The Story of the Great War, Volume III (of 12)
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Title: The Story of the Great War, Volume III (of 12)
Editor: Francis J. Reynolds
Allen L. Churchill
Francis Trevelyan Miller
Release date: April 19, 2006 [eBook #18213]
Most recently updated: December 13, 2020
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THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The War Begins
Invasion of Belgium
Battle of the Marne
VOLUME III
[Illustration: _King George V of Britain and King Albert of Belgium
inspecting Belgian troops. The youth is the Prince of Wales, and
beside him is Major General Pertab Singh of the Indian army_]
CONTENTS
PART I.--GREAT BATTLES OF THE WESTERN ARMIES
CHAPTER
I. ATTACK ON BELGIUM
II. SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LIEGE
III. BELGIUM'S DEFIANCE
IV. CAPTURE OF LOUVAIN--SURRENDER OF BRUSSELS
V. COMING OF THE BRITISH
VI. CAMPAIGNS IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE
VII. SIEGE AND FALL OF NAMUR
VIII. BATTLE OF CHARLEROI
IX. BATTLE OF MONS
X. THE GREAT RETREAT BEGINS
XI. FIGHTING AT BAY
XII. THE MARNE--GENERAL PLAN OF BATTLE FIELD
XIII. ALLIED AND GERMAN BATTLE PLANS
XIV. FIRST MOVES IN THE BATTLE
XV. GERMAN RETREAT
XVI. CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
XVII. CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
XVIII. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
XIX. "CROSSING THE AISNE"
XX. FIRST DAY'S BATTLES
XXI. THE BRITISH AT THE AISNE
XXII. BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS AND SOISSONS
XXIII. SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE
XXIV. END OF THE BATTLE
XXV. "THE RACE TO THE SEA"
XXVI. SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP
XXVII. YSER BATTLES--ATTACK ON YPRES
XXVIII. ATTACKS ON LA BASSEE AND ARRAS
XXIX. GENERAL MOVEMENTS ON THE FRENCH AND FLANDERS FRONTS
XXX. OPERATIONS AROUND LA BASSEE AND GIVENCHY
XXXI. END OF SIX MONTHS' FIGHTING IN THE WEST
PART II.--NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHAPTER
XXXII. STRENGTH OF THE RIVAL NAVIES
XXXIII. FIRST BLOOD--BATTLE OF THE BIGHT
XXXIV. BATTLES ON THREE SEAS
XXXV. THE GERMAN SEA RAIDERS
XXXVI. BATTLE OFF THE FALKLANDS
XXXVII. SEA FIGHTS OF THE OCEAN PATROL
XXXVIII. WAR ON GERMAN TRADE AND POSSESSIONS
XXXIX. RAIDS ON THE ENGLISH COAST
XL. RESULTS OF SIX MONTHS' NAVAL OPERATIONS
PART III.--THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT
XLI. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATRE OF WAR
XLII. THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF RUSSIAN POLAND
XLIII. AUSTRIAN POLAND, GALICIA, AND BUKOWINA
XLIV. THE BALKANS--COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
XLV. THE CAUCASUS--THE BARRED DOOR
PART IV.--THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN
XLVI. SERBIA'S SITUATION AND RESOURCES
XLVII. AUSTRIA'S STRENGTH AND STRATEGY
XLVIII. AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES
XLIX. THE GREAT BATTLES BEGIN
L. FIRST VICTORY OF THE SERBIANS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
KING GEORGE V REVIEWING THE ARMIES IN FRANCE
GREAT SIEGE GUN IN ACTION BRIDGE
DESTROYED BY THE BELGIANS AT LIEGE
BELGIAN FIELD GUN IN ACTION
FORTRESS TOWN OF NAMUR
CITY OF MALINES, BELGIUM
MACHINE GUN CREW IN A WHEAT FIELD
HEAVY BELGIAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION
BELGIANS INTRENCHED ALONG A RAILWAY
OBSERVER IN A RUINED CHATEAU
BAYONET CHARGE OF FRENCH INFANTRY
BRITISH NAVAL BRIGADE AT LIERRE
CITY OF LILLE UNDER FIRE
WALL FALLING UNDER SHELL FIRE
HOUSE-TO-HOUSE FIGHT AT YPRES
FIGHT IN AN ARGONNE VILLAGE
RALLY OF THE LONDON SCOTTISH
GERMAN LOOKOUTS IN A TREETOP
GERMAN PRISONERS IN CHAMPAGNE
LOUVAIN LANCERS ON THE FRENCH COAST
COMRADES AIDING A WOUNDED CUIRASSIER
RED CROSS DOCTOR DRESSING AVIATOR'S WOUNDS
NAVE AND CHOIR OF NOTRE DAME, RHEIMS
RUINS OF NOTRE DAME
FRENCH MARINES DINING ASHORE
SEARCHLIGHTS ON A BATTLESHIP
WALKÜRE, WRECKED AT PAPEETE
SYDNEY, AUSTRALIAN CRUISER
EMDEN AGROUND AFTER THE SYDNEY'S VICTORY
RESCUING SAILORS AFTER THE FIGHT NEAR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
CANADIANS SHIPPING FIELD ARTILLERY
INTERIOR OF A SUBMARINE
WRECK OF THE BLÜCHER IN THE NORTH SEA BATTLE
LIST OF MAPS
BELGIUM-FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER
FRANCE, PICTORIAL MAP OF
BELGIUM, BEGINNING OF GERMAN INVASION OF
ALSACE-LORRAINE, FRENCH INVASION OF
BATTLE OF MONS AND RETREAT OF ALLIED ARMIES
BATTLE OF THE MARNE--BEGINNING ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1914
BATTLE OF THE MARNE--SITUATION ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1914
BATTLE OF THE MARNE--END OF GERMAN RETREAT AND THE INTRENCHED LINE
ON THE AISNE RIVER
LIEGE FORT, GERMAN ATTACK OF
ANTWERP, SIEGE AND FALL OF
FLANDERS, BATTLE FRONT IN
GERMAN AND ENGLISH NAVAL POSITIONS
WAR IN THE EAST--RELATION OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES TO GERMANY
THE BALKANS, PICTORIAL MAP OF
SERBIAN AND AUSTRIAN INVASIONS
PART I--GREAT BATTLES OF THE WESTERN ARMIES
* * * * *
CHAPTER I
ATTACK ON BELGIUM
The first great campaign on the western battle grounds in the European
War began on August 4, 1914. On this epoch-making day the German
army began its invasion of Belgium--with the conquest of France
as its ultimate goal. Six mighty armies stood ready for the great
invasion. Their estimated total was 1,200,000 men. Supreme over
all was the Emperor as War Lord, but Lieutenant General Helmuth
van Moltke, chief of the General Staff, was the practical director
of military operations. General van Moltke was a nephew of the great
strategist of 1870, and his name possibly appealed as of happy
augury for repeating the former capture of Paris.
The First Army was assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle in the north of
Belgium, within a few miles of the Dutch frontier. It was under
the command of General van Kluck. He was a veteran of both the
Austrian and Franco-Prussian Wars, and was regarded as an able
infantry leader. His part was to enter Belgium at its northern
triangle, which projects between Holland and Germany, occupy Liege,
deploy on the great central plains of Belgium, then sweep toward
the French northwestern frontier in the German dash for Paris and
the English Channel. His army thus formed the right wing of the
whole German offensive. It was composed of picked corps, including
cavalry of the Prussian Guard.
The Second Army had gathered in the neighborhood of Limbourg under
the command of General von Bülow. Its advance was planned down the
valleys of the Ourthe and Vesdre to a junction with Von Kluck at
Liege, then a march by the Meuse Valley upon Namur and Charleroi.
In crossing the Sambre it was to fall into place on the left of
Von Kluck's army.
The German center was composed of the Third Army under Duke Albrecht
of Württemberg, the Fourth Army led by the crown prince, and the
Fifth Army commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria. It was assembled
on the line Neufchateau-Treves-Metz. Its first offensive was the
occupation of Luxemburg. This was performed, after a somewhat dramatic
protest by the youthful Grand Duchess, who placed her motor car
across the bridge by which the Germans entered her internationally
guaranteed independent state. The German pretext was that since
Luxemburg railways were German controlled, they were required for
the transport of troops. Preparations were then made for a rapid
advance through the Ardennes upon the Central Meuse, to form in
order upon the left of Von Bülow's army. A part of the Fifth Army
was to be detached for operations against the French fortress of
Verdun.
The Sixth Army was concentrated at Strassburg in Alsace, under
General von Heeringen. As inspector of the Prussian Guards he bore
a very high military reputation. For the time being General von
Heeringen's part was to remain in Alsace, to deal with a possibly
looked for strong French offensive by way of the Vosges or Belfort.
The main plan of the German General Staff, therefore was a wide
enveloping movement by the First and Second Armies to sweep the
shore of the English Channel in their march on Paris, a vigorous
advance of the center through the Ardennes for the same destination,
and readiness for battle by the Sixth Army for any French force
which might be tempted into Alsace. That this plan was not developed
in its entirety, was due to circumstances which fall into another
place.
[Illustration: PICTORIAL MAP OF FRANCE]
The long anticipated _Day_ dawned. Their vast military machine
moved with precision and unity. But there was a surprise awaiting
them. The Belgians were to offer a serious resistance to passage
through their territory--a firm refusal had been delivered at the
eleventh hour. The vanguard was thrown forward from Von Kluck's
army at Aix, to break through the defenses of Liege and seize the
western railways. This force of three divisions was commanded by
General von Emmich, one of them joining him at Verviers.
On the evening of August 3, 1914, Von Emmich's force had crossed
into Belgium. Early on the morning of August 4, 1914, Von Kluck's
second advance line reached Visé, situated on the Meuse north of
Liege and close to the Dutch frontier. Here an engagement took place
with a Belgian guard, which terminated with the Germans bombarding
Visé. The Belgians had destroyed the river bridge, but the Germans
succeeded in seizing the crossing.
This was the first actual hostility of the war on the western battle
grounds. With the capture of Visé, the way was clear for Von Kluck's
main army to concentrate on Belgian territory. By nightfall, Liege
was invested on three sides. Only the railway lines and roads running
westward remained open.
[Illustration: BELGIUM AND THE FRANCO-GERMAN BORDER]
* * * * *
CHAPTER II
SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LIEGE
A view of Liege will assist in revealing its three days' siege,
with the resulting effect upon the western theatre of war. Liege
is the capital of the Walloons, a sturdy race that in times past
has at many a crisis proved unyielding determination and courage.
At the outbreak of war it was the center of great coal mining and
industrial activity. In the commercial world it is known everywhere
for the manufacture of firearms. The smoke from hundreds of factories
spreads over the city, often hanging in dense clouds. It might
aptly be termed the Pittsburg of Belgium. The city lies in a deep,
broad cut of the River Meuse, at its junction with the combined
channels of the Ourthe and Vesdre. It stretches across both sides,
being connected by numerous bridges, while parallel lines of railway
follow the course of the main stream. The trunk line from Germany
into Belgium crosses the Meuse at Liege. For the most part the
old city of lofty houses clings to a cliffside on the left bank,
crowned by an ancient citadel of no modern defensive value. Whatever
picturesqueness Liege may have possessed is effaced by the squalid
and dilapidated condition of its poorer quarters. To the north
broad fertile plains extend into central Belgium, southward on the
opposite bank of the Meuse, the Ardennes present a hilly forest,
stream-watered region. In its downward course the Meuse flows out
of the Liege trench to expand through what is termed the Dutch
Flats.
Liege, at the outbreak of the war, was a place of great wealth and
extreme poverty--a Liege artisan considered himself in prosperity
on $5 a week. It was of the first strategic importance to Belgium.
Its situation was that of a natural fortress, barring the advance
of a German army.
The defenses of Liege were hardly worth an enemy's gunfire before
1890. They had consisted of a single fort on the Meuse right bank,
and the citadel crowning the heights of the old town. But subsequently
the Belgian Chamber voted the necessary sums for fortifying Liege
and Namur on the latest principles. From the plans submitted, the
one finally decided upon was that of the famous Belgian military
engineer Henri Alexis Brialmont. His design was a circle of detached
forts, already approved by German engineers as best securing a
city within from bombardment. With regard to Liege and Namur
particularly, Brialmont held that his plan would make passages of
the Meuse at those places impregnable to an enemy.
When the German army stood before Liege on this fourth day of August,
in 1914, the circumference of the detached forts was thirty-one miles
with about two or three miles between them, and at an average of
five miles from the city. Each fort was constructed on a new model
to withstand the highest range and power of offensive artillery
forecast in the last decade of the nineteenth century. When completed
they presented the form of an armored mushroom, thrust upward from
a mound by subterranean machinery. The elevation of the cupola in
action disclosed no more of its surface than was necessary for the
firing of the guns. The mounds were turfed and so inconspicuous that
in times of peace sheep grazed over them. In Brialmont's original
plan each fort was to be connected by infantry trenches with sunken
emplacements for light artillery, but this important part of his
design was relegated to the dangerous hour of a threatening enemy.
This work was undertaken too late before the onsweep of the Germans.
Instead, Brialmont's single weak detail in surrounding each fort
with an infantry platform was tenaciously preserved long after
its uselessness must have been apparent. Thus Liege was made a
ring fortress to distinguish it from the former latest pattern of
earth ramparts and outworks.
Six major and six minor of these forts encircled Liege. From north
to south, beginning with those facing the German frontier, their
names ran as follows: Barchon, Evegnée, Fleron, Chaud-fontaine,
Embourg, Boncelles, Flemalle, Hollogne, Loncin, Lantin, Liers,
and Pontisse. The armaments of the forts consisted of 6-inch and
4.7-inch guns, with 8-inch mortars and quick firers. They were
in the relative number of two, four, two and four for the major
forts, and two, two, one and three for the minor _fortins_, as
such were termed. The grand total was estimated at 400 pieces.
In their confined underground quarters the garrisons, even of the
major forts, did not exceed eighty men from the engineer, artillery
and infantry branches of the service. Between Fort Pontisse and
the Dutch frontier was less than six miles.
It was through this otherwise undefended gap that Von Kluck purposed
to advance his German army after the presumed immediate fall of
Liege, to that end having seized the Meuse crossing at Visé. The
railway line to Aix-la-Chapelle was dominated by Fort Fleron, while
the minor Forts Chaudfontaine and Embourg, to the south, commanded
the trunk line by way of Liege into Belgium. On the plateau, above
Liege, Fort Loncin held the railway junction of Ans and the lines
running from Liege north and west. Finally, the forts were not
constructed on a geometric circle, but in such manner that the
fire of any two was calculated to hold an enemy at bay should a
third between them fall. This was probably an accurate theory before
German guns of an unimagined caliber and range were brought into
action.
In command of the Belgian forts at Liege was General Leman. He had
served under Brialmont, and was pronounced a serious and efficient
officer. He was a zealous military student, physically extremely
active, and constantly on the watch for any relaxation of discipline.
These qualities enabled him to grasp at the outset the weakness
of his position.
If the Germans believed the refusal to grant a free passage for
their armies through Belgium to be little more than a diplomatic
protest, it would seem the Belgian Government was equally mistaken
in doubting the Germans would force a way through an international
treaty of Belgian neutrality. Consequently, the German crossing
of the frontier discovered Belgium with her mobilization but half
complete, mainly on a line for the defense of Brussels and Antwerp.
It had been estimated by Brialmont that 75,000 men of all arms
were necessary for the defense of Liege on a war footing, probably
35,000 was the total force hastily gathered in the emergency to
withstand the German assault on the fortifications. It included
the Civic Guard.
General Leman realized, therefore, that, without a supporting field
army, it would be impossible for him to hold the German hosts before
Liege for more than a few days--a week at most.
But he hoped within such time the French or British would march
to his relief. Thus his chief concern was for the forts protecting
the railway leading from Namur down the Meuse Valley into Liege--the
line of a French or British advance.
On the afternoon of August 4, 1914, German patrols appeared on
the left bank of the Meuse, approaching from Visé. They were also
observed by the sentries on Forts Barchon, Evegnée and Fleron.
German infantry and artillery presently came into view with the
unmistakable object of beginning the attack on those forts. The
forts fired a few shots by way of a challenge. As evening fell,
the woods began to echo with the roar of artillery. Later, Forts
Fleron, Chaudfontaine and Embourg were added to the German bombardment.
The Germans used long range field pieces with powerful explosive
shells. The fire proved to be remarkably accurate. As their shells
exploded on the cupolas and platforms of the forts, the garrisons
in their confined citadels began to experience that inferno of
vibrations which subsequently deprived them of the incentive to
eat or sleep. The Belgians replied vigorously, but owing to the
broken nature of the country, and the forethought with which the
Germans took advantage of every form of gun cover, apparently little
execution was dealt upon the enemy. However, the Belgians claimed
to have silenced two of the German pieces.
In the darkness of this historic night of August 4, 1914, the flames
of the fortress guns pierced the immediate night with vivid streaks.
Their searchlights swept in broad streams the wooded slopes opposite.
The cannonade resounded over Liege, as if with constant peals of
thunder. In the city civilians sought the shelter of their cellars,
but few of the German shells escaped their range upon the forts
to disturb them.
This exchange of artillery went on until near daybreak of August
5, 1914, when infantry fire from the woods to the right of Fort
Embourg apprised the defenders that the Germans were advancing to
the attack. The Germans came on in their customary massed formation.
The prevalent opinion that in German tactics such action was employed
to hearten the individual soldier, was denied by their General
Staff. In their opinion an advantage was thus gained by the
concentration of rifle fire. Belgian infantry withstood the assault,
and counter-attacked. When dawn broke, a general engagement was
in progress. About eight o'clock the Germans were compelled to
withdraw.
[Illustration: BEGINNING OF GERMAN INVASION OF BELGIUM]
The first engagement of the war was won by the Belgians. It was
reported that the Belgian fire had swept the Germans down in thousands,
but this was denied by German authorities. Up to this time the
German forces before Liege were chiefly Von Kluck's vanguard under
Von Emmich, his second line of advance, and detachments of Von
Bülow's army. On the Belgian side no attempt was made to follow
up the advantage. The reason given is that the Germans were seen
to be in strong cavalry force, an arm lost totally in the military
complement of Liege. The German losses were undoubtedly severe,
especially in front of Fort Barchon. This was one of the major
forts, triangular in shape, and surrounded by a ditch and barbed
wire entanglements. The armament of these major forts had recently
been reenforced by night, secretly, with guns of heavier caliber
from Antwerp. As they outmatched the German field pieces of the
first attack, presumably the German Intelligence Department had
failed in news of them. An armistice requested by the Germans to
gather in the wounded and bury the dead was refused. Thereupon
the artillery duel recommenced.
A hot and oppressive day disclosed woods rent and scarred, standing
wheat fields shell-plowed and trampled, and farm houses set ablaze.
The bringing of the Belgian wounded into Liege apprised the citizens
that their side had also suffered considerably. Meanwhile, the
Germans were reenforced by the Tenth Hanoverian Army Corps, from
command of which General von Emmich had been detached to lead Von
Kluck's vanguard, also artillery with 8.4-inch howitzers.
The bombardment on this 5th day of August, 1914, now stretched from
Visé around the Meuse right bank half circle of forts to embrace
Pontisse and Boncelles at its extremities. In a few hours infantry
attack began again. The Germans advanced in masses by short rushes,
dropping to fire rifle volleys, and then onward with unflinching
determination. The forts, wreathed in smoke, blazed shells among
them; their machine guns spraying streams of bullets. The Germans
were repulsed and compelled to retire, but only to re-form for a
fresh assault. Both Belgian and German aeroplanes flew overhead
to signal their respective gunners. A Zeppelin was observed, but
did not come within range of Belgian fire. The Belgians claim to
have shot down one German aeroplane, and another is said to have
been brought to earth by flying within range of its own artillery.
During the morning of August 5, Fort Fleron was put out of action
by shell destruction of its cupola-hoisting machinery. This proved a
weak point in Brialmont's fortress plan. It was presently discovered
that the fire of the supporting forts Evegnée and Chaudfontaine
could not command the lines forming the apex of their triangle.
Further, since the Belgian infantry was not in sufficient force
to hold the lines between the forts, a railway into Liege fell
to the enemy. The fighting here was of such a desperate nature,
that General Leman hastened to reenforce with all his reserve.
