence and power. But the second order is
by reason of things being directed to God as to their end; and it is
here that there is a medium between the creature and God, since lower
creatures are directed to God by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl.
Hier. v); and to this order pertains the assumption of human nature
by the Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and hence it
is united to flesh through the soul.
Reply Obj. 2: If the hypostasis of the Word of God were constituted
simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was nearest to
it, since it is matter which is the principle of individuation; even
as the soul, being the specific form, would be nearer the human
nature. But because the hypostasis of the Word is prior to and more
exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any part of the human
nature is, the nearer it is to the hypostasis of the Word. And hence
the soul is nearer the Word of God than the body is.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the
aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the
other remains; because although a thing's becoming may depend on
another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as
a friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter
has gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her
beauty, which makes a woman's fittingness for the marriage tie, yet
when her beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So
likewise, when the soul was separated, the union of the Word with
flesh still endured.
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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 2]
Whether the Son of God Assumed a Soul Through the Medium of the
Spirit or Mind?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul
through the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium
between itself and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence
but the soul itself, as was said above (I, Q. 77, A. 1, ad 1).
Therefore the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of
the spirit or mind.
Obj. 2: Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself more
assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the
soul; which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not
assumable, as was said above (Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it seems that the
Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit.
Obj. 3: Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first
through the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the
very essence, which naturally comes before its power--the mind.
Therefore it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul
through the medium of the spirit or mind.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii): "The
invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit,
and a body by means of the soul."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the Son of God is said to
have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the
order of dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these
may be applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we
compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed
congruously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His
likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit,
according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind." So,
too, the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the
soul, and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God is united to flesh through the
medium of the intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the
soul, God Himself being an intellect."
Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellect is not distinct from the soul in
essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a power;
and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium.
Reply Obj. 2: Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic
spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the
irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human
spirit, as is clear from what has been said above (I, Q. 62, A. 8;
First Part, Q. 64, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 3: The soul, between which and the Word of God the
intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of
the soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower
powers, which are common to every soul.
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 3]
Whether the Soul Was Assumed Before the Flesh by the Son of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before
the flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the
medium of the soul, as was said above (A. 1). Now the medium is
reached before the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul
before the body.
Obj. 2: Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels,
according to Ps. 96:8: "Adore Him, all you His angels." But the
angels were created in the beginning, as was said above (I, Q. 46, A.
3). Therefore the soul of Christ also (was created in the beginning).
But it was not created before it was assumed, for Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. iii, 2, 3, 9), that "neither the soul nor the body of
Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of the Word."
Therefore it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh,
which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (John 1:14): "We saw Him [Vulg.: 'His
glory'] full of grace and truth," and it is added afterwards that "of
His fulness we have all received" (John 1:16), i.e. all the faithful
of all time, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan.). Now this
could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fulness of
grace and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of
the world, for the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since
the fulness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union
with the Word, according to what is written in the same place: "We
saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the
Father, full of grace and truth," it would seem in consequence that
from the beginning of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the
Word of God.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 6): "The
intellect was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God,
and henceforth called Christ, before the Incarnation which was of the
Virgin."
_I answer that,_ Origen (Peri Archon i, 7, 8; ii, 8) maintained that
all souls, amongst which he placed Christ's soul, were created in the
beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first
of all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would
follow that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the
Word; and thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union
did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing
subsistence of the soul was corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting
to suppose that this soul was united to the Word from the beginning,
and that it afterwards became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin;
for thus His soul would not seem to be of the same nature as ours,
which are created at the same time that they are infused into bodies.
Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. xxxv) that "Christ's flesh was
not of a different nature to ours, nor was a different soul infused
into it in the beginning than into other men."
Reply Obj. 1: As was said above (A. 1), the soul of Christ is said to
be the medium in the union of the flesh with the Word, in the order
of nature; but it does not follow from this that it was the medium in
the order of time.
Reply Obj. 2: As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ's soul
excels our soul "not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of
power"; for it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the
angels in "fulness of grace and truth." But the mode of creation is
in harmony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is the
form of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it
is infused into and united with the body; which does not happen to
angels, since they are substances entirely free from matter.
Reply Obj. 3: Of the fulness of Christ all men receive according to
the faith they have in Him; for it is written (Rom. 3:22) that "the
justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them
that believe in Him." Now just as we believe in Him as already born;
so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, since "having
the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe," as it is written (2
Cor. 4:13). But the faith which is in Christ has the power of
justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God, according to
Rom. 4:5: "But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that
justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to
the purpose of the grace of God." Hence because this purpose is
eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the
faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was full of grace and
truth.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 6, Art. 4]
Whether the Flesh of Christ Was Assumed by the Word Before Being
United to the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by
the Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine [*Fulgentius]
says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii): "Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt
that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin
without the Godhead before it was assumed by the Word." But the flesh
of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being united to
the rational soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the
completive form in order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ
was assumed before being united to the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the
body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being
than in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted
above (A. 3). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no
other principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten
before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was th
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