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The Federalist Papers

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Title: The Federalist Papers

Author: Alexander Hamilton
        John Jay
        James Madison


        
Release date: August 1, 1991 [eBook #18]
                Most recently updated: October 11, 2025

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE FEDERALIST PAPERS ***

The Federalist Papers

by Alexander Hamilton and John Jay and James Madison


Contents

 FEDERALIST No. I. General Introduction
 FEDERALIST No. II. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
 FEDERALIST No. III. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
 FEDERALIST No. IV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
 FEDERALIST No. V. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
 FEDERALIST No. VI. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
 FEDERALIST No. VII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
 FEDERALIST No. VIII. The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
 FEDERALIST No. IX. The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
 FEDERALIST No. X. The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
 FEDERALIST No. XI. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
 FEDERALIST No. XII. The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
 FEDERALIST No. XIII. Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
 FEDERALIST No. XIV. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
 FEDERALIST No. XV. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
 FEDERALIST No. XVI. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
 FEDERALIST No. XVII. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
 FEDERALIST No. XVIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
 FEDERALIST No. XIX. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
 FEDERALIST No. XX. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
 FEDERALIST No. XXI. Other Defects of the Present Confederation
 FEDERALIST No. XXII. The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
 FEDERALIST No. XXIII. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
 FEDERALIST No. XXIV. The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
 FEDERALIST No. XXV. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
 FEDERALIST No. XXVI. The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered.
 FEDERALIST No. XXVII. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
 FEDERALIST No. XXVIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
 FEDERALIST No. XXIX. Concerning the Militia
 FEDERALIST No. XXX. Concerning the General Power of Taxation
 FEDERALIST No. XXXI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
 FEDERALIST No. XXXII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
 FEDERALIST No. XXXIII. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
 FEDERALIST No. XXXIV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
 FEDERALIST No. XXXV. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
 FEDERALIST No. XXXVI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
 FEDERALIST No. XXXVII. Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government.
 FEDERALIST No. XXXVIII. The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed.
 FEDERALIST No. XXXIX. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
 FEDERALIST No. XL. On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained.
 FEDERALIST No. XLI. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
 FEDERALIST No. XLII. The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
 FEDERALIST No. XLIII. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)
 FEDERALIST No. XLIV. Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
 FEDERALIST No. XLV. The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments.
 FEDERALIST No. XLVI. The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
 FEDERALIST No. XLVII. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts.
 FEDERALIST No. XLVIII. These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other.
 FEDERALIST No. XLIX. Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention.
 FEDERALIST No. L. Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
 FEDERALIST No. LI. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments.
 FEDERALIST No. LII. The House of Representatives
 FEDERALIST No. LIII. The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)
 FEDERALIST No. LIV. The Apportionment of Members Among the States
 FEDERALIST No. LV. The Total Number of the House of Representatives
 FEDERALIST No. LVI. The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)
 FEDERALIST No. LVII. The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation.
 FEDERALIST No. LVIII. Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands.
 FEDERALIST No. LIV. Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
 FEDERALIST No. LX. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
 FEDERALIST No. LXI. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
 FEDERALIST No. LXII. The Senate
 FEDERALIST No. LXIII. The Senate Continued
 FEDERALIST No. LXIV. The Powers of the Senate
 FEDERALIST No. LXV. The Powers of the Senate Continued
 FEDERALIST No. LXVI. Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered.
 FEDERALIST No. LXVII. The Executive Department
 FEDERALIST No. LXVIII. The Mode of Electing the President
 FEDERALIST No. LXIX. The Real Character of the Executive
 FEDERALIST No. LXX. The Executive Department Further Considered
 FEDERALIST No. LXX. The Executive Department Further Considered
 FEDERALIST No. LXXI. The Duration in Office of the Executive
 FEDERALIST No. LXXII. The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered.
 FEDERALIST No. LXXIII. The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
 FEDERALIST No. LXXIV. The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive.
 FEDERALIST No. LXXV. The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
 FEDERALIST No. LXXVI. The Appointing Power of the Executive
 FEDERALIST No. LXXVII. The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered.
 FEDERALIST No. LXXVIII. The Judiciary Department
 FEDERALIST No. LXXIX. The Judiciary Continued
 FEDERALIST No. LXXX. The Powers of the Judiciary
 FEDERALIST No. LXXXI. The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority.
 FEDERALIST No. LXXXII. The Judiciary Continued.
 FEDERALIST No. LXXXIII. The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
 FEDERALIST No. LXXXIV. Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
 FEDERALIST No. LXXXV. Concluding Remarks




THE FEDERALIST.
No. I.

General Introduction

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York:

After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting
federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new
Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its
own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the
existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it
is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most
interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems
to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct
and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men
are really capable or not of establishing good government from
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend
for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be
any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with
propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made;
and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view,
deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of
patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good
men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be
directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and
unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this
is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected.
The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular
interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve
in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of
views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of
truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution
will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious
interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes
which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence
of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the
perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to
aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will
flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the
subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from
its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this
nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve
indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their
situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or
ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may
be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much
of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make
its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not
respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived
jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes
which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many
occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right
side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance,
if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who
are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any
controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might
be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who
advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their
antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition,
and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate
as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a
question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing
could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all
times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in
religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and
sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have
already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all
former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and
malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the
opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually
hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the
number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the
bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and
efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a
temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty.
An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people,
which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be
represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for
popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on
the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that
the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of
narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally
forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of
liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed
judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous
ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the
rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for
the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that
the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction
of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned
the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career
by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and
ending tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts,
from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the
utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those
which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the
same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they
proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my
countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive
consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it.
I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your
dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel.
I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have
decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely
lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness
of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply
professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of
my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of
by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not
disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting
particulars:

THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION
THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE
PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE
PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL
SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT
SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a
satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their
appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the
utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts
of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may
be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear
it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new
Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any
general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate
confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.[1] This doctrine will,
in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries
enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more
evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject,
than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a
dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by
examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the
probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its
dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next
address.

PUBLIUS.

 [1] The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is
 held out in several of the late publications against the new
 Constitution.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. II.

Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence

For the Independent Journal.

JAY


To the People of the State of New York:

When the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to
decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the
most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of
their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of
it, will be evident.

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government,
and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is
instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in
order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of
consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest
of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be
one nation, under one federal government, or that they should divide
themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each
the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national
government.