This battle went on during the afternoon and night of August 5,
into the morning of August 6, 1914. But the fall of Fort Fleron
began to tell in favor of the Germans. Belgian resistance perforce
weakened. The ceaseless pounding of the German 8.4-inch howitzers
smashed the inner concrete and stone protective armor of the forts,
as if of little more avail than cardboard. At intervals on August
6, Forts Chaudfontaine, Evegnée and Barchon fell under the terrific
hail of German shells. A way was now opened into the city, though,
for the most part, still contested by Belgian infantry. A party
of German hussars availed themselves of some unguarded path to
make a daring but ineffectual dash to capture General Leman and
his staff.
General Leman was consulting with his officers at military headquarters,
on August 6, 1914, when they were startled by shouts outside. He
rushed forth into a crowd of citizens to encounter eight men in
German uniform. General Leman cried for a revolver to defend himself,
but another officer, fearing the Germans had entered the city in
force, lifted him up over a foundry wall. Both Leman and the officer
made their escape by way of an adjacent house. Belgian Civic Guards
hastening to the scene dispatched an officer and two men of the
German raiders. The rest of the party are said to have been made
prisoners.
The end being merely a question of hours, General Leman ordered
the evacuation of the city by the infantry. He wisely decided it
could be of more service to the Belgian army at Dyle, than held in
a beleaguered and doomed city. Reports indicate that this retreat,
though successfully performed, was precipitate. The passage of it
was scattered with arms, equipment, and supplies of all kinds.
An ambulance train was abandoned, twenty locomotives left in the
railway station, and but one bridge destroyed in rear beyond immediate
repair. After its accomplishment, General Leman took command of the
northern forts, determined to hold them against Von Kluck until
the last Belgian gun was silenced.
Early on August 7, 1914, Burgomaster Kleyer and the Bishop of Liege
negotiated terms for the surrender of the city. It had suffered
but slight damage from the bombardment. Few of the citizens were
reported among the killed or injured. On behalf of the Germans it
must be said their occupation of Liege was performed in good order,
with military discipline excellently maintained. They behaved with
consideration toward the inhabitants in establishing their rule
in the city, and paid for all supplies requisitioned. They were
quartered in various public buildings and institutions, probably to
the number of 10,000. The German troops at first seemed to present
an interesting spectacle. They were mostly young men, reported as
footsore from their long march in new, imperfectly fitting boots,
and hungry from the lack of accompanying commissariat. This is proof
that the German's military machine did not work to perfection at the
outset. Later, some hostile acts by Belgian individuals moved the
German military authorities to seize a group of the principal citizens,
and warn the inhabitants that the breaking of a peaceful attitude
would be at the risk of swiftly serious punishment. Precautions to
enforce order were such as is provided in martial law, and carried
out with as little hardship as possible to the citizens. The Germans
appeared anxious to restore confidence and win a feeling of good
will.
For some days after the capitulation of the city the northern forts
continued a heroic resistance. So long as these remained uncaptured,
General Leman maintained that, strategically, Liege had not fallen.
He thus held in check the armies of Von Kluck and Von Bülow, when
every hour was of supreme urgency for their respective onsweep into
central Belgium and up the Meuse Valley. The Germans presently
brought into an overpowering bombardment their ll-inch siege guns.
On August 13, 1914, Embourg was stricken into ruin. On the same
day the electric lighting apparatus of Fort Boncelles having been
destroyed, the few living men of its garrison fought through the
following night in darkness, and in momentary danger of suffocation
from gases emitted by the exploding German shells.
Early in the morning of August 14, 1914, though its cupolas were
battered in and shells rained upon the interior, the commander
refused an offer of surrender. A little later the concrete inner
chamber walls fell in. The commander of Boncelles, having exhausted
his defensive, hoisted the white flag. He had held out for eleven
days in a veritable death-swept inferno.
Fort Loncin disputed with Boncelles the honor of being the last to
succumb. The experience of its garrison differed only in terrible
details from Boncelles. Its final gun shot was fired by a man with
his left hand, since the other had been severed. Apparently a shell
exploded in its magazine, and blew up the whole fort. General Leman
was discovered amid its débris, pinned beneath a huge beam. He was
released by his own men. When taken to a trench, a German officer
found that he was merely unconscious from shock.
When sufficiently recovered, General Leman was conducted to General
von Emmich to tender his personal surrender. The two had previously
been comrades at maneuvers. The report of their meeting is given
by a German officer. The guard presented the customary salute due
General Leman's rank. General von Emmich advanced a few steps to
meet General Leman. Both generals saluted.
"General," said Von Emmich, "you have gallantly and nobly held your
forts."
"I thank you," Leman replied. "Our troops have lived up to their
reputation. War is not like maneuvers, _mon Général_," he added
with a pointed smile. "I ask you to bear witness that you found
me unconscious."
General Leman unbuckled his sword to offer it to the victor. Von
Emmich bowed.
"No, keep it," he gestured. "To have crossed swords with you has
been an honor."
Subsequently the President of the French Republic bestowed on Liege
the Cross of the Legion of Honor. To its motto in this instance
might have been added appropriately: Liege, the Savior of Paris.
The few days of its resistance to an overwhelming force enabled
the Belgium army to improve its mobilization, the British to throw
an expeditionary army into France, and the French to make a new
offensive alignment. It will forever remain a brilliant page in war
annals. In a military estimate it proved that forts constructed on
the lastest scientific principles, but unsupported by an intrenched
field army, crumple under the concentrated fire of long-range,
high-power enemy guns.
The fall of the northern and eastern Liege forts released Von Kluck's
army for its march into central Belgium. Meanwhile the Belgian army
had been concentrated on a line of the River Dyle, with its left
touching Malines and its right resting on Louvain. Its commander,
General Selliers de Moranville, made his headquarters in the latter
city. The Belgian force totaled 110,000 men of all complements.
Whether this included the reinforcement by the Liege infantry is
uncertain.
During August 10 and 11, 1914, General Moranville threw forward
detachments to screen his main body in front of the German advance.
On the 11th a rumor that the French had crossed the Sambre, moved
General Moranville to extend his right wing to Eghezee, with the
hope of getting in touch with the Allies. That the French and British
were hastening to his support could not be doubted. They were already
overdue, but assuredly would come soon. That was the Belgian reliance,
passing from mouth to mouth among the Court, Cabinet Ministers,
General Staff, down to the factory toilers, miners, and peasants
on their farms. The Sambre report, like many others in various
places, proved unfounded.
* * * * *
CHAPTER III
BELGIUM'S DEFIANCE
A view of the general situation in Belgium will assist in clearing
the way for swiftly following events. Germany had invaded Belgium
against the diplomatic and active protests of its Government. But
the German Government still hoped that the heroic resistance of
Liege would satisfy Belgian national spirit, and a free passage
of German troops now be granted. The German Emperor made a direct
appeal to the King of the Belgians through the medium of the Queen
of Holland. From the German point of outlook their victory could
best be attained by the march through Belgium upon Paris. The German
Government asserted that the French and British contemplated a
similar breach of Belgian neutrality. To their mind, it was a case
of which should be on the ground first. On the other hand, the
Allies pronounced the German invasion of Belgium an unprovoked
assault, and produced countertestimony. The controversy has continued
to this day. But the war as it progressed has seen many breaches of
neutrality, and a certain resignation to the inevitable has succeeded
the moral indignation so easily aroused in its early stages.
Let us now glance at the condition of Belgium when war was declared.
The Belgians were an industrial and not a militant people. They
had ample reason to yearn for a permanent peace. Their country had
been the cockpit of Europe from the time of Cæsar until Waterloo.
The names of their cities, for the most part, represented great
historic battle fields. Again and again had the ruin of conflict
swept over their unfortunately situated land. At all periods the
Belgians were brave fighters on one side or the other, for Belgium
had been denied a national unity. Doubtless, therefore, they welcomed
the establishment of their independent sovereignty and the era of
peace which followed. Historically, they had suffered enough, with
an abundance to spare, from perpetual warfare. Their minds turned
hopefully toward industrial and commercial activity, stimulated
by the natural mineral wealth of their soil. Thus the products
of their factories reached all countries, South America, China,
Manchuria, and Central Africa, especially of later years, where
a great territory had been acquired in the Congo. The iron and
steel work of Liege was famous, Antwerp had become one of the chief
ports of Europe and growing into a financial power. But owing to
the confined boundaries of Belgium, there grew to be a congestion
of population. This produced a strong democratic and socialistic
uplift which even threatened the existence of the monarchy. Also,
all that monarchy seemed to imply.
The Belgians, doubtless with memories of the past, despised and hated
the display of military. Consequently it was only with difficulty,
and in the face of popular opposition, that the Belgium Government
had succeeded with military plans for defense, but imperfectly
carried out. Herein, perhaps, we have the keynote to Belgium's
desperate resistance to the German invaders. In the light of the
foregoing, it is easily conceivable that the Germans represented
to the Belgians the military yoke. They were determined to have
none of it, upon any overtures or terms. But they relied on France
and England for protection, when common prudence should have made
the mobilization of an up-to-date army of 500,000 men ready for
the call to repel an invader on either of the frontiers, instead
of the practically helpless force of 110,000.
The German General Staff did not believe the Belgians intended
to raise a serious barrier in their path. But with the crisis,
democratic Belgium united in a rush to arms, which recalls similar
action by the American colonists at the Revolution. Every form of
weapon was grasped, from old muskets to pitchforks and shearing
knives. It was remarked by a foreign witness that in default of
properly equipped armories, the Belgians emptied the museums to
confront the Germans with the strangest assortment of antiquated
military tools.
As testimony of Belgian feeling, the Labor party organ "Le Peuple"
issued the following trumpet blast: "Why do we, as irreconcilable
antimilitarists, cry 'Bravo!' from the bottom of our hearts to
all those who offer themselves for the defense of the country?
Because it is not only necessary to protect the hearths and homes,
the women and the children, but it is also necessary to protect at
the price of our blood the heritage of our ancient freedom. Go,
then, sons of the workers, and register your names as recruits. We
will rather die for the idea of progress and solidarity of humanity
than live under a régime whose brutal force and savage violence
have wiped outright."
The Belgian General Staff, foreseeing dire consequences from such
inflaming press utterances, warned all those not regularly enlisted
to maintain a peaceful attitude. Disregard of this admonition later
met with heavy retribution.
On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, a German cavalry screen, thrown in
advance of the main forces, came in touch with Belgian patrols.
A series of engagements took place. The Germans tried to seize
the bridges across the Dyle at Haelen, and at Cortenachen on the
Velpe, a tributary of the former river, mainly with the object of
outflanking the Belgian left wing. The Belgians are said to have
numbered some 10,000 of all arms, and were successful in repulsing
the Germans.
On August 13, 1914, similar actions were continued. At Tirlemont
2,000 German cavalry swept upon the town, but were beaten off.
At Eghezee on the extreme Belgian right--close to Namur and the
historic field of Ramillies--another brush with the Germans took
place. Belgian cavalry caught a German cavalry detachment bivouacked
in the village. Sharp fighting through the streets ensued before the
Germans withdrew. In spite of the warning of the Belgian General
Staff, and similar advance German notices, the citizens of some
of these and other places began sniping German patrols.
Meantime, moving over the roads toward Namur, toiled the huge German
42-centimeter guns. The German General Staff had taken to mind
the lesson of Liege. Each gun was transported in several parts,
hauled by traction engines and forty horses. Of this, with the
advance of Von Kluck and Von Bülow, the Belgian General Staff was
kept in total ignorance by the German screen of cavalry. So ably
was this screen work performed that the Belgians were led to believe
the Germans had succeeded in placing no more than two divisions of
cavalry, together with a few detachments of infantry and artillery,
on Belgian soil. They, in fact, regarded the German cavalry skirmishing
as a rather clumsy offensive.
As we have seen, the resistance of Forts Boncelles and Loncin at
Liege held back the main German advance from seven to ten days.
Their fall released into German control the railway junction at
Ans. With that was included the line from Liege up the left bank
of the Meuse to Namur. Also, another line direct to Brussels.
On August 15, 1914, the cavalry screen was withdrawn, and four
German army corps were revealed to the surprised Belgian line.
In this emergency, clearly their only hope lay with the French.
In Louvain, Brussels, and Antwerp, anxious questions lay on all
lips. "Why do not the French hasten to our aid? When will they
come? Will the British fail us at the twelfth hour?"
Eager watchers at Ostend beheld no sign of the promised transports
to disembark a British army of support in the day of overwhelming
need. About this time some French cavalry crossed the Sambre to
join hands with the Belgian right wing near Waterloo. But it was
little more than a detachment. The French General Staff was occupied
with a realignment, and had decided not to advance into Belgium
until they could do so in force sufficient to cope with the Germans.
The Belgian General Staff saw there was no other course but to
fall back, fighting rear-guard actions until the longed-for French
army was heralded by the thunder of friendly guns.
The Belgian army was thus withdrawn from the River Gethe to hold
Aerschot on its left stubbornly through August 14, 1914. Diest,
St. Trond, and Waremme fell before the German tidal wave without
resistance. Von Kluck's main army endeavored to sweep around the
Belgian right at Wavre, but was checked for a brief space.
* * * * *
CHAPTER IV
CAPTURE OF LOUVAIN--SURRENDER OF BRUSSELS
During August 17, 1914, the German center was hurled forward in
irresistible strength. The citizens of the villages in its path
fled precipitously along the roads to Brussels. At intersections
all kinds of vehicles bearing household effects, together with live
stock, blocked the way to safety. The uhlan had become a terror,
but not without some provocation. Tirlemont was bombarded, reduced,
and evacuated by the Belgian troops. The latter made a vigorous
defensive immediately before Louvain, but their weakness in artillery
and numbers could not withstand the overwhelming superiority of
the Germans. They were thrust back from the valley of the Dyle to
begin their retreat on Antwerp, chiefly by way of Malines. This
was to elude a successful German envelopment on their Louvain right.
They retired in good order, but their losses had been considerable.
This body was the Belgian right wing, which fell back to take up
a position before Louvain. Here it fought a well-sustained action
on August 19, 1914, the purpose of which was to cover the retreat
of the main army by way of Malines on Antwerp. The Belgian right
wing thus became a rear guard.
It withstood the German attack until the early morning of August
20, 1914, when, separated from the main body, the overpowering
number of German guns and men drove it back to a final stand between
Louvain and Brussels. If its losses had been heavy, the carrying away
of the wounded proved that it still maintained a fighting front.
The retreat of the main army on Antwerp was part of Brialmont's
plan for the defense of Belgium, since the position of Brussels
was not capable of a strong defense. By this time the main army
was safely passing down the valley of the Dyle to the shelter of
the Antwerp forts, leaving the right wing to its fate. Louvain
thus fell to the Germans.
Toward noon of August 20, 1914, the burgomaster and four sheriffs
awaited at one of the city gates, the first German appearance.
This proved to be a party of hussars bearing a white flag. They
conducted the burgomaster to the waiting generals at the head of the
advance column. In token of surrender the burgomaster was requested
to remove his scarf of office, displaying the Belgian national
colors. The German terms were then pronounced. A free passage of
troops through the city was to be granted, and 3,000 men garrisoned
in its barracks. In return, cash was to be paid for all supplies
requisitioned, and a guarantee given for the lives and property
of the inhabitants. The Germans further agreed to maintain the
established civil power, but warned that hostile acts by civilians
would be severely punished. These terms were in general in conformity
with the rules of war governing the military occupation of an enemy
city. In this respect emphasis should be laid on the fact that
under these rules the hostile act of any civilian places him in
the same position as a spy. His recognized sentence is death by
court-martial.
The Germans entered Louvain with bands playing, and singing in
a great swelling chorus: "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Hail to the
War Lord." They marched to quick time, but in passing through the
great square of the Gare du Nord broke into the parade goose step.
In the van were such famous regiments as the Death's Head and Zeiten
Hussars. The infantry wore heavy boots, which, falling in unison,
struck the earth with resounding blows, to echo back from the house
walls. Thus cavalry, infantry, and artillery poured through Louvain
in a gray-green surge of hitherto unimagined military might. This,
for the latter part of the 20th and the day following.
At first the citizens looked on from the sidewalks in a spellbound
silence. Scarcely one seemed to possess the incentive to breathe
a whisper. Only the babies and very small children regarded the
awe-inspiring spectacle as something provided by way of entertainment.
For the rest of the citizens it was dumbfounding beyond human
comprehension. Cavalry, infantry, and artillery rolled on unceasingly
to the clatter of horses' hoofs, the tramp of feet, the rumble
of guns, and that triumphant mighty chorus. There was nothing of
aforetime plumed and gold-laced splendor of war about it, but the
modern Teutonic arms on grim business bent. Except for a curious
glance bestowed here and there, the German troops marched with
eyes front, and a precision as if being reviewed by the emperor.
A few shots were heard to stir instant terror among the citizen
onlookers, but these were between the German advance guard and
Belgian stragglers left behind in the city. Presently the side
streets became dangerous to pedestrians from onrushing automobiles
containing staff officers, and motor wagons of the military train.
General von Arnim, in command, ordered the hauling down of all
allied colors, but permitted the Belgian flag to remain flying above
the Hôtel de Ville. He promptly issued a proclamation warning all
citizens to preserve the peace. It was both placarded and announced
verbally. The latter was performed by a minor city official, ringing
a bell as he passed through the streets accompanied by policemen.
Toward evening of August 20, 1914, the cafés and restaurants filled
up with hungry German officers and men; every hotel room was occupied,
and provision shops speedily sold out the stores on their shelves.
The Germans paid in cash for everything ordered, and preserved
a careful attitude of nonaggression toward the citizens. But
subconsciously there ran an undercurrent of dread insecurity. At the
outset a German officer was said to have been struck by a sniper's
bullet. Somewhat conspicuously the wounded officer was borne on
a litter through the streets, followed by the dead body of his
assailant. Very promptly a news curtain was drawn down around the
city, cutting it off from all information of the world without.
Artillery fire was heard. Presumably this came from the last stand
of the Belgian rear guard in a valley of the hilly country between
Louvain and Brussels. With sustained optimism to the end, rumor
had it that the artillery fire was that of French and British guns
coming to the relief of Louvain. Toward nightfall one or two groups
of snipers were brought in from the suburbs and marched to the
place of execution.
The feeling of a threatened calamity deepened. Another warning
proclamation was issued ordering all citizens to give up their
arms. Further, everyone was ordered to bed at eight o'clock, all
windows were to be closed and all doors unlocked. A burning lamp
was to be placed in each window. On the claim that German soldiers
had been killed by citizens, the burgomaster and several of the
city officials were secured as hostages. A stern proclamation was
issued threatening with immediate execution every citizen found
with a weapon in his possession or house. Every house from which
a shot was fired would be burned.
This was on August 22, 1914. By the evening of that day the German
army had passed through Louvain, estimated to the number of 50,000
men. Only the 3,000 garrison remained in the city. Outwardly, the
citizens resumed their usual daily affairs as if with a sense of
relief, but whispers dropped now and then revealed an abiding terror
beneath. Some time during the next day or two the anticipated calamity
fell upon Louvain. The German officers insisted that sniping was
steadily going on, and the military authorities put into force their
threatened reprisal. The torch, or rather incendiary tablets were
thrown into convicted houses. Larger groups of citizens were led to
execution. Thereupon the "brute" passion dormant in soldiers broke
the bonds of discipline. Flames burst forth everywhere. Beneath the
lurid glow cast upon the sky above Louvain whole streets stood out
in blackened ruin, and those architectural treasures of the Halles
and the University, with its famous library, were destroyed beyond
hope of repair. Only the walls of St. Peter's Church, containing
many priceless paintings, remained.
Meanwhile, on the morning of August 20, 1914, the German army had
swept away the comparatively small Belgian rearguard force before
Brussels, and advanced upon the capital. On the previous 17th the
King of the Belgians removed his Government to Antwerp. The diplomatic
corps followed. Mr. Brand Whitlock, the American Minister, however,
remained. In his capacity as a neutral he had assisted stranded
Germans in Brussels from hasty official and mob peril. He stayed to
perform a similar service for the Belgians and Allies. His success
in these efforts won for him German respect and the gratitude of
the whole Belgian nation.
