Selections from Previous Works
by Samuel Butler · English · Gutenberg #19610 · 564,759 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: Selections from Previous Works
Author: Samuel Butler
Release date: October 24, 2006 [eBook #19610]
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/19610
Credits: Transcribed from the 1884 Trubner & Co. edition by David Price
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SELECTIONS FROM PREVIOUS WORKS ***
Transcribed from the 1884 Trubner & Co. edition by David Price, email
ccx074@pglaf.org
SELECTIONS FROM PREVIOUS WORKS
_WITH REMARKS ON MR. G. J. ROMANES'_ "_MENTAL EVOLUTION IN ANIMALS_"
AND
A PSALM OF MONTREAL
BY
SAMUEL BUTLER
"The course of true science, like that of true love, never did run
smooth."
PROFESSOR TYNDALL, _Pall Mall Gazette_, Oct 30, 1883.
(OP. 7)
LONDON
TRUBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL
1884
[_All rights reserved_]
Ballantyne Press
BALLANTYNE, HANSON AND CO.
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
PREFACE.
I delayed these pages some weeks in order to give Mr. Romanes an
opportunity of explaining his statement that Canon Kingsley wrote about
instinct and inherited memory in _Nature_, Jan. 18, 1867. {iii} I wrote
to the _Athenaeum_ (Jan. 26, 1884) and pointed out that _Nature_ did not
begin to appear till nearly three years after the date given by Mr.
Romanes, and that there was nothing from Canon Kingsley on the subject of
instinct and inherited memory in any number of _Nature_ up to the date of
Canon Kingsley's death. I also asked for the correct reference.
This Mr. Romanes has not thought it incumbent upon him to give. I am
told I ought not to have expected him to give it, inasmuch as it is no
longer usual for men of any but the lowest scientific standing to correct
their misstatements when they are brought to book. Science is made for
Fellows of the Royal Society, and for no one else, not Fellows of the
Royal Society for science; and if the having achieved a certain position
should still involve being obliged to be as scrupulous and accurate as
other people, what is the good of the position? This view of the matter
is practical, but I regret that Mr. Romanes should have taken it, for his
having done so has prevented my being able to tell the reader what Canon
Kingsley said about memory and instinct, and this he might have been glad
to know.
I suspect, however, that what Canon Kingsley said was after all not very
important. If it had been, Mr. Romanes would have probably told us what
it was in his own book. I should think it possible that Mr. Romanes--not
finding Canon Kingsley's words important enough to be quoted, or even
referred to correctly, or never having seen them himself and not knowing
exactly what they were, yet being anxious to give every one, and more
particularly Canon Kingsley, his due--felt that this was an occasion on
which he might fairly take advantage of his position and say at large
whatever he was in the humour for saying at the moment.
I should not have thought this possible if I had not ere now had reason
to set Mr. Romanes down as one who was not likely to be squeamish about
trifles. Nevertheless, on this present occasion I certainly did think
that he had only made a slip such as we all make sometimes, and such as
he would gladly take the earliest opportunity to correct. As it is, I do
not know what to think, except that D.C.L.'s and F.R.S.'s seem to be made
of much the same frail materials as we ordinary mortals are.
As regards the extracts from my previous books given in this volume, I
should say that I have revised and corrected the original text
throughout, and introduced a sentence or two here and there, but have
nowhere made any important alteration. I regret greatly that want of
space has prevented me from being able to give the chapters from Life and
Habit on "The Abeyance of Memory," and "What we should expect to find if
Differentiations of Structure and Instinct are mainly due to Memory;" it
is in these chapters that an explanation of many phenomena is given, of
which, so far as I know, no explanation of any kind had been previously
attempted, and in which phenomena having apparently so little connection
as the sterility of hybrids, the principle underlying longevity, the
resumption of feral characteristics, the sterility of many animals under
confinement, are not only made intelligible but are shown to be all part
and parcel of the same story--all being explicable as soon as Memory is
made the main factor of heredity.
_Feb._ 16, 1884.
SELECTIONS FROM EREWHON. {1}
_CURRENT OPINIONS_. (CHAPTER X. OF EREWHON.)
This is what I gathered. That in that country if a man falls into ill
health, or catches any disorder, or fails bodily in any way before he is
seventy years old, he is tried before a jury of his countrymen, and if
convicted is held up to public scorn and sentenced more or less severely
as the case may be. There are subdivisions of illnesses into crimes and
misdemeanours as with offences amongst ourselves--a man being punished
very heavily for serious illness, while failure of eyes or hearing in one
over sixty-five who has had good health hitherto is dealt with by fine
only, or imprisonment in default of payment.
But if a man forges a cheque, sets his house on fire, robs with violence
from the person, or does any other such things as are criminal in our own
country, he is either taken to a hospital and most carefully tended at
the public expense, or if he is in good circumstances, he lets it be
known to all his friends that he is suffering from a severe fit of
immorality, just as we do when we are ill, and they come and visit him
with great solicitude, and inquire with interest how it all came about,
what symptoms first showed themselves, and so forth,--questions which he
will answer with perfect unreserve; for bad conduct, though considered no
less deplorable than illness with ourselves, and as unquestionably
indicating something wrong with the individual who misbehaves, is
nevertheless held to be the result of either pre-natal or post-natal
misfortune. I should add that under certain circumstances poverty and
ill luck are also considered criminal.
Accordingly, there exists a class of men trained in soul-craft, whom they
call straighteners, as nearly as I can translate a word which literally
means "one who bendeth back the crooked." These men practise much as
medical men in England, and receive a quasi-surreptitious fee on every
visit. They are treated with the same unreserve and obeyed just as
readily as our own doctors--that is to say, on the whole
sufficiently--because people know that it is their interest to get well
as soon as they can, and that they will not be scouted as they would be
if their bodies were out of order, even though they may have to undergo a
very painful course of treatment.
When I say that they will not be scouted, I do not mean that an
Erewhonian offender will suffer no social inconvenience. Friends will
fall away from him because of his being less pleasant company, just as we
ourselves are disclined to make companions of those who are either poor
or poorly. No one with a due sense of self-respect will place himself on
an equality in the matter of affection with those who are less lucky than
himself in birth, health, money, good looks, capacity, or anything else.
Indeed, that dislike and even disgust should be felt by the fortunate for
the unfortunate, or at any rate for those who have been discovered to
have met with any of the more serious and less familiar misfortunes, is
not only natural, but desirable for any society, whether of man or brute;
what progress either of body or soul had been otherwise possible? The
fact therefore that the Erewhonians attach none of that guilt to crime
which they do to physical ailments, does not prevent the more selfish
among them from neglecting a friend who has robbed a bank, for instance,
till he has fully recovered; but it does prevent them from even thinking
of treating criminals with that contemptuous tone which would seem to
say, "I, if I were you, should be a better man than you are," a tone
which is held quite reasonable in regard to physical ailment.
Hence, though they conceal ill health by every kind of cunning, they are
quite open about even the most flagrant mental diseases, should they
happen to exist, which to do the people justice is not often. Indeed,
there are some who, so to speak, are spiritual valetudinarians, and who
make themselves exceedingly ridiculous by their nervous supposition that
they are wicked, while they are very tolerable people all the time. This
however is exceptional; and on the whole they use much the same reserve
or unreserve about the state of their moral welfare as we do about our
health.
It has followed that all the ordinary greetings among ourselves, such as,
How do you do? and the like, are considered signs of gross ill-breeding;
nor do the politer classes tolerate even such a common complimentary
remark as telling a man that he was looking well. They salute each other
with, "I hope you are good this morning;" or "I hope you have recovered
from the snappishness from which you were suffering when I last saw you;"
and if the person saluted has not been good, or is still snappish, he
says so, and is condoled with accordingly. Nay, the straighteners have
gone so far as to give names from the hypothetical language (as taught at
the Colleges of Unreason) to all known forms of mental indisposition, and
have classified them according to a system of their own, which, though I
could not understand it, seemed to work well in practice, for they are
always able to tell a man what is the matter with him as soon as they
have heard his story, and their familiarity with the long names assures
him that they thoroughly understand his case.
* * * * *
We in England rarely shrink from telling our doctor what is the matter
with us merely through the fear that he will hurt us. We let him do his
worst upon us, and stand it without a murmur, because we are not scouted
for being ill, and because we know the doctor is doing his best to cure
us, and can judge of our case better than we can; but we should conceal
all illness if we were treated as the Erewhonians are when they have
anything the matter with them; we should do as we do with our moral and
intellectual diseases,--we should feign health with the most consummate
art, till we were found out, and should hate a single flogging given by
way of mere punishment more than the amputation of a limb, if it were
kindly and courteously performed from a wish to help us out of our
difficulty, and with the full consciousness on the part of the doctor
that it was only by an accident of constitution that he was not in the
like plight himself. So the Erewhonians take a flogging once a week, and
a diet of bread and water for two or three months together, whenever
their straightener recommends it.
I do not suppose that even my host, on having swindled a confiding widow
out of the whole of her property, was put to more actual suffering than a
man will readily undergo at the hands of an English doctor. And yet he
must have had a very bad time of it. The sounds I heard were sufficient
to show that his pain was exquisite, but he never shrank from undergoing
it. He was quite sure that it did him good; and I think he was right. I
cannot believe that that man will ever embezzle money again. He may--but
it will be a long time before he does so.
During my confinement in prison, and on my journey, I had discovered much
of the above; but it still seemed new and strange, and I was in constant
fear of committing some rudeness from my inability to look at things from
the same stand-point as my neighbours; but after a few weeks' stay with
the Nosnibors I got to understand things better, especially on having
heard all about my host's illness, of which he told me fully and
repeatedly.
It seemed he had been on the Stock Exchange of the city for many years
and had amassed enormous wealth, without exceeding the limits of what was
generally considered justifiable or at any rate permissible dealing; but
at length on several occasions he had become aware of a desire to make
money by fraudulent representations, and had actually dealt with two or
three sums in a way which had made him rather uncomfortable. He had
unfortunately made light of it and pooh-poohed the ailment, until
circumstances eventually presented themselves which enabled him to cheat
upon a very considerable scale;--he told me what they were, and they were
about as bad as anything could be, but I need not detail them;--he seized
the opportunity, and became aware when it was too late that he must be
seriously out of order. He had neglected himself too long.
He drove home at once, broke the news to his wife and daughters as gently
as he could, and sent off for one of the most celebrated straighteners of
the kingdom to a consultation with the family practitioner, for the case
was plainly serious. On the arrival of the straightener he told his
story, and expressed his fear that his morals must be permanently
impaired.
The eminent man reassured him with a few cheering words, and then
proceeded to make a more careful diagnosis of the case. He inquired
concerning Mr. Nosnibor's parents--had their moral health been good? He
was answered that there had not been anything seriously amiss with them,
but that his maternal grandfather, whom he was supposed to resemble
somewhat in person, had been a consummate scoundrel and had ended his
days in a hospital,--while a brother of his father's, after having led a
most flagitious life for many years, had been at last cured by a
philosopher of a new school, which as far as I could understand it bore
much the same relation to the old as homoeopathy to allopathy. The
straightener shook his head at this, and laughingly replied that the cure
must have been due to nature. After a few more questions he wrote a
prescription and departed.
I saw the prescription. It ordered a fine to the State of double the
money embezzled; no food but bread and milk for six months, and a severe
flogging once a month for twelve. He had received his eleventh flogging
on the day of my arrival. I saw him later on the same afternoon, and he
was still twinged; but even though he had been minded to do so (which he
showed no sign of being), there would have been no escape from following
out the straightener's prescription, for the so-called sanitary laws of
Erewhon are very rigorous, and unless the straightener was satisfied that
his orders had been obeyed, the patient would have been taken to a
hospital (as the poor are), and would have been much worse off. Such at
least is the law, but it is never necessary to enforce it.
On a subsequent occasion I was present at an interview between Mr.
Nosnibor and the family straightener, who was considered competent to
watch the completion of the cure. I was struck with the delicacy with
which he avoided even the remotest semblance of inquiry after the
physical well-being of his patient, though there was a certain yellowness
about my host's eyes which argued a bilious habit of body. To have taken
notice of this would have been a gross breach of professional etiquette.
I am told that a straightener sometimes thinks it right to glance at the
possibility of some slight physical disorder if he finds it important in
order to assist him in his diagnosis; but the answers which he gets are
generally untrue or evasive, and he forms his own conclusions upon the
matter as well as he can.
Sensible men have been known to say that the straightener should in
strict confidence be told of every physical ailment that is likely to
bear upon the case; but people are naturally shy of doing this, for they
do not like lowering themselves in the opinion of the straightener, and
his ignorance of medical science is supreme. I heard of one lady however
who had the hardihood to confess that a furious outbreak of ill-humour
and extravagant fancies for which she was seeking advice was possibly the
result of indisposition. "You should resist that," said the
straightener, in a kind, but grave voice; "we can do nothing for the
bodies of our patients; such matters are beyond our province, and I
desire that I may hear no further particulars." The lady burst into
tears, promised faithfully that she would never be unwell again, and kept
her word.
To return however to Mr. Nosnibor. As the afternoon wore on many
carriages drove up with callers to inquire how he had stood his flogging.
It had been very severe, but the kind inquiries upon every side gave him
great pleasure, and he assured me that he felt almost tempted to do wrong
again by the solicitude with which his friends had treated him during his
recovery: in this I need hardly say that he was not serious.
During the remainder of my stay in the country Mr. Nosnibor was
constantly attentive to his business, and largely increased his already
great possessions; but I never heard a whisper to the effect of his
having been indisposed a second time, or made money by other than the
most strictly honourable means. I did hear afterwards in confidence that
there had been reason to believe that his health had been not a little
affected by the straightener's treatment, but his friends did not choose
to be over curious upon the subject, and on his return to his affairs it
was by common consent passed over as hardly criminal in one who was
otherwise so much afflicted. For they regard bodily ailments as the more
venial in proportion as they have been produced by causes independent of
the constitution. Thus if a person ruin his health by excessive
indulgence at the table, or by drinking, they count it to be almost a
part of the mental disease which brought it about and so it goes for
little, but they have no mercy on such illnesses as fevers or catarrhs or
lung diseases, which to us appear to be beyond the control of the
individual. They are only more lenient towards the diseases of the
young--such as measles, which they think to be like sowing one's wild
oats--and look over them as pardonable indiscretions if they have not
been too serious, and if they are atoned for by complete subsequent
recovery.
AN EREWHONIAN TRIAL. (CHAPTER XI. OF EREWHON.)
I shall best convey to the reader an idea of the entire perversion of
thought which exists among this extraordinary people, by describing the
public trial of a man who was accused of pulmonary consumption--an
offence which was punished with death until quite recently. The trial
did not take place till I had been some months in the country, and I am
deviating from chronological order in giving an account of it here; but I
had perhaps better do so in order to exhaust this subject before
proceeding with others.
The prisoner was placed in the dock, and the jury were sworn much as in
Europe; almost all our own modes of procedure were reproduced, even to
the requiring the prisoner to plead guilty or not guilty. He pleaded not
guilty and the case proceeded. The evidence for the prosecution was very
strong, but I must do the court the justice to observe that the trial was
absolutely impartial. Counsel for the prisoner was allowed to urge
everything that could be said in his defence.
The line taken was that the prisoner was simulating consumption in order
to defraud an insurance company, from which he was about to buy an
annuity, and that he hoped thus to obtain it on more advantageous terms.
If this could have been shown to be the case he would have escaped
criminal prosecution, and been sent to a hospital as for moral ailment.
The view however was one which could not be reasonably sustained, in
spite of all the ingenuity and eloquence of one of the most celebrated
advocates of the country. The case was only too clear, for the prisoner
was almost at the point of death, and it was astonishing that he had not
been tried and convicted long previously. His coughing was incessant
during the whole trial, and it was all that the two jailers in charge of
him could do to keep him on his legs until it was over.
The summing up of the judge was admirable. He dwelt upon every point
that could be construed in favour of the prisoner, but as he proceeded it
became clear that the evidence was too convincing to admit of doubt, and
there was but one opinion in the court as to the impending verdict when
the jury retired from the box. They were absent for about ten minutes,
and on their return the foreman pronounced the prisoner guilty. There
was a faint murmur of applause but it was instantly repressed. The judge
then proceeded to pronounce sentence in words which I can never forget,
and which I copied out into a note-book next day from the report that was
published in the leading newspaper. I must condense it somewhat, and
nothing which I could say would give more than a faint idea of the
solemn, not to say majestic, severity with which it was delivered. The
sentence was as follows:--
"Prisoner at the bar, you have been accused of the great crime of
labouring under pulmonary consumption, and after an impartial trial
before a jury of your countrymen, you have been found guilty. Against
the justice of the verdict I can say nothing: the evidence against you
was conclusive, and it only remains for me to pass such a sentence upon
you, as shall satisfy the ends of the law. That sentence must be a very
severe one. It pains me much to see one who is yet so young, and whose
prospects in life were otherwise so excellent, brought to this
distressing condition by a constitution which I can only regard as
radically vicious; but yours is no case for compassion: this is not your
first offence: you have led a career of crime, and have only profited by
the leniency shown you upon past occasions, to offend yet more seriously
against the laws and institutions of your country. You were convicted of
aggravated bronchitis last year: and I find that though you are now only
twenty-three years old, you have been imprisoned on no less than fourteen
occasions for illnesses of a more or less hateful character; in fact, it
is not too much to say that you have spent the greater part of your life
in a jail.
"It is all very well for you to say that you came of unhealthy parents,
and had a severe accident in your childhood which permanently undermined
your constitution; excuses such as these are the ordinary refuge of the
criminal; but they cannot for one moment be listened to by the ear of
justice. I am not here to enter upon curious metaphysical questions as
to the origin of this or that--questions to which there would be no end
were their introduction once tolerated, and which would result in
throwing the only guilt on the primordial cell, or perhaps even on the
elementary gases. There is no question of how you came to be wicked, but
only this--namely, are you wicked or not? This has been decided in the
affirmative, neither can I hesitate for a single moment to say that it
has been decided justly. You are a bad and dangerous person, and stand
branded in the eyes of your fellow-countrymen with one of the most
heinous known offences.
"It is not my business to justify the law: the law may in some cases have
its inevitable hardships, and I may feel regret at times that I have not
the option of passing a less severe sentence than I am compelled to do.
But yours is no such case; on the contrary, had not the capital
punishment for consumption been abolished, I should certainly inflict it
now.
"It is intolerable that an example of such terrible enormity should be
allowed to go at large unpunished. Your presence in the society of
respectable people would lead the less able-bodied to think more lightly
of all forms of illness; neither can it be permitted that you should have
the chance of corrupting unborn beings who might hereafter pester you.
The unborn must not be allowed to come near you: and this not so much for
their protection (for they are our natural enemies), as for our own; for
since they will not be utterly gainsaid, it must be seen to that they
shall be quartered upon those who are least likely to corrupt them.
