An Account of the Proceedings on the Trial of Susan B. Anthony, on the Charge of Illegal Voting, at the Presidential Election in Nov., 1872, and on the Trial of Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh, and William B. Hall, the Inspectors of Election by Whom Her Vote was Received.
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Title: An Account of the Proceedings on the Trial of Susan B. Anthony, on the Charge of Illegal Voting, at the Presidential Election in Nov., 1872, and on the Trial of Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh, and William B. Hall, the Inspectors of Election by Whom Her Vote was Received.
Author: Anonymous
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS ON THE TRIAL OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY, ON THE CHARGE OF ILLEGAL VOTING, AT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN NOV., 1872, AND ON THE TRIAL OF BEVERLY W. JONES, EDWIN T. MARSH, AND WILLIAM B. HALL, THE INSPECTORS OF ELECTION BY WHOM HER VOTE WAS RECEIVED. ***
Produced by Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, Graeme Mackreth and
the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
http://www.pgdp.net (This file was made using scans of
public domain works from the University of Michigan Digital
Libraries.)
AN
ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
ON THE
TRIAL OF
SUSAN B. ANTHONY,
ON THE
Charge of Illegal Voting,
AT THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN NOV., 1872,
AND ON THE
TRIAL OF
BEVERLY W. JONES, EDWIN T. MARSH
AND WILLIAM B. HALL,
THE INSPECTORS OF ELECTION BY WHOM HER VOTE WAS RECEIVED.
ROCHESTER, N.Y.:
DAILY DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE BOOK PRINT, 3 WEST MAIN ST.
1874.
INDEX.
PAGE.
Anthony, S.B., Indictment, 1
Her speech on receiving her sentence, 82
Her campaign speech, 151
Crowley, Richard, Opening speech in Miss Anthony's case, 5
Gage, Mrs. M. Joslyn, Speech of 179
Hall, Wm. B., Indictment, 85
Hooker, John, Article on Judge Hunt and the Right of Trial by Jury, 206
Hunt, Judge, Opinion against Miss Anthony, 59
His refusal to submit her case to the jury, 68
His refusal to permit the jury to be polled, 68
His sentence of Miss Anthony, 81
His direction to the jury in the cases of Jones, Hall and Marsh, 144
Trial by jury "_a matter of form_", 145
Jones, Beverly W., Indictment, 85
Remarks on receiving sentence, 148
Marsh, Edwin T., Indictment, 85
Remarks on being sentenced, 149
Selden, H.R., Opening speech in Miss Anthony's case, 12
Argument in her case, 17
Argument on motion for new trial, 68
Van Voorhis, John, Argument of motion to quash the indictment
in the case of Jones, Marsh and Hall, 94
Argument in the case of Jones, Marsh and Hall on the merits, 128
Motion for new trial in the case of Jones, Marsh and Hall, 147
PREFACE.
At the election of President and Vice President of the United States,
and members of Congress, in November, 1872, SUSAN B. ANTHONY, and
several other women, offered their votes to the inspectors of election,
claiming the right to vote, as among the privileges and immunities
secured to them as citizens by the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. The inspectors, JONES, HALL, and
MARSH, by a majority, decided in favor of receiving the offered votes,
against the dissent of HALL, and they were received and deposited in the
ballot box. For this act, the women, fourteen in number, were arrested
and held to bail, and indictments were found against them severally,
under the 19th Section of the Act of Congress of May 30th, 1870, (16 St.
at L. 144.) charging them with the offense of "knowingly voting without
having a lawful right to vote." The three inspectors were also arrested,
but only two of them were held to bail, HALL having been discharged by
the Commissioner on whose warrant they were arrested. All three, however
were jointly indicted under the same statute--for having "knowingly and
wilfully received the votes of persons not entitled to vote."
Of the women voters, the case of Miss ANTHONY alone was brought to
trial, a _nolle prosequi_ having been entered upon the other
indictments. Upon the trial of Miss ANTHONY before the U.S. Circuit
Court for the Northern District of New York, at Canandaigua, in June,
1873, it was proved that before offering her vote she was advised by her
counsel that she had a right to vote; and that she entertained no doubt,
at the time of voting, that she was entitled to vote. It was claimed in
her behalf:
I. That she was legally entitled to vote.
II. That if she was not so entitled, but voted in good faith in the
belief that it was her right, she was guilty of no crime.
III. That she did vote in such good faith, and with such belief.
The court held that the defendant had no right to vote--that good faith
constituted no defence--that there was nothing in the case for the jury
to decide, and directed them to find a verdict of guilty; refusing to
submit, at the request of the defendant's counsel, any question to the
jury, or to allow the clerk to ask the jurors, severally, whether they
assented to the verdict which the court had directed to be entered. The
verdict of guilty was entered by the clerk, as directed by the court,
without any express assent or dissent on the part of the jury. A fine of
$100, and costs, was imposed upon the defendant.
Miss ANTHONY insists that in these proceedings, the fundamental
principle of criminal law, that no person can be a criminal unless the
mind be so--that an honest mistake is not a crime, has been disregarded;
that she has been denied her constitutional right of trial by jury, the
jury having had no voice in her conviction; that she has been denied her
right to have the response of every juror to the question, whether he
did or did not assent to the verdict which the court directed the clerk
to enter.
The trial of the three inspectors followed that of Miss ANTHONY, and all
were convicted, the court holding, as in the case of Miss ANTHONY, that
good faith on their part in receiving the votes was not a protection;
which they think a somewhat severe rule of law, inasmuch as the statute
provides the same penalty, and in the same sentence, "for knowingly and
wilfully receiving the vote of any person not entitled to vote, or
refusing to receive the vote of any person entitled to vote." The
inspectors claim, that according to this exposition of the law, they
were placed in a position which required them, without any opportunity
to investigate or take advice in regard to the right of any voter whose
right was questioned, to decide the question correctly, at the peril of
a term in the state's prison if they made a mistake; and, though this
may be a correct exposition of the law in their case, they would be
sorry to see it applied to the decisions of any court, not excepting the
tribunal by which they were convicted.
The defendant, HALL, is at a loss to know how he could have avoided the
penalty, inasmuch as he did all that he could in the way of rejecting
the votes, without throttling his co-inspectors, and forcing them to
desist from the wrong of receiving them. He is of opinion that by the
ruling of the Court, he would have been equally guilty, if he had tried
his strength in that direction, and had failed of success.
To preserve a full record of so important a judicial determination, and
to enable the friends of the convicted parties to understand precisely
the degree of criminality which attaches to them in consequence of these
convictions, the following pamphlet has been prepared--giving a more
full and accurate statement of the proceedings than can elsewhere be
found.
INDICTMENT
AGAINST SUSAN B. ANTHONY.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
IN AND FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
* * *
At a stated session of the District Court of the United States of
America, held in and for the Northern District of New York, at the City
Hall, in the city of Albany, in the said Northern District of New York,
on the third Tuesday of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and seventy-three, before the Honorable Nathan K. Hall,
Judge of the said Court, assigned to keep the peace of the said United
States of America, in and for the said District, and also to hear and
determine divers Felonies, Misdemeanors and other offenses against the
said United States of America, in the said District committed.
Brace Millerd,
James D. Wasson,
Peter H. Bradt,
James McGinty,
Henry A. Davis,
Loring W. Osborn,
Thomas Whitbeck,
John Mullen,
Samuel G. Harris,
Ralph Davis,
Matthew Fanning,
Abram Kimmey,
Derrick B. Van Schoonhoven,
Wilhelmus Van Natten,
Adam Winne,
James Goold,
Samuel S. Fowler,
Peter D.R. Johnson,
Patrick Carroll,
good and lawful men of the said District, then and there sworn and
charged to inquire for the said United States of America, and for the
body of said District, do, upon their oaths, present, that Susan B.
Anthony now or late of Rochester, in the county of Monroe, with force
and arms, etc., to-wit: at and in the first election district of the
eighth ward of the city of Rochester, in the county of Monroe, in said
Northern District of New York, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, heretofore, to-wit: on the fifth day of November, in the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two, at an election duly
held at and in the first election district of the said eighth ward of
the city of Rochester, in said county, and in said Northern District of
New York, which said election was for Representatives in the Congress of
the United States, to-wit: a Representative in the Congress of the
United States for the State of New York at large, and a Representative
in the Congress of the United States for the twenty-ninth Congressional
District of the State of New York, said first election district of said
eighth ward of said city of Rochester, being then and there a part of
said twenty-ninth Congressional District of the State of New York, did
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully vote for a Representative in the
Congress of the United States for the State of New York at large, and
for a Representative in the Congress of the United States for said
twenty-ninth Congressional District, without having a lawful right to
vote in said election district (the said Susan B. Anthony being then and
there a person of the female sex,) as she, the said Susan B. Anthony
then and there well knew, contrary to the form of the statute of the
United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the
peace of the United States of America and their dignity.
Second Count--And the jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid do
further present that said Susan B. Anthony, now or late of Rochester, in
the county of Monroe, with force and arms, etc., to-wit: at and in the
first election district of the eighth ward of the city of Rochester, in
the county of Monroe, in said Northern District of New York, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, heretofore, to-wit: on the fifth day of
November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
seventy-two, at an election duly held at and in the first election
district of the said eighth ward, of said city of Rochester, in said
county, and in said Northern District of New York, which said election
was for Representatives in the Congress of the United States, to-wit: a
Representative in the Congress of the United States for the State of New
York at large, and a Representative in the Congress of the United States
for the twenty-ninth Congressional District of the State of New York,
said first election district of said eighth ward, of said city of
Rochester, being then and there a part of said twenty-ninth
Congressional District of the State of New York, did knowingly,
wrongfully and unlawfully vote for a candidate for Representative in the
Congress of the United States for the State of New York at large, and
for a candidate for Representative in the Congress of the United States
for said twenty-ninth Congressional District, without having a lawful
right to vote in said first election district (the said Susan B. Anthony
being then and there a person of the female sex,) as she, the said
Susan B. Anthony then and there well knew, contrary to the form of the
statute of the United States of America in such case made and provided,
and against the peace of the United States of America and their dignity.
RICHARD CROWLEY,
Attorney of the United States,
For the Northern District Of New York.
(Endorsed.) Jan. 24, 1873.
Pleads not guilty.
RICHARD CROWLEY,
U.S. Attorney.
UNITED STATES
CIRCUIT COURT.
Northern District of New York.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_vs._
SUSAN B. ANTHONY.
* * *
HON. WARD HUNT, Presiding.
* * *
APPEARANCES.
For the United States:
HON. RICHARD CROWLEY.
U.S. District Attorney.
For the Defendant:
HON. HENRY R. SELDEN.
JOHN VAN VOORHIS, ESQ.
Tried at Canandaigua. Tuesday and Wednesday, June 17th and 18th, 1873,
before Hon. Ward Hunt, and a jury.
Jury impanneled at 2:30 P.M.
MR. CROWLEY opened the case as follows:
_May it please the Court and Gentlemen of the Jury_:
On the 5th of November, 1872, there was held in this State, as well as
in other States of the Union, a general election for different officers,
and among those, for candidates to represent several districts of this
State in the Congress of the United States. The defendant, Miss Susan B.
Anthony, at that time resided in the city of Rochester, in the county of
Monroe, Northern District of New York, and upon the 5th day of November,
1872, she voted for a representative in the Congress of the United
States, to represent the 29th Congressional District of this State, and
also for a representative at large for the State of New York, to
represent the State in the Congress of the United States. At that time
she was a woman. I suppose there will be no question about that. The
question in this case, if there be a question of fact about it at all,
will, in my judgment, be rather a question of law than one of fact. I
suppose that there will be no question of fact, substantially, in the
case when all of the evidence is out, and it will be for you to decide
under the charge of his honor, the Judge, whether or not the defendant
committed the offence of voting for a representative in Congress upon
that occasion. We think, on the part of the Government, that there is no
question about it either one way or the other, neither a question of
fact, nor a question of law, and that whatever Miss Anthony's intentions
may have been--whether they were good or otherwise--she did not have a
right to vote upon that question, and if she did vote without having a
lawful right to vote, then there is no question but what she is guilty
of violating a law of the United States in that behalf enacted by the
Congress of the United States.
We don't claim in this case, gentlemen, that Miss Anthony is of that
class of people who go about "repeating." We don't claim that she went
from place to place for the purpose of offering her vote. But we do
claim that upon the 5th of November, 1872, she voted, and whether she
believed that she had a right to vote or not, it being a question of
law, that she is within the Statute.
Congress in 1870 passed the following statute: (Reads 19th Section of
the Act of 1870, page 144, 16th statutes at large.)
It is not necessary for me, gentlemen, at this stage of the case, to
state all the facts which will be proven on the part of the Government.
I shall leave that to be shown by the evidence and by the witnesses, and
if any question of law shall arise his Honor will undoubtedly give you
instructions as he shall deem proper.
_Conceded_, that on the 5th day of November, 1872, Miss Susan B. Anthony
was a woman.
BEVERLY W. JONES, a witness, called in behalf of the United States,
having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
_Examined_ by Mr. Crowley:
Q. Mr. Jones, where do you reside?
A. 8th ward, Rochester.
Q. Where were you living on the 5th of November, 1872?
A. Same place.
Q. Do you know the defendant, Miss Susan B. Anthony?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In what capacity were you acting upon that day, if any, in relation
to elections?
A. Inspector of election.
Q. Into how many election districts is the 8th ward divided, if it
contains more than one?
A. Two, sir.
Q. In what election district were you inspector of elections?
A. The first district.
Q. Who were inspectors with you?
A. Edwin T. Marsh and William B. Hall.
Q. Had the Board of Inspectors been regularly organized?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Upon the 5th day of November, did the defendant, Susan B. Anthony,
vote in the first election district of the 8th ward of the city of
Rochester?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see her vote?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state to the jury what tickets she voted, whether State,
Assembly, Congress and Electoral?
Objected to as calling for a conclusion.
Q. State what tickets she voted, if you know, Mr. Jones?
A. If I recollect right she voted the Electoral ticket, Congressional
ticket, State ticket, and Assembly ticket.
Q. Was there an election for Member of Congress for that district and
for Representative at Large in Congress, for the State of New York, held
on the 5th of November, in the city of Rochester?
A. I think there was; yes, sir.
Q. In what Congressional District was the city of Rochester at the time?
A. The 29th.
Q. Did you receive the tickets from Miss Anthony?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you do with them when you received them?
A. Put them in the separate boxes where they belonged.
Q. State to the jury whether you had separate boxes for the several
tickets voted in that election district?
A. Yes, sir; we had.
Q. Was Miss Anthony challenged upon that occasion?
A. Yes, sir--no; not on that day she wasn't.
Q. She was not challenged on the day she voted?
A. No, sir.
_Cross-Examination_ by Judge Selden:
Q. Prior to the election, was there a registry of voters in that
district made?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was you one of the officers engaged in making that registry?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the registry was being made did Miss Anthony appear before the
Board of Registry and claim to be registered as a voter?
A. She did.
Q. Was there any objection made, or any doubt raised as to her right to
vote?
A. There was.
Q. On what ground?
A. On the ground that the Constitution of the State of New York did not
allow women to vote.
Q. What was the defect in her right to vote as a citizen?
A. She was not a male citizen.
Q. That she was a woman?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did the Board consider that and decide that she was entitled to
register?
Objected to. Objection overruled.
Q. Did the Board consider the question of her right to registry, and
decide that she was entitled to registry as a voter?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And she was registered accordingly?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When she offered her vote, was the same objection brought up in the
Board of Inspectors, or question made of her right to vote as a woman?
A. She was challenged previous to election day.
Q. It was canvassed previous to election day between them?
A. Yes, sir; she was challenged on the second day of registering names.
Q. At the time of the registry, when her name was registered, was the
Supervisor of Election present at the Board?
A. He was.
Q. Was he consulted upon the question of whether she was entitled to
registry, or did he express an opinion on the subject to the inspectors?
MR. CROWLEY: I submit that it is of no consequence whether he did or
not.
JUDGE SELDEN: He was the Government Supervisor under this act of
Congress.
MR. CROWLEY: The Board of Inspectors, under the State law, constitute
the Board of Registry, and they are the only persons to pass upon that
question.
THE COURT: You may take it.
A. Yes, sir; there was a United States Supervisor of Elections, two of
them.
By JUDGE SELDEN:
Q. Did they advise the registry, or did they not?
A. One of them did.
Q. And on that advice the registry was made with the judgment of the
inspectors.
A. It had a great deal of weight with the inspectors, I have no doubt.
_Re-direct Examination by_ MR. CROWLEY:
Q. Was Miss Anthony challenged before the Board of Registry?
A. Not at the time she offered her name.
Q. Was she challenged at any time?
A. Yes, sir; the second day of the meeting of the Board.
Q. Was the preliminary and the general oath administered?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Won't you state what Miss Anthony said, if she said anything, when
she came there and offered her name for registration?
A. She stated that she did not claim any rights under the constitution
of the State of New York; she claimed her right under the constitution
of the United States.
Q. Did she name any particular amendment?
A. Yes, sir; she cited the 14th amendment.
Q. Under that she claimed her right to vote?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did the other Federal Supervisor who was present, state it as his
opinion that she was entitled to vote under that amendment, or did he
protest, claiming that she did not have the right to vote?
A. One of them said that there was no way for the inspectors to get
around placing the name upon the register; the other one, when she came
in, left the room.
Q. Did this one who said that there was no way to get around placing the
name upon the register, state that she had her right to register but did
not have the right to vote?
A. I didn't hear him make any such statement.
Q. You didn't hear any such statement as that?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was there a poll list kept of the voters of the first election
district of the 8th ward on the day of election?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. (Handing witness two books.) State whether that is the poll list of
voters kept upon the day of election in the first election district of
the 8th ward, of the city of Rochester?
A. This is the poll list, and also the register.
Q. Turn to the name of Susan B. Anthony, if it is upon that poll list?
A. I have it.
Q. What number is it?
A. Number 22.
Q. From that poll list what tickets does it purport to show that she
voted upon that occasion?
A. Electoral, State, Congress and Assembly.
_United States rests._
JUDGE SELDEN opened the case in behalf of the defendant, as follows:
_If the Court please, Gentlemen of the Jury_:
This is a case of no ordinary magnitude, although many might regard it
as one of very little importance. The question whether my client here
has done anything to justify her being consigned to a felon's prison or
not, is one that interests her very essentially, and that interests the
people also essentially. I claim and shall endeavor to establish before
you that when she offered to have her name registered as a voter, and
when she offered her vote for Member of Congress, she was as much
entitled to vote as any man that voted at that election, according to
the Constitution and laws of the Government under which she lives. If I
maintain that proposition, as a matter of course she has committed no
offence, and is entitled to be discharged at your hands.
