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Essays in Liberalism

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Title: Essays in Liberalism

Author: Various


        
Release date: December 12, 2005 [eBook #17294]
                Most recently updated: December 13, 2020

Language: English

Original publication: London: W. Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1922

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ESSAYS IN LIBERALISM ***




Produced by Melissa Er-Raqabi, Jonathan Niehof, Ted Garvin
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ESSAYS
IN
LIBERALISM

_Being the Lectures and Papers which were
delivered at the Liberal Summer School
at Oxford, 1922_


LONDON: 48 PALL MALL
W. COLLINS SONS & CO. LTD.
GLASGOW MELBOURNE AUCKLAND
Copyright 1922


_Manufactured in Great Britain_




PREFACE


The papers contained in this volume are summaries--in some cases, owing
to the defectiveness of the reports, very much abridged summaries--of a
series of discourses delivered at the Liberal Summer School at Oxford in
the first ten days of August, 1922. In two cases ("The State and
Industry" and "The Machinery of Government") two lectures have been
condensed into a single paper.

The Summer School was not arranged by any of the official organisations
of the Liberal party, nor was any part of its expenses paid out of party
funds. It was the outcome of a spontaneous movement among a number of
men and women who, believing that Liberalism is beyond all other
political creeds dependent upon the free discussion of ideas, came to
the conclusion that it was desirable to create a platform upon which
such discussion could be carried on, in a manner quite different from
what is usual, or indeed practicable, at ordinary official party
gatherings. From the first the movement received cordial support and
encouragement from the leaders of the party, who were more than content
that a movement so essentially Liberal in character should be carried
on quite independently of any official control. The meetings were
inaugurated by an address by Mr. Asquith, and wound up by a valediction
from Lord Grey, while nearly all the recognised leaders of the party
presided at one or more of the meetings, or willingly consented to give
lectures. In short, while wholly unofficial, the meetings drew together
all that is most vital in modern Liberalism.

In some degree the Summer School represented a new departure in
political discussion. Most of the lectures were delivered, not by active
politicians, but by scholars and experts whose distinction has been won
in other fields than practical politics. One or two of the speakers
were, indeed, not even professed Liberals. They were invited to speak
because it was known that on their subjects they would express the true
mind of modern Liberalism. Whatever Lord Robert Cecil, for example, may
call himself, Liberals at any rate recognise that on most subjects he
expresses their convictions.

As a glance at the list of contents will show, the papers cover almost
the whole range of political interest, foreign, domestic, and imperial,
but the greatest emphasis is laid upon the problems of economic and
industrial organisation. Yet, since it is impossible to survey the
universe in ten days, there are large and important themes which remain
unexplored, while many subjects of vital significance are but lightly
touched upon. Perhaps the most notable of these omissions is that of any
treatment of local government, and of the immensely important
subjects--education, public health, housing, and the like--for which
local authorities are primarily held responsible. These subjects are
held over for fuller treatment in later schools; and for that reason two
papers--one on local government and one on education--which were
delivered at Oxford have not been included in the present volume.

It must be obvious, from what has been said above, that these papers
make no pretence to define what may be called an official programme or
policy for the Liberal party. It was with study rather than with
programme-making that the School was concerned, and its aim was the
stimulation of free inquiry rather than the formulation of dogmas. Every
speaker was, and is, responsible for the views expressed in his paper,
though not for the form which the abridged report of it has assumed; and
there are doubtless passages in this book which would not win the assent
of all Liberals, for Liberalism has always encouraged and welcomed
varieties of opinion.

Nevertheless, taken as a whole, these papers do fairly represent the
outlook and temper of modern Liberalism. And the candid reader will not
fail to recognise in them a certain unity of tone and temper, in spite
of the diversity of their authorship and subject-matter. Whether the
subject is foreign politics, or imperial problems, or government, or
industry, the same temper shows itself--a belief in freedom rather than
in regimentation; an earnest desire to substitute law for force; a
belief in persuasion rather than in compulsion as the best mode of
solving difficult problems; an eagerness to establish organised methods
of discussion and co-operation as the best solvent of strife, in
international relations and in industrial affairs quite as much as in
the realm of national politics, to which these methods have long since
been applied.

That is the spirit of modern Liberalism, which gives unity to the
diversity of this little volume. As has often been said, Liberalism is
an attitude of mind rather than a body of definitely formulated
doctrine. It does not claim to know of any formula which will guide us
out of all our troubles, or of any panacea that will cure every social
ill. It recognises that we are surrounded in every field of social and
political life by infinitely difficult problems for which there is no
easy solution. It puts its trust in the honest inquiry and thought of
free men who take their civic responsibilities seriously.




CONTENTS

                                                            PAGE
Preface                                                        v

The League of Nations and the
Rehabilitation of Europe          _Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil_ 1

The Balance of Power              _Professor A.F. Pollard_    19

International Disarmament         _Sir Frederick Maurice_     37

Reparations and Inter-Allied Debt _John Maynard Keynes_       51

The Outlook for National Finance  _Sir Josiah Stamp_          59

Free Trade                        _Rt. Hon. J.M. Robertson_   74

India                             _Sir Hamilton Grant_        92

Egypt                             _J.A. Spender_             111

The Machinery of Government       _Ramsay Muir_              120

The State and Industry            _W.T. Layton_              145

The Regulation of Wages           _Professor L.T. Hobhouse_  165

Unemployment                      _H.D. Henderson_           176

The Problem of the Mines          _Arnold D. McNair_         194

The Land Question                 _A.S. Comyns Carr_         212

Agricultural Questions            _Rt. Hon. F.D. Acland_     227




THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE REHABILITATION OF EUROPE

BY THE RT. HON. LORD ROBERT CECIL

K.C., M.P., Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1918.
Minister of Blockade, 1916-1918. Representative of Union of South Africa
at Assembly of League of Nations.


Lord Robert Cecil said:--I ought to explain that I am here rather by
accident. The speaker who was to have addressed you was my great
personal friend, Professor Gilbert Murray, and you have greatly suffered
because he is not present. He is prevented by being at Geneva on a
matter connected with the League, and he suggested that I might take his
place. I was very glad to do so, for, let me say quite frankly, I am
ready to advocate the League of Nations before any assembly, certainly
not least an assembly of Liberals. But not only an assembly of
Liberals--I should be ready to advocate it even before an assembly of
"Die-Hards."

Your chairman has said, and said truly, that the League is not a party
question. We welcome, we are anxious for support from every one. We have
seen in another great country the very grave danger that may accrue to
the cause of the League if it unhappily becomes identified with party
politics. We welcome support, yes, I will say even from the Prime
Minister; indeed no one will reject the support of the Prime Minister of
England for any cause. I am bound to admit when I first read the speech
to which reference has already been made, I was a little reminded of the
celebrated letter of Dr. Johnson to Lord Chesterfield. Lord Chesterfield
only began to recognise the value of Johnson's works when Johnson had
already succeeded, and in one of the bitter phrases Dr. Johnson then
used he said, "Is not a patron one who looks with unconcern on a man
struggling for life in the water, and when he has reached ground
incommodes him with help?" That was a passing phase in my mind, and I am
a little ashamed of it, because, after all, we cannot say the League has
reached ground as yet. We need and are grateful for the help of any one
who will genuinely come to its assistance. I hope we may look not only
for words, but for deeds. The League needs all the support it can get in
the very perilous and menacing times which are before us. I was glad to
note that the Government has announced--it is one of the great test
questions--that not only is it in favour of the entry of Germany into
the League, but it would support the election of Germany to the Council
of the League. That is an earnest of what we trust may be a real League
policy from the Government of this country. And yet, though I have
thought it right to emphasise the non-party aspect of this question, I
am conscious, and I am sure all of you are, there are two ways in which
the League is regarded. It is not only that, as your chairman would
say, some people have more faith than others, but there is really a
distinct attitude of mind adopted by some supporters of the League from
that adopted by others.


THE TWO VIEWS OF THE LEAGUE

There is what I may call the empirical view of the League. There are
those of us in this country, and indeed all over the world, who,
profoundly impressed with the horrors of war, hating war from the bottom
of their hearts as an evil thing--a company which must include, as far
as I can see, all Christian men and women--these people, impressed with
the horrors of war, look about for some means of keeping it away, some
safeguard against its renewal. And they say: "We have tried everything
else, we have tried the doctrine of the preparation for war as a great
safeguard of peace; we have tried the doctrine of the Balance of Power;
we have tried the doctrine of making one State or group of States so
powerful that it can enforce its will on the rest of the world. We have
tried all these expedients, and we are driven to the conclusion that
they lead not to peace, but to war. Is there anything else?" And then
they come quite legitimately to the League as their last hope of
preserving the peace of the world. I was talking to a distinguished
Frenchman the other day, and that was his attitude. It is the attitude
of a great many people. In my judgment it is quite sound as far as it
goes. But it is not inspiring. It depends in the last resort merely on
a frank appeal to the terrors of mankind.

Against that view you may set the more fundamental way of approaching
this question. You may say if you are to have peace in the world it is
not enough merely to provide safeguards against war. You must aim at
creating a new international spirit, a new spirit in international
affairs; you must build from the very foundations. That is the positive
as opposed to the negative way of approaching this question. It is not
enough to cast out the war spirit and leave its habitation swept and
garnished. You have to replace the war spirit by a spirit of
international co-operation. And that is the way of regarding this great
movement which some people think can be disposed of by describing it as
idealism--a favourite term of abuse, I learn, now, but which seems to me
not only good politics and good morality, but common sense as well.


THE NEGATIVE AND THE POSITIVE

These two points of view do represent undoubtedly fundamental
differences of political attitude, and you will find that the two sets
of advocates or supporters of the League whom I have tried to describe,
will inevitably regard with different emphasis the provisions of the
Covenant, and even the achievements of the League. For if you read the
Covenant you will find two sets of provisions in that document. It does
recognise the two schools, as it were, that I have been describing. It
has a set of provisions which deal with the enforcement, the
safeguarding of peace, and a set of provisions which deal with the
building up of international co-operation. You will notice the two sets
of provisions. There are those aiming directly at the settlement of
disputes without war. This is the central part of the League. It is the
first thing before you can hope to do anything else. Before you can
begin to build up your international spirit you must get rid as far as
you can of the actual menace of war; and in that sense this is the
central part of the Covenant. But, in my view, the most enduring and
perhaps the most important part is that set of provisions which cluster
round the group of articles beginning with Article 10 perhaps, certainly
Article 12, and going on to Article 17--the group which says in effect
that before nations submit their disputes to the arbitrament of war they
are bound to try every other means of settling their differences. It
lays down first the principle that every dispute should come to some
kind of arbitration, either by the new Court of International
Justice--one of the great achievements of the League--or discussion
before a specially constituted Arbitration Court, or failing both, then
discussion before the Council of the League; and Articles 15 and 16
provide that until that discussion has taken place, and until adequate
time has been allowed for the public opinion of the world to operate on
the disputants as the result of that examination, no war is to take
place, and if any war takes place the aggressor is to be regarded as
perhaps what may be called an international outlaw.

Before you begin to build you must have freedom from actual war, and
the provisions have been effective. They are not merely theoretic. I am
not sure whether it is generally recognised, even in so instructed an
assembly as this, how successful these provisions have actually been in
practice. Let me give you briefly two illustrations: the dispute between
Sweden and Finland, and the much more urgent case of the dispute between
Serbia and Albania. In the first case you had a dispute about the
possession of certain islands in the Baltic. It was boiling up to be a
serious danger to the peace of the world. It was referred to the League
for discussion. It was before the existence of the International Court.
A special tribunal was constituted. The matter was threshed out with
great elaboration; a decision was come to which, it is interesting to
observe, was a decision against the stronger of the two parties. It was
accepted, not with enthusiasm by the party that lost, but with great
loyalty. It has been adopted, worked out in its details by other organs
of the League, and as far as one can tell, as far as it is safe to
prophesy about anything, it has absolutely closed that dispute, and the
two countries are living in a greater degree of amity than existed
before the dispute became acute.

But the Albanian case is stronger. You had a very striking case: a small
country only just struggling into international existence. Albania had
only just been created before the war as an independent State, and
during the war its independence had in effect vanished. The first thing
that happened was its application for membership of the League. That
was granted, and thereby Albania came into existence really for the
first time as an independent State. Then came its effort to secure the
boundaries to which it was entitled, which had been provisionally
awarded to it before the war. While that dispute was still unsettled,
its neighbour, following some rather disastrous examples given by
greater people in Europe, thought to solve the question by seizing even
more of the land of Albania than it already occupied. Thereupon the
Articles of the Covenant were brought into operation. The Council was
hastily summoned within a few days. It was known that this country was
prepared to advocate before that Council the adoption of the coercive
measures described in Article 16. The Council met, and the aggressive
State immediately recognised that as a member of the League it had no
course open but to comply with its obligations, and that as a prudent
State it dared not face the danger which would be caused to it by the
operation of Article 16. Immediately, before the dispute had actually
been developed, before the Council, the Serbians announced that they
were prepared to withdraw from Albanian territory, and gave orders to
their troops to retire beyond the boundary. Let us recognise that this
decision having been come to, it was carried out with absolute loyalty
and completeness. The troops withdrew. The territory was restored to
Albania without a hitch. No ill-feeling remains behind, and the next
thing we hear is that a commercial treaty is entered into between the
two States, so that they can live in peace and amity together.


THE SPIRIT OF THE LEAGUE

I want to emphasise one point about these two cases. It is not so much
that the coercive powers provided in the Covenant were effectively used.
In Sweden and Finland they never came into the question at all, and in
the other case there was merely a suggestion of their operation. What
really brought about a settlement of these two disputes was that the
countries concerned really desired peace, and were really anxious to
comply with their obligations as members of the League of Nations. That
is the essential thing--the League spirit. And if you want to see how
essential it is you have to compare another international incident: the
dispute between Poland and Lithuania, where the League spirit was
conspicuous by its absence. There you had a dispute of the same
character. But ultimately you did secure this: that from the date of the
intervention of the League till the present day--about two years--there
has been no fighting; actual hostilities were put an end to. Though that
is in itself an immensely satisfactory result, and an essential
preliminary for all future international progress, yet one must add that
the dispute still continues, and there is much recrimination and
bitterness between the two countries. The reason why only partial
success has been attained is because one must say Poland has shown a
miserable lack of the true spirit of the League.

Let me turn to the other parts of the Covenant--those which aim
directly at building up international co-operation. I am not sure that
it is always sufficiently realised that that is not only an implicit but
also an explicit object of the Covenant--that it is the main purpose for
which the League exists. International co-operation are the very first
words of the preamble to the Covenant. This is the fundamental idea I
cannot insist on too strongly, because it does really go down to the
very foundations of my whole creed in political matters. International
co-operation, class co-operation, individual co-operation--that is the
essential spirit if we are to solve the difficulties before us. Let me
remind you of the two instances of the action of the League in dealing
with the threat of epidemics to Europe. A conference was called at
Washington to consider what could be done to save Europe from the danger
of epidemics coming from the East. What is interesting is that in that
conference you had present not only members of the League considering
and devising means for the safety of Europe, but you had representatives
of Germany and Russia--a splendid example of the promotion of
international co-operation extending even beyond the limits of the
membership of the League. Admirable work was done. All countries
co-operated quite frankly and willingly under the presidency of a
distinguished Polish scientist.

That is one example of what we mean by international co-operation.
Perhaps an even more striking example was the great work of Dr. Nansen
in liberating the prisoners of war who were in Russia. He was entrusted
with the work on behalf of the League. The prisoners of war belonged to
all nationalities, including our enemies in the late war. He
accomplished his work because he went about it in the true spirit of the
League, merely anxious to promote the welfare of all, leaving aside all
prejudices whether arising from the war or from any other cause. Dr.
Nansen is in my judgment the incarnation of the spirit of the League,
and his work, immensely successful, restored to their homes some 350,000
persons, and he did it for less money than he originally estimated it
would cost.

Do not put me down as a facile optimist in this matter. In the matter of
international co-operation we have a long way to go before we reach our
goal, and we can already see one or two serious failures. I deeply
deplore that last year the League found itself unable, through the
instructions given by the Governments which composed it, to do anything
effective on behalf of the famine in Russia. It was a most deplorable
failure for the League, and still more deplorable for this country. It
was a great opportunity for us to show that we really did mean to be
actuated by a new spirit in international affairs, and that we did
recognise that the welfare of all human beings was part--if you like to
put it so--of our national interests. We failed to make that
recognition. We have been trying feebly and unsuccessfully to repair
that great mistake ever since, and for my part I do not believe there is
any hope of a solution of the Russian difficulty until we absolutely
acknowledge the failure we then made, and begin even at this late hour
to retrace the false step we then took.

