Gutenberg · e01.org

← catalogue

The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5

by John Marshall · English · Gutenberg #18595 · 641,341 chars · public domain (US)

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5
    
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.

Title: The Life of George Washington, Vol. 5

Author: John Marshall


        
Release date: June 15, 2006 [eBook #18595]

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18595

Credits: Produced by Linda Cantoni and  David Widger


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, VOL. 5 ***




Produced by Linda Cantoni and  David Widger





THE

LIFE

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON,

COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE

AMERICAN FORCES,

DURING THE WAR WHICH ESTABLISHED THE INDEPENDENCE OF HIS COUNTRY, AND

FIRST PRESIDENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES.

COMPILED UNDER THE INSPECTION OF

THE HONOURABLE BUSHROD WASHINGTON,

FROM

_ORIGINAL PAPERS_

BEQUEATHED TO HIM BY HIS DECEASED RELATIVE, AND NOW IN POSSESSION OF
THE AUTHOR.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

AN INTRODUCTION,

CONTAINING A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE COLONIES PLANTED BY THE ENGLISH
ON THE

CONTINENT OF NORTH AMERICA,

FROM THEIR SETTLEMENT TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THAT WAR WHICH TERMINATED
IN THEIR

INDEPENDENCE.


BY JOHN MARSHALL.


VOL. V.


THE CITIZENS' GUILD
OF WASHINGTON'S BOYHOOD HOME
FREDERICKSBURG, VA.

1926

Printed in the U.S.A.


[Illustration: President Washington

_From the portrait by John Vanderlyn, in the Capitol at Washington_

_This full-length portrait of our First President is the work of an
artist to whom Napoleon I awarded a gold medal for his "Marius Among
the Ruins of Carthage," and another of whose masterpieces, "Ariadne in
Naxos," is pronounced one of the finest nudes in the history of
American art. For Vanderlyn sat many other notable public men,
including Monroe, Madison, Calhoun, Clinton, Zachary Taylor and Aaron
Burr, who was his patron and whose portrait by Vanderlyn hangs in the
New York Metropolitan Museum of Art. Nevertheless, Vanderlyn failed in
achieving the success his genius merited, and he once declared
bitterly that "no one but a professional quack can live in America."
Poverty paralyzed his energies, and in 1852, old and discouraged he
retired to his native town of Kingston, New York, so poor that he had
to borrow twenty-five cents to pay the expressage of his trunk.
Obtaining a bed at the local hotel, he was found dead in it the next
morning, in his seventy-seventh year._]




CONTENTS


CHAPTER I.

G. Washington again unanimously elected President.... War between
Great Britain and France.... Queries of the President respecting the
conduct to be adopted by the American government.... Proclamation of
neutrality.... Arrival of Mr. Genet as minister from France.... His
conduct.... Illegal proceedings of the French cruisers.... Opinions of
the cabinet.... State of parties.... Democratic societies.... Genet
calculates upon the partialities of the American people for France,
and openly insults their government.... Rules laid down by the
executive to be observed in the ports of the United States in relation
to the powers at war.... The President requests the recall of
Genet.... British order of 8th of June, 1793.... Decree of the
national convention relative to neutral commerce.


CHAPTER II.

Meeting of congress.... President's speech.... His message on the
foreign relations of the United States.... Report of the Secretary of
State on the commerce of the United States.... He resigns.... Is
succeeded by Mr. Randolph.... Mr. Madison's resolutions founded on the
above report.... Debate thereon.... Debates on the subject of a
navy.... An embargo law.... Mission of Mr. Jay to Great Britain....
Inquiry into the conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury, terminates
honourably to him.... Internal taxes.... Congress adjourns.


CHAPTER III.

Genet recalled.... Is succeeded by Mr. Fauchet.... Gouverneur Morris
recalled, and is succeeded by Mr. Monroe.... Kentucky remonstrance....
Intemperate resolutions of the people of that state.... General Wayne
defeats the Indians on the Miamis.... Insurrection in the western
parts of Pennsylvania.... Quelled by the prompt and vigorous measures
of the government.... Meeting of Congress.... President's speech....
Democratic societies.... Resignation of Colonel Hamilton.... Is
succeeded by Mr. Wolcott.... Resignation of General Knox.... Is
succeeded by Colonel Pickering.... Treaty between the United States
and Great Britain.... Conditionally ratified by the President.... The
treaty unpopular.... Mr. Randolph resigns.... Is succeeded by Colonel
Pickering.... Colonel M'Henry appointed secretary at war.... Charge
against the President rejected..... Treaty with the Indians north-west
of the Ohio.... With Algiers.... With Spain.... Meeting of
congress.... President's speech.... Mr. Adet succeeds Mr. Fauchet.....
The house of representatives call upon the President for papers
relating to the treaty with Great Britain.... He declines sending
them.... Debates upon the treaty making power.... Upon the bill for
making appropriations to carry into execution the treaty with Great
Britain.... Congress adjourns.... The President endeavours to procure
the liberation of Lafayette.


CHAPTER IV.

Letters from General Washington to Mr. Jefferson.... Hostile measures
of France against the United States.... Mr. Monroe recalled and
General Pinckney appointed to succeed him.... General Washington's
valedictory address to the people of the United States.... The
Minister of France endeavours to influence the approaching
election.... The President's speech to congress.... He denies the
authenticity of certain spurious letters published in 1776.... John
Adams elected President, and Thomas Jefferson Vice President....
General Washington retires to Mount Vernon.... Political situation of
the United States at this period.... The French government refuses to
receive General Pinckney as Minister.... Congress is convened....
President's speech.... Three envoys extraordinary deputed to
France.... Their treatment.... Measures of hostility adopted by the
American government against France.... General Washington appointed
Commander-in-chief of the American army.... His death.... And
character.




THE LIFE

OF

GEORGE WASHINGTON




CHAPTER I.

     G. Washington again unanimously elected President.... War
     between Great Britain and France.... Queries of the
     President respecting the conduct to be adopted by the
     American government.... Proclamation of neutrality....
     Arrival of Mr. Genet as minister from France.... His
     conduct.... Illegal proceedings of the French cruisers....
     Opinions of the cabinet.... State of parties.... Democratic
     societies.... Genet calculates upon the partialities of the
     American people for France, and openly insults their
     government.... Rules laid down by the executive to be
     observed in the ports of the United States in relation to
     the powers at war.... The President requests the recall of
     Genet.... British order of 8th of June, 1793.... Decree of
     the national convention relative to neutral commerce.


{1793}

The term for which the President and Vice President had been elected
being about to expire on the third of March, the attention of the
public had been directed to the choice of persons who should fill
those high offices for the ensuing four years. Respecting the
President, but one opinion prevailed. From various motives, all
parties concurred in desiring that the present chief magistrate should
continue to afford his services to his country. Yielding to the weight
of the representations made to him from various quarters, General
Washington had been prevailed upon to withhold a declaration, he had
at one time purposed to make, of his determination to retire from
political life.

Respecting the person who should fill the office of Vice President,
the public was divided. The profound statesman who had been called to
the duties of that station, had drawn upon himself a great degree of
obloquy, by some political tracts, in which he had laboured to
maintain the proposition that a balance in government was essential to
the preservation of liberty. In these disquisitions, he was supposed
by his opponents to have discovered sentiments in favour of distinct
orders in society; and, although he had spoken highly of the
constitution of the United States, it was imagined that his balance
could be maintained only by hereditary classes. He was also understood
to be friendly to the system of finance which had been adopted; and
was believed to be among the few who questioned the durability of the
French republic. His great services, and acknowledged virtues, were
therefore disregarded; and a competitor was sought for among those who
had distinguished themselves in the opposition. The choice was
directed from Mr. Jefferson by a constitutional restriction on the
power of the electors, which would necessarily deprive him of the vote
to be given by Virginia. It being necessary to designate some other
opponent to Mr. Adams, George Clinton, the governor of New York, was
selected for this purpose.

Throughout the war of the revolution, this gentleman had filled the
office of chief magistrate of his native state; and, under
circumstances of real difficulty, had discharged its duties with a
courage, and an energy, which secured the esteem of the
Commander-in-chief, and gave him a fair claim to the favour of his
country. Embracing afterwards with ardour the system of state
supremacy, he had contributed greatly to the rejection of the
resolutions for investing congress with the power of collecting an
impost on imported goods, and had been conspicuous for his determined
hostility to the constitution of the United States. His sentiments
respecting the measures of the government were known to concur with
those of the minority in congress.

[Sidenote: George Washington again unanimously elected president.]

Both parties seemed confident in their strength; and both made the
utmost exertions to insure success. On opening the ballots in the
senate chamber, it appeared that the unanimous suffrage of his country
had been once more conferred on General Washington, and that Mr. Adams
had received a plurality of the votes.

The unceasing endeavours of the executive to terminate the Indian war
by a treaty, had at length succeeded with the savages of the Wabash;
and, through the intervention of the Six Nations, those of the Miamis
had also been induced to consent to a conference to be held in the
course of the ensuing spring. Though probability was against the
success of this attempt to restore peace, all offensive operations, on
the part of the United States, were still farther suspended. The
Indians did not entirely abstain from hostilities; and the discontents
of the western people were in no small degree increased by this
temporary prohibition of all incursions into the country of their
enemy. In Georgia, where a desire to commence hostilities against the
southern Indians had been unequivocally manifested, this restraint
increased the irritation against the administration.

The Indian war was becoming an object of secondary magnitude. The
critical and irritable state of things in France began so materially
to affect the United States, as to require an exertion of all the
prudence, and all the firmness, of the government. The 10th[1] of
August, 1792, was succeeded in that nation by such a state of anarchy,
and by scenes of so much blood and horror; the nation was understood
to be so divided with respect to its future course; and the republican
party was threatened by such a formidable external force; that there
was much reason to doubt whether the fallen monarch would be finally
deposed, or reinstated with a greater degree of splendour and power
than the constitution just laid in ruins, had assigned to him. That,
in the latter event, any partialities which might be manifested
towards the intermediate possessors of authority, would be recollected
with indignation, could not be questioned by an attentive observer of
the vindictive spirit of parties;--a spirit which the deeply tragic
scenes lately exhibited, could not fail to work up to its highest
possible pitch. The American minister at Paris, finding himself in a
situation not expected by his government, sought to pursue a
circumspect line of conduct, which should in no respect compromise the
United States. The executive council of France, disappointed at the
coldness which that system required, communicated their
dissatisfaction to their minister at Philadelphia. At the same time,
Mr. Morris made full representations of every transaction to his
government, and requested explicit instructions for the regulation of
his future conduct.

     [Footnote 1: The day on which the palace of the Tuilleries
     was stormed and the royal government subverted.]

The administration entertained no doubt of the propriety of
recognizing the existing authority of France, whatever form it might
assume. That every nation possessed a right to govern itself according
to its own will, to change its institutions at discretion, and to
transact its business through whatever agents it might think proper,
were stated to Mr. Morris to be principles on which the American
government itself was founded, and the application of which could be
denied to no other people. The payment of the debt, so far as it was
to be made in Europe, might be suspended only until the national
convention should authorize some power to sign acquittances for the
monies received; and the sums required for St. Domingo would be
immediately furnished. These payments would exceed the instalments
which had fallen due; and the utmost punctuality would be observed in
future. These instructions were accompanied with assurances that the
government would omit no opportunity of convincing the French people
of its cordial wish to serve them; and with a declaration that all
circumstances seemed to destine the two nations for the most intimate
connexion with each other. It was also pressed upon Mr. Morris to
seize every occasion of conciliating the affections of France to the
United States, and of placing the commerce between the two countries
on the best possible footing.[2]

     [Footnote 2: With this letter were addressed two others to
     the ministers at London and Paris respectively, stating the
     interest taken by the President and people of the United
     States in the fate of the Marquis de Lafayette. This
     gentleman was declared a traitor by France, and was
     imprisoned by Prussia. The ministers of the United States
     were to avail themselves of every opportunity of sounding
     the way towards his liberation, which they were to endeavour
     to obtain by informal solicitations; but, if formal ones
     should be necessary, they were to watch the moment when they
     might be urged with the best prospect of success. This
     letter was written at the sole instance of the President.]

The feelings of the President were in perfect unison with the
sentiments expressed in this letter. His attachment to the French
nation was as strong, as consistent with a due regard to the interests
of his own; and his wishes for its happiness were as ardent, as was
compatible with the duties of a chief magistrate to the state over
which he presided. Devoted to the principles of real liberty, and
approving unequivocally the republican form of government, he hoped
for a favourable result from the efforts which were making to
establish that form, by the great ally of the United States; but was
not so transported by those efforts, as to involve his country in
their issue; or totally to forget that those aids which constituted
the basis of these partial feelings, were furnished by the family
whose fall was the source of triumph to a large portion of his fellow
citizens.

He therefore still preserved the fixed purpose of maintaining the
neutrality of the United States, however general the war might be in
Europe; and his zeal for the revolution did not assume so ferocious a
character as to silence the dictates of humanity, or of friendship.

Not much time elapsed before the firmness of this resolution was put
to the test.

[Sidenote: War between Great Britain and France.]

Early in April, the declaration of war made by France against Great
Britain and Holland reached the United States. This event restored
full vivacity to a flame, which a peace of ten years had not been able
to extinguish. A great majority of the American people deemed it
criminal to remain unconcerned spectators of a conflict between their
ancient enemy and republican France. The feeling upon this occasion
was almost universal. Men of all parties partook of it. Disregarding
totally the circumstances which led to the rupture, except the order
which had been given to the French minister to leave London, and
disregarding equally the fact that actual hostilities were first
commenced by France, the war was confidently and generally pronounced
a war of aggression on the part of Great Britain, undertaken with the
sole purpose of imposing a monarchical government on the French
people. The few who did not embrace these opinions, and they were
certainly very few, were held up as objects of public detestation; and
were calumniated as the tools of Britain, and the satellites of
despotism.

Yet the disposition to engage in the war, was far from being general.
The inclination of the public led to a full indulgence of the most
extravagant partiality; but not many were willing to encounter the
consequences which that indulgence would infallibly produce. The
situation of America was precisely that, in which the wisdom and
foresight of a prudent and enlightened government, was indispensably
necessary to prevent the nation from inconsiderately precipitating
itself into calamities, which its reflecting judgment would avoid.

As soon as intelligence of the rupture between France and Britain was
received in the United States, indications were given in some of the
seaports, of a disposition to engage in the unlawful business of
privateering on the commerce of the belligerent powers. The President
was firmly determined to suppress these practices, and immediately
requested the attention of the heads of departments to this
interesting subject.

[Sidenote: Queries put by the president to his cabinet in relation to
the conduct proper to be adopted by the American government in
consequence of this event.]

As the new and difficult situation in which the United States were
placed suggested many delicate inquiries, he addressed a circular
letter to the cabinet ministers, inclosing for their consideration a
well digested series of questions, the answers to which would form a
complete system by which to regulate the conduct of the executive in
the arduous situations which were approaching.[3]

     [Footnote 3: See note No. I. at the end of the volume.]

These queries, with some of the answers of them, though submitted only
to the cabinet, found their way to the leading members of the
opposition; and were among the unacknowledged but operating pieces of
testimony, on which the charge against the administration, of
cherishing dispositions unfriendly to the French republic, was
founded. In taking a view of the whole ground, points certainly
occurred, and were submitted to the consideration of the cabinet, on
which neither the chief magistrate nor his ministers felt any doubt.
But the introduction of questions relative to these points, among
others with which they were intimately connected, would present a more
full view of the subject, and was incapable of producing any
mischievous effect, while they were confined to those for whom alone
they were intended.

In the meeting of the heads of departments and the attorney general,
which was held in consequence of this letter, it was unanimously
agreed, that a proclamation ought to issue, forbidding the citizens of
the United States to take part in any hostilities on the seas, with,
or against, any of the belligerent powers; warning them against
carrying to any of those powers articles deemed contraband according
to the modern usages of nations; and enjoining them from all acts
inconsistent with the duties of a friendly nation towards those at
war.

With the same unanimity, the President was advised to receive a
minister from the republic of France; but, on the question respecting
a qualification to his reception, a division was perceived. The
secretary of state and the attorney general were of opinion, that no
cause existed for departing in the present instance from the usual
mode of acting on such occasions. The revolution in France, they
conceived, had produced no change in the relations between the two
nations; nor was there any thing in the alteration of government, or
in the character of the war, which would impair the right of France to
demand, or weaken the duty of the United States faithfully to comply
with the engagements which had been solemnly formed.

The secretaries of the treasury, and of war, held a different opinion.
Admitting in its fullest latitude the right of a nation to change its
political institutions according to its own will, they denied its
right to involve other nations, _absolutely and unconditionally_, in
the consequences of the changes which it may think proper to make.
They maintained the right of a nation to absolve itself from the
obligations even of real treaties, when such a change of circumstances
takes place in the internal situation of the other contracting party,
as so essentially to alter the existing state of things, that it may
with good faith be pronounced to render a continuance of the connexion
which results from them, disadvantageous or dangerous.

They reviewed the most prominent of those transactions which had
recently taken place in France, and noticed the turbulence, the fury,
and the injustice with which they were marked. The Jacobin club at
Paris, whose influence was well understood, had even gone so far,
previous to the meeting of the convention, as to enter into measures
with the avowed object of purging that body of those persons,
favourers of royalty, who might have escaped the attention of the
primary assemblies. This review was taken, to show that the course of
the revolution had been attended with circumstances which militate
against a full conviction of its having been brought to its present
stage, by such a free, regular, and deliberate act of the nation, as
ought to silence all scruples about the validity of what had been
done. They appeared to doubt whether the present possessors of power
ought to be considered as having acquired it with the real consent of
France, or as having seized it by violence;--whether the existing
system could be considered as permanent, or merely temporary.

They were therefore of opinion, not that the treaties should be
annulled or absolutely suspended, but that the United States should
reserve, for future consideration and discussion, the question whether
the operation of those treaties ought not to be deemed temporarily and
provisionally suspended. Should this be the decision of the
government, they thought it due to a spirit of friendly and candid
procedure, in the most conciliating terms, to apprize the expected
minister of this determination.

On the questions relative to the application of the clause of
guarantee to the existing war, some diversity of sentiment also
prevailed. The secretary of state and the attorney general conceived,
that no necessity for deciding thereon existed, while the secretaries
of the treasury, and of war, were of opinion that the treaty of
alliance was plainly defensive, and that the clause of guarantee did
not apply to a war which, having been commenced by France, must be
considered as offensive on the part of that power.