"But independently of this consideration, and independently of the
physical guilt which attaches itself to a crime so great as yours, there
is yet another reason why we should be unable to show you mercy, even if
we are inclined to do so. I refer to the existence of a class of men who
lie hidden among us, and who are called physicians. Were the severity of
the law or the current feeling of the country to be relaxed never so
slightly, these abandoned persons, who are now compelled to practise
secretly, and who can be consulted only at the greatest risk, would
become frequent visitors in every household; their organisation and their
intimate acquaintance with all family secrets would give them a power,
both social and political, which nothing could resist. The head of the
household would become subordinate to the family doctor, who would
interfere between man and wife, between master and servant, until the
doctors should be the only depositaries of power in the nation, and have
all that we hold precious at their mercy. A time of universal
dephysicalisation would ensue; medicine-vendors of all kinds would abound
in our streets and advertise in all our newspapers. There is one remedy
for this, and one only. It is that which the laws of this country have
long received and acted upon, and consists in the sternest repression of
all diseases whatsoever, as soon as their existence is made manifest to
the eye of the law. Would that that eye were far more piercing than it
is.
"But I will enlarge no further upon things that are themselves so
obvious. You may say that it is not your fault. The answer is ready
enough at hand, and it amounts to this--that if you had been born of
healthy and well-to-do parents, and been well taken care of when you were
a child, you would never have offended against the laws of your country,
nor found yourself in your present disgraceful position. If you tell me
that you had no hand in your parentage and education, and that it is
therefore unjust to lay these things to your charge, I answer that
whether your being in a consumption is your fault or no, it is a fault in
you, and it is my duty to see that against such faults as this the
commonwealth shall be protected. You may say that it is your misfortune
to be criminal; I answer that it is your crime to be unfortunate.
"I do not hesitate therefore to sentence you to imprisonment, with hard
labour, for the rest of your miserable existence. During that period I
would earnestly entreat you to repent of these wrongs you have done
already, and to entirely reform the constitution of your whole body. I
entertain but little hope that you will pay attention to my advice; you
are already far too abandoned. Did it rest with myself, I should add
nothing in mitigation of the sentence which I have passed, but it is the
merciful provision of the law that even the most hardened criminal shall
be allowed some one of the three official remedies, which is to be
prescribed at the time of his conviction. I shall therefore order that
you receive two tablespoonfuls of castor-oil daily, until the pleasure of
the court be further known."
When the sentence was concluded, the prisoner acknowledged in a few
scarcely audible words that he was justly punished, and that he had had a
fair trial. He was then removed to the prison from which he was never to
return. There was a second attempt at applause when the judge had
finished speaking, but as before it was at once repressed; and though the
feeling of the court was strongly against the prisoner, there was no show
of any violence against him, if one may except a little hooting from the
bystanders when he was being removed in the prisoners' van. Indeed,
nothing struck me more during my whole sojourn in the country, than the
general respect for law and order.
MALCONTENTS. (PART OF CHAPTER XII. OF EREWHON.)
I write with great diffidence, but it seems to me that there is no
unfairness in punishing people for their misfortunes, or rewarding them
for their sheer good luck: it is the normal condition of human life that
this should be done, and no right-minded person will complain at being
subjected to the common treatment. There is no alternative open to us.
It is idle to say that men are not responsible for their misfortunes.
What is responsibility? Surely to be responsible means to be liable to
have to give an answer should it be demanded, and all things which live
are responsible for their lives and actions should society see fit to
question them through the mouth of its authorised agent.
What is the offence of a lamb that we should rear it, and tend it, and
lull it into security, for the express purpose of killing it? Its
offence is the misfortune of being something which society wants to eat,
and which cannot defend itself. This is ample. Who shall limit the
right of society except society itself? And what consideration for the
individual is tolerable unless society be the gainer thereby? Wherefore
should a man be so richly rewarded for having been son to a millionaire,
were it not clearly provable that the common welfare is thus better
furthered? We cannot seriously detract from a man's merit in having been
the son of a rich father without imperilling our own tenure of things
which we do not wish to jeopardise; if this were otherwise we should not
let him keep his money for a single hour; we would have it ourselves at
once. For property _is_ robbery, but then we are all robbers or would-be
robbers together, and have found it expedient to organise our thieving,
as we have found it to organise our lust and our revenge. Property,
marriage, the law; as the bed to the river, so rule and convention to the
instinct.
But to return. Even in England a man on board a ship with yellow fever
is held responsible for his mischance, no matter what his being kept in
quarantine may cost him. He may catch the fever and die; we cannot help
it; he must take his chance as other people do; but surely it would be
desperate unkindness to add contumely to our self-protection, unless,
indeed, we believe that contumely is one of our best means of
self-protection. Again, take the case of maniacs. We say that they are
irresponsible for their actions, but we take good care, or ought to take
good care, that they shall answer to us for their insanity, and we
imprison them in what we call an asylum (that modern sanctuary!) if we do
not like their answers. This is a strange kind of irresponsibility. What
we ought to say is that we can afford to be satisfied with a less
satisfactory answer from a lunatic than from one who is not mad, because
lunacy is less infectious than crime.
We kill a serpent if we go in danger by it, simply for being such and
such a serpent in such and such a place; but we never say that the
serpent has only itself to blame for not having been a harmless creature.
Its crime is that of being the thing which it is: but this is a capital
offence, and we are right in killing it out of the way, unless we think
it more dangerous to do so than to let it escape; nevertheless we pity
the creature, even though we kill it.
But in the case of him whose trial I have described above, it was
impossible that any one in the court should not have known that it was
but by an accident of birth and circumstances that he was not himself
also in a consumption; and yet none thought that it disgraced them to
hear the judge give vent to the most cruel truisms about him. The judge
himself was a kind and thoughtful person. He was a man of magnificent
and benign presence. He was evidently of an iron constitution, and his
face wore an expression of the maturest wisdom and experience; yet for
all this, old and learned as he was, he could not see things which one
would have thought would have been apparent even to a child. He could
not emancipate himself from, nay, it did not even occur to him to feel,
the bondage of the ideas in which he had been born and bred. So was it
with the jury and bystanders; and--most wonderful of all--so was it even
with the prisoner. Throughout he seemed fully impressed with the notion
that he was being dealt with justly: he saw nothing wanton in his being
told by the judge that he was to be punished, not so much as a necessary
protection to society (although this was not entirely lost sight of), as
because he had not been better born and bred than he was. But this led
me to hope that he suffered less than he would have done if he had seen
the matter in the same light that I did. And, after all, justice is
relative.
I may here mention that only a few years before my arrival in the
country, the treatment of all convicted invalids had been much more
barbarous than now; for no physical remedy was provided, and prisoners
were put to the severest labour in all sorts of weather, so that most of
them soon succumbed to the extreme hardships which they suffered; this
was supposed to be beneficial in some ways, inasmuch as it put the
country to less expense for the maintenance of its criminal class; but
the growth of luxury had induced a relaxation of the old severity, and a
sensitive age would no longer tolerate what appeared to be an excess of
rigour, even towards the most guilty; moreover, it was found that juries
were less willing to convict, and justice was often cheated because there
was no alternative between virtually condemning a man to death and
letting him go free; it was also held that the country paid in
recommittals for its overseverity; for those who had been imprisoned even
for trifling ailments were often permanently disabled by their
imprisonment; and when a man has been once convicted, it was probable he
would never afterwards be long off the hands of the country.
These evils had long been apparent and recognised; yet people were too
indolent, and too indifferent to suffering not their own, to bestir
themselves about putting an end to them, until at last a benevolent
reformer devoted his whole life to effecting the necessary changes. He
divided illnesses into three classes--those affecting the head, the
trunk, and the lower limbs--and obtained an enactment that all diseases
of the head, whether internal or external, should be treated with
laudanum, those of the body with castor-oil, and those of the lower limbs
with an embrocation of strong sulphuric acid and water. It may be said
that the classification was not sufficiently careful, and that the
remedies were ill chosen; but it is a hard thing to initiate any reform,
and it was necessary to familiarise the public mind with the principle,
by inserting the thin end of the wedge first: it is not therefore to be
wondered at that among so practical a people there should still be some
room for improvement. The mass of the nation are well pleased with
existing arrangements, and believe that their treatment of criminals
leaves little or nothing to be desired; but there is an energetic
minority who hold what are considered to be extreme opinions, and who are
not at all disposed to rest contented until the principle lately admitted
has been carried further.
THE MUSICAL BANKS. (CHAPTER XIV. OF EREWHON.)
On my return to the drawing-room, I found the ladies were just putting
away their work and preparing to go out. I asked them where they were
going. They answered with a certain air of reserve that they were going
to the bank to get some money.
Now I had already collected that the mercantile affairs of the
Erewhonians were conducted on a totally different system from our own; I
had however gathered little hitherto, except that they had two distinct
commercial systems, of which the one appealed more strongly to the
imagination than anything to which we are accustomed in Europe, inasmuch
as the banks conducted upon this system were decorated in the most
profuse fashion, and all mercantile transactions were accompanied with
music, so that they were called musical banks though the music was
hideous to a European ear.
As for the system itself I never understood it, neither can I do so now:
they have a code in connection with it, which I have no doubt they
themselves understand, but no foreigner can hope to do so. One rule runs
into and against another as in a most complicated grammar, or as in
Chinese pronunciation, wherein I am told the slightest change in
accentuation or tone of voice alters the meaning of a whole sentence.
Whatever is incoherent in my description must be referred to the fact of
my never having attained to a full comprehension of the subject.
So far however as I could collect anything certain, they appeared to have
two entirely distinct currencies, each under the control of its own banks
and mercantile codes. The one of them (the one with the musical banks)
was supposed to be _the_ system, and to give out the currency in which
all monetary transactions should be carried on. As far as I could see,
all who wished to be considered respectable, did keep a certain amount of
this currency at these banks; nevertheless, if there is one thing of
which I am more sure than another it is that the amount so kept was but a
very small part of their possessions. I think they took the money, put
it into the bank, and then drew it out again, repeating the process day
by day, and keeping a certain amount of currency for this purpose and no
other, while they paid the expenses of the bank with the other coinage. I
am sure the managers and cashiers of the musical banks were not paid in
their own currency. Mr. Nosnibor used to go to these musical banks, or
rather to the great mother bank of the city, sometimes but not very
often. He was a pillar of one of the other kind of banks, though he held
some minor office also in these. The ladies generally went alone; as
indeed was the case in most families, except on some few great annual
occasions.
I had long wanted to know more of this strange system, and had the
greatest desire to accompany my hostess and her daughters. I had seen
them go out almost every morning since my arrival, and had noticed that
they carried their purses in their hands, not exactly ostentatiously, yet
just so as that those who met them should see whither they were going. I
had never yet been asked to go with them myself.
It is not easy to convey a person's manner by words, and I can hardly
give any idea of the peculiar feeling which came upon me whenever I saw
the ladies in the hall, with their purses in their hands, and on the
point of starting for the bank. There was a something of regret, a
something as though they would wish to take me with them, but did not
like to ask me, and yet as though I were hardly to ask to be taken. I
was determined however to bring matters to an issue with my hostess about
my going with them, and after a little parleying and many inquiries as to
whether I was perfectly sure that I myself wished to go, it was decided
that I might do so.
We passed through several streets of more or less considerable houses,
and at last turning round a corner we came upon a large piazza, at the
end of which was a magnificent building, of a strange but noble
architecture and of great antiquity. It did not open directly on to the
piazza, there being a screen, through which was an archway, between the
piazza and the actual precincts of the bank. On passing under the
archway we found ourselves upon a green sward, round which there ran an
arcade or cloister, while in front of us uprose the majestic towers of
the bank and its venerable front, which was divided into three deep
recesses and adorned with all sorts of marbles and many sculptures. On
either side there were beautiful old trees wherein the birds were busy by
the hundred, and a number of quaint but substantial houses of singularly
comfortable appearance; they were situated in the midst of orchards and
gardens, and gave me an impression of great peace and plenty.
Indeed it had been no error to say that this building was one which
appealed to the imagination; it did more--it carried both imagination and
judgment by storm. It was an epic in stone and marble; neither had I
ever seen anything in the least comparable to it. I was completely
charmed and melted. I felt more conscious of the existence of a remote
past. One knows of this always, but the knowledge is never so living as
in the actual presence of some witness to the life of bygone ages. I
felt how short a space of human life was the period of our own existence.
I was more impressed with my own littleness, and much more inclinable to
believe that the people whose sense of the fitness of things was equal to
the upraising of so serene a handiwork, were hardly likely to be wrong in
the conclusions they might come to upon any subject. My feeling
certainly was that the currency of this bank must be the right one.
We crossed the sward and entered the building. If the outside had been
impressive the inside was even more so. It was very lofty and divided
into several parts by walls which rested upon massive pillars; the
windows were filled with glass, on which had been painted the principal
commercial incidents of the bank for many ages. In a remote part of the
building there were men and boys singing; this was the only disturbing
feature, for as the gamut was still unknown, there was no music in the
country which could be agreeable to a European ear. The singers seemed
to have derived their inspirations from the songs of birds and the
wailing of the wind, which last they tried to imitate in melancholy
cadences which at times degenerated into a howl. To my thinking the
noise was hideous, but it produced a great effect upon my companions, who
professed themselves much moved. As soon as the singing was over the
ladies requested me to stay where I was, while they went inside the place
from which it had seemed to come.
During their absence certain reflections forced themselves upon me.
In the first place, it struck me as strange that the building should be
so nearly empty; I was almost alone, and the few besides myself had been
led by curiosity, and had no intention of doing business with the bank.
But there might be more inside. I stole up to the curtain, and ventured
to draw the extreme edge of it on one side. No, there was hardly any one
there. I saw a large number of cashiers, all at their desks ready to pay
cheques, and one or two who seemed to be the managing partners. I also
saw my hostess and her daughters and two or three other ladies; also
three or four old women and the boys from one of the neighbouring
Colleges of Unreason; but there was no one else. This did not look as
though the bank was doing a very large business; and yet I had always
been told that every one in the city dealt with this establishment.
I cannot describe all that took place in these inner precincts, for a
sinister-looking person in a black gown came and made unpleasant gestures
at me for peeping. I happened to have in my pocket one of the musical
bank pieces, which had been given me by Mrs. Nosnibor, so I tried to tip
him with it; but having seen what it was, he became so angry that it was
all I could do to pacify him. When he was gone I ventured to take a
second look, and saw Zulora in the very act of giving a piece of paper
which looked like a cheque to one of the cashiers. He did not examine
it, but putting his hand into an antique coffer hard by, he pulled out a
quantity of dull-looking metal pieces apparently at random, and handed
them over without counting them; neither did Zulora count them, but put
them into her purse and departed. It seemed a very singular proceeding,
but I supposed that they knew their own business best, at any rate Zulora
seemed quite satisfied, thanked him for the money, and began making
towards the curtain: on this I let it drop and retreated to a reasonable
distance.
Mrs. Nosnibor and her daughters soon joined me. For some few minutes we
all kept silence, but at last I ventured to remark that the bank was not
so busy to-day as it probably often was. On this Mrs. Nosnibor said that
it was indeed melancholy to see what little heed people paid to the most
precious of all institutions. I could say nothing in reply, but I have
ever been of opinion that the greater part of mankind do approximately
know where they get that which does them good. Mrs. Nosnibor went on to
say that I must not imagine there was any want of confidence in the bank
because I had seen so few people there; the heart of the country was
thoroughly devoted to these establishments, and any sign of their being
in danger would bring in support from the most unexpected quarters. It
was only because people knew them to be so very safe, that in some cases
(as she lamented to say in Mr. Nosnibor's) they felt that their support
was unnecessary. Moreover these institutions never departed from the
safest and most approved banking principles. Thus they never allowed
interest on deposit, a thing now frequently done by certain bubble
companies, which by doing an illegitimate trade had drawn many customers
away; and even the shareholders were fewer than formerly, owing to the
innovations of these unscrupulous persons.
It came out by and by that the musical banks paid little or no dividend,
but divided their profits by way of bonus on the original shares once in
every three hundred and fifty years; and as it was now only two hundred
years since there had been one of these distributions, people felt that
they could not hope for another in their own time and preferred
investments whereby they got some more tangible return; all which, she
said, was very melancholy to think of.
Having made these last admissions, she returned to her original
statement, namely, that every one in the country really supported the
bank. As to the fewness of the people, and the absence of the
able-bodied, she pointed out to me with some justice that this was
exactly what we ought to expect. The men who were most conversant about
the stability of human institutions, such as the lawyers, men of science,
doctors, statesmen, painters, and the like, were just those who were most
likely to be misled by their own fancied accomplishments, and to be made
unduly suspicious by their licentious desire for greater present return,
which was at the root of nine-tenths of the opposition, by their vanity,
which would prompt them to affect superiority to the prejudices of the
vulgar, and by the stings of their own conscience, which was constantly
upbraiding them in the most cruel manner on account of their bodies,
which were generally diseased; let a person's intellect be never so
sound, unless his body were in absolute health, he could form no judgment
worth having on matters of this kind. The body was everything: it need
not perhaps be such a _strong_ body (she said this because she saw I was
thinking of the old and infirm-looking folks whom I had seen in the
bank), but it must be in perfect health; in this case, the less active
strength it had the more free would be the working of the intellect, and
therefore the sounder the conclusion. The people, then, whom I had seen
at the bank were in reality the very ones whose opinions were most worth
having; they declared its advantages to be incalculable, and even
professed to consider the immediate return to be far larger than they
were entitled to; and so she ran on, nor did she leave off till we had
got back to the house.
She might say what she pleased, but her manner was not one that carried
much conviction; and later on I saw signs of general indifference to
these banks that were not to be mistaken. Their supporters often denied
it, but the denial was generally so couched as to add another proof of
its existence. In commercial panics, and in times of general distress,
the people as a mass did not so much as even think of turning to these
banks. A few individuals might do so, some from habit and early
training, some from hope of gain, but few from a genuine belief that the
money was good; the masses turned instinctively to the other currency. In
a conversation with one of the musical bank managers I ventured to hint
this as plainly as politeness would allow. He said that it had been more
or less true till lately; but that now they had put fresh stained glass
windows into all the banks in the country, and repaired the buildings,
and enlarged the organs, and taken to talking nicely to the people in the
streets, and to remembering the ages of their children and giving them
things when they were ill, so that all would henceforth go smoothly.
"But haven't you done anything to the money itself?" said I timidly.
To this day I do not know exactly what the bank-manager said, but it came
to this in the end--that I had better not meddle with things that I did
not understand.