A lingering plan for defending Brussels by throwing up barricades
and constructing wire entanglements, to be manned by the Civic
Guard, was abandoned in the face of wiser counsel. It would merely
have resulted in a bombardment, with needless destruction of life
and property. Brussels was defenseless.
In flight before the German host, refugees of all classes were
streaming into Brussels--young and old, rich and poor, priest and
layman. Nearly all bore some burden of household treasure, many
some pathetically absurd family heirloom. Every kind of vehicle
appeared to have been called into use, from smart carriages drawn
by heavy Flemish horses to little carts harnessed to dogs. Over all
reigned a stupefied silence, broken only by shuffling footfalls.
Among them the absence of automobiles and light horses would indicate
all such had been commandeered by the Belgian military authorities.
Their cavalry was badly in need of good light-weight mounts. At
crossroads passage to imagined safety was blocked by farm live
stock driven by bewildered peasants.
On Thursday morning, August 20, 1914, the burgomaster motored forth
to meet the Germans. His reception and the terms dictated by General
von Arnim were almost identically the same as at Louvain. The
burgomaster was perforce compelled to accept. The scene of the
entry of the German troops into Louvain was repeated at Brussels.
There was the same stolidly silent-packed gathering of onlookers on
the sidewalks, the same thundering triumphant march of the German
host. Corps after corps, probably of those who had fought at Liege,
and subsequently passed around the city on the grand sweep toward
the French frontier. Moreover, huge bodies of German troops were
advancing up the valley of the Meuse and through the woods of the
Ardennes. As in Louvain, that night the hotels, restaurants, cafes,
and shops of Brussels were patronized by a rush of trade which
never before totaled such extent in a single day. Bills of purchase
were settled by the Germans in cash. The city was promptly assessed
a war indemnity of $40,000,000.
With the fall of Brussels, the first objective of the Germans may
be said to have been gained. But the right wing of Von Kluck's
army was still operating northward upon Antwerp. The Belgian army
had escaped him within the circle of Antwerp's forts, so that he
detailed a force deemed to be sufficient to hold the enemy secure.
Then he struck eastward between Antwerp and Brussels at Alost,
Ghent, and Bruges. In his advance he swept several divisions of
cavalry, also motor cars bearing machine guns. Beyond Bruges his
patrol caught their first glimpse of the North Sea, drawing in
toward another much-hoped-for goal on the English Channel.
But the Belgian army within security of Antwerp had not been routed.
It had retreated in good order, thanks to the resistance of its
right-wing rear guard. General de Moranville promptly reenforced it
with new volunteers to the extent of some 125,000 men. In addition,
he drew upon a fresh supply of ammunition, and new artillery well
horsed. His cavalry, however, were certainly no better and probably
worse than that with which his army had been complemented originally.
On August 23, 1914, obtaining information that the Germans were
in considerably inferior force at Malines, the Belgians began a
vigorous counteroffensive. General de Moranville drove the Germans
out of Malines on the day following. That was in the nature of a
master stroke, for it gave the Belgians control of the shortest
railway from Germany into West Flanders. Further, since Von Kluck
had reached Bruges, and reenforcements under General von Boehn
had passed across the Belgian direct line on Brussels, the great
German right wing was in danger of being caught in a trap. Von
Boehn, therefore, was hurriedly detached rearward to deal with
the Belgian counteroffensive. But this deprived Von Kluck of his
needed reenforcements to overcome 2,000 British marines landed
at Ostend, that, together with the Civic Guard, had beaten back
German patrols from the place. Had the British now landed an army
at Ostend, Von Kluck, between the Belgian and British forces, would
have been in serious danger of annihilation. With the German right
wing thus crumpled, the whole of their offensive would have broken
down. But the British did not come, and so the Belgians were left
to fight it out single handed. This fighting went on for three
weeks, with accurate details lacking. Mainly it was upon the line
Aershot-Dyle Valley-Termonde, with Antwerp for the Belgian base.
On August 24, 1914, a German Zeppelin sailed over Antwerp and dropped
a number of bombs. The Belgians thrust their right wing forward
and recaptured Alost. They advanced their center to a siege of
Cortenburg. Malines seemed secure. To the Belgians this was a historic
triumph. Famous for its manufacture of lace under the name of Mechlin,
almost every street contained some relic of architectural interest.
The Cathedral of St. Rombaut, the seat of a cardinal archbishop,
held upon its walls some of Van Dyck's masterpieces. Margaret of
Austria had held court in its Palais de Justice.
In this emergency, Von Boehn was heavily reenforced with the Third
Army Corps, reserves from the south, and 15,000 sailors and marines.
His army was now between 250,000 and 300,000 men. This placed
overwhelming odds against the Belgians. But for four days they fought
a stubborn battle at Weerde.
This was from September 13 to 16, 1914, and resulted in the capture
of the Louvain-Malines railway by the Germans. The Belgians had
now fought to the extremity of what could be expected without aid
from the Allies. The sole action left for them was to fall back for
a defense of Antwerp. Von Kluck's right wing of the whole German
offensive had completed its task on Belgian soil.
* * * * *
CHAPTER V
COMING OF THE BRITISH
We now come to the arrival of the British on the Continent. In
using the term British, it, is expressly intended to comprise the
united forces of the British Isles.
On August 3, 1914, the British Government practically gave up hope
that war with Germany could be avoided, though it would appear to
have lingered until the ultimatum to Germany to vacate Belgian
soil remained unanswered. On that day the army was mobilized at
Aldershot.
On August 5, 1914, Lord Kitchener was recalled at the outset from
a journey to Egypt, and appointed Minister of War. No more fortunate
selection than this could have been made. Above all else, Lord
Kitchener's reputation had been won as an able transport officer.
In the emergency, as Minister of War, the responsibility for the
transport of a British army oversea rested in his hands. On August
5, 1914, the House of Commons voted a credit of $100,000,000, and
an increase of 500,000 men to the regular forces. Upon the same
day preparations went forward for the dispatch of an expeditionary
army to France.
The decision to send the army to France, instead of direct to a
landing in Belgium, would seem to have been in response to an urgent
French entreaty that Great Britain mark visibly on French soil
her unity with that nation at the supreme crisis. For some days
previously British reluctance to enter the war while a gleam of hope
remained to confine, if not prevent, the European conflagration,
had created a feeling of disappointment in France.
The British expeditionary army consisted at first--that is previous
to the Battle of the Marne--of two and a half army corps, or five
divisions, thus distributed: First Corps, Sir Douglas Haig; Second
Corps, General Smith-Dorien; Fourth Division of the Third Corps,
General Pulteney. The Sixth Division of the Third Corps and the
Fourth Corps under General Rawlinson were not sent to France till
after the end of September, 1914. It contained besides about one
division and a half of cavalry under General Allenby. A British
division varies from 12,000 to 15,000 men (three infantry brigades
of four regiments each; three groups of artillery, each having
three batteries of six pieces; two companies of sappers, and one
regiment of cavalry). The force totaled some 75,000 men, with 259
guns. The whole was placed under the command of Field Marshal Sir
John French, with Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief
of Staff.
Field Marshal French was sixty-two and was two years younger than
Lord Kitchener. His responsibilities were great, how great no one at
the beginning of the war realized his capabilities for the developing
scope of the task untried, but as a serious and courageous officer
he fully merited the honors he had already won.
By August 7, 1914, Admiral Jellicoe was able to guarantee a safe
passage for the British army across the English Channel. A fortunate
mobilization of the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea for maneuvers
shut off the German Grand Fleet from raiding the Channel. There was
nothing to criticize in the manner in which the Expeditionary Army
was thrown into France. Its equipment was ready and in all details
fully worthy of German military organization. From arms to boots--the
latter not long since a scandal of shoddy workmanship--only the
best material and skill had been accepted. Its transport proved
the genius of Lord Kitchener in that brand of military service.
The railways leading to the ports of embarkation, together with
passenger steamships--some of them familiar in American ports--were
commandeered as early as the 4th of August.
During the night of August 7, 1914, train after train filled with
troops steamed toward Southampton, and some other south-coast ports.
Complements were also embarked at Dublin, Avonmouth, and the Bristol
Channel. In the middle of the night citizens of small towns along
the route were awakened by the unceasing rumble of trains. They
had no conception of its import. They did not even realize that
war had actually burst upon the serenity of their peaceful lives.
Each transport vessel was placed in command of a naval officer,
and guarded in its passage across the channel by light cruisers and
torpedo destroyers. The transport of the whole Expeditionary Army
was completed within ten days, without the loss of a man and with
a precision worthy of all military commendation. But such secrecy
was maintained that the British public remained in ignorance of its
passage until successfully accomplished. American correspondents,
however, were not yet strictly censored, so that their papers published
news of it on August 9.
On Sunday, August 9, 1914, two British transports were observed
making for the harbor of Boulogne. The weather was all that could
be wished, the crossing resembled a bank-holiday excursion. For
some days previously the French had taken a gloomy view of British
support. But French fishermen returning from Scotland and English
ports maintained confidence, for had not British fishermen told
them the French would never be abandoned to fall a prey to the
enemy.
When the two advance British transports steamed into view, "Les
Anglais," at last everyone cried. At once a hugely joyful reversion
of feeling. The landing of the British soldiers was made a popular
ovation. Their appearance, soldierly bearing, their gentleness
toward women and children, their care of the horses were showered
with heartfelt French compliments. Especially the Scotch Highlanders,
after their cautious fashion, wondered at the exuberance of their
welcome. For the brave Irish, was not Marshal MacMahon of near-Irish
descent and the first president of the Third Republic? The Irish
alone would save that republic. Women begged for the regimental
badges to pin on their breasts. In turn they offered delicacies of
all kinds to the soldiers. For the first time in a hundred years
the British uniform was seen on French soil. Then it represented
an enemy, now a comrade in arms. The bond of union was sealed at
a midnight military mass, celebrated by English-speaking priests,
for British and French Catholic soldiers at Camp Malbrouch round
the Colonne de la Grande Armée. The two names recalled the greatest
of British and French victories--Blenheim, Ramillies, and Oudenarde,
Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena.
Meanwhile, officers of the French General Staff had journeyed to
London to confer with the British General Staff regarding the camping
and alignment of the British troops. Meanwhile, also, the British
reserves and territorials were called to the colors. The latter
comprised the militia, infantry and artillery, and the volunteer
yeomanry cavalry, infantry and artillery. The militia was the oldest
British military force, officered to a great extent by retired
regular army men, its permanent staffs of noncommissioned officers
were from the regular army, and it was under the direct control of
the Secretary of State for War. The volunteer infantry, artillery,
and yeomanry cavalry were on a somewhat different basis, more nearly
resembling the American militia, but the British militia were linked
with regular-line battalions. The reserves, militia and volunteers,
added approximately 350,000 well-trained men for immediate home
defense.
On Sunday, August 17, 1914, it was officially announced that the
whole of the British Expeditionary Army had landed in France.
Conferences between the British and French General Staffs resulted
in the British army being concentrated first at Amiens. From that
point it was to advance into position as the left wing of the united
French and British armies, though controlled by their separate
commanders.
The French Fifth Army had already moved to hold the line of the
River Sambre, with its right in touch with Namur. Cavalry patrols
had been thrown forward to Ligny and Gembloux, where they skirmished
with uhlans. Charleroi was made French headquarters. It was the
center of extensive coal-mining and steel industry. Pit shafts
and blast furnaces dominated the landscape. Historically it was
the ground over which Blücher's Fourth Army Corps marched to the
support of the British at Waterloo. Now the British were supporting
the French upon it against their former ally.
On Thursday, August 20, 1914, the British took up their position on
the French left. Their line ran from Binche to Mons, then within the
French frontier stretched westward to Condé. From Mons to Condé it
followed the line of the canal, thus occupying an already constructed
barrier. Formerly Condé was regarded as a fortress of formidable
strength, but its position was not held to be of value in modern
strategy. Its forts, therefore, had been dismantled of guns, and its
works permitted to fall into disuse. But the fortress of Maubeuge
lay immediately in rear of the British line. In rear again General
Sordet held a French cavalry corps for flank actions. In front,
across the Belgian frontier, General d'Amade lay with a French
brigade at Tournai as an outpost.
Before proceeding to British headquarters, General French held
a conference with General Joffre, Commander in Chief of all the
French armies. Until the outbreak of the war, General Joffre was
practically unknown to the French people. He was no popular military
idol, no boulevard dashing figure. But he had seen active service
with credit, and had climbed, step by step, with persevering study
of military science into the council of the French General Staff.
As a strategist his qualities came to be recognized as paramount
in that body. A few years previously he had been intrusted with
the reorganization of the French army, and his plans accepted.
Therefore, when war with Germany became a certainty, it was natural
the supreme command of the French army should fall to General Joffre.
* * * * *
CHAPTER VI
CAMPAIGNS IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE
The French staff apparently had designed a campaign in Upper Alsace
and the Vosges, but the throwing of a brigade from Belfort across
the frontier on the extreme right of their line on August 6 would
seem to have been undertaken chiefly with a view of rousing patriotic
enthusiasm. French aeroplane scouts had brought in the intelligence
that only small bodies of German troops occupied the left bank
of the Rhine. Therefore the opportunity was presented to invade
the upper part of the lost province of Alsace--a dramatic blow
calculated to arouse the French patriotic spirit. Since the Germans
had expended hardly any effort in its defense, leaving, as it were
an open door, it may have been part of the strategic idea of their
General Staff to draw a French army into that region, with the
design of inflicting a crushing defeat. Thus French resistance
in the southern Vosges would have been weakened, the capture of
Belfort, unsupported by its field army, a probability, and a drive
beyond into France by the German forces concentrated at Neubreisach
made triumphant. Doubtless the French General Staff fully grasped
the German intention, but considered a nibble at the alluring German
bait of some value for its sentimental effect upon the French and
Alsatians. Otherwise the invasion of Upper Alsace with a brigade
was doomed at the outset to win no military advantage.
On August 7, 1914, the French dispersed a German outpost intrenched
before Altkirch. Some cavalry skirmishing followed, which resulted
in the French gaining possession of the city. As was to be expected,
the citizens of Altkirch welcomed the French with enthusiasm. The
following morning the French were permitted an uncontested advance to
Mülhausen. That such an important manufacturing center as Mülhausen
should have remained unfortified within striking distance of the
French frontier, that the French entered it without being compelled
to fire a shot, was a surprise to everyone with the probable exception
of the German and French General Staffs.
The citizens of Mülhausen repeated the joyous ovation bestowed on
the French troops in Altkirch. The French uniform was hailed as the
visible sign of deliverance from German dominion, and the restoration
of the lost province to their kindred of the neighboring republic.
The climax of this ebullition was reached in a proclamation issued
by direction of General Joffre. "People of Alsace," it ran, "after
forty years of weary waiting, French soldiers again tread the soil
of your native country. They are the pioneers in the great work of
redemption. What emotion and what pride for them! To complete the
work they are ready to sacrifice their lives. The French nation
with one heart spurs them forward, and on the folds of their flag
are inscribed the magical names Liberty and Right. Long live France!
Long live Alsace!"
During August 8, 1914, some intermittent fighting went on in the
vicinity of Mülhausen, which seems to have given the French general
in command the impression that the Germans were not eager for a
counterattack. In turn the Germans may well have been puzzled that
a French brigade instead of an army was thrown into Upper Alsace
for the bait of Mülhausen. Possibly they waited a little for the
main body, which did not come.
Sunday, August 8, 1914, revealed the Germans in such overpowering
strength, that the French were left no other choice than to beat a
hasty retreat. They accordingly fell back upon Altkirch, to intrench
a few miles beyond their own border. Thus ended the French initial
offensive. In military reckoning it achieved little of value.
Meanwhile in the Ardennes on August 13, 1914, the German Crown
Prince, commanding the Fourth Army, advanced from Luxemburg into the
southern Ardennes and captured Neuf-château. His further objective
was to break through the French line somewhere near the historic
ground of Sedan. But at this point some change in the German plan
seems to have taken place. From the maze still enveloping the opening
events of the war, one can only conjecture a reason which would
move such an irrevocable body as the German General Staff to alter
a long-fixed plan. Probably, then, the unanticipated strength of
Belgian resistance foreshadowed the summoning of reenforcements
to Von Kluck's right wing of the whole German army. We have seen,
in fact, how he came to be near a desperate need at Bruges, and
only the heavy reenforcement of Von Boehn enabled that general
to deliver a final defeat to the Belgian field army at Weerde.
Whatever the cause of change of plan may have been, important forces
attached to or intended for the armies of the Duke of Württemberg
and the crown prince were withdrawn to support the armies of Von
Kluck and Von Bülow. These forces went to form a unit under General
von Hausen, a veteran of Sadowa. This change left the Saxon army
of the crown prince with hardly sufficient strength for a main
attack on the French line at Sedan, but still formidable enough
to feel its way cautiously through the Ardennes to test the French
concentration on the central Meuse's west bank. When the German
right had finally settled Liege, the Saxon army could then join
in the united great movement on Paris.
Early on the morning of August 15, 1914, a French detachment of
half an infantry regiment, thrown into Dinant, was surprised by
a mobile Saxon advance force of cavalry, infantry and artillery.
Dinant lies across the Meuse eighteen miles south of Namur. It is
a picturesque ancient town, the haunt of artists and tourists. In
the vicinity are the estates of several wealthy Belgian families,
particularly the thirteenth-century château of Walzin, once the
stronghold of the Comtes d'Ardennes. A bridge crosses the Meuse
at Dinant, which sits mainly on the east bank within shadow of
precipitous limestone cliffs. A stone fort more imposing in appearance
than modern effectiveness crowns the highest cliff summit overlooking
Dinant. The Germans came by way of the east bank to occupy the
suburbs. They presently captured the fort and hoisted the German
flag. Meanwhile the French took possession of the bridge, being
at a considerable disadvantage from German rifle fire from the
cliffs. The solid stone abutments of the bridge, however, enabled
the French to hold that position until strong reenforcements arrived
early in the afternoon. While French infantry cleared the environs
of Germans, their artillery bombarded the fort from the west bank.
Their shells played havoc with the old fort defenses, soon compelling
its evacuation by the Germans. One of the first French artillery
shells blew into shreds the German flag flying triumphantly over
the fort, thus depriving the French of the satisfaction of hauling
it down. Toward evening the Germans retreated toward the Lesse,
followed by the French. In previous wars the forces engaged were
of sufficient strength to designate Dinant a battle, but with the
vast armies of the present conflict it sinks to the military grade
of a mere affair. However, it is called by the French the Battle
of Dinant.
The troops which entered Alsace on August 7, 1914, to the number
of 18,000 to 20,000, belonged to the army of the frontier.
This first army, which was under the orders of General Dubail,
was intrusted with the mission of making a vigorous attack and
of holding in front of it the greatest possible number of German
forces. The general in command of this army had under his orders,
if the detachment from Alsace be included, five army corps and a
division of cavalry. His orders were to seek battle along the line
Saarburg-Donon, in the Bruche Valley, at the same time possessing
himself of the crests of the Vosges as well as the mountain passes.
These operations were to have as their theaters: (1) the Vosges
Mountains, (2) the plateau of Lorraine to the northwest of Donon,
and (3) the left bank of the Meurthe. This left bank of the Meurthe
is separated from the valley of the Moselle by a bristling slope
of firs, which is traversed by a series of passages, the defiles
of Chipotte, of the Croix Idoux, of the Haut Jacques d'Anozel, of
Vanemont, of Plafond. In these passes, when the French returned
to the offensive in September, 1914, furious combats took place.
The German forces opposed to this first army consisted of five
active army corps and a reserve corps.
The first French army, after a violent struggle, conquered the
passes of the Vosges, but the conquest was vigorously opposed and
took more time than the French had reckoned on. As soon as it had
become master of the Donon and the passes, the first French army
pushed forward into the defile of Saarburg. At St. Blaise it won
the first German colors, took Blamont and Cirey (August 15, 1914),
seized the defiles north of the canal of the Marne and the Rhine,
and reached Saarburg. Here a connection was established with the
army of Lorraine, which had commenced its operations on the 14th.