But, beyond that, whether she was a legal voter or not, whether she was
entitled to vote or not, if she sincerely believed that she had a right
to vote, and offered her ballot in good faith, under that belief,
whether right or wrong, by the laws of this country she is guilty of no
crime. I apprehend that that proposition, when it is discussed, will be
maintained with a clearness and force that shall leave no doubt upon the
mind of the Court or upon your minds as the gentlemen of the jury. If I
maintain that proposition here, then the further question and the only
question which, in my judgment, can come before you to be passed upon by
you as a question of fact is whether or not she did vote in good faith,
believing that she had a right to vote.
The public prosecutor assumes that, however honestly she may have
offered her vote, however sincerely she may have believed that she had a
right to vote, if she was mistaken in that judgment, her offering her
vote and its being received makes a criminal offence--a proposition to
me most abhorrent, as I believe it will be equally abhorrent to your
judgment.
Before the registration, and before this election, Miss Anthony called
upon me for advice upon the question whether, under the 14th Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States, she had a right to vote. I had
not examined the question. I told her I would examine it and give her my
opinion upon the question of her legal right. She went away and came
again after I had made the examination. I advised her that she was as
lawful a voter as I am, or as any other man is, and advised her to go
and offer her vote. I may have been mistaken in that, and if I was
mistaken, I believe she acted in good faith. I believe she acted
according to her right as the law and Constitution gave it to her. But
whether she did or not, she acted in the most perfect good faith, and if
she made a mistake, or if I made one, that is not a reason for
committing her to a felon's cell.
For the second time in my life, in my professional practice, I am under
the necessity of offering myself as a witness for my client.
HENRY R. SELDEN, a witness sworn in behalf of the defendant, testified
as follows:
Before the last election, Miss Anthony called upon me for advice, upon
the question whether she was or was not a legal voter. I examined the
question, and gave her my opinion, unhesitatingly, that the laws and
Constitution of the United States, authorized her to vote, as well as
they authorize any man to vote; and I advised her to have her name
placed upon the registry and to vote at the election, if the inspectors
should receive her vote. I gave the advice in good faith, believing it
to be accurate, and I believe it to be accurate still.
[This witness was not cross-examined.]
JUDGE SELDEN: I propose to call Miss Anthony as to the fact of her
voting--on the question of the intention or belief under which she
voted.
MR. CROWLEY: She is not competent as a witness in her own behalf.
[The Court so held.]
_Defendant rests._
JOHN E. POUND, a witness sworn in behalf of the United States, testified
as follows:
_Examined by_ MR. CROWLEY.
Q. During the months of November and December, 1872, and January, 1873,
were you Assistant United States Dist. Attorney for the Northern
District of New York?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the defendant, Susan B. Anthony?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you attend an examination before Wm. C. Storrs, a United States
Commissioner, in the city of Rochester, when her case was examined?
A. I did
Q. Was she called as a witness in her own behalf upon that examination?
A. She was.
Q. Was she sworn?
A. She was.
Q. Did she give evidence?
A. She did.
Q. Did you keep minutes of evidence on that occasion?
A. I did.
Q. (Handing the witness a paper.) Please look at the paper now shown you
and see if it contains the minutes you kept upon that occasion?
A. It does.
Q. Turn to the evidence of Susan B. Anthony!
A. I have it.
Q. Did she, upon that occasion, state that she consulted or talked with
Judge Henry R. Selden, of Rochester, in relation to her right to vote?
JUDGE SELDEN: I object to that upon the ground that it is incompetent,
that if they refuse to allow her to be sworn here, they should be
excluded from producing any evidence that she gave elsewhere, especially
when they want to give the version which the United States officer took
of her evidence.
THE COURT: Go on.
By MR. CROWLEY:
Q. State whether she stated on that examination, under oath, that she
had talked or consulted with Judge Henry R. Selden in relation to her
right to vote?
A. She did.
Q. State whether she was asked, upon that examination, if the advice
given her by Judge Henry R. Selden would or did make any difference in
her action in voting, or in substance that?
A. She stated on the cross-examination, "I should have made the same
endeavor to vote that I did had I not consulted Judge Selden. I didn't
consult any one before I registered. I was not influenced by his advice
in the matter at all; have been resolved to vote, the first time I was
at home 30 days, for a number of years."
_Cross-examination by_ MR. VAN VOORHEES:
Q. Mr. Pound, was she asked there if she had any doubt about her right
to vote, and did she answer "Not a particle?"
A. She stated "Had no doubt as to my right to vote," on the direct
examination.
Q. There was a stenographic reporter there, was there not?
A. A reporter was there taking notes.
Q. Was not this question put to her "Did you have any doubt yourself of
your right to vote?" and did she not answer "Not a particle?"
THE COURT: Well, he says so, that she had no doubt of her right to vote.
JUDGE SELDEN: I beg leave to state, in regard to my own testimony, Miss
Anthony informs me that I was mistaken in the fact that my advice was
before her registry. It was my recollection that it was on her way to
the registry, but she states to me now that she was registered and came
immediately to my office. In that respect I was under a mistake.
_Evidence closed._
ARGUMENT OF MR. SELDEN FOR THE DEFENDANT.
The defendant is indicted under the 19th section of the Act of Congress
of May 31, 1870 (16 St. at L., 144,), for "voting without having a
lawful right to vote."
The words of the Statute, so far as they are material in this case, are
as follows:
"If at any election for representative or delegate in the Congress of
the United States, any person shall knowingly ... vote without having a
lawful right to vote ... every such person shall be deemed guilty of a
crime, ... and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding $500, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years,
or by both, in the discretion of the court, and shall pay the costs of
prosecution."
The only alleged ground of illegality of the defendant's vote is that
she is a woman. If the same act had been done by her brother under the
same circumstances, the act would have been not only innocent, but
honorable and laudable; but having been done by a woman it is said to be
a crime. The crime therefore consists not in the act done, but in the
simple fact that the person doing it was a woman and not a man. I
believe this is the first instance in which a woman has been arraigned
in a criminal court, merely on account of her sex.
If the advocates of female suffrage had been allowed to choose the point
of attack to be made upon their position, they could not have chosen it
more favorably for themselves; and I am disposed to thank those who have
been instrumental in this proceeding, for presenting it in the form of a
criminal prosecution.
Women have the same interest that men have in the establishment and
maintenance of good government; they are to the same extent as men
bound to obey the laws; they suffer to the same extent by bad laws, and
profit to the same extent by good laws; and upon principles of equal
justice, as it would seem, should be allowed equally with men, to
express their preference in the choice of law-makers and rulers. But
however that may be, no greater _absurdity_, to use no harsher term,
could be presented, than that of rewarding men and punishing women, for
the same act, _without giving to women any voice in the question which
should be rewarded, and which punished_.
I am aware, however, that we are here to be governed by the Constitution
and laws as they are, and that if the defendant has been guilty of
violating the law, she must submit to the penalty, however unjust or
absurd the law may be. But courts are not required to so interpret laws
or constitutions as to produce either absurdity or injustice, so long as
they are open to a more reasonable interpretation. This must be my
excuse for what I design to say in regard to the propriety of female
suffrage, because with that propriety established there is very little
difficulty in finding sufficient warrant in the constitution for its
exercise.
This case, in its legal aspects, presents three questions, which I
purpose to discuss.
1. Was the defendant legally entitled to vote at the election in
question?
2. If she was not entitled to vote, but believed that she was, and voted
in good faith in that belief, did such voting constitute a crime under
the statute before referred to?
3. Did the defendant vote in good faith in that belief?
If the first question be decided in accordance with my views, the other
questions become immaterial; if the second be decided adversely to my
views, the first and third become immaterial. The two first are
questions of law to be decided by the court, the other is a question for
the jury.
[The Judge here suggested that the argument should be confined to the
legal questions, and the argument on the other question suspended, until
his opinion on those questions should be made known. This suggestion was
assented to, and the counsel proceeded.]
My first position is that the defendant had the same right to vote as
any other citizen who voted at that election.
Before proceeding to the discussion of the purely legal question, I
desire, as already intimated, to pay some attention to the propriety and
justice of the rule which I claim to have been established by the
Constitution.
Miss Anthony, and those united with her in demanding the right of
suffrage, claim, and with a strong appearance of justice, that upon the
principles upon which our government is founded, and which lie at the
basis of all just government, every citizen has a right to take part,
upon equal terms with every other citizen, in the formation and
administration of government. This claim on the part of the female sex
presents a question the magnitude of which is not well appreciated by
the writers and speakers who treat it with ridicule. Those engaged in
the movement are able, sincere and earnest women, and they will not be
silenced by such ridicule, nor even by the villainous caricatures of
Nast. On the contrary, they justly place all those things to the account
of the wrongs which they think their sex has suffered. They believe,
with an intensity of feeling which men who have not associated with them
have not yet learned, that their sex has not had, and has not now, its
just and true position in the organization of government and society.
They may be wrong in their position, but they will not be content until
their arguments are fairly, truthfully and candidly answered.
In the most celebrated document which has been put forth on this side of
the Atlantic, our ancestors declared that "governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed."
Blackstone says, "The lawfulness of punishing such criminals (i.e.,
persons offending merely against the laws of society) is founded upon
this principle: that the law by which they suffer was made by their own
consent; it is a part of the original contract into which they entered
when first they engaged in society; it was calculated for and has long
contributed to their own security."
Quotations, to an unlimited extent, containing similar doctrines from
eminent writers, both English and American, on government, from the time
of John Locke to the present day, might be made. Without adopting this
doctrine which bases the rightfulness of government upon the consent of
the governed, I claim that there is implied in it the narrower and
unassailable principle that all citizens of a State, who are bound by
its laws, are entitled to an equal voice in the making and execution of
such laws. The doctrine is well stated by Godwin in his treatise on
Political Justice. He says: "The first and most important principle that
can be imagined relative to the form and structure of government, seems
to be this: that as government is a transaction in the name and for the
benefit of the whole, every member of the community ought to have some
share in its administration."
Again, "Government is a contrivance instituted for the security of
individuals; and it seems both reasonable that each man should have a
share in providing for his own security, and probable, that partiality
and cabal should by this means be most effectually excluded."
And again, "To give each man a voice in the public concerns comes
nearest to that admirable idea of which we should never lose sight, the
uncontrolled exercise of private judgment. Each man would thus be
inspired with a consciousness of his own importance, and the slavish
feelings that shrink up the soul in the presence of an imagined superior
would be unknown."
The mastery which this doctrine, whether right or wrong, has acquired
over the public mind, has produced as its natural fruit, the extension
of the right of suffrage to all the adult male population in nearly all
the states of the Union; a result which was well epitomized by President
Lincoln, in the expression, "government by the people for the people."
This extension of the suffrage is regarded by many as a source of danger
to the stability of free government. I believe it furnishes the greatest
security for free government, as it deprives the mass of the people of
all motive for revolution; and that government so based is most safe,
not because the whole people are less liable to make mistakes in
government than a select few, but because they have no interest which
can lead them to such mistakes, or to prevent their correction when
made. On the contrary, the world has never seen an aristocracy, whether
composed of few or many, powerful enough to control a government, who
did not honestly believe that their interest was identical with the
public interest, and who did not act persistently in accordance with
such belief; and, unfortunately, an aristocracy of sex has not proved an
exception to the rule. The only method yet discovered of overcoming this
tendency to the selfish use of power, whether consciously or
unconsciously, by those possessing it, is the distribution of the power
among all who are its subjects. Short of this the name free government
is a misnomer.
This principle, after long strife, not yet entirely ended has been,
practically at least, very generally recognized on this side of the
Atlantic, as far as relates to men; but when the attempt is made to
extend it to women, political philosophers and practical politicians,
those "inside of politics," two classes not often found acting in
concert, join in denouncing it. It remains to be determined whether the
reasons which have produced the extension of the franchise to all adult
men, do not equally demand its extension to all adult women. If it be
necessary for men that each should have a share in the administration of
government for his security, and to exclude partiality, as alleged by
Godwin, it would seem to be equally, if not more, necessary for women,
on account of their inferior physical power: and if, as is persistently
alleged by those who sneer at their claims, they are also inferior in
mental power, that fact only gives additional weight to the argument in
their behalf, as one of the primary objects of government, as
acknowledged on all hands, is the protection of the weak against the
power of the strong.
I can discover no ground consistent with the principle on which the
franchise has been given to all men, upon which it can be denied to
women. The principal argument against such extension, so far as argument
upon that side of the question has fallen under my observation, is based
upon the position that women are represented in the government by men,
and that their rights and interests are better protected through that
indirect representation than they would be by giving them a direct voice
in the government.
The teachings of history in regard to the condition of women under the
care of these self-constituted protectors, to which I can only briefly
allude, show the value of this argument as applied to past ages; and in
demonstration of its value as applied to more recent times, even at the
risk of being tedious, I will give some examples from my own
professional experience. I do this because nothing adds more to the
efficacy of truth than the translation of the abstract into the
concrete. Withholding names, I will state the facts with fullness and
accuracy.
An educated and refined woman, who had been many years before deserted
by her drunken husband, was living in a small village of Western New
York, securing, by great economy and intense labor in fine needle work,
the means of living, and of supporting her two daughters at an academy,
the object of her life being to give them such an education as would
enable them to become teachers, and thus secure to them some degree of
independence when she could no longer provide for them. The daughters
were good scholars, and favorites in the school, so long as the mother
was able to maintain them there. A young man, the nephew and clerk of a
wealthy but miserly merchant, became acquainted with the daughters, and
was specially attentive to the older one. The uncle disapproved of the
conduct of his nephew, and failing to control it by honorable means,
resorted to the circulation of the vilest slanders against mother and
daughters. He was a man of wealth and influence. They were almost
unknown. The mother had but recently come to the village, her object
having been to secure to her daughters the educational advantages which
the academy afforded. Poverty, as well as perhaps an excusable if not
laudable pride, compelled her to live in obscurity, and consequently the
assault upon their characters fell upon her and her daughters with
crushing force. Her employment mainly ceased, her daughters were of
necessity withdrawn from school, and all were deprived of the means,
from their own exertions, of sustaining life. Had they been in fact the
harlots which the miserly scoundrel represented them to be, they would
not have been so utterly powerless to resist his assault. The mother in
her despair naturally sought legal redress. But how was it to be
obtained? By the law the wife's rights were merged in those of the
husband. She had in law no individual existence, and consequently no
action could be brought by her to redress the grievous wrong; indeed
_according to the law she had suffered no wrong_, but the husband had
suffered all, and was entitled to all the redress. Where he was the lady
did not know; she had not heard from him for many years. Her counsel,
however, ventured to bring an action in her behalf, joining the
husband's name with hers, as the law required. When the cause came to
trial the defendant made no attempt to sustain the charges which he had
made, well knowing that they were as groundless as they were cruel; but
he introduced and proved a release of the cause of action, signed by the
husband, reciting a consideration of fifty dollars paid to him. The
defendant's counsel had some difficulty in proving the execution of the
release, and was compelled to introduce as a witness, the constable who
had been employed to find the vagabond husband and obtain his signature.
His testimony disclosed the facts that he found the husband in the
forest in one of our north-eastern counties, engaged in making shingles,
(presumably stealing timber from the public lands and converting it into
the means of indulging his habits of drunkenness,) and only five dollars
of the fifty mentioned in the release had in fact been paid. The Court
held, was compelled to hold, that the party injured _in view of the
law_, had received full compensation for the wrong--and the mother and
daughters with no means of redress were left to starve. This was the act
of the _representative_ of the wife and daughters to whom we are
referred, as a better protector of their rights than they themselves
could be.
It may properly be added, that if the action had proceeded to judgment
without interference from the husband, and such amount of damages had
been recovered as a jury might have thought it proper to award, the
money would have belonged to the husband, and the wife could not
lawfully have touched a cent of it. Her attorney might, and doubtless
would have paid it to her, but he could only have done so at the peril
of being compelled to pay it again to the drunken husband if he had
demanded it.
In another case, two ladies, mother and daughter, some time prior to
1860 came from an eastern county of New York to Rochester, where a
habeas corpus was obtained for a child of the daughter, less than two
years of age. It appeared on the return of the writ, that the mother of
the child had been previously abandoned by her husband, who had gone to
a western state to reside, and his wife had returned with the child to
her mother's house, and had resided there after her desertion. The
husband had recently returned from the west, had succeeded in getting
the child into his custody, and was stopping over night with it in
Rochester on the way to his western home. No misconduct on the part of
the wife was pretended, and none on the part of the husband, excepting
that he had gone to the west leaving his wife and child behind, no cause
appearing, and had returned, and somewhat clandestinely obtained
possession of the child. The Judge, following Blackstone's views of
husband's rights, remanded the infant to the custody of the father. He
thought the law required it, and perhaps it did; but if mothers had had
a voice, either in making or in administering the law, I think the
result would have been different. The distress of the mother on being
thus separated from her child can be better imagined than described. The
separation proved a final one, as in less than a year neither father nor
mother had any child on earth to love or care for. Whether the loss to
the little one of a mother's love and watchfulness had any effect upon
the result, cannot, of course, be known.
The state of the law a short time since, in other respects, in regard to
the rights of married women, shows what kind of security had been
provided for them by their assumed representatives. Prior to 1848, all
the personal property of every woman on marriage became the absolute
property of the husband--the use of all her real estate became his
during coverture, and on the birth of a living child, it became his
during his life. He could squander it in dissipation or bestow it upon
harlots, and the wife could not touch or interfere with it. Prior to
1860, the husband could by will take the custody of his infant children
away from the surviving mother, and give it to whom he pleased--and he
could in like manner dispose of the control of the children's property,
after his death, during their minority, without the mother's consent.
In most of these respects the state of the law has undergone great
changes within the last 25 years. The property, real and personal, which
a woman possesses before marriage, and such as may be given to her
during coverture, remains her own, and is free from the control of her
husband.
If a married woman is slandered she can prosecute in her own name the
slanderer, and recover to her own use damages for the injury.
The mother now has an equal claim with the father to the custody of
their minor children, and in case of controversy on the subject, courts
may award the custody to either in their discretion.
The husband cannot now by will effectually appoint a guardian for his
infant children without the consent of the mother, if living.
These are certainly great ameliorations of the law; but how have they
been produced? Mainly as the result of the exertions of a few heroic
women, one of the foremost of whom is her who stands arraigned as a
criminal before this Court to-day. For a thousand years the absurdities
and cruelties to which I have alluded have been embedded in the common
law, and in the statute books, and men have not touched them, and would
not until the end of time, had they not been goaded to it by the
persistent efforts of the noble women to whom I have alluded.