I could give other instances of failure, but I do not wish to depress
you, and there are cheering things we may look at. It is a matter of
great relief and congratulation that the policy of mandates really does
appear to be becoming effective, and one of the greatest activities of
the League. Nothing is better than the conception which the mandate
clause embodies, that the old ideas of conquest are to be put aside;
that you are not to allow nations to go out and take chunks of territory
for themselves; that they must hold new territory not for themselves,
but on behalf of and for the benefit of mankind at large. This is at the
bottom of mandates. Since I am speaking on behalf of Professor Murray, I
ought to remind you of the provisions of the Covenant for the protection
of racial linguistic minorities, and minorities in different countries.
It has not yet become an effective part of the machinery of the League,
but I look forward to the time when we shall have established the
doctrine that all racial minorities are entitled to be treated on a
footing absolutely equal with other nationals of the country in which
they live. If that could be established, one of the great difficulties
in the way of international co-operation in the spirit of peace will be
removed.


THE MISTAKE OF VERSAILLES

These are the two aspects I wanted to bring before you. If we are to get
down to the root of the matter; if we are to uproot the old jungle
theory of international relations, we must recognise that the chief
danger and difficulty before us is what may be described as excessive
nationalism. We have to recognise in this and other countries that a
mere belief in narrow national interests will never really take you
anywhere. You must recognise that humanity can only exist and prosper as
a whole, and that you cannot separate the nation in which you live, and
say you will work for its prosperity and welfare alone, without
considering that its prosperity and welfare depend on that of others.
And the differences on that point go right through a great deal of the
political thought of the day.

Take the question of reparations. I am not going to discuss in detail
what ought to be done in that difficult and vexed question, but I want
to call your attention to the mistake which was originally made, and
which we have never yet been able to retrieve. The fundamental error of
Versailles was the failure to recognise that even in dealing with a
conquered enemy you can only successfully proceed by co-operation. That
was the mistake--the idea that the victorious Powers could impose their
will without regard to the feelings and desires and national sentiment
of their enemy, even though he was beaten. For the first time in the
history of peace conferences, the vanquished Power was not allowed to
take part in any real discussion of the terms of the treaty. The
attitude adopted was, "These are our terms, take or leave them, but you
will get nothing else." No attempt was made to appreciate, or even
investigate the view put forward by the Germans on that occasion. And
last, but not least, they were most unfortunately excluded from
membership of the League at that time. I felt profoundly indignant with
the Germans and their conduct of the war. I still believe it was due
almost exclusively to the German policy and the policy of their rulers
that the war took place, and that it was reasonable and right to feel
profound indignation, and to desire that international misdeeds of that
character should be adequately punished. But what was wrong was to think
that you could as a matter of practice or of international ethics try to
impose by main force a series of provisions without regard to the
consent or dissent of the country on which you were trying to impose
them. That is part of the heresy that force counts for everything. I
wish some learned person in Oxford or elsewhere would write an essay to
show how little force has been able to achieve in the world. And the
curious and the really remarkable thing is that it was this heresy which
brought Germany herself to grief. It is because of the false and immoral
belief in the all-powerfulness of force that Germany has fallen, and yet
those opposed to Germany, though they conquered her, adopted only too
much of her moral code.

It was because the Allies really adopted the doctrine of the mailed fist
that we are now suffering from the terrible economic difficulties and
dangers which surround us. I venture to insist on that now, because
there are a large number of people who have not abandoned that view.
There are still a number of people who think the real failure that has
been committed is not that we went wrong, as I think, in our
negotiations at Versailles, but that we have not exerted enough force,
and that the remedy for the present situation is more threats of force.
I am sure it won't answer. I want to say that that doctrine is just as
pernicious when applied to France as when applied to Germany. You have
made an agreement. You have signed and ratified a treaty; you are
internationally bound by that treaty. It is no use turning round and
with a new incarnation of the policy of the mailed fist threatening one
of your co-signatories that they are bound to abandon the rights which
you wrongly and foolishly gave to them under that treaty.

I am against a policy based on force as applied to Germany. I am equally
opposed to a policy based on force as applied to France. If we really
understand the creed for which we stand, we must aim at co-operation all
round. If we have made a mistake we must pay for it. If we are really
anxious to bring peace to the world, and particularly to Europe, we must
be prepared for sacrifices. We have got to establish economic peace, and
if we don't establish it in a very short time we shall be faced with
economic ruin. In the strictest, most nationalistic interests of this
country, we have to see that economic war comes to an end. We have got
to make whatever concessions are necessary in order to bring that peace
into being.


ECONOMIC PEACE

That is true not only of the reparation question; it is true of our
whole economic policy. We have been preaching to Europe, and quite
rightly, that the erection of economic barriers between countries is a
treachery to the whole spirit of the League of Nations, and all that it
means, and yet with these words scarcely uttered we turn round and pass
through Parliament a new departure in our economic system which is the
very contradiction of everything we have said in international
conference.

The Safeguarding of Industries Act is absolutely opposed to the whole
spirit and purpose which the League of Nations has in view. A reference
was made by your chairman to Lord Grey, and I saw in a very
distinguished organ of the Coalition an attack on his recent speech. We
are told that he ought not at this crisis to be suggesting that the
present Government is not worthy of our confidence, but how can we trust
the present Government? How is it possible to trust them when one finds
at Brussels, at Genoa, at the Hague, and elsewhere they preach the
necessity of the economic unity of Europe, and then go down to the House
of Commons and justify this Act on the strictest, the baldest, the most
unvarnished doctrine of economic particularism for this country? Nor
does it stop there. I told you just now that for me this doctrine on
which the League is based goes right through many other problems than
those of a strictly international character. You will never solve
Indian or Egyptian difficulties by a reliance on force and force alone.
I believe that the deplorable, the scandalous condition to which the
neighbouring island of Ireland has been reduced is largely due to the
failure to recognise that by unrestricted unreasoning, and sometimes
immoral force, you cannot reach the solution of the difficulties of that
country.

And in industry it is the same thing. If you are really to get a
solution of these great problems, depend upon it you will never do it by
strikes and lock-outs. I am an outsider in industrial matters. I am
reproached when I venture to say anything about them with the
observation that I am no business man. I can only hope that in this case
lookers-on may sometimes see most of the game. But to me it is
profoundly depressing when I see whichever section of the industrial
world happens to have the market with it--whether employers or
wage-earners--making it its only concern to down the other party as much
as it can. You will never reach a solution that way. You have to
recognise in industrial as in international affairs that the spirit of
co-operation, the spirit of partnership, is your only hope of salvation.


THE TWO CAUSES OF UNREST

What is the conclusion of what I have tried to say to you? There are at
the present time two great causes of fighting and hostility. There used
to be three. There was a time when men fought about religious doctrine,
and though I do not defend it, it was perhaps less sordid than some of
our fights to-day. Now the two great causes of fighting are greed and
fear. Generally speaking, I think we may say that greed in international
matters is a less potent cause of hostility than fear. The disease the
world is suffering from is the disease of fear and suspicion. You see it
between man and man, between class and class, and most of all between
nation and nation. People reproach this great country and other great
countries with being unreasonable or unwilling to make concessions. If
you look deeply into it you will find always the same cause. It is not
mere perversity; it is fear and fear alone that makes men unreasonable
and contentious. It is no new thing; it has existed from the foundation
of the world. The Prime Minister the other day said, and said quite
truly, that the provisions of the Covenant, however admirable, were not
in themselves sufficient to secure the peace of the world. He made an
appeal, quite rightly, to the religious forces and organisations to
assist. I agree, but after all something may be done by political
action, and something by international organisation. In modern medicine
doctors are constantly telling us they cannot cure any disease--all they
can do is to give nature a chance. No Covenant will teach men to be
moral or peace-loving, but you can remove, diminish, or modify the
conditions which make for war, and take obstacles out of the way of
peace. We advocate partnership in industry and social life. We advocate
self-government, international co-operation. We recognise that these are
no ends in themselves; they are means to the end; they are the
influences which will facilitate the triumph of the right and impede the
success of the wrong.

But looking deeper into the matter, to the very foundations, we
recognise, all of us, the most devoted adherents of the League, and all
men of goodwill, that in the end we must strive for the brotherhood of
man. We admit we can do comparatively little to help it forward. We
recognise that our efforts, whether by covenant or other means, must
necessarily be imperfect; but we say, and say rightly, that we have been
told that perfect love casteth out fear, and that any step towards that
love, however imperfect, will at any rate mitigate the terrors of
mankind.




THE BALANCE OF POWER

BY PROFESSOR A.F. POLLARD

Hon. Litt.D.; Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford; F.B.A.; Professor of
English History in the University of London; Chairman of the Institute
of Historical Research.


Professor Pollard said:--The usual alternative to the League of Nations,
put forward as a means of averting war by those who desire or profess to
desire permanent peace, but dislike or distrust the League of Nations,
is what they call the Balance of Power. It is a familiar phrase; but the
thing for which the words are supposed to stand, has, if it can save us
from war, so stupendous a virtue that it is worth while inquiring what
it means, if it has any meaning at all. For words are not the same as
things, and the more a phrase is used the less it tends to mean: verbal
currency, like the coinage, gets worn with use until in time it has to
be called in as bad. The time has come to recall the Balance of Power as
a phrase that has completely lost the value it possessed when originally
it was coined.

Recent events have made an examination of the doctrine of the Balance of
Power a matter of some urgency. The Allies who won the war concluded a
pact to preserve the peace, but in that pact they have not yet been able
to include Germany or Russia or the United States, three Powers which
are, potentially at any rate, among the greatest in the world. So, some
fifty years ago, Bismarck, who won three wars in the mid-Victorian age,
set himself to build up a pact of peace. But his Triple Alliance was not
only used to restrain, but abused to repress, the excluded Powers; and
that abuse of a pact of peace drove the excluded Powers, France and
Russia, into each other's arms. There resulted the Balance of Power
which produced the war we have barely survived. And hardly was the great
war fought and won than we saw the wheel beginning to revolve once more.
The excluded Powers, repressed or merely restrained, began to draw
together; others than Turkey might gravitate in the same direction,
while the United States stands in splendid isolation as much aloof as we
were from the Triple Alliance and the Dual Entente a generation ago.
Another Balance of Power loomed on the horizon. "Let us face the facts,"
declared the _Morning Post_ on 22nd April last, "we are back again to
the doctrine of the Balance of Power, whatever the visionaries and the
blind may say." I propose to deal, as faithfully as I can in the time at
my disposal, with the visionaries and the blind--when we have discovered
who they are.

By "visionaries" I suppose the _Morning Post_ means those who believe in
the League of Nations; and by the "blind" I suppose it means them, too,
though usually a distinction is drawn between those who see too much and
those who cannot see at all. Nor need we determine whether those who
believe in the Balance of Power belong rather to the visionaries or to
the blind. A man may be receiving less than his due when he is asked
whether he is a knave or a fool, because the form of the question seems
to preclude the proper answer, which may be "both." Believers in the
Balance of Power are visionaries if they see in it a guarantee of peace,
and blind if they fail to perceive that it naturally and almost
inevitably leads to war. The fundamental antithesis is between the
Balance of Power and the League of Nations.


BALANCE OR LEAGUE?

That antithesis comes out wherever the problem of preserving the peace
of the world is seriously and intelligently discussed. Six years ago,
when he began to turn his attention to this subject, Lord Robert Cecil
wrote and privately circulated a memorandum in which he advocated
something like a League of Nations. To that memorandum an able reply was
drafted by an eminent authority in the Foreign Office, in which it was
contended that out of the discussion "the Balance of Power emerges as
the fundamental factor." That criticism for the time being checked
official leanings towards a League of Nations. But the war went on,
threatening to end in a balance of power, which was anything but welcome
to those who combined a theoretical belief in the Balance of Power with
a practical demand for its complete destruction by an overwhelming
victory for our Allies and ourselves. Meanwhile, before America came
in, President Wilson was declaring that, in order to guarantee the
permanence of such a settlement as would commend itself to the United
States, there must be, not "a Balance of Power but a Community of
Power."

Opinion in England was moving in the same direction. The League of
Nations Society (afterwards called "Union") had been formed, and at a
great meeting on 14th May, 1917, speeches advocating some such league as
the best means of preventing future wars were delivered by Lord Bryce,
General Smuts, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Hugh Cecil, and
others. Labour was even more emphatic; and, responding to popular
opinion, the Government, at Christmas, 1917, appointed a small committee
to explore the historical, juridical, and diplomatic bearings of the
suggested solution. A brief survey sufficed to show that attempts to
guarantee the peace of the world resolved themselves into three
categories: (1) a Monopoly of Power, (2) Balance of Power, and (3)
Community of Power. Rome had established the longest peace in history by
subjugating all her rivals and creating a _Pax Romana_ imposed by a
world-wide Empire. That Empire lasted for centuries, and the idea
persisted throughout the middle ages. In modern times Philip II. of
Spain, Louis XIV. of France, Napoleon, and even the Kaiser were
suspected of attempting to revive it; and their efforts provoked the
counter idea, first of a Balance of Power, and then in these latter days
of a Community of Power. The conception of a Monopoly of Power was by
common consent abandoned as impossible and intolerable, after the rise
of nationality, by all except the particular aspirants to the monopoly.
The Balance of Power and the Community of Power--in other words, the
League of Nations--thus became the two rival solutions of the problem of
permanent peace.


THE THEORY OF BALANCE

The discussion of their respective merits naturally led to an inquiry
into what the alternative policies really meant. But inasmuch as the
Foreign Office committee found itself able to agree in recommending some
form of League of Nations, the idea of the Balance of Power was not
subjected to so close a scrutiny or so searching an analysis as would
certainly have been the case had the committee realised the possibility
that reaction against an imperfect League of Nations might bring once
more to the front the idea of the Balance of Power. The fact was,
however, elicited that the Foreign Office conception of the Balance of
Power is a conception erroneously supposed to have been expressed by
Castlereagh at the time of the Congress of Vienna, and adopted as the
leading principle of nineteenth century British foreign policy.

Castlereagh was not, of course, the author of the phrase or of the
policy. The phrase can be found before the end of the seventeenth
century; and in the eighteenth the policy was always pleaded by
potentates and Powers when on the defensive, and ignored by them when in
pursuit of honour or vital interests. But Castlereagh defined it afresh
after the colossal disturbance of the balance which Napoleon effected;
and he explained it as "a just repartition of force amongst the States
of Europe." They were, so to speak, to be rationed by common agreement.
There were to be five or six Great Powers, whose independence was to be
above suspicion and whose strength was to be restrained by the jealous
watchfulness of one another. If any one State, like France under
Napoleon, grew too powerful, all the rest were to combine to restrain
it.

Now, there is a good deal in common between Castlereagh's idea and that
of the League of Nations. Of course, there are obvious differences.
Castlereagh's Powers were monarchies rather than peoples; they were
limited to Europe; little regard was paid to smaller States, whose
independence sometimes rested on no better foundation than the inability
of the Great Powers to agree about their absorption; and force rather
than law or public opinion was the basis of the scheme. But none of
these differences, important though they were, between Castlereagh's
Balance of Power and the League of Nations is so fundamental as the
difference between two things which are commonly regarded as identical,
viz., Castlereagh's idea of the Balance of Power and the meaning which
has since become attached to the phrase. There are at least two senses
in which it has been used, and the two are wholly incompatible with one
another. The League of Nations in reality resembles Castlereagh's
Balance of Power more closely than does the conventional notion of that
balance; and a verbal identity has concealed a real diversity to the
confusion of all political thought on the subject.

Castlereagh's Balance of Power is what I believe mathematicians call a
multiple balance. It was not like a pair of scales, in which you have
only two weights or forces balanced one against the other. It was rather
like a chandelier, in which you have five or six different weights
co-operating to produce a general stability or equilibrium. In
Castlereagh's scheme it would not much matter if one of the weights were
a little heavier than the others, because there would be four or five of
these others to counterbalance it; and his assumption was that these
other Powers would naturally combine for the purpose of redressing the
balance and preserving the peace. But a simple balance between two
opposing forces is a very different thing. If there are only two, you
have no combination on which you can rely to counteract the increasing
power of either, and the slightest disturbance suffices to upset the
balance. Castlereagh's whole scheme therefore presupposed the continued
and permanent existence of some five or six great Powers always
preserving their independence in foreign policy and war, and
automatically acting as a check upon the might and ambition of any
single State.