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the
prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly
united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest
citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians
now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead
of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a
division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties.
However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has
its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it
formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the arguments
or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and
declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the
people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully
convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was
not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one
connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our
western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed
it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with
innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its
inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain
round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble
rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with
highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual
transportation and exchange of their various commodities.

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has
been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a
people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of
government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by
their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side
throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general
liberty and independence.

This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and
it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance
so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other
by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial,
jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and
denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have
uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying
the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we
have made peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common
enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and
entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states.

A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people,
at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve
and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a
political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in
flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the
progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm
and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the
formation of a wise and wellbalanced government for a free people. It
is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so
inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and
inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.

This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still
continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they
observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more
remotely the latter; and being pursuaded that ample security for both
could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they
as with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to
take that important subject under consideration.

This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the
people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their
patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and
hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace,
with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in
cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without
having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love
for their country, they presented and recommended to the people the
plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not
imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to
BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and
candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject
demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was
remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished
than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience on
a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It
is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent
danger induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of
1774. That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and
the event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon
the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those
very measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed
the dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate
of consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose
ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public
good, were indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people to
reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were
deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and
decided judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.

They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and
experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the
country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a
variety of useful information. That, in the course of the time they
passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of
their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that
head. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and
prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than
their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature
deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable.

These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely
greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took
their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to
deter them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in
the men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully tried or generally
known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and
advice of the convention, for it is well known that some of the most
distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and
justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in
acquiring political information, were also members of this convention,
and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience.

It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding
Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with
the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its
Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people
in forming that convention, and it is also the great object of the plan
which the convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety,
therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular
period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or
why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better
than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always
thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform
attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty
reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing
papers. They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct
confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly
to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the
Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I
sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good
citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America
will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: “FAREWELL! A
LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS.”

PUBLIUS.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. III.

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

JAY


To the People of the State of New York:

It is not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like
the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily
persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their
interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect
for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and
uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly
united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for
all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which
appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced
that they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY
seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation
to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and
consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it
precisely and comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from
FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising
from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it
is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to
examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a
cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the
best security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will
always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the
causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If
this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST
causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED
America; for if it should turn out that United America will probably
give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union
tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other
nations.

The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation
of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed
treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except
Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She
has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and,
with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of
neighborhood to attend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the
laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident
that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by
three or four distinct confederacies.

Because when once an efficient national government is established, the
best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will
generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or
other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or
senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more
general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications
will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national
government,—especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and
never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in
some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the
political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national
government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to
other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in
one sense and executed in the same manner,—whereas, adjudications on
the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four
confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as
well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by
different and independent governments, as from the different local laws
and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the
convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and
judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and
justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and
consequently having little or no influence on the national government,
the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be
preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great
weight to this reasoning.

Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to
resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,
result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great
number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able,
if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the
aggressors. But the national government, not being affected by those
local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong
themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its
commission by others.

So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of
treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are
less to be apprehended under one general government than under several
lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of
the people.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful
violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national
government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort
than can be derived from any other quarter.

Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the
Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions
of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are
several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the
improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling
to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of
many innocent inhabitants.

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some
States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more
immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be
those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of
apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence,
to excite war with these nations; and nothing can so effectually
obviate that danger as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence
will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties
immediately interested.

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and
settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that
respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act
advisedly than the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of
men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes
their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and
offenses. The national government, in such cases, will not be affected
by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider
and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the
difficulties which threaten them.

Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united
nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State
or confederacy of little consideration or power.

In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their
Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to
FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to
submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either
have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or
Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?

PUBLIUS.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. IV.

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

JAY


To the People of the State of New York:

My last paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people
would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to
by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show
that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be
more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the
State governments or the proposed little confederacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN
force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war
to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves
in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need
not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that
nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of
getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when
their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and
objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for
personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or
support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of
other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead
him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and
interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war,
which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve
our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as kings;
and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our
relative situation and circumstances.

With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can
supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding
any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign
fish.

With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we
suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our
carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing
theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to
restrain than to promote it.

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one
nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they
had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with
commodities which we used to purchase from them.

The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this
continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,
added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address
of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the
advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the
wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.

Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the
one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other;
nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them
and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.

From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent
with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that
jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and
cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they
should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by
land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure.

The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out
of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at
present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and
opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not
be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good
national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A
SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and
discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of
defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the
resources of the country.

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be
provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us
inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in
question, more competent than any other given number whatever.

One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and
experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be
found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize,
assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the
benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of
treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular
interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can
apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any
particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State
governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of
concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of
discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of
subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate
them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if
divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent
companies.

What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the
government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of
Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?
Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at
all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the
enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?

We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if
we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if
one national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain
as to make it a nursery for seamen—if one national government had not
called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets,
their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let
England have its navigation and fleet—let Scotland have its navigation
and fleet—let Wales have its navigation and fleet—let Ireland have its
navigation and fleet—let those four of the constituent parts of the
British empire be under four independent governments, and it is easy to
perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative
insignificance.

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen
or, if you please, into three or four independent governments—what
armies could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever hope to
have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and
spend their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of
their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or
seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their
tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom
perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content
to see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would,
nevertheless, be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of
other countries, abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable
that what has so often happened would, under similar circumstances,
happen again.

But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or
confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men
and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from
which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms
of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them
and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would
be inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching
over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the
powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these
embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people.

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one
national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain
it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and
they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national
government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently
regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our
resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established,
our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed
to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the
other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government
(each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem
convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably
discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain,
another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against
each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will America make
in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their contempt
but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought experience
proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be
against themselves.

PUBLIUS.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. V.

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)

For the Independent Journal.

JAY


To the People of the State of New York:

Queen Anne, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then
forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I
shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: “An entire
and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It
will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the
animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences
betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and
trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection
and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED
TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES.” “We most earnestly recommend to you
calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union
may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to
secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of
our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR
UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION.”

It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at
home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more
to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within
ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general
the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit
by their experience without paying the price which it cost them.
Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an
island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were for ages
divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly
embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding their
true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the
same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations, their
mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series
of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were
useful and assisting to each other.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies
arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being “joined
in affection” and free from all apprehension of different “interests,”
envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and
the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general
interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and
pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always
be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant
apprehension of them.