Against convening congress, the opinion appears to have been
unanimous.

The cabinet being thus divided on an important part of the system
which, in the present critical posture of affairs, ought to be adopted
by the executive, the President signified his desire that the
ministers would respectively state to him in writing the opinions they
had formed, together with the reasoning and authorities by which those
opinions were supported.

The written arguments which were presented on this occasion, while
they attest the labour, and reflect honour on the talents of those by
whom they were formed, and evince the equal sincerity and zeal with
which the opinions on each side were advanced, demonstrate an
opposition of sentiment respecting the French revolution, which
threatened to shed its influence on all measures connected with that
event, and to increase the discord which already existed in the
cabinet.

So far as respected the reception of a minister from the French
republic without qualifying that act by any explanations, and the
continuing obligation of the treaties, the President appears to have
decided in favour of the opinions given by the secretary of state and
the attorney general.

[Sidenote: Proclamation of neutrality.]

The proclamation of neutrality which was prepared by the attorney
general, in conformity with the principles which had been adopted, was
laid before the cabinet; and, being approved, was signed by the
President, and ordered to be published.

This measure derives importance from the consideration, that it was
the commencement of that system to which the American government
afterwards inflexibly adhered, and to which much of the national
prosperity is to be ascribed. It is not less important in another
view. Being at variance with the prejudices, the feelings, and the
passions of a large portion of the society, and being founded on no
previous proceedings of the legislature, it presented the first
occasion, which was thought a fit one, for openly assaulting a
character, around which the affections of the people had thrown an
armour theretofore deemed sacred, and for directly criminating the
conduct of the President himself. It was only by opposing passions to
passions, by bringing the feeling in favour of France, into conflict
with those in favour of the chief magistrate, that the enemies of the
administration could hope to obtain the victory.

For a short time, the opponents of this measure treated it with some
degree of delicacy. The opposition prints occasionally glanced at the
executive; considered all governments, including that of the United
States, as naturally hostile to the liberty of the people; and
ascribed to this disposition, the combination of European governments
against France, and the apathy with which this combination was
contemplated by the executive. At the same time, the most vehement
declamations were published, for the purpose of inflaming the
resentments of the people against Britain; of enhancing the
obligations of America to France; of confirming the opinions, that the
coalition of European monarchs was directed, not less against the
United States, than against that power to which its hostility was
avowed, and that those who did not avow this sentiment were the
friends of that coalition, and equally the enemies of America and
France.

These publications, in the first instance, sufficiently bitter,
quickly assumed a highly increased degree of acrimony.

As soon as the commotions which succeeded the deposition of Louis XVI.
had, in some degree, subsided, the attention of the French government
was directed to the United States, and the resolution was taken to
recall the minister who had been appointed by the king; and to replace
him with one who might be expected to enter, with more enthusiasm,
into the views of the republic.[4]

     [Footnote 4: See note No. II. at the end of the volume.]

The citizen Genet, a gentleman of considerable talents, and of an
ardent temper, was selected for this purpose.

The letters he brought to the executive of the United States, and his
instructions, which he occasionally communicated, were, in a high
degree, flattering to the nation, and decently respectful to its
government. But Mr. Genet was also furnished with private
instructions, which the course of subsequent events tempted him to
publish. These indicate that, if the American executive should not be
found sufficiently compliant with the views of France, the resolution
had been taken to employ with the people of the United States the same
policy which was so successfully used with those of Europe; and thus
to affect an object which legitimate negotiations might fail to
accomplish.

[Sidenote: Arrival of Mr. Genet as minister from France.]

Mr. Genet possessed many qualities which were peculiarly adapted to
the objects of his mission; but he seems to have been betrayed by the
flattering reception which was given him, and by the universal fervour
expressed for his republic, into a too speedy disclosure of his
intentions.

[Sidenote: His conduct.]

On the eighth of April he arrived, not at Philadelphia, but at
Charleston, in South Carolina, a port whose contiguity to the West
Indies would give it peculiar convenience as a resort for privateers.
He was received by the governor of that state, and by its citizens,
with an enthusiasm well calculated to dissipate every doubt he might
previously have entertained, concerning the dispositions on which he
was to operate. At this place he continued for several days, receiving
extravagant marks of public attachment, during which time, he
undertook to authorize the fitting and arming of vessels in that port,
enlisting men, and giving commissions to cruise and commit hostilities
on nations with whom the United States were at peace. The captures
made by these cruisers were brought into port, and the consuls of
France were assuming, under the authority of Mr. Genet, to hold courts
of admiralty on them, to try, condemn, and authorize their sale.

From Charleston, Mr. Genet proceeded by land to Philadelphia,
receiving on his journey, at the different towns through which he
passed, such marks of enthusiastic attachment as had never before been
lavished on a foreign minister. On the 16th of May, he arrived at the
seat of government, preceded by the intelligence of his transactions
in South Carolina. This information did not diminish the extravagant
transports of joy with which he was welcomed by the great body of the
inhabitants. Means had been taken to render his entry pompous and
triumphal; and the opposition papers exultingly stated that he was met
at Gray's ferry by "crowds who flocked from every avenue of the city,
to meet the republican ambassador of an allied nation."

The day succeeding his arrival, he received addresses of
congratulation from particular societies, and from the citizens of
Philadelphia, who waited on him in a body, in which they expressed
their fervent gratitude for the "zealous and disinterested aids,"
which the French people had furnished to America, unbounded exultation
at the success with which their arms had been crowned, and a positive
conviction that the safety of the United States depended on the
establishment of the republic. The answers to these addresses were
well calculated to preserve the idea of a complete fraternity between
the two nations; and that their interests were identified.

The day after being thus accredited by the citizens of Philadelphia,
he was presented to the President, by whom he was received with
frankness, and with expressions of a sincere and cordial regard for
his nation. In the conversation which took place on this occasion, Mr.
Genet gave the most explicit assurances that, in consequence of the
distance of the United States from the theatre of action, and of other
circumstances, France did not wish to engage them in the war, but
would willingly leave them to pursue their happiness and prosperity in
peace. The more ready faith was given to these declarations, because
it was believed that France might derive advantages from the
neutrality of America, which would be a full equivalent for any
services which she could render as a belligerent.

Before the ambassador of the republic had reached the seat of
government, a long catalogue of complaints, partly founded on his
proceedings in Charleston, had been made by the British minister to
the American executive.

This catalogue was composed of the assumptions of sovereignty already
mentioned;--assumptions calculated to render America an instrument of
hostility to be wielded by France against those powers with which she
might be at war.

[Sidenote: Illegal proceedings of the French cruisers.]

These were still further aggravated by the commission of actual
hostilities within the territories of the United States. The ship
Grange, a British vessel which had been cleared out from Philadelphia,
was captured by the French frigate L'Ambuscade within the capes of the
Delaware, while on her way to the ocean.

The prizes thus unwarrantly made, being brought within the power of
the American government, Mr. Hammond, among other things, demanded a
restitution of them.

On many of the points suggested by the conduct of Mr. Genet, and by
the memorials of the British minister, it would seem impossible that
any difference of opinion could exist among intelligent men, not under
the dominion of a blind infatuation. Accordingly it was agreed in the
cabinet, without a dissenting voice, that the jurisdiction of every
independent nation, within the limits of its own territory, being of a
nature to exclude the exercise of any authority therein by a foreign
power, the proceedings complained of, not being warranted by any
treaty, were usurpations of national sovereignty, and violations of
neutral rights, a repetition of which it was the duty of the
government to prevent.

It was also agreed that the efficacy of the laws should be tried
against those citizens of the United States who had joined in
perpetrating the offence.

[Sidenote: Opinions of the Cabinet in relation thereto.]

The question of restitution, except as to the Grange, was more
dubious. The secretary of state and the attorney general contended
that, if the commissions granted by Mr. Genet were invalid, the
captures were totally void, and the courts would adjudge the property
to remain in the former owners. In this point of view, therefore,
there being a regular remedy at law, it would be irregular for the
government to interpose.

If, on the contrary, the commissions were good, then, the captures
having been made on the high seas, under a valid commission from a
power at war with Great Britain, the original right of the British
owner was, by the laws of war, transferred to the captor.

The legal right being in the captor, it could only be taken from him
by an act of force, that is to say, of reprisal for the offence
committed against the United States in the port of Charleston.
Reprisal is a very serious thing, ought always to be preceded by a
demand and refusal of satisfaction, is generally considered as an act
of war, and never yet failed to produce it in the case of a nation
able to make war.

[Illustration: Martha Washington

_From the portrait by James Sharples_

_This is one of the three Sharples portraits of the Washington family
and the only good profile of Martha Washington that was painted from
life. Martha, who was a few months younger than her husband, is
described as having been "amiable in character and lovely in person."
By the courtesy of the period she was called Lady Washington, and
whether in her own home or at the "federal court," she presided with
marked dignity and grace. She died at Mount Vernon, May 22, 1802,
having survived her husband two and a half years._

Courtesy Herbert L. Pratt]

Admitting the case to be of sufficient importance to require reprisal,
and to be ripe for that step, the power of taking it was vested by the
constitution in congress, not in the executive department of the
government.

Of the reparation for the offence committed against the United States,
they were themselves the judges, and could not be required by a
foreign nation, to demand more than was satisfactory to themselves. By
disavowing the act, by taking measures to prevent its repetition, by
prosecuting the American citizens who were engaged in it, the United
States ought to stand justified with Great Britain; and a demand of
further reparation by that power would be a wrong on her part.

The circumstances under which these equipments had been made, in the
first moments of the war, before the government could have time to
take precautions against them, and its immediate disapprobation of
those equipments, must rescue it from every imputation of being
accessory to them, and had placed it with the offended, not the
offending party.

Those gentlemen were therefore of opinion, that the vessels which had
been captured on the high seas, and brought into the United States, by
privateers fitted out and commissioned in their ports, ought not to be
restored.

The secretaries of the treasury, and of war, were of different
opinion. They urged that a neutral, permitting itself to be made an
instrument of hostility by one belligerent against another, became
thereby an associate in the war. If land or naval armaments might be
formed by France within the United States, for the purpose of carrying
on expeditions against her enemy, and might return with the spoils
they had taken, and prepare new enterprises, it was apparent that a
state of war would exist between America and those enemies, of the
worst kind for them: since, while the resources of the country were
employed in annoying them, the instruments of this annoyance would be
occasionally protected from pursuit, by the privileges of an
ostensible neutrality. It was easy to see that such a state of things
could not be tolerated longer than until it should be perceived.

It being confessedly contrary to the duty of the United States, as a
neutral nation, to suffer privateers to be fitted in their ports to
annoy the British trade, it seemed to follow that it would comport
with their duty, to remedy the injury which may have been sustained,
when it is in their power so to do.

That the fact had been committed before the government could provide
against it might be an excuse, but not a justification. Every
government is responsible for the conduct of all parts of the
community over which it presides, and is supposed to possess, at all
times, the means of preventing infractions of its duty to foreign
nations. In the present instance, the magistracy of the place ought to
have prevented them. However valid this excuse might have been, had
the privateers expedited from Charleston been sent to the French
dominions, there to operate out of the reach of the United States, it
could be of no avail when their prizes were brought into the American
ports, and the government, thereby, completely enabled to administer a
specific remedy for the injury.

Although the commissions, and the captures made under them, were valid
as between the parties at war, they were not so as to the United
States. For the violation of their rights, they had a claim to
reparation, and might reasonably demand, as the reparation to which
they were entitled, restitution of the property taken, with or without
an apology for the infringement of their sovereignty. This they had a
right to demand as a species of reparation consonant with the nature
of the injury, and enabling them to do justice to the party in
injuring whom they had been made instrumental. It could be no just
cause of complaint on the part of the captors that they were required
to surrender a property, the means of acquiring which took their
origin in a violation of the rights of the United States.

On the other hand, there was a claim on the American government to
arrest the effects of the injury or annoyance to which it had been
made accessory. To insist therefore on the restitution of the property
taken, would be to enforce a right, in order to the performance of a
duty.

These commissions, though void as to the United States, being valid as
between the parties, the case was not proper for the decision of the
courts of justice. The whole was an affair between the governments of
the parties concerned, to be settled by reasons of state, not rules of
law. It was the case of an infringement of national sovereignty to the
prejudice of a third party, in which the government was to demand a
reparation, with the double view of vindicating its own rights, and of
doing justice to the suffering party.

They, therefore, were of opinion that, in the case stated for their
consideration, restitution ought to be made.

On the point respecting which his cabinet was divided, the President
took time to deliberate. Those principles on which a concurrence of
sentiment had been manifested being considered as settled, the
secretary of state was desired to communicate them to the ministers of
France and Britain; and circular letters were addressed to the
executives of the several states, requiring their co-operation, with
force if necessary, in the execution of the rules which were
established.

The citizen Genet was much dissatisfied with these decisions of the
American government. He thought them contrary to natural right, and
subversive of the treaties by which the two nations were connected. In
his exposition of these treaties, he claimed, for his own country, all
that the two nations were restricted from conceding to others, thereby
converting negative limitations into an affirmative grant of
privileges to France.

Without noticing a want of decorum in some of the expressions which
Mr. Genet had employed, he was informed that the subjects on which his
letter treated had, from respect to him, been reconsidered by the
executive; but that no cause was perceived for changing the system
which had been adopted. He was further informed that, in the opinion
of the President, the United States owed it to themselves, and to the
nations in their friendship, to expect, as a reparation for the
offence of infringing their sovereignty, that the vessels, thus
illegally equipped, would depart from their ports.

Mr. Genet was not disposed to acquiesce in these decisions. Adhering
to his own construction of the existing treaty, he affected to
consider the measures of the American government as infractions of it,
which no power in the nation had a right to make, unless the United
States in congress assembled should determine that their solemn
engagements should no longer be performed. Intoxicated with the
sentiments expressed by a great portion of the people, and
unacquainted with the firm character of the executive, he seems to
have expected that the popularity of his nation would enable him to
overthrow that department, or to render it subservient to his views.
It is difficult otherwise to account for his persisting to disregard
its decisions, and for passages with which his letters abound, such as
the following:

"Every obstruction by the government of the United States to the
arming of French vessels must be an attempt on the rights of man, upon
which repose the independence and laws of the United States; a
violation of the ties which unite the people of France and America;
and even a manifest contradiction of the system of neutrality of the
President; for, in fact, if our merchant vessels,[5] or others, are
not allowed to arm themselves, when the French alone are resisting the
league of all the tyrants against the liberty of the people, they will
be exposed to inevitable ruin in going out of the ports of the United
States, which is certainly not the intention of the people of America.
Their fraternal voice has resounded from every quarter around me, and
their accents are not equivocal. They are pure as the hearts of those
by whom they are expressed, and the more they have touched my
sensibility, the more they must interest in the happiness of America
the nation I represent;--the more I wish, sir, that the federal
government should observe, as far as in their power, the public
engagements contracted by both nations; and that, by this generous and
prudent conduct, they will give at least to the world, the example of
a true neutrality, which does not consist in the cowardly abandonment
of their friends in the moment when danger menaces them, but in
adhering strictly, if they can do no better, to the obligations they
have contracted with them. It is by such proceedings that they will
render themselves respectable to all the powers; that they will
preserve their friends and deserve to augment their numbers."

     [Footnote 5: The regulation alluded to as was stated by Mr.
     Jefferson in reply, did not relate to vessels arming for
     defence, but to cruisers against the enemies of France.]

A few days previous to the reception of the letter from which the
above is an extract, two citizens of the United States, who had been
engaged by Mr. Genet in Charleston to cruise in the service of France,
were arrested by the civil magistrate, in pursuance of the
determination formed by the executive for the prosecution of persons
having thus offended against the laws. Mr. Genet demanded their
release in the following extraordinary terms:

"I have this moment been informed that two officers in the service of
the republic of France, citizen Gideon Henfield and John Singletary,
have been arrested on board the privateer of the French republic, the
Citizen Genet, and conducted to prison. The crime laid to their
charge--the crime which my mind can not conceive, and which my pen
almost refuses to state,--is the serving of France, and defending with
her children the common glorious cause of liberty.

"Being ignorant of any positive law or treaty which deprives Americans
of this privilege, and authorizes officers of police arbitrarily to
take mariners in the service of France from on board their vessels, I
call upon your intervention, sir, and that of the President of the
United States, in order to obtain the immediate releasement of the
above mentioned officers, who have acquired, by the sentiments
animating them, and by the act of their engagement, anterior to every
act to the contrary, the right of French citizens, if they have lost
that of American citizens."

This lofty offensive style could not fail to make a deep impression on
a mind penetrated with a just sense of those obligations by which the
chief magistrate is bound to guard the dignity of his government, and
to take care that his nation be not degraded in his person. Yet, in no
single instance, did the administration, in its communications with
Mr. Genet, permit itself to be betrayed into the use of one
intemperate expression. The firmness with which the extravagant
pretensions of that gentleman were resisted, proceeding entirely from
a sense of duty and conviction of right, was unaccompanied with any
marks of that resentment which his language and his conduct were alike
calculated to inspire.

[Sidenote: State of parties.]

Mr. Genet appears to have been prevented from acquiescing in a line of
conduct thus deliberately adopted and prudently pursued, by a belief
that the sentiments of the people were in direct opposition to the
measures of their government. So excessive, and so general, were the
demonstrations of enthusiastic devotion to France; so open were their
expressions of outrage and hostility towards all the powers at war
with that republic; so thin was the veil which covered the chief
magistrate from that stream of malignant opprobrium directed against
every measure which thwarted the views of Mr. Genet; that a person
less sanguine than that minister might have cherished the hope of
being able ultimately to triumph over the opposition to his designs.
Civic festivals, and other public assemblages of people, at which the
ensigns of France were displayed in union with those of America; at
which the red cap, as a symbol of French liberty and fraternity,
triumphantly passed from head to head; at which toasts were given
expressive of a desire to identify the people of America with those of
France; and, under the imposing guise of adhering to principles not to
men, containing allusions to the influence of the President which
could not be mistaken; appeared to Mr. Genet to indicate a temper
extremely favourable to his hopes, and very different from that which
would be required for the preservation of an honest neutrality.
Through the medium of the press, these sentiments were communicated to
the public, and were represented as flowing from the hearts of the
great body of the people. In various other modes, that important
engine contributed its powerful aid to the extension of opinions,
calculated, essentially, to vary the situation of the United States.
The proclamation of neutrality which was treated as a royal edict, was
not only considered as assuming powers not belonging to the executive,
and, as evidencing the monarchical tendencies of that department, but
as demonstrating the disposition of the government to break its
connexions with France, and to dissolve the friendship which united
the people of the two republics. The declaration that "the duty and
interest of the United States required that they should with sincerity
and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial
towards the belligerent powers," gave peculiar umbrage. The scenes of
the revolutionary war were brought into review; the object and effect
of British hostility were painted in glowing colours; and the
important aids afforded by France were drawn with a pencil not less
animated. That the conduct of Britain, since the treaty of peace had
furnished unequivocal testimony of enmity to the United States, was
strongly pressed. With this continuing enmity was contrasted the
amicable dispositions professed by the French republic; and it was
asked with indignation, whether the interests of the United States
required that they should pursue "a line of conduct entirely impartial
between these two powers? That the services of the one as well as the
injuries of the other, should be forgotten? that a friend and an enemy
should be treated with equal favour? and that neither gratitude nor
resentment should constitute a feature of the American character?" The
supposed freedom of the French was opposed to the imagined slavery of
the English; and it was demanded whether "the people of America were
alike friendly to republicanism and to monarchy? to liberty and to
despotism?"