On reviewing the whole matter, I can be certain of this much only, that
the money given out at the musical banks is not the current coin of the
realm. It is not the money with which the people do as a general rule
buy their bread, meat, and clothing. It is like it; some coins very like
it; and it is not counterfeit. It is not, take it all round, a spurious
article made of base metal in imitation of the money which is in daily
use; but it is a distinct coinage which, though I do not suppose it ever
actually superseded the ordinary gold, silver, and copper, was probably
issued by authority, and was intended to supplant those metals. Some of
the pieces were really of exquisite beauty; and some were, I do verily
believe, nothing but the ordinary currency, only that there was another
head and name in place of that of the commonwealth. And here was one of
the great marvels; for those who were most strongly in favour of this
coinage maintained, and even grew more excited if they were opposed here
than on any other matter, that the very self-same coin with the head of
the commonwealth upon it was of little if any value, while it became
exceedingly precious it stamped with the other image.
Some of the coins were plainly bad; of these last there were not many;
still there were enough for them to be not uncommon. These were entirely
composed of alloy; they would bend easily, would melt away to nothing
with a little heat, and were quite unsuited for a currency. Yet there
were few of the wealthier classes who did not maintain that even these
coins were genuine good money, though they were chary of taking them.
Every one knew this, so they were seldom offered; but all thought it
incumbent upon them to retain a good many in their possession, and to let
them be seen from time to time in their hands and purses. Of course
people knew their real value exceedingly well; but few, if any, dared to
say what that value was; or if they did, it would be only in certain
companies or in writing in the newspapers anonymously. Strange! there
was hardly any insinuation against this coinage which they would not
tolerate and even applaud in their daily papers; and yet, if the same
thing were said without ambiguity to their faces--nominative case verb
and accusative being all in their right places, and doubt impossible--they
would consider themselves very seriously and justly outraged, and accuse
the speaker of being unwell.
I never could understand, neither can I do so now, why a single currency
should not suffice them; it would seem to me as though all their dealings
would have been thus greatly simplified; but I was met with a look of
horror if ever I dared to hint at it. Even those who to my certain
knowledge kept only just enough money at the musical banks to swear by,
would call the other banks (where their securities really lay) cold,
deadening, paralysing, and the like. I noticed another thing moreover
which struck me greatly. I was taken to the opening of one of these
banks in a neighbouring town, and saw a large assemblage of cashiers and
managers. I sat opposite them and scanned their faces attentively. They
did not please me; they lacked, with a few exceptions, the true
Erewhonian frankness; and an equal number from any other class would have
looked happier and better men. When I met them in the streets they did
not seem like other people, but had, as a general rule, a cramped
expression upon their faces which pained and depressed me.
Those who came from the country were better; they seemed to have lived
less as a separate class, and to be freer and healthier; but in spite of
my seeing not a few whose looks were benign and noble, I could not help
asking myself concerning the greater number of those whom I met, whether
Erewhon would be a better country if their expression were to be
transferred to the people in general. I answered myself emphatically,
no. A man's expression is his sacrament; it is the outward and visible
sign of his inward and spiritual grace, or, want of grace; and as I
looked at the majority of these men, I could not help feeling that there
must be a something in their lives which had stunted their natural
development, and that they would have been more healthily-minded in any
other profession.
I was always sorry for them, for in nine cases out of ten they were well-
meaning persons; they were in the main very poorly paid; their
constitutions were as a rule above suspicion; and there were recorded
numberless instances of their self-sacrifice and generosity; but they had
had the misfortune to have been betrayed into a false position at an age
for the most part when their judgment was not matured, and after having
been kept in studied ignorance of the real difficulties of the system.
But this did not make their position the less a false one, and its bad
effects upon themselves were unmistakable.
Few people would speak quite openly and freely before them, which struck
me as a very bad sign. When they were in the room every one would talk
as though all currency save that of the musical banks should be
abolished; and yet they knew perfectly well that even the cashiers
themselves hardly used the musical bank money more than other people. It
was expected of them that they should appear to do so, but this was all.
The less thoughtful of them did not seem particularly unhappy, but many
were plainly sick at heart, though perhaps they hardly knew it, and would
not have owned to being so. Some few were opponents of the whole system;
but these were liable to be dismissed from their employment at any
moment, and this rendered them very careful, for a man who had once been
cashier at a musical bank was out of the field for other employment, and
was generally unfitted for it by reason of that course of treatment which
was commonly called his education. In fact it was a career from which
retreat was virtually impossible, and into which young men were generally
induced to enter before they could be reasonably expected, considering
their training, to have formed any opinions of their own. Few indeed
were those who had the courage to insist on seeing both sides of the
question before they committed themselves to either. One would have
thought that this was an elementary principle,--one of the first things
that an honourable man would teach his boy to do; but in practice it was
not so.
I even saw cases in which parents bought the right of presenting to the
office of cashier at one of these banks, with the fixed determination
that some one of their sons (perhaps a mere child) should fill it. There
was the lad himself--growing up with every promise of becoming a good and
honourable man--but utterly without warning concerning the iron shoe
which his natural protector was providing for him. Who could say that
the whole thing would not end in a life-long lie, and vain chafing to
escape?
I confess that there were few things in Erewhon which shocked me more
than this.
BIRTH FORMULAE. (CHAPTER XVII. OF EREWHON.)
I heard what follows not from Arowhena, but from Mr. Nosnibor and some of
the gentlemen who occasionally dined at the house: they told me that the
Erewhonians believe in pre-existence; and not only this (of which I will
write more fully in the next chapter), but they believe that it is of
their own free act and deed in a previous state that people come to be
born into this world at all.
They hold that the unborn are perpetually plaguing and tormenting the
married (and sometimes even the unmarried) of both sexes, fluttering
about them incessantly, and giving them no peace either of mind or body
until they have consented to take them under their protection. If this
were not so--this is at least what they urge--it would be a monstrous
freedom for one man to take with another, to say that he should undergo
the chances and changes of this mortal life without any option in the
matter. No man would have any right to get married at all, inasmuch as
he can never tell what misery his doing so may entail forcibly upon his
children who cannot be unhappy as long as they remain unborn. They feel
this so strongly that they are resolved to shift the blame on to other
shoulders; they have therefore invented a long mythology as to the world
in which the unborn people live, what they do, and the arts and
machinations to which they have recourse in order to get themselves into
our own world.
I cannot think they seriously believe in this mythology concerning pre-
existence; they do and they do not; they do not know themselves what they
believe; all they know is that it is a disease not to believe as they do.
The only thing of which they are quite sure is that it is the pestering
of the unborn, which causes them to be brought into this world, and that
they would not be here if they would only let peaceable people alone.
It would be hard to disprove this position, and they might have a good
case if they would only leave it as it stands. But this they will not
do; they must have assurance doubly sure; they must have the written word
of the child itself as soon as it is born, giving the parents indemnity
from all responsibility on the score of its birth, and asserting its own
pre-existence. They have therefore devised something which they call a
birth formula--a document which varies in words according to the caution
of parents, but is much the same practically in all cases; for it has
been the business of the Erewhonian lawyers during many ages to exercise
their skill in perfecting it and providing for every contingency.
These formulae are printed on common paper at a moderate cost for the
poor; but the rich have them written on parchment and handsomely bound,
so that the getting up of a person's birth formula is a test of his
social position. They commence by setting forth, That whereas A. B. was
a member of the kingdom of the unborn, where he was well provided for in
every way, and had no cause of discontent, &c. &c., he did of his own
wanton restlessness conceive a desire to enter into this present world;
that thereon having taken the necessary steps as set forth in laws of the
unborn kingdom, he set himself with malice aforethought to plague and
pester two unfortunate people who had never wronged him, and who were
quite contented until he conceived this base design against their peace;
for which wrong he now humbly entreats their pardon. He acknowledges
that he is responsible for all physical blemishes and deficiencies which
may render him answerable to the laws of his country; that his parents
have nothing whatever to do with any of these things; and that they have
a right to kill him at once if they be so minded, though he entreats them
to show their marvellous goodness and clemency towards him by sparing his
life. If they will do this he promises to be their most abject creature
during his earlier years, and indeed unto his life's end, unless they
should see fit in their abundant generosity to remit some portion of his
service hereafter. And so the formula continues, going sometimes into
very minute details, according to the fancies of family lawyers, who will
not make it any shorter than they can help.
The deed being thus prepared, on the third or fourth day after the birth
of the child, or as they call it, the "final importunity," the friends
gather together, and there is a feast held, where they are all very
melancholy--as a general rule, I believe quite truly so--and make
presents to the father and mother of the child in order to console them
for the injury which has just been done them by the unborn. By and by
the child himself is brought down by his nurse, and the company begin to
rail upon him, upbraiding him for his impertinence and asking him what
amends he proposes to make for the wrong that he has committed, and how
he can look for care and nourishment from those who have perhaps already
been injured by the unborn on some ten or twelve occasions; for they say
of people with large families, that they have suffered terrible injuries
from the unborn; till at last, when this has been carried far enough,
some one suggests the formula, which is brought forth and solemnly read
to the child by the family straightener. This gentleman is always
invited on these occasions, for the very fact of intrusion into a
peaceful family shows a depravity on the part of the child which requires
his professional services.
On being teased by the reading and tweaked by the nurse, the child will
commonly fall a-crying, which is reckoned a good sign as showing a
consciousness of guilt. He is thereon asked, Does he assent to the
formula? on which, as he still continues crying and can obviously make no
answer, some one of the friends comes forward and undertakes to sign the
document on his behalf, feeling sure (so he says) that the child would do
it if he only knew how, and that he will release the present signer from
his engagement on arriving at maturity. The friend then inscribes the
signature of the child at the foot of the parchment, which is held to
bind the child as much as though he had signed it himself. Even this,
however, does not fully content them, for they feel a little uneasy until
they have got the child's own signature after all. So when he is about
fourteen these good people partly bribe him by promises of greater
liberty and good things, and partly intimidate him through their great
power of making themselves passively unpleasant to him, so that though
there is a show of freedom made, there is really none, and partly they
use the offices of the teachers in the Colleges of Unreason, till at
last, in one way or another, they take very good care that he shall sign
the paper by which he professes to have been a free agent in coming into
the world, and to take all the responsibility of having done so on to his
own shoulders. And yet, though this document is in theory the most
important which any one can sign in his whole life, they will have him
commit himself to it at an age when neither they nor the law will for
many a year allow any one else to bind him to the smallest obligation, no
matter how righteously he may owe it, because they hold him too young to
know what he is about.
I thought this seemed rather hard, and not of a piece with the many
admirable institutions existing among them. I once ventured to say a
part of what I thought about it to one of the Professors of Unreason. I
asked him whether he did not think it would do serious harm to a lad's
principles, and weaken his sense of the sanctity of his word, and of
truth generally, that he should be led into entering upon an engagement
which it was so plainly impossible he should keep even for a single day
with tolerable integrity--whether, in fact, the teachers who so led him,
or who taught anything as a certainty of which they were themselves
uncertain, were not earning their living by impairing the truth-sense of
their pupils. The professor, who was a delightful person, seemed
surprised at the view I took, and gave me to understand, perhaps justly
enough, that I ought not to make so much fuss about a trifle. No one, he
said, expected that the boy either would or could do all that he
undertook; but the world was full of compromises; and there was hardly
any engagement which would bear being interpreted literally. Human
language was too gross a vehicle of thought--thought being incapable of
absolute translation. He added, that as there can be no translation from
one language into another which shall not scant the meaning somewhat, or
enlarge upon it, so there is no language which can render thought without
a jarring and a harshness somewhere--and so forth; all of which seemed to
come to this in the end, that it was the custom of the country, and that
the Erewhonians were a conservative people; that the boy would have to
begin compromising sooner or later, and this was part of his education in
the art. It was perhaps to be regretted that compromise should be as
necessary as it was; still it was necessary, and the sooner the boy got
to understand it the better for himself. But they never tell this to the
boy.
From the book of their mythology about the unborn I made the extracts
which will form the following chapter.
THE WORLD OF THE UNBORN. (PART OF CHAPTER XVII. OF EREWHON.)
The Erewhonians say it was by chance only that the earth and stars and
all the heavenly worlds began to roll from east to west, and not from
west to east, and in like manner they say it is by chance that man is
drawn through life with his face to the past instead of to the future.
For the future is there as much as the past, only that we may not see it.
Is it not in the loins of the past, and must not the past alter before
the future can do so?
They have a fable that there was a race of men tried upon the earth once,
who knew the future better than the past, but that they died in a
twelvemonth from the misery which their knowledge caused them. They say
that if any were to be born too prescient now, he would die miserably,
before he had time to transmit so peace-destroying a faculty to
descendants.
Strange fate for man! He must perish if he get that, which he must
perish if he strive not after. If he strive not after it he is no better
than the brutes, if he get it he is more miserable than the devils.
Having waded through many chapters like the above, I came at last to the
unborn themselves, and found that they were held to be souls pure and
simple, having no actual bodies, but living in a sort of gaseous yet more
or less anthropomorphic existence, like that of a ghost; they have thus
neither flesh nor blood nor warmth. Nevertheless they are supposed to
have local habitations and cities wherein they dwell, though these are as
unsubstantial as their inhabitants; they are even thought to eat and
drink some thin ambrosial sustenance, and generally to be capable of
doing whatever mankind can do, only after a visionary ghostly fashion, as
in a dream. On the other hand, as long as they remain where they are
they never die--the only form of death in the unborn world being the
leaving it for our own. They are believed to be extremely numerous, far
more so than mankind. They arrive from unknown planets, full grown, in
large batches at a time; but they can only leave the unborn world by
taking the steps necessary for their arrival here--which is, in fact, by
suicide.
They ought to be a happy people, for they have no extremes of good or ill
fortune; never marrying, but living in a state much like that fabled by
the poets as the primitive condition of mankind. In spite of this,
however, they are incessantly complaining; they know that we in this
world have bodies, and indeed they know everything else about us, for
they move among us whithersoever they will, and can read our thoughts, as
well as survey our actions at pleasure. One would think that this should
be enough for them; and indeed most of them are alive to the desperate
risk which they will run by indulging themselves in that body with
"sensible warm motion" which they so much desire; nevertheless, there are
some to whom the _ennui_ of a disembodied existence is so intolerable
that they will venture anything for a change; so they resolve to quit.
The conditions which they must accept are so uncertain, that none but the
most foolish of the unborn will consent to take them; and it is from
these and these only that our own ranks are recruited.
When they have finally made up their minds to leave, they must go before
the magistrate of the nearest town and sign an affidavit of their desire
to quit their then existence. On their having done this, the magistrate
reads them the conditions which they must accept, and which are so long
that I can only extract some of the principal points, which are mainly
the following:--
First, they must take a potion which will destroy their memory and sense
of identity; they must go into the world helpless, and without a will of
their own; they must draw lots for their dispositions before they go, and
take it, such as it is, for better or worse--neither are they to be
allowed any choice in the matter of the body which they so much desire;
they are simply allotted by chance, and without appeal, to two people
whom it is their business to find and pester until they adopt them. Who
these are to be, whether rich or poor, kind or unkind, healthy or
diseased, there is no knowing; they have, in fact, to entrust themselves
for many years to the care of those for whose good constitution and good
sense they have no sort of guarantee.
It is curious to read the lectures which the wiser heads give to those
who are meditating a change. They talk with them as we talk with a
spendthrift, and with about as much success.
"To be born," they say, "is a felony--it is a capital crime, for which
sentence may be executed at any moment after the commission of the
offence. You may perhaps happen to live for some seventy or eighty
years, but what is that, in comparison with the eternity which you now
enjoy? And even though the sentence were commuted, and you were allowed
to live for ever, you would in time become so terribly weary of life that
execution would be the greatest mercy to you. Consider the infinite
risk; to be born of wicked parents and trained in vice! to be born of
silly parents, and trained to unrealities! of parents who regard you as a
sort of chattel or property, belonging more to them than to yourself!
Again, you may draw utterly unsympathetic parents, who will never be able
to understand you, and who will thwart you as long as they can to the
utmost of their power (as a hen when she has hatched a duckling), and
then call you ungrateful because you do not love them, or parents who may
look upon you as a thing to be cowed while it is still young, lest it
should give them trouble hereafter by having wishes and feelings of its
own.
"In later life, when you have been finally allowed to pass muster as a
full member of the world, you will yourself become liable to the
pesterings of the unborn--and a very happy life you may be led in
consequence! For we solicit so strongly that a few only--nor these the
best--can refuse us; and yet not to refuse is much the same as going into
partnership with half a dozen different people about whom one can know
absolutely nothing beforehand--not even whether one is going into
partnership with men or women, nor with how many of either. Delude not
yourself with thinking that you will be wiser than your parents. You may
be an age in advance of _them_, but unless you are one of the great ones
(and if you are one of the great ones, woe betide you), you will still be
an age behind your children.
"Imagine what it must be to have an unborn quartered upon you, who is of
a different temperament to your own; nay, half a dozen such, who will not
love you though you may tell them that you have stinted yourself in a
thousand ways to provide for their well-being,--who will forget all that
self-sacrifice of which you are yourself so conscious, and of whom you
may never be sure that they are not bearing a grudge against you for
errors of judgment into which you may have fallen, but which you had
hoped had been long since atoned for. Ingratitude such as this is not
uncommon, yet fancy what it must be to bear! It is hard upon the
duckling to have been hatched by a hen, but is it not also hard upon the
hen to have hatched the duckling?
"Consider it again, we pray you, not for our sake but for your own. Your
initial character you must draw by lot; but whatever it is, it can only
come to a tolerably successful development after long training; remember
that over that training you will have no control. It is possible, and
even probable, that whatever you may get in after life which is of real
pleasure and service to you, will have to be won in spite of, rather than
by the help of, those whom you are now about to pester, and that you will
only win your freedom after years of a painful struggle, in which it will
be hard to say whether you have suffered most injury, or inflicted it.
"Remember also, that if you go into the world you will have free will;
that you will be obliged to have it, that there is no escaping it, that
you will be fettered to it during your whole life, and must on every
occasion do that which on the whole seems best to you at any given time,
no matter whether you are right or wrong in choosing it. Your mind will
be a balance for considerations, and your action will go with the heavier
scale. How it shall fall will depend upon the kind of scales which you
may have drawn at birth, the bias which they will have obtained by use,
and the weight of the immediate considerations. If the scales were good
to start with, and if they have not been outrageously tampered with in
childhood, and if the combinations into which you enter are average ones,
you may come off well; but there are too many "ifs" in this, and with the
failure of any one of them your misery is assured. Reflect on this, and
remember that should the ill come upon you, you will have yourself to
thank, for it is your own choice to be born, and there is no compulsion
in the matter.