THE CHANGE SINCE CASTLEREAGH

Now, it was this condition, essential to the maintenance of
Castlereagh's Balance of Power, which completely broke down during the
course of the nineteenth century. Like most of the vital processes in
history, the change was gradual and unobtrusive, and its significance
escaped the notice of politicians, journalists, and even historians. Men
went on repeating Castlereagh's phrases about the Balance of Power
without perceiving that the circumstances, which alone had given it
reality, had entirely altered. The individual independence and automatic
action of the Great Powers in checking the growing ambitions and
strength of particular States were impaired, if not destroyed, by
separate Alliances, which formed units into groups for the purposes of
war and foreign policy, and broke up the unity of the European system,
just as a similar tendency threatens to break up the League of Nations.
There was a good deal of shifting about in temporary alliances which
there is no need to recount; but the ultimate upshot was the severance
of Europe into the two great groups with which we are all familiar, the
Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy on one side, and the
Triple Entente between Russia, France, and Great Britain on the other.
The multiple Balance of Power was thus changed into a simple balance
between two vast aggregations of force, and nothing remained outside to
hold the balance, except the United States, which had apparently
forsworn by the Monroe Doctrine the function of keeping it even.

And yet men continued to speak of the Balance of Power as though there
had been no change, and as though Castlereagh's ideas were as applicable
to the novel situation as they had been to the old! That illustrates
the tyranny of phrases. Cynics have said that language is used to
conceal our thoughts. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that
phrases are used to save us the trouble of thinking. We are always
giving things labels in order to put them away in their appropriate
pigeon-holes, and then we talk about the labels without thinking about
them, and often forgetting (if we ever knew) the things for which they
stand. So we Pelmanised the Balance of Power, and continued to use the
phrase without in the least troubling to ask what it means. When I asked
at the Foreign Office whether diplomatists meant by the Balance of Power
the sort of simple balance between two great alliances like the Triple
Alliance and the Triple Entente, I was told "yes"; and there was some
surprise--since the tradition of Castlereagh is strong in the
service--when I pointed out that that was an entirely different balance
from that of which Castlereagh had approved as a guarantee of peace. You
remember the Cheshire cat in _Alice in Wonderland_--an excellent
text-book for students of politics--and how the cat gradually faded away
leaving only its grin behind it to perplex and puzzle the observer. So
the body and the substance of Castlereagh's Balance of Power passed
away, and still men talk of the grin and look to the phrase to save them
from war. Whether to call them visionaries or the blind, I do not know.


MISCHIEVOUS HALLUCINATION

In either case, it is a mischievous hallucination; for the simple
Balance of Power between two great combinations is not only no guarantee
of peace, but the great begetter of fear, of the race for armaments, and
of war. Consider for a moment. If you want a balance, you want to have
it perfect. What is a perfect balance between two opposing weights or
forces? It is one which the addition of a feather-weight to either scale
will at once and completely upset. Now what will that equipoise produce?
The ease with which the balance may be destroyed will produce either on
one side the temptation to upset it, and on the other fear lest it be
upset, or fear on both sides at once. What indeed was it but this even
balance and consequent fear which produced the race for armaments? And
what does the race for armaments result in but in war? If we want war,
we need only aim at a Balance of Power, and it will do the rest. So far
from being a guarantee of peace, the Balance of Power is a sovereign
specific for precipitating war.

Of course, there are arguments for a Balance of Power. Plenty of them,
alas! though they are not often avowed. It produces other things than
war. For one thing, it makes fortunes for munition firms. For another,
it provides careers for those who have a taste for fighting or for
military pomp. Thirdly, in order to maintain armies and navies and
armaments, it keeps up taxation and diverts money from social,
educational, and other reforms which some people want to postpone.
Fourthly, it gratifies those who believe that force is the ultimate
sanction of order, and, by necessitating the maintenance of large forces
for defensive purposes, incidentally provides means for dealing with
domestic discontent. Fifthly, it panders to those who talk of prestige
and think that prestige depends upon the size of a nation's armaments.
For the sake of these things many would be willing to take the risk of
war which the Balance of Power involves. But most of those who use the
phrase are unconscious of these motives, and use it as they use many
another phrase, simply because they know not what it means. For,
assuredly, no sane person who had examined the Balance of Power, as it
existed before the war, could ever advocate it as a means of peace.

Indeed, whenever there has been the prospect of a practical Balance of
Power, its votaries have shown by their action that they knew their
creed was nonsense. The late war, for instance, might have been ended in
1916 on the basis of a Balance of Power. There were a few who believed
that that was the best solution; but they were not our latter-day
believers in the Balance of Power. Their cry was all for a fight to a
finish and a total destruction of the Balance of Power by an
overwhelming victory for the Allies, and their one regret is that a
final blow by Marshal Foch did not destroy the last vestige of a German
army. What is the point of expressing belief in the Balance of Power
when you indignantly repudiate your own doctrine on every occasion on
which you might be able to give it effect? And what is the point of the
present advocacy of the Balance of Power by those who think themselves
neither visionaries nor blind? Do they wish to restore the military
strength of Germany and of Russia and to see an Alliance between them
confronting a Franco-British union, compelled thereby to be militarist
too? Is it really that they wish to be militarists and that the League
of Nations, with its promise of peace, retrenchment, and reform, is to
them a greater evil than the Balance of Power?


WHERE THE LINE IS DRAWN

There is yet another fatal objection to the Balance of Power due to the
change in circumstances since the days of Castlereagh. He could afford
to think only of Europe, but we have to think of the world; and if our
specific has any value it must be of world-wide application. We cannot
proclaim the virtues of the Balance of Power and then propose to limit
it to the land or to any particular continent. Now, did our believers in
the Balance of Power ever wish to see power balanced anywhere else than
on the continent of Europe? That, if we studied history in any other
language than our own, we should know was the gibe which other peoples
flung at our addiction to the Balance of Power. We wanted, they said, to
see a Balance of Power on the continent of Europe, to see one half of
Europe equally matched against the other, because the more anxiously
Continental States were absorbed in maintaining their Balance of Power,
the keener would be their competition for our favour, and the freer
would be our hands to do what we liked in the rest of the world.

Was that a baseless slander? Let us test it with a question or two. Did
we ever want a Balance of Power at sea? British supremacy, with a
two-to-one or at least a sixteen-to-ten standard was, I fancy, our
minimum requirement. Is British supremacy what we mean by a Balance of
Power? Again, did we ever desire a Balance of Power in Africa, America,
or Asia? We may have talked of it sometimes, but only when we were the
weaker party and feared that another might claim in those continents the
sort of Balance of Power we claimed on the sea. We never spoke of the
Balance of Power in the interests of any nation except ourselves and an
occasional ally. We cannot speak in those terms to-day. If we demand a
Balance of Power on land, we must expect others to claim it at sea; if
we urge it on Europe as a means of peace, we cannot object if others
turn our own argument against us in other quarters of the globe; and
wherever you have a Balance of Power you will have a race for armaments
and the fear of war.

The Balance of Power is, in fact, becoming as obsolete as the Monopoly
of Power enjoyed by the Roman Empire. It is a bankrupt policy which went
into liquidation in 1914, and the high court of public opinion demands a
reconstruction. The principle of that reconstruction was stated by
President Wilson, a great seer whose ultimate fame will survive the
obloquy in which he has been involved by the exigencies of American
party-politics and the short-sightedness of public opinion in Europe. We
want, he said, a Community of Power, and its organ must be the League of
Nations. Nations must begin to co-operate and cease to counteract.

I am not advocating the League of Nations except in the limited way of
attempting to show that the Balance of Power is impossible as an
alternative unless you can re-create the conditions of a century ago,
restore the individual independence of a number of fairly equal Powers,
and guarantee the commonwealth of nations against privy conspiracy and
sedition in the form of separate groups and alliances. But there is one
supreme advantage in a Community of Power, provided it remains a
reality, and that is that it need never be used. Its mere existence
would be sufficient to ensure the peace; for no rebel State would care
to challenge the inevitable defeat and retribution which a Community of
Power could inflict. It has even been urged, and I believe it myself,
that Germany would never have invaded Belgium had she been sure that
Great Britain, and still less had she thought that America, would
intervene. It was the Balance of Power that provoked the war, and it was
the absence of a Community of Power which made it possible.


BASIS OF SECURITY

But no one who thinks that power--whether a Monopoly, a Balance, or even
a Community of Power is the ultimate guardian angel of our peace, has
the root of the matter in him. Men, said Burke, are not governed
primarily by laws, still less by force; and behind all power stands
opinion. To believe in public opinion rather than in might excludes the
believer from the regular forces of militarism and condemns him as a
visionary and blind. For advocates of the Balance of Power bear a
striking resemblance to the Potsdam school; and even so moderate a
German as the late Dr. Rathenau declared in his unregenerate days before
the war that Germans were not in the habit of reckoning with public
opinion. Nevertheless, there is a frontier in the world which for a
century and more has enjoyed a security which all the armaments of
Prussian militarism could not give the German Fatherland; and the
absolute security of that frontier rests not upon a monopoly nor a
community, still less upon a balance of power, but on the opinion held
on both sides of that frontier that all power is irrational and futile
as a guarantee of peace between civilised or Christian people.

Let us look at that frontier for a moment. It is in its way the most
wonderful thing on earth, and it holds a light to lighten the nations
and to guide our feet into the way of peace. It runs, of course, between
the Dominion of Canada and the United States of America across the great
lakes and three thousand miles of prairie; and from the military and
strategic point of view it is probably the worst frontier in the world.
Why then is it secure? Is it because of any monopoly or community or
balance of power? Is it because the United States and the British
Empire are under a common government, or because there is along that
frontier a nicely-balanced distribution of military strength? No, it is
secure, not in spite of the absence of force, but because of the absence
of force; and if you want to destroy the peace of that frontier from end
to end, all you need to do is to send a regiment to protect it, launch a
_Dreadnought_ on those lakes, and establish a balance of power. For
every regiment or warship on one side will produce a regiment or warship
on the other; and then your race for armaments will begin, and the
poison will spread until the whole of America becomes like Europe, an
armed camp of victims to the theory of strategic frontiers and of the
Balance of Power.

Those theories, their application, and their consequences recently cost
the world thirty million casualties and thousands of millions of pounds
within a brief five years, and yet left the frontiers of Europe less
secure than they were before. Three thousand miles of frontier in North
America have in more than a hundred years cost us hardly a life, or a
limb, or a penny. As we put those details side by side we realise
_quantula regitur mundus sapientia_--with how little wisdom do men rule
the world. Yet the truth was told us long ago that he that ruleth his
spirit is better than he that taketh a city, and we might have learnt by
our experience of the peace that the only conquest that really pays is
the conquest of oneself.

The real peace of that North American frontier is due to no conquest of
Americans by Canadians or of Canadians by Americans, but to their
conquest of themselves and of that foolish pride of "heathen folk who
put their trust in reeking tube and iron shard." Let us face the facts,
whatever the visionaries and the blind may say. So be it. The war is a
fact, and so is the desolation it has wrought. But that Anglo-American
frontier is also a fact, and so is that century of peace which happily
followed upon the resolution to depend for the defence of that frontier
on moral restraint instead of on military force. Verily, peace hath her
victories not less renowned than those of war.


THE ALTERNATIVE

We have, indeed, to face the facts, and the facts about the Balance of
Power must dominate our deliberations and determine the fate of our
programmes. There may be no more war for a generation, but there can be
no peace with a Balance of Power. There can be nothing better than an
armed truce; and an armed truce, with super-dreadnoughts costing from
four to eight times what they did before the war, is fatal to any
programme of retrenchment and reform. We are weighted enough in all
conscience with the debt of that war without the burden of preparation
for another; and a Balance of Power involves a progressive increase in
preparations for war.

Unless we can exorcise fear, we are doomed to repeat the sisyphean
cycles of the past and painfully roll our programmes up the hill, only
to see them dashed to the bottom, before we get to the top, by the
catastrophe of war. Fear is fatal to freedom; it is fear which alone
gives militarism its strength, compels nations to spend on armaments
what they fain would devote to social reform, drives them into secret
diplomacy and unnatural alliances, and leads them to deny their just
liberties to subject populations. Fear is the root of reaction as faith
is the parent of progress; and the incarnation of international fear is
the Balance of Power.




INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE, K.C.M.G., C.B.

Director of Military Operations--Imperial General Staff, 1915-16.


Sir Frederick Maurice said:--This problem of the reduction of armaments
is one of the most urgent of the international and national problems of
the day. It is urgent in its economic aspect, urgent also as regards its
relation to the future peace of the world. The urgency of its economic
aspect was proclaimed two years ago at the Brussels conference of
financiers assembled by the League of Nations. These experts said quite
plainly and definitely that, so far as they could see, the salvation of
Europe from bankruptcy depended upon the immediate diminution of the
crushing burden of expenditure upon arms. That was two years ago. Linked
up with this question is the whole question of the economic
reconstruction of Europe. Linked up with it also is that deep and grave
problem of reparations. It is no longer the case to-day, if it has ever
been the case since the war, which I doubt, that sober opinion in France
considers it necessary for France to have large military forces in order
to protect her from German aggression in the near future. For the past
two years, however, it has been the custom of those who live upon alarms
to produce the German menace. There is a great body of opinion in
France at this moment which feels that unless France is able to put the
pistol to Germany's head, it will never be able to get a penny out of
Germany.

You have the further connection of the attitude of America to the
problem. America said, officially through Mr. Hoover and unofficially
through a number of her leading financiers, that she was not ready to
come forward and take her share in the economic restoration of Europe so
long as Europe is squandering its resources upon arms. The connection is
quite definitely and explicitly recognised in the Covenant of the League
of Nations. Article 8 begins: "The principles of the League recognise
that the maintenance of peace requires reduction of national armaments
to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement
by common action of international obligations." These words were
promulgated in 1919. Personally, I find myself in complete agreement
with what Lord Robert Cecil said this morning, and what Lord Grey said a
few days ago at Newcastle, that one of the prime causes of the war was
Prussian militarism. By that I mean the influence of that tremendous
military machine, which had been built up through years of labour in
Germany, in moulding the public opinion of that country.


A GROUP OF NEW ARMIES

Well, how do we stand in regard to that to-day? We stand to-day in the
position that the armaments of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, have
all been compulsorily drastically reduced, but in their place you have a
whole group of new armies. You have armies to-day which did not exist
before the war, in Finland, Esthonia, Poland, Lithuania, and
Czecho-Slovakia, and the sum total is that at this moment there are more
armed men in time of peace in Europe than in 1913. Is there no danger
that this machine will mould the minds of some other peoples, just as
the German machine moulded the minds of the Germans? This is the
position as regards the peace establishments of Europe to-day in their
relation to the future peace of the world. What about the economic
position? I have mentioned that certain Powers have had their forces
drastically reduced, and that has brought with it a drastic reduction of
expenditure, but I have before me the naval, military, and air force
estimates of the eight principal Powers in Europe, leaving out Germany,
Austria, and Bulgaria, whose forces have been compulsorily reduced.

At the economic conference of financiers in Brussels in 1920 it was
mentioned with horror that 20 per cent. of the income of Europe was then
being devoted to arms. I find that to-day 25 per cent. of the total
income of these eight Powers is devoted to arms. I find, further, that
of these eight Powers who have budgeted for a smaller service, only
one--Yugo-Slavia--has managed to balance her budget, and the others have
large deficits which are many times covered by their expenditure on
arms. And this is going on at a time when all these eight nations are
taxed almost up to their limit, when the whole of their industries are
suffering in consequence, and when the danger of bankruptcy, which
horrified the financiers in 1920, is even more imminent.

That being the case, what has been done in the last few years to remedy
this matter, and why is more not being done? As you all know, this
question is in the forefront of the programme of the League of Nations.
And the League began to deal with it at once. Lord Robert Cecil will
agree with me that the framers of the Covenant, of which he is one of
the chief, could not foresee everything, and they did not foresee at the
time the Covenant was framed, that machinery would be required to deal
with this extraordinarily complex question of armaments. They created an
organisation then called a Permanent Military Command, still in
existence, to advise the Council of the League on all military matters.
But when these gentlemen got to work upon such questions as reduction of
armaments, they at once found themselves dealing with matters entirely
beyond their competence, because into this problem enter problems of
high politics and finance, and a thousand other questions of which
soldiers, sailors, and airmen know nothing whatever.


THE LEAGUE'S COMMISSION

The first step was to remedy an oversight in the machinery, and that was
done at the first meeting of the Assembly. The first meeting of the
Assembly created a temporary mixed commission on armaments, which was
composed of persons of recognised competence in political, social, and
economic matters. It consisted of six members of the old Permanent
Commission, and in addition a number of statesmen, employers, and
representatives of labour. This body started to tackle this grave
question. Before it began the first Assembly of the League had suggested
one line of approach--that there should be an agreement to limit
expenditure; that an attempt should be made to limit armaments by
limiting budgets; and nations were asked to agree that they would not
exceed in the two years following the acceptance of the resolution the
budgeted expenditure on armaments of the current year.