With infectious enthusiasm it was contended, that there was a natural
and inveterate hostility between monarchies and republics; that the
present combination against France was a combination against liberty
in every part of the world; and that the destinies of America were
inseparably linked with those of the French republic.

On the various points of controversy which had arisen between the
executive and Mr. Genet, this active and powerful party openly and
decidedly embraced the principles for which that minister contended.
It was assumed that his demands were sanctioned by subsisting
treaties, and that his exposition of those instruments was perfectly
correct. The conduct of the executive in withholding privileges to
which France was said to be entitled by the most solemn engagements,
was reprobated with extreme acrimony; was considered as indicative of
a desire to join the coalesced despots in their crusade against
liberty; and as furnishing to the French republic such just motives
for war, that it required all her moderation and forbearance to
restrain her from declaring it against the United States.

Mr. Genet was exhorted not to relax in his endeavours to maintain the
just rights of his country; and was assured that, in the affections of
the people, he would find a firm and certain support.

These principles and opinions derived considerable aid from the
labours and intrigues of certain societies, who had constituted
themselves the guardians of American liberty.

The manner in which that attention of the conduct of those invested
with the power which is essential in balanced governments, may safely
be employed, had been so misconceived, that temporary and detached
clubs of citizens had occasionally been formed in different parts of
the United States, for the avowed purpose of watching the conduct of
their rulers. After the adoption of the constitution, some slight use
was made, by its enemies, of this weapon; and, in the German
Republican Society particularly, many of the most strenuous opponents
of the administration were collected.

[Sidenote: Democratic societies formed.]

The force and power of these institutions had been fully developed,
and their efficacy in prostrating existing establishments clearly
ascertained by the revolution in France. The increased influence which
they derived from corresponding with each other, had been
unequivocally demonstrated; and soon after the arrival of Mr. Genet, a
democratic society was formed in Philadelphia on the model of the
Jacobin club in Paris. An anxious solicitude for the preservation of
freedom, the very existence of which was menaced by a "European
confederacy transcendent in power and unparalleled in iniquity;" which
was endangered also by "the pride of wealth and arrogance of power,"
displayed within the United States; was the motive assigned for the
association. "A constant circulation of useful information, and a
liberal communication of republican sentiments, were thought to be the
best antidotes to any political poison with which the vital principle
of civil liberty might be attacked:" and to give the more extensive
operation to their labours, a corresponding committee was appointed,
through whom they would communicate with other societies, which might
be established on similar principles, throughout the United States.

Faithful to their founder, and true to the real objects of their
association, these societies continued, during the term of their
existence, to be the resolute champions of all the encroachments
attempted by the agents of the French republic on the government of
the United States, and the steady defamers of the views and measures
of the American executive.

Thus strongly supported, Mr. Genet persisted in his construction of
the treaties between the two nations; and, in defiance of the positive
determination of the government, continued to act according to that
construction.

The President was called to Mount Vernon by urgent business, which
detained him less than three weeks; and, in his absence, the heads of
departments superintended the execution of those rules which had been
previously established.

In this short interval, a circumstance occurred, strongly marking the
rashness of the minister of France, and his disrespect to the
executive of the United States.

The Little Sarah, an English merchantman, had been captured by a
French frigate, and brought into the port of Philadelphia, where she
was completely equipped as a privateer, and was just about to sail on
a cruise under the name of _le petit Democrat_, when the secretary of
the treasury communicated her situation to the secretaries of state
and of war; in consequence of which, Governor Mifflin was desired to
cause an examination of the fact. The warden of the port was directed
to institute the proper inquiries; and late in the evening of the
sixth of July, he reported her situation, and that she was to sail the
next day.

[Sidenote: Genet calculates upon the partialities of the American
people for France and openly insults their government.]

In pursuance of the instructions which had been given by the
President, the governor immediately sent Mr. Secretary Dallas for the
purpose of prevailing on Mr. Genet to relieve him from the employment
of force, by detaining the vessel in port until the arrival of the
President, who was then on his way from Mount Vernon. Mr. Dallas
communicated this message to the French minister in terms as
conciliatory as its nature would permit. On receiving it, he gave a
loose to the most extravagant passion. After exclaiming with vehemence
against the measure, he complained, in strong terms, and with many
angry epithets, of the ill treatment which he had received from some
of the officers of the general government, which he contrasted with
the cordial attachment that was expressed by the people at large for
his nation. He ascribed the conduct of those officers to principles
inimical to the cause of France, and of liberty. He insinuated that,
by their influence, the President had been misled; and observed with
considerable emphasis, that the President was not the sovereign of
this country. The powers of peace and war being vested in congress, it
belonged to that body to decide those questions growing out of
treaties which might involve peace or war; and the President,
therefore, ought to have assembled the national legislature before he
ventured to issue his proclamation of neutrality, or to prohibit, by
his instructions to the state governors, the enjoyment of the
particular rights which France claimed under the express stipulations
of the treaty of commerce. The executive construction of that treaty
was neither just nor obligatory; and he would make no engagement which
might be construed into a relinquishment of rights which his
constituents deemed indispensable. In the course of this vehement and
angry declamation, he spoke of publishing his correspondence with the
officers of government, together with a narrative of his proceedings;
and said that, although the existing causes would warrant an abrupt
departure, his regard for the people of America would induce him to
remain here, amidst the insults and disgusts that he daily suffered in
his official character from the public officers, until the meeting of
congress; and if that body should agree in the opinions and support
the measures of the President, he would certainly withdraw, and leave
the dispute to be adjusted between the two nations themselves. His
attention being again called by Mr. Dallas to the particular subject,
he peremptorily refused to enter into any arrangements for suspending
the departure of the privateer, and cautioned him against any attempt
to seize her, as she belonged to the republic; and, in defence of the
honour of her flag, would unquestionably repel force by force.

On receiving the report of Mr. Dallas, Governor Mifflin ordered out
one hundred and twenty militia, for the purpose of taking possession
of the privateer; and communicated the case, with all its
circumstances, to the officers of the executive government. On the
succeeding day, Mr. Jefferson waited on Mr. Genet, in the hope of
prevailing on him to pledge his word that the privateer should not
leave the port until the arrival of the President. The minister was
not less intemperate with Mr. Jefferson than he had been with Mr.
Dallas. He indulged himself, in a repetition of nearly the same
passionate language, and again spoke, with extreme harshness, of the
conduct of the executive. He persisted in refusing to make any
engagements for the detention of the vessel; and, after his rage had
in some degree spent itself, he entreated that no attempt might be
made to take possession of her, as her crew was on board, and force
would be repelled by force.

He then also said that she was not ready to sail immediately. She
would change her position, and fall down the river a small distance on
that day; but was not yet ready to sail.

In communicating this conversation to Governor Mifflin, Mr. Jefferson
stated his conviction that the privateer would remain in the river
until the President should decide on her case; in consequence of
which, the governor dismissed the militia, and requested the advice of
the heads of departments on the course which it would be proper for
him to pursue. Both the governor and Mr. Jefferson stated, that in
reporting the conversation between Mr. Genet and himself, Mr. Dallas
had said that Mr. Genet threatened, in express terms, "to appeal from
the President to the people."

Thus braved and insulted in the very heart of the American empire, the
secretaries of the treasury, and of war, were of opinion that it was
expedient to take immediate provisional measures for establishing a
battery on Mud Island, under cover of a party of militia, with
directions, that if the vessel should attempt to depart before the
pleasure of the President should be known concerning her, military
coercion should be employed to arrest her progress.

The secretary of state dissenting from this opinion, the measure was
not adopted. The vessel fell down to Chester before the arrival of the
President, and sailed on her cruise before the power of the government
could be interposed.

On the 11th of July the President reached Philadelphia, and requested
that his cabinet ministers would convene at his house the next day at
nine in the morning.

Among the papers placed in his hands by the secretary of state, which
required immediate attention, were those which related to the Little
Democrat. On reading them, a messenger was immediately despatched for
the secretary, but he had retired, indisposed, to his seat in the
country. Upon hearing this, the President instantly addressed a letter
to him, of which the following is an extract. "What is to be done in
the case of the Little Sarah, now at Chester? Is the minister of the
French republic to set the acts of this government at defiance _with
impunity_--and then threaten the executive with an appeal to the
people? What must the world think of such conduct? and of the
government of the United States in submitting to it?

"These are serious questions--circumstances press for decision;--and
as you have had time to consider them, (upon me they come
unexpectedly,) I wish to know your opinion upon them even before
to-morrow--for the vessel may then be gone."

In answer to this letter, the secretary stated the assurances which
had on that day been given to him by Mr. Genet, that the vessel would
not sail before the President's decision respecting her should be
made. In consequence of this information, immediate coercive measures
were suspended; and in the council of the succeeding day it was
determined to retain in port all[6] privateers which had been equipped
by any of the belligerent powers within the United States. This
determination was immediately communicated to Mr. Genet; but, in
contempt of it, the Little Democrat proceeded on her cruise.

     [Footnote 6: They were particularly enumerated, and the
     decision was also extended to the ship Jane, an English
     armed merchantman, alleged by Mr. Genet to be a privateer,
     and the governor was requested to attend to her, and if he
     found her augmenting her force and about to depart, to cause
     her to be stopped.

     The Jane had augmented her armament by replacing four old
     gun-carriages with new ones, and opening two new portholes.
     The request of the British consul that these alterations
     might be allowed was peremptorily rejected, and directions
     were given that she should be restored precisely to the
     situation in which she entered the port. Had she attempted
     to sail without obeying these orders, Governor Mifflin had
     taken measures to stop her at Mud Island.]

In this, as in every effort made by the executive to maintain the
neutrality of the United States, that great party which denominated
itself "THE PEOPLE," could perceive only a settled hostility to France
and to liberty, a tame subserviency to British policy, and a desire,
by provoking France, to engage America in the war, for the purpose of
extirpating republican principles.[7]

     [Footnote 7: See note No. III. at the end of the volume.]

The administration received strong additional evidence of the
difficulty that would attend an adherence to the system which had been
commenced, in the acquittal of Gideon Henfield.

A prosecution had been instituted against this person who had enlisted
in Charleston on board a French privateer equipped in that port, which
had brought her prizes into the port of Philadelphia. This prosecution
had been directed under the advice of the attorney general, who was of
opinion, that persons of this description were punishable for having
violated subsisting treaties, which, by the constitution, are the
supreme law of the land; and that they were also indictable at common
law, for disturbing the peace of the United States.

It could not be expected that the democratic party would be
inattentive to an act so susceptible of misrepresentation. Their
papers sounded the alarm; and it was universally asked, "what law had
been offended, and under what statute was the indictment supported?
Were the American people already prepared to give to a proclamation
the force of a legislative act, and to subject themselves to the will
of the executive? But if they were already sunk to such a state of
degradation, were they to be punished for violating a proclamation
which had not been published when the offence was committed, if indeed
it could be termed an offence to engage with France, combating for
liberty against the combined despots of Europe?"

As the trial approached, a great degree of sensibility was displayed;
and the verdict in favour of Henfield was celebrated with extravagant
marks of joy and exultation. It bereaved the executive of the strength
to be derived from an opinion, that punishment might be legally
inflicted on those who should openly violate the rules prescribed for
the preservation of neutrality; and exposed that department to the
obloquy of having attempted a measure which the laws would not
justify.

About this time, a question growing out of the war between France and
Britain, the decision of which would materially affect the situation
of the United States, was presented to the consideration of the
executive.

It will be recollected that during the war which separated America
from Britain, the celebrated compact termed the _armed neutrality_ was
formed in the north of Europe, and announced to the belligerent
powers. A willingness to acquiesce in the principles it asserted, one
of which was that free bottoms should make free goods, was expressed
by the governments engaged in the war, with the single exception of
Great Britain. But, however favourably the United States, as a
belligerent, might view a principle which would promote the interests
of inferior maritime powers, they were not willing, after the
termination of hostilities, to enter into engagements for its support
which might endanger their future peace; and, in this spirit,
instructions were given to their ministers in Europe.

This principle was ingrafted into the treaty of commerce with France;
but no stipulation on the subject had been made with England. It
followed, that, with France, the character of the bottom was imparted
to the cargo; but with Britain, the law of nations was the rule by
which the respective rights of the belligerent and neutral were to be
decided.

Construing this rule to give security to the goods of a friend in the
bottoms of an enemy, and to subject the goods of an enemy to capture
in the bottoms of a friend, the British cruisers took French property
out of American vessels, and their courts condemned it as lawful
prize.

Mr. Genet had remonstrated against the acquiescence of the American
executive in this exposition of the law of nations, in such terms as
he was accustomed to employ; and on the 9th of July, in the moment of
the contest respecting the Little Democrat, he had written a letter
demanding an immediate and positive answer to the question, what
measures the President had taken, or would take, to cause the American
flag to be respected? He observed, that "as the English would continue
to carry off, with impunity, French citizens, and French property
found on board of American vessels, without embarrassing themselves
with the philosophical principles proclaimed by the President of the
United States," and as the embarrassing engagements of France deprived
her of the privileges of making reprisals at every point, it was
necessary for the interests of both nations, quickly to agree on
taking other measures.

Not receiving an immediate answer, Mr. Genet, towards the close of
July, again addressed the secretary of state on the subject. In this
extraordinary letter, after complaining of the insults offered to the
American flag by seizing the property of Frenchmen confided to its
protection, he added, "your political rights are counted for nothing.
In vain do the principles of neutrality establish, that friendly
vessels make friendly goods; in vain, sir, does the President of the
United States endeavour, by his proclamation, to reclaim the
observation of this maxim; in vain does the desire of preserving peace
lead to sacrifice the interests of France to that of the moment; in
vain does the thirst of riches preponderate over honour in the
political balance of America: all this management, all this
condescension, all this humility, end in nothing; our enemies laugh at
it; and the French, too confident, are punished for having believed
that the American nation had a flag, that they had some respect for
their laws, some conviction of their strength, and entertained some
sentiment of their dignity. It is not possible for me, sir, to paint
to you all my sensibility at this scandal which tends to the
diminution of your commerce, to the oppression of ours, and to the
debasement and vilification of republics. It is for Americans to make
known their generous indignation at this outrage; and I must confine
myself to demand of you a second time, to inform me of the measures
which you have taken, in order to obtain restitution of the property
plundered from my fellow citizens, under the protection of your flag.
It is from our government they have learnt that the Americans were our
allies, that the American nation was sovereign, and that they knew how
to make themselves respected. It is then under the very same sanction
of the French nation, that they have confided their property and
persons to the safeguard of the American flag; and on her, they submit
the care of causing those rights to be respected. But if our fellow
citizens have been deceived, if you are not in a condition to maintain
the sovereignty of your people, speak; we have guaranteed it when
slaves, we shall be able to render it formidable, having become
freemen."

On the day preceding the date of this offensive letter, the secretary
of state had answered that of the 9th of July; and, without noticing
the unbecoming style in which the decision of the executive was
demanded, had avowed and defended the opinion, that "by the general
law of nations, the goods of an enemy found in the vessels of a friend
are lawful prize." This fresh insult might therefore be passed over in
silence.

While a hope remained that the temperate forbearance of the executive,
and the unceasing manifestations of its friendly dispositions towards
the French republic, might induce the minister of that nation to
respect the rights of the United States, and to abstain from
violations of their sovereignty, an anxious solicitude not to impair
the harmony which he wished to maintain between the two republics, had
restrained the President from adopting those measures respecting Mr.
Genet, which the conduct of that gentleman required. He had seen a
foreign minister usurp within the territories of the United States
some of the most important rights of sovereignty, and persist, after
the prohibition of the government, in the exercise of those rights. In
asserting this extravagant claim, so incompatible with national
independence, the spirit in which it originated had been pursued, and
the haughty style of a superior had been substituted for the
respectful language of diplomacy. He had seen the same minister
undertake to direct the civil government; and to pronounce, in
opposition to the decisions of the executive, in what departments of
the constitution of the United States had placed certain great
national powers. To render this state of things more peculiarly
critical and embarrassing, the person most instrumental in producing
it, had, from his arrival, thrown himself into the arms of the people,
stretched out to receive him; and was emboldened by their favour, to
indulge the hope of succeeding in his endeavours, either to overthrow
their government, or to bend it to his will. But the full experiment
had now been made; and the result was a conviction not to be resisted,
that moderation would only invite additional injuries, and that the
present insufferable state of things could be terminated only by
procuring the removal of the French minister, or by submitting to
become, in his hands, the servile instrument of hostility against the
enemies of his nation. Information was continually received from every
quarter, of fresh aggressions on the principles established by the
government; and, while the executive was thus openly disregarded and
contemned, the members of the administration were reproached in all
the papers of an active and restless opposition, as the violators of
the national faith, the partisans of monarchy, and the enemies of
liberty and of France.

The unwearied efforts of that department to preserve that station in
which the various treaties in existence had placed the nation, were
incessantly calumniated[8] as infractions of those treaties, and
ungrateful attempts to force the United States into the war against
France.

     [Footnote 8: See note No. IV. at the end of the volume.]

The judgment of the President was never hastily formed; but, once made
up, it was seldom to be shaken. Before the last letter of Mr. Genet
was communicated to him, he seems to have determined to take decisive
measures respecting that minister.

[Sidenote: Rules laid down by the executive in relation to the powers
at war within the ports of the United States.]