"Not that we deny the existence of pleasures among mankind; there is a
certain show of sundry phases of contentment which may even amount to
very considerable happiness; but mark how they are distributed over a
man's life, belonging, all the keenest of them, to the fore part, and few
indeed to the after. Can there be any pleasure worth purchasing with the
miseries of a decrepit age? If you are good, strong, and handsome, you
have a fine fortune indeed at twenty, but how much of it will be left at
sixty? For you must live on your capital; there is no investing your
powers so that you may get a small annuity of life for ever: you must eat
up your principal bit by bit and be tortured by seeing it grow
continually smaller and smaller, even though you happen to escape being
rudely robbed of it by crime or casualty. Remember, too, that there
never yet was a man of forty who would not come back into the world of
the unborn if he could do so with decency and honour. Being in the
world, he will as a general rule stay till he is forced to go; but do you
think that he would consent to be born again, and re-live his life, if he
had the offer of doing so? Do not think it. If he could so alter the
past as that he should never have come into being at all, do you not
think that he would do it very gladly? What was it that one of their own
poets meant, if it was not this, when he cried out upon the day in which
he was born, and the night in which it was said there is a man child
conceived? 'For now,' he says, 'I should have lain still and been quiet,
I should have slept; then had I been at rest with kings and counsellors
of the earth, which built desolate places for themselves; or with princes
that had gold, who filled their houses with silver; or as an hidden
untimely birth, I had not been; as infants which never saw light. There
the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest.' Be very
sure that the guilt of being born carries this punishment at times to all
men; but how can they ask for pity, or complain of any mischief that may
befall them, having entered open-eyed into the snare?
"One word more and we have done. If any faint remembrance, as of a
dream, flit in some puzzled moment across your brain, and you shall feel
that the potion which is to be given you shall not have done its work,
and the memory of this existence which you are leaving endeavours vainly
to return; we say in such a moment, when you clutch at the dream but it
eludes your grasp, and you watch it, as Orpheus watched Eurydice, gliding
back again into the twilight kingdom, fly--fly--if you can remember the
advice--to the haven of your present and immediate duty, taking shelter
incessantly in the work which you have in hand. This much you may
perhaps recall; and this, if you will imprint it deeply upon your every
faculty, will be most likely to bring you safely and honourably home
through the trials that are before you." {47}
This is the fashion in which they reason with those who would be for
leaving them, but it is seldom that they do much good, for none but the
unquiet and unreasonable ever think of being born, and those who are
foolish enough to think of it are generally foolish enough to do it.
Finding therefore that they can do no more, the friends follow weeping to
the courthouse of the chief magistrate, where the one who wishes to be
born declares solemnly and openly that he accepts the conditions attached
to his decision. On this he is presented with the potion, which
immediately destroys his memory and sense of identity, and dissipates the
thin gaseous tenement which he has inhabited: he becomes a bare vital
principle, not to be perceived by human senses, nor appreciated by any
chemical test. He has but one instinct, which is that he is to go to
such and such a place, where he will find two persons whom he is to
importune till they consent to undertake him; but whether he is to find
these persons among the race of Chowbok or the Erewhonians themselves is
not for him to choose.
SELECTIONS FROM THE FAIR HAVEN.
MEMOIR OF THE LATE JOHN PICKARD OWEN. (CHAPTER I. OF THE FAIR HAVEN.)
{48}
The subject of this memoir, and author of the work which follows it, was
born in Goodge Street, Tottenham Court Road, London, on the 5th of
February 1832. He was my elder brother by about eighteen months. Our
father and mother had once been rich, but through a succession of
unavoidable misfortunes they were left with but a slender income when my
brother and myself were about three and four years old. My father died
some five or six years afterwards, and we only recollected him as a
singularly gentle and humorous playmate who doted upon us both and never
spoke unkindly.
The charm of such a recollection can never be dispelled; both my brother
and myself returned his love with interest, and cherished his memory with
the most affectionate regret, from the day on which he left us till the
time came that the one of us was again to see him face to face. So sweet
and winning was his nature that his slightest wish was our law--and
whenever we pleased him, no matter how little, he never failed to thank
us as though we had done him a service which we should have had a perfect
right to withhold. How proud were we upon any of these occasions, and
how we courted the opportunity of being thanked! He did indeed well know
the art of becoming idolised by his children, and dearly did he prize the
results of his own proficiency; yet truly there was no art about it; all
arose spontaneously from the well-spring of a sympathetic nature which
was quick to feel as others felt, whether old or young, rich or poor,
wise or foolish. On one point alone did he neglect us--I refer to our
religious education. On all other matters he was the kindest and most
careful teacher in the world. Love and gratitude be to his memory!
My mother loved us no less ardently than my father, but she was of a
quicker temper, and less adept at conciliating affection. She must have
been exceedingly handsome when she was young, and was still comely when
we first remembered her; she was also highly accomplished, but she felt
my father's loss of fortune more keenly than my father himself, and it
preyed upon her mind, though rather for our sake than for her own. Had
we not known my father we should have loved her better than any one in
the world, but affection goes by comparison, and my father spoiled us for
any one but himself; indeed, in after life, I remember my mother's
telling me, with many tears, how jealous she had often been of the love
we bore him, and how mean she had thought it of him to entrust all
scolding or repression to her, so that he might have more than his due
share of our affection. Not that I believe my father did this
consciously; still, he so greatly hated scolding that I dare say we might
often have got off scot-free when we really deserved reproof had not my
mother undertaken the _onus_ of scolding us herself. We therefore
naturally feared her more than my father, and fearing more we loved less.
For as love casteth out fear, so fear love.
This must have been hard to bear, and my mother scarcely knew the way to
bear it. She tried to upbraid us, in little ways, into loving her as
much as my father; the more she tried this, the less we could succeed in
doing it; and so on and so on in a fashion which need not be detailed.
Not but what we really loved her deeply, while her affection for us was
insurpassable; still we loved her less than we loved my father, and this
was the grievance.
My father entrusted our religious education entirely to my mother. He
was himself, I am assured, of a deeply religious turn of mind, and a
thoroughly consistent member of the Church of England; but he conceived,
and perhaps rightly, that it is the mother who should first teach her
children to lift their hands in prayer, and impart to them a knowledge of
the One in whom we live and move and have our being. My mother accepted
the task gladly, for in spite of a certain narrowness of view--the
natural but deplorable result of her earlier surroundings--she was one of
the most truly pious women whom I have ever known; unfortunately for
herself and us she had been trained in the lowest school of Evangelical
literalism--a school which in after life both my brother and myself came
to regard as the main obstacle to the complete overthrow of unbelief; we
therefore looked upon it with something stronger than aversion, and for
my own part I still deem it perhaps the most insidious enemy which the
cause of Christ has ever encountered. But of this more hereafter.
My mother, as I said, threw her whole soul into the work of our religious
education. Whatever she believed she believed literally, and, if I may
say so, with a harshness of realisation which left little scope for
imagination or mystery. Her ideas concerning heaven and her solutions of
life's enigmas were clear and simple, but they could only be reconciled
with certain obvious facts--such as the omnipotence and all-goodness of
God--by leaving many things absolutely out of sight. And this my mother
succeeded effectually in doing. She never doubted that her opinions
comprised the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; she
therefore made haste to sow the good seed in our tender minds, and so far
succeeded that when my brother was four years old he could repeat the
Apostles' Creed, the general confession, and the Lord's Prayer without a
blunder. My mother made herself believe that he delighted in them; but,
alas! it was far otherwise; for strange as it may appear concerning one
whose later life was a continual prayer, in childhood he detested nothing
so much as being made to pray, and to learn his catechism. In this I am
sorry to say we were both heartily of a mind. As for Sunday the less
said the better.
I have already hinted (but as a warning to other parents had better,
perhaps, express myself more plainly) that this aversion was probably the
result of my mother's undue eagerness to reap an artificial fruit of lip-
service, which could have little meaning to the heart of one so young. I
believe that the severe check which the natural growth of faith
experienced in my brother's case was due almost entirely to this cause,
and to the school of literalism in which he had been trained; but,
however this may be, we both of us hated being made to say our prayers.
Morning and evening it was our one bugbear, and we would avoid it, as
indeed children generally will, by every artifice which we could employ.
Thus we were in the habit of feigning to be asleep shortly before prayer
time, and would gratefully hear my father tell my mother that it was a
shame to wake us; whereon he would carry us up to bed in a state
apparently of the profoundest slumber when we were really wide awake and
in great fear of detection. For we knew how to pretend to be asleep, but
we did not know how we ought to wake again; there was nothing for it
therefore when we were once committed, but to go on sleeping till we were
fairly undressed and put to bed, and could wake up safely in the dark.
But deceit is never long successful, and we were at last ignominiously
exposed.
It happened one evening that my mother suspected my brother John, and
tried to open his little hands which were lying clasped in front of him.
Now my brother was as yet very crude and inconsistent in his theories
concerning sleep, and had no conception what a real sleeper would do
under these circumstances. Fear deprived him of his powers of
reflection, and he thus unfortunately concluded that because sleepers, so
far as he had observed them, were always motionless, therefore they must
be rigid and incapable of motion; and indeed that any movement, under any
circumstances (for from his earliest childhood he liked to carry his
theories to their legitimate conclusion), would be physically impossible
for one who was really sleeping; forgetful, oh! unhappy one, of the
flexibility of his own body on being carried up stairs, and, more unhappy
still, ignorant of the art of waking. He therefore clenched his fingers
harder and harder as he felt my mother trying to unfold them, while his
head hung listless, and his eyes were closed as though he were sleeping
sweetly. It is needless to detail the agony of shame that followed. My
mother begged my father to box his ears, which my father flatly refused
to do. Then she boxed them herself, and there followed a scene, and a
day or two of disgrace for both of us.
Shortly after this there happened another misadventure. A lady came to
stay with my mother, and was to sleep in a bed that had been brought into
our nursery, for my father's fortunes had already failed, and we were
living in a humble way. We were still but four and five years old, so
the arrangement was not unnatural, and it was assumed that we should be
asleep before the lady went to bed, and be down stairs before she would
get up in the morning. But the arrival of this lady and her being put to
sleep in the nursery were great events to us in those days, and being
particularly wanted to go to sleep, we of course sat up in bed talking
and keeping ourselves awake till she should come up stairs. Perhaps we
had fancied that she would give us something, but if so we were
disappointed. However, whether this was the case or not, we were wide
awake when our visitor came to bed, and having no particular object to
gain, we made no pretence of sleeping. The lady kissed us both, told us
to lie still and go to sleep like good children, and then began doing her
hair.
I remember this was the occasion on which my brother discovered a good
many things in connection with the fair sex which had hitherto been
beyond his ken; more especially that the mass of petticoats and clothes
which envelop the female form were not, as he expressed it to me, "all
solid woman," but that women were not in reality more substantially built
than men, and had legs as much as he had--a fact which he had never yet
realised. On this he for a long time considered them as impostors, who
had wronged him by leading him to suppose that they had far more "body in
them" (so he said) than he now found they had.
This was a sort of thing which he regarded with stern moral reprobation.
If he had been old enough to have a solicitor I believe he would have put
the matter into his hands, as well as certain other things which had
lately troubled him. For but recently my mother had bought a fowl, and
he had seen it plucked, and the inside taken out; his irritation had been
extreme on discovering that fowls were not all solid flesh, but that
their insides--and these formed, as it appeared to him, an enormous
percentage of the bird--were perfectly useless. He was now beginning to
understand that sheep and cows were also hollow as far as good meat was
concerned; the flesh they had was only a mouthful in comparison with what
they ought to have considering their apparent bulk: insignificant, mere
skin and bone covering a cavern. What right had they, or anything else,
to assert themselves as so big, and prove so empty? And now this
discovery of woman's falsehood was quite too much for him. The world
itself was hollow, made up of shams and delusions, full of sound and fury
signifying nothing.
Truly a prosaic young gentleman enough. Everything with him was to be
exactly in all its parts what it appeared on the face of it, and
everything was to go on doing exactly what it had been doing hitherto. If
a thing looked solid, it was to be very solid; if hollow, very hollow;
nothing was to be half and half, and nothing was to change unless he had
himself already become accustomed to its times and manners of changing;
there were to be no exceptions and no contradictions; all things were to
be perfectly consistent, and all premisses to be carried with extremest
rigour to their legitimate conclusions. Heaven was to be very neat (for
he was always tidy himself), and free from sudden shocks to the nervous
system, such as those caused by dogs barking at him, or cows driven in
the streets. God was to resemble my father, and the Holy Spirit to bear
some sort of indistinct analogy to my mother.
Such were the ideal theories of his childhood--unconsciously formed, but
very firmly believed in. As he grew up he made such modifications as
were forced upon him by enlarged perceptions, but every modification was
an effort to him, in spite of a continual and successful resistance to
what he recognised as his initial mental defect.
I may perhaps be allowed to say here, in reference to a remark in the
preceding paragraph, that both my brother and myself used to notice it as
an almost invariable rule that children's earliest ideas of God are
modelled upon the character of their father--if they have one. Should
the father be kind, considerate, full of the warmest love, fond of
showing it, and reserved only about his displeasure, the child, having
learned to look upon God as his Heavenly Father through the Lord's Prayer
and our Church Services, will feel towards God as he does towards his own
father; this conception will stick to a man for years and years after he
has attained manhood--probably it will never leave him. On the other
hand, if a man has found his earthly father harsh and uncongenial, his
conception of his Heavenly Parent will be painful. He will begin by
seeing God as an exaggerated likeness of his father. He will therefore
shrink from Him. The rottenness of still-born love in the heart of a
child poisons the blood of the soul, and hence, later, crime.
To return, however, to the lady. When she had put on her night-gown, she
knelt down by her bed-side and, to our consternation, began to say her
prayers. This was a cruel blow to both of us; we had always been under
the impression that grown-up people were not made to say their prayers,
and the idea of any one saying them of his or her own accord had never
occurred to us as possible. Of course the lady would not say her prayers
if she were not obliged; and yet she did say them; therefore she must be
obliged to say them; therefore we should be obliged to say them, and this
was a great disappointment. Awe-struck and open-mouthed we listened
while the lady prayed aloud and with a good deal of pathos for many
virtues and blessings which I do not now remember, and finally for my
father and mother and for both of us--shortly afterwards she rose, blew
out the light and got into bed. Every word that she said had confirmed
our worst apprehensions: it was just what we had been taught to say
ourselves.
Next morning we compared notes and drew some painful inferences; but in
the course of the day our spirits rallied. We agreed that there were
many mysteries in connection with life and things which it was high time
to unravel, and that an opportunity was now afforded us which might not
readily occur again. All we had to do was to be true to ourselves and
equal to the occasion. We laid our plans with great astuteness. We
would be fast asleep when the lady came up to bed, but our heads should
be turned in the direction of her bed, and covered with clothes, all but
a single peep-hole. My brother, as the eldest, had clearly a right to be
nearest the lady, but I could see sufficiently, and could depend on his
reporting faithfully whatever should escape me.
There was no chance of her giving us anything--if she had meant to do so
she would have done it sooner; she might, indeed, consider the moment of
her departure as the most auspicious for this purpose, but then she was
not going yet, and the interval was at our own disposal. We spent the
afternoon in trying to learn to snore, but we were not certain about it,
and in the end concluded that as snoring was not _de rigueur_ we had
better dispense with it.
We were put to bed; the light was taken away; we were told to go to
sleep, and promised faithfully that we would do so; the tongue indeed
swore, but the mind was unsworn. It was agreed that we should keep
pinching one another to prevent our going to sleep. We did so at
frequent intervals; at last our patience was rewarded with the heavy
creak, as of a stout elderly lady labouring up the stairs, and presently
our victim entered.
To cut a long story short, the lady on satisfying herself that we were
asleep, never said her prayers at all; during the remainder of her visit
whenever she found us awake she always said them, but when she thought we
were asleep, she never prayed. I should perhaps say that we had the
matter out with her before she left, and that the consequences were
unpleasant for all parties; they added to the troubles in which we were
already involved as to our prayers, and were indirectly among the
earliest causes which led my brother to look with scepticism upon
religion.
For awhile, however, all went on as though nothing had happened. An
effect of distrust, indeed, remained after the cause had been forgotten,
but my brother was still too young to oppose anything that my mother told
him, and to all outward appearance he grew in grace no less rapidly than
in stature.
For years we led a quiet and eventless life, broken only by the one great
sorrow of our father's death. Shortly after this we were sent to a day
school in Bloomsbury. We were neither of us very happy there, but my
brother, who always took kindly to his books, picked up a fair knowledge
of Latin and Greek; he also learned to draw, and to exercise himself a
little in English composition. When I was about fourteen my mother
capitalised a part of her income and started me off to America, where she
had friends who could give me a helping hand; by their kindness I was
enabled, after an absence of twenty years, to return with a handsome
income, but not, alas! before the death of my mother.
Up to the time of my departure my mother continued to read the Bible with
us and explain it. She had become enamoured of those millenarian
opinions which laid hold of so many some twenty-five or thirty years ago.
The Apocalypse was perhaps her favourite book in the Bible, and she was
imbued with a conviction that all the many and varied horrors with which
it teems were upon the eve of their accomplishment. The year eighteen
hundred and forty-eight was to be (as indeed it was) a time of general
bloodshed and confusion, while in eighteen hundred and sixty-six, should
it please God to spare her, her eyes would be gladdened by the visible
descent of the Son of Man with a shout, with the voice of the Archangel,
with the trump of God, and the dead in Christ should rise first; then
she, as one of them that were alive, would be caught up with other saints
into the air, and would possibly receive while rising some distinguishing
token of confidence and approbation which should fall with due
impressiveness upon the surrounding multitude; then would come the
consummation of all things, and she would be ever with the Lord. She
died peaceably in her bed before she could know that a commercial panic
was the nearest approach to the fulfilment of prophecy which the year
eighteen hundred and sixty-six brought forth.
These opinions of my mother's injured her naturally healthy and vigorous
mind by leading her to indulge in all manner of dreamy and fanciful
interpretations of Scripture, which any but the most narrow literalist
would feel at once to be untenable. Thus several times she expressed to
us her conviction that my brother and myself were to be the two witnesses
mentioned in the eleventh chapter of the Book of Revelation, and dilated
upon the gratification she should experience upon finding that we had
indeed been reserved for a position of such distinction. We were as yet
mere children, and naturally took all for granted that our mother told
us; we therefore made a careful examination of the passage which threw
light upon our future. On finding that the prospect was gloomy and full
of bloodshed we protested against the honours which were intended for us,
more especially when we reflected that the mother of the two witnesses
was not menaced in Scripture with any particular discomfort. If we were
to be martyrs, my mother ought to wish to be a martyr too, whereas
nothing was farther from her intention. Her notion clearly was that we
were to be massacred somewhere in the streets of London, in consequence
of the anti-Christian machinations of the Pope; that after lying about
unburied for three days and a half we were to come to life again; and
finally, that we should conspicuously ascend to heaven, in front,
perhaps, of the Foundling Hospital.