A violent battle ensued, known under the name of the Battle of
Saarburg. The left wing of the French army attacked August 19, 1914;
it hurled itself at the fortified positions, which were copiously
fringed with heavy artillery. In spite of the opposition it made
progress to the northwest of Saarburg.
On the 20th the attack was renewed, but from the beginning it was
evident that it could not succeed and that the duty intrusted to
the Eighth Army Corps of opening up the way for the cavalry corps
could not be accomplished. This army corps had gone through a trying
ordeal as a result of the bombardment by the heavy German artillery
established in fortified positions, covering distances all measured
in advance, with every group and French battery presenting a sure
target and the action of the French cannon rendered useless.
If the left wing of the First Army found itself checked, the center
and the right on the other hand were in an excellent position and
were able to advance. But at this point (August 21, 1914) the Second
French Army (the army of Lorraine) met a serious reverse in the
region of Morhange and was compelled to retreat. This retreat left
the flank of the First Army gravely unprotected, and as a consequence
this army was also obliged to fall back. This rear-guard movement
was accomplished over a very difficult piece of country down to
the Baccarat-Ban de Sapt-Provenchère line, south of the Col du
Bonhomme. It was found necessary to abandon the Donon and the Col
de Sapt.
The task committed to the Second Army, that of Lorraine under De
Castlenau, was to protect Nancy, then to transfer itself to the
east, advancing later to the north and attacking in a line parallel
to that taken by the First Army on the Dieuze-Château Salins front
in the general direction of Saarbrücken. Its mission was therefore
at once both offensive and defensive: to cover Nancy and continue
toward the west the attack of the First Army.
After having repulsed, August 10 and 11, 1914, the strong German
attacks in the region of Spincourt and of Château Salins the Second
Army took the offensive and went forward almost without stopping
during four days of uninterrupted fighting. Penetrating into Lorraine,
which had been annexed, it reached the right bank of the Selle, cut
off Marsal and Château Salins, and pushed forward in the direction
of Morhange. The enemy fell back; at Marsal he even left behind
enormous quantities of ammunition.
As a matter of fact, he fell back on positions that had been carefully
fortified in advance and whence his artillery could bombard at an
almost perfectly accurate range. August 20, 1914, made a violent
counterattack on the canal of Salines and Morhange in the Lake
district. The immediate vicinity of Metz furnished the German army
with a vast quantity of heavy artillery, which played a decisive
role in the Battle of Morhange. The French retreated, and during
this rear-guard movement the frontier city of Lunéville was for
some days occupied by the Germans.
Thus the First and Second Armies failed in their offensive and saw
themselves obliged to retreat, but their retreat was accomplished
under excellent circumstances, and the troops, after a couple of
days of rest, found themselves in a condition again to take the
offensive. The First Army gave energetic support to the Second
Army, which was violently attacked by the Germans in the second
week of August. The German attack, which was first arrayed against
Nancy, turned more and more to the east.
The battle, at first waged in the Mortagne basin, was gradually
extended to the deep woods on the left bank of the Meurthe and on
to Chipotte, Nompatelize, etc. The battles that have been named
the Battle of Mortagne, the Battle of the Meurthe, the Battle of
the Vosges, all waged by the First Army, were extremely violent
in the last week of August and the first two weeks of September.
These combats partly coincided with the Battle of the Marne; they
resulted, at the end of that battle, in the German retreat. The
Second Army renewed the offensive August 25, 1914; it decisively
checked the march of the German army and commenced to force it
back.
The instructions issued to General de Castelnau directed him everywhere
to march forward and make direct attacks. The day of August 25,
1914, was a successful day for the French; everywhere the Germans
were repulsed. From August 26 till September 2, 1914, the Second
Army continued its attacks.
At this point the commander in chief having need of important forces
at his center and at his right relieved the Second Army of much of
its strength. This did not prevent it from engaging in the great
Battle of Nancy and winning it. It was September 4, 1914, that this
battle began and it continued till the 11th, the army sustaining
the incessant assaults of the Germans on its entire front advanced
from Grand Couronne. The German emperor was personally present at
this battle. There was at Dieuze a regiment of white cuirassiers
at whose head it was his intention to make a triumphal entry into
Nancy. Heavy German artillery of every caliber made an enormous
expenditure of ammunition; on the Grand Mont d'Amance alone, one
of the most important positions of the Grand Couronne of Nancy,
more than 30,000 howitzer shells were fired in two days. The fights
among the infantry were characterized on the entire front by an
alternation of failure and success, every point being taken, lost
and retaken at intervals.
The struggle attained to especial violence in the Champenoux Forest.
On September 5, 1914, the enemy won Maixe and Remereville, which
they lost again in the evening, but they were unable to dislodge
the French from the ridge east of the forest of Champenoux. The
Mont d'Amance was violently bombarded; a German brigade marched
on Pont-à-Mousson. The French retook Crevic and the Crevic Wood.
On the 7th the Germans directed on Ste. Geneviève, north of the Grand
Couronne, a very violent attack, which miscarried. Ste. Geneviève
was lost for a time, but it was retaken on the 8th; more than 2,000
Germans lay dead on the ground. The same day the enemy threw themselves
furiously on the east front, the Mont d'Amance, and La Neuvelotte.
South of the Champenoux Forest the French were compelled to retire;
they were thrown back on the ridge west of the forest. On the 9th a
new bombardment of Mont d'Amance, a struggle of extreme violence,
took place on the ridge west of the forest of Champenoux, the French
gaining ground. General Castelnau decided to take the direct offensive,
the Germans giving signs of great fatigue. On the 12th they retired
very rapidly. They evacuated Lunéville, a frontier town, where they
left a great quantity of arms and ammunition. The French began
immediately to pursue them, the Germans withdrawing everywhere
over the frontier.
* * * * *
CHAPTER VII
SIEGE AND FALL OF NAMUR
When the Germans occupied Brussels on August 20, 1914, we observed
that corps after corps did not enter the city, but swept to the
south. This was Von Kluck's left wing moving to attack the Allies
on the Sambre-Mons front. The forces which passed through Brussels
were Von Kluck's center, advancing south by east to fall in line
beside the right wing, which had mainly passed between Brussels
and Antwerp to the capture of Bruges and Ghent. The whole line
when re-formed on the French frontier would stretch from Mons to
the English Channel--the great right wing of the German armies.
Meanwhile, Von Bülow's second army had advanced up the valley of
the Meuse, with its right sweeping the Hisbaye uplands. Some part
of this army may have been transported by rail from Montmedy. Its
general advance in columns was directed chiefly upon the Sambre
crossings. As Von Kluck's wide swing through Belgium covered a
greater distance, Von Bülow's army was expected to strike the Allies
some twenty-four hours earlier. Its march, therefore, was in the
nature of an onrush.
But Von Bülow was now in the full tide of fighting strength--an
amazing spectacle to chance or enforced witnesses. Well may the
terrified peasants have stood hat in hand in the midst of their
ruined villages. Any door not left open was immediately broken
down and the interior searched. Here and there a soldier could be
seen carrying a souvenir from some wrecked château. But for the
most part everyone fled from before its path, leaving it silent
and abandoned. The field gray-green uniforms were almost invisible
in cover, in a half light, or when advancing through mist. No
conceivable detail seemed to have been overlooked. Each man carried
a complete equipment down to handy trifles, the whole weighed to
the fraction of an ounce, in carefully estimated proportions.
But this was not enough. Waiting for each column to pass were men
with buckets of drinking water, into which the soldiers dipped
their aluminum cups. Temporary field post offices were established
in advance, so that messages could be gathered in as the columns
passed. Here and there were men to offer biscuits and handfuls of
prunes. In methodical, machine-like progress came the ammunition
wagons, commissariat carts, field kitchens, teams of heavy horses
attached to pontoons, traction engines hauling enormous siege guns,
motor plows for excavating trenches, aeroplanes, carriages containing
surgeons, automobiles for the commanders, and motor busses in which
staff officers could be seen studying their maps. On some of these
vehicles were chalked Berlin-Paris. No branch of the service was
absent, no serviceable part if it overlooked--not even a complement
of grave diggers. It moved forward always at an even pace, as if on
parade, with prearranged signals passed down the line when there
was any obstacle, a descent or bend in the road.
The tramp of many thousands cast into the atmosphere clouds of
fine dust, but even those in rear marched through it as if their
lungs were made of steel. No permission was granted to open out
for the circulation of air, though it was the month of August. It
is safe to assert there was not a single straggler in Von Bülow's
army. At the first sign of it he was admonished with a vigor to
deter his comrades. Discipline was severely maintained. At every
halt the click of heels, and rattle of arms in salute went on down
the line with the sharp delivery of orders.
On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, the town of Huy, situated midway
between Liege and Namur, was seized. It possessed an old citadel,
but it was disarmed, and used now only as a storehouse. Some Belgian
detachments offered a slight resistance at the bridge, but were
speedily driven off. The capture of Huy gave the Germans control
of the railway from Aix-la-Chapelle to France, though broken at
Liege by the still standing northern forts. But they secured a
branch line of more immediate service, running from Huy into Central
Belgium.
On August 15, 1914, Von Bülow's vanguard came within sight of Namur.
Before evening German guns were hurling shells upon its forts. Began
then the siege of Namur. Namur, being the second fortress hope
of the Allies--the pivot upon which General Joffre had planned to
swing his army into Belgium in a sweeping attack upon the advancing
Germans--a brief survey of the city and fortifications will be
necessary. The situation of the city is not as imposing as that
of Liege. For the most part it sits on a hillside declivity, to
rest in the angle formed by the junction of the Sambre and Meuse.
It is a place of some historic and industrial importance, though
in the latter respect not so well known as Liege. To the west,
however, up the valley of the Sambre, the country presents the
usual features of a mining region--pit shafts, tall chimneys issuing
clouds of black smoke, and huge piles of unsightly débris. While
away to the north stretches the great plain of Central Belgium,
southward the Central Meuse offers a more picturesque prospect in
wooded slopes rising to view-commanding hilltops. Directly east,
the Meuse flows into the precipitous cut on its way to Liege.
But in Belgian eyes the fame of Namur lay to a great extent in its
being the second of Brialmont's fortress masterpieces. Its plan
was that of Liege--a ring of outer detached forts, constructed on
the same armor-clad cupola principle. At Namur these were nine in
number, four major forts and five _fortins_. The distance between
each fort was on the average two and a half miles, with between
two and a half to five miles from the city as the center of the
circumference.
Facing Von Bülow's advance, fort Cognlée protected the Brussels
railway, while the guns of Marchovelette swept the space between
it and the left bank of the Meuse. In the southwest angle formed
by the Meuse, forts Maizeret, Andoy and Dave continued the ring.
Again in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse forts St. Héribert and
Malonne protected the city. North of the Sambre, forts Suarlée
and Emines completed the circle.
In the emergency Namur possessed one advantage over Liege. The
resistance of Liege gave Namur due warning of the German invasion,
and some days to prepare for attack. General Michel was in command
or the garrison of Namur, which comprised from 25,000 to 30,000
men. Doubtless reports had come to him of the situation at Liege.
He immediately set to work to overcome the cause of the failure
of Brialmont's plan at Liege, by constructing trenches between
the forts, protected by barbed wire entanglements, and mines in
advance of the German approach. As his circumference of defense
was less than that of Liege, his force promised to be capable of
a more prolonged resistance.
Besides the Allies were close at hand. Only eighteen miles separated
him from strong detachments of French infantry and artillery at
Dinant. As we have seen French cavalry had been thrown forward
as far as Gembloux on the road to Brussels, but ten miles to the
northeast of Namur. Somewhere between that place and Charleroi
French Chasseurs d'Afrique had advanced to occupy outpost positions.
His position appeared by no means hopeless--considerably better than
the unsupported field army at Liege. The armor of his forts was
calculated to withstand the 36-lb. shells of the heaviest German
fieldpieces, but comparatively slight damage was anticipated from the
known heavier howitzers. If the Germans purposed to assault Namur
in mass formation, as they had done at Liege, General Michel had
every reason to feel confident he could repulse them with tremendous
losses.
But the Germans had learned a severely taught lesson at Liege. They
had no intention of repeating those tactics. Behind a remarkable
screen of secrecy, they managed to conceal from General Michel--as
they did from the Allies--the existence of their enormous siege
guns. Whether they brought into action at Namur their famous
42-centimeters, capable of throwing a shell of high explosive power
weighing 2,500 lbs., is uncertain. In fact, it is still doubtful
where they were first fired at the allied enemy. Two are said to
have assisted in the final destruction of the northern forts of
Liege, and two were seen rolling over the field of Waterloo. The
Germans remained silent upon the subject, and nothing definite
about their first discharge was disclosed. But unquestionably their
fire was capable of demolishing into ruin any fort on earth within
a short period. It is certain, however, the Germans brought against
Namur their 28-centimeter guns, and probably some of 21-centimeter
caliber. These artillery weapons were quite formidable enough to
reduce the Namur forts. The former threw a shell of 750 pounds
from a range of three miles--beyond the reach of the Namur guns.
The latter projected shells of 250 pounds. The Germans are said
to have employed thirty-two of the heavier caliber guns, and a
large number of 21-centimeter.
Thus Namur was doomed before the bombardment commenced. Von Bülow's
left wing advanced up the Meuse north bank from Huy, some part of
it crossing to the south bank at Ardenne, where it came in touch
with the Saxon army.
At sundown of August 20, 1914, Von Bülow was in position before
Namur, three miles from its defenses. Darkness fell upon a hot
and sultry August atmosphere. Presently the flashes and boom of
the German guns began a bombardment of the trenches between forts
Cognelée and Marchovelette. It continued through the night. But
the Belgian fortress guns were outranged. It would have been a mere
waste of ammunition to reply. Neither could the Belgian infantry
venture on a counterattack, for the Germans were clearly observed
in overwhelming strength. At the outset the Germans devoted their
efforts to clearing the trenches of the Belgian infantry, leaving the
forts for subsequent demolition. The unfortunate Belgian infantry,
therefore, could do nothing but fire intermittent rifle volleys,
without any effect upon the Germans. They bravely bore this storm
of shells for ten hours. Not a man who lifted his head above the
German machine gun-swept parapets but was not instantly killed or
wounded. Thus the majority of the officers were killed, and the
ranks within the trenches decimated.
Toward morning on August 21, 1914, the Belgians could stand the
tornado of death no longer. The demoralized troops fled from the
trenches, leaving the gap between forts Cognelée and Marchovelette
open. The Germans then opened fire on the forts. In comparison
with the new German siege howitzers, the old-fashioned Belgian
guns proved to be weak weapons. The tremendous pounding of the
German shells not only smashed the fort cupolas, and crumpled into
ruin the interior stone and steel protective armor, but quickly put
the Belgian guns out of action. Thus while fort Maizeret received
some 1,200 German shells at the speed of twenty to the minute, it was
able to reply with only ten shots. Forts Marchovelette and Maizeret
were the first to fall. Seventy-five men of the Marchovelette garrison
were found dead amid its ruins--nearly its total complement.
[Illustration: FRENCH INVASION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE]
Early on Friday morning of August 21, 1914, forts Andoy, Dave,
St. Héribert and Malonne were subjected to a similar furious
bombardment. After three hours of the cannonade Andoy, Dave and
St. Héribert surrendered. During the morning the Germans thrust
a force into the southern angle of the Sambre and Meuse. Here the
Belgian infantry offered a vigorous resistance. It was hoped that
the French at Dinant would hasten to their relief. But Dinant was
for the second time within a few days the scene of conflict. Some
6,000 French Turcos and artillery did arrive, but too late to be
of use in helping to save Namur. Shells now began to drop in the
city while aeroplanes flung down bombs. A thunderstorm rumbled in
combination with the continuous roar of the German guns. A panic
took hold of the citizens. Distracted men, women and children huddled
together in spellbound terror, or sought the shelter of their cellars.
The more superstitious pronounced this to be the end of all things,
from the eclipse of the sun which darkened the sky. Fort Malonne
succumbed sometime during the afternoon of August 21, 1914.
As at Liege, with General Leman, so in Namur General Michel foresaw
the city and forts' fate was imminent. Only the northwest forts
Suarlée, Emines and Cognelée held out. The Belgians and French
had been defeated by the Germans in the angle of the Sambre and
Meuse. The horizon revealed no sign of a French army advancing.
General Michel, therefore, decided upon the evacuation of the city
by the Belgian infantry. It was successfully accomplished, though
even more in the nature of a flight than at Liege. But General
Michel went with them, instead of remaining, like General Leman,
to fight the defense of his fortress to the last.
The retreating Belgians on August 22, 1914, had some adventurous
wandering before them. They had first to cut their way through
a body of German troops, then to become involved with a French
force near Charleroi. It took them seven days to reach Rouen by way
of Amiens. There they were embarked for sea transport to Ostend.
At Ostend, they joined the main Belgian army after its retreat
from Antwerp.
On Sunday morning, August 23, 1914, the Germans began the bombardment
of Fort Suarlée. This fort repeated the heroic resistance of Fort
Boncelles at Liege. It held out until the afternoon of August 25. It
was apparently then blown up by the explosion of its own magazine,
thus again repeating the end of Fort Loncin at Liege. Meantime the
Germans had succeeded in reducing Forts Cognelée and Emines.
The Germans entered Namur on the afternoon of August 23, 1914. There
seems to have been some oversight in the plan, for the advance guard
found themselves under fire of their own guns directed upon the citadel
and the Grande Place. This, however, was speedily rectified. Their
behavior was much the same as at Louvain and Brussels. They marched
in with bands playing and singing patriotic songs. Proclamations
were at once issued warning the citizens not to commit any hostile
act. The inhabitants were far too cowed to contemplate anything
but submission. Good discipline was preserved, and though the city
took fire that night there is nothing to show it was from German
design. The citizens were induced to come forth from their cellars
and hiding places to reopen the cafés and shops.
General von Bülow entered Namur on Monday morning August 24, 1914.
He was accompanied by Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz, recently
appointed Governor General of Belgium. Previous to the former Balkan
War he had been employed in reorganizing the Turkish army. An onlooker
in Namur thus describes the German Field Marshal:--"An elderly
gentleman covered with orders, buttoned in an overcoat up to his
nose, above which gleamed a pair of enormous spectacles."
General Michel attributed his defeat to the German siege guns. The
fire was so continuous upon the trenches that it was impossible
to hold them, and the forts simply crumpled under the storm of
shells. But back of General Michel's plea the allied Intelligence
Departments lacked efficiency or energy, or both, in not gaining
more than a hint, at any rate, of the enormous German siege guns
until they were actually thundering at the gates.
* * * * *
CHAPTER VIII
BATTLE OF CHARLEROI
Toward the end of the third week of August, 1914, the atmosphere
of every European capital became tense with the realization that a
momentous crisis was impending. It was known that the French-British
armies confronted German armies of equal, if not of superior strength.
In Paris and London the military critics wrote optimistically that
the Germans were marching into a trap.
The British army had arrived at the front in splendid fighting
trim. It was difficult to restrain the impetuous valor of the French
soldiers. The skies were bright and there was confidence that the
Germans would unquestionably meet with a crushing defeat. Let us
glance at the line of the French and British armies stretched along
the Belgian frontier. It ran from within touch of Namur up the right
bank of the Sambre, through Charleroi to Binche and Mons, thence
by way of the coal barge canal just within the French frontier to
Condé. For the choice of a great battle ground there was nothing
particularly attractive about it in a military sense.
There is evidence to show in an official communiqué from General
Joffre published on August 24, 1914, that it was intended to be
merely the left wing of a gigantic French battle offensive--on
the adopted German plan--from Condé to Belfort. "An army," runs
the communiqué, "advancing from the northern part of the Woevre
and moving on Neufchâteau is attacking the German forces which have
been going through the Duchy of Luxemburg and are on the right bank
of the Samoy. Another army from the region of Sedan is traversing the
Belgian Ardennes and attacking the German forces marching between
the Lesse and the Meuse. A third army from the region of Chimay
has attacked the German right between the Sambre and the Meuse.
It is supported by the English army from the region of Mons."
These attacks comprised chiefly the battle of Dinant and cavalry
skirmishing, but the purpose of General Joffre was otherwise made
plain in throwing advance French troops across the Belgian frontier
into Ligny and Gembloux on the road to a recapture of Brussels.