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot
reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal
footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so
at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human
contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of
those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one
part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to the
effects of that superior policy and good management which would
probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by which
their relative equality in strength and consideration would be
destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound
policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of
these confederacies for a long succession of years.

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it
would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on
the scale of political importance much above the degree of her
neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and
with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance, if not
to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her importance; and
would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to
secure her prosperity. Much time would not be necessary to enable her
to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not
only to lose confidence in her neighbors, but also to feel a
disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust naturally creates
distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily
changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations, whether
expressed or implied.

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed
confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably
more formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become
evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and
sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did
in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash
conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey
in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more
delicate neighbors.

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in
contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would
be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but
on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual
injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations
in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY
TO EACH OTHER.

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly
mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be
formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination
and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary
to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign
enemies.

When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were
formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces
against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT
NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to
regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities
are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties
be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create
different interests, and of course different degrees of political
attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. Hence it
might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the
SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the
NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and
friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would
not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and
fulfilled with perfect good faith.

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring
nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly
passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering
our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these
confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant
nations, and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to
guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard
against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let
us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into
our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade
or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and others
make in the characters of allies, and what innovations did they under
the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they
pretended to protect.

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any
given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us
against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.

PUBLIUS.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. VI.

Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York:

The three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of
disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now
proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more
alarming kind—those which will in all probability flow from dissensions
between the States themselves, and from domestic factions and
convulsions. These have been already in some instances slightly
anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more full
investigation.

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt
that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united
in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be
thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To
presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against
their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive,
and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number
of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood,
would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at
defiance the accumulated experience of ages.

The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some
which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective
bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the
desire of pre-eminence and dominion—the jealousy of power, or the
desire of equality and safety. There are others which have a more
circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their
spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between
commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous than either
of the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions; in
the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading
individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this
class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in too many
instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the
pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the
national tranquillity to personal advantage or personal gratification.

The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
prostitute,[1] at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his
countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the
SAMNIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
MEGARENSIANS,[2] another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution
with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of
the statuary Phidias,[3] or to get rid of the accusations prepared to
be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the
purchase of popularity,[4] or from a combination of all these causes,
was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in
the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after
various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the
ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.

The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,[5] entertained
hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the
influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of
this enterprising and powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a
war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at
the hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over
which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if
there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of
universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues
Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.

The influence which the bigotry of one female,[6] the petulance of
another,[7] and the cabals of a third,[8] had in the contemporary
policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe,
are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally
known.

To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the
production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,
according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.
Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from
which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of
instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature
will not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either of
the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference,
tending to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made
to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not
been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts
would have been plunged into a civil war.

But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this
particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men, who
stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the
States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of
republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency
to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable
humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics,
like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous
contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest,
and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.

Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest
of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit?
If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it
not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions,
and immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over
human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility
or justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than
monarchies? Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the
latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires
of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not
popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage,
resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent
propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often
governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are,
of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those
individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the
objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and
enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been
as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the
prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity
of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many
instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the
one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of
human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.

Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them,
Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often
engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies
of the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp;
and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.

Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very
war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into
the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn,
gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a
conquest of the commonwealth.

Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition,
till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II.
found means to accomplish that formidable league,[9] which gave a
deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.

The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and
taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They
had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were
among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of
Louis XIV.

In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose
one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the
predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have
been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom
has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the
people.

There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as
royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their
representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs
into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and
sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. In that
memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA
and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known
that the antipathies of the English against the French, seconding the
ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite leader,[10] protracted
the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy, and for a
considerable time in opposition to the views of the court.

The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure
grown out of commercial considerations;—the desire of supplanting and
the fear of being supplanted either in particular branches of traffic,
or in the general advantages of trade and navigation; and sometimes
even the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other
nations, without their consent.

The last war but two between Britain and Spain, sprang from the
attempts of the English merchants, to prosecute an illicit trade with
the Spanish main. These unjustifiable practices on their part, produced
severities on the part of the Spaniards, towards the subjects of Great
Britain, which were not more justifiable; because they exceeded the
bounds of a just retaliation, and were chargeable with inhumanity and
cruelty. Many of the English who were taken on the Spanish coasts, were
sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress of a
spirit of resentment, the innocent were after a while confounded with
the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the
merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, which soon
after broke out in the House of Commons, and was communicated from the
body to the ministry. Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war
ensued; which, in its consequences, overthrew all the alliances that
but twenty years before had been formed, with sanguine expectations of
the most beneficial fruits.

From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose
situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason
can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an
expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present
confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough
of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have
amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections,
weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time
to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a
practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as
well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the
happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?

Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and
credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and
ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State
of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and
the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare—!

So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the
tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of
discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion,
that it has from long observation of the progress of society become a
sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation,
constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses
himself on this subject to this effect: “NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he)
are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces
them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution
prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing
that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves
at the expense of their neighbors.”[11] This passage, at the same time,
points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.

PUBLIUS.

 [1] Aspasia, _vide_ Plutarch’s _Life of Pericles_.

 [2] _Ibid_.

 [3] _Ibid_. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with
 the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of
 Minerva.

 [4] _Ibid_.

 [5] Worn by the popes.

 [6] Madame de Maintenon.

 [7] Duchess of Marlborough.

 [8] Madame de Pompadour.

 [9] The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of
 France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and
 states.

 [10] The Duke of Marlborough.

 [11] _Vide Principes des Négociations_ par l’Abbé de Mably.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. VII.

The Same Subject Continued

(Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York:

It is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements
could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It
would be a full answer to this question to say—precisely the same
inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the
nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of
a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our
immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the
restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience
to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those
restraints were removed.

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most
fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest
proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this
origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast
tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United
States. There still are discordant and undecided claims between several
of them, and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for
similar claims between them all. It is well known that they have
heretofore had serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to
the lands which were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which
usually went under the name of crown lands. The States within the
limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have claimed
them as their property, the others have contended that the rights of
the crown in this article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all
that part of the Western territory which, either by actual possession,
or through the submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to
the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished
in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events an
acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has
been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by
prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for
the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a
continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable
termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy,
however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same
subject. At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is,
by cession at least, if not by any anterior right, the common property
of the Union. If that were at an end, the States which made the
cession, on a principle of federal compromise, would be apt when the
motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion.
The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of
representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, could
not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in territory
acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained
undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all
the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock,
there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule
of apportionment. Different principles would be set up by different
States for this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite
interests of the parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a
pacific adjustment.