She was not herself indeed to share either our martyrdom or our
glorification, but was to survive us many years on earth, living in an
odour of great sanctity and reflected splendour, as the central and most
august figure in a select society. She would perhaps be able indirectly,
through her sons' influence with the Almighty, to have a voice in most of
the arrangements both of this world and of the next. If all this were to
come true (and things seemed very like it), those friends who had
neglected us in our adversity would not find it too easy to be restored
to favour, however greatly they might desire it--that is to say, they
would not have found it too easy in the case of one less magnanimous and
spiritually-minded than herself. My mother said but little of the above
directly, but the fragments which occasionally escaped her were pregnant,
and on looking back it is easy to perceive that she must have been
building one of the most stupendous aerial fabrics that have ever been
reared.
I have given the above in its more amusing aspect, and am half afraid
that I may appear to be making a jest of weakness on the part of one of
the most devotedly unselfish mothers who have ever existed. But one can
love while smiling, and the very wildness of my mother's dream serves to
show how entirely her whole soul was occupied with the things which are
above. To her, religion was all in all; the earth was but a place of
pilgrimage--only so far important as it was a possible road to heaven.
She impressed this upon both of us by every word and action--instant in
season and out of season, so that she might but fill us more deeply with
a sense of the things belonging to our peace.
But the inevitable consequences happened; my mother had aimed too high
and had overshot her mark. The influence indeed of her guileless and
unworldly nature remained impressed upon my brother even during the time
of his extremest unbelief (perhaps his ultimate safety is in the main
referable to this cause, and to the happy memories of my father, which
had predisposed him to love God), but my mother had insisted on the most
minute verbal accuracy of every part of the Bible; she had also dwelt
upon the duty of independent research, and on the necessity of giving up
everything rather than assent to things which our conscience did not
assent to. No one could have more effectually taught us to try _to
think_ the truth, and we had taken her at her word because our hearts
told us that she was right. But she required three incompatible things.
When my brother grew older he came to feel that independent and
unflinching examination, with a determination to abide by the results,
would lead him to reject the point which to my mother was more important
than any other--I mean the absolute accuracy of the Gospel records. My
mother was inexpressibly shocked at hearing my brother doubt the
authenticity of the Epistle to the Hebrews; and then, as it appeared to
him, she tried to make him violate the duties of examination and candour
which he had learnt too thoroughly to unlearn. Thereon came pain and an
estrangement which was none the less profound for being mutually
concealed. It seemed to my mother that he would not give up the
wilfulness of his own opinions for her and for his Redeemer's sake. To
him it seemed that he was ready to give up not only his mother but Christ
Himself for Christ's sake.
This estrangement was the gradual work of some five or six years, during
which my brother was between eleven and seventeen years old. At
seventeen, I am told that he was remarkably well informed and clever. His
manners were, like my father's, singularly genial, and his appearance
very prepossessing. He had as yet no doubt concerning the soundness of
any fundamental Christian doctrine, but his mind was already too active
to allow of his being contented with my mother's childlike faith. There
were points on which he did not indeed doubt, but which it would none the
less be interesting to consider; such for example as the perfectibility
of the regenerate Christian, and the meaning of the mysterious central
chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. He was engaged in these
researches though still only a boy, when an event occurred which gave the
first real shock to his faith.
He was accustomed to teach in a school for the poorest children every
Sunday afternoon, a task for which his patience and good temper well
fitted him. On one occasion, however, while he was explaining the effect
of baptism to one of his favourite pupils, he discovered to his great
surprise that the boy had never been baptized. He pushed his inquiries
further, and found that out of the fifteen boys in his class only five
had been baptized, and, not only so, but that no difference in
disposition or conduct could be discovered between the regenerate boys
and the unregenerate. The good and bad boys were distributed in
proportions equal to the respective numbers of the baptized and
unbaptized. In spite of a certain impetuosity of natural character, he
was also of a matter-of-fact and experimental turn of mind; he therefore
went through the whole school, which numbered about a hundred boys, and
found out who had been baptized and who had not. The same results
appeared. The majority had not been baptized; yet the good and bad
dispositions were so distributed as to preclude all possibility of
maintaining that the baptized boys were better than the unbaptized.
The reader may smile at the idea of any one's faith being troubled by a
fact of which the explanation is so obvious, but as a matter of fact my
brother was seriously and painfully shocked. The teacher to whom he
applied for a solution of the difficulty was not a man of any real power,
and reported my brother to the rector for having disturbed the school by
his inquiries. The rector was old and self-opinionated; the difficulty,
indeed, was plainly as new to him as it had been to my brother, but
instead of saying so at once, and referring to any recognised theological
authority, he tried to put him off with words which seemed intended to
silence him rather than to satisfy him; finally he lost his temper, and
my brother fell under suspicion of unorthodoxy.
This kind of treatment did not answer with my brother. He alludes to it
resentfully in the introductory chapter of his book. He became
suspicious that a preconceived opinion was being defended at the expense
of honest scrutiny, and was thus driven upon his own unaided
investigation. The result may be guessed: he began to go astray, and
strayed further and further. The children of God, he reasoned, the
members of Christ and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven, were no more
spiritually minded than the children of the world and the devil. Was
then the grace of God a gift which left no trace whatever upon those who
were possessed of it? A thing the presence or absence of which might be
ascertained by consulting the parish registry, but was not discernible in
conduct? The grace of man was more clearly perceptible than this.
Assuredly there must be a screw loose somewhere, which, for aught he
knew, might be jeopardising the salvation of all Christendom. Where then
was this loose screw to be found?
He concluded after some months of reflection that the mischief was caused
by the system of sponsors and by infant baptism. He, therefore, to my
mother's inexpressible grief, joined the Baptists, and was immersed in a
pond near Dorking. With the Baptists he remained quiet about three
months, and then began to quarrel with his instructors as to their
doctrine of predestination. Shortly afterwards he came accidentally upon
a fascinating stranger who was no less struck with my brother than my
brother with him, and this gentleman, who turned out to be a Roman
Catholic missionary, landed him in the Church of Rome, where he felt sure
that he had now found rest for his soul. But here, too, he was mistaken;
after about two years he rebelled against the stifling of all free
inquiry; on this rebellion the flood-gates of scepticism were opened, and
he was soon battling with unbelief. He then fell in with one who was a
pure Deist, and was shorn of every shred of dogma which he had ever held,
except a belief in the personality and providence of the Creator.
On reviewing his letters written to me about this time, I am painfully
struck with the manner in which they show that all these pitiable
vagaries were to be traced to a single cause--a cause which still exists
to the misleading of hundreds of thousands, and which, I fear, seems
likely to continue in full force for many a year to come--I mean, to a
false system of training which teaches people to regard Christianity as a
thing one and indivisible, to be accepted entirely in the strictest
reading of the letter, or to be rejected as absolutely untrue. The fact
is, that all permanent truth is as one of those coal measures, a seam of
which lies near the surface, and even crops up above the ground, but
which is generally of an inferior quality and soon worked out; beneath it
there comes a labour of sand and clay, and then at last the true seam of
precious quality, and in virtually inexhaustible supply. The truth which
is on the surface is rarely the whole truth. It is seldom until this has
been worked out and done with--as in the case of the apparent flatness of
the earth--that unchangeable truth is discovered. It is the glory of the
Lord to conceal a matter: it is the glory of the king to find it out. If
my brother, from whom I have taken the above illustration, had had some
judicious and wide-minded friend, to correct and supplement the mainly
admirable principles which had been instilled into him by my mother, he
would have been saved years of spiritual wandering; but, as it was, he
fell in with one after another, each in his own way as literal and
unspiritual as the other--each impressed with one aspect of religious
truth, and with one only. In the end he became perhaps the widest-minded
and most original thinker whom I have ever met; but no one from his early
manhood could have augured this result; on the contrary, he showed every
sign of being likely to develop into one of those who can never see more
than one side of a question at a time, in spite of their seeing that side
with singular clearness of mental vision. In after life, he often met
with mere lads who seemed to him to be years and years in advance of what
he had been at their age, and would say, smiling, "With a great sum
obtained I this freedom; but thou wast free-born."
Yet when one comes to think of it, a late development and laborious
growth are generally more fruitful than those which are over early
luxuriant. Drawing an illustration from the art of painting, with which
he was well acquainted, my brother used to say that all the greatest
painters had begun with a hard and precise manner, from which they had
only broken after several years of effort; and that in like manner all
the early schools were founded upon definiteness of outline to the
exclusion of truth of effect. This may be true; but in my brother's case
there was something even more unpromising than this; there was a
commonness, so to speak, of mental execution, from which no one could
have foreseen his after-emancipation. Yet in the course of time he was
indeed emancipated to the very uttermost, while his bonds will, I firmly
trust, be found to have been of inestimable service to the whole human
race.
For although it was so many years before he was enabled to see the
Christian scheme _as a whole_, or even to conceive the idea that there
was any whole at all, other than each one of the stages of opinion
through which he was at the time passing; yet when the idea was at length
presented to him by one whom I must not name, the discarded fragments of
his faith assumed shape, and formed themselves into a consistently
organised scheme. Then became apparent the value of his knowledge of the
details of so many different sides of Christian verity. Buried in the
details, he had hitherto ignored the fact that they were only the
unessential developments of certain component parts. Awakening to the
perception of the whole after an intimate acquaintance with the details,
he was able to realise the position and meaning of all that he had
hitherto experienced in a way which has been vouchsafed to few, if any
others. Thus he became truly a broad Churchman. Not broad in the
ordinary and ill-considered use of the term (for the broad Churchman is
as little able to sympathise with Romanists, extreme High Churchmen and
Dissenters, as these are with himself--he is only one of a sect which is
called by the name of broad, though it is no broader than its own base),
but in the true sense of being able to believe in the naturalness,
legitimacy, and truth _qua_ Christianity even of those doctrines which
seem to stand most widely and irreconcilably asunder.
SELECTIONS FROM LIFE AND HABIT.
ON CERTAIN ACQUIRED HABITS. (FROM CHAPTER I. OF LIFE AND HABIT.) {68}
It will be our business in the following chapters to consider whether the
unconsciousness, or quasi-unconsciousness, with which we perform certain
acquired actions, throws any light upon Embryology and inherited
instincts, and otherwise to follow the train of thought which the class
of actions above mentioned may suggest. More especially I propose to
consider them in so far as they bear upon the origin of species and the
continuation of life by successive generations, whether in the animal or
vegetable kingdoms.
Taking then, the art of playing the piano as an example of the kind of
action we are in search of, we observe that a practised player will
perform very difficult pieces apparently without effort, often, indeed,
while thinking and talking of something quite other than his music; yet
he will play accurately and, possibly, with much expression. If he has
been playing a fugue, say in four parts, he will have kept each part well
distinct, in such a manner as to prove that his mind was not prevented,
by its other occupations, from consciously or unconsciously following
four distinct trains of musical thought at the same time, nor from making
his fingers act in exactly the required manner as regards each note of
each part.
It commonly happens that in the course of four or five minutes a player
may have struck four or five thousand notes. If we take into
consideration the rests, dotted notes, accidentals, variations of time,
&c., we shall find his attention must have been exercised on many more
occasions than when he was actually striking notes: so that it may not be
too much to say that the attention of a first-rate player has been
exercised--to an infinitesimally small extent--but still truly
exercised--on as many as ten thousand occasions within the space of five
minutes, for no note can be struck nor point attended to without a
certain amount of attention, no matter how rapidly or unconsciously
given.
Moreover, each act of attention has been followed by an act of volition,
and each act of volition by a muscular action, which is composed of many
minor actions; some so small that we can no more follow them than the
player himself can perceive them; nevertheless, it may have been
perfectly plain that the player was not attending to what he was doing,
but was listening to conversation on some other subject, not to say
joining in it himself. If he has been playing the violin, he may have
done all the above, and may also have been walking about. Herr Joachim
would unquestionably be able to do all that has here been described.
So complete may be the player's unconsciousness of the attention he is
giving, and the brain power he is exerting, that we may find it difficult
to awaken his attention to any particular part of his performance without
putting him out. Indeed we cannot do so. We observe that he finds it
hardly less difficult to compass a voluntary consciousness of what he has
once learnt so thoroughly that it has passed, so to speak, into the
domain of unconsciousness, than he found it to learn the note or passage
in the first instance. The effort after a second consciousness of detail
baffles him--compels him to turn to his music or play slowly. In fact it
seems as though he knows the piece too well to be able to know that he
knows it, and is only conscious of knowing those passages which he does
not know so thoroughly.
At the end of his performance, his power of recollecting appears to be no
less annihilated than was his consciousness of attention and volition.
For of the thousands of acts requiring the exercise of both the one and
the other, which he has done during the five minutes, we will say, of his
performance, he will remember hardly one when it is over. If he calls to
mind anything beyond the main fact that he has played such and such a
piece, it will probably be some passage which he has found more difficult
than the others, and with the like of which he has not been so long
familiar. All the rest he will forget as completely as the breath which
he has drawn while playing.
He finds it difficult to remember even the difficulties he experienced in
learning to play. A few may have so impressed him that they remain with
him, but the greater part will have escaped him as completely as the
remembrance of what he ate, or how he put on his clothes, this day ten
years ago; nevertheless, it is plain he does in reality remember more
than he remembers remembering, for he avoids mistakes which he made at
one time, and his performance proves that all the notes are in his
memory, though if called upon to play such and such a bar at random from
the middle of the piece, and neither more nor less, he will probably say
that he cannot remember it unless he begins from the beginning of the
phrase which leads to it.
In spite, however, of the performer's present proficiency, our experience
of the manner in which proficiency is usually acquired warrants us in
assuming that there must have been a time when what is now so easy as to
be done without conscious effort of the brain was only done by means of
brain work which was very keenly perceived, even to fatigue and positive
distress. Even now, if the player is playing something the like of which
he has not met before, we observe he pauses and becomes immediately
conscious of attention.
We draw the inference, therefore, as regards pianoforte or violin
playing, that the more the familiarity or knowledge of the art, the less
is there consciousness of such knowledge; even so far as that there
should be almost as much difficulty in awakening consciousness which has
become, so to speak, latent,--a consciousness of that which is known too
well to admit of recognised self-analysis while the knowledge is being
exercised--as in creating a consciousness of that which is not yet well
enough known to be properly designated as known at all. On the other
hand, we observe that the less the familiarity or knowledge, the greater
the consciousness of whatever knowledge there is.
* * * * *
To sum up, then, briefly. It would appear as though perfect knowledge
and perfect ignorance were extremes which meet and become
indistinguishable from one another; so also perfect volition and perfect
absence of volition, perfect memory and perfect forgetfulness; for we are
unconscious of knowing, willing, or remembering, either from not yet
having known or willed, or from knowing and willing so well and so
intensely as to be no longer conscious of either. Conscious knowledge
and volition are of attention; attention is of suspense; suspense is of
doubt; doubt is of uncertainty; uncertainty is of ignorance; so that the
mere fact of conscious knowing or willing implies the presence of more or
less novelty and doubt.
It would also appear as a general principle on a superficial view of the
foregoing instances (and the reader may readily supply himself with
others which are perhaps more to the purpose), that unconscious knowledge
and unconscious volition are never acquired otherwise than as the result
of experience, familiarity, or habit; so that whenever we observe a
person able to do any complicated action unconsciously, we may assume
both that he must have done it very often before he could acquire so
great proficiency, and also that there must have been a time when he did
not know how to do it at all.
We may assume that there was a time when he was yet so nearly on the
point of neither knowing nor willing perfectly, that he was quite alive
to whatever knowledge or volition he could exert; going further back, we
shall find him still more keenly alive to a less perfect knowledge;
earlier still, we find him well aware that he does not know nor will
correctly, but trying hard to do both the one and the other; and so on,
back and back, till both difficulty and consciousness become little more
than "a sound of going," as it were, in the brain, a flitting to and fro
of something barely recognisable as the desire to will or know at
all--much less as the desire to know or will definitely this or that.
Finally they retreat beyond our ken into the repose--the inorganic
kingdom--of as yet unawakened interest.
In either case--the repose of perfect ignorance or of perfect
knowledge--disturbance is troublesome. When first starting on an
Atlantic steamer, our rest is hindered by the screw; after a short time,
it is hindered if the screw stops. A uniform impression is practically
no impression. One cannot either learn or unlearn without pains or pain.
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS KNOWERS THE LAW AND GRACE. (FROM CHAPTER II.
OF LIFE AND HABIT.)
Certain it is that we know best what we are least conscious of knowing,
or at any rate least able to prove; as, for example, our own existence,
or that there is a country England. If any one asks us for proof on
matters of this sort, we have none ready, and are justly annoyed at being
called to consider what we regard as settled questions. Again, there is
hardly anything which so much affects our actions as the centre of the
earth (unless, perhaps, it be that still hotter and more unprofitable
spot the centre of the universe), for we are incessantly trying to get as
near it as circumstances will allow, or to avoid getting nearer than is
for the time being convenient. Walking, running, standing, sitting,
lying, waking, or sleeping, from birth till death it is a paramount
object with us; even after death--if it be not fanciful to say so--it is
one of the few things of which what is left of us can still feel the
influence; yet what can engross less of our attention than this dark and
distant spot so many thousands of miles away?
The air we breathe, so long as it is neither too hot nor cold, nor rough,
nor full of smoke--that is to say, so long as it is in that state with
which we are best acquainted--seldom enters into our thoughts; yet there
is hardly anything with which we are more incessantly occupied night and
day.
Indeed, it is not too much to say that we have no really profound
knowledge upon any subject--no knowledge on the strength of which we are
ready to act at moments unhesitatingly without either preparation or
after-thought--till we have left off feeling conscious of the possession
of such knowledge, and of the grounds on which it rests. A lesson
thoroughly learned must be like the air which feels so light, though
pressing so heavily against us, because every pore of our skin is
saturated, so to speak, with it on all sides equally. This perfection of
knowledge sometimes extends to positive disbelief in the thing known, so
that the most thorough knower shall believe himself altogether ignorant.
No thief, for example, is such an utter thief--so _good_ a thief--as the
kleptomaniac. Until he has become a kleptomaniac, and can steal a horse
as it were by a reflex action, he is still but half a thief, with many
unthievish notions still clinging to him. Yet the kleptomaniac is
probably unaware that he can steal at all, much less that he can steal so
well. He would be shocked if he were to know the truth. So again, no
man is a great hypocrite until he has left off knowing that he is a
hypocrite. The great hypocrites of the world are almost invariably under
the impression that they are among the very few really honest people to
be found; and, as we must all have observed, it is rare to find any one
strongly under this impression without ourselves having good reason to
differ from him.
Again, it has been often and very truly said that it is not the conscious
and self-styled sceptic, as Shelley, for example, who is the true
unbeliever. Such a man as Shelley will, as indeed his life abundantly
proves, have more in common than not with the true unselfconscious
believer. Gallio again, whose indifference to religious animosities has
won him the cheapest immortality which, so far as I can remember, was
ever yet won, was probably, if the truth were known, a person of the
sincerest piety. It is the unconscious unbeliever who is the true
infidel, however greatly he would be surprised to know the truth. Mr.