This we have previously noted in another connection. The rout of
the French army in Lorraine, however, put an end to the grand
Condé-Belfort offensive.
Thus the Namur-Condé line became a main defensive position instead
of an offensive left wing sweep through Belgium upon Germany. As
such it was well enough--if its pivot on the fortress of Namur
held secure. Liege had already proved its vulnerability, but it
would seem that the French General Staff joined with General Michel,
the Commander of Namur, in believing the Namur forts would give
a better account. The French General Staff were informed of the
approximate strength of the advancing armies of Von Kluck and Von
Bülow, and had nothing to fear from inferiority in numbers. The
staff never gave out the strength of their forces, but there is
reason for believing the great armies were nearly equally matched
after mobilization--about 1,200,000 men.
Let us now see what was developing in the Ardennes away to the
French right. It has been established that woods, particularly
in summer, form the best cover from the observation or attacks
of airmen. The spreading, leafy boughs are difficult to penetrate
visually from a height of even a few hundred feet, at least to
obtain accurate information of what is transpiring beneath.
French air scouts brought in correct information that they had
seen the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince massed
along the southern Luxemburg and Belgian forest region. But under
the foliage there was another army unseen--that of General von
Hausen. The French moved their Fifth Army up to position on the
line of the Sambre. They advanced their Third Army, commanded by
General Ruffey, upon Luxemburg, and their Fourth Army under General
de Langle de Cary across the River Semois to watch the Meuse left
bank and gain touch with General Lanzerac. General de Cary came
from Sedan, throwing out detachments upon the Meuse left bank. These
operations were to confront the armies of the Duke of Württemberg
and crown prince.
But the French apparently knew nothing of the movements of the
army of General von Hausen. Their air scouts either could not
distinguish it from the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and the
crown prince, amid the forest of the Ardennes, or they did not
observe it at all. To the army of General von Hausen there clings
a good deal of mystery. When last noted by us, previous to the
minor battle of Dinant, it had been formed by forces drawn from
the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince. Ostensibly
at that time, it was destined to support, as a separate field force,
the armies of Von Kluck and von Bülow.
Possibly the Germans had begun to doubt how long Liege could hold
out. Von Kluck was compelled to mark time in his impetuous march
on Central Belgium. His losses had been heavy. Support in strength
seemed urgent. But this need passed as the Liege forts fell one
after the other under the fire of the German siege guns. General
von Hausen was released for action elsewhere. Thus we may assume,
he was ordered to follow the armies of the Duke of Württemberg
and crown prince down through the Ardennes to strike the Meuse
south of Namur. By this time he had been substantially reenforced.
Now under his command were the complete Twelfth and Nineteenth
Corps, and the Eleventh Reserve Corps. Also a cavalry division of
the Prussian Guard, with some other detachments of cavalry. His
Eleventh Reserve Corps were Hessians, the Twelfth and Nineteenth
Corps were Saxons. The latter two corps were regarded as among the
best in the German army. In the Franco-Prussian War they fought
with conspicuous bravery through every battle in which they were
engaged. They won the battle for Prussia at Gravelotte by turning
the French right and capturing St. Privat. They marched to Sedan
under the crown prince--subsequently the Emperor Frederick--to
occupy the first line in the hard fighting of the Givonne Valley.
During the siege of Paris they occupied a part of the German northern
line, finally to march in triumph into Paris. This infantry and
cavalry of the Prussian Guard stiffened Von Hausen's force into
an army of battle strength.
We have thus two factors to bear in mind with regard to the French
defensive position at Charleroi--the resisting power of the Namur
forts, and the unknown, to the French, proximity of Von Hausen's
army.
However substantial was the measure of reliance that the French
General Staff and General Michel placed on the Namur forts, evidently
General von Bülow regarded them as little more than passing targets
for his siege guns. He seemed to have made a comparatively simple
mathematical calculation of almost the number of shells necessary
to fire, and the hours to be consumed in reducing the Namur forts
to masses of débris.
We can picture General von Bülow as he sat in the motor car with
Marshal von der Goltz--the old gentleman with an overcoat buttoned
up to his nose in August, and huge spectacles. Doubtless discussion
ran mainly upon the impending attack of their Second Army on the
French right. Emphasis would have been laid on the positions of
the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince advancing
away to their left upon the forces of the French Generals Ruffey
and de Cary. But there was apparently a German gap here between
Von Bülow's army and the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and
crown prince, though we noticed previously Von Bülow's army came
in touch with Saxon troops half way between Huy and Namur, when a
detachment of Von Bülow's left wing was thrown across the Meuse at
Ardenne. This gap was faced by the French extreme right resting on
the southward Namur bend of the Meuse. It was possibly the "trap"
military critics of the moment foresaw for the Germans. Quite likely
the two German generals Von Bülow and Von der Goltz, chatting in
their motor car, referred to this gap, and it is hardly a stretch
of imagination to suggest a twinkle in the huge glasses of the
old gentleman in the August overcoat, when now and then the name
of Von Hausen was mentioned.
The German attack on the French right began early in the morning
of Friday, August 21, 1914. A party of German hussars crossed the
Meuse, rode through Charleroi, and trotted on toward the Sambre.
At first they were mistaken for a British cavalry patrol. Probably
the populace in Charleroi were not sufficiently familiar at that
time with the British hussar uniform to distinguish it from the
German. In all armies hussar uniforms bear a close resemblance. A
French officer, however, presently detected the situation. After
a skirmish the German hussars were driven off with the loss of a
few killed and wounded. But the raid evidently came out of the gap
as a surprise to the French. The citizens were promptly ordered to
their homes. Barricades were raised in the streets, and mitrailleuses
were placed in sweeping positions. An artillery engagement began at
Jemappe, nine miles above Namur on the left bank of the Sambre,
between Von Bülow's vanguard and the main French right. Later in
the day Von Bülow's vanguard artillery had advanced to open fire
on Charleroi and Thuin, seven miles beyond.
On Saturday, August 22, 1914, Von Bülow attacked Charleroi in full
strength. As we have seen, he had already practically settled with
Namur. Their main assault on Saturday was delivered on the Sambre
bridges at Chatelet and Thuin, below and above Charleroi, respectively.
Sometime on Saturday they succeeded in crossing to turn Charleroi
into one of the most frightful street battle grounds in history.
The conflict raged for the possession of iron foundries, glass
works, and other factories. The thoroughfares were swept by storms
of machine-gun fire. Tall chimneys toppled over and crashed to
the ground, burying defenders grouped near under piles of débris.
Desperate hand-to-hand encounters took place in workshops,
electric-power stations, and manufacturing plants. The normal whir
of machinery, now silent, was succeeded by the crack and spitting
of continuous rifle fire.
The French-Turco and Zouave troops fought with savage ferocity,
with gleaming eyes, using bayonets and knives to contest alleys
and passageways. House doors were battered in to reach those firing
from upper windows. Roofs and yard walls were scaled in chase of
fleeing parties. The Germans were driven out of Charleroi several
times, only to return in stronger force. Similarly with the French.
With each change of victors, the losing side turned to bombard
with a torrent of artillery shells the war-engulfed city.
At nightfall on August 22, 1914, Charleroi burst into flames. A
dread and significant glow fell upon the sky. Absent were the usual
intermittent flare of blast furnaces. The greater part of Charleroi
had become a heap of ruins. Those of its citizens still alive cowered
in holes or corners for shelter.
The battle of Charleroi went on throughout the night. Early on the
morning of Sunday, August 23, 1914, Von Hausen swept down through
the gap between the armies of Von Bülow and the Duke of Württemberg.
He crossed the Meuse, drove from before him the French detachments
watching it, and advanced to attack the rear of the French right.
Von Hausen took the French at Charleroi completely by surprise.
At the moment they could comprehend neither where he came from
nor the measure of his strength. But he was in army force.
The French were compelled to withdraw their right from Charleroi.
Von Hausen seized the advantage to hurl his forces upon their rear,
while Von Bülow thundered in assault more vigorously than ever on
the French front. A powerful force was hurled upon them from an
unexpected direction. Presently the retreat of the French Fifth
Army was threatened by the two Saxon corps of Von Hausen's army,
pressing on the French right flank and rear. In this emergency the
retirement of the French Fifth Army appears to have been undertaken
with spontaneous realization of utmost danger. It gave way before
the attacks of Von Bülow and Von Hausen to move southward, leaving
their British left wing without information of defeat.
* * * * *
CHAPTER IX
BATTLE OF MONS
On Friday, August 21, 1914, the British force began to take position
on the French left, forming the line Binche-Mons-Condé. When finally
concentrated it comprised the First and Second Army Corps, and
General Allenby's cavalry division. The regiments forming the cavalry
division were the Second Dragoon Guards, Ninth Lancers, Fourth
Hussars, Sixth Dragoon Guards, with a contingent of the Household
Guards. The First Army Corps was given the right of the line from
Binche to Mons. It was commanded by Sir Douglas Haig. He was a
cavalry officer like the commander in chief, and a comparatively
young man for such a responsibility, but had seen active service
with credit. His corps was comprised of six guards' battalions.
The First Black Watch, Second Munster Fusiliers, The Royal Sussex,
North Lancashire, Northamptons, Second King's Royal Rifles, Third
West Surreys, The South Wales Borderers, Gloucesters, First Welsh
Regiment, Highland Light Infantry, Connaught Rangers, Liverpools,
South Staffords, Berkshires, and First King's Royal Rifles. The First
Irish Guards went into action for the first time in its history.
The second corps extended from Mons to Condé, commanded by Sir
Horace Smith-Dorrien. General Dorrien was a west of England man,
and turning fifty-six. He had seen active service in the Zulu War,
Egypt, Sudan, the Chitral Relief Force, and Tirah campaign. He had
occupied the positions of adjutant general in India, commander
of the Quetta division, and commander in chief at Aldershot. He
was recognized as a serious military student, and possessing the
approval and confidence of Lord Kitchener. The Second Corps was
composed of Royal Irish Rifles, Wiltshires, South Lancashires,
Worcesters, Gordons, Royal Scots, Royal Irish, Middlesex, Royal
Fusiliers, Northumberland Fusiliers, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Lincolns,
Yorkshire Light Infantry, West Kent, West Riding, Scottish Borderers,
Manchesters, Cornwalls, East Surreys, and Suffolks. To the rear
Count Gleichen commanded the Norfolks, Bedfords, Cheshires, and
Dorsets. On the left of the Second Corps was stationed General
Allenby's cavalry.
In passing we may note that the commander in chief of the British
forces was a cavalry officer, the commander of the First Army Corps
a cavalry officer, and that the cavalry was in comparatively ample
force. Von Mackensen of the German force came from that branch of
the service. Cavalry officers are excellent soldiers, but their
training as such is not promising for the command of modern armies,
mainly of infantry and artillery, with other complements. In war much
has changed since Waterloo, with the value of cavalry retreating
into the background as aeroplanes sweep to the front for scouting
and other purposes.
From Binche to Condé the line assigned to the British was approximately
twenty-five miles. Their force totaled some 75,000 men with 259 guns.
General French, therefore, had 2,500 men to the mile of front.
This was an insufficient force, as the usual fighting front for a
battalion of a thousand men in defense or in attack is estimated in
all armies at about 425 yards. The British brigade of four battalions
(4,000 rifles) covers a half-mile front. General French's Third
Army Corps having been utilized elsewhere, he was compelled to
use his cavalry in four brigades as reserve.
Previous to the German attack on Charleroi, General Joffre still held
to his plan of a left-wing attack, or rather a counter-attack after
the Germans were beaten. But battles were commencing on other fronts,
properly belonging to the general retreat, which made its execution
doubtful even in an hour of Victory. The capture of Charleroi, of
course, dissipated it as a dream. That General French realized
the superiority in numbers of Von Kluck's advancing army both in
infantry and artillery is nowhere suggested. His airmen had merely
brought in the information that the attack would be in "considerable
force." The French Intelligence Service were led to believe and
informed the British commander that Von Kluck was advancing upon him
with only one corps, or two at the most. Some of General French's
cavalry scouting as far toward Brussels as Soignes, during the 21st
and 22d, confirmed it. But the British proceeded to prepare for
attack immediately on taking position. They set to work digging
trenches.
While continuing their defensive efforts through Saturday, August
22, 1914, there floated to them a distant rumble from the eastward.
Opinions differed as to whether it was the German guns bombarding
Namur, or a battle in progress on the Sambre. For the most part
British officers and men had but a vague idea of their position, or
the progress of the fighting in the vicinity. Even the headquarters
staff remained uninformed of the desperate situation developing on
the French right at Charleroi.
The headquarters of the British army was at Mons. It lies within
what is known as "le Borinage," that is the boring district of
Belgium, the coal-mining region. In certain physical aspects it
much resembles the same territory of Pennsylvania. Containing one
or two larger towns such as Charleroi and Mons, it is sprinkled
over with villages gathered near the coal pits. Everywhere trolley
lines are to be seen running from the mines to supply the main
railways and barge canals.
Formerly the people were of a rough, ignorant and poverty toiling
type, but of late years have greatly improved with the introduction
of organized labor and education. Previous bad conditions, however,
have left their mark in a stunted and physically degenerate type of
descendants from the mining population of those times. In contrast
to later comers they resemble a race of dwarfs. The men seldom
exceed four feet eight inches in height, the women and children
appear bloodless and emaciated.
The output of the Borinage coal field exceeds twenty million tons
a year. Its ungainly features of shafts, chimneys, and mounds of
débris are relieved in places by woodlands, an appearance of a
hilly country is presented where the pit mounds have been planted
with fir trees. Apart from its mining aspect, Mons is a city of
historic importance. It contains a Gothic cathedral and town hall
of medieval architectural note. It also, cherishes a special yearly
fête of its own on Trinity Sunday, when in the parade of the Limaçon,
or snail, the spectacle of St. George and the Dragon is presented.
With great pride the citizens of Mons showed the British soldiers
of occupation an ancient cannon, claimed to have been used by their
forefathers as an ally of the English at Crecy.
Especially east of Mons, toward Binche, the British line ran through
this district. Several of the greatest European battles have been
fought in its vicinity--Ramilles, Malplaquet, Jemappe, and Ligny.
The night of Saturday, August 23, 1914, passed peacefully for the
British soldiers, still working on their trenches. But distant boom
of guns from the east continued to vibrate to them at intervals.
Of its portend they knew nothing. Doubtless as they plied the shovel
they again speculated over it, wondering and possibly regretting
a chance of their having been deprived of the anticipated battle.
Sunday morning, August 24, 1914, dawned brightly with no sign of
the enemy. In Mons and the surrounding villages the workmen donned
their usual holiday attire, women stood about their doors chatting,
children played in the streets. Church bells rung as usual summoning
to public worship. General French gathered his generals for an
early conference. General Joffre's message on Saturday morning,
assured General French of victory, and positively informed him
that Von Kluck was advancing upon him with no more than one or
two army corps. In testimony of it, General French thus wrote a
subsequent official dispatch.
"From information I received from French headquarters, I understood
that little more than one or at most two of the enemy's army corps,
with perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position,
and I was aware of no outflanking movement attempted by the enemy"
(Von Hausen's advance on the right). "I was confirmed in this opinion
by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in
their reconnoitering operations. The observations of my aeroplanes
seemed also to bear out this estimate."
To General French, therefore, his position seemed well secured.
In the light of it he awaited Von Kluck's attack with confidence.
Toward mid-day some German aeroplanes swept up above the woods
in front, and circled over the British line. British marksmen at
once fired on the bodies and hawklike wings of the intruders.
Some tense interest was roused among the men as British aeroplanes
rose to encounter the German aircraft. It was the first real battle
of the sky they had witnessed. General French's cavalry patrols now
brought information that the woods were thick with German troops,
some of them deploying eastward toward their right at Binche.
At twenty minutes to one the first shots swept from the woods upon
the British line. Presently, Von Kluck's main attack developed
with great rapidity. The German artillery was brought to the front
edge of the woods to hurl a storm of shells on the British trenches.
It was returned with equal vigor. But very soon it became apparent
to British commanders along the line that the German artillery
fire was in far greater volume than what might be expected from
two army corps, whose normal complement would be some 340 guns.
Instead it was estimated 600 German guns were shortly brought into
action.
The battle field was described by the Germans as "an emptiness."
The term is intended to emphasize that the old martial display and
pomp has completely gone. A grand advance upon each other, with
trumpets sounding, banners fluttering, brilliant uniforms, and
splendid cavalry charges, was impossible with long range weapons
hailing storms of bullets and shells of devastating explosive power.
Cover was the all important immediate aim of both attack and defense.
In this respect as we have seen, the German gray-green uniform
assisted by rendering them almost invisible within shelter of such
woods as those before Mons. On the other hand, the brown khaki
shade of the British field uniforms--originally designed for the
same purpose on the sandy wastes of Egypt and Northern India--became
conspicuous upon a green background.
As the battle of Mons developed, the British line of the Condé
Canal was swept with German shrapnel. German shells, also, began
bursting in the suburbs of Mons and in the near-by villages. Sir
Douglas Haig's right thus came under strong fire. German aeroplanes
assisted by dropping smoke bombs over the British positions to give
the angle of range for their artillery. Thereupon fights above
took place between British and German airmen, while the armies
beneath thundered shot and shell upon each other. The Germans came
on in massed formation of attack. The British were accustomed to
attack in open extended line, and their shooting from any available
cover was generally excellent. They could not understand the German
attack in such close order that they were mowed down in groups of
hundreds.
The German infantry rifle fire, breaking from the shelter of the
woods to encounter a stronger British fire than was anticipated,
was at first ineffective. As to the mass formation they depended
upon overwhelming reserves to take the places of those dead piled
in heaps before the British trenches. It was General Grant's "food
for powder" plan of attack repeated.
Thus the battle raged upon the entire length of the British line,
with repeated advances and retreats on the part of the Germans.
Now and then the bodies almost reached the British trenches, and
a breach seemed in certain prospect. But the British sprang upon
the invaders, bayonet in hand, and drove them back to the shelter
of the woods. The Irish regiments, especially, were considered
invincible in this "cold steel" method of attack, their national
impulsive ardor carrying them in a fury through the ranks of an
enemy. But at Mons always the Germans returned in ever greater
numbers. The artillery increased the terrible rain of shells. Pen
pictures by British soldiers vividly describe the battle somewhat
conflictingly.
"They were in solid square blocks, standing out sharply against the
skyline, and you couldn't help hitting them. It was like butting
your head against a stone wall.... They crept nearer and nearer,
and then our officers gave the word. A sheet of flame flickered
along the line of trenches and a stream of bullets tore through the
advancing mass of Germans. They seemed to stagger like a drunken
man hit between the eyes, after which they made a run for us....
Halfway across the open another volley tore through their ranks,
and by this time our artillery began dropping shells around them.
Then an officer gave an order and they broke into open formation,
rushing like mad toward the trenches on our left. Some of our men
continued the volley firing, but a few of our crack shots were
told off for independent firing.... They fell back in confusion,
and then lay down wherever cover was available. We gave them no
rest, and soon they were on the move again in flight.... This sort
of thing went on through the whole day."
From another view we gather that "We were in the trenches waiting
for them, but we didn't expect anything like the smashing blow
that struck us. All at once, so it seemed, the sky began to rain
down bullets and shells. At first they went wide... but after a
time... they got our range and then they fairly mopped us up....
I saw many a good comrade go out."
During the early part of the battle Von Kluck directed his main
attack upon the British right, with a furious artillery bombardment
of Binche and Bray. This was coincident with the crumpling of the
French right at Charleroi by the army of Von Bülow, and its threatened
retreat by that of Von Hausen. The retirement of the French Fifth
Army, therefore, left General Haig exposed to a strong flank attack
by Von Kluck. Confronted with this danger, General Haig was compelled
to withdraw his right to a rise of ground southward of Bray. This
movement left Mons the salient of an angle between the First and
Second British Army Corps. Shortly after this movement was performed,
General Hamilton, in command of Mons, found himself in peril of
converging German front and flank attacks. If the Germans succeeded
in breaking through the British line beyond Mons, he would be cut
off and surrounded. General Hamilton informed his superior, General
French, of this danger, and was advised in return "to be careful
not to keep the troops in the salient too long, but, if threatened
seriously to draw back the center behind Mons."