That proposal did not meet with great success. It was turned down by
seven Powers, notably by France and Spain. On the whole, I think France
and Spain and the other Powers had some reason on their side, because it
is not possible to approach this problem solely from the financial
standpoint. You cannot get a financial common denominator and apply it
to armaments. The varying costs of a soldier in Europe and in Japan have
no relation to each other. The cost of a voluntary soldier in Great
Britain has no relation to the cost of a conscript on the Continent.
Therefore, that line of approach, when applied too broadly, is not
fruitful. I think myself it is quite possible that you may be able to
apply financial limitations to the question of material, the
construction of guns and other weapons of war, because the cost of these
things in foreign countries tends much more to a common level. I think
this is a possible line of approach, but to try to make a reduction of
armaments by reducing budgets on a wholesale scale I do not think will
lead us anywhere at all. I may safely say that for the present that line
of approach has been abandoned.

The Temporary Mixed Commission got to work, and in its first year,
frankly, I cannot say it did very much. It concerned itself very largely
with the accumulation of information and the collection of statistics,
bearing rather the same relation to world problems as a Royal Commission
does to our domestic problems. By the time the second Assembly met
practically nothing had been done by the Commission. But other people
had been at work, and our own League of Nations Union had put forward a
proposal--a line of approach, rather, I would say, to this
problem--which I for one think is extremely useful. It began by
inquiring as to what armaments were for, which after all is a useful way
of beginning, and the inquiry came to the conclusion that nations
required them for three purposes--to maintain internal order; as a last
resort for the enforcement of law and order; and to protect overseas
possessions. After these purposes were served there was a large residuum
left. That residuum could only be required for one purpose--to protect
the country in question from foreign aggression. When you had gone thus
far in your reasoning, you had obviously got into the zone where
bargaining becomes possible, because it is obvious that by agreement you
can get the force by which a nation is liable to become reduced. That
line of approach received the general blessing at the second Assembly of
the League of Nations. Things began to move, primarily because the
Dominion of South Africa took a keen interest in this problem of the
reduction of armaments, and South Africa appointed Lord Robert Cecil as
its representative, and instructed him to press the matter on, and he
did. The Assembly definitely instructed this temporary mixed Commission
that by the time the third Assembly met plans should be prepared and
concrete proposals put on paper.


WASHINGTON

Soon after that came the Washington Conference--a great landmark in the
history of this problem. For reasons I need not go into in detail, the
naval problem is very much easier than the military or air problem. You
have as the nucleus of naval forces something quite definite and
precise--the battleship--and it also happens that that particular unit
is extremely costly, and takes a long time to build, and no man has yet
ever succeeded in concealing the existence of a battleship. There you
had three important points--a large and important unit in the possession
of everybody concerned, very costly, so that by reducing it you make
great reductions in expenditure. There was no possibility of avoiding an
agreement about the construction of battleships, and it is to these
facts mainly that the happy results of the Washington Conference were
due.

But for the furtherance of the problem the point is this. The Washington
Conference definitely established the principle of reduction of
armaments on a great ratio. The ratio for battleships between Great
Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy, was settled as to
5, 5, 3, and 1.75. They all agreed on a definite ratio. All agreed to
scrap a certain number of ships, to bring their tonnage down to a
certain figure, and by doing that relatively they were left in the same
position as before, with this advantage--that they at once obtained an
enormous reduction in expenditure on armaments.

That opened up a new line of approach for the attack on this problem
from the military and air standpoint. And the next development took
place in February this year at the meeting of the Temporary Mixed
Commission on armaments, when the Esher proposals were presented. There
has been a great deal of talk about the Esher proposals, and I am glad
of it, because the one thing wanted in this question is public interest.
The Esher proposals were an endeavour to apply to land armaments this
principle of reduction on a great ratio. And the line taken was this. It
was necessary to find some unit in land armaments which corresponded
with the battleships, and the unit selected by Lord Esher was the
300,000 regular soldiers of the peace armies in France, England, and
Spain. It was selected because it happened to be the number to which the
Austrian army was reduced by treaty, and with that unit he proposed a
ratio for the armies of Europe, which would leave everybody relatively
in much the same position as before, but would obtain an immediate
reduction in numbers of standing armies and a great reduction of
expenditure.

This proposal was subjected to a great deal of criticism, and I am sorry
to say nine-tenths of the criticism appears to emanate from persons who
have never read the proposal at all. It is a proposal which lends itself
to a great deal of criticism, and the most effective criticism which
could have been applied at the time it was presented was that it put the
cart before the horse, and approached the problem from the wrong
direction, for, as Lord Robert Cecil has said here this morning, what
nations require is security. Some of them have clear ideas as to the way
of obtaining it, but they all want it, and before you can expect people
to reduce their armaments, which are, after all, maintained mainly for
the purpose of providing security, you must give them something that
will take the place of armaments.


A GENERAL DEFENSIVE PACT

In June an important development took place in this Temporary
Commission. It was increased by the addition of a number of statesmen,
and, amongst others, of men who ought to have been on it long ago. Lord
Robert Cecil was added, and he at once proceeded to remedy what was a
real difficulty in Lord Esher's proposals. He put forward a plan for
providing security in the form, as the Assembly of the League had asked,
of a definite written proposal--really a brief treaty. The purport of
that treaty is included in the form of resolutions, which are roughly as
follows:--No scheme for the reduction of armaments can be effective
unless it is general; that in the present state of the world no
Government can accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of
armaments unless it is given some other equally satisfactory guarantee
of the safety of its country; such guarantee can only be found in a
general defensive agreement of all the countries concerned, binding them
all to come to the assistance of any one of them if attacked.

A general defensive pact, with a proviso! It is obviously unreasonable
to expect the States of the American continent to be ready to come over
at any moment to help in Europe. It is obviously unreasonable to expect
the States of Europe to bind themselves to come and fight in Asia.
Therefore, there was this proviso added that an obligation to come to
the assistance of the attacked country should be limited to those
countries which belonged to the same quarter of the globe. Thus, you
see, you are getting the obligation of the League into regional
application. Personally my own conviction is that this is the line upon
which many of the functions of the League will develop.

The main point of the situation as it is to-day is that you have got a
committee working out in detail a general pact, which when it is
formulated will be far more complete and satisfactory than the very
general and vague Clause 10 of the Covenant. We have reached the
position when practical proposals are beginning to emerge. What more is
wanted? How can we help on this work? You will have gathered from what I
said that it is my own conviction that with this problem of reduction of
armaments is so closely linked up the problem of economic reconstruction
and reparations that the whole ought to be taken together. I believe one
of the reasons why so little progress has been made is that the economic
problems have been entrusted, with the blessing of our and other
Governments, to perambulating conferences, while the disarmament problem
has been left solely to the League of Nations. I believe if you could
get the whole of these problems considered by one authority--and there
is one obvious authority--progress would be far more rapid.

There is another matter which concerns us as citizens--the attitude of
our own Government to this question. I was delighted to see recently an
announcement made by a Minister in the House of Commons that the
Government was seriously in favour of a reduction of armaments on a
great ratio. I was delighted to read the other day a speech, to which
reference has already been made, by the Prime Minister. We have had a
great many words on this question. The time has come for action, and
quite frankly the action of our Government in the past two years with
regard to this question has been neutral, and not always one of
benevolent neutrality. Our official representatives at Geneva have been
very careful to stress the difficulties, but up to the present I am
unaware that our Government has ever placed its immense resources as
regards information at the disposal of the one Englishman who has been
striving with all his power and knowledge to get a definite solution. I
believe there is going to be a change; I hope so. In any case, the best
thing we can do is to see that it is changed, and that Lord Robert Cecil
is not left to fight a lone battle.


THE APPEAL TO PUBLIC OPINION

There is something more. There is something wanted from each of us.
Personally, I am convinced myself that this problem is soluble on the
lines by which it is now being approached. I speak to you as a
professional who has given some study to the subject. I am convinced
that on the lines of a general pact as opposed to the particular pact, a
general defensive agreement as opposed to separate alliances, followed
by reduction on a great ratio, the practicability of which has been
proved at Washington, a solution can be reached. Given goodwill--that is
the point. At the last Assembly of the League of Nations a report was
presented by the Commission, of which Lord Robert Cecil was a member,
and it wound up with these words: "Finally, the committee recognises
that a policy of disarmament, to be successful, requires the support of
the population of the world. Limitation of armaments will never be
imposed by Governments on peoples, but it may be imposed by peoples on
Governments." That is absolutely true. How are we going to apply it?
Frankly, myself, I do not see that there is a great deal of value to be
got by demonstrations which demand no more war. I have every sympathy
with their object, but we have got to the stage when we want to get
beyond words to practical resolutions. We want definite concrete
proposals, and you won't get these merely by demonstrations. They are
quite good in their way, but they are not enough. What you want in this
matter is an informed public opinion which sees what is practical and
insists on having it.

I am speaking to you as one who for a great many years believed
absolutely that preparation for war was the means of securing peace. In
1919--when I had a little time to look round, to study the causes of the
war and the events of the war--I changed my opinion. I then came quite
definitely to the conclusion that preparation for war, carried to the
point to which it had been carried in 1914, was a direct cause of war. I
had to find another path, and I found it in 1919. Lord Robert may
possibly remember that in the early days of the Peace Conference I came
to him and made my confession of faith, and I promised to give him what
little help I could. I have tried to keep my promise, and I believe this
vital problem, upon which not only the economic reconstruction of Europe
and the future peace of the world, but also social development at home
depend, can be solved provided you will recognise that the problem is
very complex; that there is fear to be overcome; that you are content
with what is practical from day to day, and accept each practical step
provided it leads forward to the desired goal. I therefore most
earnestly trust that the Liberal party will take this question up, and
translate it into practical politics. For that is what is required.




REPARATIONS AND INTER-ALLIED DEBT

BY JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES

M.A., C.B.; Fellow of King's College, Cambridge; Editor of _Economic
Journal_ since 1912; principal representative of the Treasury at the
Paris Peace Conference, and Deputy for the Chancellor of the Exchequer
on the Supreme Economic Council, Jan.-June, 1919.


Mr. Keynes said:--I do not complain of Lord Balfour's Note, provided we
assume, as I think we can, that it is our first move, and not our last.
Many people seem to regard it as being really addressed to the United
States. I do not agree. Essentially it is addressed to France. It is a
reply, and a very necessary reply, to the kites which M. Poincaré has
been flying in _The Times_ and elsewhere, suggesting that this country
should sacrifice all its claims of every description in return
for--practically nothing at all, certainly not a permanent solution of
the general problem. The Note brings us back to the facts and to the
proper starting-point for negotiations.

In this question of Reparations the position changes so fast that it may
be worth while for me to remind you just how the question stands at this
moment. There are in existence two inconsistent settlements, both of
which still hold good in law. The first is the assessment of the
Reparation Commission, namely, 132 milliard gold marks. This is a
capital sum. The second is the London Settlement, which is not a capital
sum at all, but a schedule of annual payments calculated according to a
formula; but the capitalised value of these annual payments, worked out
on any reasonable hypothesis, comes to much less than the Reparation
Commission's total, probably to not much more than a half.


THE BREAKDOWN OF GERMANY

But that is not the end of the story. While both the above settlements
remain in force, the temporary régime under which Germany has been
paying is different from, and much less than, either of them. By a
decision of last March Germany was to pay during 1922 £36,000,000 (gold)
in cash, _plus_ deliveries in kind. The value of the latter cannot be
exactly calculated, but, apart from coal, they do not amount to much,
with the result that the 1922 demands are probably between a third and a
quarter of the London Settlement, and less than one-sixth of the
Reparation Commission's original total. It is under the weight of this
reduced burden that Germany has now broken down, and the present crisis
is due to her inability to continue these reduced instalments beyond the
payment of July, 1922. In the long run the payments due during 1922
should be within Germany's capacity. But the insensate policy pursued by
the Allies for the last four years has so completely ruined her
finances, that for the time being she can pay nothing at all; and for a
shorter or longer period it is certain that there is now no alternative
to a moratorium.

What, in these circumstances, does M. Poincaré propose? To judge from
the semi-official forecasts, he is prepared to cancel what are known as
the "C" Bonds, provided Great Britain lets France off the whole of her
debt and forgoes her own claims to Reparation. What are these "C" Bonds?
They are a part of the London Settlement of May, 1921, and, roughly
speaking, they may be said to represent the excess of the Reparation
Commission's assessment over the capitalised value of the London
Schedule of Payments, and a bit more. That is to say, they are pure
water. They mainly represent that part of the Reparation Commission's
total assessment which will not be covered, even though the London
Schedule of Payments is paid in full.

In offering the cancellation of these Bonds, therefore, M. Poincaré is
offering exactly nothing. If Great Britain gave up her own claims to
Reparations, and the "C" Bonds were cancelled to the extent of France's
indebtedness to us, France's claims against Germany would be actually
greater, even on paper, than they are now. For the demands under the
London Settlement would be unabated, and France would be entitled to a
larger proportion of them. The offer is, therefore, derisory. And it
seems to me to be little short of criminal on the part of _The Times_ to
endeavour to trick the people of this country into such a settlement.

Personally, I do not think that at this juncture there is anything
whatever to be done except to grant a moratorium. It is out of the
question that any figure, low enough to do Germany's credit any good
now, could be acceptable to M. Poincaré, in however moderate a mood he
may visit London next week. Apart from which, it is really impossible at
the present moment for any one to say how much Germany will be able to
pay in the long run. Let us content ourselves, therefore, with a
moratorium for the moment, and put off till next year the discussion of
a final settlement, when, with proper preparations beforehand, there
ought to be a grand Conference on the whole connected problem of
inter-Governmental debt, with representatives of the United States
present, and possibly at Washington.


THE ILLUSION OF A LOAN

The difficulties in the way of any immediate settlement now are so
obvious that one might wonder why any one should be in favour of the
attempt. The explanation lies in that popular illusion, with which it
now pleases the world to deceive itself--the International Loan. It is
thought that if Germany's liability can now be settled once and for all,
the "bankers" will then lend her a huge sum of money by which she can
anticipate her liabilities and satisfy the requirements of France.

In my opinion the International Loan on a great scale is just as big an
illusion as Reparations on a great scale. It will not happen. It cannot
happen. And it would make a most disastrous disturbance if it did
happen. The idea that the rest of the world is going to lend to
Germany, for her to hand over to France, about 100 per cent. of their
liquid savings--for that is what it amounts to--is utterly preposterous.
And the sooner we get that into our heads the better. I am not quite
clear for what sort of an amount the public imagine that the loan would
be, but I think the sums generally mentioned vary from £250,000,000 up
to £500,000,000. The idea that any Government in the world, or all of
the Governments in the world in combination, let alone bankrupt Germany,
could at the present time raise this amount of new money (that is to
say, for other purposes than the funding or redemption of existing
obligations) from investors in the world's Stock Exchanges is
ridiculous.

The highest figure which I have heard mentioned by a reliable authority
is £100,000,000. Personally, I think even this much too high. It could
only be realised if subscriptions from special quarters, as, for
example, German hoards abroad, and German-Americans, were to provide the
greater part of it, which would only be the case if it were part of a
settlement which was of great and obvious advantage to Germany. A loan
to Germany, on Germany's own credit, yielding, say, 8 to 10 per cent.,
would not in my opinion be an investor's proposition in any part of the
world, except on a most trifling scale. I do not mean that a larger
anticipatory loan of a different character--issued, for example, in
Allied countries with the guarantees of the Allied Government, the
proceeds in each such country being handed over to the guaranteeing
Government, so that no new money would pass--might not be possible. But
a loan of this kind is not at present in question.

Yet a loan of from £50,000,000 to £100,000,000--and I repeat that even
this figure is very optimistic except as the result of a settlement of a
kind which engaged the active goodwill of individual Germans with
foreign resources and of foreigners of German origin and
sympathies--would only cover Germany's liabilities under the London
Schedule for four to six months, and the temporarily reduced payments of
last March for little more than a year. And from such a loan, after
meeting Belgian priorities and Army of Occupation costs, there would not
be left any important sum for France.

I see no possibility, therefore, of any final settlement with M.
Poincaré in the immediate future. He has now reached the point of saying
that he is prepared to talk sense in return for an enormous bribe, and
that is some progress. But as no one is in a position to offer him the
bribe, it is not much progress, and as the force of events will compel
him to talk sense sooner or later, even without a bribe, his bargaining
position is not strong. In the meantime he may make trouble. If so, it
can't be helped. But it will do him no good, and may even help to bring
nearer the inevitable day of disillusion. I may add that for France to
agree to a short moratorium is not a great sacrifice since, on account
of the Belgian priority and other items, the amount of cash to which
France will be entitled in the near future, even if the payments fixed
last March were to be paid in full, is quite trifling.