Spurgeon was reported as having asked God to remove Lord Beaconsfield
from office "_as soon as possible_." There lurks a more profound
distrust of God's power in these words than in almost any open denial of
His existence.
In like manner, the most perfect humour and irony is generally quite
unconscious. Examples of both are frequently given by men whom the world
considers as deficient in humour; it is more probably true that these
persons are unconscious of their own delightful power through the very
mastery and perfection with which they hold it. There is a play, for
instance, of genuine fun in some of the more serious scientific and
theological journals which for some time past we have looked for in vain
in "---"
The following extract, from a journal which I will not advertise, may
serve as an example:
"Lycurgus, when they had abandoned to his revenge him who had put out his
eyes, took him home, and the punishment he inflicted upon him was
sedulous instructions to virtue." Yet this truly comic paper does not
probably know that it is comic, any more than the kleptomaniac knows that
he steals, or than John Milton knew he was a humorist when he wrote a
hymn upon the circumcision, and spent his honeymoon in composing a
treatise on divorce. No more again did Goethe know how exquisitely
humorous he was when he wrote, in his Wilhelm Meister, that a beautiful
tear glistened in Theresa's right eye, and then went on to explain that
it glistened in her right eye and not in her left, because she had had a
wart on her left which had been removed--and successfully. Goethe
probably wrote this without a chuckle; he believed what a good many
people who have never read Wilhelm Meister believe still, namely, that it
was a work full of pathos--of fine and tender feeling; yet a less
consummate humorist must have felt that there was scarcely a paragraph in
it from first to last the chief merit of which did not lie in its
absurdity.
But enough has perhaps been said. As the fish in the sea, or the bird in
the air, so unreasoningly and inarticulately safe must a man feel before
he can be said to know. It is only those who are ignorant and
uncultivated who can know anything at all in a proper sense of the words.
Cultivation will breed in any man a certainty of the uncertainty even of
his most assured convictions. It is perhaps fortunate for our comfort
that we can none of us be cultivated upon very many subjects, so that
considerable scope for assurance will still remain to us; but however
this may be, we certainly observe it as a fact that those are the
greatest men who are most uncertain in spite of certainty, and at the
same time most certain in spite of uncertainty, and who are thus best
able to feel that there is nothing in such complete harmony with itself
as a flat contradiction in terms. For nature hates that any principle
should breed, so to speak, hermaphroditically, but will give to each an
help meet for it which shall cross it and be the undoing of it; as in the
case of descent with modification, of which the essence is that every
offspring resembles its parents, and yet, at the same time, that no
offspring resembles its parents. But for the slightly irritating
stimulant of this perpetual crossing, we should pass our lives
unconsciously as though in slumber.
Until we have got to understand that though black is not white, yet it
may be whiter than white itself (and any painter will readily paint that
which shall show obviously as black, yet it shall be whiter than that
which shall show no less obviously as white), we may be good logicians,
but we are still poor reasoners. Knowledge is in an inchoate state as
long as it is capable of logical treatment; it must be transmuted into
that sense or instinct which rises altogether above the sphere in which
words can have being at all, otherwise it is not yet incarnate. For
sense is to knowledge what conscience is to reasoning about light and
wrong; the reasoning must be so rapid as to defy conscious reference to
first principles, and even at times to be apparently subversive of them
altogether, or the action will halt. It must become automatic before we
are safe with it. While we are fumbling for the grounds of our
conviction, our conviction is prone to fall, as Peter for lack of faith
sinking into the waves of Galilee; so that the very power to prove at all
is an _a priori_ argument against the truth--or at any rate the practical
importance to the vast majority of mankind--of all that is supported by
demonstration. For the power to prove implies a sense of the need of
proof, and things which the majority of mankind find practically
important are in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred above proof. The
need of proof becomes as obsolete in the case of assured knowledge, as
the practice of fortifying towns in the middle of an old and long-settled
country. Who builds defences for that which is impregnable or little
likely to be assailed? The answer is ready, that unless the defences had
been built in former times it would be impossible to do without them now;
but this does not touch the argument, which is not that demonstration is
unwise but that as long as a demonstration is still felt necessary, and
therefore kept ready to hand, the subject of such demonstration is not
yet securely known. _Qui s'excuse_, _s'accuse_; and unless a matter can
hold its own without the brag and self-assertion of continual
demonstration, it is still more or less of a parvenu, which we shall not
lose much by neglecting till it has less occasion to blow its own
trumpet. The only alternative is that it is an error in process of
detection, for if evidence concerning any opinion has long been deemed
superfluous, and ever after this comes to be again felt necessary, we
know that the opinion is doomed.
If there is any truth in the above, it follows that our conception of the
words "science" and "scientific" must undergo some modification. Not
that we should speak slightingly of science, but that we should recognise
more than we do, that there are two distinct classes of scientific
people, corresponding not inaptly with the two main parties into which
the political world is divided. The one class is deeply versed in those
sciences which have already become the common property of mankind;
enjoying, enforcing, perpetuating, and engraining still more deeply into
the mind of man acquisitions already approved by common experience, but
somewhat careless about extension of empire, or at any rate disinclined,
for the most part, to active effort on their own part for the sake of
such extension--neither progressive, in fact, nor aggressive--but quiet,
peaceable people, who wish to live and let live, as their fathers before
them; while the other class is chiefly intent upon pushing forward the
boundaries of science, and is comparatively indifferent to what is known
already save in so far as necessary for purposes of extension. These
last are called pioneers of science, and to them alone is the title
"scientific" commonly accorded; but pioneers, important to an army as
they are, are still not the army itself, which can get on better without
the pioneers than the pioneers without the army. Surely the class which
knows thoroughly well what it knows, and which adjudicates upon the value
of the discoveries made by the pioneers--surely this class has as good a
right or better to be called scientific than the pioneers themselves.
These two classes above described blend into one another with every shade
of gradation. Some are admirably proficient in the well-known
sciences--that is to say, they have good health, good looks, good temper,
common sense, and energy, and they hold all these good things in such
perfection as to be altogether without introspection--to be not under the
law, but so entirely under grace that every one who sees them likes them.
But such may, and perhaps more commonly will, have very little
inclination to extend the boundaries of human knowledge; their aim is in
another direction altogether. Of the pioneers, on the other hand, some
are agreeable people, well versed in the older sciences, though still
more eminent as pioneers, while others, whose services in this last
capacity have been of inestimable value, are noticeably ignorant of the
sciences which have already become current with the larger part of
mankind--in other words, they are ugly, rude, and disagreeable people,
very progressive, it may be, but very aggressive to boot.
The main difference between these two classes lies in the fact that the
knowledge of the one, so far as it is new, is known consciously, while
that of the other is unconscious, consisting of sense and instinct rather
than of recognised knowledge. So long as a man has these, and of the
same kind as the more powerful body of his fellow-countrymen, he is a man
of science though he can hardly read or write. As my great namesake said
so well, "He knows what's what, and that's as high as metaphysic wit can
fly." As is usual in cases of great proficiency, these true and thorough
knowers do not know that they are scientific, and can seldom give a
reason for the faith that is in them. They believe themselves to be
ignorant, uncultured men, nor can even the professors whom they sometimes
outwit in their own professorial domain perceive that they have been
outwitted by men of superior scientific attainments to their own. The
following passage from Dr. Carpenter's "Mesmerism, Spiritualism," &c.,
may serve as an illustration:--
"It is well known that persons who are conversant with the geological
structure of a district are often able to indicate with considerable
certainty in what spot and at what depth water will be found; and men _of
less scientific knowledge_, _but of considerable practical
experience_"--(so that in Dr. Carpenter's mind there seems to be some
sort of contrast or difference in kind between the knowledge which is
derived from observation of facts and scientific knowledge)--"frequently
arrive at a true conclusion upon this point without being able to assign
reasons for their opinions."
"Exactly the same may be said in regard to the mineral structure of a
mining district; the course of a metallic vein being often correctly
indicated by the shrewd guess of an _observant_ workman, when _the
scientific reasoning_ of the mining engineer altogether fails."
Precisely. Here we have exactly the kind of thing we are in search of:
the man who has observed and observed till the facts are so thoroughly in
his head that through familiarity he has lost sight both of them and of
the processes whereby he deduced his conclusions from them--is apparently
not considered scientific, though he knows how to solve the problem
before him; the mining engineer, on the other hand, who reasons
scientifically--that is to say, with a knowledge of his own knowledge--is
found not to know, and to fail in discovering the mineral.
"It is an experience we are continually encountering in other walks of
life," continues Dr. Carpenter, "that particular persons are guided--some
apparently by an original and others by _an acquired intuition_--to
conclusions for which they can give no adequate reason, but which
subsequent events prove to have been correct." And this, I take it,
implies what I have been above insisting on, namely, that on becoming
intense, knowledge seems also to become unaware of the grounds on which
it rests, or that it has or requires grounds at all, or indeed even
exists. The only issue between myself and Dr. Carpenter would appear to
be that Dr. Carpenter, himself an acknowledged leader in the scientific
world, restricts the term "scientific" to the people who know that they
know, but are beaten by those who are not so conscious of their own
knowledge; while I say that the term "scientific" should be applied (only
that they would not like it) to the nice sensible people who know what's
what rather than to the professorial classes.
And this is easily understood when we remember that the pioneer cannot
hope to acquire any of the new sciences in a single lifetime so perfectly
as to become unaware of his own knowledge. As a general rule, we observe
him to be still in a state of active consciousness concerning whatever
particular science he is extending, and as long as he is in this state he
cannot know utterly. It is, as I have already so often insisted, those
who do not know that they know so much who have the firmest grip of their
knowledge: the best class, for example, of our English youth, who live
much in the open air, and, as Lord Beaconsfield finely said, never read.
These are the people who know best those things which are best worth
knowing--that is to say, they are the most truly scientific.
Unfortunately, the apparatus necessary for this kind of science is so
costly as to be within the reach of few, involving, as it does, an
experience in the use of it for some preceding generations. Even those
who are born with the means within their reach must take no less pains,
and exercise no less self-control, before they can attain the perfect
unconscious use of them, than would go to the making of a James Watt or a
Stephenson; it is vain, therefore, to hope that this best kind of science
can ever be put within the reach of the many; nevertheless it may be
safely said that all the other and more generally recognised kinds of
science are valueless except in so far as they minister to this the
highest kind. They have no _raison d'etre_ unless they tend to do away
with the necessity for work, and to diffuse good health, and that good
sense which is above self-consciousness. They are to be encouraged
because they have rendered the most fortunate kind of modern European
possible, and because they tend to make possible a still more fortunate
kind than any now existing. But the man who devotes himself to science
cannot--with the rarest, if any, exceptions--belong to this most
fortunate class himself. He occupies a lower place, both scientifically
and morally, for it is not possible but that his drudgery should somewhat
soil him both in mind and health of body, or, if this be denied, surely
it must let him and hinder him in running the race for unconsciousness.
We do not feel that it increases the glory of a king or great nobleman
that he should excel in what is commonly called science. Certainly he
should not go further than Prince Rupert's drops. Nor should he excel in
music, art, literature, or theology--all which things are more or less
parts of science. He should be above them all, save in so far as he can
without effort reap renown from the labours of others. It is a _lache_
in him that he should write music or books, or paint pictures at all; but
if he must do so, his work should be at best contemptible. Much as we
must condemn Marcus Aurelius, we condemn James I. even more severely.
It is a pity there should exist so general a confusion of thought upon
this subject, for it may be asserted without fear of contradiction that
there is hardly any form of immorality now rife which produces more
disastrous effects upon those who give themselves up to it, and upon
society in general, than the so-called science of those who know that
they know too well to be able to know truly. With very clever people--the
people who know that they know--it is much as with the members of the
early Corinthian Church, to whom St. Paul wrote, that if they looked
their numbers over, they would not find many wise, nor powerful, nor well-
born people among them. Dog-fanciers tell us that performing dogs never
carry their tails; such dogs have eaten of the tree of knowledge, and are
convinced of sin accordingly--they know that they know things, in respect
of which, therefore, they are no longer under grace, but under the law,
and they have yet so much grace left as to be ashamed. So with the human
clever dog; he may speak with the tongues of men and angels, but so long
as he knows that he knows, his tail will droop.
More especially does this hold in the case of those who are born to
wealth and of old family. We must all feel that a rich young nobleman
with a taste for science and principles is rarely a pleasant object. We
do not understand the rich young man in the Bible who wanted to inherit
eternal life, unless, indeed, he merely wanted to know whether there was
not some way by which he could avoid dying, and even so he is hardly
worth considering. Principles are like logic, which never yet made a
good reasoner of a bad one, but might still be occasionally useful if
they did not invariably contradict each other whenever there is any
temptation to appeal to them. They are like fire, good servants but bad
masters. As many people or more have been wrecked on principle as from
want of principle. They are, as their name implies, of an elementary
character, suitable for beginners only, and he who has so little mastered
them as to have occasion to refer to them consciously, is out of place in
the society of well-educated people. The truly scientific invariably
hate him, and, for the most part, the more profoundly in proportion to
the unconsciousness with which they do so.
If the reader hesitates, let him go down into the streets and look in the
shop-windows at the photographs of eminent men, whether literary,
artistic, or scientific, and note the work which the consciousness of
knowledge has wrought on nine out of every ten of them; then let him go
to the masterpieces of Greek and Italian art, the truest preachers of the
truest gospel of grace; let him look at the Venus of Milo, the
Discobolus, the St. George of Donatello. If it had pleased these people
to wish to study, there was no lack of brains to do it with; but imagine
"what a deal of scorn" would "look beautiful in the contempt and anger"
of the Venus of Milo's lip if it were suggested to her that she should
learn to read. Which, think you, knows most, the Theseus, or any modern
professor taken at random? True, learning must have a great share in the
advancement of beauty, inasmuch as beauty is but knowledge perfected and
incarnate--but with the pioneers it is _sic vos non vobis_; the grace is
not for them, but for those who come after. Science is like offences. It
must needs come, but woe unto that man through whom it comes; for there
cannot be much beauty where there is consciousness of knowledge, and
while knowledge is still new it must in the nature of things involve much
consciousness.
It is not knowledge, then, that is incompatible with beauty; there cannot
be too much knowledge, but it must have passed through many people who it
is to be feared must be both ugly and disagreeable, before beauty or
grace will have anything to say to it; it must be so diffused throughout
a man's whole being that he shall not be aware of it, or he will bear
himself under it constrainedly as one under the law, and not as one under
grace.
And grace is best, for where grace is, love is not distant. Grace! the
old Pagan ideal whose charm even unlovely Paul could not withstand, but,
as the legend tells us, his soul fainted within him, his heart misgave
him, and, standing alone on the seashore at dusk, he "troubled deaf
heaven with his bootless cries," his thin voice pleading for grace after
the flesh.
The waves came in one after another, the sea-gulls cried together after
their kind, the wind rustled among the dried canes upon the sandbanks,
and there came a voice from heaven saying, "Let My grace be sufficient
for thee." Whereon, failing of the thing itself, he stole the word and
strove to crush its meaning to the measure of his own limitations. But
the true grace, with her groves and high places, and troops of young men
and maidens crowned with flowers, and singing of love and youth and
wine--the true grace he drove out into the wilderness--high up, it may
be, into Piora, and into such-like places. Happy they who harboured her
in her ill report.
It is common to hear men wonder what new faith will be adopted by mankind
if disbelief in the Christian religion should become general. They seem
to expect that some new theological or quasi-theological system will
arise, which, _mutatis mutandis_, shall be Christianity over again. It
is a frequent reproach against those who maintain that the supernatural
element of Christianity is without foundation, that they bring forward no
such system of their own. They pull down but cannot build. We sometimes
hear even those who have come to the same conclusions as the destroyers
say, that having nothing new to set up, they will not attack the old. But
how can people set up a new superstition, knowing it to be a
superstition? Without faith in their own platform, a faith as intense as
that manifested by the early Christians, how can they preach? A new
superstition will come, but it is in the very essence of things that its
apostles should have no suspicion of its real nature; that they should no
more recognise the common element between the new and the old than the
early Christians recognised it between their faith and Paganism. If they
did, they would be paralysed. Others say that the new fabric may be seen
rising on every side, and that the coming religion is science. Certainly
its apostles preach it without misgiving, but it is not on that account
less possible that it may prove only to be the coming superstition--like
Christianity, true to its true votaries, and, like Christianity, false to
those who follow it introspectively.
It may well be we shall find we have escaped from one set of taskmasters
to fall into the hands of others far more ruthless. The tyranny of the
Church is light in comparison with that which future generations may have
to undergo at the hands of the doctrinaires. The Church did uphold a
grace of some sort as the _summum bonum_, in comparison with which all so-
called earthly knowledge--knowledge, that is to say, which had not passed
through so many people as to have become living and incarnate--was
unimportant. Do what we may, we are still drawn to the unspoken teaching
of her less introspective ages with a force which no falsehood could
command. Her buildings, her music, her architecture, touch us as none
other on the whole can do; when she speaks there are many of us who think
that she denies the deeper truths of her own profounder mind, and
unfortunately her tendency is now towards more rather than less
introspection. The more she gives way to this--the more she becomes
conscious of knowing--the less she will know. But still her ideal is in
grace.
The so-called man of science, on the other hand, seems now generally
inclined to make light of all knowledge, save of the pioneer character.
His ideal is in self-conscious knowledge. Let us have no more Lo, here,
with the professor; he very rarely knows what he says he knows; no sooner
has he misled the world for a sufficient time with a great flourish of
trumpets than he is toppled over by one more plausible than himself. He
is but medicine-man, augur, priest, in its latest development; useful it
may be, but requiring to be well watched by those who value freedom. Wait
till he has become more powerful, and note the vagaries which his conceit
of knowledge will indulge in. The Church did not persecute while she was
still weak. Of course every system has had, and will have, its heroes,
but, as we all very well know, the heroism of the hero is but remotely
due to system; it is due not to arguments, nor reasoning, nor to any
consciously recognised perceptions, but to those deeper sciences which
lie far beyond the reach of self-analysis, and for the study of which
there is but one schooling--to have had good forefathers for many
generations.
Above all things let no unwary reader do me the injustice of believing in
_me_. In that I write at all I am among the damned. If he must believe
in anything, let him believe in the music of Handel, the painting of
Giovanni Bellini, and in the thirteenth chapter of St. Paul's First
Epistle to the Corinthians.
But to return. Whenever we find people knowing that they know this or
that, we have the same story over and over again. They do not yet know
it perfectly.
We come, therefore, to the conclusion that our knowledge and reasonings
thereupon, only become perfect, assured, unhesitating, when they have
become automatic, and are thus exercised without further conscious effort
of the mind, much in the same way as we cannot walk nor read nor write
perfectly till we can do so automatically.
APPLICATION OF FOREGOING CHAPTERS TO CERTAIN HABITS ACQUIRED AFTER BIRTH
WHICH ARE COMMONLY CONSIDERED INSTINCTIVE. (CHAPTER III. OF LIFE AND
HABIT.)