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample
theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to
interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to
the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword
would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The
circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania,
respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in
expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of
confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision
of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in
favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of
dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be
entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something
like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have
sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest
censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed
herself to have been injured by the decision; and States, like
individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their
disadvantage.

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions
which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and
the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as
well from States not interested as from those which were interested in
the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the
Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert
its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one,
a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest
of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had
obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district.
Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours,
seemed more solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their
own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions,
discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland,
till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that
State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small States,
saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. In
a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which
would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be
their unpropitious destiny to become disunited.

The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of
contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous
of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing
in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or
separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy
peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and
exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on
the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since
the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to
those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent
of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE
THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT
SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise,
which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no
occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable
that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations
of trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive
benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations,
on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would
naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.

The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others
tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently
submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New
York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind.
New York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her
importations. A great part of these duties must be paid by the
inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of
what we import. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego
this advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them
should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor would
it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to
distinguish the customers in our own markets. Would Connecticut and New
Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit?
Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed
enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an
advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so
oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent
weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of
New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will
answer in the affirmative.

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision
between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the
first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be
alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible
to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is
scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real
objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse
interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the
States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some
of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit,
or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in
the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment
of the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify
the difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of
whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the
State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for
some equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of the
former would excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a
rule would, in the meantime, be postponed by real differences of
opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the States interested
would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their
just demands, and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the
double contingency of external invasion and internal contention.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the
apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule
agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some
States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would
naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as
naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an
increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too
plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their
contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance
of these States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter
discussion and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice
justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments
on the part of some of the States would result from a diversity of
other causes—the real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of
their finances; accidental disorders in the management of the
government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men
commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies
which produced them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants.
Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints,
recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to
disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual
contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and
coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite,
that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of
money.

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions
on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may
be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not
authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would
preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if
unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in
too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the
disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the
enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we
reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a
war, not of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious
breaches of moral obligation and social justice.

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States
or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this
situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded
in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this
part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if
not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league,
offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring
alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of
European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the
parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to
the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them
all. _Divide et impera_[1] must be the motto of every nation that
either hates or fears us.[2]

PUBLIUS.

 [1] Divide and command.

 [2] In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as
 possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them
 four times a week—on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in
 the Daily Advertiser.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. VIII.

The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, November 20, 1787.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York:

Assuming it therefore as an established truth that the several States,
in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be
formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to
those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with
each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not
united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some
of the consequences that would attend such a situation.

War between the States, in the first period of their separate
existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it
commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments
have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the
continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and
economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage
of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that
rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their
introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same
ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified
places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in
reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an
enemy’s country. Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust
the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an
invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country
almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but
now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the
defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to
frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The history
of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations
subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of
battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than
victories; of much effort and little acquisition.

In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of
military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The
want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to
another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with
little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests
would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War,
therefore, would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation
ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals
would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize
our military exploits.

This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not
long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most
powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty
will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction
of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm
attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most
attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions
which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To
be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being
less free.

The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the
correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies,
it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is
therefore inferred that they may exist under it.[1] Their existence,
however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most,
problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied,
must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent
war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant
preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or
confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon
an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to
supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular
and effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by
fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to
strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their
constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. It
is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the
legislative authority.

The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or
confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors.
Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous
governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often
triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength,
which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the pride nor
the safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit
them long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority.
They would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had
been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence.
Thus, we should, in a little time, see established in every part of
this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge
of the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural course of
things; and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in
proportion as they are accommodated to this standard.

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative
defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the
hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are
solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of
human affairs.

It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not
standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often
distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally
satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of
the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and
devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are
incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the
true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue,
which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and
silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which
is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of
nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and
have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the
citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.

There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in
one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them.
The rulers of the former can have a good pretext, if they are even so
inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be
maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case,
rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the
people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The
laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military
exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted,
nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state.
The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community
an over-match for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to
the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions,
neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of
jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a
power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their
rights. The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the
magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or
insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against
the united efforts of the great body of the people.

In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all
this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government
to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough
for instant defense. The continual necessity for their services
enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the
condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the
civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are
unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which
serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people
are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but
as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of
considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is
very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make
a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military
power.

The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An
insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great
measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the
necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force to
make head against a sudden descent, till the militia could have time to
rally and embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No motive of
national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated,
a larger number of troops upon its domestic establishment. There has
been, for a long time past, little room for the operation of the other
causes, which have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war.
This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree, contributed
to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite
of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain
had been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she
would have been, by that situation, to make her military establishments
at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe,
she, like them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to
the absolute power of a single man. ’T is possible, though not easy,
that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but
it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which
has been usually kept up within the kingdom.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a
great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to
continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any
dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this
position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited,
and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is
most probable, should be thrown together into two or three
confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the
predicament of the continental powers of Europe —our liberties would be
a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and
jealousy of each other.

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It
deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and
honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn
pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this
interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and
trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with
trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in
all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that
flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries
would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers,
real, certain, and formidable.

PUBLIUS.

 [1] This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it
 will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been
 taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to
 be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in
 America, most of which contain no guard at all on this subject.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. IX.

The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York:

A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of
the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It
is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and
Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the
distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the
rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of
perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If
they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast
to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of
felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising
from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be
overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If
momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle
us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time
admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the
direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted
endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so
justly celebrated.

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the
advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms
of republican government, but against the very principles of civil
liberty. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the
order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation
over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics
reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have,
in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I
trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other
edifices, not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent
monuments of their errors.

But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of
republican government were too just copies of the originals from which
they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised
models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty
would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of
government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most
other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various
principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all,
or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power
into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and
checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their
offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the
legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new
discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection
in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the
excellences of republican government may be retained and its
imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances
that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I
shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on
a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the
new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such
systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single
State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great
Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object
under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the
principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended
to in another place.

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard
the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external
force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced
upon in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of
the most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of
the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the
observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory
for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of
the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work,
nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they
subscribe with such ready acquiescence.

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards
he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost
every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be
compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms
of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point
as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either
of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting
ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous
commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the
miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers
who have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have
been aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at
the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an
infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the
multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess
not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles
of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or
happiness of the people of America.

Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as
has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that,
in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon
the occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more
considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their
being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the
true question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition
to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a
CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the sphere of
popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with
those of republicanism.

“It is very probable,” (says he[1]) “that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single
person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the
internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force
of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.

“This form of government is a convention by which several smaller
STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to
form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new
one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they
arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the
security of the united body.

“A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may
support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this
society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

“If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he
could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the
confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this
would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still
remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he
had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his
usurpation.

“Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states
the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part,
they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be
destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be
dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

“As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation,
it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of
large monarchies.”

I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages,
because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments
in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false
impressions which a misapplication of other parts of the work was
calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an intimate connection
with the more immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate
the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a
CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential
characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its
authority to the members in their collective capacities, without
reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended
that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of
internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the
members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a
confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary;
they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed
happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the
manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent
in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive
exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example
will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be
clearly shown in the course of this investigation that as far as the
principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of
incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.

The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be “an
assemblage of societies,” or an association of two or more states into
one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal
authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate
organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by
a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in
perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would
still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a
confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an
abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the
national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the
Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very
important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every
rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.

In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or
republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON
COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE. The
COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of
the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate species of
interference in their internal administration; for if there be any
thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions,
it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking
of this association, says: “Were I to give a model of an excellent
Confederate Republic, it would be that of Lycia.” Thus we perceive that
the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of
this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they
are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory.

PUBLIUS.

 [1] _Spirit of Laws_, vol. i., book ix., chap. i.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. X.

The Same Subject Continued

(The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)

From the New York Packet.

Friday, November 23, 1787.

MADISON


To the People of the State of New York:

Among the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed Union, none
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments
never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as
when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will
not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without
violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper
cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into
the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under
which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to
be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to
liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable
improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models,
both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it
would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as
effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and
expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and
virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and
of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable,
that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties,
and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of
an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish
that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts
will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will
be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the
distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the
operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time,
that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest
misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing
distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are
echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be
chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with
which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by
removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one,
by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the
other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions,
and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was
worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an
aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less
folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because
it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air,
which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its
destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise.
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty
to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the
connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions
and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and
the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of
property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity
of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of
government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of
property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division
of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we
see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity,
according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for
different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many
other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to
different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or
to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting
to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more
disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their
common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into
mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself,
the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to
kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent
conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been
the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and
those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in
society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under
a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a
mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,
grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into
different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the
principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit
to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of
the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but
concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the
different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the
causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private
debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side
and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between
them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the
most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must
be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and
in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions
which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing
classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the
public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of
property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality;
yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity
and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules
of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior
number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust
these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public
good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in
many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into
view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over
the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the
rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction
cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of
controlling its EFFECTS.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by
the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its
sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may
convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is
included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other
hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both
the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public
good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at
the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular
government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are
directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this
form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it
has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of
mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only.
Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at
the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such
coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and
local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of
oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide,
we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on
as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice
and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to
the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy
becomes needful.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure
democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can
admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or
interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the
whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government
itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the
weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention;
have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights
of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they
have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have
patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that
by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights,
they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises
the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which
it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature
of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic
are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small
number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of
citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be
extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and
enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be
more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may
be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of
sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means,
first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the
people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics
are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public
weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious
considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the
republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain
number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that,
however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in
order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number
of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of
the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small
republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not
less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a
greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater
number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be
more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the
vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the
suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre
in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and
established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a
mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By
enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the
representatives too little acquainted with all their local
circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you
render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend
and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a
happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests
being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State
legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and
extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of
republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance
principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in
the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer
probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the
fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to
act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be
remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable
purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to
the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has
over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by
a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States
composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of
representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render
them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not
be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to
possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater
security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of
any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal
degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the
Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater
obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret
wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of
the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration
through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a
political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of
sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national
councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money,
for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for
any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the
whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same
proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county
or district, than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican
government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel
in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and
supporting the character of Federalists.

PUBLIUS.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. XI.

The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York:

The importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those
points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of
opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of
men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to
our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.

There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous
spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has
already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of
Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in
that carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the
foundation of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies
in America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming,
with painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten
their American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have
all the dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the
creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally
indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving
us, as far as possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This
would answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in
their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of
clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did
not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by
facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers.

If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our
prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending,
at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign
countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets.
This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to
appreciate the importance of the markets of three millions of
people—increasing in rapid progression, for the most part exclusively
addicted to agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to remain
so—to any manufacturing nation; and the immense difference there would
be to the trade and navigation of such a nation, between a direct
communication in its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its
products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of another
country. Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America, capable
of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of
commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation of
this step upon her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with
the fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most
valuable and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When
these questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have
received a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has
been said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the
system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us
through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate customers
and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for the supply of
our markets. But would not her navigation be materially injured by the
loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade?
Would not the principal part of its profits be intercepted by the
Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and risk? Would not the mere
circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction? Would not so
circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations,
by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by
transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch
of the British commerce?

A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will
justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a
state of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of
the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities
of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present
system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the
markets of those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive
the most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British
government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in
exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a
correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be
inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations
toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a
federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union
under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period
not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with
those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable
weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties.
This would be more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the
West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the
reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the
fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest
magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most
commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that of the
usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of
military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived
that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great
advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon
our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the
Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America,
and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this
part of the world as our interest may dictate.

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that
the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and
would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly
placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would
be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each
other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple
or remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often
as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be
respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation,
despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being
neutral.

Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and
resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle
all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This
situation would even take away the motive to such combinations, by
inducing an impracticability of success. An active commerce, an
extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the
offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little
arts of the little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and
unchangeable course of nature.

But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might
operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations,
availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the
conditions of our political existence; and as they have a common
interest in being our carriers, and still more in preventing our
becoming theirs, they would in all probability combine to embarrass our
navigation in such a manner as would in effect destroy it, and confine
us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should then be compelled to content
ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to see the
profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and
persecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes the
genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which is in itself
an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and lost,
and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with wisdom,
might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.

There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are
rights of the Union—I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the
Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the
Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the
future existence of these rights; which the interest of more powerful
partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. The
disposition of Spain with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment.
France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries, and view
them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. They, of course,
would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which
experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable branch of
traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those nations in their
own markets. What more natural than that they should be disposed to
exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors?