A POLICY FOR THE LIBERAL PARTY

So much for the immediate situation and the politics of the case. If we
look forward a little, I venture to think that there is a clear, simple,
and practical policy for the Liberal Party to adopt and to persist in.
Both M. Poincaré and Mr. Lloyd George have their hands tied by their
past utterances. Mr. Lloyd George's part in the matter of Reparations is
the most discreditable episode in his career. It is not easy for him,
whose hands are not clean in the matter, to give us a clean settlement.
I say this although his present intentions appear to be reasonable. All
the more reason why others should pronounce and persist in a clear and
decided policy. I was disappointed, if I may say so, in what Lord Grey
had to say about this at Newcastle last week. He said many wise things,
but not a word of constructive policy which could get any one an inch
further forward. He seemed to think that all that was necessary was to
talk to the French sympathetically and to put our trust in international
bankers. He puts a faith in an international loan as the means of
solution which I am sure is not justified. We must be much more concrete
than that, and we must be prepared to say unpleasant things as well as
pleasant ones.

The right solution, the solution that we are bound to come to in the
end, is not complicated. We must abandon the claim for pensions and
bring to an end the occupation of the Rhinelands. The Reparation
Commission must be asked to divide their assessment into two parts--the
part that represents pensions and separation allowances and the rest.
And with the abandonment of the former the proportion due to France
would be correspondingly raised. If France would agree to this--which is
in her interest, anyhow--and would terminate the occupation it would be
right for us to forgive her (and our other Allies) all they owe us, and
to accord a priority on all receipts in favour of the devastated areas.
If we could secure a real settlement by these sacrifices, I think we
should make them completely regardless of what the United States may say
or do.

In declaring for this policy in the House of Commons yesterday, Mr.
Asquith has given the Liberal Party a clear lead. I hope that they will
make it a principal plank in their platform. This is a just and
honourable settlement, satisfactory to sentiment and to expediency.
Those who adopt it unequivocally will find that they have with them the
tide and a favouring wind. But no one must suppose that, even with such
a settlement, any important part of Germany's payments can be
anticipated by a loan. Any small loan that can be raised will be
required for Germany herself, to put her on her legs again, and enable
her to make the necessary annual payments.




THE OUTLOOK FOR NATIONAL FINANCE

BY SIR JOSIAH STAMP, K.B.E., D.SC.

Assistant Secretary Board of Inland Revenue, 1916-19. Member of Royal
Commission on Income Tax, 1919.


Sir Josiah Stamp said:--In discussing the problem of National Finance we
have to decide which problem we mean, viz., the "short period" or the
"long period," for there are distinctly two issues. I can, perhaps,
illustrate it best by the analogy of the household in which the chief
earner or the head of the family has been stricken down by illness. It
may be that a heavy doctor's bill or surgeon's fee has to be met, and
that this represents a serious burden and involves the strictest economy
for a year or two; that all members of the household forgo some
luxuries, and that there is a cessation of saving and perhaps a "cut"
into some past accumulations. But once these heroic measures have been
taken and the burden lifted, and the chief earner resumes his
occupation, things proceed on the same scale and plan as before. It may
be, however, that the illness or operation permanently impairs his
earning power, and that the changes which have to be made must be more
drastic and permanent. Then perhaps would come an alteration of the
whole ground plan of the life of that family, the removal to a smaller
house with lower standing charges and a changed standard of living. What
I call the "short period" problem involves a view only of the current
year and the immediate future for the purpose of ascertaining whether we
can make ends meet by temporary self-denial. What I term the "long
distance" problem involves an examination of the whole scale upon which
our future outlay is conditioned for us.

The limit of further economies on the lines of the "Geddes' cut" that
can become effective in 1923, would seem to be some 50 or 60 millions,
because every 10 per cent. in economy represents a much more drastic and
difficult task than the preceding, and it cuts more deeply into your
essential national services. On the other side of the account one sees
the probable revenue diminish to an almost similar extent, having regard
to the effect of reductions in the rate of tax and the depression in
trade, with a lower scale of profits, brought about by a lower price
level, entering into the income-tax average. It looks as though 1923 may
just pay its way, but if so, then, like the current year, it will make
no contribution towards the reduction of the debt. So much for the
"short period." Our worst difficulties are really going to be
deep-seated ones.


THE TWO PARTS OF A BUDGET

Now a national budget may consist of two parts, one of which I will call
the "responsive" and the other the "non-responsive" portion. The
responsive portion is the part that may be expected to answer sooner or
later--later perhaps rather than sooner--to alterations in general
conditions, and particularly to price alterations. If there is a very
marked difference in general price level, the salaries--both by the
addition or remission of bonuses and the general alteration in scales
for new entrants--may be expected to alter, at any rate, in the same
direction, and that part of the expense which consists of the purchase
of materials will also be responsive. The second, or non-responsive
part, is the part that has a fixed expression in currency, and does not
alter with changed conditions. This, for the most part, is the capital
and interest for the public debt.

Now the nature and gravity of the "long distance" problem is almost
entirely a question of the proportions which these two sections bear to
each other. If the non-responsive portion is a small percentage of the
total the problem will not be important, but if it is larger, then the
question must be faced seriously. Suppose, for example, that you have
now a total budget of 900 million pounds, and that, in the course of
time, all values are expressed at half the present currency figure.
Imagine that the national income in this instance is 3600 million
pounds. Then the burden, on a first approximation, is 25 per cent. Now,
if the whole budget is responsive, we may find it ultimately at 450
million pounds out of a national income of 1800 million pounds, _i.e._
still 25 per cent. But let the non-responsive portion be 400 million
pounds, then your total budget will be 650 million pounds out of a
national income of about 2000 million pounds, or 33-1/3 per cent., and
every alteration in prices--or what we call "improvement" in the cost of
living--becomes an extraordinarily serious matter as a burden upon new
enterprise in the future.

Let me give you a homely and familiar illustration. During the war the
nation has borrowed something that is equivalent to a pair of boots.
When the time comes for paying back the loan it repays something which
is equivalent to two pairs or, possibly, even to three pairs. If the
total number of boots produced has not altered, you will see what an
increasing "pull" this is upon production. There are, of course, two
ways in which this increasing pull--while a great boon to the person who
is being repaid--must be an increased burden to the individual. Firstly,
if the number of people making boots increases substantially, it may
still be only one pair of boots for the same volume of production, if
the burden is spread over that larger volume. Secondly, even supposing
that the number of individuals is not increased, if the arts of
production have so improved that two pairs can be produced with the same
effort as was formerly necessary for one, then the debt may be repaid by
them without the burden being actually heavier than before.

Now, coming back to the general problem. The two ways in which the
alteration in price level can be prevented from resulting in a heavier
individual burden than existed at the time when the transaction was
begun, are a large increase in the population with no lower average
wealth, or a large increase in wealth with the same population--which
involves a greatly increased dividend from our complex modern social
organism with all its mechanical, financial, and other differentiated
functions. Of course, some of the debt burden is responsive, so far as
the annual charge is concerned, on that part of the floating debt which
is reborrowed continually at rates of interest which follow current
money rates, but, even so, the burden of capital repayment remains. An
opportunity occurs for putting sections of the debt upon a lower annual
charge basis whenever particular loans come to maturity, and there may
be some considerable relief in the annual charge in the course of time
by this method.

What are the prospects of the two methods that I have mentioned coming
to our rescue in this "long distance" problem? It is a problem to which
our present "short distance" contribution is, you will admit, a very
poor one, for we have not so far really made any substantial
contribution from current revenue towards the repayment of the debt.


A CENTURY OF THE NATIONAL DEBT

Historical surveys and parallels are notoriously risky, particularly
where the conditions have no precedent. They ought, however, to be made,
provided that we keep our generalisations from them under careful
control. Now, after the Napoleonic wars we had a national debt somewhat
comparable in magnitude in its relation to the national wealth and
income with the present debt. What happened to that as a burden during
the 100 years just gone by? If it was alleviated, to what was the
alleviation due? I would not burden you with a mass of figures, but I
would just give you one or two selected periods. You can find more
details in my recent book on _Wealth and Taxable Capacity_. We had a
total debt of--

850 million pounds in 1817
841    "      "    "  1842
836    "      "    "  1857
659    "      "    "  1895
800    "      "    "  1903

and before this last war it had been reduced to 707 million pounds. In
1920, of course, it was over 8000 million pounds. Such incidents as the
Crimean and the Boer wars added materially to the debt, but apart
therefrom you will see that there is no tremendous relief by way of
capital repayment to the original debt. Similarly, in a hundred years,
even if we have no big wars, it is quite possible we may have additions
to the national debt from smaller causes. Yet the volume of the debt per
head fell from £50 to £15.7, so you will see that the increasing
population made an enormous difference. The real burden of the debt is
of course felt mainly in its annual charge. I will take this, therefore,
rather than the capital:--

In 1817 the charge was 32 million pounds
"  1842  "    "     "  28    "      "
"  1857  "    "     "  28.8  "      "
In 1895 the charge was 25 million pounds
"  1903  "    "     "  27    "      "
"  1914  "    "     "  24    "      "

Here you will see that the reduction from 32 to 24 was 25 per cent. or a
much greater reduction than the reduction of the _total_ capital debt,
and this, of course, was contributed to by the lower rates of interest
which had been brought about from time to time. When we take the annual
charge per head the fall is much more striking. In the hundred years it
decreased from 37s. to 10s. This, however, was a money reduction, and
the _real_ burden per head can only be judged after we have considered
what the purchasing power of that money was. Now, the charge per head,
reduced to a common basis of purchasing power, fell as follows:--

        Index figure
1817       260
1842       242
1857       191
1895       210
1914       118

In the year 1920 the charge per head was £7.16 and my purchasing power
index figure 629. You will see that the _real_ burden in commodities
moved down much less violently than the _money_ burden, and the relief
was not actually so great as it looks, because prices were far lower in
1914 than they were early in the nineteenth century.

In view of the fact that our debt is approximately ten times that of the
last century, let us ask ourselves the broad question: "Can we look
forward to nothing better than the reduction of our debt by 450
millions in thirty-seven years?"

The nineteenth century was one long contest between two opposing forces.
The increase in the population, together with the power to make wealth,
were together enormously effective in decreasing the burden. Against
them was the ultimate tendency to lower prices, and the former of these
two forces slowly won the day.

I hesitate to say that we can expect anything at all comparable with the
wonderful leap forward in productive power during the early Victorian
era. I hope that in this I may prove to be wrong. Anyway I do not think
that in our lifetime we can expect these islands to double their
population.


THE CAPITAL LEVY

If we cannot look forward to any great measure of relief through these
channels, to what then must we look? By far the most important
alternative remedy which has been put to us is that of a Capital Levy;
it has the enormous virtue that it would repay on one level of prices
the debts incurred at that level; in short, it would give back one pair
of boots at once for every pair it has borrowed, instead of waiting and
stretching out over future generations the burden of two pairs. It is so
attractive that one cannot wonder there is a tendency to slur over its
less obvious difficulties.

Advocates of this scheme fall into two camps, whom I would distinguish
broadly as the economist group and the Labour Party, and if you will
examine their advocacy carefully, you will see that they support it by
two different sets of contentions, which are not easily reconciled. The
economists lay stress upon the fact that you not only pay off at a less
onerous cost in real goods, but that it may, considered arithmetically
or actuarially, be "good business" for a payer of high income-tax to
make an outright payment now and have a lighter income-tax in future.
Very much of the economists' case rests indeed upon the argument drawn
from the outright cut and the arithmetical relief. It will be seen that
this case depends upon two assumptions. The first is that the levy in
practice as well as in theory is an outright cut, and the second, that
it is not repeated, or rather that the income-tax is really effectively
reduced. But if you look at the programme of the other supporters of the
Capital Levy you will not find any convincing guarantees of its
non-repetition. I have not seen anywhere any scheme by which we can feel
politically insured against its repetition. You will find plenty of
indication that some intend to have both the levy and a high tax as
well, the new money to be employed for other social purposes. The
arguments based upon arithmetical or actuarial superiority of the levy
for your pocket and for mine may therefore rather go by the board. But I
am not going to discuss either the question of political guarantees or
the possible future socio-financial policy of the Labour Party. I will
merely ask you to consider whether the levy is likely to be in practice
the outright cut that is the basis of the chief and most valid
contention for it. Please understand that I am not attempting to sum up
all the many reasons for and against this proposal, but only to deal
with the particular virtue claimed for it, bearing upon the increasing
burden of the debt as prices decline.

Any taxation scheme dependent upon general capital valuation, where the
amount to be paid is large--say larger than a year's revenue--falls, in
my judgment, into the second or third rate category of taxation
expedients. Whenever we are living in uncertain times, with no
steadiness of outlook, valuation of many classes of wealth is then a
tremendous lottery, and collection--which takes time--may be no less so.

The fair face of the outright and graduated levy would be marred in many
ways. First, there are cases affected by valuation. The valuation of a
fixed rate of interest on good security is easy enough. The valuation of
a field or a house in these days presents more difficulty, but is, of
course, practicable. In practice, however, people do not own these
things outright. They have only an interest in them. This is where the
rub comes. A very large part of the property in this country is held in
life interests, and on reversions or contingencies. It is not a question
of saying that a given property is worth £10,000 and that it forms part
of the fortune of Jones, who pays 40 per cent. duty. The point is that
the £10,000 is split between Jones and Robinson. Jones maybe has a life
interest in it, and Robinson a reversionary interest. You value Jones's
wealth by his prospect of life on a life table, and Robinson has the
balance. But the life table does not indicate the actual likelihood of
Jones's life being fifteen years. It only represents the actuarial
average expectation of all the lives. This may be useful enough for
insurance dependent on the total experience, but it may be a shocking
injustice to the individual in taxation. Only some 10 per cent. of the
Joneses will live for the allotted time, and for the rest your valuation
and your tax will be dead wrong, either too much or too little. Jones
will be coming to you two years after he has paid, or rather his
executors will come to you and say: "We paid a tax based on Jones living
15 years, and he has died; this ought, therefore, to be shifted to
Robinson."


DIFFICULTIES OF VALUATION

People often say that a Capital Levy merely imagines everybody dying at
the same time. This parallel is wrong in degree when you are considering
the ease of paying duty or of changing the market values by a glut of
shares, and it is still more wrong when you are thinking of ease of
valuation. When a man is dead, he is dead, and in estimating the death
duty you have not to bother about how long he is going to live! But
every time you value a life interest and take a big slice of it for tax
you are probably doing a double injustice. The charge is incorrect for
two taxpayers. On a flat rate of tax this difficulty might be made less,
but the essence of any effective levy is a progressive scale. Moreover,
whether you are right or wrong about Robinson's tax, he has nothing in
hand with which to pay it. He has either to raise a mortgage on his
expectation (on which he pays _annual_ interest) or pay you by
instalments. So far as his burden is concerned, therefore, there is no
outright cut. You will be getting an annual figure over nearly the whole
class of life interests and reversions. It is difficult to see how one
can escape making adjustments year after year for some time in the light
of the ascertained facts, until the expiry of, say, nine or ten years
has reduced the disparities between the estimated valuations and the
facts of life to smaller proportions.

Next come those valuations which depend for their accuracy upon being
the true mid-point of probabilities. A given mine may last for five
years in the view of some experts, or it may go on for fifteen in the
view of others, and you may take a mid-point, say ten, and collect your
tax, but, shortly after, this valuation turns out to be badly wrong,
_though all your valuations in the aggregate are correct_. While the
active procedure of collecting the levy is in progress for a number of
years these assessments will simply shout at you for adjustment. There
are other types of difficulty in assessment which involve annual
adjustment, but you will appreciate most the necessity for care in the
collection. Enthusiastic advocates for the levy meet every hard case put
forward where it is difficult to raise money, such as a private
ownership of an indivisible business, by saying: "But that will be made
in instalments, or the man can raise a mortgage." But the extent to
which this is done robs the levy of all the virtues attaching to
outrightness, for each instalment becomes, as the years roll on,
different in its real content upon a shifting price level, and every
payment of interest on the mortgage--to say nothing of the ultimate
repayment of that mortgage--falls to be met as if reckoned upon the
original currency level. Then those classes of wealth which are not
easily realisable without putting down the market price also require
treatment by instalments, and those who wish to put forward a logical
scheme also add a special charge upon salary-earners for some years--a
pseudo-capitalisation of their earning power.

A really fair and practicable levy would certainly be honeycombed with
annual adjustments and payments for some period of years, and one must
consider how far this would invalidate the economic case of the
"outright cut," and make it no better than a high income-tax; indeed far
worse, for the high income-tax does at least follow closely upon the
annual facts as they change, or is not stereotyped by a valuation made
in obsolete conditions. Imagine three shipowners each with vessels
valued at £200,000, and each called upon to pay 20 per cent., or
£40,000. One owning five small ships might have sold one of them, and
thus paid his bill; the second, with one large ship, might have agreed
to pay £8000 annually (plus interest) for five years; while the third
might have mortgaged his vessel for £40,000, having no other capital at
disposal. At to-day's values each might have been worth, say, £50,000,
but for the tax. The first would actually have ships worth £40,000, so
he would have borne the correct duty of 20 per cent. The second would
have £50,000, bringing in, say, £5000 annually, and would be attempting
to pay £8000 out of it, while the third would be paying £2000 a year out
of his income and still be faced with an 80 per cent. charge on his
fortune! His assessment is computed at one point of time, and liquidated
at another, when its incidence is totally different.