What is true of knowing is also true of willing. The more intensely we
will, the less is our will deliberate and capable of being recognised as
will at all. So that it is common to hear men declare under certain
circumstances that they had no will, but were forced into their own
action under stress of passion or temptation. But in the more ordinary
actions of life, we observe, as in walking or breathing, that we do not
will anything utterly and without remnant of hesitation, till we have
lost sight of the fact that we are exercising our will.
The question, therefore, is forced upon us, how far this principle
extends, and whether there may not be unheeded examples of its operation
which, if we consider them, will land us in rather unexpected
conclusions. If it be granted that consciousness of knowledge and of
volition vanishes when the knowledge and the volition have become intense
and perfect, may it not be possible that many actions which we do without
knowing how we do them, and without any conscious exercise of the
will--actions which we certainly could not do if we tried to do them, nor
refrain from doing if for any reason we wished to do so--are done so
easily and so unconsciously owing to excess of knowledge or experience
rather than deficiency, we having done them too often, knowing how to do
them too well, and having too little hesitation as to the method of
procedure, to be capable of following our own action, without the
derangement of such action altogether; or, in other cases, because we
have so long settled the question that we have stowed away the whole
apparatus with which we work in corners of our system which we cannot now
conveniently reach?
It may be interesting to see whether we can find any class or classes of
actions which link actions which for some time after birth we could not
do at all, and in which our proficiency has reached the stage of
unconscious performance obviously through repeated effort and failure,
and through this only, with actions which we could do as soon as we were
born, and concerning which it would at first sight appear absurd to say
that they can have been acquired by any process in the least analogous to
what we commonly call experience, inasmuch as the creature itself which
does them has only just begun to exist, and cannot, therefore, in the
very nature of things, have had experience.
Can we see that actions, for the acquisition of which experience is such
an obvious necessity, that whenever we see the acquisition we assume the
experience, gradate away imperceptibly into actions which seem, according
to all reasonable analogy, to necessitate experience--of which, however,
the time and place are so obscure, that they are not now commonly
supposed to have any connection with _bona fide_ experience at all.
Eating and drinking appear to be such actions. The new-born child cannot
eat, and cannot drink, but he can swallow as soon as he is born; and
swallowing appears (as we may remark in passing) to have been an earlier
faculty of animal life than that of eating with teeth. The ease and
unconsciousness with which we eat and drink is clearly attributable to
practice; but a very little practice seems to go a long way--a
suspiciously small amount of practice--as though somewhere or at some
other time there must have been more practice than we can account for. We
can very readily stop eating or drinking, and can follow our own action
without difficulty in either process; but as regards swallowing, which is
the earlier habit, we have less power of self-analysis and control: when
we have once committed ourselves beyond a certain point to swallowing, we
must finish doing so,--that is to say, our control over the operation
ceases. Also, a still smaller experience seems necessary for the
acquisition of the power to swallow than appeared necessary in the case
of eating; and if we get into a difficulty we choke, and are more at a
loss how to become introspective than we are about eating and drinking.
Why should a baby be able to swallow--which one would have said was the
more complicated process of the two--with so much less practice than it
takes him to learn to eat? How comes it that he exhibits in the case of
the more difficult operation all the phenomena which ordinarily accompany
a more complete mastery and longer practice? Analogy points in the
direction of thinking that the necessary experience cannot have been
wanting, and that, too, not in such a quibbling sort as when people talk
about inherited habit or the experience of the race, which, without
explanation, is to plain-speaking persons very much the same, in regard
to the individual, as no experience at all, but _bona fide_ in the
child's own person.
Breathing, again, is an action acquired after birth, generally with some
little hesitation and difficulty, but still acquired in a time seldom
longer, as I am informed, than ten minutes or a quarter of an hour. For
an art which has to be acquired at all, there seems here, as in the case
of eating, to be a disproportion between, on the one hand, the intricacy
of the process performed, and on the other, the shortness of the time
taken to acquire the practice, and the ease and unconsciousness with
which its exercise is continued from the moment of acquisition.
We observe that in later life much less difficult and intricate
operations than breathing require much longer practice before they can be
mastered to the extent of unconscious performance. We observe also that
the phenomena attendant on the learning by an infant to breathe are
extremely like those attendant upon the repetition of some performance by
one who has done it very often before, but who requires just a little
prompting to set him off, on getting which, the whole familiar routine
presents itself before him, and he repeats his task by rote. Surely then
we are justified in suspecting that there must have been more _bona fide_
personal recollection and experience, with more effort and failure on the
part of the infant itself, than meet the eye.
It should be noticed, also that our control over breathing is very
limited. We can hold our breath a little, or breathe a little faster for
a short time, but we cannot do this for long, and after having gone
without air for a certain time we must breathe.
Seeing and hearing require some practice before their free use is
mastered, but not very much. They are so far within our control that we
can see more by looking harder, and hear more by listening
attentively--but they are beyond our control in so far as that we must
see and hear the greater part of what presents itself to us as near, and
at the same time unfamiliar, unless we turn away or shut our eyes, or
stop our ears by a mechanical process; and when we do this it is a sign
that we have already involuntarily seen or heard more than we wished. The
familiar, whether sight or sound, very commonly escapes us.
Take again the processes of digestion, the action of the heart, and the
oxygenisation of the blood--processes of extreme intricacy, done almost
entirely unconsciously, and quite beyond the control of our volition.
Is it possible that our unconsciousness concerning our own performance of
all these processes arises from over-experience?
Is there anything in digestion or the oxygenisation of the blood
different in kind to the rapid unconscious action of a man playing a
difficult piece of music on the piano? There may be in degree, but as a
man who sits down to play what he well knows, plays on when once started,
almost, as we say, mechanically, so, having eaten his dinner, he digests
it as a matter of course, unless it has been in some way unfamiliar to
him or he to it, owing to some derangement or occurrence with which he is
unfamiliar, and under which therefore he is at a loss how to comport
himself, as a player would be at a loss how to play with gloves on, or
with gout in his fingers, or if set to play music upside down.
Can we show that all the acquired actions of childhood and after-life,
which we now do unconsciously, or without conscious exercise of the will,
are familiar acts--acts which we have already done a very great number of
times?
Can we also show that there are no acquired actions which we can perform
in this automatic manner which were not at one time difficult, requiring
attention, and liable to repeated failure, our volition failing to
command obedience from the members which should carry its purposes into
execution?
If so, analogy will point in the direction of thinking that other acts
which we do even more unconsciously may only escape our power of self-
examination and control because they are even more familiar--because we
have done them oftener; and we may imagine that if there were a
microscope which could show us the minutest atoms of consciousness and
volition, we should find that even the apparently most automatic actions
were yet done in due course, upon a balance of considerations, and under
the deliberate exercise of the will.
We should also incline to think that even such an action as the
oxygenisation of its blood by an infant of ten minutes' old, can only be
done so well and so unconsciously, after repeated failures on the part of
the infant itself.
True, as has been already implied, we do not immediately see when the
baby could have made the necessary mistakes and acquired that infinite
practice without which it could never go through such complex processes
satisfactorily; we have therefore invented the word "heredity," and
consider it as accounting for the phenomena; but a little reflection will
show that though this word may be a very good way of stating the
difficulty, it does nothing whatever towards removing it. {96}
Why should heredity enable a creature to dispense with the experience
which we see to be necessary in all other cases before difficult
operations can be performed successfully?
What is this talk that is made about the experience _of the race_, as
though the experience of one man could profit another who knows nothing
about him? If a man eats his dinner, it nourishes _him_ and not his
neighbour; if he learns a difficult art, it is _he_ that can do it and
not his neighbour. Yet, practically, we see that the vicarious
experience, which seems so contrary to our common observation, does
nevertheless appear to hold good in the case of creatures and their
descendants. Is there, then, any way of bringing these apparently
conflicting phenomena under the operation of one law? Is there any way
of showing that this experience of the race, of which so much is said
without the least attempt to show in what way it may or does become the
experience of the individual, is in sober seriousness the experience of
one single being only, repeating in a great many different ways certain
performances with which it has become exceedingly familiar?
It comes to this--that we must either suppose the conditions of
experience to differ during the earlier stages of life from those which
we observe them to become during the heyday of any existence--and this
would appear very gratuitous, tolerable only as a suggestion because the
beginnings of life are so obscure, that in such twilight we may do pretty
much whatever we please without fear of being found out--or that we must
suppose continuity of life and sameness between living beings, whether
plants or animals, and their descendants, to be far closer than we have
hitherto believed; so that the experience of one person is not enjoyed by
his successor, so much as that the successor is _bona fide_ an elongation
of the life of his progenitors, imbued with their memories, profiting by
their experiences--which are, in fact, his own until he leaves their
bodies--and only unconscious of the extent of these memories and
experiences owing to their vastness and already infinite repetition.
Certainly it presents itself to us as a singular coincidence--
I. That we are _most conscious of_, _and have most control over_, such
habits as speech, the upright position, the arts and sciences--which are
acquisitions peculiar to the human race, always acquired after birth, and
not common to ourselves and any ancestor who had not become entirely
human.
II. That we are _less conscious of_, _and have less control over_, the
use of teeth, swallowing, breathing, seeing and hearing--which were
acquisitions of our prehuman ancestry, and for which we had provided
ourselves with all the necessary apparatus before we saw light, but which
are still, geologically speaking, recent, or comparatively recent.
ill. That we are _most unconscious of_, _and have least control over_,
our digestion, which we have in common even with our invertebrate
ancestry, and which is a habit of extreme antiquity.
There is something too like method in this for it to be taken as the
result of mere chance--chance again being but another illustration of
Nature's love of a contradiction in terms; for everything is chance, and
nothing is chance. And you may take it that all is chance or nothing
chance, according as you please, but you must not have half chance and
half not chance--which, however, in practice is just what you _must_
have.
Does it not seem as though the older and more confirmed the habit, the
more unquestioning the act of volition, till, in the case of the oldest
habits, the practice of succeeding existences has so formulated the
procedure, that, on being once committed to such and such a line beyond a
certain point, the subsequent course is so clear as to be open to no
further doubt, and admit of no alternative, till the very power of
questioning is gone, and even the consciousness of volition? And this
too upon matters which, in earlier stages of a man's existence, admitted
of passionate argument and anxious deliberation whether to resolve them
thus or thus, with heroic hazard and experiment, which on the losing side
proved to be vice, and on the winning virtue. For there was passionate
argument once what shape a man's teeth should be, nor can the colour of
his hair be considered as even yet settled, or likely to be settled for a
very long time.
It is one against legion when a creature tries to differ from his own
past selves. He must yield or die if he wants to differ widely, so as to
lack natural instincts, such as hunger or thirst, or not to gratify them.
It is more righteous in a man that he should "eat strange food," and that
his cheek should "so much as lank not," than that he should starve if the
strange food be at his command. His past selves are living in unruly
hordes within him at this moment and overmastering him. "Do this, this,
this, which we too have done, and found our profit in it," cry the souls
of his forefathers within him. Faint are the far ones, coming and going
as the sound of bells wafted on to a high mountain; loud and clear are
the near ones, urgent as an alarm of fire. "Withhold," cry some. "Go on
boldly," cry others. "Me, me, me, revert hitherward, my descendant,"
shouts one as it were from some high vantage-ground over the heads of the
clamorous multitude. "Nay, but me, me, me," echoes another; and our
former selves fight within us and wrangle for our possession. Have we
not here what is commonly called an _internal tumult_, when dead
pleasures and pains tug within us hither and thither? Then may the
battle be decided by what people are pleased to call our own experience.
Our own indeed! What is our own save by mere courtesy of speech? A
matter of fashion. Sanction sanctifieth and fashion fashioneth. And so
with death--the most inexorable of all conventions.
However this may be, we may assume it as an axiom with regard to actions
acquired after birth, that we never do them automatically save as the
result of long practice, and after having thus acquired perfect mastery
over the action in question.
But given the practice or experience, and the intricacy of the process to
be performed appears to matter very little. There is hardly anything
conceivable as being done by man, which a certain amount of familiarity
will not enable him to do, unintrospectively, and without conscious
effort. "The most complex and difficult movements," writes Mr. Darwin,
"can in time be performed without the least effort or consciousness." All
the main business of life is done thus unconsciously or
semi-unconsciously. For what is the main business of life? We work that
we may eat and digest, rather than eat and digest that we may work; this,
at any rate, is the normal state of things; the more important business
then is that which is carried on unconsciously. So again, the action of
the brain, which goes on prior to our realising the idea in which it
results, is not perceived by the individual. So also all the deeper
springs of action and conviction. The residuum with which we fret and
worry ourselves is a mere matter of detail, as the higgling and haggling
of the market, which is not over the bulk of the price, but over the last
halfpenny.
Shall we say, then, that a baby of a day old sucks (which involves the
whole principle of the pump, and hence a profound practical knowledge of
the laws of pneumatics and hydrostatics), digests, oxygenises its blood
(millions of years before Sir Humphry Davy discovered oxygen), sees and
hears--all most difficult and complicated operations, involving an
unconscious knowledge of the facts concerning optics and acoustics,
compared with which the conscious discoveries of Newton sink into utter
insignificance? Shall we say that a baby can do all these things at
once, doing them so well and so regularly, without being even able to
direct its attention to them, and without mistake, and at the same time
not know how to do them, and never have done them before?
Such an assertion would be a contradiction to the whole experience of
mankind. Surely the _onus probandi_ must rest with him who makes it.
A man may make a lucky hit now and again by what is called a fluke, but
even this must be only a little in advance of his other performances of
the same kind. He may multiply seven by eight by a fluke after a little
study of the multiplication table, but he will not be able to extract the
cube root of 4913 by a fluke, without long training in arithmetic, any
more than an agricultural labourer would be able to operate successfully
for cataract. If, then, a grown man cannot perform so simple an
operation as that, we will say, for cataract, unless he have been long
trained in other similar operations, and until he has done what comes to
the same thing many times over, with what show of reason can we maintain
that one who is so far less capable than a grown man, can perform such
vastly more difficult operations, without knowing how to do them, and
without ever having done them before? There is no sign of "fluke" about
the circulation of a baby's blood. There may perhaps be some little
hesitation about its earliest breathing, but this, as a general rule,
soon passes over, both breathing and circulation, within an hour after
birth, being as regular and easy as at any time during life. Is it
reasonable, then, to say that the baby does these things without knowing
how to do them, and without ever having done them before, and continues
to do them by a series of lifelong flukes?
It would be well if those who feel inclined to hazard such an assertion
would find some other instances of intricate processes gone through by
people who know nothing about them, and who never had any practice
therein. What _is_ to know how to do a thing? Surely to do it. What is
proof that we know how to do a thing? Surely the fact that we can do it.
A man shows that he knows how to throw the boomerang by throwing the
boomerang. No amount of talking or writing can get over this; _ipso
facto_, that a baby breathes and makes its blood circulate, it knows how
to do so; and the fact that it does not know its own knowledge is only
proof of the perfection of that knowledge, and of the vast number of past
occasions on which it must have been exercised already. As has been said
already, it is less obvious when the baby could have gained its
experience, so as to be able so readily to remember exactly what to do;
_but it is more easy to suppose that the necessary occasions cannot have
been wanting_, _than that the power which we observe_, _should have been
obtained without practice and memory_.
If we saw any self-consciousness on the baby's part about its breathing
or circulation, we might suspect that it had had less experience, or had
profited less by its experience, than its neighbours--exactly in the same
manner as we suspect a deficiency of any quality which we see a man
inclined to parade. We all become introspective when we find that we do
not know our business, and whenever we are introspective we may generally
suspect that we are on the verge of unproficiency. Unfortunately, in the
case of sickly children we observe that they sometimes do become
conscious of their breathing and circulation, just as in later life we
become conscious that we have a liver or a digestion. In that case there
is always something wrong. The baby that becomes aware of its breathing
does not know how to breathe and will suffer for his ignorance and
incapacity, exactly in the same way as he will suffer in later life for
ignorance and incapacity in any other respect in which his peers are
commonly knowing and capable. In the case of inability to breathe, the
punishment is corporal, breathing being a matter of fashion, so old and
long settled that nature can admit of no departure from the established
custom, and the procedure in case of failure is as much formulated as the
fashion itself. In the case of the circulation, the whole performance
has become one so utterly of rote, that the mere discovery that we could
do it at all was considered one of the highest flights of human genius.
It has been said a day will come when the Polar ice shall have
accumulated, till it forms vast continents many thousands of feet above
the level of the sea, all of solid ice. The weight of this mass will, it
is believed, cause the world to topple over on its axis, so that the
earth will be upset as an ant-heap overturned by a ploughshare. In that
day the icebergs will come crunching against our proudest cities, razing
them from off the face of the earth as though they were made of rotten
blotting-paper. There is no respect now of Handel nor of Shakespeare;
the works of Rembrandt and Bellini fossilise at the bottom of the sea.
Grace, beauty, and wit, all that is precious in music, literature, and
art--all gone. In the morning there was Europe. In the evening there
are no more populous cities nor busy hum of men, but a sea of jagged ice,
a lurid sunset, and the doom of many ages. Then shall a scared remnant
escape in places, and settle upon the changed continent when the waters
have subsided--a simple people, busy hunting shellfish on the drying
ocean beds, and with little time for introspection; yet they can read and
write and sum, for by that time these accomplishments will have become
universal, and will be acquired as easily as we now learn to talk; but
they do so as a matter of course, and without self-consciousness. Also
they make the simpler kinds of machinery too easily to be able to follow
their own operations--the manner of their own apprenticeship being to
them as a buried city. May we not imagine that, after the lapse of
another ten thousand years or so, some one of them may again become
cursed with lust of introspection, and a second Harvey may astonish the
world by discovering that it can read and write, and that steam-engines
do not grow, but are made? It may be safely prophesied that he will die
a martyr, and be honoured in the fourth generation.
PERSONAL IDENTITY. (CHAPTER V. OF LIFE AND HABIT.)
"Strange difficulties have been raised by some," says Bishop Butler,
"concerning personal identity, or the sameness of living agents as
implied in the notion of our existing now and hereafter, or indeed in any
two consecutive moments." But in truth it is not easy to see the
strangeness of the difficulty, if the words either "personal" or
"identity" are used in any strictness.
Personality is one of those ideas with which we are so familiar that we
have lost sight of the foundations upon which it rests. We regard our
personality as a simple definite whole; as a plain, palpable, individual
thing, which can be seen going about the streets or sitting indoors at
home; as something which lasts us our lifetime, and about the confines of
which no doubt can exist in the minds of reasonable people. But in truth
this "we," which looks so simple and definite, is a nebulous and
indefinable aggregation of many component parts which war not a little
among themselves, our perception of our existence at all being perhaps
due to this very clash of warfare, as our sense of sound and light is due
to the jarring of vibrations. Moreover, as the component parts of our
identity change from moment to moment, our personality becomes a thing
dependent upon time present, which has no logical existence, but lives
only upon the sufferance of times past and future, slipping out of our
hands into the domain of one or other of these two claimants the moment
we try to apprehend it. And not only is our personality as fleeting as
the present moment, but the parts which compose it blend some of them so
imperceptibly into, and are so inextricably linked on to, outside things
which clearly form no part of our personality, that when we try to bring
ourselves to book and determine wherein we consist, or to draw a line as
to where we begin or end, we find ourselves baffled. There is nothing
but fusion and confusion.