Much has been done, but much more remains to be done by women. If they
had possessed the elective franchise, the reforms which have cost them a
quarter of a century of labor would have been accomplished in a year.
They are still subject to taxation upon their property, without any
voice as to the levying or destination of the tax; and are still subject
to laws _made by men_, which subject them to fine and imprisonment for
the same acts which men do with honor and reward--and when brought to
trial no woman is allowed a place on the bench or in the jury box, or a
voice in her behalf at the bar. They are bound to suffer the penalty of
such laws, made and administered solely by men, and to be silent under
the infliction. Give them the ballot, and, although I do not suppose
that any great revolution will be produced, or that all political evils
will be removed, (I am not a believer in political panaceas,) but if I
mistake not, valuable reforms will be introduced which are not now
thought of. Schools, almshouses, hospitals, drinking saloons, and those
worse dens which are destroying the morals and the constitutions of so
many of the young of both sexes, will feel their influence to an extent
now little dreamed of. At all events women will not be taxed without an
opportunity to be heard, and will not be subject to fine and
imprisonment by laws made exclusively by men for doing what it is lawful
and honorable for men to do.
It may be said in answer to the argument in favor of female suffrage
derived from the cases to which I have referred, that men, not
individually, but collectively, are the natural and appropriate
representatives of women, and that, notwithstanding cases of individual
wrong, the rights of women are, on the whole, best protected by being
left to their care. It must be observed, however, that the cases which I
have stated, and which are only types of thousands like them, in their
cruelty and injustice, are the result of ages of legislation by these
assumed protectors of women. The wrongs were less in the men than in the
laws which sustained them, and which contained nothing for the
protection of the women.
But passing this view, let us look at the matter historically and on a
broader field.
If Chinese women were allowed an equal share with men in shaping the
laws of that great empire, would they subject their female children to
torture with bandaged feet, through the whole period of childhood and
growth, in order that they might be cripples for the residue of their
lives?
If Hindoo women could have shaped the laws of India, would widows for
ages have been burned on the funeral pyres of their deceased husbands?
If Jewish women had had a voice in framing Jewish laws, would the
husband, at his own pleasure, have been allowed to "write his wife a
bill of divorcement and give it in her hand, and send her out of his
house?"
Would women in Turkey or Persia have made it a heinous, if not capital,
offence for a wife to be seen abroad with her face not covered by an
impenetrable veil?
Would women in England, however learned, have been for ages subjected to
execution for offences for which men, who could read, were only
subjected to burning in the hand and a few months imprisonment?
The principle which governs in these cases, or which has done so
hitherto, has been at all times and everywhere the same. Those who
succeed in obtaining power, no matter by what means, will, with rare
exceptions, use it for their exclusive benefit. Often, perhaps
generally, this is done in the honest belief that such use is for the
best good of all who are affected by it. A wrong, however, to those upon
whom it is inflicted, is none the less a wrong by reason of the good
motives of the party by whom it is inflicted.
The condition of subjection in which women have been held is the result
of this principle; the result of superior strength, not of superior
rights, on the part of men. Superior strength, combined with ignorance
and selfishness, but not with malice. It is a relic of the barbarism in
the shadow of which nations have grown up. Precisely as nations have
receded from barbarism the severity of that subjection has been relaxed.
So long as merely physical power governed in the affairs of the world,
the wrongs done to women were without the possibility of redress or
relief; but since nations have come to be governed by laws, there is
room to hope, though the process may still be a slow one, that injustice
in all its forms, or at least political injustice, may be extinguished.
No injustice can be greater than to deny to any class of citizens not
guilty of crime, all share in the political power of a state, that is,
all share in the choice of rulers, and in the making and administration
of the laws. Persons to which such share is denied, are essentially
slaves, because they hold their rights, if they can be said to have any,
subject to the will of those who hold the political power. For this
reason it has been found necessary to give the ballot to the emancipated
slaves. Until this was done their emancipation was far from complete.
Without a share in the political powers of the state, no class of
citizens has any security for its rights, and the history of nations to
which I briefly alluded, shows that women constitute no exception to the
universality of this rule.
Great errors, I think, exist in the minds of both the advocates and the
opponents of this measure in their anticipation of the immediate
effects to be produced by its adoption. On the one hand it is supposed
by some that the character of women would be radically changed--that
they would be unsexed, as it were, by clothing them with political
rights, and that instead of modest, amiable and graceful beings, we
should have bold, noisy and disgusting political demagogues, or
something worse, if anything worse can be imagined. I think those who
entertain such opinions are in error. The innate character of women is
the result of God's laws, not of man's, nor can the laws of man affect
that character beyond a very slight degree. Whatever rights may be given
to them, and whatever duties may be charged upon them by human laws,
their general character will remain unchanged. Their modesty, their
delicacy, and intuitive sense of propriety, will never desert them, into
whatever new positions their added rights or duties may carry them.
So far as women, without change of character as women, are qualified to
discharge the duties of citizenship, they will discharge them if called
upon to do so, and beyond that they will not go. Nature has put barriers
in the way of any excessive devotion of women to public affairs, and it
is not necessary that nature's work in that respect should be
supplemented by additional barriers invented by men. Such offices as
women are qualified to fill will be sought by those who do not find
other employment, and others they will not seek, or if they do, will
seek in vain. To aid in removing as far as possible the disheartening
difficulties which women dependent upon their own exertions encounter,
it is, I think, desirable that such official positions as they can fill
should be thrown open to them, and that they should be given the same
power that men have to aid each other by their votes. I would say,
remove all legal barriers that stand in the way of their finding
employment, official or unofficial, and leave them as men are left, to
depend for success upon their character and their abilities. As long as
men are allowed to act as milliners, with what propriety can they
exclude women from the post of school commissioners when chosen to such
positions by their neighbors? To deny them such rights, is to leave them
in a condition of political servitude as absolute as that of the African
slaves before their emancipation. This conclusion is readily to be
deduced from the opinion of Chief Justice Jay in the case of _Chisholm's
Ex'rs vs. The State of Georgia (2 Dallas, 419-471)_, although the
learned Chief Justice had of course no idea of any such application as I
make of his opinion.
The action was assumpsit by a citizen of the State of South Carolina,
and the question was, whether the United States Court had jurisdiction,
the State of Georgia declining to appear.
The Chief Justice, in the course of his opinion, after alluding to the
feudal idea of the character of the sovereign in England, and giving
some of the reasons why he was not subject to suit before the courts of
the kingdom, says:
"The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and
constantly remind us of the distinction between the prince and the
subject. No such ideas obtain here. At the revolution the sovereignty
devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the
country, but _they are sovereigns without subjects_ (unless the African
slaves among us may be so called), and have none to govern but
themselves; the citizens of America _are equal as fellow-citizens, and
as joint tenants in the sovereignty_."
Now I beg leave to ask, in case this charge against Miss Anthony can be
sustained, what equality and what sovereignty is enjoyed by the half of
the citizens of these United States to which she belongs? Do they not,
in that event, occupy, _politically_, exactly the position which the
learned Chief Justice assigns to the African slaves? Are they not shown
to be _subjects_ of the other half, who are the sovereigns? And is not
their _political subjection_ as absolute as was that of the African
slaves? If that charge has any basis to rest upon, the learned Chief
Justice was wrong. The sovereigns of this country, according to the
theory of this prosecution, are not sovereigns without subjects. Though
two or three millions of their subjects have lately ceased to be such,
and have become freemen, they still hold twenty millions of subjects in
absolute _political_ bondage.
If it be said that my language is stronger than the facts warrant, I
appeal _to the record in this case_ for its justification.
As deductions from what has been said, I respectfully insist, 1st. That
upon the principles upon which our government is based, the privilege of
the elective franchise cannot justly be denied to women. 2d. That women
need it for their protection. 3d. That the welfare of both sexes will be
promoted by granting it to them.
Having occupied much more time than I intended in showing the justice
and propriety of the claim made by my client to the privileges of a
voter, I proceed to the consideration of the present state of the law on
that subject:
It would not become me, however clear my own convictions may be on the
subject, to assert the right of women, under our constitution and laws
as they now are, to vote at presidential and congressional elections, is
free from doubt, because very able men have expressed contrary opinions
on that question, and, so far as I am informed, there has been no
authoritative adjudication upon it; or, at all events, none upon which
the public mind has been content to rest as conclusive. I proceed,
therefore, to offer such suggestions as occur to me, and to refer to
such authorities bearing upon the question, as have fallen under my
observation, hoping to satisfy your honor, not only that my client has
committed no criminal offense, but that she has done nothing which she
had not a legal and constitutional right to do.
It is not claimed that, under our State constitution and the laws made
in pursuance of it, women are authorized to vote at elections, other
than those of private corporations, and, consequently, the right of Miss
Anthony to vote at the election in question, can only be established by
reference to an authority superior to and sufficient to overcome the
provisions of our State constitution. Such authority can only be found,
and I claim that it is found in the constitution of the United States.
For convenience I beg leave to bring together the various provisions of
that constitution which bear more or less directly upon the question:
ARTICLE I, Section 2. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members chosen every second year, by the people of the several States;
and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature."
The same Article, Section 3, "The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two senators from each State, chosen by the legislature
thereof for six years; and each senator shall have one vote."
ARTICLE II, Section 1. "Each State shall appoint in such manner as the
legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole
number of senators and representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress."
ARTICLE IV, Section 2. "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
Same Article, Section 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every
State in the union a republican form of government."
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT.
DECEMBER 18, 1865.
"1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
"2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
JULY 28, 1868.
Section 1. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Section 2. "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the
right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State."
* * * * *
Section 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Section 1. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account
of race, color or previous condition of servitude."
Section 2. "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."
By reference to the provisions of the original Constitution, here
recited, it appears that prior to the thirteenth, if not until the
fourteenth, amendment, the whole power over the elective franchise, even
in the choice of Federal officers, rested with the States. The
Constitution contains no definition of the term "citizen," either of the
United States, or of the several States, but contents itself with the
provision that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." The States
were thus left free to place such restrictions and limitations upon the
"privileges and immunities" of citizens as they saw fit, so far as is
consistent with a republican form of government, subject only to the
condition that no State could place restrictions upon the "privileges or
immunities" of the citizens of any other State, which would not be
applicable to its own citizens under like circumstances.
It will be seen, therefore, that the whole subject, as to what should
constitute the "privileges and immunities" of the citizen being left to
the States, no question, such as we now present, could have arisen under
the original constitution of the United States.
But now, by the fourteenth amendment, the United States have not only
declared what constitutes citizenship, both in the United States and in
the several States, securing the rights of citizens to "all persons born
or naturalized in the United States;" but have absolutely prohibited the
States from making or enforcing "_any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States_."
By virtue of this provision, I insist that the act of Miss Anthony in
voting was lawful.
It has never, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, been
questioned, and cannot be questioned, that women as well as men are
included in the terms of its first section, nor that the same
"privileges and immunities of citizens" are equally secured to both.
What, then, are the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States" which are secured against such abridgement, by this section? I
claim that these terms not only include the right of voting for public
officers, but that they include that right as pre-eminently the most
important of all the privileges and immunities to which the section
refers. Among these privileges and immunities may doubtless be classed
the right to life and liberty, to the acquisition and enjoyment of
property, and to the free pursuit of one's own welfare, so far as such
pursuit does not interfere with the rights and welfare of others; but
what security has any one for the enjoyment of these rights when denied
any voice in the making of the laws, or in the choice of those who make,
and those who administer them? The possession of this voice, in the
making and administration of the laws--this _political_ right--is what
gives security and value to the other rights, which are merely personal,
not political. A person deprived of political rights is essentially a
slave, because he holds his personal rights subject to the will of those
who possess the political power. This principle constitutes the very
corner-stone of our government--indeed, of all republican government.
Upon that basis our separation from Great Britain was justified.
"Taxation without representation is tyranny." This famous aphorism of
James Otis, although sufficient for the occasion when it was put forth,
expresses but a fragment of the principle, because government can be
oppressive through means of many appliances besides that of taxation.
The true principle is, that all government over persons deprived of any
voice in such government, is tyranny. That is the principle of the
declaration of independence. We were slow in allowing its application to
the African race, and have been still slower in allowing its application
to women; but it has been done by the fourteenth amendment, rightly
construed, by a definition of "citizenship," which includes women as
well as men, and in the declaration that "the privileges and immunities
of citizens shall not be abridged." If there is any privilege of the
citizen which is paramount to all others, it is the right of suffrage;
and in a constitutional provision, designed to secure the most valuable
rights of the citizen, the declaration that the privileges and
immunities of the citizen shall not be abridged, must, as I conceive, be
held to secure that right before all others. It is obvious, when the
entire language of the section is examined, not only that this
declaration was designed to secure to the citizen this _political_
right, but that such was its principal, if not its sole object, those
provisions of the section which follow it being devoted to securing the
_personal_ rights of "life, liberty, property, and the equal protection
of the laws." The clause on which we rely, to wit:--"No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States," might be stricken out of the section,
and the residue would secure to the citizen every right which is now
secured, excepting the political rights of voting and holding office.
_If the clause in question does not secure those political rights, it is
entirely nugatory, and might as well have been omitted._
If we go to the lexicographers and to the writers upon law, to learn
what are the privileges and immunities of the "citizen" in a republican
government, we shall find that the leading feature of citizenship is the
enjoyment of the right of suffrage.
The definition of the term "citizen" by _Bouvier_ is: "One who under the
constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote for
Representatives in Congress, and other public officers, and who is
qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people."
By _Worcester_--"An inhabitant of a republic who enjoys the rights of a
freeman, and has a right to vote for public officers."
By _Webster_--"In the United States, a person, native or naturalized,
who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, or the
qualifications which enable him to vote for rulers, and to purchase and
hold real estate."
The meaning of the word "citizen" is directly and plainly recognized by
the latest amendment of the constitution (the fifteenth.)
"_The right of the citizens of the United States to vote_ shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." This clause assumes
that the right of citizens, _as such_, to vote, is an existing right.
Mr. Richard Grant White, in his late work on Words and their Uses, says
of the word citizen: "A citizen is a person who has certain political
rights, and the word is properly used only to imply or suggest the
possession of these rights."
Mr. Justice Washington, in the case of _Corfield vs. Coryell (4 Wash,
C.C. Rep. 380)_, speaking of the "privileges and immunities" of the
citizen, as mentioned in Sec. 2, Art. 4, of the constitution, after
enumerating the personal rights mentioned above, and some others, as
embraced by those terms, says, "to which may be added the elective
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of
the State in which it is to be exercised." At that time the States had
entire control of the subject, and could abridge this privilege of the
citizen at its pleasure; but the judge recognizes the "elective
franchise" as among the "privileges and immunities" secured, to a
qualified extent, to the citizens of every State by the provisions of
the constitution last referred to. When, therefore, the States were, by
the fourteenth amendment, absolutely prohibited from abridging the
privileges of the citizen, either by enforcing existing laws, or by the
making of new laws, the right of every "citizen" to the full exercise of
this privilege, as against State action, was absolutely secured.
Chancellor Kent and Judge Story both refer to the opinion of Mr. Justice
Washington, above quoted, with approbation.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in the case of _Amy, a woman of color,
vs. Smith (1 Littell's Rep. 326)_, discussed with great ability the
questions as to what constituted citizenship, and what were the
"privileges and immunities of citizens" which were secured by Sec. 2,
Art. 4, of the constitution, and they showed, by an unanswerable
argument, that the term "citizens," as there used, was confined to those
who were entitled to the enjoyment of the elective franchise, and that
that was among the highest of the "privileges and immunities" secured
to the citizen by that section. The court say that, "to be a citizen it
is necessary that he should be entitled to the enjoyment of these
privileges and immunities, upon the same terms upon which they are
conferred upon other citizens; and unless he is so entitled, _he cannot,
in the proper sense of the term, be a citizen_."
In the case of _Scott vs. Sanford (19 How. 404)_, Chief Justice Taney
says: "The words 'people of the United States,' and 'citizens,' are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing; they describe the _political
body, who, according to our republican institutions, form the
sovereignty and hold the power, and conduct the government through their
representatives_. They are what we familiarly call the sovereign people,
and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of
this sovereignty."
Mr. Justice Daniel, in the same case, (p. 476), says: "Upon the
principles of etymology alone, the term citizen, as derived from
_civitas_, conveys the idea of connection or identification with the
state or government, and a participation in its functions. But beyond
this, there is not, it is believed, to be found in the theories of
writers on government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried, an
exposition of the term citizen, which has not been understood as
conferring the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right of
acquisition and enjoyment of _an entire equality of privileges, civil
and political_."
Similar references might be made to an indefinite extent, but enough has
been said to show that the term citizen, in the language of Mr. Justice
Daniel, conveys the idea "of identification with the state or
government, and a participation in its functions."
Beyond question, therefore, the first section of the fourteenth
amendment, by placing the citizenship of women upon a par with that of
men, and declaring that the "privileges and immunities" of the citizen
shall not be abridged, has secured to women, equally with men, the right
of suffrage, unless that conclusion is overthrown by some other
provision of the constitution.
It is not necessary for the purposes of this argument to claim that this
amendment prohibits a state from making or enforcing any law whatever,
regulating the elective franchise, or prescribing the conditions upon
which it may be exercised. But we do claim that in every republic the
right of suffrage, in some form and to some extent, is not only one of
the privileges of its citizens, but is the first, most obvious and most
important of all the privileges they enjoy; that in this respect _all
citizens are equal_, and that the effect of this amendment is, to
prohibit the States from enforcing any law which denies this right to
any of its citizens, or which imposes any restrictions upon it, which
are inconsistent with a republican form of government. Within this
limit, it is unnecessary for us to deny that the States may still
regulate and control the exercise of the right.
The only provisions of the constitution, which it can be contended
conflict with the construction which has here been put upon the first
section of the fourteenth amendment, are the fifteenth amendment, and
the second section of the fourteenth.
In regard to the fifteenth amendment, I shall only say, that if my
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is correct, there was still
an object to be accomplished and which was accomplished by the
fifteenth. The prohibition of any action abridging the privileges and
immunities of citizens, contained in the fourteenth amendment, applies
only to the States, and leaves the United States government free to
abridge the political privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, as such, at its pleasure. By the fifteenth amendment both
the United States and the State governments, are prohibited from
exercising this power, "on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude" of the citizen.
The first remark to be made upon the second section of the fourteenth
amendment is, that it does not give and was not designed to give to the
States any power to deny or abridge the right of any citizen to exercise
the elective franchise. So far as it touches that subject, it was
designed to be restrictive upon the States. It gives to them no power
whatever. It takes away no power, but it gives none, and if the States
possess the power to deny or abridge the right of citizens to vote, it
must be derived from some other provision of the constitution. I believe
none such can be found, which was not necessarily abrogated by the first
section of this amendment.