That the course to be pursued might be well considered, the secretary
of state was requested to collect all the correspondence with him, to
be laid before a cabinet council about to be held for the purpose of
adjusting a complete system of rules to be observed by the
belligerents in the ports of the United States. These rules were
discussed at several meetings, and finally, on the third of August,
received the unanimous approbation of the cabinet. They[9] evidence
the settled purpose of the executive, faithfully to observe all the
national engagements, and honestly to perform the duties of that
neutrality in which the war found them, and in which those engagements
left them free to remain.

     [Footnote 9: See note No. V. at the end of the volume.]

[Sidenote: The president requests the recall of Genet.]

In the case of the minister of the French republic, it was unanimously
agreed that a letter should be written to Mr. Morris, the minister of
the United States at Paris, stating the conduct of Mr. Genet, resuming
the points of difference which had arisen between the government and
that gentleman, assigning the reasons for the opinion of the former,
desiring the recall of the latter, and directing that this letter,
with those which had passed between Mr. Genet and the secretary of
state, should be laid before the executive of the French government.

To a full view of the transactions of the executive with Mr. Genet,
and an ample justification of its measures, this able diplomatic
performance adds assurances of unvarying attachment to France,
expressed in such terms of unaffected sensibility, as to render
it impossible to suspect the sincerity of the concluding
sentiment--"that, after independence and self-government, there was
nothing America more sincerely wished than perpetual friendship with
them."

An adequate idea of the passion it excited in Mr. Genet, who received
the communication in September, at New York, can be produced only by a
perusal of his letter addressed, on that occasion, to the secretary of
state. The asperity of his language was not confined to the President,
whom he still set at defiance, whom he charged with transcending the
limits prescribed by the constitution, and of whose accusation before
congress he spoke as an act of justice "which the American people,
which the French people, which all free people were interested to
reclaim:" nor to those "gentlemen who had been painted to him so often
as aristocrats, partisans of monarchy, partisans of England, and
consequently enemies of the principles which all good Frenchmen had
embraced with a religious enthusiasm." Its bitterness was also
extended to the secretary of state himself, whom he had been induced
to consider as his personal friend, and who had, he said, "initiated
him into mysteries which had inflamed his hatred against all those who
aspire to an absolute power."

During these deliberations, Mr. Genet was received in New York with
the same remarks of partiality to his nation, and of flattering regard
to himself, which had been exhibited in the more southern states. At
this place too, he manifested the same desire to encourage discontent
at the conduct of the government, and to embark America in the
quarrel, by impressing an opinion that the existence of liberty
depended on the success of the French republic, which he had uniformly
avowed. In answer to an address from the republican citizens of New
York, who had spoken of the proclamation of neutrality as relating
only to acts of open hostility, not to the feelings of the heart; and
who had declared that they would "exultingly sacrifice a liberal
portion of their dearest interests could there result, on behalf of
the French republic, an adequate advantage;" he said--"in this respect
I can not but interpret as you have done the declaration of your
government. They must know that the strict performance of treaties is
the best and safest policy; they must know that good faith alone can
inspire respectability to a nation; that a pusillanimous conduct
provokes insult, and brings upon a country those very dangers which it
weakly means to avert.

"There is indeed too much reason to fear that you are involved in the
general conspiracy of tyrants against liberty. They never will, they
never can forgive you for having been the first to proclaim the rights
of man. But you will force them to respect you by pursuing with
firmness the only path which is consistent with your national honour
and dignity.

"The cause of France is the cause of all mankind, and no nation is
more deeply interested than you are in its success. Whatever fate
awaits her, you are ultimately to share. But the cause of liberty is
great and it shall prevail.

"And if France, under a despotic yoke, has been able so successfully
to assert your rights, they can never again be endangered while she is
at liberty to exert, in your support, that powerful arm which now
defies the combined efforts of a whole world."

While these exertions were successfully making to give increased
force, and a wider extent, to opinions which might subvert the system
adopted by the executive, Mr. Jay, the chief justice of the United
States, and Mr. King, a senator representing the state, arrived in New
York from Philadelphia. They had been preceded by a report, which was
whispered in private circles, that the French minister had avowed a
determination to appeal from the President to the people. The
confidential intercourse subsisting between these gentlemen and a part
of the administration rendering it probable that this declaration, if
made, had been communicated to them, they were asked, whether the
report was true; having received the information through a channel[10]
which was entitled to the most implicit faith, they answered that it
was.

     [Footnote 10: They received it from the secretaries of the
     treasury and of war.]

Their having said so was controverted; and they were repeatedly
required, in the public papers, to admit or deny that they had made
such an assertion. Thus called upon, they published a certificate
avowing that they had made the declaration imputed to them.

On reflecting men this communication made a serious impression. The
recent events in Poland, whose dismemberment and partition were easily
traced to the admission of foreign influence, gave additional
solemnity to the occurrence, and led to a more intent consideration of
the awful causes which would embolden a foreign minister to utter such
a threat.

That party, which in the commencement of the contests respecting the
constitution was denominated federal, had generally supported the
measures of the administration.

That which was denominated anti-federal, had generally opposed those
measures. South of the Potomac especially, there was certainly many
important exceptions to this arrangement of parties; yet as a general
arrangement, it was unquestionably correct.

In the common partialities for France, in the common hope that the
revolution in that country would be crowned with success, and would
produce important benefits to the human race, they had equally
participated; but in the course to be pursued by the United States,
the line of separation between the two parties was clear and distinct.
The federalists were universally of opinion that, in the existing war,
America ought to preserve a neutrality as impartial as was compatible
with her treaties; and that those treaties had been fairly and justly
construed by the executive. Seduced however by their wishes, and by
their affections, they at first yielded implicit faith to the
assurances given by Mr. Genet of the disinclination of the French
republic to draw them from this eligible position; and from this
belief, they receded slowly and reluctantly.

They were inclined to ascribe the bitter invectives which were
pronounced against the executive to an inveterate hostility to the
government, and to those who administered it; and, when at length they
were compelled to perceive that the whole influence of Mr. Genet was
employed in stimulating and pointing these invectives, they fondly
indulged the hope that his nation would not countenance his conduct.
Adding to their undiminished attachment to the chief magistrate, a
keen sense of the disgrace, the humiliation, and the danger of
permitting the American government to be forced into any system of
measures by the machinations of a foreign minister with the people,
they had occasionally endeavoured, through the medium of the press, to
keep the public mind correct; and, when it was announced that an
appeal to themselves was threatened, they felt impelled by the
strongest sentiments of patriotism and regard for national honour, to
declare the indignation which the threat had inspired. In every
quarter of the union, the people assembled in their districts, and the
strength of parties was fully tried. The contest was warm and
strenuous. But public opinion appeared to preponderate greatly in
favour of neutrality, and of the proclamation by which its observance
was directed. It was apparent too, that the American bosom still
glowed with ardent affection for their chief magistrate; and that,
however successful might have been the shafts directed against some of
those who shared his confidence, the arrows aimed at himself had
missed their mark.

Yet it was not to be concealed that the indiscreet arrogance of Mr.
Genet, the direct insults to the President, and the attachment which
many, who were in opposition to the general measures of the
administration, still retained for the person of that approved
patriot, contributed essentially to the prevalence of the sentiment
which was called forth by the occasion.

In the resolutions expressing the strongest approbation of the
measures which had been adopted, and the greatest abhorrence of
foreign influence, a decided partiality for France was frequently
manifested; while in those of a contrary description, respect for the
past services of the President, and a willingness to support the
executive in the exercises of its constitutional functions, seemed,
when introduced, to be reluctantly placed among the more agreeable
declarations of detestation for those who sought to dissolve the union
between America and France, and of the devotion with which the French
revolution ought to be espoused by all the friends of liberty.

The effect which the certificate of Mr. Jay and Mr. King might
possibly produce was foreseen; and Mr. Genet sought to avoid its
influence by questioning its veracity. Not only had it never been
alleged that the exceptionable expressions were used to the President
personally, but it was certain that they had not been uttered in his
presence. Affecting not to have adverted to this obvious circumstance,
the minister, on the 13th of August, addressed a letter to the chief
magistrate, which, being designed for publication, was itself the act
he had threatened, in which he subjoined to a detail of his
accusations against the executive, the demand of an explicit
declaration that he had never intimated to him an intention to appeal
to the people.

On the 16th this letter was answered by the secretary of state, who,
after acknowledging its receipt by the President, added, "I am desired
to observe to you that it is not the established course for the
diplomatic characters residing here to have any direct correspondence
with him. The secretary of state is the organ through which their
communications should pass.

"The President does not conceive it to be within the line of propriety
or duty, for him to bear evidence against a declaration, which,
whether made to him or others, is perhaps immaterial; he therefore
declines interfering in the case."

Seldom has more conclusive testimony been offered of the ascendency
which, in the conflicts of party, the passions maintain over reason,
than was exhibited, on this occasion, by the zealous partisans of the
French minister. It might have been expected that, content with
questioning the fact, or with diverting the obloquy attending it from
the French nation, no American would have been found hardy enough to
justify it; and but few, to condemn those gentlemen by whose means it
had reached the public ear. Nothing could be farther removed from this
expectation, than the conduct that was actually observed. The censure
merited by the expressions themselves fell, not upon the person who
had used them, but upon those who had communicated them to the public.
Writers of considerable political eminence, charged them as being
members of a powerful faction who were desirous of separating America
from France, and connecting her with England, for the purpose of
introducing the British constitution.

As if no sin could equal the crime of disclosing to the people a truth
which, by inducing reflection, might check the flood of that passion
for France which was deemed the surest test of patriotism, the darkest
motives were assigned for the disclosure, and the reputation of those
who made it has scarcely been rescued by a lapse of years, and by a
change of the subjects of controversy, from the peculiar party odium
with which they were at the time overwhelmed.

Sentiments of a still more extraordinary nature were openly avowed. In
a republican country, it was said, the people alone were the basis of
government. All powers being derived from them, might, by them, be
withdrawn at pleasure. They alone were the authors of the law, and to
them alone, must the ultimate decision on the interpretation belong.
From these delicate and popular truths, it was inferred, that the
doctrine that the sovereignty of the nation resided in the departments
of government was incompatible with the principles of liberty; and
that, if Mr. Genet dissented from the interpretation given by the
President to existing treaties, he might rightfully appeal to the real
sovereign whose agent the President was, and to whom he was
responsible for his conduct. Is the President, it was asked, a
_consecrated_ character, that an appeal from his decisions must be
considered criminal? or are the people in such a state of monarchical
degradation, that to speak of consulting them is an offence as great,
as if America groaned under a dominion equally tyrannical with the old
monarchy of France?

It was soon ascertained that Mr. Dallas, to whom this threat of
appealing to the people had been delivered, did not admit that the
precise words had been used. Mr. Genet then, in the coarsest terms,
averred the falsehood of the certificate which had been published, and
demanded from the attorney general, and from the government, that Mr.
Jay and Mr. King should be indicted for a libel upon himself and his
nation. That officer accompanied his refusal to institute this
information with the declaration that any other gentleman of the
profession, who might approve and advise the attempt, could be at no
loss to point out a mode which would not require his intervention.

While the minister of the French republic thus loudly complained of
the unparalleled injury he received from being charged with employing
a particular exceptionable phrase, he seized every fair occasion to
carry into full execution the threat which he denied having made. His
letters, written for the purpose of publication, and actually
published by himself, accused the executive, before the tribunal of
the people, on those specific points, from its decisions respecting
which he was said to have threatened the appeal. As if the offence
lay, not in perpetrating the act, but in avowing an intention to
perpetrate it, this demonstration of his designs did not render his
advocates the less vehement in his support, nor the less acrimonious
in reproaching the administration, as well as Mr. Jay and Mr. King.

Whilst insult was thus added to insult, the utmost vigilance of the
executive officers was scarcely sufficient to maintain an observance
of the rules which had been established for preserving neutrality in
the American ports. Mr. Genet persisted in refusing to acquiesce in
those rules; and fresh instances of attempts to violate them were
continually recurring. Among these, was an outrage committed in
Boston, too flagrant to be overlooked.

A schooner, brought as a prize into the port of Boston by a French
privateer, was claimed by the British owner; who instituted
proceedings at law against her, for the purpose of obtaining a
decision on the validity of her capture. She was rescued from the
possession of the marshal, by an armed force acting under the
authority of Mr. Duplaine, the French consul, which was detached from
a frigate then lying in port. Until the frigate sailed, she was
guarded by a part of the crew; and, notwithstanding the determination
of the American government that the consular courts should not
exercise a prize jurisdiction within the territories of the United
States, Mr. Duplaine declared his purpose to take cognizance of the
case.

To this act of open defiance, it was impossible for the President to
submit. The facts being well attested, the exequatur which had been
granted to Mr. Duplaine was revoked, and he was forbidden further to
exercise the consular functions. It will excite surprise that even
this necessary measure could not escape censure. The self-proclaimed
champions of liberty discovered in it a violation of the constitution,
and a new indignity to France.

Mr. Genet did not confine his attempts to employ the force of America
against the enemies of his country to maritime enterprises. On his
first arrival, he is understood to have planned an expedition against
the Floridas, to be carried on from Georgia; and another against
Louisiana, to be carried on from the western parts of the United
States. Intelligence was received that the principal officers were
engaged; and the temper of the people inhabiting the western country
was such as to furnish some ground for the apprehension, that the
restraints which the executive was capable of imposing, would be found
too feeble to prevent the execution of this plan. The remonstrances of
the Spanish commissioners on this subject, however, were answered with
explicit assurances that the government would effectually interpose to
defeat any expedition from the territories of the United States
against those of Spain; and the governor of Kentucky was requested to
co-operate in frustrating this improper application of the military
resources of his state.

It was not by the machinations of the French minister alone that the
neutrality of the United States was endangered. The party which, under
different pretexts, urged measures the inevitable tendency of which
was war, derived considerable aid, in their exertions to influence the
passions of the people, from the conduct of others of the belligerent
powers. The course pursued both by Britain and Spain rendered the task
of the executive still more arduous, by furnishing weapons to the
enemies of neutrality, capable of being wielded with great effect.

The resentment excited by the rigour with which the maritime powers of
Europe retained the monopoly of their colonial commerce, had, without
the aid of those powerful causes which had lately been brought into
operation, been directed peculiarly against Great Britain. These
resentments had been greatly increased. That nation had not mitigated
the vexations and inconveniences which war necessarily inflicts on
neutral trade, by any relaxations in her colonial policy.

[Sidenote: Decree of the national convention relative to neutral
commerce.]

To this rigid and repulsive system, that of France presented a perfect
contrast. Either influenced by the politics of the moment, or
suspecting that, in a contest with the great maritime nations of
Europe, her commerce must search for security in other bottoms than
her own, she opened the ports of her colonies to every neutral flag,
and offered to the United States a new treaty, in which it was
understood that every mercantile distinction between Americans and
Frenchmen should be totally abolished.

With that hasty credulity which, obedient to the wishes, can not await
the sober and deliberate decisions of the judgment, the Americans
ascribed this change, and these propositions, to the liberal genius of
freedom; and expected the new commercial and political systems to be
equally durable. As if, in the term REPUBLIC, the avaricious spirit of
commercial monopoly would lose its influence over men; as if the
passions were to withdraw from the management of human affairs, and
leave the helm to the guidance of reason, and of disinterested
philanthropy; a vast proportion of the American people believed this
novel system to be the genuine offspring of new-born liberty; and
consequently expected that, from the success of the republican arms, a
flood of untried good was to rush upon the world.

The avidity with which the neutral merchants pressed forward to reap
the rich and tempting harvest offered to them by the regulations and
the wants of France, presented a harvest not less rich and tempting to
the cruisers of her enemies. Captures to a great extent were made,
some with, others without, justifiable cause; and the irritations
inseparable from disappointment in gathering the fruits of a gainful
traffic, were extensively communicated to the agricultural part of
society.

The vexations on the ocean to which neutrals are commonly exposed
during war, were aggravated by a measure of the British cabinet, which
war was not admitted to justify.

[Sidenote: British order of 1793.]

The vast military exertions of the French republic had carried many
hands from their usual occupations, to the field; and the measures of
government, added to the internal commotions, had discouraged labour
by rendering its profits insecure. These causes, aided perhaps by
unfavourable seasons, had produced a scarcity which threatened famine.
This state of things suggested to their enemies the policy of
increasing the internal distress, by cutting off the external supply.
In execution of this plan, the British cruisers were instructed "to
stop all vessels loaded wholly or in part with corn, flour, or meal,
bound to any port in France, or any port occupied by the armies of
France, and to send them to such ports as shall be most convenient, in
order that such corn, meal, or flour, may be purchased on behalf of
his majesty's government, and the ships be relieved after such
purchase, and after a due allowance for freight; or that the masters
of such ships on giving due security, to be approved by the court of
admiralty, be permitted to proceed to dispose of their cargoes of
corn, meal, or flour, in the ports of any country in amity with his
majesty."

In the particular character of the war, and in the general expressions
of some approved modern writers on the law of nations, the British
government sought a justification of this strong measure. But by
neutrals generally, it was deemed an unwarrantable invasion of their
rights; and the remonstrances made against it by the American
government in particular, were serious and earnest. This attempt to
make a principle, which was understood to be applicable only to
blockaded places, subservient to the impracticable plan of starving an
immense agricultural nation, was resisted with great strength of
reasoning by the administration; and added, not inconsiderably, to the
resentment felt by the body of the people.[11]

     [Footnote 11: See note No. VI. at the end of the volume.]

Hostilities on the ocean disclosed still another source of irritation,
which added its copious stream to the impetuous torrent which
threatened to sweep America into the war that desolated Europe.

The British government had long been accustomed to resort to the
practice of manning their fleet by impressment. The exercise of this
prerogative had not been confined to the land. Merchantmen in their
ports, and even at sea, were visited, and mariners were taken out of
them, to be employed in the royal navy. The profits of trade enabling
neutral merchants to give high wages, British sailors were tempted, in
great numbers, to enter their service; but the neutral ship furnished
no protection. Disregarding the bottom in which they sailed, the
officers of the navy impressed them wherever found, often leaving
scarcely hands enough to navigate the vessel into port.

The Americans were peculiarly exposed to the abuse to which such
usages are liable. Descended from the same ancestors and speaking the
same language, the distinction between them and the English, though in
general sufficiently marked, was not always so visible as to prevent
unintentional error; nor were the captains of ships of war, at all
times, very solicitous to avoid mistake. Native Americans, therefore,
were frequently impressed, and compelled to serve against the French
republic.