[Illustration: GERMAN HOSTS INVADE AND CONQUER BELGIUM.
SIEGE GUN. FORTRESSES OF LIEGE, NAMUR, MALINES. VALIANT RESISTANCE
BY THE BELGIANS
One of the great siege guns that destroyed the fortresses in Belgium
and northern France and made possible the first great drive of
the German armies]
[Illustration: This bridge over the Meuse at Liege was blown up by
the Belgians to delay the German advance. The German army crossed
on pontoon bridges]
[Illustration: Belgian gunners and field gun in action on the firing
line between Termond and St. Giles, Belgium]
[Illustration: The fortress town of Namur, Belgium, whose once
impregnable fortifications were shattered in a few days by the great
German siege guns]
[Illustration: The city of Malines Belgium, from which the inhabitants
fled as the Germans advanced from Brussels]
[Illustration: A Belgian machine-gun corps taking up their position
in a beet field at Lebbeke on learning of the approach of the German
invaders]
[Illustration: Belgian artillery replying to the fire of the Germans.
Though hidden by trees, this battery could be detected by aeroplane
scouts]
[Illustration: Belgian soldiers intrenched along a railway line.
The fine roads and railways of Belgium and France aided the rapid
advance of the invaders]
A little after General French had sent General Hamilton this warning,
he received a telegram from General Joffre which he describes as
"a most unexpected message." General Joffre's telegram conveyed
the first news to General French not only that the French Fifth
Army had been defeated and was in retreat--the first intimation
even that the French right at Charleroi under General Lanrezac was
in peril--but that at least three German army corps were attacking
the British. Doubtless the German smashing of General Joffre's
planned grand counterattack, after the Germans were to be beaten,
was disheartening as well as a sore disappointment.
General French possessed 75,000 men. It was now disclosed that
in front Von Kluck was hurling upon him 200,000 men, Von Bülow
was hammering on his right, Von Hausen in pursuit of the French
threatened his rear, while some 50,000 Germans were enveloping
his left. He had no option but to order a retreat.
Dealing with the combined action of the French and British in this
critical period a French military writer says:
"The French armies of the center--that is to say, the Third and
Fourth Armies--had as their mission the duty of attacking the German
army in Belgian Luxembourg, of attempting to put it to flight and
of crumpling it up against the left flank of the German main body
at the north. This offensive on the part of the French center began
on August 21, 1914. The Third Army (General Ruffey) followed from
the east to the west the course of the Semoy, a tributary on the
right of the Meuse. The Fourth Army operated between the Meuse
and the Lesse. The Germans occupied the plateau which extends from
Neufchâteau to Paliseul. It is uncertain territory, covered with
heaths and thick woods, and lends itself poorly to the reconnaissance
work of aviators or cavalry patrols. There are no targets for the
artillery. The Germans had strongly fortified the ground. The infantry
of the Fourth Army which hurled itself against these positions
was thrown hack; still fighting it fell back over the Meuse. The
pursuit by the Germans was punctuated by strong counterattacks,
which inflicted great losses on them. The Third Army was similarly
checked in its march on Neufchâteau by the superior forces of the
crown prince and was thrown back on the Semoy. Thus the offensive
actions undertaken by the armies of the French center miscarried.
Not only were they unable to lend their aid to the armies of the
left, but they saw themselves obliged to retreat.
"The situation could only be reestablished by a victory on the
part of the Fifth French Army operating in conjunction with the
army of General French. This army, however, found itself in the
presence of German forces of great strength, consisting of the
crack corps of the German army. On the 22d the Germans at the cost
of considerable losses succeeded in passing the Sambre, and General
Lanrezac fell back on Beaumont-Givet, being apprehensive of the danger
which threatened his right. On the 24th the British army retreated,
in the face of a German attack, on to the Maubeuge-Valenciennes
line. It appeared at first that the British had in front of them
at most an army corps, with perhaps a corps of cavalry. They were
apprised, however, about five o'clock in the evening that three
army corps were advancing against them, while a fourth was marching
against their left along the road from Tournai in a turning movement.
General French effected his retreat during the night behind the
salient of Mons. Threatened on August 24 by the strength of the
whole German army, he fled backward in the direction of Maubeuge."
* * * * *
CHAPTER X
THE GREAT RETREAT BEGINS
The German hosts now stood at the gates of France. It was a mighty
spectacle. The soldiery of the Kaiser which had swept their way into
Belgium, there to meet the unexpected resistance of the defenders
of King Albert, had reached their goal--the French frontier.
About the middle of August, 1914, General Joffre, assigned to the
British Expeditionary Force, commanded by Sir John French, the task
of holding Mons against the powerful German advance. The British
force formed the left wing of the line of front that stretched for
some two hundred miles close to the Belgian frontier. Extending
from Arras through the colliery towns of Mons and Charleroi, the
extreme western front of the armies was held by General D'Amade
at Arras, with about 40,000 reserve territorial troops; by General
French, with 80,000 British regulars, at Mons; by the Fifth French
Army of 200,000 first-line troops, under General Lanrezac, near
Charleroi; and by a force of 25,000 Belgian troops at Namur. The
total Allied troops in this field of battle were thus about 345,000
men.
Opposed to them, on the north, were about 700,000 German troops,
General von Kluck farthest to the west, Generals von Bülow and von
Hausen around the Belgian fortress of Namur, Grand Duke Albrecht
of Württemberg in the neighborhood of Maubeuge, and finally, on the
extreme left of the German line, the Army of the Moselle, under
Crown Prince Wilhelm.
The position of the Allied armies was based on the resisting power
of Namur. It was expected that Namur would delay the German advance
as long as Liege had done. Then the French line of frontier
fortresses--Lille, with its half-finished defenses; Maubeuge, with
strong forts and a large garrison; and other strongholds--would
form a still more useful system of fortified points for the Allies.
The German staff, however, had other plans. At Liege they had rashly
endeavored to storm a strong fortress by a massed infantry attack,
which had failed disastrously until their new Krupp siege guns
had been brought up. These quickly demolished the defenses. These
siege guns, therefore, which had thus fully demonstrated their
value against fortifications soon brought about the total defeat
of the French offensive, and compelled the Allies to retreat from
Belgium and northern France. The Germans lost no time in investing
Namur, and on Saturday, as noted above, August 22, 1914, the fortress
fell into the invaders' hands.
On the same day, August 22, 1914, the Fifth French Army, under
the lead of General Lanrezac, was enduring the double stress of
Von Bülow's army thundering against its front, and Von Hausen's two
army corps pressing hard upon its right flank and rear, threatening
its line of retreat. Against such terrific odds the French line at
Dinant and Givet broke, exposing the flank and rear of the whole
army; and by the evening of that day, August 22, the passages of
the River Sambre, near Charleroi, had been forced, and the Fifth
Army was falling back, contesting every mile of the ground with
desperate rear-guard action. The British, meanwhile, defending the
Mons position, were in grave danger of being cut off, enveloped,
and destroyed.
Sir John French had put his two army corps into battle array. He
had about thirty miles of front to defend, with Mons nearly in
the center.
On Sunday afternoon, August 23, 1914, the full weight of the German
onset fell for the first time upon the British.
All that night the British were under the fire of German artillery.
Sir John French realized the danger of his Maubeuge-Jenlain position,
and on Monday evening, August 23, 1914, realizing the importance
of putting a substantial barrier, such as the Somme or the Oise,
between his force and the enemy, gave orders for the retirement
to be continued at five o'clock the next morning, August 24, 1914.
He had decided upon a new position about the town of Le Cateau,
east of Cambrai. Before dawn, August 25, 1914, the southward march
over rough, hilly country was resumed, and toward evening of August
25, 1914, after a long, hard day's fighting march over the highroads,
in midsummer heat and thundershowers, the Guards Brigade and other
regiments of the Second Corps, wet and weary, arrived at the little
market town of Landrecies. From Landrecies, after an encounter with
a German column, they marched south toward Wassigny on Guise.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF MONS AND RETREAT OF ALLIED ARMIES]
While the night attack on Landrecies was raging, the Germans, taxing
their men to the uttermost, marched four other corps through the
tract of country between the west side of the forest and the road
from Valenciennes to Cambrai. These corps were in a position along
Smith-Dorrien's front before dawn of Wednesday, August, 26, 1914,
and in the earliest hours of the morning it became apparent that
the Germans were determined to throw the bulk of their strength
against the British battalions which had moved up to a position
south of the small town of Solesmes, extending to the south of
Cambrai. Thus placed, this force could shield the Second Corps, now
beginning its retreat under pressure of the German army advancing
from Tournai. These troops under General Snow were destined to
play an important part in the impending battle of Le Cateau.
By sunrise the guns of the four German corps were firing from positions
facing the British left, and gray-green masses of infantry were
pressing forward in dense firing lines. In view of this attack,
General Smith-Dorrien judged it impossible to continue his retreat
at daybreak. The First Corps was at that moment scarcely out of
difficulty, and General Sordêt--whose troops had been fighting
hard on the flank of the Fifth French Army, with General Lanrezac,
against General von Bülow's hosts--was unable to help the British,
owing to the exhausted state of his cavalry. The situation was full
of peril; indeed, Wednesday bade fair to become the most critical
day of the retreat.
As the day of August 26, 1914, wore on, General von Kluck, abandoning
frontal attacks, began to use his superior numbers in a great enveloping
move on both flanks, and some of his batteries secured positions
from which they could enfilade the British line. Smith-Dorrien,
having no available reserves, was thus virtually ringed by enemy
guns on one side and by hostile infantry on all sides. "It became
apparent," says Sir John French's dispatch, "that if complete
annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted;
and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement
was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by
the artillery, which had suffered heavily, and the fine work done
by the cavalry in the farther retreat from the position assisted
materially in the completion of this difficult and dangerous operation.
The saving of the left wing could never have been accomplished
unless a commander" (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien) "of rare coolness
had been present to personally conduct the operation."
This retirement foreshadowed the end of the battle. Worn out by
repeated repulses, the Germans had suffered too heavily to continue
their attacks or to engage in an energetic pursuit. According to
General French's estimate, the British losses during the trying
period from August 23 to August 26, 1914, inclusive, were between
5,000 and 6,000 men, and the losses suffered by the Germans in
their pursuit and attacks across the open country, owing largely to
their dense formation, were much greater. The Battle of Le Cateau
gave the Germans pause. Further retreat of the British could now
be resumed in orderly array; for by now General Sordêt with his
cavalry was relieving the pressure on the British rear, and General
D'Amade with his two reserve divisions from the neighborhood of
Arras was attacking General von Kluck's right, driving it back on
Cambrai. Disaster to the British forces was averted, though the
peril of German interposition between the Allied army and Paris
would soon compel still further withdrawals.
Covered by their gunners, but still under heavy fire of the German
artillery, the British began again to retire southward. Their retreat
was continued far into the night of August 26, 1914, and through
the 27th and 28th; on the last date--after vigorous cavalry
fighting--the exhausted troops halted on a line extending from the
French cathedral town of Noyon through Chauny to La Fère. There
they were joined by reenforcements amounting to double their loss.
Guns to replace those captured or shattered by the enemy were brought
up to the new line. There was a breathing space for a day, while
the British made ready to take part in the next great encounter.
This fourth week in August marked a decisive period in the history
of the Great War. All the French armies, from the east to the west,
as well as the British army, were in retreat over their frontiers.
To what resolution had the French commander in chief come? That
was the question on every lip. What at that moment was the real
situation of the French army? Certainly the first engagements had
not turned out as well as the French could have hoped. The Germans
were reaping the reward of their magnificent preparation for the
war. Their heavy artillery, with which the French army was almost
entirely unprovided, was giving proof of its efficacy and its worth.
The moral effect of those great projectiles launched from great
distances by the immense German guns was considerable. At such
great distances the French cannons of 75, admirable as they were,
could make no effective reply to the German batteries. The French
soldiers were perfectly well aware that they were the targets of the
great German shells while their own cannon could make no parallel
impression on the enemy.
The German army revealed itself as an extraordinary instrument
of war. Its mobility and accouterments were perfect. It had aver
a hundred thousand professional non-commissioned officers or
subofficers, admirably suited to their work, with their men marching
under the control of their eye and finger. In the German army the
active corps, as well as the reserve carps, showed themselves,
thanks to these noncommissioned officers, marvelously equipped.
In the French army the number of noncommissioned officers by profession
totaled hardly half the German figures. The German army, moreover,
was much more abundantly supplied with machine guns than the French.
The Germans had almost twice as many, and they understood how to
use them in defense and attack better than the French. They had
moreover, to a degree far superior to that of the French, studied
the use of fortifications in the field, trenches, wire entanglements,
and so on. The Germans were also at first better trained than the
French reservists; they had spent langer periods in the German
army, and their reserve carps were almost equal to the active carps.
In the French army, on the other hand, an apprenticeship and training
of several weeks were required to give to the divisions of reserve
their full worth. At the end of two weeks, nevertheless, thanks
to the marvelous elasticity of the French soldier and the warlike
qualities of the race, the training was completed. At the beginning
of the month of September the reserve divisions fought with the
same skill, the same keenness, and the same swing as the active
army carps.
Moreover, certain incompetencies had revealed themselves in the
French high command. These General Jaffre attended to without the
loss of an instant. Every general that appeared to him incapable
of fulfilling the task allotted to him was weeded out on the spot,
without considering friendships or the bonds of comradeship, or
intimacy that might be between them.
As things were seen in Paris, all may be summed up in this formula:
That the German army was better prepared for war than the French
army, for the simple reason that Germany had long prepared for the
war, because she had it in view, a thing which could not be said
of France. But the French army revealed right from the beginning the
most admirable and marvelous qualities. The soldiers fought with a
skill and heroism that have never been equaled. Sometimes, indeed,
their enthusiasm and courage carried them too far. It mattered
little. In spite of losses, in spite even of retreat, the morale
of the whole French army on the entire front from Alsace to the
Somme remained extraordinarily high.
The violation of Belgian neutrality and the passage of the German
armies through Belgium had been foreseen by the French General
Staff, but opinions differed in regard to the breadth of the turning
movement likely to be made by the German right wing in crossing
Belgian territory. Among French experts some were of opinion that
the Germans would confine themselves to the right bank of the Meuse,
while others thought that they would cross the Meuse, and make a much
vaster turning movement, thus descending on France in a direction
due north and south.
If the violation of Belgian neutrality was no surprise to the French
Staff, it was nevertheless hardly expected that the Germans would
be able to put in line with such rapidity at the outset all their
reserve formations. Each army corps was supported by its reserve
corps, which showed itself as quick in mobilization and preparation
as the active corps.
Germany, while maintaining sufficient forces on the Russian front,
was still able to put in the field for its great offensive against
France a more numerous body of troops than would have been believed
in France. This permitted them to maintain in Alsace, in Lorraine,
and in Belgian Luxembourg armies as numerous as those which faced
them on the French side, and at the same time to mass the major
part of their troops on the right so as to pour into the valley
of the Oise their chief invading forces.
This explains why the French left, which was exposed to the offensive
of the German right, was obliged to make a rapid retreat, permitting
the German armies of General von Kluck and General von Bülow to
advance with all speed in the direction of Paris.
The French military staff, as soon as they perceived the danger
that threatened, proceeded to a new alignment of forces. As long
as this alignment of forces could not be effected the retreat had
to continue. As soon as it was accomplished, as soon as General
Joffre had his armies well in hand and the situation of his troops
well disposed, he checked the retreat, gave the signal for the
offensive, and so followed the great Battle of the Marne.
The German plan consisted, therefore, in delivering the main blow
through the medium of the right wing of the German forces, consisting
of the army of Von Kluck, the army of Von Bülow, and the army of
Von Hausen, which were to march with all speed in the direction
of Paris.
What plan had the French staff in mind to oppose to this plan of
the Germans? Its plan aimed at checking and holding the greatest
possible number of Germans by a vigorous offensive in Alsace and
Lorraine so as to prevent them from joining the three first German
armies which threatened Paris. In support of this offensive of the
armies of Alsace and Lorraine, the central French armies attacked
in the direction of the Ardennes and Belgian Luxembourg with the
object of checking the center of the German armies and then turning
toward the west so as to cooperate in the offensive of the French
forces which, aided by the British army and the Belgian army, were
fighting in Belgium.
The French armies, which are numbered from the right to the left--that
is, from the east to the west--comprised: A detachment of the Army of
Alsace that was dissolved toward the end of the month of August; the
First Army (General Dubail); the Second Army (General de Castelnau);
the Third Army (General Ruffey, replaced at the end of August,
1914, by General Sarrail); the Fourth Army (General de Langle de
Cary); the Fifth Army (General Lanrezac, replaced in the last days
of August, 1914, by General Franche d'Espérey). At the right of this
army was stationed the British army under the command of General
French.
To what resolution did General Joffre, come? On that memorable
evening of the 24th, and on that morning of the 25th, two alternatives
presented themselves before him. Should they, rather than permit
the enemy to invade the soil of France, make a supreme effort to
check the Germans on the frontier?
This first apparent solution had the evident advantage of abandoning
to the enemy no part of the national soil, but it had some serious
inconveniences. The attack of the German armies operating on the
right (Generals von Kluck, von Bülow, von Hausen) were extremely
menacing. In order to parry this attack it was necessary considerably
to reenforce the French left, and for that purpose to transfer from
the right to the left a certain number of army corps. That is what
the military call, in the language of chess players, "to castle" the
army corps. But this movement could not be accomplished in a few
hours. It required, even with all the perfection of organization
shown by the French railways during this war, a certain number of
days. As long as this operation from the right to the left had
not been accomplished, as long as the left wing of the French army
and even the center remained without the reenforcement of elements
taken from the right, it would have been extremely imprudent, not
to say rash, for the French high command to attempt a decisive
battle. If General Joffre had risked a battle immediately he would
have been playing the game without all his trumps in hand and would
have been in danger of a defeat, and even of a decided disaster,
from which it might have been impossible to recover.
The second alternative consisted in drawing back and in profiting
from a retreat by putting everything in shipshape order to bring
about a new grouping of forces. They would allow the Germans to
advance, and when the occasion showed itself favorable the French
armies, along with the British army, would take the offensive and
wage a decisive battle.
It was to this second decision that General Joffre came. As soon as
on August 25, 1914, he had made up his mind as to what the French
retreat was going to lead he gave orders for a new marshaling of
forces and for preparations with a view to the offensive.
General Joffre has made no objection to the publication of his
orders in detail from that date, August 25, 1914, down to the Battle
of the Marne. They constitute an eloquent and convincing document.
The series of orders were contained in the "Bulletin des Armées
de la République Française," June 6, 1915, Sunday. The first of
these orders, dated August 25, 1914, runs as follows:
"The projected offensive movement not having been found possible
of execution, the consequent operations will be so conducted as
to put in line, on our left, by the junction of the Fourth and
Fifth Armies, the British army, and new forces recruited from the
eastern district, a body capable of taking the offensive while
other armies for the needed interval hold in check the efforts of
the enemy...."
The retreating movement was regulated so as to bring about the following
disposition of forces preparatory to an offensive:
"In the Amiens district a new grouping of forces, formed of elements
conveyed by rail (Seventh Corps, four divisions of reserve, and
perhaps another active army corps), brought together from August
27 to September 2, 1914. This body will remain ready to take the
offensive in the general direction of St. Pol-Arras or Arras-Bapaume."
The same general instructions of August 25, 1914, marks out the
zones of march, and says:
"The movement will be covered by the rear guards spread out at
favorable points of vantage so as to utilize every obstacle for
the purpose of checking, by brief and violent counterattacks in
which the artillery will play the chief part, the march of the
enemy or at least to retard it."
(Signed) J. JOFFRE.
The object of this maneuver is thus already on August 25, 1914,
clearly indicated; it looked not to a defensive, but to an offensive
movement, which was to be resumed as soon as circumstances appeared
favorable. Much is made clear in these orders of General Joffre,
which are characterized by perspicuity, foresight, and precision.
The retreat was effected; but it was only a provisional retreat.
Whenever an occasion presented itself to counterattack the enemy
for the purpose of delaying his advance, that occasion was to be
taken advantage of. And that is, in fact, what took place.