It may be conceded that the persons who prepared this section supposed,
that, by other parts of the constitution, or in some other way, the
States would still be authorized, notwithstanding the provisions of the
first section, to deny to the citizens the privilege of voting, as
mentioned in the second section; but their mistake cannot be held to add
to, or to take from the other provisions of the constitution. It is very
clear that they did not intend, by this section, _to give_ to the States
any such power, but, believing that the States possessed it, they
designed to hold the prospect of a reduction of their representation in
Congress _in terrorem_ over them to prevent them from exercising it.
They seem not to have been able to emancipate themselves from the
influence of the original constitution which conceded this power to the
States, or to have realized the fact that the first section of the
amendment, when adopted, would wholly deprive the States of that power.
But those who prepare constitutions are never those who adopt them, and
consequently the views of those who frame them have little or no bearing
upon their interpretation. The question for consideration here is, what
the people, who, through their representatives in the legislatures,
adopted the amendments, understood, or must be presumed to have
understood, from their language. They must be presumed to have known
that the "privileges and immunities" of citizens which were secured to
them by the first section beyond the power of abridgment by the States,
gave them the right to exercise the elective franchise, and they
certainly cannot be presumed to have understood that the second section,
which was also _designed to be restrictive_ upon the States, would be
held to confer by implication a power upon them, which the first section
in the most express terms prohibited.
It has been, and may be again asserted, that the position which I have
taken in regard to the second section is inadmissible, because it
renders the section nugatory. That is, as I hold, an entire mistake. The
leading object of the second section was the readjustment of the
representation of the States in Congress, rendered necessary by the
abolition of chattel slavery [_not of political slavery_], effected by
the thirteenth amendment. This object the section accomplishes, and in
this respect it remains wholly untouched, by my construction of it.
Neither do I think the position tenable which has been taken by one
tribunal, to which the consideration of this subject was presented, that
the constitutional provision does not execute itself.
The provisions on which we rely were negative merely, and were designed
to nullify existing as well as any future State legislation interfering
with our rights. This result was accomplished by the constitution
itself. Undoubtedly before we could exercise our right, it was necessary
that there should be a time and place appointed for holding the election
and proper officers to hold it, with suitable arrangements for receiving
and counting the votes. All this was properly done by existing
laws, and our right _being made complete by the Constitution, no further
legislation was required in our behalf_. When the State officers
attempted to interpose between us and the ballot-box the State
Constitution or State law, whether ancient or recent, abridging or
denying our equal right to vote with other citizens, we had but to refer
to the United States Constitution, prohibiting the States from enforcing
any such constitutional provision or law, and our rights were complete;
we needed neither Congressional nor State legislation in aid of them.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, in a case in the United States
Circuit Court in New Orleans (_1 Abb. U.S. Rep. 402_) would seem to be
decisive of this question, although the right involved in that case was
not that of the elective franchise. The learned justice says: "It was
very ably contended on the part of the defendants that the fourteenth
amendment was intended only to secure to all citizens _equal capacities
before the law_. That was at first our view of it. But it does not so
read. The language is: 'No State shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.' What are the privileges
and immunities of citizens? Are they capacities merely? Are they not
also rights?"
Senator Carpenter, who took part in the discussion of the fourteenth
amendment in the Senate, and aided in its passage, says: "The fourteenth
amendment executes itself in _every_ State of the Union.... It is thus
the will of the United States in every State, and silences every State
Constitution, usage or law which conflicts with it.... And if this
provision does protect the colored citizen, then it protects every
citizen, black or white, male or female.... And all the privileges and
immunities which I vindicate to a colored citizen, I vindicate to our
mothers, our sisters and our daughters."--_Chicago Legal News_, vol.
iv., No. 15.
It has been said, with how much or how little truth I do not know, that
the subject of securing to women the elective franchise was not
considered in the preparation, or in the adoption of these amendments.
It is wholly immaterial whether that was so or not. It is never possible
to arrive at the intention of the people in adopting constitutions,
except by referring to the language used. As is said by Mr. Cooley, "the
intent is to be found in the instrument itself" (p. 55), and to that I
have confined my remarks. It is not a new thing for constitutional and
legislative acts to have an effect beyond the anticipation of those who
framed them. It is undoubtedly true, that in exacting _Magna Charta_
from King John, the Barons of England provided better securities for the
rights of the common people than they were aware of at the time,
although the rights of the common people were neither forgotten nor
neglected by them. It has also been said, perhaps with some truth, that
the framers of the original Constitution of the United States "builded
better than they knew;" and it is quite possible that in framing the
amendments under consideration, those engaged in doing it have
accomplished a much greater work than they were at the time aware of. I
am quite sure that it will be fortunate for the country, if this great
question of female suffrage, than which few greater were ever presented
for the consideration of any people, shall be found, almost
unexpectedly, to have been put at rest.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, in regard to this amendment, in the
case before referred to, if I understand it, corresponds very nearly
with what I have here said. The learned judge, in one part of his
opinion, says: "It is possible that those who framed the article were
not themselves aware of the far-reaching character of its terms. They
may have had in mind but one particular phase of social and political
wrong, which they desired to redress--yet, if the amendment, as framed
and expressed, does, in fact, have a broader meaning, and does extend
its protecting shield over those who were never thought of when it was
conceived and put in form, and does reach such social evils which were
never before prohibited by constitutional amendment, it is to be
presumed that the American people, in giving it their imprimatur,
understood what they were doing, and meant to decree what has, in fact,
been done....
"It embraces much more. The 'privileges and immunities' secured by the
original Constitution were only such as each State gave its own
citizens. Each was prohibited from discriminating in favor of its own
citizens, and against the citizens of other States.
"But the fourteenth amendment prohibits any State from abridging the
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, whether
its own citizens or any others. It not merely requires equality of
privileges, but it demands that _the privileges and immunities of all
citizens shall be absolutely unabridged, unimpaired_. (_1 Abbott's U.S.
Rep. 397._)
It will doubtless be urged as an objection to my position (that
citizenship carries with it the right to vote) that it would, in that
case, follow that infants and lunatics, who, as well as adults and
persons of sound mind, are citizens, would also have that right. This
objection, which appears to have great weight with certain classes of
persons, is entirely without force. It takes no note of the familiar
fact, that every legislative provision, whether constitutional or
statutory, which confers any _discretionary_ power, is always confined
in its operation to persons who are _compos mentis_. It is wholly
unnecessary to except idiots and lunatics out of any such statute. They
are excluded from the very nature of the case. The contrary supposition
would be simply absurd. And, in respect to every such law, infants,
during their minority, are in the same class. But are women, _who are
not infants_, ever included in this category? Does any such principle
of exclusion apply to them? Not at all. On the contrary, they stand, in
this respect, upon the same footing as men, with the sole exception of
the right to vote and the right to hold office. In every other respect,
whatever rights and powers are conferred upon persons by law may be
exercised by women as well as by men. They may transact any kind of
business for themselves, or as agents or trustees for others; may be
executors or administrators, with the same powers and responsibilities
as men; and it ought not to be a matter of surprise or regret that they
are now placed, by the fourteenth amendment, in other respects upon a
footing of perfect equality.
Although not directly connected with the argument as to the right
secured to women by the Constitution, I deem it not improper to allude
briefly to some of the popular objections against the propriety of
allowing females the privilege of voting. I do this because I know from
past experience that these popular objections, having no logical bearing
upon the subject, are yet, practically, among the most potent arguments
against the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, which I consider
the only one that its language fairly admits of.
It is said that women do not desire to vote. Certainly many women do
not, but that furnishes no reason for denying the right to those who do
desire to vote. Many men decline to vote. Is that a reason for denying
the right to those who would vote?
I believe, however, that the public mind is greatly in error in regard
to the proportion of female citizens who would vote if their right to do
so were recognized. In England there has been to some extent a test of
that question, with the following result, as given in the newspapers,
the correctness of which, in this respect, I think there is no reason to
doubt:
"Woman suffrage is, to a certain extent, established in England, with
the result as detailed in the London _Examiner_, that in 66 municipal
elections, out of every 1,000 women who enjoy equal rights with men on
the register, 516 went to the poll, which is but 48 less than the
proportionate number of men. And out of 27,949 women registered, where a
contest occurred, 14,416 voted. Of men there were 166,781 on the
register, and 90,080 at the poll. The _Examiner_ thereupon draws this
conclusion: 'Making allowance for the reluctance of old spinsters to
change their habits, and the more frequent illness of the sex, it is
manifest that women, if they had opportunity, would exercise the
franchise as freely as men. There is an end, therefore, of the argument
that women would not vote if they had the power.'"
Our law books furnish, perhaps, more satisfactory evidence of the
earnestness with which women in England are claiming the right to vote,
under the reform act of 1867, aided by Lord Brougham's act of 1850.
The case of _Chorlton_, appellant, _vs. Lings_, respondent, came before
the Court of Common Pleas in England in 1869. It was an appeal from the
decision of the revising barrister, for the borough of Manchester, to
the effect "that Mary Abbott, being a woman, was not entitled to be
placed on the register." Her right was perfect in all respects excepting
that of sex. The court, after a very full and able discussion of the
subject, sustained the decision of the revising barrister, denying to
women the right to be placed on the register, and consequently denying
their right to vote. The decision rested upon the peculiar phraseology
of several Acts of Parliament, and the point decided has no
applicability here. My object in referring to the case has been to call
attention to the fact stated by the reporter, _that appeals of 5,436
other women were consolidated and decided with this_. No better evidence
could be furnished of the extent and earnestness of the claim of women
in England to exercise the elective franchise.--_Law Rep. Com. Pleas,
4-374._
I infer, without being able to say how the fact is, that the votes given
by women, as mentioned in the newspapers, were given at municipal
elections merely, and that the cases decided by the Court of Common
Pleas relate to elections for members of Parliament.
Another objection is, that the right to hold office must attend the
right to vote, and that women are not qualified to discharge the duties
of responsible offices.
I beg leave to answer this objection by asking one or more questions.
How many of the male bipeds who do our voting are qualified to hold high
offices? How many of the large class to whom the right of voting is
supposed to have been secured by the fifteenth amendment, are qualified
to hold office?
Whenever the qualifications of persons to discharge the duties of
responsible offices is made the test of their right to vote, and we are
to have a competitive examination on that subject, open to all
claimants, my client will be content to enter the lists, and take her
chances among the candidates for such honors.
But the practice of the world, and our own practice, give the lie to
this objection. Compare the administration of female sovereigns of great
kingdoms, from Semiramis to Victoria, with the average administration of
male sovereigns, and which will suffer by the comparison? How often have
mothers governed large kingdoms, as regents, during the minority of
their sons, and governed them well? Such offices as the "sovereigns" who
rule them in this country have allowed women to hold (they having no
voice on the subject), they have discharged the duties of with ever
increasing satisfaction to the public; and Congress has lately passed
an act, making the official bonds of married women valid, so that they
could be appointed to the office of postmaster.
The case of _Olive vs. Ingraham (7 Modern Rep. 263)_ was an action
brought to try the title to an office. On the death of the sexton of the
parish of St. Butolph, the place was to be filled by election, the
voters being the housekeepers who "paid Scot and lot" in the parish. The
widow of the deceased sexton (Sarah Bly) entered the lists against
Olive, the plaintiff in the suit, and received 169 indisputable votes,
and 40 votes given by women who were "housekeepers, and paid to church
and poor." The plaintiff had 174 indisputable votes, and 22 votes given
by such women as voted for Mrs. Bly. Mrs. Bly was declared elected. The
action was brought to test two questions: 1. Whether women were legal
voters; and 2. Whether a woman was capable of holding the office. The
case was four times argued in the King's Bench, and all the judges
delivered opinions, holding that the women were competent voters; that
the widow was properly elected, and could hold the office.
In the course of the discussion it was shown that women had held many
offices, those of constable, church warden, overseer of the poor, keeper
of the "gate house" (a public prison), governess of a house of
correction, keeper of castles, sheriffs of counties, and high constable
of England.
If women are legally competent to hold minor offices, I would be glad to
have the rule of law, or of propriety, shown which should exclude them
from higher offices, and which marks the line between those which they
may and those which they may not hold.
Another objection is that women cannot serve as soldiers. To this I
answer that capacity for military service has never been made a test of
the right to vote. If it were, young men from sixteen to twenty-one
would be entitled to vote, and old men from sixty and up-wards would
not. If that were the test, some women would present much stronger
claims than many of the male sex.
Another objection is that engaging in political controversies is not
consistent with the feminine character. Upon that subject, women
themselves are the best judges, and if political duties should be found
inconsistent with female delicacy, we may rest assured that women will
either effect a change in the character of political contests, or
decline to engage in them. This subject may be safely left to their
sense of delicacy and propriety.
If any difficulty on this account should occur, it may not be impossible
to receive the votes of women at their places of residence. This method
of voting was practiced in ancient Rome under the republic; and it will
be remembered that when the votes of the soldiers who were fighting our
battles in the Southern States were needed to sustain their friends at
home, no difficulty was found in the way of taking their votes at their
respective camps.
I humbly submit to your honor, therefore, that on the constitutional
grounds to which I have referred, Miss Anthony had a lawful right to
vote; that her vote was properly received and counted; that the first
section of the fourteenth amendment secured to her that right, and did
not need the aid of any further legislation.
But conceding that I may be in error in supposing that Miss Anthony had
a right to vote, she has been guilty of no crime, if she voted in good
faith believing that she had such right.
This proposition appears to me so obvious, that were it not for the
severity to my client of the consequences which may follow a conviction,
I should not deem it necessary to discuss it.
To make out the offence, it is incumbent on the prosecution to show
affirmatively, not only that the defendant knowingly voted, but that she
so voted _knowing that she had no right to vote_. That is, the term
"knowingly," applies, not to the fact of voting, but to the fact of
_want of right_. Any other interpretation of the language would be
absurd. We cannot conceive of a case where a party could vote without
knowledge of the fact of voting, and to apply the term "knowingly" to
the more act of voting, would make nonsense of the statute. This word
was inserted as defining the essence of the offence, and it limits the
criminality to cases where the voting is not only without right, but
where it is done wilfully, with a _knowledge that it is without right_.
Short of that there is no offence within the statute. This would be so
upon well established principles, even if the word "knowingly" had been
omitted, but that word was inserted to prevent the possibility of doubt
on the subject, and to furnish security against the inability of stupid
or prejudiced judges or jurors, to distinguish between wilful wrong and
innocent mistake. If the statute had been merely, that "if at any
election for representative in Congress any person shall vote without
having a lawful right to vote, such person shall be deemed guilty of a
crime," there could have been justly no conviction under it, without
proof that the party voted _knowing_ that he had not a right to vote. If
he voted innocently supposing he had the right to vote, but had not, it
would not be an offence within the statute. An innocent mistake is not a
crime, and no amount of judicial decisions can make it such.
Mr. Bishop says, (1 Cr. Law, §205): "There can be no crime unless _a
culpable intent_ accompanies the criminal act." The same author, (1 Cr.
Prac. §521), repeated in other words, the same idea: "In order to
render a party criminally responsible, _a vicious will_ must concur with
a wrongful act."
I quote from a more distinguished author: "_Felony is always accompanied
with an evil intention, and therefore shall not be imputed to a mere
mistake, or misanimadversion_, as where persons break open a door, in
order to execute a warrant, which will not justify such proceeding:
_Affectio enim tua nomen imponit operi tuo: item crimen non contrahitur
nisi nocendi, voluntas intercedat_," which, as I understand, may read:
"For your volition puts the name upon your act; and _a crime is not
committed unless the will of the offender takes part in it_."
1 Hawk. P.C., p. 99, Ch. 85, §3.
This quotation by Hawkins is, I believe, from Bracton, which carries the
principle back to a very early period in the existence of the common
law. It is a principle, however, which underlies all law, and must have
been recognized at all times, wherever criminal law has been
administered, with even the slightest reference to the principles of
common morality and justice.
I quote again on this subject from Mr. Bishop: "The doctrine of _the
intent_ as it prevails in the criminal law, is necessarily _one of the
foundation principles of public justice_. There is only one criterion by
which the guilt of man is to be tested. It is whether the mind is
criminal. Criminal law relates only to crime. And neither in
philosophical speculation, nor in religious or moral sentiment, would
any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless
his mind was so. It is, therefore, a principle of our legal system, as
probably it is of every other, that _the essence of an offence is the
wrongful intent without which it cannot exist_." (_1 Bishop's Crim. Law,
§287._)
Again, the same author, writing on the subject of _knowledge_, as
necessary to establish the intent, says: "It is absolutely necessary to
constitute guilt, as in indictments for uttering forged tokens, or other
attempts to defraud, or for receiving stolen goods, and offences of a
similar description." (_1 Crim. Prac. §504._)
In regard to the offence of obtaining property by false pretenses, the
author says: "The indictment must allege that the defendant knew the
pretenses to be false. _This is necessary upon the general principles of
the law_, in order to show an offence, even though the statute does not
contain the word 'knowingly.'" (_2 Id. §172._)
As to a _presumed knowledge_ of the law, where the fact involves a
question of law, the same author says: "The general doctrine laid down
in the foregoing sections," (i.e. that every man is presumed to know the
law, and that ignorance of the law does not excuse,) "is plain in itself
and plain in its application. Still there are cases, the precise nature
and extent of which are not so obvious, wherein ignorance of the law
constitutes, in a sort of indirect way, not in itself a defence, but a
foundation on which another defence rests. Thus, if the guilt or
innocence of a prisoner, depends on the fact to be found by the jury, of
his having been or not, when he did the act, in some precise mental
condition, _which mental condition is the gist of the offence_, the jury
in determining this question of mental condition, _may_ take into
consideration his ignorance or misinformation in a matter of law. For
example, to constitute larceny, there must be an intent to steal, which
involves the knowledge that the property taken does not belong to the
taker; yet, if all the facts concerning the title are known to the
accused, and so the question is one merely of law whether the property
is his or not, still he may show, and the showing _will be a defence_ to
him against the criminal proceeding, that he _honestly believed it his
through a misapprehension of the law_."
(1 Cr. Law, §297.)