If one cannot have a levy complete at the time of imposition, it clearly
ought not to be launched at a time of rapidly changing prices. But that
is, perhaps, when the economic case for it is strongest.


A DESPERATE REMEDY

I do not rule the Capital Levy out as impracticable by any means, but as
a taxation expedient I cannot be enthusiastic about it. It is a
desperate remedy. But if our present temper for "annual" tax relief at
all costs continues, we may _need_ a desperate remedy. Without a levy
what kind of position can you look forward to? Make some assumptions,
not with any virtue in their details, but just in order to determine the
possible prospect. If in fifteen to twenty years reparation payments
have wiped out 1000 millions, debt repayments another 1000, and ordinary
reductions by sinking funds another 1000 millions, you will have the
debt down to 5000 millions, and possibly the lower interest then
effective may bring the annual charge down to some 200 or 225 million
pounds. If the population has reached sixty millions the nominal annual
charge will be reduced from £7 16s. by one-half, but if prices have
dropped further, say half-way, to the pre-war level, the comparable
burden will still be £4 10s. per head.

It is no good talking about "holidays from taxation" and imagining you
can get rid of this thing easily; you won't. We are still in the war
financially. There is the same need of the true national spirit and
heroism as there was then. Thus hard facts may ultimately force us to
some such expedient as the levy, but we should not accept it
light-heartedly, or regard it as an obvious panacea. Perhaps in two or
three years we may tell whether economic conditions are stable enough to
rob it of its worst evils. The question whether the burden of rapidly
relieving debt by this means in an instalment levy over a decade is
actually lighter than the sinking fund method, depends on the relation
of the drop in prices over the short period to the drop over the ensuing
period, with a proper allowance for discount--at the moment an insoluble
problem. I cannot yet with confidence join those who, on purely economic
and non-political grounds, commend the scheme and treat it as "good
business for the income-tax payer."




FREE TRADE

BY RT. HON. J.M. ROBERTSON

P.C.; President of National Liberal Federation since 1920; M.P. (L.),
Tyneside Division, Northumberland, 1906-18; Parliamentary Secretary to
Board of Trade, 1911-15.


Mr. Robertson said:--At an early stage of the war Mr. H.G. Wells
published a newspaper article to the effect that while we remained Free
Traders we were determined in future to accord free entry only to the
goods of those States which allowed it to us. The mere state of war, no
doubt, predisposed many to assent to such theses who a few years before
would have remembered that this was but the nominal position of the
average protectionist of the three preceding generations. War being in
itself the negation of Free Trade, the inevitable restrictions and the
war temper alike prepared many to find reasons for continuing a
restrictive policy when the war was over. When, therefore, the Committee
of Lord Balfour of Burleigh published its report, suggesting a variety
of reasons for setting up compromises in a tariffist direction, there
were not wanting professed Free Traders who agreed that the small
tariffs proposed would not do any harm, while others were even anxious
to think that they might do good.

Yet the policy proposed by Lord Balfour's Committee has not been
adopted by the Coalition Government in anything like its entirety. Apart
from the Dyestuffs Act, and such devices as the freeing of home-made
sugar from excise, we have only had the Safeguarding of Industries Bill,
a meticulously conditional measure, providing for the setting up of
particular tariffs in respect of particular industries which may at a
given moment be adjudged by special committees _ad hoc_ to need special
protection from what is loosely called "dumping." And even the findings
of these committees so far have testified above all things to the lack
of any accepted set of principles of a protectionist character. Six
thousand five hundred articles have been catalogued as theoretically
liable to protective treatment, and some dozen have been actually
protected. They have given protection to certain products and refused it
to others; according it to fabric gloves and glass and aluminium goods
and refusing it to dolls' eyes and gold leaf.

Finally, the decision in favour of a tariff on fabric gloves has evoked
such a storm of protest from the textile manufacturers who export the
yarns with which foreign fabric gloves are made, that even the
Coalitionist press has avowed its nervousness. When a professed
protectionist like Lord Derby, actually committed to this protectionist
Act, declares that it will never do to protect one industry at the cost
of injuring a much greater one, those of his party who have any
foresight must begin to be apprehensive even when a House of Commons
majority backs the Government, which, hard driven by its tariffists,
decided to back its Tariff Committee against Lancashire. Protectionists
are not much given to the searching study of statistics, but many of
them have mastered the comparatively simple statistical process of
counting votes.


THE "NEW CIRCUMSTANCES" CRY

In a sense, there are new fiscal "circumstances." But I can assure my
young friends that they are just the kind of circumstances which were
foreseen by their seniors in pre-war days as sure to arise when any
attempt was made to apply tariffist principles to British industry. As a
German professor of economics once remarked at a Free Trade Conference,
it is not industries that are protected by tariffs: it is firms. When a
multitude of firms in various industries subscribed to a large Tariff
Reform fund for election-campaign purposes, they commanded a large
Conservative vote; but when for platform tariff propaganda, dealing in
imaginative generalities and eclectic statistics, there are substituted
definite proposals to meddle with specified interests, the real troubles
of the tariffist begin. You might say that they began as soon as he met
the Free Trader in argument; but that difficulty did not arise with his
usual audiences. It is when he undertakes to protect hides and hits
leather, or to protect leather and hits boot-making, or to help shipping
and hits shipbuilding that he becomes acutely conscious of difficulties.
Now he is in the midst of them. The threat of setting up a general
tariff which will hit everybody alike seems so far to create no alarm,
because few traders now believe in it. Still, it would be very unwise to
infer that the project will not be proceeded with. It served as a party
war-cry in Opposition for ten years, and nearly every pre-war
Conservative statesman was committed to it--Earl Balfour and Lord
Lansdowne included. Even misgivings about Lancashire may fail to deter
the tariffist rump.

Some of the people who even yet understand nothing of Free Trade
economics are still found to argue that, if only the duty on imported
gloves is put high enough, sufficient gloves will be made at home to
absorb all the yarns now exported to German glove-makers. They are still
blind, that is to say, to the elementary fact that since Germany
manufactures for a much larger glove-market than the English, the
exclusion of the German gloves means the probable loss to the
yarn-makers of a much larger market than England can possibly offer,
even if we make all our own gloves. In a word, instead of having to
furnish new Free Trade arguments to meet a new situation, we find
ourselves called upon to propound once more the fundamental truths of
Free Trade, which are still so imperfectly assimilated by the nation.

So far as I can gather, the circumstances alleged to constitute a new
problem are these; the need to protect special industries for war
purposes; and the need to make temporary fiscal provision against
industrial fluctuation set up by variations in the international money
exchanges. Obviously, the first of these pleas has already gone by the
board, as regards any comprehensive fiscal action. One of the greatest
of all war industries is the production of food; and during the war some
supposed that after it was over, there could be secured a general
agreement to protect British agriculture to the point at which it could
be relied on to produce at least a war ration on which the nation could
subsist without imports. That dream has already been abandoned by
practical politicians, if any of them ever entertained it. The effective
protection of agriculture on that scale has been dismissed as
impossible; and we rely on foreign imports as before. Whatever may be
said as to the need of subsidising special industries for the production
of certain war material is nothing further to the fiscal purpose,
whether the alleged need be real or not. The production of war material
is a matter of military policy on all fours with the maintenance of
Government dockyards, and does not enter into the fiscal problem
properly so called. But to the special case of dyes, considered as a
"key" or "pivotal" industry, I will return later.

How then stands the argument from the fluctuations of the exchanges? If
that argument be valid further than to prove that _all_ monetary
fluctuations are apt to embarrass industry, why is it not founded on for
the protection of _all_ industries affected by German competition? The
Prime Minister in his highly characteristic speech to the Lancashire
deputation, admitted that the fall of the mark had not had "the effect
which we all anticipated"--that is, which he and his advisers
anticipated--and this in the very act of pretending that the _further_
fall of the mark is a reason for adhering to the course of taxing
fabric gloves. All this is the temporising of men who at last realise
that the case they have been putting forward will bear no further
scrutiny. The idea of systematically regulating an occasional tariff in
terms of the day-to-day fluctuations of the exchanges is wholly
chimerical. A tariff that is on even for one year and may be off the
next is itself as disturbing a factor in industry as any exchange
fluctuations can be.

Nor is there, in the nature of things, any possibility of continuous
advantage in trade to any country through the low valuation of its
currency. The Prime Minister confesses that Germany is _not_ obtaining
any export trade as the result of the fall. Then the whole argument has
been and is a false pretence. The plea that the German manufacturer is
advantaged because his wages bill does not rise as fast as the mark
falls in purchasing power is even in theory but a statement of one side
of a fluctuating case, seeing that when the mark rises in value his
wages bill will not fall as fast as the mark rises, and he is then, in
the terms of the case, at a competitive disadvantage.

But the worst absurdity of all in the tariffist reasoning on this topic
is the assumption that in no other respect than wage-rates is German
industry affected by the fall of the mark. The wiseacres who point
warningly to the exchanges as a reason for firm action on fabric gloves
never ask how a falling currency relates to the process of purchasing
raw materials from abroad. So plainly is the falling mark a bar to such
purchase that there is _prima facie_ no cause to doubt the German
official statement made in June, that foreign goods are actually
underbidding German goods in the German markets, and that the falling
exchange makes it harder and harder for Germany to compete abroad. We
are dealing with a four-square fallacy, the logical implication of which
is that a bankrupt country is the best advantaged for trade, that
Austria is even better placed for competition than Germany, and that
Russia is to-day the best placed of all.


TARIFFS AND WAGES

The argument from the exchanges, which is now admitted to be wholly
false in practice, really brings us back to the old tariffist argument
that tariffs are required to protect us against the imports of countries
whose general rate of wages is lower than ours. On the one hand, they
assured us that a tariff was the one means of securing good wages for
the workers in general. On the other, they declared that foreign goods
entered our country to the extent they did because foreign employers in
general sweated their employees. That is to say--seeing that nearly all
our competitors had tariffs--the tariffed countries pay the worst wages;
and we were to raise ours by having tariffs also. But even that pleasing
paralogism did not suffice for the appetite of tariffism in the way of
fallacy. The same propaganda which affirmed the lowness of the rate of
wages paid in tariffist countries affirmed also the _superiority_ of the
rate of wages paid in the United States, whence came much of our
imported goods which the tariffists wished to keep out. In this case,
the evidence for the statement lay in the high wage-rate figures for
three employments in particular--those of engine-drivers, compositors,
and builders' labourers: three industries incapable of protection by
tariffs.

Thus even the percentage of truth was turned to the account of delusion;
for the wages in the protected industries of the States were so far from
being on the scale of the others just mentioned, that they were reported
at times to be absolutely below those paid in the same industries in
Britain. For the rest, _costs of living_ were shown by all the official
statistics to be lower with us than in any of the competing tariffed
countries; and in particular much lower than in the United States. There
were thus established the three facts that wages were higher in the Free
Trade country than in the European tariffed countries; that real wages
here were higher than those of the protected industries in the United
States, and that Protection was thus so far from being a condition of
good wages as to be ostensibly a certain condition of bad. All the same,
high wages in America and low wages on the Continent were alike given as
reasons why we should have a protective tariff.

There stands out, then, the fact that the payment of lower wages by the
protected foreign manufacturer was one of the tariffist arguments of the
pre-war period, when there was no question of unequal currency
exchanges. To-day, the argument from unequal currency exchanges is that
in the country where the currency value is sinking in terms of other
currencies the manufacturer is getting his labour cheaper, seeing that
wages are slow to follow increase in cost of living. Both pleas alike
evade the primary truth that if country A trades with country B at all,
it must receive _some_ goods in payment for its exports, save in a case
in which, for a temporary purpose, it may elect to import gold. But that
fact is vital and must be faced if the issue is to be argued at all.
Unless, then, the defender of the occasional tariff system contends that
that system will rectify trade conditions by keeping out goods which are
made at an artificial advantage, amounting to what is called "unfair
competition," and letting in only the goods not so produced, he is not
facing the true fiscal problem at all. Either he admits that exports and
freight charges and other credit claims must be balanced by imports or
he denies it. If he denies it, the discussion ceases: there is no use in
arguing further. If he admits it, and argues that by his tariff he can
more or less determine _what_ shall be imported, the debate soon narrows
itself to one issue.

The pre-war tariffist argued, when he dealt with the problem, that
tariffs would suffice at will to keep out manufactured goods and let in
only raw material. To that the answer was simple. An unbroken conversion
of the whole yield of exports and freight returns and interest on
foreign investments into imported raw material to be wholly converted
into new products, mainly for export, was something utterly beyond the
possibilities. It would mean a rate of expansion of exports never
attained and not only not attainable but not desirable. On such a
footing, the producing and exporting country would never concretely
taste of its _profit_, which is to be realised, if at all, only in
consumption of imported goods and foods. It is no less plainly
impossible to discriminate by classes between kinds of manufactured
imports on the plea that inequality in the exchanges gives the foreign
competitor an advantage in terms of the relatively lower wage-rate paid
by him while his currency value is falling. Any such advantage, in the
terms of the case, must be held to accrue to all forms of production
alike, and cannot possibly be claimed to accrue in the manufacture of
one thing as compared with another, as fabric gloves in comparison with
gold leaf. In a word, the refusal of protection to gold leaf is an
admission that the argument from inequality of currency exchanges counts
for nothing in the operation of the Safeguarding of Industries Bill. In
the case of any other import, then, the argument falls.


MEMBERS ONE OF ANOTHER

But that is not all. The case of Russia alone has brought home to all
capable of realising an economic truth the fact that the economic
collapse of any large mass of population which had in the past entered
into the totality of international trade is a condition of proportional
impoverishment to all the others concerned. He who sees this as to
Russia cannot conceivably miss seeing it as to Germany; even tariffist
hallucinations about a "losing trade" under German tariffs cannot shut
out the fact that our trade with Russia and the United States was
carried on under still higher hostile tariffs. The unalterable fact
remains that industrial prosperity rises and falls in the measure of the
total mass of goods handled; and men who realise the responsibility of
all Governments for the material wellbeing of their populations can come
to only one conclusion. Trade must be facilitated all round for our own
sake.

Once more we come in sight of the truth that the industrial health of
every trading country depends on the industrial health of the rest--a
Free Trade truth that is perceptibly of more vital importance now than
ever before. It is in the exchange of commodities, and the extension of
consumption where that is required on a large scale, that the prosperity
of the industrial nations consists. And to say that, is to say that
until the trade exchanges of the world in general return to something
like the old footing, there cannot be a return of the old degree of
industrial wellbeing. Not that industrial wellbeing is to be secured by
the sole means of industrial re-expansion: the question of the need of
restriction of rate of increase of population is now being more and more
widely recognised as vital. But the present argument is limited to the
fiscal issue; and it must suffice merely to indicate the other as being
of the highest concurrent importance.

Adhering, then, to the fiscal issue, we reach the position that, just as
foreign trade has been a main source of British wealth in the past, and
particularly in the Free Trade era, the wealth consumed in the war is
recoverable only on the same lines. It is not merely that British
shipping--at present so lamentably paralysed and denuded of earning
power--cannot be restored to prosperity without a large resumption of
international exchanges: a large proportion of industrial employment
unalterably depends upon that resumption. And it is wholly impossible to
return to pre-war levels of employment by any plan of penalising
imports.


THE DYESTUFFS ACT

How then does the persistent Free Trader relate to the special case of
the "key industry," of which we heard so much during the war, and hear
so little to-day? I have said that the question of maintaining any given
industry on the score that it is essential for the production of war
material is a matter of military administration, and not properly a
matter of fiscal policy at all. But the plea, we know, has been made the
ground of a fiscal proceeding by the present Government, inasmuch as the
special measure known as the Dyestuffs (Import Regulation) Act of 1920
forbids for ten years the importation of dyestuffs into this country
except under licence of the Board of Trade. Dyestuffs include, by
definition, all the coal-tar dyes, colours, and colouring matter, and
all organic intermediate products used in the manufacture of these--the
last category including a large number of chemicals such as
formaldehyde, formic acid, acetic acid, and methyl alcohol. The
argument is, in sum, that all this protective control is necessary to
keep on foot, on a large scale, an industry which in time of war has
been proved essential for the production of highly important munitions.