Two days later, on August 27, 1914, General Joffre brought together,
using army corps and divisions recruited elsewhere, a supplementary
army, the Ninth Army, which was detailed to take its place between
the Fourth and Fifth Armies. He intrusted its command to a general,
who, while commanding the Twentieth Corps, had distinguished himself
by his brilliant conduct in Lorraine, General Foch.
The establishment of the army of Manoury on the left of the French
armies so as to fall on the right flank of the Germans when they
marched on Paris; the establishment of a strong army under one
of the best French generals at the center for the purpose of
encountering the main weight of the German army; such were the
two decisions of the French commander in chief, taken on August
25 and 27, 1914, which contained in germ the victory of the Marne,
waged and won two weeks later.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XI
FIGHTING AT BAY
The forces of France also had been fighting to protect their retreat
southward in these August days of 1914. After the passages of the
Sambre were forced, during the great Mons-Charleroi battle, the
Fifth French Army was placed in very perilous straits by the failure
of the Fourth Army, under General Langle, to hold the Belgian river
town of Givet. Hard pressed in the rear by General von Bülow's
army, and on their right by General von Hausen commanding the Saxon
Army and the Prussian Guard, the Fifth Army of France had to retire
with all possible speed, for their path of retreat was threatened
by a large body of Teutons advancing on Rocroi.
On August 23, 1914, holding their indomitable pursuers in check
by desperate rear-guard action, with their two cavalry divisions
under General Sordêt galloping furiously along the lines of the
western flank to protect the retiring infantry and guns, the Fifth
Army unexpectedly turned at Guise. At that point considerable
reenforcements in troops and material arrived, making the Fifth
Army the strongest in France. It now defeated and drove over the
Oise the German Guard and Tenth Corps, and then continued its
retirement. But the left wing of the French army was unsuccessful,
and Amiens and the passages of the Somme had to be abandoned to
the invaders.
On Sunday, August 23, 1914, the Fourth Army, operating from the
Meuse, was heavily outnumbered by the Saxon army around the river
town of Dinant. They fell back, after furious fighting for the
possession of the bridges, which the French engineers blew up as
the army withdrew southward to the frontier. Soon after, at Givet,
the Germans succeeded in wedging their way across the Meuse. Some
advanced on Rocroi and Rethel, and other corps marched along the
left bank of the Meuse, through wooded country, against a steadily
increasing resistance which culminated at Charleville, a town on
the western bank of the river. There a determined stand was made.
On August 24, 1914, the town of Charleville was evacuated, the
civilians were sent away to join multitudes of other homeless refugees,
and then the French also retired, leaving behind them several machine
guns hidden in houses, placed so that they commanded the town and
the three bridges that connected it with Mézières.
The German advance guards reached the two towns next day, August
25, 1914, which, as we know, witnessed the British retirement toward
Le Cateau. Unmolested, they rode across the three bridges into the
quiet, empty streets. Suddenly, when all had crossed, the bridges
were blown up behind them by contact mines, and the German cavalrymen
were raked by the deadly fire of the machine guns. Nevertheless,
finding their foes were not numerous, they made a courageous stand,
waiting for their main columns to draw nearer. Every French machine
gunner was silenced by the Guards with their Maxims; but when the
main invading army swept into view along the river valley, the
French artillery from the hills around Charleville mowed down the
heads of columns with shrapnel. Still the Teutons advanced with
reckless courage. While their artillery was engaged in a duel with
the French, German sappers threw pontoon bridges across the river,
and finally the French had to retire. Between Charleville and Rethel
there was another battle, resulting in the abandonment of Mézières
by the French.
The retreating army crossed the Semois, a tributary of the Meuse,
which it enters below Mézières, and advanced toward Neufchâteau;
but they were repulsed by the Germans under the Duke of Württemberg.
At Nancy on August 25, 1914, there was another engagement between
the garrison of Toul and the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria;
after fierce onslaughts the garrison was compelled to yield and
retire. Finally, on August 27, 1914, at Longwy, a fortified town near
Verdun, the army of the German crown prince succeeded in bursting
into France after a long siege, and marched toward the Argonne.
Thus from the western coast almost to Verdun there was a general
Franco-British retreat.
On August 28, 1914, pressed by the German armies commanded by Von
Kluck on the west, by Von Hausen from Dinant and Givet, by Von
Bülow from Charleroi and Namur, the Allies were pushed back upon
a line stretching roughly from Amiens through Noyon-Le Fère to
Mézières; while their forces east of the Meuse between Mézières
and Verdun were retreating before Duke Albrecht of Württemberg,
and to the southeast of Verdun before the Bavarians. All northern
France was thus open to the invaders.
After the battle of Le Cateau, however, the Germans slackened their
pursuit for a very brief interval; partly because the terrific strain
of marching and fighting was telling upon them no less than upon
the Allies, partly because the engineers had blown up the bridges
over every river, canal, and stream, behind the retreating armies,
and partly because, under directions from the French commander in
chief, General Manoury was organizing a new force on the British
left, a new Sixth Army, mainly reserve troops, one corps of line
troops, and General Sordêt's cavalry. On the right of the British
were General Lanrezac's troops; then, between Lanrezac's Fifth
Army and the Fourth Army, came a Ninth Army, under General Foch,
formed of three corps from the south.
Counterattacks were ordered by the French general in chief, continued
during the entire retreat and had frequently brilliant results.
On August 29, 1914, a corps of the Fifth Army and of the divisions
of reserve attacked with success in the direction of St. Quentin
with the object of withdrawing the pressure on the British army.
Two other corps and a division of reserves joined issue with the
Prussian Guard and the Tenth Corps of the German army which debouched
from Guise. This was a very violent battle, known under the name
of the Battle of Guise. At the end of the day, after various
fluctuations in the fight, the Germans were thrown completely over
the Oise and the entire British front was relieved. The Prussian
Guard on that occasion suffered great losses.
August 27, 1914, the Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary
succeeded likewise in throwing the enemy across the Meuse as he
endeavored to secure a footing on the left bank. The success continued
on the 28th; on that day a division of this army (First Division of
Morocco under the orders of General Humbert) inflicted a sanguinary
defeat on a Saxon army corps in the region of Signy l'Abbaye.
Thanks to these brilliant successes, the retreat was accomplished in
good order and without the French armies being seriously demoralized;
as a matter of fact, they were actually put to flight at no point.
All the French armies were thus found intact and prepared for the
offensive.
The right wing of the German army marched in the direction of Paris
at great speed, and the rapidity of the German onslaught obliged the
French General Staff to prolong the retreat until they were able
to establish a new alignment of forces. The new army established
on the left of the French armies, and intrusted to General Manoury,
was not able to complete its concentration in the localities first
intended. In place of concentrating in the region of Amiens it
was obliged to operate more to the south.
The situation on the evening of September 2, 1914, as a result
of the vigorous onward march of the German right, was as follows:
A corps of German cavalry had crossed the Oise and had reached Château
Thierry. The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of
four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiègne.
The Second Army (General von Bülow), with three active army corps
and two reserve corps, had attained to the region of Laon. The
Third German Army (General van Hausen), with two active army corps
and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne and reached Château
Porcin-Attigny.
Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German
Armies, making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps,
and numerous Ersatz companies, were in contact with the French
troops (Fourth and Fifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the
others from Verdun to the Vosges. Such was the situation.
It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army,
commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Espérey, would have
found itself in grave peril following on the backward bending of
the British and French forces operating on its left, if the French
had accepted the challenge of a decisive battle. The French commander
in chief resolutely chose the alternative that obviated such a
risk, that is, he decided on a postponement of the offensive and
the continuation of the retreat.
Already on September 1, 1914, he prescribed as the extreme limits of
the retreat the line running through Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine,
Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, and the region north of Bar-le-Due.
That line would have been reached had it been necessary. On the
other hand, it was his intention to attack before it was reached if
the forces could be offensively arrayed, allowing of the cooperation
of the British army and the army of Manoury on the left, and on
the right that of the divisions of reserve that had been held on
the heights of the Meuse.
Meanwhile, late in the afternoon of August 29, 1914, the British
retirement began afresh, and 10,000 French troops also withdrew from
the Somme, blowing up the bridges as they went. Everywhere along
the roads were crowds of country folk and villagers with wagons and
carts piled high with household goods or carrying aged persons and
children, all in panic flight before the dreaded invaders, fleeing
for refuge in Paris. At various places these stricken multitudes
joined the army ambulances, taking the shortest routes. Rumors of
the coming of the uhlans ran along the straggling lines with tales
of the grievous havoc and ruin which these horsemen, vanguards
of the German columns, had wrought in the land. Hardly had the
retirement begun, when a body of uhlans entered Amiens and demanded
from the mayor the surrender of the town. This was formally given,
and the civilians were ordered, on pain of death, not to create the
slightest disturbance and not to take part in any action, overt
or covert, against the soldiery. Afterward, cavalry, infantry,
and artillery took possession of the town on August 30, 1914. On
the same day a German aeroplane dropped bombs on Paris.
While retiring from the thickly wooded country south of Compiègne,
the British First Cavalry Brigade were surprised while dismounted
and at breakfast in the early morning of September 1, 1914. Moving
figures on the distant skyline first attracted the attention of
those who had field glasses, but in the dim light their identity
was not at first revealed. Suddenly all doubt was resolved by a
rain of shells on the camp. Many men and a large number of horses
were killed. At once the order "Action front!" rang out, and the
remaining horses, five to a man, were hurried to cover in the rear,
while on the left a battery of horse artillery went into instant
action. The German attack was pressed hard, and the battery was
momentarily lost until some detachments from the British Third
Corps, with the guns of the artillery brigade, galloped up to its
support. Then they not only recovered their own guns, but also
succeeded in capturing twelve of the enemy's.
On the eventful day of September 3, 1914, the British forces reached
a position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets. They
had defended the passage of the river against the German armies
as long as possible, and had destroyed bridges in the path of the
pursuers. Next, at General Joffre's request, they retired some
twelve miles farther southward with a view to taking a position
behind the Seine. In the meantime the Germans had built pontoon
bridges across the Marne, and were threatening the Allies all along
the line of the British forces and the Fifth and Ninth French Armies.
Consequently several outpost actions took place.
By the 1st of September, 1914, the day of the Russian victories
at Lemberg, Von Kluck's army had reached Senlis, only twenty-five
miles from Paris. Despite this imminent danger, the capital was
remarkably quiet and calm; every day, as fateful event crowded
upon event, seemed to renew the resolution and coolness of the
population. It seemed advisable, however, to transfer the seat of
government for the time being from Paris to Bordeaux, after assuring
the defense of the city by every means that could be devised.
The defenses of Paris consisted of three great intrenched camps,
on the north, east, and southwest, respectively. Of these the most
important is the last, which includes all the fortified area to
the south and west of the Seine. A railway over sixty miles in
length connects all the works, and, under the shelter of the forts,
it could not only keep them supplied with the necessary ammunition
and stores, but also it could be utilized to convey troops from
point to point as they might be needed. However, it was an open
secret that even the outer and newer defenses were not of any great
strength. If the Germans broke through the outlying circle of forts,
the inner line would be of small value, and the city itself would
be exposed to long-range bombardment.
Paris was not ready for a siege, and if attacked it would speedily
fall.
Early in the morning of September 3, 1914, President Poincaré,
accompanied by all the ministers, left Paris, and was followed
at noon by the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and
the reserves of the Banque de France. The higher courts were also
transferred to Bordeaux. The municipal authority was constituted
by the president of the City Council, and the Council of the Seine
Department, who were empowered to direct civil affairs under the
authority of General Galliéni as military governor, the prefect
of Paris, and the prefect of police.
On his appointment to the command, Galliéni did what he could to
strengthen the defenses. Trenches were dug, wire entanglements
were constructed; and hundreds of buildings that had been allowed
to spring up over the military zone of defense were demolished in
order to leave a clear field of fire. The gates of the city were
barred with heavy palisades backed by sandbags, and neighboring
streets also were barricaded for fighting. Certain strategic streets
were obstructed by networks of barbed wire, and in others pits
were dug to the depth of a man's shoulders. The public buildings
were barricaded with sandbags and guarded with machine guns.
But while Paris was preparing for siege and assault the French
staff were concentrating their efforts on making a siege impossible
by a decisive stroke against the German advance.
Hardly had the Government left the city when tidings arrived that
instead of marching on Paris, General von Kluck had swung southeastward
toward the crossing of the Marne. This news was obtained by the
allied flying corps, which had made daring flights over the enemy's
line.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XII
THE MARNE--GENERAL PLAN OF BATTLE FIELD
On September 4, 1914, the bugler of Destiny sounded the "Halt!" to
the retreat of the armies of the Allies from the Belgian frontier.
The marvelous fighting machine of the German armies, perhaps the
most superb organization of military potency that has been conceived
by the mind of man, seemed to reach its limit of range. Success
had perched upon the German eagles, and for two weeks there had
been a steady succession of victories. Nevertheless the British
and French armies were not crushed. They were overwhelmed, they
were overpowered, and, under stern military necessity, they were
forced to fall back.
Day after day, under the swinging hammer-head blows of the German
drive, the flower of the forces of the Allies had been compelled
to break. A little less generalship on the part of the defenders,
or a little more recklessness behind that smashing offensive might
have turned this retirement into a rout. Even as it was, the official
dispatches reveal that, while occasional and local retirements had
been considered, such a sweeping retreat was far from contemplated by
Generals Joffre and French. German official dispatches bear testimony
to the intrepid character of the defenders sullenly falling back
and contesting every inch of the way, as much as they do to the
daring and the vivid bravery of the German attackers who hurled
themselves steadily, day after day, upon positions hastily taken
up in the retreat where the retirement could be partly repaid by
the heaviest toll of death.
The great strategical plan of the Germans, which had displayed
itself throughout the entire operations on the western theatre
of war from the very first gun of the campaign, came to its apex
on this September 3, 1914. If the allied armies could develop a
strong enough defense to halt the German offensive at this point,
and especially if they could develop a sufficiently powerful
counteroffensive to strike doubt into the confident expectations
of the armies of the Central Powers, then the strategical plan
had reached a check, which might or might not be a checkmate, as
the fortunes of war might determine. If, on the other hand, the
stand made by the Allies at this point should prove ineffective,
and if the counteroffensive should reveal that the German hosts
had been able to establish impregnable defenses as they marched,
then the original strategic plan of the attackers must be considered
as intact and the peril of France would become greatly intensified.
It is idle, in a war of such astounding magnitude, to speak about
any one single incident as being a "decisive" one. Such a term can
only rightly be applied to conditions where the opposing powers
each have but one organized army in the field, and these armies
meet in a pitched battle. None the less, the several actions which
are known as the Battles of the Marne may be considered as decisive,
to the extent that they decided the limit of the German offensive
at that point. The German General Staff, taking the ordinary and
obvious precautions in the case of a possible repulse, chose and
fortified in the German rear positions to which its forces might
fall back in the event of retreat. These prepared positions had
a secondary contingent value for the Germans in view of the grave
Russian menace that might call at any moment for a transfer of
German troops from the western to the eastern front.
The Battle of the Marne stopped the advance of the main German army
on that line, forcing it back.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--BEGINNING ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1914]
The scene of the battle ground is one of the most famous in Europe,
not even the plains of Belgium possessing a richer historical
significance than that melancholy plain, the Champagne-Pouilleuse,
upon whose inhospitable flats rested for centuries the curse of a
prophecy, that there would the fate of France be decided, a prophecy
of rare connotation of accuracy, for it refrained from stating what
that fate should be. Yet the historic sense is amplified even more
by remembrance than by prophecy, for in the territory confronting
that huge arc on which 1,400,000 German and Austrian soldiers lay
encamped, awaiting what even the German generals declared to be
"the great decision," there lies, on the old Roman road running
from Chalons a vast oval mound, known to tradition as "the Camp of
Attila." In that country, a Roman general, Aetius, leading a host
of soldiers of whom many were Gauls, broke a vast flood wave of the
Huns as those savage Mongol hordes hurled themselves against Rome's
westernmost possession. On that occasion, however, the Visigoths,
under their King Theodoric, fought side by side with the Gauls.
Then, the dwellers on the banks of the Rhine and on the banks of
the Seine were brothers in arms, now, that same countryside shall
see them locked in deadly conflict.
The morale of tradition is a curious thing, and often will nerve a
sword arm when the most impassioned utterance of a beloved leader
may fail. There were few among the soldiers of France who forgot
that in the south of this same plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse was
the home of Joan of Arc, the Maid of Orleans, patriot and saint,
and more than one French soldier prayed that the same voices which
had whispered in the ear of the virgin of Domremy should guide
the generalissimo who was to lead the armies of France upon the
morrow. Here, tradition again found old alliances severed and new
ones formed, for the Maid of Orleans led the French against the
English, while in the serried ranks awaiting the awful test of
the shock of battle, English and French soldiers lived and slept
as brothers.
The topography of the region of the battle field is of more than
common interest, for modern tactics deal with vaster stretches
of country than would have been considered in any previous war.
This is due, partly, to the large armies handled, partly to the
terrific range of modern artillery, and also to what may be called
the territorial perceptiveness which aeronautical surveys make
possible to a general of to-day. While war has not changed, it is
true that a commander of an army in modern campaign is compelled
to review and to take into account a far larger group of factors. A
modern general must be capable of grasping increased complexities,
and must possess a synthetic mind to be able to reduce all these
complicating factors into a single whole. The first factor of the
battles of the Marne was the topographical factor, the consideration
of the land over which the action was to take place.
Let the River Marne be used as a base from which this topography can
be determined. The Marne rises near Langres, which is the northwest
angle of that pentagon of fortresses (Belfort, Epinal, Langres, Dijon,
and Besançon), which incloses an almost impregnable recuperative
ground for exhausted armies. From Langres the Marne flows almost north
by west for about fifty miles through a hilly and wooded country,
then, taking a more westerly course, it flows for approximately
seventy-five miles almost northwest, across the Plain of Champagne,
past Vitry-le-François and Châlons, thence almost due westward
through the Plateau of Sézanne, by Epernay, Château Thierry, La
Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and Meaux to join the Seine just south of Paris.
In the neighborhood of Meaux, three small tributaries flow into
the Marne--the Ourcq from the north, and the Grand Morin and Petit
Morin from the east. The Marshes of St. Gond, ten miles long from
east to west and a couple of miles across, lie toward the eastern
borders of the Plateau of Sézanne, and form the source of the Petit
Morin, which has been deepened in the reclamation of the marsh
country.
Once more considering the source of the Marne, near Langres, it
will be noted that the River Meuse rises near by, flowing north
by east to Toul, and then north-northwest past Verdun to Sedan,
where it turns due north, flowing through the Ardennes country
to Namur, in Belgium. To the east of the Meuse lies the difficult
forest clad hill barrier, known as the Hills of the Meuse; to the
east extends (as far as Triaucourt) the craggy and broken wooded
country of the Argonne, a natural barrier which stretches southward
in a chain of lakes and forests.
West of this impassible country of the Meuse and the Argonne lies
the plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse, which is almost a steppe, bare
and open, only slightly undulating, overgrown with heath, and studded
here and there by small copses of planted firs, naught but a small
portion of the whole being under cultivation. Between the Forest
of the Argonne and this great plain, which is over a hundred miles
long from north to south and forty miles in width, lies a short
stretch of miniature foothills, with upland meadows here and there,
but crossed in every direction by small ravines filled with shrubs
and low second-growth timber. Here lies the source of the Aisne, a
river destined to live in history; and on the farther side begins
the great plain.
On the west of the plain of Champagne rises, 300 feet, with a curious
clifflike suddenness, the Plateau of Sézanne. The effect is as
though a geological fault had driven the original plateau from
north to south throughout its entire length, and then as though
there had been a general subsidence of the plain, giving rise to
the clifflike formations known as Les Falaises de Champagne, at
the foot of which runs the road from La Fère-Champenoise to Rheims.
The disposition and arrangement of the German forces is next to
be considered. It can be assumed that their objective was Paris.
It is also worthy of remembrance that the German tactical method
has always favored the envelopment of the enemy's flanks rather
than a frontal attack aiming to pierce the enemy's center, which
latter was a favorite method of Napoleon I to reach decision.