The conclusions of the writer here, are correct, but in a part of the
statement the learned author has thrown some obscurity over his own
principles. The doctrines elsewhere enunciated by him, show with great
clearness, that in such cases _the state of the mind constitutes the
essence of the offence_, and if the state of the mind which the law
condemns does not exist, in connection with the act, there is no
offence. It is immaterial whether its non-existence be owing to
ignorance of law or ignorance of fact, in either case the fact which the
law condemns, the criminal intent, is wanting. It is not, therefore, in
an "indirect way," that ignorance of the law in such cases constitutes a
defence, but in the most direct way possible. It is not a fact which
jurors "may take into consideration," or not, at their pleasure, but
which they must take into consideration, because, in case the ignorance
exists, no matter from what cause, _the offence which the statute
describes is not committed_. In such case, ignorance of the law is not
interposed as a shield to one committing a criminal act, but merely to
show, as it does show, that no criminal act has been committed.
I quote from Sir Mathew Hale on the subject. Speaking of larceny, the
learned author says: "As it is _cepit_ and _asportavit_, so it must be
_felonice_, or _animo furandi_, otherwise it is not felony, for _it is
the mind_ that makes the taking of another's goods to be a felony, or a
bare trespass only; but because the intention and mind are secret, the
intention must be judged of by the circumstances of the fact, and these
circumstances are various, and may sometimes deceive, yet regularly and
ordinarily these circumstances following direct in the case. If A.,
thinking he hath a title to the house of B., seizeth it as his own ...
this regularly makes no felony, but a trespass only; but yet this may be
a trick to colour a felony, and the ordinary discovery of a felonious
intent is, if the party doth it secretly, or being charged with the
goods denies it."
(1 Hales P.C. 509.)
I concede, that if Miss Anthony voted, knowing that as a woman she had
no right to vote, she may properly be convicted, and that if she had
dressed herself in men's apparel, and assumed a man's name, or resorted
to any other artifice to deceive the board of inspectors, the jury might
properly regard her claim of right, to be merely colorable, and might,
in their judgment, pronounce her guilty of the offence charged, in case
the constitution has not secured to her the right she claimed. All I
claim is, that if she voted in perfect good faith, believing that it was
her right, she has committed no crime. An innocent mistake, whether of
law or fact, though a wrongful act may be done in pursuance of it,
cannot constitute a crime.
[The following cases and authorities were referred to and commented upon
by the counsel, as sustaining his positions: _U.S. vs. Conover, 3
McLean's Rep. 573; The State vs. McDonald, 4 Harrington, 555; The State
vs. Homes, 17 Mo. 379; Rex vs. Hall, 3 C. & P. 409, (S.C. 14 Eng. C.L.);
The Queen vs. Reed, 1 C. & M. 306. (S.C. 41 Eng. C.L.); Lancaster's
Case, 3 Leon. 208; Starkie on Ev., Part IV, Vol. 2, p. 828, 3d Am. Ed._]
The counsel then said, there are some cases which I concede cannot be
reconciled with the position which I have endeavoured to maintain, and I
am sorry to say that one of them is found in the reports of this State.
As the other cases are referred to in that, and the principle, if they
can be said to stand on any principle, is in all of them the same, it
will only be incumbent on me to notice that one. That case is not only
irreconcilable with the numerous authorities and the fundamental
principles of criminal law to which I have referred, but the enormity of
its injustice is sufficient alone to condemn it. I refer to the case of
_Hamilton vs. The People_, (_57 Barb. 725_). In that case Hamilton had
been convicted of a misdemeanor, in having voted at a general election,
after having been previously convicted of a felony and sentenced to two
years imprisonment in the state prison, and not having been pardoned;
the conviction having by law deprived him of citizenship and right to
vote, unless pardoned and restored to citizenship. The case came up
before the General Term of the Supreme Court, on writ of error. It
appeared that on the trial evidence was offered, that before the
prisoner was discharged from the state prison, he and his father applied
to the Governor for a pardon, and that the Governor replied in writing,
that on the ground of the prisoner's being a minor at the time of his
discharge from prison, a pardon would not be necessary, and that he
would be entitled to all the rights of a citizen on his coming of age.
They also applied to two respectable counsellors of the Supreme Court,
and they confirmed the Governor's opinion. All this evidence was
rejected. It appeared that the prisoner was seventeen years old when
convicted of the felony, and was nineteen when discharged from prison.
The rejection of the evidence was approved by the Supreme Court on the
ground that the prisoner was bound to know the law, and was presumed to
do so, and his conviction was accordingly confirmed.
Here a young man, innocent so far as his conduct in this case was
involved, was condemned, for acting in good faith upon the advice,
(mistaken advice it may be conceded,) of one governor and two lawyers to
whom he applied for information as to his rights; and this condemnation
has proceeded upon the assumed ground, conceded to be false in fact,
that he knew the advice given to him was wrong. On this judicial fiction
the young man, in the name of justice, is sent to prison, punished for a
mere mistake, and a mistake made in pursuance of such advice. It cannot
be, consistently with the radical principles of criminal law to which I
have referred, and the numerous authorities which I have quoted, that
this man was guilty of a crime, that his _mistake_ was a crime, and I
think the judges who pronounced his condemnation, upon their own
principles, better than their victim, deserved the punishment which they
inflicted.
The condemnation of Miss Anthony, her good faith being conceded, would
do no less violence to any fair administration of justice.
One other matter will close what I have to say. Miss Anthony believed,
and was advised that she had a right to vote. She may also have been
advised, as was clearly the fact, that the question as to her right
could not be brought before the courts for trial, without her voting or
offering to vote, and if either was criminal, the one was as much so as
the other. Therefore she stands, now arraigned as a criminal, for taking
the only steps by which it was possible to bring the great
constitutional question as to her right, before the tribunals of the
country for adjudication. If for thus acting, in the most perfect good
faith, with motives as pure and impulses as noble as any which can find
place in your honor's breast in the administration of justice, she is by
the laws of her country to be condemned as a criminal, she must abide
the consequences. Her condemnation, however, under such circumstances,
would only add another most weighty reason to those which I have already
advanced, to show that women need the aid of the ballot for their
protection.
Upon the remaining question, of the good faith of the defendant, it is
not necessary for me to speak. That she acted in the most perfect good
faith stands conceded.
Thanking your honor for the great patience with which you have listened
to my too extended remarks, I submit the legal questions which the case
involves for your honor's consideration.
* * *
THE COURT addressed the jury as follows:
_Gentlemen of the Jury_:
I have given this case such consideration as I have been able to, and,
that there might be no misapprehension about my views, I have made a
brief statement in writing.
The defendant is indicted under the act of Congress of 1870, for having
voted for Representatives in Congress in November, 1872. Among other
things, that Act makes it an offence for any person knowingly to vote
for such Representatives without having a right to vote. It is charged
that the defendant thus voted, she not having a right to vote because
she is a woman. The defendant insists that she has a right to vote; that
the provision of the Constitution of this State limiting the right to
vote to persons of the male sex is in violation of the 14th Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States, and is void. The 13th, 14th and
15th Amendments were designed mainly for the protection of the newly
emancipated negroes, but full effect must nevertheless be given to the
language employed. The 13th Amendment provided that neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude should longer exist in the United States. If
honestly received and fairly applied, this provision would have been
enough to guard the rights of the colored race. In some States it was
attempted to be evaded by enactments cruel and oppressive in their
nature, as that colored persons were forbidden to appear in the towns
except in a menial capacity; that they should reside on and cultivate
the soil without being allowed to own it; that they were not permitted
to give testimony in cases where a white man was a party. They were
excluded from performing particular kinds of business, profitable and
reputable, and they were denied the right of suffrage. To meet the
difficulties arising from this state of things, the 14th and 15th
Amendments were enacted.
The 14th Amendment created and defined citizenship of the United States.
It had long been contended, and had been held by many learned
authorities, and had never been judicially decided to the contrary, that
there was no such thing as a citizen of the United States, except as
that condition arose from citizenship of some State. No mode existed, it
was said, of obtaining a citizenship of the United States except by
first becoming a citizen of some State. This question is now at rest.
The 14th Amendment defines and declares who should be citizens of the
United States, to wit: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The latter
qualification was intended to exclude the children of foreign
representatives and the like. With this qualification every person born
in the United States or naturalized is declared to be a citizen of the
United States, and of the State wherein he resides. After creating and
defining citizenship of the United States, the Amendment provides that
no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States. This clause
is intended to be a protection, not to all our rights, but to our rights
as citizens of the United States only; that is, the rights existing or
belonging to that condition or capacity. The words "or citizen of a
State," used in the previous paragraph are carefully omitted here. In
article 4, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of the United States it had
been already provided in this language, viz: "the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens
in the several States." The rights of citizens of the States and of
citizens of the United States are each guarded by these different
provisions. That these rights were separate and distinct, was held in
the Slaughter House Cases recently decided by the United States Supreme
Court at Washington. The rights of citizens of the State, as such, are
not under consideration in the 14th Amendment. They stand as they did
before the adoption of the 14th Amendment, and are fully guaranteed by
other provisions. The rights of citizens of the States have been the
subject of judicial decision on more than one occasion. _Corfield agt.
Coryell, 4 Wash.; C.C.R., 371. Ward agt. Maryland; 12 Wall., 430. Paul
agt. Virginia, 8 Wall., 140._
These are the fundamental privileges and immunities belonging of right
to the citizens of all free governments, such as the right of life and
liberty; the right to acquire and possess property, to transact
business, to pursue happiness in his own manner, subject to such
restraint as the Government may adjudge to be necessary for the general
good. In _Cromwell agt. Nevada, 6 Wallace, 36_, is found a statement of
some of the rights of a citizen of the United States, viz: "To come to
the seat of the Government to assert any claim he may have upon the
Government, to transact any business he may have with it; to seek its
protection; to share its offices; to engage in administering its
functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports through which
all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries,
land offices, and courts of justice in the several States." Another
privilege of a citizen of the United States, says Miller, Justice, in
the "Slaughter House" cases, is to demand the care and protection of the
Federal Government over his life, liberty and property when on the high
seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. The right to
assemble and petition for a redress of grievances, the privilege of the
writ of _habeas corpus_, he says, are rights of the citizen guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution.
The right of voting, or the privilege of voting, is a right or privilege
arising under the Constitution of the State, and not of the United
States. The qualifications are different in the different States.
Citizenship, age, sex, residence, are variously required in the
different States, or may be so. If the right belongs to any particular
person, it is because such person is entitled to it by the laws of the
State where he offers to exercise it, and not because of citizenship of
the United States. If the State of New York should provide that no
person should vote until he had reached the age of 31 years, or after he
had reached the age of 50, or that no person having gray hair, or who
had not the use of all his limbs, should be entitled to vote, I do not
see how it could be held to be a violation of any right derived or held
under the Constitution of the United States. We might say that such
regulations were unjust, tyrannical, unfit for the regulation of an
intelligent State; but if rights of a citizen are thereby violated, they
are of that fundamental class derived from his position as a citizen of
the State, and not those limited rights belonging to him as a citizen of
the United States, and such was the decision in _Corfield agt. Coryell_.
(Supra.) The United States rights appertaining to this subject are those
first under article I, paragraph 2, of the United States Constitution,
which provides that electors of Representatives in Congress shall have
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State Legislature, and second, under the 15th Amendment, which
provides that the right of a citizen of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. If the
Legislature of the State of New York should require a higher
qualification in a voter for a representative in Congress than is
required for a voter for a Member of Assembly, this would, I conceive,
be a violation of a right belonging to one as a citizen of the United
States. That right is in relation to a Federal subject or interest, and
is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The inability of a State to
abridge the right of voting on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, arises from a Federal guaranty. Its violation
would be the denial of a Federal right--that is a right belonging to the
claimant as a citizen of the United States.
This right, however, exists by virtue of the 15th Amendment. If the 15th
Amendment had contained the word "sex," the argument of the defendant
would have been potent. She would have said, an attempt by a State to
deny the right to vote because one is of a particular sex, is expressly
prohibited by that Amendment. The amendment, however, does not contain
that word. It is limited to race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. The Legislature of the State of New York has seen fit to say,
that the franchise of voting shall be limited to the male sex. In saying
this, there is, in my judgment, no violation of the letter or of the
spirit of the 14th or of the 15th Amendment. This view is assumed in the
second section of the 14th Amendment, which enacts that if the right to
vote for Federal officers is denied by any state to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, except for crime, the basis of representation
of such State shall be reduced in proportion specified. Not only does
this section assume that the right of male inhabitants to vote was the
especial object of its protection, but it assumes and admits the right
of a State, notwithstanding the existence of that clause under which the
defendant claims to the contrary, to deny to classes or portions of the
male inhabitants the right to vote which is allowed to other male
inhabitants. The regulation of the suffrage is thereby conceded to the
States as a State's right. The case of Myra Bradwell, decided at a
recent term of the Supreme Court of the United States, sustains both the
positions above put forth, viz: First, that the rights referred to in
the 14th Amendment are those belonging to a person as a citizen of the
United States and not as a citizen of a State, and second, that a right
of the character here involved is not one connected with citizenship of
the United States. Mrs. Bradwell made application to be admitted to
practice as an attorney and counsellor at law, in the Courts of
Illinois. Her application was denied, and upon appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, it was there held that to give jurisdiction
under the 14th Amendment, the claim must be of a right pertaining to
citizenship of the United States, and that the claim made by her did
not come within that class of cases. Mr. Justice Bradley and Mr.
Justice Field held that a woman was not entitled to a license to
practice law. It does not appear that the other Judges passed upon that
question.
The 14th Amendment gives no right to a woman to vote, and the voting by
Miss Anthony was in violation of the law.
If she believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance upon that
belief, does that relieve her from the penalty? It is argued that the
knowledge referred to in the act relates to her knowledge of the
illegality of the act, and not to the act of voting; for it is said that
she must know that she voted. Two principles apply here: First,
ignorance of the law excuses no one; second, every person is presumed to
understand and to intend the necessary effects of his own acts. Miss
Anthony knew that she was a woman, and that the constitution of this
State prohibits her from voting. She intended to violate that
provision--intended to test it, perhaps, but certainly intended to
violate it. The necessary effect of her act was to violate it, and this
she is presumed to have intended. There was no ignorance of any fact,
but all the facts being known, she undertook to settle a principle in
her own person. She takes the risk, and she cannot escape the
consequences. It is said, and authorities are cited to sustain the
position, that there can be no crime unless there is a culpable intent;
to render one criminally responsible a vicious will must be present. A
commits a trespass on the land of B, and B, thinking and believing that
he has a right to shoot an intruder on his premises, kills A on the
spot. Does B's misapprehension of his rights justify his act? Would a
Judge be justified in charging the jury that if satisfied that B
supposed he had a right to shoot A he was justified, and they should
find a verdict of not guilty? No Judge would make such a charge. To
constitute a crime, it is true, that there must be a criminal intent,
but it is equally true that knowledge of the facts of the case is always
held to supply this intent. An intentional killing bears with it
evidence of malice in law. Whoever, without justifiable cause,
intentionally kills his neighbor, is guilty of a crime. The principle is
the same in the case before us, and in all criminal cases. The precise
question now before me has been several times decided, viz.: that one
illegally voting was bound and was assumed to know the law, and that a
belief that he had a right to vote gave no defense, if there was no
mistake of fact. (Hamilton against The People, 57th of Barbour, p. 625;
State against Boyet, 10th of Iredell, p. 336; State against Hart, 6th
Jones, 389; McGuire against State, 7 Humphrey, 54; 15th of Iowa reports,
404.) No system of criminal jurisprudence can be sustained upon any
other principle. Assuming that Miss Anthony believed she had a right to
vote, that fact constitutes no defense if in truth she had not the
right. She voluntarily gave a vote which was illegal, and thus is
subject to the penalty of the law.
Upon this evidence I suppose there is no question for the jury and that
the jury should be directed to find a verdict of guilty.
JUDGE SELDEN: I submit that on the view which your Honor has taken, that
the right to vote and the regulation of it is solely a State matter.
That this whole law is out of the jurisdiction of the United States
Courts and of Congress. The whole law upon that basis, as I understand
it, is not within the constitutional power of the general Government,
but is one which applies to the States. I suppose that it is for the
jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty of a crime or not. And
I therefore ask your Honor to submit to the jury these propositions:
First--If the defendant, at the time of voting, believed that she had a
right to vote and voted in good faith in that belief, she is not guilty
of the offense charged.
Second--In determining the question whether she did or did not believe
that she had a right to vote, the jury may take into consideration, as
bearing upon that question, the advice which she received from the
counsel to whom she applied.
Third--That they may also take into consideration, as bearing upon the
same question, the fact that the inspectors considered the question and
came to the conclusion that she had a right to vote.
Fourth--That the jury have a right to find a general verdict of guilty
or not guilty as they shall believe that she has or has not committed
the offense described in the Statute.
A professional friend sitting by has made this suggestion which I take
leave to avail myself of as bearing upon this question: "The Court has
listened for many hours to an argument in order to decide whether the
defendant has a right to vote. The arguments show the same question has
engaged the best minds of the country as an open question. Can it be
possible that the defendant is to be convicted for acting upon such
advice as she could obtain while the question is an open and undecided
one?"
THE COURT: You have made a much better argument than that, sir.
JUDGE SELDEN: As long as it is an open question I submit that she has
not been guilty of an offense. At all events it is for the jury.
THE COURT: I cannot charge these propositions of course. The question,
gentlemen of the jury, in the form it finally takes, is wholly a
question or questions of law, and I have decided as a question of law,
in the first place, that under the 14th Amendment, which Miss Anthony
claims protects her, she was not protected in a right to vote. And I
have decided also that her belief and the advice which she took does
not protect her in the act which she committed. If I am right in this,
the result must be a verdict on your part of guilty, and I therefore
direct that you find a verdict of guilty.
JUDGE SELDEN: That is a direction no Court has power to make in a
criminal case.
THE COURT: Take the verdict, Mr. Clerk.
THE CLERK: Gentlemen of the jury, hearken to your verdict as the Court
has recorded it. You say you find the defendant guilty of the offense
whereof she stands indicted, and so say you all?
JUDGE SELDEN: I don't know whether an exception is available, but I
certainly must except to the refusal of the Court to submit those
propositions, and especially to the direction of the Court that the jury
should find a verdict of guilty. I claim that it is a power that is not
given to any Court in a criminal case.
Will the Clerk poll the jury?
THE COURT: No. Gentlemen of the jury, you are discharged.
On the next day a motion for a new trial was made by Judge Selden, as
follows:
_May it please the Court_:
The trial of this case commenced with a question of very great
magnitude--whether by the constitution of the United States the right of
suffrage was secured to female equally with male citizens. It is likely
to close with a question of much greater magnitude--whether the right of
trial by jury is absolutely secured by the federal constitution to
persons charged with crime before the federal courts.