The British cabinet disclaimed all pretensions to the impressment of
real American citizens, and declared officially a willingness to
discharge them, on the establishment of their citizenship. But time
was necessary to procure the requisite testimonials; and those
officers who had notoriously offended in this respect, were not so
discountenanced by their government as to be deterred from a
repetition of the offence. There was too, one class of citizens,
concerning whose rights a difference of opinion prevailed, which has
not even yet been adjusted. These were British subjects who had
migrated to, and been adopted by, the United States.

The continuance of the Indian war added still another item to this
catalogue of discontents.

The efforts of the United States to make a treaty with the savages of
the Miamis had proved abortive. The Indians insisted on the Ohio as
the boundary between them and the whites; and, although the American
commissioners expressed a willingness to relinquish some of the lands
purchased at the treaty of fort Harmar, and pressed them to propose
some line between the boundary established by that treaty and the
Ohio, they adhered inflexibly to their original demand.

It was extensively believed in America, and information collected from
the Indians countenanced the opinion, that they were encouraged by the
government of Canada to persevere in this claim, and that the treaty
was defeated by British influence. The conviction was universal that
this influence would continue so long as the posts south of the lakes
should be occupied by British troops; and the uneasiness which the
detention of those posts created, daily acquired strength.
Unfortunately, the original pretext for detaining them was not yet
removed. The courts of the United States had not yet declared that
British debts contracted before the war, were recoverable. In one of
the circuits, a decision had been recently made, partly favourable,
and partly unfavourable, to the claim of the creditor. To this
decision writs of error had been brought, and the case was pending
before the supreme court. The motives therefore originally assigned
for holding the posts on the lakes still remained; and, as it was a
maxim with the executive "to place an adversary clearly in the wrong,"
and it was expected that the existing impediments to the fulfilment of
the treaty on the part of the United States would soon be done away,
it was thought unadviseable, had the military force of the union been
equal to the object, to seize those posts, until their surrender could
be required in consequence of a complete execution of the treaty. In
the mean time, the British minister was earnestly pressed upon the
subject.

This prudent conduct was far from being satisfactory to the people.
Estimating at nothing, infractions made by themselves, and rating
highly those committed by the opposite party, they would, in any state
of things, have complained loudly of this act of the British
government. But, agitated as they were by the various causes which
were perpetually acting on their passions, it is not wonderful that an
increased influence was given to this measure; that it should be
considered as conclusive testimony of British hostility, and should
add to the bitterness with which the government was reproached for
attempting a system "alike friendly and impartial to the belligerent
powers."

The causes of discontent which were furnished by Spain, though less
the theme of public declamation, continued to be considerable.

The American ministers at Madrid could make no progress in their
negotiation. The question of limits remained unsettled, and the
Mississippi was still closed against the Americans. In addition to
these subjects of disquiet, the southern states were threatened with
war from the Creeks and Cherokees, who were, with good reason,
believed to be excited to hostility by the Spanish government. Of
these irritating differences, that which related to the Mississippi
was far the most operative, and embarrassing. The imagination,
especially when warmed by discontent, bestows on a good which is
withheld, advantages much greater than the reality will justify; and
the people of the western country were easily persuaded to believe
that the navigation of the Mississippi was a mine of wealth which
would at once enrich them. That jealousy which men so readily
entertain of the views of those with whom they do not associate, had
favoured the efforts made by the enemies of the administration, to
circulate the opinion that an opposition of interests existed between
the eastern and the western people, and that the endeavours of the
executive to open their great river were feeble and insincere. At a
meeting of the Democratic Society in Lexington, in Kentucky, this
sentiment was unanimously avowed in terms of peculiar disrespect to
the government; and a committee was appointed to open a correspondence
with the inhabitants of the whole western country, for the purpose of
uniting them on this all important subject, and of preparing on it a
remonstrance to the President and congress of the United States, to be
expressed "in the bold, decent and determined language, proper to be
used by injured freemen when they address the servants of the people."
They claimed much merit for their moderation in having thus long, out
of regard to their government, and affection for their fellow citizens
on the Atlantic, abstained from the use of those means which they
possessed for the assertion of what they termed a natural and
unalienable right; and seemed to indicate the opinion that this
forbearance could not be long continued. Without regarding the
determination of Spain in the case or the poverty of the means placed
in the hands of the executive for inducing a change in this
determination, they demanded from the government the free use of the
Mississippi, as if only an act of the will was necessary to insure it
to them. Not even the probability that the public and intemperate
expression of these dangerous dispositions would perpetuate the evil,
could moderate them. This restless uneasy temper gave additional
importance to the project of an expedition against Louisiana, which
had been formed by Mr. Genet.

These public causes for apprehending hostilities[12] with Spain, were
strengthened by private communications. The government had received
intelligence from their ministers in Europe that propositions had been
made by the cabinet of Madrid to that of London, the object of which
was the United States. The precise nature of these propositions was
not ascertained, but it was understood generally, that their tendency
was hostile.

     [Footnote 12: The state of affairs was so inauspicious to
     the continuance of peace that in a letter written in the
     month of June, to the secretary of war, the President thus
     expressed himself: "It is of great importance that this
     government should be fully informed of the Spanish force in
     the Floridas, the troops which have lately arrived, the
     number of their posts, and the strength and situation of
     each; together with such other circumstances as would enable
     it to adopt correspondent measures, in case we should, in
     spite of our endeavours to avoid it, get embroiled with that
     nation. It would be too improvident, might be too late, and
     certainly would be disgraceful, to have this information to
     obtain when our plans ought to be formed." After suggesting
     the propriety of making the proper inquiries in a particular
     channel, he added, "I point you to the above as one source
     only of information. My desire to obtain knowledge of these
     facts leads me to request with equal earnestness, that you
     would improve every other to ascertain them with certainty.
     No reasonable expense should be spared to accomplish objects
     of such magnitude in times so critical."]

Thus unfavourable to the pacific views of the executive were the
circumstances under which congress was to assemble.




CHAPTER II.

     Meeting of congress.... President's speech.... His message
     on the foreign relations of the United States.... Report of
     the Secretary of State on the commerce of the United
     States.... He resigns.... Is succeeded by Mr. Randolph....
     Mr. Madison's resolutions founded on the above report....
     Debate thereon.... Debates on the subject of a navy.... An
     embargo law.... Mission of Mr. Jay to Great Britain....
     Inquiry into the conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury,
     terminates honourably to him.... Internal taxes.... Congress
     adjourns.


{1793}

[Sidenote: Meeting of Congress.]

A malignant fever, believed to be infectious, had, through part of the
summer and autumn, severely afflicted the city of Philadelphia, and
dispersed the officers of the executive government. Although the fear
of contagion was not entirely dispelled when the time for the meeting
of congress arrived, yet, such was the active zeal of parties, and
such the universal expectation that important executive communications
would be made, and that legislative measures not less important would
be founded on them, that both houses were full on the first day, and a
joint committee waited on the President with the usual information
that they were ready to receive his communications.

On the fourth of December, at twelve, the President met both houses in
the senate chamber. His speech was moderate, firm, dignified, and
interesting. It commenced with his own re-election, his feelings at
which were thus expressed--

[Sidenote: President's speech.]

"Since the commencement of the term for which I have been again called
into office, no fit occasion has arisen for expressing to my
fellow-citizens at large, the deep and respectful sense which I feel
of the renewed testimony of public approbation. While on the one hand,
it awakened my gratitude for all those instances of affectionate
partiality with which I have been honoured by my country; on the
other, it could not prevent an earnest wish for that retirement, from
which no private consideration could ever have torn me. But,
influenced by the belief that my conduct would be estimated according
to its real motives, and that the people, and the authorities derived
from them, would support exertions having nothing personal for their
object, I have obeyed the suffrage which commanded me to resume the
executive power; and I humbly implore that Being on whose will the
fate of nations depends, to crown with success our mutual endeavours
for the general happiness."

Passing to those measures which had been adopted by the executive for
the regulation of its conduct towards the belligerent nations, he
observed, "as soon as the war in Europe had embraced those powers with
whom the United States have the most extensive relations, there was
reason to apprehend that our intercourse with them might be
interrupted, and our disposition for peace drawn into question by
suspicions too often entertained by belligerent nations. It seemed
therefore to be my duty to admonish our citizens of the consequence of
a contraband trade, and of hostile acts to any of the parties; and to
obtain, by a declaration of the existing state of things, an easier
admission of our rights to the immunities belonging to our situation.
Under these impressions the proclamation which will be laid before you
was issued.

"In this posture of affairs, both new and delicate, I resolved to
adopt general rules which should conform to the treaties, and assert
the privileges of the United States. These were reduced into a system,
which shall be communicated to you."

After suggesting those legislative provisions on this subject, the
necessity of which had been pointed out by experience, he proceeded to
say,

"I can not recommend to your notice measures for the fulfilment of
_our_ duties to the rest of the world, without again pressing upon you
the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defence,
and of exacting from _them_ the fulfilment of their duties towards us.
The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to
the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those
painful appeals to arms with which the history of every nation
abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations which
will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of
weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it;
if we desire to secure peace--one of the most powerful instruments of
our prosperity--it must be known that we are, at all times, ready for
war."

These observations were followed by a recommendation to augment the
supply of arms and ammunition in the magazines, and to improve the
militia establishment.

After referring to a communication to be subsequently made for
occurrences relative to the connexion of the United States with
Europe, which had, he said, become extremely interesting; and after
reviewing Indian affairs, he particularly addressed the house of
representatives. Having presented to them in detail some subjects of
which it was proper they should be informed, he added;--"no pecuniary
consideration is more urgent than the regular redemption and discharge
of the public debt; on none can delay be more injurious, or an economy
of time more valuable.

"The productiveness of the public revenues hitherto has continued to
be equal to the anticipations which were formed of it; but it is not
expected to prove commensurate with all the objects which have been
suggested. Some auxiliary provisions will therefore, it is presumed,
be requisite; and it is hoped that these may be made consistently with
a due regard to the convenience of our citizens, who can not but be
sensible of the true wisdom of encountering a small present addition
to their contributions, to obviate a future accumulation of burdens."

The speech was concluded with the following impressive exhortation:

"The several subjects to which I have now referred, open a wide range
to your deliberations, and involve some of the choicest interests of
our common country. Permit me to bring to your remembrance the
magnitude of your task. Without an unprejudiced coolness, the welfare
of the government may be hazarded; without harmony, as far as consists
with freedom of sentiment, its dignity may be lost. But, as the
legislative proceedings of the United States will never, I trust, be
reproached for the want of temper, or of candour, so shall not the
public happiness languish from the want of my strenuous and warmest
co-operation."

[Sidenote: His message on the subject of the foreign relations of the
United States.]

The day succeeding that on which this speech was delivered, a special
message was sent to both houses, containing some of the promised
communications relative to the connexion of the United States with
foreign powers.

After suggesting as a motive for this communication that it not only
disclosed "matter of interesting inquiry to the legislature," but,
"might indeed give rise to deliberations to which they alone were
competent;" the President added--"the representative and executive
bodies of France have manifested generally a friendly attachment to
this country; have given advantages to our commerce and navigation;
and have made overtures for placing these advantages on permanent
ground. A decree, however, of the national assembly, subjecting
vessels laden with provisions to be carried into their ports, and
making enemy goods lawful prize in the vessel of a friend, contrary to
our treaty, though revoked at one time as to the United States, has
been since extended to their vessels also, as has been recently stated
to us. Representations on the subject will be immediately given in
charge to our minister there, and the result shall be communicated to
the legislature.

"It is with extreme concern I have to inform you that the person whom
they have unfortunately appointed their minister plenipotentiary here,
has breathed nothing of the friendly spirit of the nation which sent
him. Their tendency on the contrary has been to involve us in a war
abroad and discord and anarchy at home. So far as his acts, or those
of his agents, have threatened an immediate commitment in the war, or
flagrant insult to the authority of the laws, their effect has been
counteracted by the ordinary cognizance of the laws, and by an
exertion of the powers confided to me. Where their danger was not
imminent, they have been borne with, from sentiments of regard to his
nation, from a sense of their friendship towards us, from a conviction
that they would not suffer us to remain long exposed to the actions of
a person who has so little respected our mutual dispositions, and, I
will add, from a reliance on the firmness of my fellow-citizens in
their principles of peace and order. In the mean time I have respected
and pursued the stipulations of our treaties, according to what I
judged their true sense; and have withheld no act of friendship which
their affairs have called for from us, and which justice to others
left us free to perform. I have gone further. Rather than employ force
for the restitution of certain vessels which I deemed the United
States bound to restore, I thought it more adviseable to satisfy the
parties by avowing it to be my opinion, that, if restitution were not
made, it would be incumbent on the United States to make
compensation."

The message next proceeded to state that inquiries had been instituted
respecting the vexations and spoliations committed on the commerce of
the United States, the result of which when received would be
communicated.

The order issued by the British government on the 8th of June, and the
measures taken by the executive of the United States in consequence
thereof, were briefly noticed; and the discussions which had taken
place in relation to the non-execution of the treaty of peace were
also mentioned. The message was then concluded with a reference to the
negotiations with Spain. "The public good," it was said, "requiring
that the present state of these should be made known to the
legislature in confidence only, they would be the subject of a
separate and subsequent communication."

This message was accompanied with copies of the correspondence between
the secretary of state and the French minister, on the points of
difference which subsisted between the two governments, together with
several documents necessary for the establishment of particular facts;
and with the letter written by Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Morris, which
justified the conduct of the United States by arguments too clear to
be misunderstood, and too strong ever to be encountered.

The extensive discussions which had taken place relative to the
non-execution of the treaty of peace, and the correspondence produced
by the objectionable measures which had been adopted by the British
government during the existing war, were also laid before the
legislature.

In a popular government, the representatives of the people may
generally be considered as a mirror, reflecting truly the passions and
feelings which govern their constituents. In the late elections, the
strength of parties had been tried; and the opposition had derived so
much aid from associating the cause of France with its own principles,
as to furnish much reason to suspect that, in one branch of the
legislature at least, it had become the majority. The first act of the
house of representatives served to strengthen this suspicion. By each
party a candidate for the chair was brought forward; and Mr.
Muhlenberg, who was supported by the opposition, was elected by a
majority of ten votes, against Mr. Sedgewick, whom the federalists
supported.

The answer, however, to the speech of the President, wore no tinge of
that malignant and furious spirit which had infused itself into the
publications of the day. Breathing the same affectionate attachment to
his person and character which had been professed in other times, and
being approved by every part of the house, it indicated that the
leaders, at least, still venerated their chief magistrate, and that no
general intention as yet existed, to involve him in the obloquy
directed against his measures.

Noticing that unanimous suffrage by which he had been again called to
his present station, "it was," they said, "with equal sincerity and
promptitude they embraced the occasion for expressing to him their
congratulations on so distinguished a testimony of public approbation,
and their entire confidence in the purity and patriotism of the
motives which had produced this obedience to the voice of his country.
It is," proceeded the address, "to virtues which have commanded long
and universal reverence, and services from which have flowed great and
lasting benefits that the tribute of praise may be paid without the
reproach of flattery; and it is from the same sources that the fairest
anticipations may be derived in favour of the public happiness."

The proclamation of neutrality was approved in guarded terms, and the
topics of the speech were noticed in a manner which indicated
dispositions cordially to co-operate with the executive.

On the part of the senate also, the answer to the speech was
unfeignedly affectionate. In warm terms they expressed the pleasure
which the re-election of the President gave them. "In the unanimity,"
they added, "which a second time marks this important national act, we
trace with particular satisfaction, besides the distinguished tribute
paid to the virtues and abilities which it recognizes, another proof
of that discernment, and constancy of sentiments and views, which have
hitherto characterized the citizens of the United States." Speaking of
the proclamation, they declared it to be "a measure well timed and
wise, manifesting a watchful solicitude for the welfare of the nation,
and calculated to promote it."

In a few days, a confidential message was delivered, communicating the
critical situation of affairs with Spain. The negotiations attempted
with that power in regard to the interesting objects of boundary,
navigation, and commerce, had been exposed to much delay and
embarrassment, in consequence of the changes which the French
revolution had effected in the political state of Europe. Meanwhile,
the neighborhood of the Spanish colonies to the United States had
given rise to various other subjects of discussion, one of which had
assumed a very serious aspect.

Having the best reason to suppose that the hostility of the southern
Indians was excited by the agents of Spain, the President had directed
the American commissioners at Madrid to make the proper
representations on the subject, and to propose that each nation
should, with good faith, promote the peace of the other with their
savage neighbours.

About the same time, the Spanish government entertained, or affected
to entertain, corresponding suspicions of like hostile excitements by
the agents of the United States, to disturb their peace with the same
nations. The representations which were induced by these real or
affected suspicions, were accompanied with pretensions, and made in a
style, to which the American executive could not be inattentive. His
Catholic Majesty asserted these claims as a patron and protector of
those Indians. He assumed a right to mediate between them and the
United States, and to interfere in the establishment of their
boundaries. At length, in the very moment when those savages were
committing daily inroads on the American frontier, at the instigation
of Spain, as was believed, the representatives of that power,
complaining of the aggressions of American citizens on the Indians,
declared "that the continuation of the peace, good harmony, and
perfect friendship of the two nations, was very problematical for the
future, unless the United States should take more convenient measures,
and of greater energy than those adopted for a long time past."

Notwithstanding the zeal and enthusiasm with which the pretensions of
the French republic, as asserted by their minister, continued to be
supported out of doors, they found no open advocate in either branch
of the legislature. That this circumstance is, in a great measure, to
be ascribed to the temperate conduct of the executive, and to the
convincing arguments with which its decisions were supported, ought
not to be doubted. But when it is recollected that the odium which
these decisions excited, sustained no diminution; that the accusation
of hostility to France and to liberty, which originated in them, was
not retracted; that, when afterwards many of the controverted claims
were renewed by France, her former advocates still adhered to her; it
is not unreasonable to suppose that other considerations mingled
themselves with the conviction which the correspondence laid before
the legislature was calculated to produce.

An attack on the administration could be placed on no ground more
disadvantageous than on its controversy with Mr. Genet. The conduct
and language of that minister were offensive to reflecting men of all
parties. The President had himself taken so decisive a part in favour
of the measures which had been adopted, that they must be ascribed to
him, not to his cabinet; and, of consequence, the whole weight of his
personal character must be directly encountered, in an attempt to
censure those measures. From this censure it would have been difficult
to extricate the person who was contemplated by the party in
opposition as its chief; for the secretary of state had urged the
arguments of the administration with a degree of ability and
earnestness, which ought to have silenced the suspicion that he might
not feel their force.