What has actually happened under this Act I confess I am unable to tell.
Weeks ago I wrote to the President of the Board of Trade asking if,
without inconvenience, he could favour me with a general account of what
had been done in the matter of issuing licences, and my letter was
promised attention, but up to the moment of delivering this address I
have had no further reply. I can only, then, discuss the proposed policy
on its theoretic merits.[1] The theoretic issues are fairly clear.
Either the licensing power of the Board of Trade has been used to
exclude competitive imports or it has not. If it has been so used, it is
obvious that we have no security whatever for the maintenance of the
industry in question in a state of efficiency. In the terms of the case,
it is enabled to persist in the use of plant and of methods which may be
inferior to those used in the countries whose competition has been
excluded. Then the very object posited as the justification for the Act,
the securing of a thoroughly efficient key industry necessary to the
production of munitions, is not attained by the fiscal device under
notice. If, on the other hand, there has been no barring of imports
under the licence system, the abstention from use of it is an admission
that it was either unnecessary or injurious or was felt to be useless
for its purpose.

[Footnote 1: The promised statistics were soon afterwards sent to Mr.
Robertson by the Board of Trade. They will be found in the _Liberal
Magazine_ for September, 1922, p. 348.--ED.]

And the common-sense verdict on the whole matter is that if continuous
and vigilant research and experiment in the chemistry of dye-making is
held to be essential to the national safety, the proper course is for
the Government to establish and maintain a department or arsenal for
such research and experiment, unhampered by commercial exigencies. Such
an institution may or may not be well managed. But a dividend-earning
company, necessarily concerned first and last with dividend earning, and
at the same time protected against foreign competition in the sale of
its products, cannot be for the purpose in question well managed, being
expressly enabled and encouraged to persist in out-of-date practices.

This being so, the whole argument for protection of key industries goes
by the board. It has been abandoned as to agriculture, surely the most
typical key industry of all; and it has never even been put forward in
regard to shipbuilding, the next in order of importance. For the
building of ships of war the Government has its own dockyards: let it
have its own chemical works, if that be proved to be necessary.
Protection cannot avail. If the Dyestuffs Act is put in operation so as
to exclude the competition of foreign chemicals, it not only keeps our
chemists in ignorance of the developments of the industry abroad: it
raises the prices of dyestuffs against the dye-using industries at home,
and thereby handicaps them dangerously in their never-ending competition
with the foreign industries, German and other, which offer the same
goods in foreign markets.

The really fatal competition is never that of goods produced at low
wages-cost. It is that of superior goods; and if foreign textiles have
the aid of better dyes than are available to our manufacturers our
industry will be wounded incurably. It appears in fact to be the
superior quality of German fabric gloves, and not their cheapness, that
has hitherto defeated the competition of the native product. To protect
inferior production is simply the road to ruin for a British industry.
Delicacy in dyes, in the pre-war days, gave certain French woollen goods
an advantage over ours in our own markets; yet we maintained our vast
superiority in exports by the free use of all the dyes available. Let
protection operate all round, and our foreign markets will be closed to
us by our own political folly. Textiles which are neither well-dyed nor
cheap will be unsaleable against better goods.


THE PARIS RESOLUTIONS

It is of a piece with that prodigy of self-contradiction that, when the
Liberal leaders in the House of Commons expose the absurdity of
professing to rectify the German exchanges by keeping out German fabric
gloves, a tariffist leader replies by arguing that the Paris Resolutions
of the first Coalition Government, under Mr. Asquith, conceded the
necessity of protecting home industries against unfair competition. Men
who are normally good debaters seem, when they are fighting for a
tariff, to lose all sense of the nature of argument. As has been
repeatedly and unanswerably shown by my right hon. friend the Chairman,
the Paris Resolutions were expressly framed to guard against a state of
things which has never supervened--a state of things then conceived as
possible after a war without a victory, but wholly excluded by the
actual course of the war. And those Resolutions, all the same, expressly
provided that each consenting State should remain free to act on them
upon the lines of its established fiscal system, Britain being thus left
untrammelled as to its Free Trade policy.

Having regard to the whole history, Free Traders are entitled to say
that the attempt of tariffists to cite the Paris Resolutions in support
of the pitiful policy of taxing imports of German fabric gloves, or the
rest of the ridiculous "litter of mice" that has thus far been yielded
by the Safeguarding of Industries Act, is the crowning proof at once of
the insincerity and ineptitude of tariffism where it has a free hand,
and of the adamantine strength of the Free Trade case. If any further
illustration were needed, it is supplied by the other tariffist
procedure in regard to the promise made five years ago to Canada that
she, with the other Dominions, should have a relative preference in our
markets for her products. In so far as that plan involved an advantage
to our own Dominions over the Allies who, equally with them, bore with
us the heat and burden of the war, it was as impolitic as it was unjust,
and as unflattering as it was impolitic, inasmuch as it assumed that the
Dominions wanted a "tip" as a reward for their splendid comradeship.

As it turns out, the one concession that Canada really wanted was the
removal of the invidious embargo on Canadian store cattle in our ports.
And whereas a promise to that effect was actually given by the tariffist
Coalition during the war, it is only after five years that the promise
is about to be reluctantly fulfilled. It was a promise, be it observed,
of _free importation_, and it is fulfilled only out of very shame. It
may be surmised, indeed, that the point of the possible lifting of the
Canadian embargo was used during the negotiations with Ireland to bring
the Sister State to terms; and that its removal may lead to new trouble
in that direction. But that is another story, with which Free Traders
are not concerned. Their withers are unwrung.


SCIENCE AND EXPERIENCE

On the total survey, then, the case for Free Trade is not only unshaken,
it is stronger than ever before, were it only because many of the enemy
have visibly lost faith in their own cause. The Coalition, in which
professed Liberals were prepared to sacrifice something of Free Trade to
colleagues who were pledged in the past to destroy it, has quailed
before the insuperable practical difficulties which arise the moment the
scheme of destruction is sought to be framed.

All that has resulted, after four and a half years, is a puerile
tinkering with three or four small industries--a tinkering that is on
the face of it open to suspicion of political corruption. To intelligent
Free Traders there is nothing in it all that can give the faintest
surprise. They knew their ground. The doctrine of Free Trade is
_science_, or it is nothing. It is not a passing cry of faction, or a
survival of prejudice, but the unshakable inference of a hundred years
of economic experience verifying the economic science on which the great
experiment was founded.

On the other hand, let me say, the tactic of tinkering with Free Trade
under a system of special committees who make decisions that only the
House of Commons should ever be able to make, is a "felon blow" at
self-government. It puts national affairs under the control of cliques,
amenable to the pressures of private interests. Millions of men and
women are thus taxable in respect of their living-costs at the caprice
of handfuls of men appointed to do for a shifty Government what it is
afraid to do for itself. It is a vain thing to have secured by statute
that the House of Commons shall be the sole authority in matters of
taxation, if the House of Commons basely delegates its powers to
unrepresentative men. Here, as so often in the past, the Free Trade
issue lies at the heart of sound democratic politics; and if the nation
does not save its liberties in the next election it will pay the price
in corrupted politics no less than in ruined trade.




INDIA

BY SIR HAMILTON GRANT

K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.; Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province,
India; Deputy Commissioner of various Frontier districts; Secretary to
Frontier Administration; Foreign Secretary, 1914-19; negotiated Peace
Treaty with Afghanistan, 1919.


Sir Hamilton Grant said:--I have been asked to address you on the
subject of India, that vast, heterogeneous continent, with its varied
races, its Babel of languages, its contending creeds. There are many
directions in which one might approach so immense a topic, presenting,
as it does, all manner of problems, historical, ethnological,
linguistic, scientific, political, economic, and strategic. I do not
propose, however, to attempt to give you any general survey of those
questions, or to offer you in tabloid form a resumé of the matters that
concern the government of India. I propose to confine my remarks to two
main questions which appear to be of paramount importance at the present
time, and which, I believe, will be of interest to those here present
to-day, namely, the problems of the North-West Frontier, and the
question of internal political unrest.

Let me deal first with the North-West Frontier. As very few schoolboys
know, we have here a dual boundary--an inner and an outer line. The
inner line is the boundary of the settled districts of the North-West
Frontier Province, the boundary, in fact, of British India proper, and
is known as the Administrative border. The outer line is the boundary
between the Indian Empire and Afghanistan, and is commonly known as the
Durand line, because it was settled by Sir Mortimer Durand and his
mission in 1895 with the old Amir Abdur Rahman. These two lines give us
three tracts to be dealt with--first, the tract inside the inner line,
the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province, inhabited for
the most part by sturdy and somewhat turbulent Pathans; second, the
tract between the two lines, that welter of mountains where dwell the
hardy brigand hillmen: the tribes of the Black Mountain, of Swat and
Bajur, the Mohmands, the Afridis, the Orakzais, the Wazirs, the Mahsuds,
and a host of others, whose names from time to time become familiar
according as the outrageousness of their misconduct necessitates
military operations; third, the country beyond the outer line, "the
God-granted kingdom of Afghanistan and its dependencies."

Now each of these tracts presents its own peculiar problems, though all
are intimately inter-connected and react one on the other. In the
settled districts we are confronted with the task of maintaining law and
order among a backward but very virile people, prone to violence and
impregnated with strange but binding ideas of honour, for the most part
at variance with the dictates of the Indian Penal Code. For this reason
there exists a special law called the Frontier Crimes Regulation, a most
valuable enactment enabling us to deal with cases through local
Councils of Elders, with the task of providing them with education,
medical relief etc., in accordance with their peculiar needs, and above
all with the task of affording them protection from the raids and forays
of their neighbours from the tribal hills. In the tribal area we are
faced with the task of controlling the wild tribesmen. This control
varies from practically direct administration as in the Lower Swat and
Kurram valleys to the most shadowy political influence, as in the remote
highlands of Upper Swat and the Dir Kohistan, where the foot of white
man has seldom trod. Our general policy, however, with the tribes is to
leave them independent in their internal affairs, so long as they
respect British territory and certain sacrosanct tracts beyond the
border, such as the Khyber road, the Kurram, and the Tochi. The problem
is difficult, because when hardy and well-armed hereditary robbers live
in inaccessible mountains which cannot support the inhabitants,
overlooking fat plains, the temptation to raid is obviously
considerable: and when this inclination to raid is reinforced by
fanatical religion, there must be an ever-present likelihood of trouble.


FRONTIER RAIDS

Few people here in England reading of raids on the North-West Frontier
in India realise the full horror of these outrages. What generally
happens is that in the small hours of the morning, a wretched village is
suddenly assailed by a gang of perhaps 50, perhaps 200, well-armed
raiders, who put out sentries, picket the approaches, and conduct the
operation on the most skilful lines. The houses of the wealthiest men
are attacked and looted; probably several villagers are brutally
murdered--and probably one or two unhappy youths or women are carried
off to be held up to ransom. Sometimes the raid is on a larger scale,
sometimes it is little more than an armed dacoity. But there is nearly
always a tale of death and damage. Not infrequently, however, our
troops, our militia, our frontier constabulary, our armed police, or the
village _chigha_ or hue-and-cry party are successful in repelling and
destroying the raiders. Our officers are untiring in their vigilance,
and not infrequently the district officers and the officers of their
civil forces are out three or four nights a week after raiding gangs.
Statistics in such matters are often misleading and generally dull, but
it may be of interest to state that from the 1st April, 1920, to the
31st March, 1921, when the tribal ebullition consequent on the third
Afghan war had begun to die down, there were in the settled districts of
the North-West Frontier Province 391 raids in which 153 British subjects
were killed and 157 wounded, in which 310 British subjects were
kidnapped and some £20,000 of property looted. These raids are often led
by outlaws from British territory; but each tribe is responsible for
what emanates from or passes through its limits--and when the bill
against a tribe has mounted up beyond the possibility of settlement,
there is nothing for it but punitive military operations. Hence the
large number of military expeditions that have taken place on this
border within the last half century.

Now this brings us to the question so often asked by the advocates of
what is called the Forward policy: "If the tribes give so much trouble,
why not go in and conquer them once and for all and occupy the country
up to the Durand line?" It sounds an attractive solution, and it has
frequently been urged on paper by expert soldiers. But the truth is that
to advance our frontier only means advancing the seat of trouble, and
that the occupation of tribal territory by force is a much more
formidable undertaking than it sounds. We have at this moment before us
a striking proof of the immense difficulty and expense of attempting to
tame and occupy even a comparatively small tract of tribal territory in
the Waziristan operations. Those operations have been going on for two
and a half years. At the start there were ample troops, ample equipment,
and no financial stringency. The operations were conducted, if a layman
may say so, with skill and determination, and our troops fought
gallantly. But what is the upshot? We managed to advance into the heart
of the Mahsud country on a single line, subjected and still subject to
incessant attacks by the enemy; but we are very little nearer effective
occupation than when we started; and now financial stringency has
necessitated a material alteration in the whole programme, and we are
reverting more or less to the methods whereby we have always controlled
the tribes, namely, tribal levies or _khassadars_ belonging to the
tribe itself, frontier militia or other armed civil force, backed by
troops behind.


FRONTIER POLICY

And for my own part I believe this is the best solution. We must not
expect a millennium on the North-West Frontier. The tribal lion will not
lie down beside the district lamb in our time, and we must deal with the
problem as best we can in accordance with our means, and to this end my
views are briefly as follows:--

(1) We should do everything possible to provide the younger trans-border
tribesmen with all honourable employment for which they are suited:
service in the army, in the frontier civil forces, and in the Indian
police or similar forces overseas, and we should give labour and
contracts as far as possible to tribesmen for public works in their
vicinity. For the problem is largely economic. Unless the lion gets
other food he is bound to cast hungry eyes on the lamb.

(2) We should do all that is possible to establish friendly relations
with the tribal elders through selected and sympathetic political
officers, to give them, by means of subsidies for service, an interest
in controlling the hot-bloods of their tribe, and, where possible, to
give them assistance in education and enlightenment. We must remember
that we have duties to the tribes as well as rights against them.

(3) We should extend the _khassadar_ or levy system; that is, we should
pay for tribal corps to police their own borders, arming themselves and
providing their own ammunition and equipment. In this way we give
honourable employment and secure an effective safeguard against raiders
without pouring more arms into tribal territory.

(4) We must have efficient irregular civil forces, militia, frontier
constabulary, and police, well paid and contented.

(5) We should revert to the old system of a separate frontier force in
the army, specially trained in the work of guarding the marches. Those
who remember the magnificent old Punjab frontier force will agree with
me in deploring its abolition in pursuance of a scheme of army
reorganisation.

(6) We should improve communications, telephones, telegraphs, and
lateral M.T. roads.

(7) We should give liberal rewards for the interception and destruction
of raiding gangs, and the rounding up of villages from which raids
emanate.

(8) We should admit that the Amir of Afghanistani for religious reasons
exercises a paramount influence over our tribes, and we should get him
to use that influence for the maintenance of peace on our common border.
It has been the practise of our statesmen to adopt the attitude that
because the Amir was by treaty precluded from interfering with our
tribes, therefore he must have nothing to do with them. This is a
short-sighted view. We found during the Great War the late Amir's
influence, particularly over the Mahsuds, of the greatest value, when he
agreed to use it on our behalf.

(9) Finally, there is a suggestion afoot that the settled districts of
the North-West Frontier Province should be re-amalgamated with the
Punjab. I have shown, I think, clearly, how inseparable are the problems
of the districts, the tribal area, and of Afghanistan; and any attempt
to place the districts under a separate control could only mean
friction, inefficiency, and disaster. The proposal is, indeed, little
short of administrative lunacy. There is, however, an underlying method
in the madness that has formulated it, namely, the self-interest of a
clever minority, which I need not now dissect. I trust that if this
proposal should go further it will be stoutly resisted.


AFGHANISTAN

Let me now turn to Afghanistan. Generally speaking, the story of our
dealings with that country has been a record of stupid, arrogant muddle.
From the days of the first Afghan war, when an ill-fated army was
despatched on its crazy mission to place a puppet king, Shah Shuja, on
the throne of Afghanistan, our statesmen have, with some notable
exceptions, mishandled the Afghan problem. And yet it is simple enough
in itself. For we want very little of Afghanistan, and she does
not really want much of us. All we want from the Amir is
good-neighbourliness; that he should not allow his country to become the
focus of intrigue or aggression against us by Powers hostile to us, and
that he should co-operate with us for the maintenance of peace on our
common border. All he wants of us is some assistance in money and
munitions for the internal and external safeguarding of his realm,
commercial and other facilities, and honourable recognition, for the
Afghan, like the Indian, has a craving for self-respect and the respect
of others.