I assume, without attempting to produce any authority on the subject,
that this Court has power to grant to the defendant a new trial in case
it should appear that in the haste and in the lack of opportunity for
examination which necessarily attend a jury trial, any material error
should have been committed prejudicial to the defendant, as otherwise no
means whatever are provided by the law for the correction of such
errors.
The defendant was indicted, under the nineteenth section of the act of
Congress of May 31st, 1870, entitled, "An act to enforce the right of
citizens of the United States to vote in the several states of this
Union, and for other purposes," and was charged with having knowingly
voted, without having a lawful right to vote, at the congressional
election in the eighth ward of the City of Rochester, in November last;
the only ground of illegality being that the defendant was a woman.
The provisions of the act of Congress, so far as they bear upon the
present case, are as follows:
"Section 19. If at any election for representative or delegate in the
Congress of the United States, any person shall knowingly personate and
vote, or attempt to vote, in the name of any other person, whether
living, dead or fictitious, or vote more than once at the same election
for any candidate for the same office, or vote at a place where he may
not be lawfully entitled to vote, or vote without having a lawful right
to vote, ... every such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime, and
shall for such crime be liable to prosecution in any court of the United
States, of competent jurisdiction, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment for a term not
exceeding three years, or both, in the discretion of the Court, and
shall pay the costs of prosecution."
It appeared on the trial that before voting the defendant called upon a
respectable lawyer, and asked his opinion whether she had a right to
vote, and he advised her that she had such right, and the lawyer was
examined as a witness in her behalf, and testified that he gave her such
advice, and that he gave it in good faith, believing that she had such
right.
It also appeared that when she offered to vote, the question whether as
a woman she had a right to vote, was raised by the inspectors, and
considered by them in her presence, and they decided that she had a
right to vote, and received her vote accordingly.
It was also shown on the part of the government, that on the examination
of the defendant before the commissioner, on whose warrant she was
arrested, she stated that she should have voted, if allowed to vote,
without reference to the advice she had received from the attorney whose
opinion she had asked; that she was not influenced to vote by that
opinion; that she had before determined to offer her vote, and had no
doubt about her right to vote.
At the close of the testimony the defendant's counsel proceeded to
address the jury, and stated that he desired to present for
consideration three propositions, two of law and one of fact:
First--That the defendant had a lawful right to vote.
Second--That whether she had a lawful right to vote or not, it she
honestly believed that she had that right and voted in good faith in
that belief, she was guilty of no crime.
Third--That when she gave her vote she gave it in good faith, believing
that it was her right to do so.
That the two first propositions presented questions for the Court to
decide, and the last for the jury.
When the counsel had proceeded thus far, the Court suggested that the
counsel had better discuss in the first place the questions of law;
which the counsel proceeded to do, and having discussed the two legal
questions at length, asked leave then to say a few words to the jury on
the question of fact. The Court then said to the counsel that he thought
that had better be left until the views of the Court upon the legal
questions should be made known.
The District Attorney thereupon addressed the Court at length upon the
legal questions, and at the close of his argument the Court delivered an
opinion adverse to the positions of the defendant's counsel upon both of
the legal questions presented, holding that the defendant was not
entitled to vote; and that if she voted in good faith in the belief in
fact that she had a right to vote, it would constitute no defense--the
grounds of the decision on the last point being that she was bound to
know that by law she was not a legal voter, and that even if she voted
in good faith in the contrary belief, it constituted no defense to the
crime with which she was charged. The decision of the Court upon these
questions was read from a written document.
At the close of the reading, the Court said that the decision of these
questions disposed of the case and left no question of fact for the
jury, and that he should therefore direct the jury to find a verdict of
guilty, and proceeded to say to the jury that the decision of the Court
had disposed of all there was in the case, and that he directed them to
find a verdict of guilty, and he instructed the clerk to enter a verdict
of guilty.
At this point, before any entry had been made by the clerk, the
defendant's counsel asked the Court to submit the case to the jury, and
to give to the jury the following several instructions:
First--That if the defendant, at the time of voting, believed that she
had a right to vote, and voted in good faith in that belief, she is not
guilty of the offence charged.
Second--In determining the question whether she did or did not believe
that she had a right to vote, the jury may take into consideration, as
bearing upon that question, the advice which she received from the
counsel to whom she applied.
Third--That they may also take into consideration as bearing upon the
same question, the fact that the inspectors considered the question, and
came to the conclusion that she had a right to vote.
Fourth--That the jury have a right to find a general verdict of guilty
or not guilty, as they shall believe that she has or has not been guilty
of the offense described in the statute.
The Court declined to submit the case to the jury upon any question
whatever, and directed them to render a verdict of guilty against the
defendant.
The defendant's counsel excepted to the decision of the Court upon the
legal questions to its refusal to submit the case to the jury: to its
refusal to give the instructions asked; and to its direction to the jury
to find a verdict of guilty against the defendant--the counsel insisting
that it was a direction which no Court had a right to give in a criminal
case.
The Court then instructed the clerk to take the verdict, and the clerk
said, "Gentlemen of the jury, hearken to the verdict as the Court hath
recorded it. You say you find the defendant guilty of the offence
charged. So say you all."
No response whatever was made by the jury, either by word or sign. They
had not consulted together in their seats or otherwise. Neither of them
had spoken a word. Nor had they been asked whether they had or had not
agreed upon a verdict.
The defendant's counsel then asked that the clerk be requested to poll
the jury. The Court said, "that cannot be allowed. Gentlemen of the
jury, you are discharged," and the jurors left the box. No juror spoke a
word during the trial, from the time they were impanelled to the time of
their discharge.
Now I respectfully submit, that in these proceedings the defendant has
been substantially denied her constitutional right of trial by jury. The
jurors composing the panel have been merely silent spectators of the
conviction of the defendant by the Court. They have had no more share in
her trial and conviction than any other twelve members of the jury
summoned to attend this Court, or any twelve spectators who have sat by
during the trial. If such course is allowable in this case, it must be
equally allowable in all criminal cases, whether the charge be for
treason, murder or any minor grade of offence which can come under the
jurisdiction of a United States court; and as I understand it, if
correct, substantially abolishes the right of trial by jury.
It certainly does so in all those cases, where the judge shall be of the
opinion that the facts which he may regard as clearly proved, lead
necessarily to the guilt of the defendant. Of course by refusing to
submit any question to the jury, the judge refuses to allow counsel to
address the jury in the defendant's behalf.
The constitutional provisions which I insist are violated by this
proceeding are the following:
Constitution of the United States, article 3, section 2. "The trial of
all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury."
Amendments to Constitution, article 6. "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law; and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense."
In accordance with these provisions, I insist that in every criminal
case, where the party has pleaded not guilty, whether upon the trial the
guilt of such party appears to the Judge to be clear or not, the
response to the question, guilty or not guilty, must come from the jury,
must be their voluntary act, and cannot be imposed upon them by the
Court.
No opportunity has been given me to consult precedents on this subject,
but a friend has referred me to an authority strongly supporting my
position, from which I will quote, though I deem a reference to
precedents unnecessary to sustain the plain declarations of the
Constitution: I refer to the case of the _State vs. Shule_, (_10
Iredell, 153_,) the substance of which is stated in _2 Graham &
Waterman_ on New Trials, page 363. Before stating that case I quote from
the text of G. & W.
"The verdict is to be the result of the deliberation of the jury
upon all the evidence in the case. The Court has no right to
anticipate the verdict by an expression of opinion calculated so to
influence the jury as to take from them their independence of
action."
In the _State vs. Shule_, two defendants were indicted for an affray.
"The jury remaining out a considerable time, at the request of the
prosecuting attorney they were sent for by the Court. The Court then
charged them that although Jones, (the other defendant,) had first
commenced a battery upon Shule, yet, if the jury believed the evidence,
the defendant, Shule, was also guilty. Thereupon, one of the jurors
remarked that they had agreed to convict Jones, but were about to acquit
Shule. The Court then charged the jury again, and told them that they
could retire if they thought proper to do so. The jury consulted
together a few minutes in the Court room. The prosecuting attorney
directed the clerk to enter a verdict of guilty as to both defendants.
When the clerk had entered the verdict, the jury were asked to attend to
it, as it was about to be read by the clerk. The clerk then read the
verdict in the hearing of the jury. The jury, upon being requested, if
any of them disagreed to the verdict to make, it known by a nod, seemed
to express their unanimous assent; and no juror expressed his dissent."
In reviewing the case the Court say: "The error complained of is, that
before the jury had announced their verdict, and in fact after they had
intimated an intention to acquit the defendant, Shule, the Court allowed
the clerk to be directed to enter a verdict finding him guilty, and
after the verdict was so entered, allowed the jury to be asked if any of
them disagreed to the verdict which had been recorded by the clerk. No
juror expressed his dissent; but by a nod which appeared to be made by
each juror, expressed their unanimous assent. The innovation is, that
instead of permitting the jury to give their verdict, the Court allows a
verdict to be entered for them, such as it is to be presumed the Court
thinks they ought to render, and then they are asked if any of them
disagree to it; thus making a verdict for them, unless they are bold
enough to stand out against a plain intimation of the opinion of the
Court." A _venire de novo_ was ordered. The principal difference between
this case and the one under consideration is, that in the latter the
Court directed the clerk to enter the verdict, and in the former he was
allowed to do so, and in the latter the Court denied liberty to the
jurors to dissent from the verdict, and in the former the Court allowed
such dissent.
With what jealous care the right of trial by jury in criminal cases has
been guarded by every English speaking people from the days of King
John, indeed from the days of King Alfred, is known to every lawyer and
to every intelligent layman, and it does not seem to me that such a
limitation of that right as is presented by the proceedings in this
case, can be reconciled either with constitutional provisions, with the
practice of courts, with public sentiment on the subject, or with safety
in the administration of justice. How the question would be regarded by
the highest Court of this State may fairly be gathered from its decision
in the case of _Cancemi, 18 N.Y., 128_, where, on a trial for murder,
one juror, some time after the trial commenced, being necessarily
withdrawn, a stipulation was entered into, signed by the
District-Attorney, and by the defendant and his counsel, to the effect
that the trial should proceed before the remaining eleven jurors, and
that their verdict should have the same effect as the verdict of a full
panel would have. A verdict of guilty having been rendered by the eleven
jurors, was set aside and a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeals,
on the ground that the defendant could not, even by his own consent, be
lawfully tried, by a less number of jurors than twelve. It would seem to
follow that he could not waive the entire panel, and effectually consent
to be tried by the Court alone, and still less could the Court, against
his protest, assume the duties of the jury, and effectually pronounce
the verdict of guilty or not guilty in their stead.
It will doubtless be insisted that there was no disputed question of
fact upon which the jury were required to pass. In regard to that, I
insist that however clear and conclusive the proof of the facts might
appear to be, the response to the question, guilty or not guilty, must
under the Constitution come from the jury and could not be supplied by
the judgment of the Court, unless, indeed, the jury should see fit to
render a special verdict, which they always may, but can never be
required, to do.
It was the province of the Court to instruct the jury as to the law, and
to point out to them how clearly the law, on its view of the
established facts, made out the offence; but it has no authority to
instruct them positively on any question of fact, or to order them to
find any particular verdict. That must be their spontaneous work.
But there was a question of fact, which constituted the very essence of
the offence, and one on which the jury were not only entitled to
exercise, but were in duty bound to exercise, their independent
judgment. That question of fact was, whether the defendant, at the time
when she voted, knew that she had not a right to vote. The statute makes
this knowledge the very gist of the offence, without the existence of
which, in the mind of the voter, at the time of voting, there is no
crime. There is none by the statute and none in morals. The existence of
this knowledge, in the mind of the voter, at the time of voting, is
under the statute, necessarily a fact and nothing but a fact, and one
which the jury was bound to find as a fact, before they could, without
violating the statute, find the defendant guilty. The ruling which took
that question away from the jury, on the ground that it was a question
of law and not of fact, and which declared that as a question of law,
the knowledge existed, was, I respectfully submit, a most palpable
error, both in law and justice. It was an error in law, because its
effect was to deny any force whatever to the most important word which
the statute uses in defining the offense--the word "knowingly." It was
also unjust, because it makes the law declare a known falsehood as a
truth, and then by force of that judicial falsehood condemns the
defendant to such punishment as she could only lawfully be subject to,
if the falsehood were a truth.
I admit that it is an established legal maxim that every person
(judicial officers excepted) is bound, and must be presumed, to know the
law. The soundness of this maxim, in all the cases to which it can
properly be applied, I have no desire to question; but it has no
applicability whatever to this case. It applies in every case where a
party does an act which the law pronounces criminal, whether the party
knows or does not know that the law has made the act a crime. That maxim
would have applied to this case, if the defendant had voted, knowing
that she had no legal right to vote; without knowing that the law had
made the act of knowingly voting without a right, a crime. In that case
she would have done the act which the law made a crime, and could not
have shielded herself from the penalty by pleading ignorance of the law.
But in the present case the defendant has not done the act which the law
pronounces a crime. The law has not made the act of voting without a
lawful right to vote, a crime, where it is done by mistake, and in the
belief by the party voting that he has the lawful right to vote. The
crime consists in voting "knowingly," without lawful right. Unless the
knowledge exists in fact, is the very gist of the offence is wanting. To
hold that the law presumes conclusively that such knowledge exists in
all cases where the legal right is wanting, and to reject all evidence
to the contrary, or to deny to such evidence any effect, as has been
done on this trial, is to strike the word "knowingly" out of the
statute--and to condemn the defendant on the legal fiction that she was
acting in bad faith, it being all the while conceded that she was in
fact acting in good faith. I admit that there are precedents to sustain
such ruling, but they cannot be reconciled with the fundamental
principles of criminal law, nor with the most ordinary rules of justice.
Such a ruling cannot but shock the moral sense of all right-minded,
unprejudiced men.
No doubt the assumption by the defendant of a belief of her right to
vote might be made use of by her as a mere cover to secure the privilege
of giving a known illegal vote, and of course that false assumption
would constitute no defence to the charge of illegal voting. If the
defendant had dressed herself in male attire, and had voted as John
Anthony, instead of Susan, she would not be able to protect herself
against a charge of voting with a knowledge that she had no right to
vote, by asserting her belief that she had a right to vote as a woman.
The artifice would no doubt effectually overthrow the assertion of good
faith. No such question, however, is made here. The decision of which I
complain concedes that the defendant voted in good faith, in the most
implicit belief that she had a right to vote, and condemns her on the
strength of the legal fiction, conceded to be in fact a mere fiction,
that she knew the contrary.
But if the facts admitted of a doubt of the defendant's good faith, that
was a question for the jury, and it was clear error for the court to
assume the decision of it.
Again. The denial of the right to poll the jury was most clearly an
error. Under the provisions of the constitution which have been cited,
the defendant could only be convicted on the verdict of a jury. The case
of Cancemi shows that such jury must consist of twelve men; and it will
not be claimed that anything less than the unanimous voice of the jury
can be received as their verdict. How then could the defendant be
lawfully deprived of the right to ask every juror if the verdict had his
assent? I believe this is a right which was never before denied to a
party against whom a verdict was rendered in any case, either civil or
criminal. The following cases show, and many others might be cited to
the same effect, that the right to poll the jury is an absolute right in
all cases, civil and criminal. (The People vs. Perkins, 1 Wend. 91.
Jackson vs. Hawks, 2 Wend. 619. Fox vs. Smith. 3 Cowen, 23.)
The ground on which the right of the defendant to vote has been denied,
is, as I understand the decision of the court, "that the rights of the
citizens of the state as such were not under consideration in the
fourteenth amendment; that they stand as they did before that
amendment.... The right of voting or the privilege of voting is a right
or privilege arising under the constitution of the state, and not of the
United States. If the right belongs to any particular person, it is
because such person is entitled to it as a citizen of the state where he
offers to exercise it, and not because of citizenship of the United
States.... The regulation of the suffrage is conceded to the states as a
state right."
If this position be correct, which I am not now disposed to question, I
respectfully insist that the congress of the United States had no power
to pass the act in question, that by doing so it has attempted to usurp
the rights of the states, and that all proceedings under the act are
void.
I claim therefore that the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
First--Because she has been denied her right of trial by jury.
Second--Because she has been denied the right to ask the jury severally
whether they assented to the verdict which the court had recorded for
them.
Third--Because the court erroneously held, that the defendant had not a
lawful right to vote.
Fourth--Because the court erroneously held, that if the defendant, when
she voted, did so in good faith, believing that she had a right to vote,
that fact constituted no defence.
Fifth--Because the court erroneously held that the question, whether the
defendant, at the time of voting knew that she had not a right to vote,
was a question of law to be decided by the court, and not a question of
fact to be decided by the jury.
Sixth--Because the court erred in holding that it was a presumption of
law that the defendant knew that she was not a legal voter, although in
fact she had not that knowledge.
Seventh--Because congress had no constitutional right to pass the act
under which the defendant was indicted, and the act and all proceedings
under it are void.
Sir, so far as my information in regard to legal proceedings extends,
this is the only court in any country where trial by jury exists, in
which the decisions that are made in the haste and sometimes confusion
of such trials, are not subject to review before any other tribunal. I
believe that to the decisions of this court, in criminal cases, no
review is allowed, except in the same court in the informal way in which
I now ask your honor to review the decisions made on this trial. This is
therefore the court of last resort, and I hope your honor will give to
these, as they appear to me, grave questions, such careful and
deliberate consideration as is due to them from such final tribunal.
If a new trial shall be denied to the defendant, it will be no
consolation to her to be dismissed with a slight penalty, leaving the
stigma resting upon her name, of conviction for an offence, of which she
claims to be, and I believe is, as innocent as the purest of the
millions of male voters who voted at the same election, are innocent of
crime in so voting. If she is in fact guilty of the crime with which she
stands charged, and of which she has been convicted by the court, she
deserves the utmost penalty which the court under the law has power to
impose; if she is not guilty she should be acquitted, and not declared
upon the records of this high court guilty of a crime she never
committed.
The court after hearing the district attorney, denied the motion.
JUDGE HUNT--(Ordering the defendant to stand up), "Has the prisoner
anything to say why sentence shall not be pronounced?"
MISS ANTHONY--Yes, your honor, I have many things to say; for in your
ordered verdict of guilty, you have trampled under foot every vital
principle of our government. My natural rights, my civil rights, my
political rights, my judicial rights, are all alike ignored. Robbed of
the fundamental privilege of citizenship, I am degraded from the status
of a citizen to that of a subject; and not only myself individually, but
all of my sex, are, by your honor's verdict, doomed to political
subjection under this, so-called, form of government.
JUDGE HUNT--The Court cannot listen to a rehearsal of arguments the
prisoner's counsel has already consumed three hours in presenting.