The expression of a legislative opinion, in favour of the points
insisted on by the French minister, would probably have involved the
nation in a calamitous war, the whole responsibility for which would
rest on them.

To these considerations was added another which could not be
disregarded. The party in France, to which Mr. Genet owed his
appointment, had lost its power; and his fall was the inevitable
consequence of the fall of his patrons. That he would probably be
recalled was known in America; and that his conduct had been
disapproved by his government was generally believed. The future
system of the French republic, with regard to the United States, could
not be foreseen; and it would be committing something to hazard, not
to wait its development.

These objections did not exist to an indulgence of the partialities
and prejudices of the nation towards the belligerent powers, in
measures suggested by its resentment against Great Britain. But,
independent of these considerations, it is scarcely possible to doubt
that congress really approved the conduct of the executive with regard
to France, and was also convinced that a course of hostility had been
pursued by Great Britain, which the national interest and the national
honour required them to repel. In the irritable state of the public
temper, it was not difficult to produce this opinion.

In addition to the causes of dissatisfaction with Great Britain which
have already been suggested, others soon occurred. Under her auspices,
a truce for one year had been lately negotiated between Portugal and
the Regency of Algiers, which, by withdrawing a small squadron
stationed during the war, by the former power, in the Streights,
opened a passage into the Atlantic to the cruisers of the latter. The
capture of American merchantmen, which was the immediate consequence
of this measure, was believed, in the United States, to have been its
motive. Not admitting the possibility that a desire to extricate
Portugal from a war unproductive of any advantages, and to leave her
maritime force free to act elsewhere, could have induced this
interposition of England, the Americans ascribed it, exclusively, to
that enmity to their commerce, and to that jealousy of its prosperity,
which had, as they conceived, long marked the conduct of those who
administered the affairs of that nation.

This transaction was afterwards explained by England, and was ascribed
to her desire to serve an ally, and to enable that ally to act more
efficaciously in a common cause.

[Illustration: George Washington

_From the painting by Charles Willson Peale._

_In June, 1783, Washington spent some time in Princeton, New Jersey,
whither the Continental Congress had adjourned from Philadelphia in
consequence of a mutiny among the unpaid troops stationed there. On
leaving Princeton the American Commander-in-Chief donated 50 guineas
to the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University. The trustees
spent the money on this portrait and had it put in the frame formerly
occupied by a picture of King George III, which was destroyed by a
cannon ball in the Battle of Princeton. This canvas still hangs in the
Princeton Faculty room._

By Courtesy of Princeton University]

From governments accustomed to trust rather to artifice, than to force
or to reason, and influenced by vindictive passions which they have
not strength or courage to gratify, hostility may be expected to exert
itself in a cruel insidious policy, which unfeelingly dooms
individuals to chains, and involves them in ruin, without having a
tendency to effect any national object. But the British character
rather wounds by its pride, and offends by its haughtiness, and open
violence, than injures by the secret indulgence of a malignant, but a
paltry and unprofitable revenge: and, certainly, such unworthy motives
ought not lightly to be imputed to a great and magnanimous nation,
which dares to encounter a world, and risk its existence, for the
preservation of its station in the scale of empires, of its real
independence, and of its liberty.

But, in believing the views of the British cabinet to be unfriendly to
the United States, America was perhaps not entirely mistaken. Indeed,
dispositions of a different nature could not reasonably have been
expected. It may be denied, but can not be disguised, that the
sentiments openly expressed by a great majority of the American
people, warranted the opinion that, notwithstanding the exertions of
the administration, they were about to arrange themselves, in the war,
on the side of France. In a government like that of the United States,
no firmness on the part of the chief magistrate can long resist the
current of popular opinion; and that opinion, without professing it,
unquestionably led to war.

If the character of the British minister at Philadelphia is to be
collected from his intercourse with the executive of the country to
which he was deputed, there is reason to suppose that his
communications to his own government did not diminish the impression
which the evidence furnished on this subject, by the American people
themselves, was calculated to make. It is therefore not improbable,
whatever may be the permanent views of England respecting the
commercial prosperity of the United States, that the measures of the
British cabinet, about this time, were taken in the belief that war
between the two nations was a probable event.

[Sidenote: Report of the secretary of state in relation to the
commerce of the United States.]

Early in the session a report was made by the secretary of state, in
pursuance of a resolution of the house of representatives passed on
the 23d of February, 1791, requiring him "to report to congress the
nature and extent of the privileges and restrictions of the commercial
intercourse of the United States with foreign nations, and the
measures which he should think proper to be adopted for the
improvement of the commerce and navigation of the same."

This report stated the exports of the United States in articles of
their own produce and manufacture at nineteen millions, five hundred
and eighty-seven thousand, and fifty-five dollars; and the imports at
nineteen millions, eight hundred and twenty-three thousand, and sixty
dollars.

Of the exports, nearly one-half was carried to the kingdom of Great
Britain and its dominions; of the imports, about four-fifths were
brought from the same countries. The American shipping amounted to two
hundred and seventy-seven thousand, five hundred and nineteen tons, of
which not quite one-sixth was employed in the trade with Great Britain
and its dominions.

In all the nations of Europe, most of the articles produced in the
United States were subjected to heavy duties, and some of them were
prohibited. In England, the trade of the United States was in the
general on as good a footing as the trade of other countries; and
several articles were more favoured than the same articles of the
growth of other countries.

The statements and arguments of this report tended to enforce the
policy of making discriminations which might favour the commerce of
the United States with France, and discourage that with England; and
which might promote the increase of American navigation as a branch of
industry, and a resource of defence.

This was the last official act of the secretary of state. Early in the
preceding summer, he had signified to the President his intention to
retire in September from the public service; and had, with some
reluctance, consented to postpone the execution of this intention to
the close of the year. Retaining his purpose, he resigned his office
on the last day of December.

[Sidenote: He resigns.]

This gentleman withdrew from political station at a moment when he
stood particularly high in the esteem of his countrymen. His
determined opposition to the financial schemes which had been proposed
by the secretary of the treasury, and approved by the legislative and
executive departments of the government; his ardent and undisguised
attachment to the revolutionary party in France; the dispositions
which he was declared to possess in regard to Great Britain; and the
popularity of his opinions respecting the constitution of the United
States; had devoted to him that immense party whose sentiments were
supposed to comport with his, on most, or all of these interesting
subjects. To the opposite party he had, of course, become particularly
unacceptable. But the publication of his correspondence with Mr. Genet
dissipated much of the prejudice which had been excited against him.
He had, in that correspondence, maintained with great ability the
opinions embraced by the federalists on those points of difference
which had arisen between the two republics; and which, having become
universally the subjects of discussion, had in some measure displaced
those topics on which parties were previously divided. The partiality
for France that was conspicuous through the whole of it, detracted
nothing from its merit in the opinion of the friends of the
administration, because, however decided their determination to
support their own government in a controversy with any nation
whatever, they felt all the partialities for that republic which the
correspondence expressed. The hostility of his enemies therefore was,
for a time, considerably lessened, without a corresponding diminution
of the attachment of his friends. It would have been impracticable, in
office, long to preserve these dispositions. And it would have been
difficult to maintain that ascendency which he held over the minds of
those who had supported, and probably would continue to support, every
pretension of the French republic, without departing from principles
and measures which he had openly and ably defended.

[Sidenote: Is succeeded by Mr. Randolph.]

He was immediately succeeded by Mr. Edmund Randolph; and the office of
attorney general was filled by Mr. William Bradford, a gentleman of
considerable eminence in Pennsylvania.

{1794}

On the fourth of January, the house resolved itself into a committee
of the whole, on the report of the secretary of state, relative to the
privileges and restrictions of the commerce of the United States; when
Mr. Madison, after some prefatory observations, laid on the table a
series of resolutions[13] for the consideration of the members.

     [Footnote 13: See note No. VII. at the end of the volume.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Madison's resolutions founded on the above report.]

These memorable resolutions embraced almost completely the idea of the
report. They imposed an additional duty on the manufactures, and on
the tonnage of vessels, of nations having no commercial treaty with
the United States; while they reduced the duties already imposed by
law, on the tonnage of vessels belonging to nations having such
commercial treaty: and they reciprocated the restrictions which were
imposed on American navigation.

[Sidenote: Debate thereon.]

On the 13th of January they were taken into consideration, when the
debate was opened by Mr. Smith of South Carolina.

After noticing the importance of the subject to the best interests of
the United States, he observed that, being purely commercial in its
nature, he would exclude from the view he should take of it, those
political considerations which some might think connected with it. He
imagined it would be right to dismiss, for the present, all questions
respecting the Indians, Algerines, and western posts. There would be a
time for these questions; and then he should give his opinion upon
them with firmness, and according to what he conceived to be the true
interests of his country. The regulation of commerce gave of itself
sufficient scope for argument, without mixing it with extraneous
matter.

After some general observations on the delicacy of the crisis, and on
the claims of the resolutions to dispassionate investigation, he
proceeded to consider the report on which they were founded.

The great object of that report being to establish a contrast between
France and Britain, he would request the attention of the committee to
an accurate statement of facts, which, being compared with the report,
would enable them to decide on the justness of its inferences.

In the opinion that any late relaxations of the French republic were
produced by interests too momentary and fluctuating to be taken as the
basis of calculations for a permanent system, he should present a
comparative view of the commerce of the United States to those
countries, as it stood anterior to the revolution of France. For this
purpose, he produced a table which had been formed by a person whose
commercial information was highly respectable, from which he said it
would appear, notwithstanding the plaudits so generally bestowed on
the justice and liberality of the one nation, and the reproaches
uttered against the other, that, with the exception of the trifling
article of fish oil, the commerce of the United States was not more
favoured in France than in Great Britain, and was, in many important
articles, more favoured by the latter power, than that of other
nations.

Mr. Smith then reviewed, in detail, the advantages and disadvantages
attending the sale of the great products of America in the ports of
each nation, which, he conceived, were more encouraged by the British
than by the French market.

A comparative statement, he added, of the value of the exports of the
two countries, would assist in confirming this opinion.

The value of the exports to Great Britain, at the close of the year
ending with September, 1789, was nearly double those made to France in
the same period: and even the average of the years 1790, 1791 and
1792, gave an annual excess to the exports to Great Britain of three
millions, seven hundred and fifty-two thousand, seven hundred and
sixty dollars.

The great amount of merchandise imported from Britain, instead of
being a grievance, demonstrated, in the opinion of Mr. Smith, the
utility of the trade with that country. For the extent of the
intercourse between the two nations, several obvious reasons might be
assigned. Britain was the first manufacturing country in the world,
and was more able, than any other, to supply an assortment of those
articles which were required in the United States. She entitled
herself, too, to the preference which was given her, by the extensive
credit she afforded. To a young country wanting capital, credit was of
immense advantage. It enabled them to flourish by the aid of foreign
capital, the use of which had, more than any other circumstance,
nourished the industry of America.

By the advocates for forcing a trade with France, it was asserted that
she could supply the wants of America on better terms than Great
Britain. To do this, she must not only sell cheaper, but give credit,
which, it was known her merchants either could not, or would not give.

The very necessity of laying a duty on British manufactures, in order
to find a sale for those of other countries, was a proof that the
first could be purchased on better terms, or were better adapted to
the market.

If the object of the resolutions were the encouragement of domestic
manufactures, there might be some semblance of argument in their
favour. But this is not contemplated. Their avowed object is to turn
the course of trade from one nation to another, by means which would
subject the citizens of the United States to great inconvenience.

Mr. Smith next proceeded to consider the subject with a view to
navigation.

The trade of the United States to Great Britain, for the
transportation of their own produce, was as free in American as in
British bottoms, a few trifling port charges excepted. In France, they
enjoyed the advantages granted to the most favoured nation. Thus far
the comparison was in favour of Great Britain. In the West Indies, he
admitted the existence of a different state of things. All American
bottoms were excluded from the British islands, with the exception of
Turks island. In the French islands, vessels under sixty tons were
admitted, but this advantage was common to all other nations.

The effect of the difference in the regulations of the two rival
nations in respect of navigation, was not so considerable as the
secretary of state had supposed. He had stated the tonnage employed in
the intercourse with France and her colonies, at 116,410 tons; and
that employed in the commerce with Great Britain at 43,580 tons. The
secretary was led into this miscalculation by taking for his guide,
the actual entries of American bottoms from the dominions of each
country in the year. As four voyages are made to the West Indies,
while only two are made to Europe, the vessels employed in the former
traffic will be counted four times in the year, and those employed in
the latter will be counted only twice in the same period. The
deceptiveness of the calculations made from these data had induced a
call on the secretary of the treasury for an account of the actual
tonnage employed in trade with foreign nations for one year. This
account shows that France employs 82,510 tons, and Great Britain
66,582 tons, of American shipping; leaving in favour of France, an
excess of 15,928, instead of 72,830 tons, as reported by the secretary
of state.

From this comparative view taken of the regulations of the two
nations, Mr. Smith conceived himself justified in saying, that the
commercial system of Great Britain towards the United States, far from
being hostile, was friendly; and that she made many discriminations in
their favour. France, on the contrary, placed them on a better
situation than her rival, only in one solitary instance, the
unimportant article of fish oil.

If this be a true picture of the existing state of things, and he
could not perceive in what it was defective, was it not time, he
asked, that the deceptions practised on the people by the eulogists of
France and the revilers of Great Britain, should be removed?

The resolutions were supported by Mr. Madison, Mr. Findley, Mr.
Nicholas, Mr. Clarke, Mr. Smiley, Mr. Moore, and Mr. Giles.

They admitted the subject before the committee to be of a commercial
nature, but conceived it to be impracticable to do justice to the
interests of the United States, without some allusions to politics.
The question was in some measure general. They were to inquire how far
it was the interest of this country by commercial regulations to vary
the state of commerce now existing. They were of opinion that most of
the injuries proceeding from Great Britain were inflicted for the
promotion of her commercial objects, and were to be remedied by
commercial resistance. The Indian war, and the Algerine attack,
originated both in commercial views, or Great Britain must stand
without excuse for instigating the most horrid cruelties. The
propositions before the committee were the strongest weapon America
possessed, and would, more probably than any other, restore her to all
her political and commercial rights. They professed themselves the
friends of free trade, and declared the opinion that it would be to
the general advantage, if all commerce was free. But this rule was not
without its exceptions. The navigation act of Great Britain was a
proof of the effect of one exception on the prosperity of national
commerce. The effect produced by that act was equally rapid and
extensive.

There is another exception to the advantages of a free trade, where
the situation of a country is such with respect to another, that by
duties on the commodities of that other, it shall not only invigorate
its own means of rivalship, but draw from that other the hands
employed in the production of those commodities. When such an effect
can be produced, it is so much clear gain, and is consistent with the
general theory of national rights.

The effect of leaving commerce to regulate itself is to submit it to
the regulation of other nations. If the United States had a commercial
intercourse with one nation only, and should permit a free trade,
while that nation proceeded on a monopolizing system, would not the
carrying trade be transferred to that nation, and with it, the
maritime strength it confers be heaped upon a rival? Then, in the same
proportion to the freedom granted to the vessels of other nations in
the United States, and to the burdens other nations impose on American
vessels, will be the transfer of those maritime resources.

The propositions before the committee should be examined as they
concern navigation, manufactures, and the just principles of
discrimination that ought to prevail in their policy to nations having
treaties with them.

With respect to navigation, it was conceded that they were not placed
upon the same footing by the two nations with whom they had the
greatest commercial intercourse. British vessels could bring the
produce of all countries into any port of the United States; while
American vessels could carry to the ports of Britain only their own
commodities, and those only to a part of her dominions. From her ports
in the West Indies they were entirely excluded.

To exhibit at a glance the effect of the British navigation act, it
was sufficient to compare the quantity of American and British tonnage
employed in their intercourse with each other. The former in 1790
amounted to 43,000 tons, and the latter to 240,000 tons. The effect of
British policy would be further shown by showing the proportion of
domestic tonnage employed at the same time in the intercourse with
other European nations. With Spain the American was to the Spanish as
five to one, with Portugal six to one, Netherlands fifteen to one,
Denmark twelve to one, France five to one, Great Britain one to five.
This ratio had by particular circumstances been somewhat changed. From
calculations founded on the documents last introduced into the house,
it appeared that, at present, the proportion of American to foreign
tonnage employed in the American trade was, with Spain as sixteen to
one, Portugal seventeen to one, Netherlands twenty-six to one, Denmark
fifteen to one, Russia fourteen to one, France between four and five
to one, and Great Britain one to three.

The situation of American commerce was the more mortifying when the
nature and amount of their exports came to be considered. They were
not only necessaries of life, or necessaries for manufactures, and
therefore of life to the manufacturer, but their bulkiness gave them
an advantage over the exports of every other country. If America, to
increase her maritime strength, should secure to herself the
transportation of her own commodities, leaving to other nations the
transportation of theirs, it would greatly augment the proportion of
her shipping and of her sailors.

In relation to manufactures, the regulations existing between the
United States and Great Britain were not more equal. Out of the whole
amount of manufactured articles imported into this country, which was
stated in round numbers at fifteen millions, two hundred and ninety
thousand dollars, Great Britain furnished thirteen millions, nine
hundred and sixty thousand. In the same period, in the year 1789-90,
the articles which the United States received from France, a country
which actually consumed more of their produce, amounted only to one
hundred and fifty-five thousand dollars. The balance of trade, at the
same epoch, was greatly in favour of the United States with every
other nation, and greatly against them with Britain. Although it might
happen in some cases, that other advantages might be derived from an
intercourse with a particular nation, which might compensate for an
unfavourable balance of trade, it was impossible that this could
happen in the intercourse with Great Britain. Other nations, however,
viewed a balance of trade against them as a real evil; and Great
Britain, in particular, was careful to prevent it. What then must be
the feelings of a nation, between whom and the United States the most
friendly relations existed, when she saw, not only the balance of
trade against her, but that what was thus obtained from her, flowed in
the same manner into the coffers of one of her most jealous rivals,
and inveterate enemies?

The propriety of discriminating between nations having treaties with
the United States, and those having none, was admitted in some states
before the establishment of the present government, and was sanctioned
by that house during their sittings in New York. It was the practice
of nations to make such a discrimination. It was necessary to give
value to treaties.