The tactical method of envelopment demands great numerical superiority,
and on account of the extreme extension of front necessitated is apt
to become dangerous as perforce the center is left weak. Attempts
to envelop, with which the observer is confronted again and again
when considering the military movements of the Central Powers on
the western battle front, were revealed on the morning of September
3, 1914, in the position occupied by the German forces, and,
correspondingly, in the arrangement of the allied armies.
The German right, on September 3, 1914, and September 4, 1914,
at which time it was nearest to its desired goal of Paris, held
the banks of the Marne from Epernay to the banks of the little
tributary the Ourcq, which runs into the Marne from the north. This
extreme right comprised the Second Corps and the Fourth Reserve
Corps, encamped on the western bank of the little stream the Ourcq;
while the Fourth Corps was given the honor of the tip of the right,
being camped on the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, supported by
the Third Corps, the Seventh Corps and the Seventh Corps Reserve.
The Ninth Cavalry Division occupied an advanced position west of
Crécy and the Second Cavalry Division occupied an advanced position
near the British army, north of Coulommiers. These troops constituted
the First German Army, under the command of General von Kluck.
The Allies' left, confronting this position, held strong reserves,
and by the nature of the ground itself, was well placed to prevent
any enveloping movement, dear to the German school of military
tactics. It rested securely on the fortress of Paris, believed
by its constructors to be the most fully fortified city in the
world, and should the German right endeavor to encircle the left
wing of the Allies, should it develop a farther westerly movement,
it would but come in contact with the outer line of those defenses
and thence be deflected in such an enormous arc as to thin the line
beyond the power of keeping it strong enough to resist a piercing
attack at all points. Clearly, then, as long as the extreme left
of the Allies remained in contact with the defenses of Paris, an
enveloping movement was not possible on the easterly flank.
Facing the German extreme right, was the Sixth French Army, one
of the great reserves of General Joffre, which had been steadily
building up since August 29, 1914, with its right on the Marne
and its left at Betz, in the Ourcq Valley, encamped on the western
side of that stream, facing the Second and Fourth Corps of the
Germans. The strengthening of that army from the forces at Paris
was hourly, and while three or four days before it had been felt
that the Sixth French Army was too weak to be placed in so vital a
point--that it should have been supplemented with the Ninth Army--the
results justified the French generalissimo's plans and more than
justified his confidence in the British Army, or Expeditionary
Force, which faced the tip of the German right wing drive and was
encamped on a line from Villeneuve le Comte to Jouy le Chatel, the
center of the British army being at a point five miles southeast
of Coulommiers. This army was under the command of General Sir
John French.
The right center of the German line was held by General von Bülow's
army, consisting of the Ninth Corps, the Tenth Corps, the Tenth
Reserve Corps, and the Guard Corps. This army also was encamped
upon the Marne, stretching from the eastern end of General Von
Kluck's army as far as Epernay. This army thus held the Forests
of Vassy but was confronted by the marshes of St. Gand.
Confronting this right center was, first of all, General Conneau's
Cavalry Corps, which was in touch with the right wing of the British
army under Sir John French. Then, holding the line from Esternay
to Courtaçon lay the Fifth French Army under General d'Espérey.
Full in face of the strongest part of the German right center stood
one of the strongest or General Joffre's new reserves, the Ninth
Army under General Foch, with the marshes of St. Gond in front or
him, and holding a twenty-mile line from Esternay, past Sézanne
to Camp de Mailly, a remarkably well-equipped army, very eager
for the fray.
The hastily replenished corps, largely of Saxons, which had been
General von Hausen's army, lay next to General von Bülow, a little
north of Vitry, and as it proved, a weak spot in the German line.
The left center of the attacking force was under the command of
the Duke of Württemberg and extended across the whole southern
end of the plain of Champagne to the upper streams of the Aisne
south of St. Menhould. The extreme left of this advanced line was
the army of the Imperial Crown Prince, holding the old line on the
Argonne to the south of Verdun. In close relation to this advanced
line, but not directly concerned with the battles of the Marne, were
the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince, encamped in the plateau
of the Woevre, engaged largely in the task of holding open the
various lines of communication, while far to the south, in the
vicinity of the much battered little town of Mulhouse, lay the
remains of the decimated army or the Alsace campaigns under General
von Heeringen.
Facing this left center came General Langle's Fourth French Army,
covering the southern side of the plain of Chalons, it lay south
of Vitry-le-François, and faced due north. On this army, it was
expected, the brunt of the drive would fall. At this point the French
battle line made a sharp angle, the Third French Army, commanded
by General Sarrail, occupying a base from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun.
It thus faced almost west, skirting the lower edge of the Forest
of Argonne. At the same time it was back to back with the Second
French Army, which covered the great barrier of forts from Verdun
to Toul and Epinal, while the First French Army held the line from
Epinal to Belfort.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XIII
ALLIED AND GERMAN BATTLE PLANS
So much for the actual disposition of the armies. The question
of preponderance of numbers, of advantages of position, and of
comparative fighting efficiency is the next factor with which to
be reckoned. The numbers were fairly evenly matched. About twelve
days before this fateful day of September 3, 1914, there were
approximately 100 German divisions as against seventy-five French,
British, and Belgian divisions. But, during those twelve days,
French and British mobilization advanced with hectic speed, while,
at the same time, Germany was compelled to transfer ten or perhaps
fifteen of her divisions to the eastern theater of war. It follows,
therefore, that there were about 4,000,000 soldiers in all the
armies that confronted each other in the week of September 3-10,
1914, of whom, probably, 3,000,000 were combatants.
An early estimate placed the German strength at 1,300,000 combatants,
and the Allies at about 1,700,000. A later French estimate put
the Germans at 1,600,000, with the Allies between 1,400,000 and
1,500,000. The preponderance of efficiency of equipment lay with
the Germans.
The plans of the German campaign at this time, so far as they can
be determined from the official orders and from the manner in which
the respective movements were carried out, were three-fold. The
first of these movements was the order given to General von Kluck
to swirl his forces to the southeast of Paris, swerving away from
the capital in an attempt to cut the communications between it and
the Fifth French Army under General d'Espérey. This plan evidently
involved a feint attack upon the Sixth French Army under General
Manoury (though General Pare took charge of the larger issues of
this western campaign), coupled with a swift southerly stroke and
an attack upon what was supposed to be the exposed western flank of
General d'Espérey's army. The cause of the failure of this attempt was
the presence of the British army, as has been shown in the alignment
of the armies given above, and as will be shown in detail later, in
the recital of the actual progress of the fighting. Important as
was this movement, however, it was the least of the three elements
in General von Moltke's plan for the shattering of the great defense
line of the Allies.
The second element in this plan was, contrary to Germany's usual
tactics, the determination to attack the center of the French line
and break through. Almost three-quarters of a million men were
concentrated on this point. The armies of General von Bülow, General
Hausen and the Duke of Württemberg were massed in the center of the
line. There, however, General Foch's new Ninth Army was prepared
to meet the attack. It will be remembered that, in the disposition
of the troops, these respective armies were facing each other across
the great desolate plain, the ancient battle ground. If the German
center could break through the French center, and if at the same
time General von Kluck, commanding the German right, could execute
a swift movement to the southeast, the Fifth French Army would
be between two fires, together with such part of the Ninth Army
as lay to the westward of the point to be pierced. This strategic
plan held high promise, and it would have menaced the whole interior
of France southward from the plain of Champagne, but even this
second part of the plan, important as it was, does not appear to
have been the crucial point in the campaign.
The glory of the victory, if indeed victory it should prove, as
the successes of the previous two weeks had led the Germans to
believe, was to be given to the crown prince. With a great deal
of trouble and with far more delay than had been anticipated, the
crown prince's army had at last managed to get within striking
distance of the forefront of the great battle line. His forces
occupied the territory north of Verdun to a southern point not
far from Bar-le-Duc. Here the German secret service seems to have
been as efficient, as it failed to be with regard to conditions
only fifty miles away. General Sarrail's army, which confronted
the army of the crown prince, was somewhat weak. It consisted of
about two army corps with reserve divisions. Nor could General Joffre
send any reenforcements. Every available source of reenforcements
had been drawn upon to aid the Sixth Army, encamped upon the banks
of the Ourcq, in order that Paris might be well guarded. No troops
could be spared from the Fifth and Ninth Armies, which had to bear
the brunt of the attack from the German center. General Sarrail,
therefore, had to depend on the natural difficulties of the country
and to avoid giving battle too readily against the superior forces
by which he was confronted. It was a part of the plan of the French
generalissimo, however, to feel the strength of the German center,
and if it proved that they could be held, to release several divisions
and send them to the aid of General Sarrail.
Subordinate to this contemplated attack by the crown prince, yet
forming a part of it, and, in a measure, a fourth element in the
campaign, was the double effort from the garrisons of Metz and
Saarbrucken, combining with the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince
and the forces of General von Heeringen. The Second French Army,
therefore, could not come to the aid of the Third, except in desperate
need, for it was in the very forefront of the attack on Nancy. If the
German left could pierce the French lines at Nancy and pour through
the Gap of Lorraine, it would be able to take General Sarrail's army
in the rear at Bar-le-Duc, and would thus completely hem it in,
at the same time isolating Verdun, which, thus invested in the
course of time must fall, forming an invaluable advanced fortress
to the German advance.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--SITUATION ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1914]
Before proceeding to the actual working out of this plan of campaign
it may be well to recapitulate it, in order that each development
may be clear. The German plan was to pierce the French line at
three places, at Meaux, at Bar-le-Duc and at Nancy. General von
Kluck, at Meaux, would cut off the Fifth and the Ninth Armies from
communication with their base at Paris, the Bavarian Crown Prince
would weaken General Sarrail's defense in the rear, and if possible
come up behind him, and thus the stage would be set for the great
onrush of the Imperial Crown Prince, who, with an almost fresh army,
and with a most complete and elaborate system of communications
and supplies, should be able to crush the weak point in France's
defense, the army under General Sarrail. Such a victory was designed
to shed an especial luster upon the crown prince and thus upon
the Hohenzollern dynasty, a prestige much needed, for the delays
in the advance of the crown prince's army had already given rise
to mutterings of discontent. From a strategical point of view the
plan was sound and brilliant, the disposition of the forces was
excellently contrived, and the very utmost of military skill had
been used in bringing matters to a focus.
The French plan, is the next to be considered. From official orders
and dispatches and also from the developments of that week, it is
clear that General Joffre had perceived the possibility of such
a plan as the Germans had actually conceived. He had brought back
his armies--and there is nothing harder to handle than a retreating
army--step by step over northern France without losing them their
morale. The loss of life was fearful, but it never became appalling.
The French soldiers had faith in Joffre, even as their faith in
France, and, while the Germans had victories to cheer them on,
the soldiers of the Allies had to keep up their courage under the
perpetual strain of retreat. The administration had evacuated Paris.
Everywhere it seemed that the weakness of France was becoming apparent.
To the three armies in the field, those commanded severally by
General Manoury, Sir John French, and General Lanrezac, the
generalissimo steadily sent reenforcements. But he informed the
French Government that he was not able to save the capital from a
siege. Yet, as after events showed, while these various conditions
could not rightly be considered as ruses upon General Joffre's
part to lure on the Germans, there is no doubt that he understood
and took full advantage of the readiness of the attacking hosts
to esteem all these points as prophetic of future victory. The
first feature of the French plan, therefore, was to lend color to
the German belief that the armies of the Allies were disheartened
and thereby to induce the attacking forces to join the issue quickly.
The second part of the French plan lay in General Joffre's decision
not to do the expected thing. With General Sarrail placed at the
extremest point of danger, it would have been a likely move to
transfer the entire British Expeditionary Force from the left wing
to the weak point at Bar-le-Duc. There is reason to believe that
General von Kluck believed that this had been done.
The third part of the defensive prepared by General Joffre was that
of a determination to turn the steady retreat into a counterdrive.
Time after time had the other generals implored their leader to
give them leave to take the offensive, and on every occasion a
shake of the head had been the reply. Sir John French had wondered.
But when the French officers found themselves in the region of the
Marne, close to the marshes of St. Gond, where in 1814 Napoleon
had faced the Russians, they were more content. It was familiar
as well as historic ground. Even the youngest officer knew every
foot of that ground thoroughly. It was, at the same time, the best
point for the forward leap and one of the last points at which a
halt could be made.
The fourth part of the plan was the holding fast to the point of
Verdun, for thereby the communication of the armies of the Central
Powers was seriously weakened. It is to be remembered that this actual
fighting army of more than a million men depended for food and for
ammunition supplies upon the routes from Belgium and Luxemburg by
way of Mézières and Montmédy, and the circuitous line to Brussels
via St. Quentin. Had Maubeuge fallen a little earlier the situation
of the Central Powers would have been less difficult, and both
commissariat and ammunition problems would have been easier of
solution. But Maubeuge held out until September 7, 1914, and by
that time the prime results of the battles of the Marne had been
achieved. To this problem Verdun was the key, for from Metz through
Verdun ran the main line, less than one-half the length of line
to the Belgian bases of supplies, and, owing to the nature of the
country, a line that could be held with a quarter the number of
men. But Verdun stood, and General Joffre held the two armies back
to back, converging on the point at Verdun.
Such was the country over which the battles of the Marne were fought,
such were the numbers and dispositions of the several armies on
each side, and such, as far as can be judged, were the plans and
counterplans of the strategic leaders in the great conflict.
* * * * *
CHAPTER XIV
FIRST MOVES IN THE BATTLE
The first movement in this concerted plan was taken by the German
extreme right. This was the closing in of General von Kluck's army in
a southeasterly direction. It was a hazardous move, for it required
General von Kluck to execute a flank march diagonally across the
front of the Sixth French Army and the British Expeditionary Force.
At this time, according to the dispatches from Sir John French, the
British army lay south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets,
defending the passage of the river and blowing up the bridges before
General von Kluck.
On September 4, 1914, air reconnaissances showed that General von
Kluck had stopped his southward advance upon Paris, and that his
columns were moving in a southeasterly direction east of a line
drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. Meanwhile the French
and British generals more effectually concealed their armies in
the forests, doing so with such skill that their movements were
unmarked by the German air scouts. All that day General von Kluck
moved his forces, leaving his heavy artillery with about 100,000
men on the steep eastern bank of the Ourcq and taking 150,000 troops
south across the Marne toward La Ferté Gaucher. He crossed the
Petit Morin and the Grand Morin, all unconscious that scores of
field glasses were trained upon his troops.
Probably believing that the British army had been hurried to the
aid of General Sarrail, General von Kluck advanced confidently.
Having concealment in view, the commanders of the French army and
the British army between them had left a wide gap between the two
armies. Through one of these apparently unguarded openings a strong
body of uhlan patrols advanced, riding southward until they reached
Nogent, south of Paris, and seemingly with the whole rich country
of central France laid wide open to a sharp and sudden attack.
Among the many strange features of this series of the battles of
the Marne this must certainly be reckoned as one. Though possessing
an unequaled military organization, though priding itself on its
cavalry scouts, though aided by aerial scouts, and though well
supplied with spies, yet the Allied armies, with the age-old device
of a forest, were able to cloak their movements from this perfectly
organized and powerful invading army. Much of the credit of this
may be assigned to the French and English aircraft, which kept
German scouting aircraft at a distance. But the Allied generals
were astounded at the result of their maneuver, which, as they
admitted afterward, was merely a military precautionary measure
against the discovery of artillery sites, and a device to keep
the enemy in general ignorance.
On Saturday, September 5, 1914, at the extreme north of the line
of the two armies facing each other across the Ourcq, an artillery
duel began. The offensive was taken by the French, and though in
itself it was not more striking than any of the artillery clashes
that had marked the previous month's fighting, it was significant,
for it marked the beginning of the battles of the Marne. The plans
of General Joffre were complete, but the actual point at which
the furious contest should begin was not yet determined. In the
northern Ourcq section, however, the realization by the French
that they were actually on the offensive at last, that the long
period of retreat was over, could not be restrained. The troops
were eager to get to work with the bayonet, and greatly aided by
their field artillery, in which mobility had been sacrificed to
power, they quickly cleared the hills to the westward of the Ourcq.
By nightfall of September 5, 1914, the country west of the Ourcq
was in French hands. But to cross that river seemed impossible.
General von Kluck's heavy artillery had been left behind to hold
that position, and every possible crossing was covered with its
own blast of death.
Here General von Kluck's generalship was successful. It might have
been regarded as risky to leave 100,000 men to guard a river confronted
by 250,000 picked and reenforced French troops. But General von Kluck's
faith in German guns and German gunnery was not ill-founded. This
was the first of the open-air siege conflicts, and the French army
had no guns which could be used against the German heavy artillery.
Hence it followed that the brilliant work of the Sixth French Army
on this first day of the battles of the Marne achieved no important
result, for the long-range hidden howitzers, manned by expert German
gunners and well supplied with ammunition, defied all attempts at
crossing the little stream of the Ourcq.
This first day's fighting on the Marne revealed one of France's
chiefest needs--heavy artillery. The French light quick-firing gun
was a deadly weapon, but France had neglected the one department
of artillery in which the Germans had been most successful--the
use of powerful motor traction to move big guns without slackening
the march of an army. General von Kluck's artillery was impregnable
to the French. Indeed, the Germans could not be dislodged from the
Ourcq until the British Expeditionary Force sent up some heavy
field batteries. It was then too late for the withdrawal from the
Ourcq to be of any serious consequence in determining the result
along the battle front.
The afternoon of that day, when the Zouaves were driving the Germans
across the Ourcq with the bayonet and were themselves effectually
stopped by the German wall of artillery fire, General Joffre and
Sir John French met. At last the British commander received the
welcome news from the generalissimo that retreat was over and advance
was about to be begun.
"I met the French commander in chief at his request," runs the
official dispatch, "and he informed me of his intention to take
the offensive forthwith by wheeling up the left flank of the Sixth
Army, pivoting on the Marne, and directing it to move on the Ourcq;
cross and attack the flank of the First German Army, which was
then moving in a southeasterly direction east of that river.
"He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left
resting on the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army--to fill the
gap between that army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against
the enemy on my front and join in the general offensive movement.
German troops, which were observed moving southeast up the left
bank of the Ourcq on the Fourth, were now reported to be halted and
facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing
at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château-Thierry, and Mezy.
"Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging
on Montmirail, while before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy
were located in the neighborhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais,
La Ferté-Gaucher, and Dagny.
"These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September
6, at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle
opened on a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in
front of the left flank of the Sixth French Army, through Lizy on
the Marne, Maupertuis, which was about the British center, Courtaçon,
which was the left of the Fifth French Army, to Esternay and
Charleville, the left of the Ninth Army under General Foch, and
so along the front of the Ninth, Fourth, and Third French Armies
to a point north of the fortress of Verdun."
Sunrise on Sunday morning, on a summer day in sunny France, was
the setting for the grim and red carnage which should show in the
next five consecutive days that the German advance was checked,
that the southernmost point had been reached, and that for a long
time to come it would tax the resources of the invaders to hold
the land that already had been won. General Joffre had so arranged
his forces that the most spectacular--and the easiest--part fell to
the British, and it was accomplished with perfection of detail. But
the honors of the battles of the Marne lay with General Sarrail's
army and with the "Iron Division of Toul."
On the same morning, this special army order, issued by Sir John
French, was read to the British troops:
"After a most trying series of operations, mostly in retirement,
which have been rendered necessary by the general strategic plan
of the allied armies, the British forces stand to-day formed in
line with their French comrades, ready to attack the enemy. Foiled
in their attempt to invest Paris, the Germans have been driven to
move in an easterly and southeasterly direction with the apparent
intention of falling in strength upon the Fifth French Army. In
this operation they are exposing their right flank and their line
of communications to an attack from the combined Sixth French Army
and the British forces.
"I call upon the British army in France to now show the enemy its
power and to push on vigorously to the attack beside the Sixth
French Army.
"I am sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, on the
contrary, by another manifestation of the magnificent spirit which
they have shown in the past fortnight, they will fall on the enemy's
flank with all their strength and, in unison with the Allies, drive
them back."
As before, the day's fighting began with the efforts of the Sixth
French Army against the Ourcq. Before the Germans could be driven
from the east bank the few villages they occupied on the west bank
had to be taken, and as these were covered by heavy artillery from
the farther bank, the French loss of life was very severe. Yet
these several combats--of which there were as many as the
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