MISS ANTHONY--May it please your honor, I am not arguing the question,
but simply stating the reasons why sentence cannot, in justice, be
pronounced against me. Your denial of my citizen's right to vote, is the
denial of my right of consent as one of the governed, the denial of my
right of representation as one of the taxed, the denial of my right to a
trial by a jury of my peers, as an offender against law, therefore, the
denial of my sacred rights to life, liberty, property and--
JUDGE HUNT--The Court cannot allow the prisoner to go on.
MISS ANTHONY--But your honor will not deny me this one and only poor
privilege of protest against this high-handed outrage upon my citizen's
rights. May it please the Court to remember that since the day of my
arrest last November, this is the first time that either myself or any
person of my disfranchised class has been allowed a word of defense
before judge or jury--
JUDGE HUNT--The prisoner must sit down--the Court cannot allow it.
MISS ANTHONY--All of my prosecutors, from the 8th ward corner grocery
politician, who entered the complaint, to the United States Marshal,
Commissioner, District Attorney, District Judge, your honor on the
bench, not one is my peer, but each and all are my political sovereigns;
and had your honor submitted my case to the jury, as was clearly your
duty, even then I should have had just cause of protest, for not one of
those men was my peer; but, native or foreign born, white or black, rich
or poor, educated or ignorant, awake or asleep, sober or drunk, each and
every man of them was my political superior; hence, in no sense, my
peer. Even, under such circumstances, a commoner of England, tried
before a jury of Lords, would have far less cause to complain than
should I, a woman, tried before a jury of men. Even my counsel, the Hon.
Henry R. Selden, who has argued my cause so ably, so earnestly, so
unanswerably before your honor, is my political sovereign. Precisely as
no disfranchised person is entitled to sit upon a jury, and no woman is
entitled to the franchise, so, none but a regularly admitted lawyer is
allowed to practice in the courts, and no woman can gain admission to
the bar--hence, jury, judge, counsel, must all be of the superior class.
JUDGE HUNT--The Court must insist--the prisoner has been tried according
to the established forms of law.
MISS ANTHONY--Yes, your honor, but by forms of law all made by men,
interpreted by men, administered by men, in favor of men, and against
women; and hence, your honor's ordered verdict of guilty, against a
United States citizen for the exercise of "_that citizen's right to
vote_," simply because that citizen was a woman and not a man. But,
yesterday, the same man made forms of law, declared it a crime
punishable with $1,000 fine and six months' imprisonment, for you, or
me, or any of us, to give a cup of cold water, a crust of bread, or a
night's shelter to a panting fugitive as he was tracking his way to
Canada. And every man or woman in whose veins coursed a drop of human
sympathy violated that wicked law, reckless of consequences, and was
justified in so doing. As then, the slaves who got their freedom must
take it over, or under, or through the unjust forms of law, precisely
so, now, must women, to get their right to a voice in this government,
take it; and I have taken mine, and mean to take it at every possible
opportunity.
JUDGE HUNT--The Court orders the prisoner to sit down. It will not allow
another word.
MISS ANTHONY--When I was brought before your honor for trial, I hoped
for a broad and liberal interpretation of the Constitution and its
recent amendments, that should declare all United States citizens under
its protecting ægis--that should declare equality of rights the national
guarantee to all persons born or naturalized in the United States. But
failing to get this justice--failing, even, to get a trial by a jury
_not_ of my peers--I ask not leniency at your hands--but rather the full
rigors of the law.
JUDGE HUNT--The Court must insist--
(Here the prisoner sat down.)
JUDGE HUNT--The prisoner will stand up.
(Here Miss Anthony arose again.)
The sentence of the Court is that you pay a fine of one hundred dollars
and the costs of the prosecution.
MISS ANTHONY--May it please your honor, I shall never pay a dollar of
your unjust penalty. All the stock in trade I possess is a $10,000 debt,
incurred by publishing my paper--_The Revolution_--four years ago, the
sole object of which was to educate all women to do precisely as I have
done, rebel against your man-made, unjust, unconstitutional forms of
law, that tax, fine, imprison and hang women, while they deny them the
right of representation in the government; and I shall work on with
might and main to pay every dollar of that honest debt, but not a penny
shall go to this unjust claim. And I shall earnestly and persistently
continue to urge all women to the practical recognition of the old
revolutionary maxim, that "Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God."
JUDGE HUNT--Madam, the Court will not order you committed until the fine
is paid.
* * *
INDICTMENT AGAINST BEVERLY W. JONES, EDWIN T. MARSH, AND WILLIAM B.
HALL.
* * *
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN AND FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
* * *
At a stated Session of the District Court of the United States of
America, held in and for the Northern District of New York, at the City
Hall, in the city of Albany, in the said Northern District of New York,
on the third Tuesday of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and seventy-three, before the Honorable Nathan H. Hall,
Judge of the said Court, assigned to keep the peace of the said United
States of America, in and for the said District, and also to hear and
determine divers Felonies, Misdemeanors and other offences against the
said United States of America, in the said District committed.
Brace Millerd,
James D. Wasson,
Peter H. Bradt,
James McGinty,
Henry A. Davis,
Loring W. Osborn,
Thomas Whitbeck,
John Mullen,
Samuel C. Harris,
Ralph Davis,
Matthew Fanning,
Abram Kimmey,
Derrick B. Van Schoonhoven,
Wilhelmus Van Natten,
James Kenney,
Adam Winne,
James Goold,
Samuel S. Fowler,
Peter D.R. Johnson,
Patrick Carroll,
good and lawful men of the said District, then and there sworn and
charged to inquire for the said United States of America, and for the
body of said District, do, upon their oaths, present, that at the City
of Rochester, in the County of Monroe, in the Northern District of New
York, on the 15th day of October, A.D. 1872, Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T.
Marsh and William B. Hall were then and there Inspectors of Elections in
and for the first election District of the eighth ward of said City of
Rochester, duly elected, appointed, qualified and acting as such
Inspectors.
And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present
that on the day aforesaid, said Inspectors duly met at the place
designated for holding a poll of an election to be had and held at and
in said election District on the fifth day of November, A.D. 1872, for
Representatives in the Congress of the United States, to-wit: a
Representative in the Congress of the United States for the State of New
York at large, and a Representative in the Congress of the United States
for the Twenty-Ninth Congressional District of the State of New York,
said first election District of said eighth ward then and there being a
part of said Twenty-Ninth Congressional District of the State of New
York, and for other officers, and at said place on said day did then and
there duly organize themselves as a board for the purpose of Registering
the names of the legal voters of such District, and did then and there
proceed to make a list of all persons entitled to vote at said election
in said District, said list to constitute and to be known as the
Registry of electors of said District.
And said Board of Inspectors again duly met on the Friday of the week
preceding the day of said election, to-wit, on the first day of
November, A.D. 1872, at the place designated for holding the poll of
said election in and for said first election District, for the purpose
of receiving and correcting said list, and for that purpose duly met at
eight o'clock in the morning of the day aforesaid, at the place
aforesaid, and remained in session until nine o'clock in the evening of
that day; and for the purpose aforesaid, said Board of Inspectors again
duly met at the place aforesaid, at eight o'clock in the morning of the
day following, to-wit, the second day of November, A.D. 1872, and
remained in session until nine o'clock in the evening of that day.
And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present
that on the said second day of November, A.D. 1872, at the City of
Rochester, in the County of Monroe, in the Northern District of New
York, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, to-wit, at the place
designated for holding the poll of said election for said
Representatives in the Congress of the United States, and other officers
in and for said first election District of said eighth ward as
aforesaid, and between the hours of eight o'clock in the morning, and
nine o'clock in the evening of said second day of November, A.D. 1872,
Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh and William B. Hall, being then and
there Inspectors of Elections in and for said first election District of
said eighth ward of said City of Rochester, duly elected, appointed,
qualified and acting as such, and having then and there duly met for the
purpose of revising and correcting said list of all persons entitled to
vote at said election as aforesaid, known as the registry of electors
for said election district, they, said Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh
and William B. Hall, _did then and, there knowingly and wilfully
register as a voter of said District, one Susan B. Anthony, she, said
Susan B. Anthony then and there not being entitled to be registered as a
voter of said District in that she, said Susan B. Anthony was then and
there a person of the female sex, contrary to the form, of the statute
of the United States of America in such case made and provided, and
against the peace of the United States of America and their dignity_.
_Second Count_: And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do
further present that at the City of Rochester, in the County of Monroe,
in the Northern District of New York, on the fifteenth day of October,
A.D. 1872, Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh and William B. Hall, were
then and there Inspectors of Elections in and for the first election
District of the eight ward of said City of Rochester, duly elected,
appointed, qualified and acting as such.
And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present
that on the day aforesaid, said Inspectors duly met at the place
designated for the holding of the poll of an election to be had and held
at and in said election District on the fifth day of November, A.D.
1872, for Representatives in the Congress of the United States, to-wit:
a Representative in the Congress of the United States for the State of
New York at large, and a Representative in the Congress of the United
States for the Twenty-Ninth Congressional District of the State of New
York, said first election district of said eighth ward then and there
being a part of said Twenty-Ninth Congressional District of the State of
New York, and for other officers, and at said place on said day, did
then and there duly organize themselves as a Board for the purpose of
Registering the names of the legal voters of said District, and did then
and there proceed to make a list of all persons entitled to vote at said
election in said District, said list to constitute and to be known as
the registry of electors of said District.
And said Board of Inspectors again duly met on the Friday of the week
preceding the day of said election, to-wit, on the first day of
November, A.D. 1872, at the place designated for holding the poll of
said election in and for said first Election District, for the purpose
of revising and correcting said list, and for that purpose duly met at
eight o'clock in the morning of the day aforesaid, at the place
aforesaid, and remained in session until nine o'clock in the evening of
that day; and for the purpose aforesaid, said Board of Inspectors again
duly met at the place aforesaid, at eight o'clock in the morning of the
day following, to-wit, the second day of November, A.D. 1872, and
remained in session until nine o'clock in the evening of that day.
And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further
present, that on the said first day of November, A.D. 1872, at the City
of Rochester, in the County of Monroe, in the Northern District of New
York, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, to-wit, at the place
designated for holding the poll of said election for said
Representatives in the Congress of the United States, and other officers
in and for said first election District of said eighth ward of said City
of Rochester, and between the hours of eight o'clock in the morning, and
nine o'clock in the evening of said first day of November, A.D. 1872,
Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh and William B. Hall being then and
there Inspectors of Elections in and for said first election District of
said eighth ward of said City of Rochester, duly elected, appointed,
qualified and acting as such as aforesaid, and having then and there
duly met for the purpose of revising and correcting said list of all
persons entitled to vote at said election as aforesaid, known as the
Registry of electors for said election District, they, said Beverly W.
Jones, Edwin T. Marsh and William B. Hall, _did then and there knowingly
and wilfully register as voters of said District, certain persons,
to-wit_: Susan B. Anthony, Sarah Truesdale, Mary Pulver, Mary Anthony,
Ellen S. Baker, Margaret Leyden, Anna L. Moshier, Nancy M. Chapman,
Lottie B. Anthony, Susan M. Hough, Hannah Chatfield, Mary S. Hibbard,
Rhoda DeGarmo, and Jane Cogswell, said persons then and there not being
entitled to be Registered as voters of said District, in that each of
said persons was then and there a person of the female sex, contrary to
the form of the statute of the United States of America in such case
made and provided, and against the peace of the United States of America
and their dignity.
_Third Count_: And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do
further present that Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh and William D.
Hall, of the City of Rochester, in the County of Monroe, with force and
arms, &c., to-wit, at and in the first election District of the eighth
ward of said City of Rochester, in the County of Monroe, in the Northern
District of New York, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
heretofore, to-wit, on the fifth day of November, A.D. 1872, at an
election duly held at and in the said first election District of the
said eighth ward of said City of Rochester, in said County, and in said
Northern District of New York, which said election was for
Representatives in the Congress of the United States, to-wit, a
Representative in the Congress of the United States for the State of New
York at large, and a Representative in the Congress of the United States
for the Twenty-Ninth Congressional District of the State of New York,
said first election District of said eighth ward of said City of
Rochester being then and there a part of said Twenty-Ninth Congressional
District of the State of New York, and said Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T.
Marsh, and William B. Hall, being then and there Inspectors of Elections
in and for said first election District of said eighth ward of said City
of Rochester, in said County of Monroe, duly elected, appointed, and
qualified and acting as such, they, said Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T.
Marsh, and William B. Hall, as such Inspectors of Elections, did then
and there, to-wit, on the fifth day of November, A.D. 1872, at the first
election District of the eighth ward of the City of Rochester, in the
County of Monroe, in the Northern District of New York, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, knowingly and wilfully receive the votes of
certain persons, and not then and there entitled to vote, to-wit: Susan
B. Anthony, Sarah Truesdale, Mary Pulver, Mary Anthony, Ellen S. Baker,
Margaret Leyden, Hannah L. Mosher, Nancy M. Chapman, Susan M. Hough,
Guelma S. McLean, Hannah Chatfield, Mary S. Hibbard, Rhoda DeGarmo, and
Jane Cogswell, each of said persons then and there being a person of the
female sex, and then and there not entitled to vote, as they, said
Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh and William B. Hall then and there well
knew, contrary to the form of the statute of the United States of
America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the
United States of America and their dignity.
_Fourth Count_: And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do
further present, that Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh and William B.
Hall, now, or late of Rochester, in the County of Monroe, with force and
arms, &c., to-wit, at and in the first election District of the eighth
ward of the City of Rochester, in the County of Monroe, in said Northern
District of New York, and within the jurisdiction of this Court
heretofore, to wit, on the fifth day of November, A.D. 1872, at an
election duly held at and in the said first election District of said
eighth ward of said City of Rochester, in said County of Monroe, in said
Northern District of New York, which said election was for
Representatives in the Congress of the United States, to-wit: a
Representative in the Congress of the United States for the State of New
York at large, and a Representative in the Congress of the United States
for the Twenty-Ninth Congressional District of the State of New York,
said first election District of said eighth ward being then and there a
part of said Twenty-Ninth Congressional District, and they, said Beverly
W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh, and William B. Hall, being then and there
Inspectors of Elections in and for said first election District of said
eighth ward of said City of Rochester, in said County of Monroe, duly
appointed, elected, qualified and acting as such, they said Beverly W.
Jones, Edwin T. Marsh, and William B. Hall, did then and there, to-wit,
at said first election District of said eighth ward of said City of
Rochester, in said County of Monroe, in said Northern District of New
York, on said fifth day of November, A.D. 1872, knowingly and wilfully
receive the votes of certain persons for candidate for Representative in
the Congress of the United States for the State of New York at large,
and candidate for Representative in the Congress of the United States
for the Twenty-Ninth Congressional District of the State of New York,
said persons then and there not being entitled to vote for said
Representatives in the Congress of the United States, viz.: Susan B.
Anthony, Sarah Truesdale, Mary Pulver, Mary Anthony, Ellen S. Baker,
Margaret Leyden, Hannah L. Mosher, Nancy M. Chapman, Lottie B. Anthony,
Susan M. Hough, Guelma L. McLean, Hannah Chatfield, Mary S. Hibbard,
Rhoda DeGarmo and Jane Cogswell, each of said persons then and there
being a person of the female sex, and then and there not entitled to
vote for said Representatives in Congress, as they, said Beverly W.
Jones, Edwin T. Marsh and William B. Hall, then and there well knew,
contrary to the form of the statute of the United States of America in
such case made and provided, against the peace of the United States of
America and their dignity.
RICHARD CROWLEY,
Attorney of the United States, in and for the
Northern District of New York.
(Endorsed.) January 22, 1873.
Jones and Marsh plead not guilty.
RICHARD CROWLEY,
U.S. Attorney.
Hall did not plead at all.
* * *
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT.
* * *
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
* * *
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
_vs._
BEVERLY W. JONES, EDWIN T. MARSH, AND
WILLIAM B. HALL.
* * *
HON. WARD HUNT, Presiding.
* * *
APPEARANCES.
For the United States:
HON. RICHARD CROWLEY,
U.S. District Attorney.
For the Defendants:
JOHN VAN VOORHIS, ESQ.
* * *
Tried at Canandaigua, Wednesday, June 18th, 1873, before Hon. Ward Hunt
and a Jury.
Case opened in behalf of the U.S. by Mr. Crowley.
MR. VAN VOORHIS: I wish to raise some questions upon the indictment in
this case. This indictment, I claim, is bad for two reasons, and should
be quashed.
First--The Act of Congress under which it is framed, is invalid so far
as it relates to this offence, because not authorized by the
Constitution of the United States.
Second--There is no sufficient statement of any offence in the
indictment.
First.
Congress has no power to pass laws for the punishment of Inspectors of
Elections, elected or appointed under the laws of the State of New York,
for receiving illegal votes, or registering as voters, persons who have
no right to be registered.
No law of Congress defines the qualifications of voters in the several
States. These are found only in the State Constitutions and Statutes.
The offenses charged in the indictment are, that the defendants, being
State officers, have violated the laws of the State. If it be so, they
may be tried and punished in accordance with the State laws. No
proposition can be clearer. If the United States can also punish them
for the same offense, it follows that they may be twice indicted, tried,
convicted and punished for one offense. A plea in a State Court, of a
conviction and sentence, in a United States Court would constitute no
bar or defense, (_12 Metcalf_, _387_, _Commonwealth v. Peters_,) and the
defendants might be punished twice for the same offense. This cannot be,
and if the act in question be valid, the State of New York is ousted of
jurisdiction. And where does Congress derive the power to pass laws to
punish offenders against the laws of a State? This case must be tried
under the laws of the United States. Against those laws, no offense is
charged to have been committed. Such power, if it exist, must be
somewhere expressly granted, or it must be necessary in order to execute
some power that is expressly granted.
The Act of Congress in question, became a law on May 31st, 1870. It is
entitled--
"AN ACT TO ENFORCE THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES TO VOTE IN
THE SEVERAL STATES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSE."
The indictment is found under the 19th section of the Act as it passed
originally, and the 20th section as amended by the Act of February 28th,
1871.
The 19th Section, so far as it is necessary to quote it here, is as
follows:
"_That if at any election for representatives or delegates in the
Congress of the United States any person shall knowingly_ personate
and vote, or attempt to vote, in the name of any other person,
whether living or dead, or fictitious; or vote more than once at
the same election for any candidate for the same office; or vote at
a place where he may not be entitled to vote; _or vote without
having a lawful right to vote, ... or knowingly and wilfully
receives the vote of any person not entitled to vote_, or refuses
to receive the vote of any person entitled to vote; ... every such
person shall be deemed guilty of a crime, and shall for such crime
be liable to prosecution in any Court of the United States of
competent jurisdiction, and on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or both, in the
discretion of the Court, and shall pay the costs of prosecution."