The disadvantages of depending on a single nation for articles of
necessary consumption was strongly pressed; and it was added as an
evil of most serious magnitude, more truly alarming than any other of
its features, that this commercial dependence produced an influence in
their councils which enabled it, the more inconvenient it became by
its constant growth, to throw the more obstacles in the way of a
necessary remedy.

They entertained no apprehensions of injurious consequences from
adopting the proposed resolutions. The interests of Great Britain
would not suffer her to retaliate: and the intercourse between the two
countries would not be interrupted further than was required by the
convenience and the interests of the United States. But if Great
Britain should retaliate, the effects of a commercial conflict would
be felt by her, much more sensibly, than by the United States. Its
effects would be felt in the shipping business, by the merchants, and
above all by the manufacturer.

Calculations were offered, by comparing the total amount of British
exports with those to the United States, to prove, that three hundred
thousand British manufacturers would be suddenly thrown out of
employment, by withdrawing the trade carried on between America and
that country. In the complication of distress to which such a measure
would reduce them, they would consider the United States as a natural
asylum from wretchedness. But whether they remained in discontent at
home, or sought their fortune abroad, the evil would be considered and
felt by the British government as equally great, and they would surely
beware of taking any step that might provoke it.

On the advantages of America in such a contest with a populous and
manufacturing country, they dwelt with peculiar earnestness. She
produced all the necessaries of life within herself, and could
dispense with the articles received from others. But Great Britain,
not producing them in sufficient abundance, was dependent on the
United States for the supply of her most essential wants. Again, the
manufacturer of that country was dependent on this for the sale of his
merchandise which was to purchase his bread. Thus was produced a
double dependence of Great Britain on the United States. She was also
dependent on them for the raw materials which formed the basis of her
manufactures. Her West Indies were almost completely dependent. This
country furnished the best market for their productions, and was
almost the only one which could supply them with the necessaries of
life. The regulation excluding the provisions of other foreign
countries was entitled to no consideration. It was of ancient date,
and had remained untouched because there was no other foreign country
by which provisions could be supplied.

That the commercial regulations of Great Britain were as favourable to
the United States as to other nations, ought not to satisfy America.
If other nations were willing to bear impositions, or were unable to
retaliate, their examples were not worthy of imitation. America was in
a condition to insist, and ought to insist, on perfect commercial
equality.

It was denied that any real advantage was derived from the extensive
credit given by the merchants of Great Britain. On the contrary, the
use made of British capital was pronounced a great political evil. It
increased the unfavourable balance of trade, discouraged domestic
manufactures, and promoted luxury. But its greatest mischief was, that
it favoured a system of British influence, which was dangerous to
their political security.

As the debate advanced, the expressions of exasperation against
Britain became stronger; and occasionally allusions were made to those
party questions which had long agitated the public mind, with a
bitterness which marked their intimate connexion with the conduct of
the United States to foreign countries.

It was said to be proper in deciding the question under debate, to
take into view political, as well as commercial considerations. Ill
will and jealousy had at all times been the predominant features of
the conduct of England to the United States. That government had
grossly violated the treaty of peace, had declined a commercial
treaty, had instigated the Indians to raise the tomahawk and scalping
knife against American citizens, had let loose the Algerines upon
their unprotected commerce, and had insulted their flag, and pillaged
their trade in every quarter of the world. These facts being
notorious, it was astonishing to hear gentlemen ask how had Britain
injured their commerce?

The conduct of France, on the contrary, had been warm and friendly.
That nation respected American rights, and had offered to enter into
commercial arrangements on the liberal basis of perfect reciprocity.

The period which Mr. Smith had taken as that at which the systems of
the two nations should be compared with each other, was reprobated
with peculiar severity. It was insinuated to proceed from a wish that
the United States should directly countenance the restoration of
despotism; and much regret was expressed that a distrust of the
permanency of the French revolution should be avowed. It was hoped and
believed that the present was the settled state of things; and that
the old order of things was unsettled for ever: that the French
revolution was as much more permanent than had been the French
despotism, as was the great fabric of nature, than the petty plastic
productions of art. To exclude the period since the revolution, would
be to exclude some of the strongest evidences of the friendship of one
nation, and the enmity of the other.

The animadversions which had been made on the report of the secretary
of state were retorted with acrimony. It was declared that he would
not suffer by a comparison in point of intelligence, accuracy, and
patriotism, either with the laborious compiler of the table produced
by Mr. Smith, or with the gentleman who had been judiciously selected
for its interpreter. Some explanations were given of the inaccuracies
which had been alleged; and the facts omitted were declared to be
immaterial circumstances, which, if inserted, would have swelled the
report, without adding to the information it communicated.

In reply to the argument which stated that Great Britain did not, in
common years, raise a sufficient quantity of grain for her own
consumption, and would consequently afford an increasing market for
American wheat and flour, it was remarked that this not only
established the all important position of the dependence of that
country on this, but suggested a very interesting reflection. It was
that the continual increase of debt and paper machinery, will not
produce a correspondent increase of ability in the nation to feed
itself. That an infinity of paper will not produce an infinity of
food.

In contrasting the ability of the two nations to support a commercial
conflict, it was said, "Great Britain, tottering under the weight of a
king, a court, a nobility, a priesthood, armies, navies, debts, and
all the complicated machinery of oppression which serves to increase
the number of unproductive, and lessen the number of productive hands;
at this moment engaged in a foreign war; taxation already carried to
the ultimatum of financial device; the ability of the people already
displayed in the payment of taxes, constituting a political
phenomenon; all prove the debility of the system, and the decreptitude
of old age. On the other hand, the United States, in the flower of
youth; increasing in hands; increasing in wealth; and, although an
imitative policy had unfortunately prevailed in the erection of a
funded debt, in the establishment of an army, the anticipation of a
navy,[14] and all the paper machinery for increasing the number of
unproductive, and lessening the number of productive hands; yet the
operation of natural causes has, as yet, in some degree, countervailed
their influence, and still furnish a great superiority in comparison
with Great Britain."

An attempt was made to liken the present situation of America to that
in which she stood at the commencement of her revolutionary war; and
the arguments drawn from the inconvenience to which a privation of
British manufactures would expose the people at large were answered by
observing--"This was not the language of America at the time of the
non-importation association; this was not her language at the time of
the declaration of independence. Whence then this change of American
sentiment? Has America less ability than she then had? Is she less
prepared for a national trial than she then was? This can not be
pretended. There is, it is true, one great change in her political
situation. America has now a funded debt: she had no funded debt at
those glorious epochs. May not this change of sentiment, therefore, be
looked for in her change of situation in this respect? May it not be
looked for in the imitative sympathetic organization of our funds with
the British funds? May it not be looked for in the indiscriminate
participation of citizens and foreigners in the emoluments of the
funds? May it not be looked for in the wishes of some to assimilate
the government of the United States to that of Great Britain? or at
least, in wishes for a more intimate connexion?

     [Footnote 14: Resolutions had been offered for the creation
     of a small navy to be employed in the Mediterranean.]

"If these causes exist, it is not difficult to find the source of the
national debility. It is not difficult to see that the interests of
the few, who receive and disburse the public contributions, are more
respected than the interest of the great majority of the society, who
furnish the contributions. It is not difficult to see that the
government, instead of legislating for a few millions, is legislating
for a few thousands; and that the sacredness of their rights is the
great obstacle to a great national exertion."

In addition to Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, the resolutions were
opposed by Mr. Smith, of Maryland, Mr. Goodhue, Mr. Lea, Mr. Dexter,
Mr. Ames, Mr. Dayton, Mr. Hartley, Mr. Tracy, Mr. Hillhouse, Mr.
Forest, Mr. Fitzsimmons, and Mr. Foster.

If, it was said, the United States had sustained political wrongs from
Great Britain, they should feel as keenly as any persons for the
prostrated honour of their country; but this was not the mode of
redressing them. When that subject should be brought before congress,
they would not be slow in taking such measures as the actual state of
things might require. But they did not approve of retaliating injuries
under the cloak of commercial regulations. Independent of other
objections, it would derogate from the dignity of the American
character.

The resolutions, it was said, ought to be contemplated commercially;
and the influence they would probably have on the United States,
deliberately weighed. If they were adopted, it ought to be because
they would promote the interests of America, not because they would
benefit one foreign nation, and injure another. It was an old adage
that there was no friendship in trade. Neither ought there to be any
hatred. These maxims should not be forgotten in forming a judgment on
the propositions before the committee. Their avowed objects were to
favour the navigation and the manufactures of the United States, and
their probable operation on these objects ought to be considered.

It had been said that the American tonnage ought to bear the same
proportion to the foreign tonnage employed in her trade, as exists
between the bulk of her exports and imports. But the correctness of
this principle was not admitted. The fact was otherwise, and it was
not believed to be an evil.

Great Britain carries for other nations from necessity. Her situation
is calculated for navigation. Her country is fully peopled, so full
that the ground is not sufficient to furnish bread for the whole.
Instead, therefore, of ploughing the earth for subsistence, her
subjects are obliged to plough the ocean. The defence of their coasts
has been another cause which obliges them to abandon the more
lucrative pursuits of agriculture, to provide for their defence. They
have been compelled to sacrifice profit to safety.

The United States possessed a fertile, extensive, and unsettled
country; and it might well be questioned how far their real interests
would be promoted by forcing a further acceleration of the growth of
their marine, by impelling their citizens from the cultivation of the
soil to the navigation of the ocean. The measures already adopted had
been very operative; and it was by no means certain that an additional
stimulus would be advantageous. The increased duty on foreign tonnage,
and on goods imported in foreign bottoms, had already been attended
with sensible effects. In 1790, the American tonnage was one-half the
whole tonnage employed in their trade: in 1791, it was three-fifths:
in 1792, it had increased to two-thirds. This growth was believed to
be sufficiently rapid. It was more rapid than the growth of British
tonnage had ever been under the fostering care of their celebrated
navigation act. Let the existing system be left to its natural
operation, and it was believed that it would give to the United States
that share in the carriage of their commodities, which it was their
interest to take.

But if a different opinion prevailed, and it was conceived that
additional encouragement ought to be given to navigation, then let the
duty on all foreign bottoms be increased, and let the particular
disabilities to which American vessels are subjected in any country,
be precisely retaliated. The discriminations proposed, instead of
increasing American navigation, were calculated to encourage the
navigation of one foreign nation at the expense of another.

The United States did not yet possess shipping sufficient for the
exportation of their produce. The residue must reach a market in
foreign bottoms, or rot upon their hands. They were advancing to a
different state of things; but, in the mean time, they ought to pursue
their interest, and employ those vessels which would best answer their
purpose. The attempt to make it their interest to employ the vessels
of France rather than those of Britain, by discriminating duties which
must enhance the price of freight, was a premium to the vessels of the
favourite nation, paid by American agriculture.

The navigation act of Great Britain had been made a subject of heavy
complaint. But that act was not particularly directed against the
United States. It had been brought into operation while they were yet
colonies, and was not more unfavourable to them than to others. To its
regulations, Great Britain was strongly attached; and it was not
probable that America could compel her to relinquish them.
Calculations were made on the proportion of British manufactures
consumed in America, from which it was inferred that her trade, though
important, was not sufficiently important to force that nation to
abandon a system which she considered as the basis of her grandeur. In
the contest, considerable injury would be unquestionably sustained;
and nothing was perceived in the situation of the United States, which
should induce them to stand forth the champions of the whole
commercial world, in order to compel the change of a system, in which
all other nations had acquiesced. But if they were to engage in such a
contest, it was by a similar act, by opposing disabilities to
disabilities, that it ought to be carried on. Upon this point, several
members who were opposed to the resolutions, avowed an opinion
favourable to an American navigation act, and expressed their
willingness to concur in framing regulations which meet the
prohibitions imposed on their vessels with corresponding prohibitions.
Thus far they were ready to go; but they were not ready to engage in a
contest injurious to themselves, for the benefit of a foreign nation.

Another avowed object of the resolutions was to favour the
manufactures of the United States. But certainly it was not by
discriminating duties, by endeavouring to shift commerce from one
channel to another, that American manufactures were to be promoted.
This was to be done by pursuing the course already adopted, by laying
protecting duties on selected articles, in the manufacture of which
America had made some progress; and by a prohibitory duty on others,
of which a sufficient domestic supply could be afforded. But the
proposed measure only went to the imposition of a tax on their own
citizens, for the benefit of a foreign nation.

If the British market afforded an assortment of goods best suited to
their consumption, and could give them cheaper, a prohibitory duty
imposed upon those goods would only drive their citizens to seek them
in another market, less able to supply their wants, and at a dearer
rate. There was nothing in this tending to encourage manufactures.

If the United States were prepared to manufacture to the whole amount
of their wants, the importation of all rival articles might be
prohibited. But this they were not prepared to do. Their manufactures
must advance by slow degrees; and they were not to enter into a
measure of this kind, for the purpose of retaliating on a nation which
had not commercially injured them.

The resolutions then were adapted to the encouragement neither of the
navigation, nor the manufactures of the United States, but of a
foreign nation. Their effect would obviously be to force trade to
change its natural course, by discriminations against a nation which
had in no instance discriminated against the United States, but had
favoured them in many points of real importance. By what commercial
considerations could such a system be recommended?

That it would be attended with great immediate inconveniences must be
admitted; but for these, ample compensation, it had been said, was to
be found in its remote advantages. These were, a diminution of
American commerce with one nation, by its proportional augmentation
with another; and a repeal of the navigation act, and of the colonial
system of Great Britain.

On the subject of forcing trade from one nation to another, which is,
of necessity, so complicated in principle, so various and invisible in
consequence, the legislature should never act but with the utmost
caution. They should constantly keep in view, that trade will seek its
own markets, find its own level, and regulate itself much better than
it could be regulated by law. Although the government might embarrass
it, and injure their own citizens, and even foreign nations, for a
while, it would eventually rise above all the regulations they could
make. Merchants, if left to themselves, would always find the best
markets. They would buy as cheap and sell as dear as possible. Why
drive them from those markets into others which were less
advantageous? If trade with Britain was less free, or less profitable,
than with France, the employment of coercive means to force it into
French channels would be unnecessary. It would voluntarily run in
them. That violence must be used in order to change its course,
demonstrated that it was in its natural course.

It was extraordinary to hear gentlemen complaining of British
restrictions on American commerce, and at the same time stating her
proportion of that commerce as a national grievance, and that the
trade was so free as to become an injury. The very circumstance that
she retained so large a share of it, was evidence that it did not
experience in her ports unusual burdens. Whenever greater advantages
were offered by other countries, there would be no need of legislative
interference to induce the merchants to embrace them. That portion of
trade would go to each country, for which the circumstances of each
were calculated. If Great Britain purchased more American produce than
she consumed, it was because, all circumstances considered, it was the
interest of America to sell her more than she consumed. While this
interest continued, no mischief could result from the fact; when the
cause should cease, the effect would cease also, without the
intervention of the legislature.

It was very improbable that the resolutions under consideration would
effect their other avowed object, a repeal of the British navigation
act.

The season, it was said, was peculiarly unfavourable to such
experiments. The internal convulsions of France had laid her
manufactures in ruins. She was not in a condition to supply her own
wants, much less those of the United States. The superb column erected
at Lyons could furnish no stimulus to the industry of her
manufacturers.

But the attempt to stop the natural intercourse between the United
States and Great Britain, though incapable of producing on the latter
the full effect which was desired, might inflict deep and lasting
wounds on the most essential interests of the former. The injuries
which their agriculture would sustain from the measure, might be long
and severely felt.

It had been proudly stated, that while America received articles which
might be dispensed with, she furnished in return the absolute
necessaries of life; she furnished bread, and raw materials for
manufactures. "One would think," said Mr. Tracy, "to hear the
declarations in this house, that all men were fed at the opening of
our hand; and, if we shut that hand, the nations starve, and if we but
shake the fist after it is shut, they die." And yet one great
objection to the conduct of Britain was, her prohibitory duty on the
importation of bread stuff while it was under a certain price.

Nothing could be more deceptive than the argument founded on the
nature of American exports. What, it was asked, would be done with the
surplus produce of the United States? Was it to remain in the country,
and rot upon the hands of those who raised it? If not, if it was to be
exported, it would find its way to the place of demand. Food would
search out those who needed it; and the raw material would be carried
to the manufacturer whose labour could give it value.

But there was a much more serious aspect in which this subject ought
to be placed. The products of America grew in other soils than hers.
The demands for them might be supplied by other countries. Indeed, in
some instances, articles usually obtained from the United States would
be excluded by a fair competition with the same articles furnished by
other countries. The discriminations made in their favour enabled them
to obtain a preference in the British market. By withholding those
which were of the growth of the United States, Great Britain would not
lose the article, but America would lose the market; and a formidable
rival would be raised up, who would last much longer than the
resolutions under consideration. It is easy by commercial regulations
to do much mischief, and difficult to retrieve losses. It is
impossible to foresee all evils which may arise out of such measures;
and their effects may last after the cause is removed.

The opponents of the resolutions persisted to consider the credit
given by British merchants, as a solid advantage to any country which,
like the United States, was defective in commercial capital; but they
denied that, from that source, any political influence had arisen.
"If," said Mr. Tracy, "we may argue from a great state, Virginia, to
the union, this is not true; for although that state owes immense
debts, her representatives come forward with great spirit to bring
Great Britain to her feet. The people to the eastward do not owe the
English merchants, and are very generally opposed to these
regulations. These facts must convince us that the credit given by
Great Britain, does not operate to produce a fear, and a dependence,
which can be alarming to government."

"If," said Mr. Dexter, "I have a predilection for any country besides
my own, that bias is in favour of France, the place of my father's
sepulture. No one, more than myself, laments the spasm of patriotism
which convulses that nation, and hazards the cause of freedom; but I
shall not suffer the torrent of love or hatred to sweep me from my
post. I am sent neither to plead the cause of France nor England, but
am delegated as a guardian of the rights and interests of America."

The speakers against the resolutions universally laboured to exclude
from all weight in the decision on them, considerations which were
foreign to the interests of the United States. "The discussion of this
subject," said Mr. Tracy, "has assumed an appearance which must be
surprising to a stranger, and painful in the extreme to ourselves. The
supreme legislature of the United States is seriously deliberating,
not upon the welfare of our own citizens, but upon the relative
circumstances of two European nations; and this deliberation has not
for its object, the relative benefits of their markets to us, but
which form of government is best and most like our own, which people
feel the greatest affection for us, and what measures we can adopt
which will best humble one and exalt the other.