This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit.
All the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously
participate in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of
mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of
seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the
principles of navigation in the several States, will become, a
universal resource. To the establishment of a navy, it must be
indispensable.

To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various
ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the
quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and
support. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources
of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or
partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single
part. It happens, indeed, that different portions of confederated
America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential
establishment. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance
certain kinds of naval stores—tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood
for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting
texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy
might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of
signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of national
economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater
plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn
from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external
or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more
than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of
a navy.

An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance
the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions,
not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for
exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part
will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion and vigor from
a free circulation of the commodities of every part. Commercial
enterprise will have much greater scope, from the diversity in the
productions of different States. When the staple of one fails from a
bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of
another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for
exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be
conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a
given value than with a small number of materials of the same value;
arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctations of
markets. Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods,
and unsalable at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can
scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter
predicament, and on this account the operations of the merchant would
be less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation. The
speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these
observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the
commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable
than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions.

It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united
or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them
which would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered,
interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the
course of these papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial,
as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of
government.

There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed,
of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into
the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a
newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe, that our situation
invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the
system of American affairs. The world may politically, as well as
geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set
of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by
her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees,
extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have
successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long
maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the
World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit.
Men admired as profound philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed
to her inhabitants a physical superiority, and have gravely asserted
that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in
America—that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in
our atmosphere.[1] Facts have too long supported these arrogant
pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor
of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation.
Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add another victim to
his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European
greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and
indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system,
superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and
able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new
world!

PUBLIUS.

 [1] “Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains.”




THE FEDERALIST.
No. XII.

The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, November 27, 1787.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York:

The effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have
been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of
revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.

The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all
enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most
productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a
primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of
gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the
precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise,
it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry, and to
make them flow with greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous
merchant, the laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the
industrious manufacturer,—all orders of men, look forward with eager
expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of their
toils. The often-agitated question between agriculture and commerce
has, from indubitable experience, received a decision which has
silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between them, and has
proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are
intimately blended and interwoven. It has been found in various
countries that, in proportion as commerce has flourished, land has
risen in value. And how could it have happened otherwise? Could that
which procures a freer vent for the products of the earth, which
furnishes new incitements to the cultivation of land, which is the most
powerful instrument in increasing the quantity of money in a
state—could that, in fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and
industry, in every shape, fail to augment that article, which is the
prolific parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which they
are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have
had an adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a
spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and
refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason
and conviction.

The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a
great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the
celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these
objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and
facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. The hereditary
dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile,
cultivated, and populous territory, a large proportion of which is
situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this
territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And
yet, from the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch
can boast but slender revenues. He has several times been compelled to
owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for the
preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the
strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.

But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be
seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of
view, in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive.
It is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the
people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is
impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation.
Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the
collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been
uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained
empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the nature of
popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident
to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every
experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the
different legislatures the folly of attempting them.

No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be
surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of
Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more
tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more
practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the national
revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and
from excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this
latter description.

In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means
of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must be
confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill
brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets
of the farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty
supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and
lands; and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to
be laid hold of in any other way than by the inperceptible agency of
taxes on consumption.

If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will
best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be
best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious
doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general
Union. As far as this would be conducive to the interests of commerce,
so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from
that source. As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations for
the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it
must serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties
more productive, and of putting it into the power of the government to
increase the rate without prejudice to trade.

The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which
they are intersected, and of bays that wash there shores; the facility
of communication in every direction; the affinity of language and
manners; the familiar habits of intercourse; —all these are
circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade between
them a matter of little difficulty, and would insure frequent evasions
of the commercial regulations of each other. The separate States or
confederacies would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the
temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their duties. The
temper of our governments, for a long time to come, would not permit
those rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard the
avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by water;
and which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the
adventurous stratagems of avarice.

In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly
employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the
dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these
patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense
difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, where there is an
inland communication, and places in a strong light the disadvantages
with which the collection of duties in this country would be
encumbered, if by disunion the States should be placed in a situation,
with respect to each other, resembling that of France with respect to
her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the
patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free country.

If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the
States, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but
ONE SIDE to guard—the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from
foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to
hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would
attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would
have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well
after as before their arrival at the places of their final destination.
An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the prevention of
any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed
vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at
a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the
government having the same interest to provide against violations
everywhere, the co-operation of its measures in each State would have a
powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should
preserve by Union, an advantage which nature holds out to us, and which
would be relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a great
distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other
places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign
trade. The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single
night, as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other
neighboring nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious
security against a direct contraband with foreign countries; but a
circuitous contraband to one State, through the medium of another,
would be both easy and safe. The difference between a direct
importation from abroad, and an indirect importation through the
channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels, according to time and
opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland communication,
must be palpable to every man of discernment.

It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able, at
much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison,
further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any
partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted,
that these duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three
per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent.,
and in Britain they exceed this proportion.[1] There seems to be
nothing to hinder their being increased in this country to at least
treble their present amount. The single article of ardent spirits,
under federal regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable
revenue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the whole
quantity imported into the United States may be estimated at four
millions of gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two
hundred thousand pounds. That article would well bear this rate of
duty; and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an
effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy,
to the morals, and to the health of the society. There is, perhaps,
nothing so much a subject of national extravagance as these spirits.

What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail ourselves of
the resource in question in its full extent? A nation cannot long exist
without revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign
its independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a province.
This is an extremity to which no government will of choice accede.
Revenue, therefore, must be had at all events. In this country, if the
principal part be not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive
weight upon land. It has been already intimated that excises, in their
true signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the
people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxation; nor,
indeed, in the States where almost the sole employment is agriculture,
are the objects proper for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very
ample collections in that way. Personal estate (as has been before
remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be subjected to
large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on consumption.
In populous cities, it may be enough the subject of conjecture, to
occasion the oppression of individuals, without much aggregate benefit
to the State; but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure,
escape the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of
the State, nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, the
defect of other resources must throw the principal weight of public
burdens on the possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants
of the government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the
sources of revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the
community, under such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation
consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus we shall not
even have the consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the
oppression of that valuable class of the citizens who are employed in
the cultivation of the soil. But public and private distress will keep
pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in deploring the
infatuation of those counsels which led to disunion.

PUBLIUS.

 [1] If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. XIII.

Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York:

As connected with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety
consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be
usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be
drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under
one government, there will be but one national civil list to support;
if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many
different national civil lists to be provided for—and each of them, as
to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be
necessary for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the
States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too
extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates. The
ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem
generally turned toward three confederacies—one consisting of the four
Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five Southern
States. There is little probability that there would be a greater
number. According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise
an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great
Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a
confederacy can be properly regulated by a government less
comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been
proposed by the convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a
certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the
same forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater
extent. This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is
no rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary
to the government of any given number of individuals; but when we
consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of
the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of people,
and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the
passions of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no
reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be sufficient to
perform the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil power,
properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a
very great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part
of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of subordinate
institutions.

The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be
likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive
than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition,
more probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as
the alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to
geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the
habits and prejudices of the different States, we shall be led to
conclude that in case of disunion they will most naturally league
themselves under two governments. The four Eastern States, from all the
causes that form the links of national sympathy and connection, may
with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is,
would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank
to the weight of that confederacy. There are other obvious reasons that
would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State
to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful
combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission
into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the
Northern league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own
navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and
dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from various
circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the
encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which would give
unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the
purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to
confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy. As she
must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most consistent with
her safety to have her exposed side turned towards the weaker power of
the Southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the Northern,
Confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the
Flanders of America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania,
if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood
of more than one confederacy to the south of that State.

Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able
to support a national government better than one half, or one third, or
any number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight
in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on
the principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to
take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on
mistaken ground.

If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we
take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed
to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies
against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of
the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into view the military
establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from
the jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the
States would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation
would be not less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity,
commerce, revenue, and liberty of every part.

PUBLIUS.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. XIV.

Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory
Answered

From the New York Packet.

Friday, November 30, 1787.

MADISON


To the People of the State of New York:

We have seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against foreign
danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of
our commerce and other common interests, as the only substitute for
those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the
Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of faction,
which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of which
alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains,
within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection
that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union
embraces. A few observations on this subject will be the more proper,
as it is perceived that the adversaries of the new Constitution are
availing themselves of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the
practicable sphere of republican administration, in order to supply, by
imaginary difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they
endeavor in vain to find.

The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has
been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that
it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a
republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from
the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was
also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the
people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they
assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A
democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic
may be extended over a large region.

To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of
some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in
forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects
either of an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to
heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by
placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by
citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient
Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an
easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a
democracy only; and among others, the observation that it can never be
established but among a small number of people, living within a small
compass of territory.

Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular
governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in
modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation,
no example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the
same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of
discovering this great mechanical power in government, by the simple
agency of which the will of the largest political body may be
concentred, and its force directed to any object which the public good
requires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis
of unmixed and extensive republics. It is only to be lamented that any
of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the additional merit of
displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the comprehensive
system now under her consideration.

As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central
point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as
often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater
number than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a
republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the
representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the
administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the limits of the
United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those who
recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union,
that during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the
States have been almost continually assembled, and that the members
from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater
intermissions of attendance than those from the States in the
neighborhood of Congress.

That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting
subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The
limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic,
on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the
Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line running in some
instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling as low as
the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that
latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and
forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three
common miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to
seven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean for the
distance, the amount will be eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and
three-fourths. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi
does not probably exceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison
of this extent with that of several countries in Europe, the
practicability of rendering our system commensurate to it appears to be
demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than Germany, where a diet
representing the whole empire is continually assembled; or than Poland
before the late dismemberment, where another national diet was the
depositary of the supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find
that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the
representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to
travel to the national council as will be required of those of the most
remote parts of the Union.

Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain
which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.

In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government
is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering
laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which
concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be
attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate
governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects
which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority
and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish
the governments of the particular States, its adversaries would have
some ground for their objection; though it would not be difficult to
show that if they were abolished the general government would be
compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in
their proper jurisdiction.

A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the
federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive
States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other
States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods,
which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that
may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which
lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left to those whom further
discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task.

Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout
the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will
everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for
travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on
our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the
whole extent of the thirteen States. The communication between the
Western and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each,
will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which
the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art
finds it so little difficult to connect and complete.

A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost
every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus
find, in regard to its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices
for the sake of the general protection; so the States which lie at the
greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and which, of course,
may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits, will be
at the same time immediately contiguous to foreign nations, and will
consequently stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its
strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the
States forming our western or northeastern borders, to send their
representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more
so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support
alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by
the neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less
benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less
distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other
respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained
throughout.

I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full
confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions
will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never
suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however
fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive you into
the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion
would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you
that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords
of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same
family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual
happiness; can no longer be fellowcitizens of one great, respectable,
and flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells
you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a
novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in
the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it
is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against
this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which it
conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American
citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their
sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of
their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be
shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild
of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us
in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and promote our
happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be
rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the
glory of the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent
regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not
suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to
overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of
their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this
manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the
world for the example, of the numerous innovations displayed on the
American theatre, in favor of private rights and public happiness. Had
no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which
a precedent could not be discovered, no government established of which
an exact model did not present itself, the people of the United States
might, at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims
of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight
of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of
mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole human
race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a
revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They
reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of
the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is
incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works
betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred
most in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to
be executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of
your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate
and to decide.

PUBLIUS.




THE FEDERALIST.
No. XV.

The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union

For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York.

In the course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my
fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light,
the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have
unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be
exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of
America together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by
jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through
which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated
will receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto
unnoticed. If the road over which you will still have to pass should in
some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect that
you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which
can engage the attention of a free people, that the field through which
you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of
the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which
sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles
from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done,
without sacrificing utility to despatch.

In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of
the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the
“insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the
Union.” It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or
proof to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or
doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men
assent, and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as
by the friends of the new Constitution. It must in truth be
acknowledged that, however these may differ in other respects, they in
general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are
material imperfections in our national system, and that something is
necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts
that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They
have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and
have at length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the
principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived,
a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of
our federal government, which have been long pointed out and regretted
by the intelligent friends of the Union.

We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last
stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can
wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which
we do not experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which
we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects
of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and
to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the
preservation of our political existence? These remain without any
proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable
territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power
which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been
surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our
interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent
or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor
government.[1] Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity?
The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty,
ought first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a
free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes
us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of
public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and
irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at
the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of
foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The
imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us. Our
ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a
violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of
national distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the
country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of
waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that want of
private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among
all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of
every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That
most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced
within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of
insecurity than from the scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration
of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it
may in general be demanded, what indication is there of national
disorder, poverty, and insignificance that could befall a community so
peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which does not
form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?