Putting theology on one side, and dealing only with the common sense of
mankind, our body is certainly part of our personality. With the
destruction of our bodies, our personality, as far as we can follow it,
comes to a full stop; and with every modification of them it is
correspondingly modified. But what are the limits of our bodies? They
are composed of parts, some of them so unessential as to be hardly
included in personality at all, and to be separable from ourselves
without perceptible effect, as hair, nails, and daily waste of tissue.
Again, other parts are very important, as our hands, feet, arms, legs,
&c., but still are no essential parts of our "self" or "soul," which
continues to exist, though in a modified condition, in spite of their
amputation. Other parts, as the brain, heart, and blood, are so
essential that they cannot be dispensed with, yet it is impossible to say
that personality consists in any one of them.
Each one of these component members of our personality is continually
dying and being born again, supported in this process by the food we eat,
the water we drink, and the air we breathe; which three things link us
on, and fetter us down, to the organic and inorganic world about us. For
our meat and drink, though no part of our personality before we eat and
drink, cannot, after we have done so, be separated entirely from us
without the destruction of our personality altogether, so far as we can
follow it; and who shall say at what precise moment our food has or has
not become part of ourselves? A famished man eats food; after a short
time his whole personality is so palpably affected that we know the food
to have entered into him and taken, as it were, possession of him; but
who can say at what precise moment it did so? Thus we find that we melt
away into outside things and are rooted into them as plants into the soil
in which they grow, nor can any man say he consists absolutely in this or
that, nor define himself so certainly as to include neither more nor less
than himself; many undoubted parts of his personality being more
separable from it, and changing it less when so separated, both to his
own senses and those of other people, than other parts which are strictly
speaking no parts at all.
A man's clothes, for example, as they lie on a chair at night are no part
of him, but when he wears them they would appear to be so, as being a
kind of food which warms him and hatches him, and the loss of which may
kill him of cold. If this be denied, and a man's clothes be considered
as no part of his self, nevertheless they, with his money, and it may
perhaps be added his religious opinions, stamp a man's individuality as
strongly as any natural feature can stamp it. Change in style of dress,
gain or loss of money, make a man feel and appear more changed than
having his chin shaved or his nails cut. In fact, as soon as we leave
common parlance on one side, and try for a scientific definition of
personality, we find that there is none possible, any more than there can
be a demonstration of the fact that we exist at all--a demonstration for
which, as for that of a personal God, many have hunted but which none
have found. The only solid foundation is, as in the case of the earth's
crust, pretty near the surface of things; the deeper we try to go, the
damper, darker, and altogether more uncongenial we find it. There is no
quagmire of superstition into which we may not be easily lured if we once
cut ourselves adrift from those superficial aspects of things, in which
alone our nature permits us to be comforted.
Common parlance, however, settles the difficulty readily enough (as
indeed it settles most others if they show signs of awkwardness) by the
simple process of ignoring it: we decline, and very properly, to go into
the question of where personality begins and ends, but assume it to be
known by every one, and throw the onus of not knowing it upon the over-
curious, who had better think as their neighbours do, right or wrong, or
there is no knowing into what villany they may not presently fall.
Assuming, then, that every one knows what is meant by the word "person"
(and such superstitious bases as this are the foundations upon which all
action, whether of man, beast, or plant, is constructed and rendered
possible; for even the corn in the fields grows upon a superstitious
basis as to its own existence, and only turns the earth and moisture into
wheat through the conceit of its own ability to do so, without which
faith it were powerless; and the lichen only grows upon the granite rock
by first saying to itself, "I think I can do it;" so that it would not be
able to grow unless it thought it could grow, and would not think it
could grow unless it found itself able to grow, and thus spends its life
arguing most virtuously in a most vicious circle--basing action upon
hypothesis, which hypothesis is in turn based upon action)--assuming that
we know what is meant by the word "person," we say that we are one and
the same person from birth till death, so that whatever is done by or
happens to any one between birth and death, is said to happen to or be
done by one individual. This in practice is found sufficient for the law
courts and the purposes of daily life, which, being full of hurry and the
pressure of business, can only tolerate compromise, or conventional
rendering of intricate phenomena. When facts of extreme complexity have
to be daily and hourly dealt with by people whose time is money, they
must be simplified, and treated much as a painter treats them, drawing
them in squarely, seizing the more important features, and neglecting all
that does not assert itself as too essential to be passed over--hence the
slang and cant words of every profession, and indeed all language; for
language at best is but a kind of "patter," the only way, it is true, in
many cases, of expressing our ideas to one another, but still a very bad
way, and not for one moment comparable to the unspoken speech which we
may sometimes have recourse to. The metaphors and _facons de parler_ to
which even in the plainest speech we are perpetually recurring (as, for
example, in this last two lines, "plain," "perpetually," and "recurring,"
are all words based on metaphor, and hence more or less liable to
mislead) often deceive us, as though there were nothing more than what we
see and say, and as though words, instead of being, as they are, the
creatures of our convenience, had some claim to be the actual ideas
themselves concerning which we are conversing.
This is so well expressed in a letter I have recently received from a
friend, now in New Zealand, and certainly not intended by him for
publication, that I shall venture to quote the passage, but should say
that I do so without his knowledge or permission which I should not be
able to receive before this book must be completed.
"Words, words, words," he writes, "are the stumbling-blocks in the way of
truth. Until you think of things as they are, and not of the words that
misrepresent them, you cannot think rightly. Words produce the
appearance of hard and fast lines where there are none. Words divide;
thus we call this a man, that an ape, that a monkey, while they are all
only differentiations of the same thing. To think of a thing they must
be got rid of: they are the clothes that thoughts wear--only the clothes.
I say this over and over again, for there is nothing of more importance.
Other men's words will stop you at the beginning of an investigation. A
man may play with words all his life, arranging them and rearranging them
like dominoes. If I could _think_ to you without words you would
understand me better."
If such remarks as the above hold good at all, they do so with the words
"personal identity." The least reflection will show that personal
identity in any sort of strictness is an impossibility. The expression
is one of the many ways in which we are obliged to scamp our thoughts
through pressure of other business which pays us better. For surely all
reasonable people will feel that an infant an hour before birth, when in
the eye of the law he has no existence, and could not be called a peer
for another sixty minutes, though his father were a peer, and already
dead,--surely such an embryo is more personally identical with the baby
into which he develops within an hour's time than the born baby is so
with itself (if the expression may be pardoned), one, twenty, or it may
be eighty years after birth. There is more sameness of matter; there are
fewer differences of any kind perceptible by a third person; there is
more sense of continuity on the part of the person himself, and far more
of all that goes to make up our sense of sameness of personality between
an embryo an hour before birth and the child on being born, than there is
between the child just born and the man of twenty. Yet there is no
hesitation about admitting sameness of personality between these two
last.
On the other hand, if that hazy contradiction in terms, "personal
identity," be once allowed to retreat behind the threshold of the womb,
it has eluded us once for all. What is true of one hour before birth is
true of two, and so on till we get back to the impregnate ovum, which may
fairly claim to have been personally identical with the man of eighty
into which it ultimately developed, in spite of the fact that there is no
particle of same matter nor sense of continuity between them, nor
recognised community of instinct, nor indeed of anything which on a
_prima facie_ view of the matter goes to the making up of that which we
call identity.
There is far more of all these things common to the impregnate ovum and
the ovum immediately before impregnation, or again between the impregnate
ovum, and both the ovum before impregnation and the spermatozoon which
impregnated it. Nor, if we admit personal identity between the ovum and
the octogenarian, is there any sufficient reason why we should not admit
it between the impregnate ovum and the two factors of which it is
composed, which two factors are but offshoots from two distinct
personalities, of which they are as much part as the apple is of the
apple-tree; so that an impregnate ovum cannot without a violation of
first principles be debarred from claiming personal identity with both
its parents, and hence, by an easy chain of reasoning, _with each of the
impregnate ova from which its parents were developed_.
So that each ovum when impregnate should be considered not as descended
from its ancestors, but as being a continuation of the personality of
every ovum in the chain of its ancestry, every which ovum _it actually
is_ as truly as the octogenarian _is_ the same identity with the ovum
from which he has been developed. The two cases stand or fall together.
This process cannot stop short of the primordial cell, which again will
probably turn out to be but a brief resting-place. We therefore prove
each one of us to _be actually_ the primordial cell which never died nor
dies, but has differentiated itself into the life of the world, all
living beings whatever, being one with it, and members one of another.
To look at the matter for a moment in another light, it will be admitted
that if the primordial cell had been killed before leaving issue, all its
possible descendants would have been killed at one and the same time. It
is hard to see how this single fact does not establish at the point, as
it were, of a logical bayonet, an identity between any creature and all
others that are descended from it.
* * * * *
The fencing (for it does not deserve the name of serious disputation)
with which Bishop Butler meets his opponents is rendered possible by the
laxness with which the words "identical" and "identity" are ordinarily
used. Bishop Butler would not seriously deny that personality undergoes
great changes between infancy and old age, and hence that it must undergo
some change from moment to moment. So universally is this recognised,
that it is common to hear it said of such and such a man that he is not
at all the person he was, or of such and such another that he is twice
the man he used to be--expressions than which none nearer the truth can
well be found. On the other hand, those whom Bishop Butler is intending
to confute would be the first to admit that, though there are many
changes between infancy and old age, yet they come about in any one
individual under such circumstances as we are all agreed in considering
as the factors of personal identity rather than as hindrances
thereto--that is to say that there has been no entire and permanent death
on the part of the individual between any two phases of his existence,
and that any one phase has had a lasting though perhaps imperceptible
effect upon all succeeding ones. So that no one ever seriously argued in
the manner supposed by Bishop Butler, unless with modifications and
saving clauses, to which it does not suit his purpose to call attention.
* * * * *
No doubt it would be more strictly accurate to say "you are the now phase
of the person I met last night," or "you are the being which has been
evolved from the being I met last night," than "you are the person I met
last night." But life is too short for the periphrases which would crowd
upon us from every quarter, if we did not set our face against all that
is under the surface of things, unless, that is to say, the going beneath
the surface is, for some special chance of profit, excusable or capable
of extenuation.
* * * * *
Take again the case of some weeping trees, whose boughs spring up into
fresh trees when they have reached the ground, who shall say at what time
they cease to be members of the parent tree? In the case of cuttings
from plants it is easy to elude the difficulty by making a parade of the
sharp and sudden act of separation from the parent stock, but this is
only a piece of mental sleight of hand; the cutting remains as much part
of its parent plant as though it had never been severed from it; it goes
on profiting by the experience which it had before it was cut off, as
much as though it had never been cut off at all. This will be more
readily seen in the case of worms which have been cut in half. Let a
worm be cut in half, and the two halves will become fresh worms; which of
them is the original worm? Surely both. Perhaps no simpler cage than
this could readily be found of the manner in which personality eludes us,
the moment we try to investigate its real nature. There are few ideas
which on first consideration appear so simple, and none which becomes
more utterly incapable of limitation or definition as soon as it is
examined closely.
It has gone the way of species. It is now generally held that species
blend or have blended into one another; so that any possibility of
arrangement and apparent subdivision into definite groups, is due to the
suppression by death both of individuals and whole genera, which, had
they been now existing, would have linked all living beings by a series
of gradations so subtle that little classification could have been
attempted. What we have failed to see is that the individual is as much
linked onto other individuals as the species is linked on to other
species. How it is that the one great personality of life as a whole,
should have split itself up into so many centres of thought and action,
each one of which is wholly, or at any rate nearly unconscious of its
connection with the other members, instead of having grown up into a huge
polyp, or as it were coral reef or compound animal over the whole world,
which should be conscious but of its own one single existence; how it is
that the daily waste of this creature should be carried on by the
conscious death of its individual members, instead of by the unconscious
waste of tissue which goes on in the bodies of each individual (if indeed
the tissue which we waste daily in our own bodies is so unconscious of
its birth and death as we suppose); how, again, that the daily repair of
this huge creature life should have become decentralised, and be carried
on by conscious reproduction on the part of its component items, instead
of by the unconscious nutrition of the whole from a single centre, as the
nutrition of our own bodies would appear (though perhaps falsely) to be
carried on; these are matters upon which I dare not speculate here, but
on which some reflections may follow in subsequent chapters.
INSTINCT AS INHERITED MEMORY. (CHAPTER XI. OF LIFE AND HABIT.)
Obviously the memory of a habit or experience will not commonly be
transmitted to offspring in that perfection which is called "instinct,"
till the habit or experience has been repeated in several generations
with more or less uniformity; for otherwise the impression made will not
be strong enough to endure through the busy and difficult task of
reproduction. This of course involves that the habit shall have
attained, as it were, equilibrium with the creature's sense of its own
needs, so that it shall have long seemed the best course possible,
leaving upon the whole and under ordinary circumstances little further to
be desired, and hence that it should have been little varied during many
generations. We should expect that it would be transmitted in a more or
less partial, varying, imperfect, and intelligent condition before
equilibrium had been attained; it would, however, continually tend
towards equilibrium.
When this stage has been reached, as regards any habit, the creature will
cease trying to improve; on which the repetition of the habit will become
stable, and hence capable of more unerring transmission--but at the same
time improvement will cease; the habit will become fixed, and be perhaps
transmitted at an earlier and earlier age, till it has reached that date
of manifestation which shall be found most agreeable to the other habits
of the creature. It will also be manifested, as a matter of course,
without further consciousness or reflection, for people cannot be always
opening up settled questions; if they thought a matter all over yesterday
they cannot think it all over again to-day, what they thought then they
will think now, and will act upon their opinion; and this, too, even in
spite sometimes of misgiving, that if they were to think still further
they could find a still better course. It is not, therefore, to be
expected that "instinct" should show signs of that hesitating and
tentative action which results from knowledge that is still so imperfect
as to be actively self-conscious; nor yet that it should grow or vary
perceptibly unless under such changed conditions as shall baffle memory,
and present the alternative of either invention--that is to say,
variation--or death.
But every instinct must have passed through the laboriously intelligent
stages through which human civilisations _and mechanical inventions_ are
now passing; and he who would study the origin of an instinct with its
development, partial transmission, further growth, further transmission,
approach to more unreflecting stability, and finally, its perfection as
an unerring and unerringly transmitted instinct, must look to laws,
customs, _and machinery_ as his best instructors. Customs and machines
are instincts _and organs_ now in process of development; they will
assuredly one day reach the unconscious state of equilibrium which we
observe in the structures and instincts of bees and ants, and an approach
to which may be found among some savage nations. We may reflect,
however, not without pleasure, that this condition--the true
millennium--is still distant. Nevertheless the ants and bees seem happy;
perhaps more happy than when so many social questions were in as hot
discussion among them as other and not dissimilar ones will one day be
amongst ourselves.
And this, as will be apparent, opens up the whole question of the
stability of species, which we cannot follow further here, than to say,
that according to the balance of testimony, many plants and animals do
appear to have reached a phase of being from which they are hard to
move--that is to say, they will die sooner than be at the pains of
altering their habits--true martyrs to their convictions. Such races
refuse to see changes in their surroundings as long as they can, but when
compelled to recognise them, they throw up the game because they cannot
and will not, or will not and cannot, invent.
This is perfectly intelligible, for a race is nothing but a long-lived
individual, and like any individual, or tribe of men whom we have yet
observed, will have its special capacities and its special limitations,
though, as in the case of the individual, so also with the race, it is
exceedingly hard to say what those limitations are, and why, having been
able to go so far, it should go no further. Every man and every race is
capable of education up to a certain point, but not to the extent of
being made from a sow's ear into a silk purse. The proximate cause of
the limitation seems to lie in the absence of the wish to go further; the
presence or absence of the wish will depend upon the nature and
surroundings of the individual, which is simply a way of saying that one
can get no further, but that as the song (with a slight alteration)
says:--
"Some breeds do, and some breeds don't,
Some breeds will, but this breed won't:
I tried very often to see if it would,
But it said it really couldn't, and I don't think it could."
* * * * *
M. Ribot in his work on Heredity {119} writes (p. 14):--"The duckling
hatched by the hen makes straight for water." In what conceivable way
can we account for this, except on the supposition that the duckling
knows perfectly well what it can and what it cannot do with water, owing
to its recollection of what it did when it was still one individuality
with its parents, and hence, when it was a duckling before?
"The squirrel, before it knows anything of winter, lays up a store of
nuts. A bird when hatched in a cage will, when given its freedom, build
for itself a nest like that of its parents, out of the same materials,
and of the same shape."
If this is not due to memory, "even an imperfect" explanation of what
else it can be due to, "would," to quote from Mr. Darwin, "be
satisfactory."
"Intelligence gropes about, tries this way and that, misses its object,
commits mistakes, and corrects them."
Yes. Because intelligence is of consciousness, and consciousness is of
attention, and attention is of uncertainty, and uncertainty is of
ignorance or want of consciousness. Intelligence is not yet thoroughly
up to its business.
"Instinct advances with a mechanical certainty, hence comes its
unconscious character. It knows nothing either of ends, or of the means
of attaining them: it implies no comparison, judgment, or choice."
This is assumption. What is certain is that instinct does not betray
signs of self-consciousness as to its own knowledge. It has dismissed
reference to first principles, and is no longer under the law, but under
the grace of a settled conviction.
"All seems directed by thought."
Yes; because all _has been_ in earlier existences directed by thought.
"Without ever arriving at thought."
Because it has _got past thought_, and though "directed by thought"
originally, is now travelling in exactly the opposite direction. It is
not likely to reach thought again, till people get to know worse and
worse how to do things, the oftener they practise them.
"And if this phenomenon appear strange, it must be observed that
analogous states occur in ourselves. _All that we do from
habit_--_walking_, _writing_, _or practising a mechanical act_, _for
instance_--_all these and many other very complex acts are performed
without consciousness_.
"Instinct appears stationary. It does not, like intelligence, seem to
grow and decay, to gain and to lose. It does not improve."
Naturally. For improvement can only as a general rule be looked for
along the line of latest development, that is to say, in matters
concerning which the creature is being still consciously exercised. Older
questions are settled, and the solution must be accepted as final, for
the question of living at all would be reduced to an absurdity, if
everything decided upon one day was to be undecided again the next; as
with painting or music, so with life and politics, let every man be fully
persuaded in his own mind, for decision with wrong will be commonly a
better policy than indecision--I
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