"The primary motive of these resolutions, as acknowledged by their
defenders, is, not the increase of our agriculture, manufactures, or
navigation, but to humble Great Britain and build up France; and
although it is said our manufactures and navigation may receive some
advantage, it is only mentioned as a substitute in case of failure as
to the great object.

"The discussion in favour of these resolutions has breathed nothing
but hostility and revenge against the English; and yet _they_ put on
the mild garb of commercial regulations. Legislatures, always cautious
of attempting to force trade from its own channels and habits, should
certainly be peculiarly cautious, when they do undertake such
business, to set about it with temperance and coolness; but in this
debate, we are told of the inexecution of a former treaty, withholding
western posts, insults and dominations of a haughty people, that
through the agency of Great Britain the savages are upon us on one
side, and the Algerines on the other. The mind is roused by a group of
evils, and then called upon to consider a statement of duties on goods
imported from foreign countries. If the subject is commercial, why not
treat it commercially, and attend to it with coolness? if it is a
question of political hostility, or of war, a firmer tone may be
adopted."

On this side of the question, the conduct of Great Britain, if as
hostile as it was represented to be, was spoken of with high
indignation. "If," said Mr. Tracy, "these statements are founded in
fact, I can not justify myself to my constituents, or my conscience,
in saying the adoption of the regulations of commerce, a navigation
act, or the whole parade of shutting ports, and freeing trade from its
shackles, is in any degree calculated to meet or remedy the evil.

"Although I deprecate war as the worst of calamities for my country,
yet I would inquire seriously whether we had on our part, fulfilled
the treaty with Great Britain, and would do complete justice to them
first. I would negotiate as long and as far as patience ought to go;
and, if I found an obstinate denial of justice, I would then lay the
hand of force upon the western posts, and would teach the world that
the United States were no less prompt in commanding justice to be done
them, than they had been patient and industrious in attempting to
obtain it by fair and peaceable means. In this view of the subject I
should be led to say, away with your milk and water regulations; they
are too trifling to effect objects of such importance. Are the
Algerines to be frightened with paper resolves, or the Indians to be
subdued, or the western posts taken, by commercial regulations? when
we consider the subject merely as a commercial one, it goes too far,
and attempts too much; but when considered as a war establishment, it
falls infinitely short of the mark, and does too little."

This earnest and interesting debate was protracted to a great length,
and was conducted on both sides with great spirit and eloquence. At
length, on the third of February, the question was taken on the first
resolution, which was carried by a majority of five. The further
consideration of the resolutions was then postponed until the first
Monday in March.

This animated debate was succeeded by another, on a question which
also brought into full view, the systems that were embraced by the
opposite parties, on some of those great national subjects which give
a character to an administration.

On the second of January, a resolution was agreed to in the house of
representatives declaring "that a naval force adequate to the
protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine
corsairs, ought to be provided." The force proposed was to consist of
six frigates; four of forty-four, and two of thirty-six guns.

This measure was founded on the communications of the President,
representing the improbability of being able to negotiate a peace with
the dey of Algiers; and on undoubted information that the corsairs of
that regency had, during their first short cruise in the Atlantic,
captured eleven American merchantmen, and made upwards of one hundred
prisoners; and were preparing to renew their attack on the unprotected
vessels of the United States.

In every stage of its progress this bill was most strenuously opposed.

[Sidenote: Debates on the subject of a navy.]

The measure was viewed simply as a present protection to commerce, and
then as the commencement of a permanent naval establishment. In both
characters it was reprobated with extreme severity.

As a measure of protection, it was declared to be altogether
incompetent to the attainment of its object, because the force
contemplated was insufficient, and because it could not be brought
into immediate use. The measure, therefore, would be totally
inefficacious.

But the object might be effected by other means, more eligible, and
less expensive. By proper management, and a due attention to time and
circumstances, a peace might be procured with money.

Nations possessing a naval force greatly superior to the proposed
armament, had found it to their advantage to purchase the friendship
of the Algerines. That mode of procuring peace was recommended both by
its efficacy, and its economy. Unless the object was obtained, the
money would not be expended.

Another mode of giving security to their commerce, preferable to the
plan in the bill, was to purchase the protection of foreign powers.
This might be acquired at a less expense than would be incurred in
fitting out the proposed armament, and its utility would be immediate.

But the measure was also to be considered as the commencement of a
permanent navy. The question which this view of it presented, was one
of the most important that could engage the consideration of the
house. The adoption of the principle would involve a complete
dereliction of the policy of discharging the public debt. History
afforded no instance of a nation which continued to increase its navy,
and at the same time to decrease its debt.

To the expensiveness of the navy system were ascribed the oppression
under which the people of England groaned, the overthrow of the French
monarchy, and the dangers which threatened that of Great Britain. The
expensiveness of the government was the true ground of the oppression
of the people. The king, the nobility, the priesthood, the _army_, and
above all, the navy. All this machinery lessens the number of
productive, and increases the number of unproductive hands in the
nation.

The United States had already advanced full far enough in this system.
In addition to the civil list, they had funded a debt on the
principles of duration, had raised an army at an immense expense, and
now a proposition was made for a navy.

The system of governing by debts, was the most refined system of
tyranny. It seemed to be a contrivance devised by politicians to
succeed the old system of feudal tenures. Both were tyrannical, but
the objects of their tyranny were different. The one operated on the
person, the other operates on the pockets of the individual. The
feudal lord was satisfied with the acknowledgment of the tenant that
he was a slave, and the rendition of a pepper corn as an evidence of
it; the product of his labour was left for his own support. The system
of debts affords no such indulgence. Its true policy is to devise
objects of expense, and to draw the greatest possible sum from the
people in the least visible mode. No device can facilitate the system
of debts and expense so much as a navy; and they should hold the
liberty of the American people at a lower rate, should this policy be
adopted.

Another great objection to the establishment of a navy was, that until
the United States should be able to contend with the great maritime
powers on the ocean, it would be a hostage, to its full value, for
their good behaviour. It would increase rather than lessen their
dependence.

In reply, it was said that if it had been the intention of the house
to incur a vast expense in the establishment of a navy for vain
parade, there might be force in some of the objections which had been
made. But this was not the case. It was a measure, not of choice, but
of necessity. It was extorted by the pressure of unavoidable events.

It being universally admitted that their commerce required protection
against the Algerine corsairs, the question was, simply, whether the
plan proposed in the bill was the best mode of affording that
protection.

To decide this question, it would be proper to consider the
substitutes which had been offered; and then to review the objections
which had been made to the measure.

The substitutes were, first, to purchase a peace; and secondly, to
subsidize other nations to protect commerce.

On the first substitute, it was said that the late communications must
satisfy every person who had attended to them, that all hope of
purchasing a peace must be abandoned, unless there was a manifestation
of some force which might give effect to negotiation. So long as the
vessels of the United States remained an easy and tempting prey to the
cupidity of those corsairs, it would be vain to expect that they would
sell a peace for the price the government would be willing to give, or
that a peace would be of any duration. If the executive had
experienced such difficulties while the Algerine cruisers had captured
only one or two vessels, and were confined to the Mediterranean by a
Portuguese squadron, how much less prospect was there of success after
they had captured a considerable number of ships, were likely to
capture many more, and were at liberty to cruise on the Atlantic to
the very coasts of the United States? Even that little prospect of
success would be diminished, when the dey of Algiers should understand
that the United States would take no measures to protect their trade,
and were afraid of the expense of a small armament.

It was to be understood that they did not rely solely on the
operations of the armament. They still looked forward to negotiation,
and were willing to provide the means for purchasing a peace. But the
former measure was necessary to give success to the latter, and the
armament might be employed to advantage should negotiation fail.

The other substitute was to subsidize foreign powers. The national
dishonour of depending upon others for that protection which the
United States were able to afford themselves, was strongly urged. But
there were additional objections to this project. Either the nations
in contemplation were at peace or at war with the regency of Algiers.
If the former, it was not to be expected that they would relinquish
that peace for any indemnification the United States could make them.
If the latter, they had sufficient inducements to check the
depredations of their enemies without subsidies. Such a protection
would be hazardous, as it would be, at any time, in the power of the
nation that should be employed, to conclude a truce with Algiers, and
leave the trade of the United States at the mercy of her corsairs.
While the expense of protection was perpetually to be incurred, it
would never furnish the strength which that expense ought to give.

With a navy of her own, America might co-operate to advantage with any
power at war with Algiers, but it would be risking too much to depend
altogether on any foreign nation.

To the argument that the force was incompetent to the object, it was
answered, that, from the documents before them, and from the diligent
inquiries of a large committee, the number and strength of the
Algerine corsairs had been ascertained, and the armament contemplated
in the bill was believed to be sufficient. If gentlemen thought
differently, it was surprising that they did not move to augment it.

The expense of the frigates had been strongly urged. But the saving in
insurance, in ships and cargoes, and in the ransom of seamen, was more
than equivalent to this item. "But are not the slavery of our fellow
citizens, and the national disgrace resulting from it, to be taken
into the account? these are considerations beyond all calculation. Who
can, after reading the affecting narratives of the unfortunate, sit
down contented with cold calculations and syllogisms? their narratives
ought to excite every possible exertion, not only to procure the
release of the captured, but to prevent the increase of the number of
these unhappy victims."

That a bill providing six frigates, to exist during the war with the
Algerines, should excite apprehensions of a large permanent navy, and
of an immense debt, was truly astonishing. But even if the bill had
not contained a clause enabling the President to discontinue the
armament provided peace should be concluded with the regency of
Algiers, the weight of the objection was denied. America was
peculiarly fitted for a navy; she abounded in all kinds of naval
resources, and had within herself, those means which other nations
were obliged to obtain from abroad. Her situation, and the
dispositions of a considerable proportion of her citizens, evinced
still more the propriety of a naval establishment. Perhaps the country
was not yet mature for such an establishment to any great extent. But
the period was not far distant when it would be. The United States had
an increasing population, much individual wealth, and considerable
national resources. It was not believed that the expense of equipping
a small naval armament for the protection of their commerce, would be
insupportable.

It was, however, matter of surprise, that gentlemen who had deemed the
improvement of American navigation, as a source of defence, an object
of so much importance as to be anxious to wage an immediate commercial
war with Great Britain for that purpose, should avow such a fixed
determination against resorting to that resource in any degree
whatever, under circumstances the most urgent.

The original resolution was carried only by a majority of two voices;
but as the bill advanced, several members who were accustomed to vote
in the opposition gave it their support; and, on the final question, a
majority of eleven appeared in its favour. The other branch of the
legislature concurred, and it received the cordial assent of the
President.

Pending these discussions, the irritations in which they commenced
were greatly aggravated by accounts, that captures of American vessels
by British cruisers were made to an extent altogether unprecedented;
and early in March, an authentic paper was received which proved that
those captures were not unauthorized.

On the sixth of November, 1793, additional instructions had been
issued to the ships of war and privateers of Great Britain, requiring
them to stop and detain all ships, laden with goods the produce of any
colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies
to any such colony, and to bring the same, with their cargoes, to
legal adjudication, in the British courts of admiralty.

These instructions made a serious impression on the most reflecting
and moderate men in the United States. It was believed that they
originated in a spirit of hostility which must lead to war; and that
it had now become the part of prudence to prepare for that event.

On the 12th of March, Mr. Sedgewick moved several resolutions, the
objects of which were to raise a military force, and to authorize the
President to lay an embargo. The armament was to consist of fifteen
thousand men, who should be brought into actual service in case of war
with any European power, but not until war should break out. In the
mean time, they were to receive pay while assembled for the purpose of
discipline, which was not to exceed twenty-four days in each year.

After stating the motives which led to the introduction of these
resolutions, they were laid on the table for the consideration of the
members. Two days afterwards, a motion was made to take up that which
related to an embargo; but this motion was negatived for the purpose
of resuming the consideration of the commercial regulations which had
been offered by Mr. Madison. On the motion of Mr. Nicholas, those
resolutions were amended so as to subject the manufactures of Great
Britain alone, instead of those of all nations having no commercial
treaties with the United States, to the proposed augmentation of
duties. They were again debated with great earnestness, but no
decision on them was made.

In addition to the objections urged against them as forming a
commercial system in time of peace, they were said to be particularly
inapplicable to the present moment. If, as was believed, the United
States were about to be forced into a war, the public counsels ought
to be directed to measures of defence. In that event, the resolutions
would, at best, be useless. But the greater the danger of war, the
more incumbent was it on the government to unite public opinion in
support of it; and this would best be effected by observing a line of
conduct which would furnish no just cause of hostility. The commercial
discriminations proposed were of a hostile and irritating nature,
might render war certain, would be considered by many as unnecessary,
and might impair that unanimity in which the great strength of the
country consisted. It was submitted to the gentlemen to decide whether
it was wise to press their system through, with so small a majority as
was in its favour.

The resolutions were defended on the principle, that though not in
themselves contributing to the national defence, they would not
prevent the adoption of such other measures as the state of things
might render necessary. If war should take place, they could do no
harm. But war must at some time be succeeded by peace: and they would
form a valuable basis for negotiation.[15]

     [Footnote 15: In the course of this debate the resolutions
     were still considered as calculated to promote the
     interests, not of the United States, but of France. Mr. Ames
     said they had _French_ stamped upon the very face of them.
     This expression produced a warm retort from Colonel Parker.
     He wished there was a stamp on the forehead of every person
     to designate whether he was for France or Britain. For
     himself he would not be silent and hear that nation abused
     to whom America was indebted for her rank as a nation. He
     was firmly persuaded that but for the aid of France in the
     last war, those gentlemen now on the floor who prided
     themselves in abusing her, would not have had an opportunity
     in that place of doing it. This sentiment produced a clap in
     the galleries. This indecorum was severely reprobated, and a
     motion was made to clear the galleries. Although the debate
     shows that the degree of sensibility excited by this
     disorder was extremely different in the different parties,
     it was justified by none, and the galleries were cleared.]

[Sidenote: An embargo law.]

On the 21st of March, Mr. Sedgewick's motion authorizing the President
to lay an embargo was negatived by a majority of two voices; but in a
few days, the consideration of that subject was resumed, and a
resolution passed, prohibiting all trade from the United States to any
foreign port or place for the space of thirty days, and empowering the
President to carry the resolution into effect.

This resolution was accompanied with vigorous provisional measures for
defence, respecting the adoption of which, no considerable division of
sentiment was avowed.

While the measures of congress indicated that expectation of war, a
public document made its appearance which seemed to demonstrate that
Great Britain also was preparing for that event. This was the answer
of Lord Dorchester, on the 10th of February, to a speech delivered by
the deputies of a great number of Indian tribes assembled at Quebec.
In this answer, his lordship had openly avowed the opinion, founded,
as he said, on the conduct of the American people, that a war between
Great Britain and the United States, during the present year, was
probable, and that a new line between the two nations must then be
drawn by the sword.

This document was not authentic; but it obtained general belief, and
contributed to confirm the opinion that war was scarcely to be
avoided.

On the 27th of March, Mr. Dayton moved a resolution for sequestering
all debts due to British subjects, and for taking means to secure
their payment into the treasury, as a fund out of which to indemnify
the citizens of the United States for depredations committed on their
commerce by British cruisers, in violation of the laws of nations.

The debate on this resolution was such as was to be expected from the
irritable state of the public mind. The invectives against the British
nation were uttered with peculiar vehemence, and were mingled with
allusions to the exertions of the government for the preservation of
neutrality, censuring strongly the system which had been pursued.

Before any question was taken on the proposition for sequestering
British debts, and without a decision on those proposed by Mr.
Madison, Mr. Clarke moved a resolution, which in some degree suspended
the commercial regulations that had been so earnestly debated. This
was to prohibit all intercourse with Great Britain until her
government should make full compensation for all injuries done to the
citizens of the United States by armed vessels, or by any person or
persons acting under the authority of the British king; and until the
western posts should be delivered up.[16]

     [Footnote 16: A few days before the motions of Mr. Dayton
     and Mr. Clarke, a report was made by the secretary of state
     relative to the vexations of American commerce committed by
     the officers and cruisers of the belligerent powers. It was
     made from materials collected in an inquiry which had been
     instituted by the President before the meeting of congress.
     In this report, after detailing the numerous complaints
     which were made against Great Britain, the secretary
     proceeded to notice those which were brought against other
     nations. Against France, he said, it was urged that her
     privateers harassed the American trade no less than those of
     the British. That their courts of admiralty were guilty of
     equal oppression. That they had violated the treaty between
     the two nations. That a very detrimental embargo had
     detained a number of American vessels in her ports, and that
     the government had discharged a specie contract with
     assignats. The effect of this report seems to have been to
     excite a suspicion that the secretary of state was not
     sufficiently attached to liberty and to France.]

On the fourth of April, before any decision was made on the several
propositions which have been stated, the President laid before
congress a letter just received from Mr. Pinckney, the minister of the
United States at London, communicating additional instructions to the
commanders of British armed ships, which were dated the eighth of
January. These instructions revoked those of the sixth of November;
and, instead of bringing in for adjudication all neutral vessels
trading with the French islands, British cruisers were directed to
bring in those only which were laden with cargoes the produce of the
French islands, and were on a direct voyage from those islands to
Europe.

The letter detailed a conversation with Lord Grenville on this
subject, in which his lordship explained the motives which had
originally occasioned the order of the sixth of November, and gave to
it a less extensive signification than it had received in the courts
of vice admiralty.

It was intended, he said, to be temporary, and was calculated to
answer two purposes. One was, to prevent the abuses which might take
place in consequence of the whole of the St. Domingo fleet having gone
to the United States; the other was, on account of the attack designed
upon the French West India islands by the armament under Sir John
Jarvis and Sir Charles Grey; but it was now no longer necessary to
continue the regulations for those purposes. His lordship added, that
the order of the sixth of November did not direct the confiscation of
all vessels trading with the French islands, but only that they should
be brought in for legal adjudication; and he conceived that no vessel
would be condemned under it, which would not have been previously
liable to the same sentence.

The influence of this communication on the party in the legislature
which was denominated federal, was very considerable. Believing that
the existing differences between the two nations still admitted of
explanation and adjustment, they strenuously opposed all measures
which were irritating in their tendency, or which might be construed
into a dereliction of the neutral character they were desirous of
maintaining; but they gave all their weight to those which, by putting
the nation in a posture of defence, prepared it for war, should
negotiation fail.

On the opposite party, no change of sentiment or of views appears to
have been 

Showing first 200,000 characters. Full text: gutenberg.org/ebooks/18595