Section 20, as amended, so far as pertinent, reads as follows:
"That if at any registration of voters for an election for
representatives or delegates in the Congress of the United States,
any person shall _knowingly_ ... hinder any person having a lawful
right to register, from duly exercising that right; or compel or
induce by any of such means, or other unlawful means, ANY OFFICER
OF REGISTRATION to admit to registration any person not legally
entitled thereto; ... _or if any such officer shall knowingly and
wilfully register as a voter any person not entitled to be
registered_, or refuse so to register any person entitled to be
registered, ... _every such person shall be deemed guilty of a
crime, and shall be liable to prosecution and punishment therefor,
as provided in section 19 of said Act of May 31, 1870, for persons
guilty of the crimes therein specified_."
No law of Congress describes the qualifications of voters in this State,
or in any State.
Congress has provided no registry law. Therefore, what constitutes the
offenses charged in this indictment, must be looked for in the laws of
the State. By no Act of Congress can it be determined in what case a
person votes, "_without having a right to vote_." By no Act of Congress
can it be determined when an Inspector of Election has received the vote
of "_any person not entitled to vote_," or has registered "_as a voter,
any person not entitled to be registered_." These are the offenses
alleged in this indictment. They are penal offenses by the Statutes of
New York. The jurisdiction of the State Courts over them is complete,
and cannot be questioned.
By the Act of May 31, 1870, above cited, Congress has ordained, in legal
effect, that if any person violates the penal Code of the State of New
York, or any State, in respect of voting, he may be punished by the
United States. And the offense is a variable quantity; what is a crime
in one State under this Act, is a legal right and duty in another. A
citizen of Rhode Island, for instance, who votes when not possessed in
his own right, of an estate in fee simple--in fee tail, for life, or in
reversion or remainder, of the value of $134 or up-wards, may be
convicted of a crime under this Act, and imprisoned in a State Prison.
He voted in violation of the laws of his State. A citizen of New York
votes under precisely similar circumstances, and with the same
qualifications, and his act is a legal one, and he performs a simple
duty. Any State may, by its Constitution and laws, permit women to vote.
Had these defendants been acting as Inspectors of Elections in such
State, their act would be no crime, and this indictment could not be
sustained, for the only illegality alleged is, that the citizens whose
votes were received were women, and therefore not entitled to vote.
The Act of Congress thus, is simply an Act to enforce the diverse penal
statutes of the various States in relation to voting. In order to make a
case, the United States must combine the federal law with the statutes
of the State where the _venue_ of the prosecution is laid.
Before the enactment of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, it is not,
and never was pretended, that Congress possessed any such power.
Subdivision 1 of Section 2, of Article one of the Constitution, provides
as follows:
"The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen
every second year by the people of the several States; and the
electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature."
By this provision, what shall qualify a person to be an elector, is left
entirely to the States. Whoever, in any State, is permitted to vote for
members of the most numerous branch of its legislature, is also
competent to vote for Representatives in Congress. The State might
require a property qualification, or it might dispense with it. It might
permit negroes to vote, or it might exclude them. It might permit women
to vote, or even foreigners, and the federal constitution would not be
infringed. If a State had provided a different qualification for an
elector of Representatives in Congress, from that required of an elector
of the most numerous branch of its Legislature, the power of the federal
constitution might be invoked, and the law annuled. But never was the
idea entertained, that this provision of the Constitution authorizes
Congress to pass laws for the punishment of individuals in the States
for illegal voting, or State returning officers for receiving illegal
votes.
This power, if it exist, must be found in the recent Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution.
I assume that your Honor will hold, as you did yesterday in Miss
Anthony's case, that these amendments do not confer the right to vote
upon citizens of the United States, and therefore not upon women. That
decision is the law of this case. It follows necessarily from that
decision, that these amendments have nothing to do with the right of
voting, except so far as that right "_is denied or abridged by the
United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude_."
The thirteenth article of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, in Section 1, ordains that "_neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction_."
Section 2, ordains that "_Congress shall have power to enforce this
Article by appropriate legislation_."
The fourteenth article of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, ordains in Section 1, "_All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States, and of the State where they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States. Nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal
protection of the laws._"
Section five enacts, "_The Congress shall have power to enforce by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article._"
The fifteenth article of Amendment to the Constitution ordains in its
first section, that "That the right of citizens of the United States to
vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude."
Section two enacts, that "_The Congress shall have power to enforce this
Article by appropriate legislation._"
These are the provisions of the Constitution relied on to support the
legislation of Congress now before this Court. Some features of that
legislation may be constitutional and valid. Whether this be so or not,
it is not necessary now to determine. The question here is, has
Congress, by either of these amendments, been clothed with the power, to
pass laws to punish inspectors of elections in this State for receiving
the votes of women?
The thirteenth amendment simply abolishes slavery, and authorizes such
legislation as shall be necessary to make that enactment effectual.
The power in question is not found there.
The fourteenth amendment defines who are citizens of the United States,
and prohibits the States from making or enforcing "_any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities_" of such citizens.
Either the right to vote is one of the "_privileges or immunities_" of
the United States citizen, which the states are forbidden to abridge, or
it is not. If it is, then the women whose votes these defendants
received, being citizens of the United States, and in every other way
qualified to vote, possessed the right to vote, and their votes were
rightfully received. If it is not, then the fourteenth amendment confers
no power upon Congress, to legislate, on the subject of voting in the
States. There is no other clause or provision of that amendment which
can by any possibility confer such power--a power which cannot be
implied, but which, if it exist, must be expressly given in some part of
the Constitution, or clearly needed to carry into effect some power that
is expressly given.
No such power is conferred by the fifteenth amendment. That amendment
operates upon the States and upon the United States, and not upon the
citizen. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote, shall not
be denied or abridged by 'THE UNITED STATES OR BY ANY STATE.'" The terms
"_United States_" and "State," as here used, mean the government of the
United States and of the States. They do not apply to individuals or to
offenses committed by individuals, but only to acts done by the State or
the United States.
But at any rate, the operation of this amendment, and the power given to
Congress to enforce it, is limited to offenses committed in respect of
depriving persons of the right to vote because of their "_race, color,
or previous condition of servitude_."
This is not such a case. There is no ground for saying that these
defendants have committed any offense against the spirit or the letter
of the fifteenth amendment, or any legitimate legislation for its
enforcement.
Congress cannot make laws to regulate the duties of Inspectors, and it
cannot inflict a penalty.
Second.
_No offense is stated in the indictment._
The first count in the indictment is for knowingly and wilfully
registering as a voter, Susan B. Anthony. This count is under Section 26
of the Act of May 31, 1870, as amended by the Act of February 28, 1871.
The indictment contains no averment that the defendants were "_officers
of registration_," and charged with the duty of making a correct
registry of voters. It simply alleges that they were _Inspectors of
Elections_. What that means, the indictment does not inform us. It is
not an office defined by the Acts of Congress upon which this indictment
was found, nor has the Court any information of which it can take notice
as to what are the duties of such officers. In the absence of any claim
in the indictment to that effect, the Court will not presume the
existence of so important a circumstance against the defendants, and
therefore this count of the indictment must fail.
2. The second count is for the same offense, and obnoxious to the same
objection. The only variation being that the first count charges the
illegal registry of one woman, and the second, fourteen.
3. The third count charges that the defendants, being inspectors of
elections, received the votes of fourteen women who had no right to
vote, wrongfully.
This count does not allege that it was the duty of the defendants to
receive or count the votes. It simply alleges that they were Inspectors
of Election. Their duties as such are not stated. It is not alleged that
as such inspectors they were charged with the duty of receiving and
counting votes. It is not claimed by the indictment that these votes
were counted or put into the ballot box--or affected the result. The
defendants simply received the votes. What they did with them, does not
appear. Any bystander, who had received these votes, could be convicted
under this indictment as well as they.
WILLIAM F. MORRISON, a witness called in behalf of the United States,
testified as follows:
_Examined_ by Mr. Crowley:
Q. Where did you live, in November, 1872?
A. City of Rochester.
Q. Where do you live now?
A. Same place.
Q. Did you occupy any official position in the month of November, 1872?
A. I did.
Q. And do you now?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is it?
A. City Clerk.
Q. Have you any registration lists and poll lists of the 1st Election
District, 8th Ward, City of Rochester, in your possession?
A. I have.
Q. Will you produce them?
[Witness produces two books.]
Q. Do you know the defendants, Beverly W. Jones, Edwin T. Marsh, and Wm.
B. Hall, or any of them?
A. I know them all.
Q. Do you know their hand-writing?
A. I cannot say that I do.
Q. What are those books you hold in your hand?
A. The register of the Board of Registry, and the poll list kept on
election day.
Q. In what district?
A. 1st election district of the 8th Ward.
Q. By whom were those books left in your office, if by any one?
A. To the best of my knowledge, they were left by Beverly W. Jones,
Chairman of the Board of Inspectors.
Q. By whom do they purport to be signed?
A. Beverly W. Jones, Wm. B. Hall, and Edwin T. Marsh.
Q. Is there a certificate attached to them, purporting to show what they
are?
A. There is a certificate attached to the register, but not to the poll
list.
Q. Please read the certificate attached to the registration list.
A. "We, the undersigned, composing the Board of Registry for the first
district, 8th Ward, City of Rochester, do certify that the foregoing is
a correct list of the voters in said district, so far as the same is
known to us. Dated Nov. 2d, 1872."
Q. In what Congressional District was the first election district of the
8th Ward, in November, 1872?
A. 29th.
Q. Was there an election for Members of Congress for that district, and
for Members of Congress at Large for the State, held in that ward and
election district, last November?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And candidates voted for both of those officers by those who saw fit
to vote for them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What day was the election?
A. 5th day of November.
MR. CROWLEY: We offer the poll list and the registration of voters in
evidence.
[Poll list marked Ex. "A." Registration list, marked Ex. "B."]
[This witness was not cross-examined.]
SYLVESTER LEWIS, a witness sworn in behalf of the United States,
testified as follows:
_Examined by_ MR. CROWLEY:
Q. Where did you live in November, 1872?
A. In the city of Rochester.
Q. Do you know the defendants, Jones, Marsh and Hall?
A. I do.
Q. Do you know whether or not they acted as a Board of Registry for the
registration of voters in the first election district, 8th ward, City of
Rochester, preceding the last general election?
A. I know they acted at the November election.
Q. Did they act as a Board of Registry preceding the election?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was you present on any day when they were registering voters?
A. I was present on Friday mostly, and on Saturday.
Q. Were all three of these defendants there?
A. They were the most of the time.
Q. Receiving the names of persons who claimed to be entitled to vote?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And taking a registration list?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see Miss Anthony and other ladies there upon that day?
A. I saw Miss Anthony there on the first day, and other ladies.
Q. Did you see there, upon that day, the following named persons: Susan
B. Anthony, Sarah Truesdell, Mary Pulver, Mary Anthony, Ellen S. Baker,
Margaret Leyden, Ann S. Mosher, Nancy M. Chapman, Lottie B. Anthony,
Susan M. Hough, Hannah Chatfield, Mary S. Hibbard, Rhoda DeGarmo, Jane
Cogswell.
A. I saw a number of them; I didn't see the whole of them.
Q. Do you know by sight, any of those persons whose names I have read?
A. I know a number of them.
Q. Did you see a number of them there?
A. I did.
Q. Did you see any of them register on that day?
A. I did.
Q. Have you a list of those that you saw register?
A. I have, (producing a paper.)
Q. Please state to the Jury, those that you saw register on that day.
A. I can hardly recollect which day they registered.
Q. Either of the days preceding the election, when this Board was in
session.
A. Rhoda DeGarmo, Mary Anthony, Sarah C. Truesdell, Susan M. Hough, Mrs.
M.E. Pulver.
By MR. VAN VOORHIS:
Q. What paper are you reading from?
A. From a memorandum I made at the time--No, it is a paper that was
given on the last day of registry.
Q. A paper that you made yourself?
A. The names that I took.
Q. On the last day of registry?
A. Yes, sir.
By MR. CROWLEY:
Q. State them.
A. The names of the parties that I found on the poll list as having
registered; I didn't see them all register myself, but I did a good
portion of them.
Q. I am asking you to state who you saw register. I don't ask you who
were registered before your attention was called to the list.
A. Well, I saw Rhoda DeGarmo register; Miss Mary Anthony, Sarah C.
Truesdell, Susan M. Hough; I think I saw Nancy M. Chatfield register;
Mrs. Margaret Leyden, Mrs. M.E. Pulver; those I recollect; I was better
acquainted with those than with the others.
Q. At the time you saw these ladies register, were the three inspectors,
Hall, Jones, and Marsh present?
A. Some of the time I saw all three, I think, there; at other times I
saw but two of them; sometimes Hall and Jones, sometimes Marsh and
Jones, sometimes Hall and Marsh; I think they took turns when they went
to dinner.
Q. On the day of election were you at the polls?
A. I was.
Q. Did you see any of these women vote on the day of election?
A. I did.
Q. Were these defendants present when their votes were received?
A. They were.
Q. And did they receive their votes?
A. They did.
Q. Who did you see vote, or offer their votes upon the day of election?
A. Susan B. Anthony, Mrs. McLean, Rhoda DeGarmo, Mary Anthony, Ellen S.
Baker, Sarah C. Truesdell, Mrs. Hough, Mrs. Mosher, Mrs. Leyden, Mrs.
Pulver. I recollect seeing those ladies; in fact, I think I saw the
whole of them vote with the exception of two, but I will not be positive
on that point.
Q. But you saw those whose names you have given?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know how many tickets they voted, or offered to the
inspectors?
A. I think they voted four tickets.
Q. Do you know how these tickets were endorsed, or what they were
called?
A. I was not near enough to see the endorsement; I noticed which boxes
they went into.
Q. Upon the day of election were the defendants Jones, Marsh, and Hall,
acting as inspectors of election?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Receiving votes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And were acting as inspectors of election when these ladies voted?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. About what time in the day, or what time in the morning was it that
these ladies voted?
A. I think there had been but a very few votes received in the morning
when a number of them voted.
Q. Well, was it about 5 o'clock in the morning--very early?
A. No, sir; not so early as that; the probability is that there was not
over 20 or 25 votes received before they presented theirs.
_Conceded_: That the women named in the indictment were women on the 5th
day of November, 1872.
_Cross-Examination by_ MR. VAN VOORHIS:
Q. Which of those persons did you see register?
A. Mrs. Hough, Mrs. Pulver, Mrs. Truesdell, Mrs. Leyden.
Q. Do you swear you saw Mrs. Leyden register?
A. I think I did.
Q. Take a second thought and see if you are willing to say you saw her
register--please look off that paper. Do you recollect seeing those
persons register, or do you suppose they did, because you find it on a
paper there?
A. No, sir; I recollect seeing pretty much all of them on my list with
the exception of one or two; I won't be fully positive I saw Mrs. Leyden
register; I saw her vote.
Q. Did you go to Mrs. Leyden's house and advise her to go and register?
A. I don't think I did.
THE COURT: That is not important.
Q. Do you recollect seeing any others register except those you have now
mentioned?
A. I think I saw Mary Anthony.
Q. Any other?
A. Mrs. Chapman.
Q. Can you recollect this without looking at that paper?
A. Well, the object in looking at that paper is to try to refresh my
memory on which day they registered.
Q. Does that paper contain dates?
A. No, sir; it contains the names of all those who registered.
Q. You copied that paper from the registry, didn't you?
A. They were copied by Hall at the time of the election, and handed to
me.
Q. What was your business at the registry at that time?
A. I had a poll list; I was checking parties that I supposed had a legal
right to vote.
Q. What sort of a poll list?
Objected to as immaterial.
THE COURT: It is only competent as a test of his knowledge.
A. I had canvassed the ward and taken a list of all the voters in the
first district; all those that I supposed would be entitled to vote.
Q. You had canvassed the ward in the employment of somebody?
Objected to as immaterial.
Q. How many of these people did you see vote?
A. I think I saw the whole of them vote, with the exception of Mrs.
Hough and Mrs. Cogswell.
Q. Who took Miss Anthony's vote?
A. Mr. Jones.
Q. Were both the other inspectors present when he took it?
A. I believe they were.
Q. Did Jones take all of the votes of those persons whose names you have
on your list?
A. I don't think he did.
Q. Who took any others that you saw?
A. I saw Mr. Hall take some of the ballots.
Q. How many?
A. I couldn't tell how many.
Q. Did you see him take more than one?
A. I don't know as I did.
Q. Do you know whose it was?
A. If I recollect right, it was Mrs. DeGarmo's.
Q. At that time was Jones there?
A. No, I believe Jones had stepped out.
Q. Hall received the vote on account of Jones being absent?
A. I believe so.
Q. Jones' position was at the window receiving votes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who put them in the boxes?
A. Jones and Hall.
Q. You were not near enough to see what these ballots were?
A. No, sir.
Q. How many ballot boxes were there?
A. Six, if I recollect right.
Q. And six tickets voted at that poll?
A. Six tickets altogether; there was the Constitutional Amendment voted
at that election.
Q. Did you observe which boxes the tickets of these persons were put
into?
A. I did.
Q. Which were they?
A. I think that the ballots that these ladies voted.
Q. I don't want what you think; I want what you know.
A. Well, they went into those boxes; Member of Congress, Member at
Large.
Q. Were there two boxes for Congressmen?
A. I think there was; I am not quite positive; I rather think I am
mistaken about that.
Q. Well, give us what you know about the boxes?
A. The most that I know about is, that the remark was made by the
inspector that they voted the four tickets.
Q. You heard the remark made that they voted four tickets; who made that
remark?
A. Mr. Jones or Mr. Hall; when they passed their ballots they would say,
"They vote all four tickets; no Constitutional Amendment voted."
Q. That was the practice of the inspector, no matter who voted?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then you didn't see the tickets as they went into the boxes?
A. No, sir.
Q. You can't swear which boxes they went into?
A. I understood from the inspectors that they voted all the tickets with
the exception of the Constitutional Amendment.
Q. I don't ask for any conversation; I ask for what you know by what you
saw.
A. Well, I wasn't near enough to read the tickets.
Q. Did you hear either of the inspectors say anything about it?
A. I did.
Q. Which one?
A. I heard the inspector that would be at the window where the ballots
would be received.
Q. Name him.
A. I heard Mr. Jones say that they voted the four tickets.
Q. Was that all he said?
A. Well, he would declare it in this way; sometimes he would say, "They
vote all the tickets with the exception of the Amendment;" that is the
way he generally declared it.
Q. I want to get at what he said when these votes were taken?
A. He didn't at all times declare the ticket vo
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