This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those
very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the
proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us
to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss
that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive
that ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand
for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us
at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the
paths of felicity and prosperity.

It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be
resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract
proposition that there exist material defects in our national system;
but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old
adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition
to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a chance of
success. While they admit that the government of the United States is
destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it those
powers which are requisite to supply that energy. They seem still to
aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of
federal authority, without a diminution of State authority; at
sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members.
They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political
monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the
principal defects of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that
the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial
imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the
building, which cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in
the first principles and main pillars of the fabric.

The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as
contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though
this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the
Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the
rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United States
has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money;
but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to
the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that
though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws,
constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice
they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at
their option.

It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that
after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head,
there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for
deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old,
and which is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of
GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at
all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to
the mild influence of the magistracy.

There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or
alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes
precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place,
circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and
depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts
of this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual
vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and non-observance, as the
interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early
part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for
this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times
fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to
establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the
world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and
quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed before
they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to
mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have
no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose
general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any
immediate interest or passion.

If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a
similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general
DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be pernicious,
and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated
under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at least,
consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate
government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and
defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends
and enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships,
nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.

But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we
still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is
the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a
common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those
ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic
difference between a league and a government; we must extend the
authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, —the only proper
objects of government.

Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the
idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words,
a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty
annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to
be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or
recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted
in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or
by military force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the
COERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men; the
last kind must of necessity, be employed against bodies politic, or
communities, or States. It is evident that there is no process of a
court by which the observance of the laws can, in the last resort, be
enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of
their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into execution by
the sword. In an association where the general authority is confined to
the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach
of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must
become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things
can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent
man choose to commit his happiness to it.

There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the
regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a
sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the
respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the
constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present
day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the
same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further
lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times
betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is
actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of
civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the
passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice,
without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more
rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary
of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of
mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to
reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action
is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon
one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the
deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of
whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they
would blush in a private capacity.

In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an
impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the
exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to
restrain or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in
every political association which is formed upon the principle of
uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there
will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or
inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual
effort in each to fly off from the common centre. This tendency is not
difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power.
Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of
that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple
proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that
the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the
particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with
perfect good-humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to
execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The
reverse of this results from the constitution of human nature.

If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed
without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will
be little prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the
respective members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it
or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures
themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or
required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary
conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this
will be done; and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny,
without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state,
which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong
predilection in favor of local objects, which can hardly fail to
mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every member
of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the plans,
framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the
discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part.
Those who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular
assemblies; who have seen how difficult it often is, where there is no
exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious
resolutions on important points, will readily conceive how impossible
it must be to induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a
distance from each other, at different times, and under different
impressions, long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits.

In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is
requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every
important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was
to have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been
executed; the delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured
themselves to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels
of the national government, and brought them to an awful stand.
Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the
forms of administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a
more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal
government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once.
The causes which have been specified produced at first only unequal and
disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the
Union. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of
example and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the
least delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those
who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should we
consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden? These
were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand, and which
even speculative men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could
not, without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding to the persuasive
voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn
its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall
upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.

PUBLIUS.

 [1] “I mean for the Union.”




THE FEDERALIST.
No. XVI.

The Same Subject Continued

(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)

From the New York Packet.

Tuesday, December 4, 1787.

HAMILTON


To the People of the State of New York:

The tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or
communities, in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified
by the experiment we have made of it, is equally attested by the events
which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind, of
which we have any account, in exact proportion to its prevalence in
those systems. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a
distinct and particular examination. I shall content myself with barely
observing here, that of all the confederacies of antiquity, which
history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far
as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from
the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those
which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the
applauding suffrages of political writers.

This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled
the parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies in the
members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that
whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the
immediate effect of the use of it, civil war.

It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government, in its
application to us, would even be capable of answering its end. If there
should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national
government it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when
this could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the
Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league, in which the
strongest combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it
consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted the general
authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed
would be confined to a single member, and if there were more than one
who had neglected their duty, similarity of situation would induce them
to unite for common defense. Independent of this motive of sympathy, if
a large and influential State should happen to be the aggressing
member, it would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors to win
over some of them as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of
danger to the common liberty could easily be contrived; plausible
excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty, be
invented to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the passions, and
conciliate the good-will, even of those States which were not
chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be the
more likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members
might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation
in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control
upon their designs of personal aggrandizement; the better to effect
which it is presumable they would tamper beforehand with leading
individuals in the adjacent States. If associates could not be found at
home, recourse would be had to the aid of foreign powers, who would
seldom be disinclined to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy,
from the firm union of which they had so much to fear. When the sword
is once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The
suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment,
would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the Union
were exerted, to any extremes necessary to avenge the affront or to
avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would
probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.

This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy. Its
more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of
experiencing, if the federal system be not speedily renovated in a more
substantial form. It is not probable, considering the genius of this
country, that the complying States would often be inclined to support
the authority of the Union by engaging in a war against the
non-complying States. They would always be more ready to pursue the
milder course of putting themselves upon an equal footing with the
delinquent members by an imitation of their example. And the guilt of
all would thus become the security of all. Our past experience has
exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. There would,
in fact, be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could
with propriety be employed. In the article of pecuniary contribution,
which would be the most usual source of delinquency, it would often be
impossible to decide whether it had proceeded from disinclination or
inability. The pretense of the latter would always be at hand. And the
case must be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with
sufficient certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion. It
is easy to see that this problem alone, as often as it should occur,
would open a wide field for the exercise of factious views, of
partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that happened to prevail
in the national council.

It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to
prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by
the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the
ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the
plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of
extending its operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable
at all, would instantly degenerate into a military despotism; but it
will be found in every light impracticable. The resources of the Union
would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to
confine the larger States within the limits of their duty; nor would
the means ever be furnished of forming such an army in the first
instance. Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of
these States singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what
they will become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once
dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their
movements by laws to operate upon them in their collective capacities,
and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same
capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic than the
monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous heroes and
demi-gods of antiquity.

Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller
than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign
States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual.
It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker
members; and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and
disobedient have been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of
the confederacy has displayed its banners against the other half.

The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly
this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal
government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the
general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed
to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the
opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must carry its agency to the
persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate
legislations; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the
ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the
national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts
of justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State, must
be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of
individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have
the

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