Now, where our statesmen have failed is in regarding Afghanistan as a
petty little State to be browbeaten and ordered about at our pleasure,
without recognising the very valuable cards that the Amir holds against
us. He sees his hand and appraises it at its value. He knows, in the
first place, that nothing can be more embarrassing to us than the
necessity for another Afghan war, and the despatch of a large force to
the highlands of Kabul, to sit there possibly for years as an army of
occupation, in a desolate country, incapable of affording supplies for
the troops, at enormous cost which could never be recovered, and at the
expense of much health and life, with no clear-cut policy beyond. He
knows, in the second place, that such a war would be the signal for the
rising of practically every tribe along our frontier. The cry of _Jehad_
would go forth, as in the third Afghan war, and we should be confronted
sooner or later with an outburst from the Black Mountain to
Baluchistan--a formidable proposition in these days. He knows, in the
third place, that with Moslem feeling strained as it is to-day on the
subject of Turkey, there would be sympathy for him in India, and among
the Moslem troops of the Indian army. Now these are serious
considerations, but I do not suggest that they are so serious as to make
us tolerate for a moment an offensive or unreasonable attitude on the
part of the Amir. If the necessity should be forced on us, which God
forbid, we should face the position with promptitude and firmness and
hit at once; and apart from an advance into Afghanistan we have a
valuable card in the closing of the passes and the blockade of that
country.

All I suggest is that in negotiating with Afghanistan, we should
remember these things and should not attempt to browbeat a proud and
sensitive ruler, who, however inferior in the ordinary equipment for
regular war, holds such valuable assets on his side. And my own
experience is that the Afghans are not unreasonable. Like every one
else, they will "try it on," but if handled courteously, kindly, with
geniality, and, above all, with complete candour, they will generally
see reason. And remember one thing. In spite of all that has happened,
our mistakes, our bluster, our occasional lapses from complete
disingenuousness, the Afghans still like us. Moreover, their hereditary
mistrust of Russia still inclines them to lean on us. We have lately
concluded a treaty with Afghanistan--not by any means a perfect treaty,
but the best certainly that could be secured in the circumstances, and
we have sent a Minister to Kabul, Lt.-Colonel Humphrys, who was one of
my officers on the frontier. A better man for the post could not, I
believe, be found in the Empire. Unless unduly hampered by a hectoring
diplomacy from Whitehall, he will succeed in establishing that goodwill
and mutual confidence which between Governments is of more value than
all the paper engagements ever signed. One word more of the Afghans.
There is an idea that they are a treacherous and perfidious people.
This, I believe, is wicked slander, so far as the rulers are concerned.
In 1857, during the Indian Mutiny, the Amir Dost Muhammed was true to
his bond, when he might have been a thorn in our side; and during the
Great War the late Amir Halilullah, in the face of appalling
difficulties, maintained the neutrality of his country, as he promised,
and was eventually murdered, a martyr to his own good faith to us.


INTERNAL UNREST

Let me now turn to our second question: internal political unrest. In
clubs and other places where wise men in arm-chairs lay down the law
about affairs of state, one constantly hears expressions of surprise and
indignation that there should be any unrest in India at all. "We have,"
say the die-hard wiseacres, "governed India jolly well and jolly
honestly, and the Indians ought to be jolly grateful instead of kicking
up all this fuss. If that meddlesome Montagu had not put these wicked
democratic ideas into their heads, and stirred up all this mud, we
should have gone on quite comfortable as before." But if we face the
facts squarely, we shall see that the wonder is not that there has been
so much, but that there has been so comparatively little unrest, and
that India should, on the whole, have waited so patiently for a definite
advance towards self-government.

What are the facts? They are these. Partly by commercial enterprise,
partly by adroit diplomacy, partly by accident, largely by the valour of
our arms, we have obtained dominion over the great continent of India.
We have ruled it for more than a century through the agency of a handful
of Englishmen, alien in creed, colour, and custom from the people whom
they rule--men who do not even make their permanent homes in the land
they administer. Now, however efficient, however honest, however
impartial, however disinterested such a rule may be, it cannot obviously
be really agreeable to the peoples ruled. This is the fundamental
weakness of our position. That our rule on these lines has lasted so
long and has been so successful is due not to the fact alone that it has
been backed by British bayonets, but rather to the fact that it has been
remarkably efficient, honest, just, and disinterested--and, above all,
that we have in the past given and secured goodwill.

Superimposed on this underlying irritant, there have been of late years
a number of other more direct causes of unrest. Education, which we gave
to India and were bound to give, had inevitably bred political
aspiration, and an _intelligensia_ had grown up hungry for political
rights and powers. Simultaneously the voracious demands of a centralised
bureaucracy for reports and returns had left the district officer little
leisure for that close touch with the people which in the past meant
confidence and goodwill. Political restlessness had already for some
years begun to manifest itself in anarchical conspiracies and crimes of
violence, when the Great War began. In India, as elsewhere, the reflex
action of the war was a disturbing element. High prices, stifled trade,
high taxation, nationalist longings and ideas of self-determination and
self-government served to reinforce subterranean agitation.

But throughout the war India not only remained calm and restrained, but
her actual contribution to the war, in men and material, was colossal
and was ungrudgingly given. She had a right to expect in return generous
treatment; but what did she get? She got the Rowlatt Bill. Now, of
course, there was a great deal of wicked, lying nonsense talked by
agitators about the provisions of the Rowlatt Bill, and the people were
grossly misled. But the plain fact remains that when India had emerged
from the trying ordeal of the war, not only with honour untarnished, but
having placed us under a great obligation, our first practical return
was to pass a repressive measure, for fear, forsooth, that if it was not
passed then it might be pigeon-holed and forgotten. India asked for
bread and we gave her a stone--a stupid, blundering act, openly
deprecated at the time by all moderate unofficial opinion in India. What
was the result? The Punjab disturbances and the preventive massacre of
the Jallianwala Bagh. I do not propose to dwell on this deplorable and
sadly mishandled matter, save to say that so far from cowing agitation,
it has left a legacy of hate that it will take years to wipe out; and
that the subsequent action of a number of ill-informed persons in
raising a very large sum of money for the officer responsible for that
massacre has further estranged Indians and emphasised in their eyes the
brand of their subjection.


THE RISE OF GHANDI

To India, thus seething with bitterness over the Punjab disturbances,
there was added the Moslem resentment over the fate of Turkey. I was
myself in London and Paris in a humble capacity at the Peace Conference,
and I know that our leading statesmen were fully informed of the Moslem
attitude and the dangers of unsympathetic and dilatory action in this
matter. But an arrogant diplomacy swept all warnings aside and scorned
the Moslem menace as a bogey. What was the result? Troubles in Egypt, in
Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, Afghanistan, and the Khilifat movement in India.
Hindu agitators were not slow to exploit Moslem bitterness, and for the
first time there was a genuine, if very ephemeral, _entente_ between the
two great rival creeds.

It was in this electric atmosphere that Ghandi, emerging from his
ascetic retirement, found himself an unchallenged leader. Short of
stature, frail, with large ears, and a gap in his front teeth, he had
none of the outward appearance of dominance. His appeal lay in the
simplicity of his life and character, for asceticism is still revered in
the East. But his intellectual equipment was mediocre, his political
ideas nebulous and impracticable to a degree, his programme archaic and
visionary; and from the start he was doomed to fail. The _Hijrat_
movement which he advocated brought ruin to thousands of Moslem homes;
his attack on Government educational establishments brought disaster to
many youthful careers; non-co-operation fizzled out. Government servants
would not resign their appointments, lawyers would not cease to
practise, and title-holders, with a few insignificant exceptions, would
not surrender their titles; the "back to the spinning-wheel" call did
not attract, and the continual failure of Ghandi's predictions of the
immediate attainment of complete _Swaraj_ or self-government, which he
was careful never to define, like hope deferred turned the heart sick.

From being a demi-god Ghandi gradually became a bore, and when he was at
last arrested, tragic to relate, there was hardly a tremor of resentment
through the tired political nerves of India. The arrest was indeed a
triumph of wise timing that does credit to the sagacity of the
Government of India. Had the arrest been effected when the name of
Ghandi was at its zenith, there would have been widespread trouble and
bloodshed. As it was, people were only too glad to be rid of a gadfly
that merely goaded them into infructuous bogs.

I apologise for this long excursus on the somewhat threadbare subject of
the causes of unrest in India. But I want those here present to realise
what potent forces have been at work and to believe that the Indian
generally is not the ungrateful, black-hearted seditionist he is painted
by the reactionary press. India is going through an inevitable stage of
political transition, and we must not hastily judge her peoples--for the
most part so gallant, so kindly, so law-abiding, so lovable--by the
passing tantrums of political puberty.


THE PRESENT SITUATION

As things stand at present, there is a remarkable lull. It would be
futile to predict whether it will last. It is due in part, as I have
suggested, to general political weariness, in part to the drastic action
taken against the smaller agitating fry, in part to the depletion of the
coffers of the extremists, in part to the fact that the extremists are
quarrelling amongst themselves as to their future programme. Some are
for continuing a boycott of the Councils; others are for capturing all
the seats and dominating the legislature; others are for re-beating the
dead horse of non-co-operation. Meanwhile, with disunion in the
extremist camp, the Councils conduct their business on moderate lines,
and, so far as one can judge, with marked temperance and sanity.

The work of the first Councils has indeed been surprisingly good, and
augurs well for the future. India has not yet, of course, by any means
grasped the full significance of representative government. The party
system is still in embryo, although two somewhat vague and nebulous
parties calling themselves the "Nationalists" and the "Democrats" do
exist. But these parties have no clear-cut programme, and they do not
follow the lead of the Ministers, who are regarded, not as representing
the elected members of the Council, but as newly-appointed additional
members of the official bureaucracy. There will doubtless in time be
gradual sorting of politicians into definite groups, but there are two
unbridgeable gulfs in the Indian social system which must always
militate against the building up of a solid political party system:
first, the gulf between Hindu and Moslem, which still yawns as wide as
ever, and second, the gulf between the Brahman and the "untouchables"
who, by the way, have found their fears that they would be downtrodden
under the new Councils completely baseless.

There are and must be breakers ahead. Some we can see, and there are
doubtless others still bigger which we cannot yet glimpse over the
welter of troubled waters. What we can see is this: first, there is a
danger that unless Government and the Councils together can before the
next elections in 1923-24 take definite steps towards the industrial
development and the self-defence of India, the extremist party are
likely to come in in full force and to create a deadlock in the
administration; second, unless the Councils continue to accept a fiscal
policy in accordance with the general interests of Great Britain and the
Empire, there will be trouble. The fiscal position is obscure, but it is
the crux, for the Councils can indirectly stultify any policy
distasteful to them, and this too may mean a deadlock; third, there is a
danger that the Indianisation of the Services will advance much more
rapidly than was ever contemplated, or than is desirable in the
interests of India for many years to come, for the simple reason that
capable young Englishmen of the right stamp will not, without adequate
guarantees for their future, accept employment in India. Those
guarantees can be given satisfactorily by one authority alone, and that
is by the Indian Legislatures voicing popular opinion. For a complex
administration bristling with technical questions, administrative,
political, and economic, it is essential that India should have for many
years to come the assistance of highly-educated Britons with the
tradition of administration in their blood. The Councils will be wise to
recognise this and make conditions which will secure for them in the
future as in the past the best stamp of adventurous Briton.

Finally, the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme, though a capable and
conscientious endeavour to give gradual effect to a wise and generous
policy, has of necessity its weak points. The system of diarchy--of
allotting certain matters to the bureaucratic authority of the Viceroy
and of the Provincial Governors and other matters to the representatives
of the people--is obviously a stop-gap, which is already moribund. The
attempt to fix definite periods at which further advances towards
self-government can be considered is bound to fail: you cannot give
political concessions by a stop-watch; the advance will either be much
more rapid or much slower than the scheme anticipates. Again, the
present basis of election is absurdly small, but any attempt to broaden
it must tend towards adult suffrage, which in itself would appear
impracticable with a population of over 200 millions.


OUR DUTY TO INDIA

It is a mistake, however, in politics to look too far ahead. Sufficient
unto the day. For the time being we may be certain of one thing, and
that is that we cannot break the Indian connection and leave India. Both
our interests and our obligations demand that we should remain at the
helm of Indian affairs for many years to come. That being so, let us
accept our part cheerfully and with goodwill as in the past. Let us try
to give India of our best, as we have done heretofore. Let us regive and
regain, above all things, goodwill. Let us not resent the loss of past
privilege, the changes in our individual status, and let us face the
position in a practical and good-humoured spirit. Let us abandon all
talk of holding India by the sword, as we won it by the sword--because
both propositions are fundamentally false. Let us realise that we have
held India by integrity, justice, disinterested efficiency--and, above
all, by goodwill--and let us continue to co-operate with India in India
for India on these same lines.




EGYPT

BY J.A. SPENDER

Editor of the _Westminster Gazette_, 1896 to 1922; Member of the Special
Mission to Egypt, 1919-1920.


Mr. Spender said:--The Egyptian problem resembles the Indian and all
other Eastern problems in that there is no simple explanation or
solution of it. Among the many disagreeable surprises which awaited us
after the war, none was more disagreeable than the discovery in March,
1919, that Egypt was in a state of rebellion. For years previously we
had considered Egypt a model of imperial administration. We had pulled
her out of bankruptcy and given her prosperity. We had provided her with
great public works which had enriched both pasha and fellah. We had
scrupulously refrained from exploiting her in our own interests. No man
ever worked so disinterestedly for a country not his own as Lord Cromer
for Egypt, and if ever a Nationalist movement could have been killed by
kindness, it should have been the Egyptian. Nor were the Egyptian people
ungrateful. I have talked to Egyptian Nationalists of all shades, and
seldom found any who did not handsomely acknowledge what Great Britain
had done for Egypt, but they asked for one thing more, which was that
she should restore them their independence. "We won it from the Turks,"
they said, "and we cannot allow you to take it from us."

This demand was no new thing, but it was brought to a climax by events
during and after the war. When the war broke out, our representative in
Egypt was still only "Agent and Consul-General," and was theoretically
and legally on the same footing with the representative of all other
Powers; when it ended, he was "High Commissioner," governing by martial
law under a system which we called a "protectorate." This to the
Egyptians seemed a definite and disastrous change for the worse.
Throughout the forty years of our occupation we have most carefully
preserved the theory of Egyptian independence. We have occupied and
administered the country, but we have never annexed it or claimed it to
be part of the British Empire. We intervened in 1882 for the purpose of
restoring order, and five years later we offered to withdraw, and were
only prevented from carrying out our intention because the Sultan of
Turkey declined, at the instigation of another Power, to sign the Firman
which gave us the right of re-occupying the country if order should
again be disturbed. In the subsequent years we gave repeated assurances
to Egyptians and to foreign Powers that we had no intention of altering
the status of the country as defined in its theoretical government by
Khedive, Egyptian Ministers, and Egyptian Council or Assembly. And
though it was true that in virtue of the army of occupation we were in
fact supreme, by leaving the forms of their government untouched and
refraining from all steps to legalise our position we reassured the
Egyptians as to our ultimate objects.

In the eyes of the Egyptians the proclamation of the Protectorate and
the conversion of the "Agent and Consul-General" into a "High
Commissioner" armed with the weapons of martial law seriously prejudiced
this situation, and though they acquiesced for the period of the war,
they were determined to have a settlement with us immediately it was
over, and took us very seriously at our word when we promised to review
the whole situation when that time came. The truth about the
"Protectorate" was that we adopted it as a way out of the legal
entanglement which would otherwise have converted the Egyptians into
enemy aliens when their suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey, entered the war
against us, and we did it deliberately as the preferable alternative to
annexing the country. But we have neither explained to the Egyptians nor
made clear to ourselves what exactly we meant by it, and in the absence
of explanations it was interpreted in Egypt as a first step to the
extinction of Egyptian nationality.


AFTER-WAR MISTAKES

Had we acted wisely and expeditiously at the end of the war we might
even then have avoided the trouble that followed. But when Egyptian
ministers asked leave to come to London in December, 1918, we answered
that the time was not opportune for these discussions, and when the
Nationalist leaders proposed to send a delegation, we said that no good
purpose could be served by their coming to Europe. This heightened the
alarm, and the Nationalists retorted by raising their claims from
"complete autonomy" to "complete independence," and started a violent
agitation. The Government retaliated by deporting Zaghlul to Malta,
whereupon the country broke into rebellion. Lord Allenby now came upon
the scene, and, while suppressing the rebellion, released Zaghlul and
gave him and his delegation the permission to go to Europe which had
been refused in January. It was now decided to send out the Milner
Mission, but there was a further delay of seven months before it
started, and during all that time agitation continued.

When the Mission arrived it quickly discovered that there was no
possible "Constitution under the Protectorate" which would satisfy the
Egyptians, and that the sole alternatives were further suppression or
the discovery of some means of settlement which dispensed with the
Protectorate. The Mission unanimously came to the conclusion that though
the first was mechanically possible if the cost and discredit were
faced, the second was not only feasible but far preferable, and that the
right method was a treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Egypt,
recognising Egypt as a sovereign State, but affording all necessary
guarantees for imperial interests. Working on those lines the Mission
gradually broke down the boycott proclaimed against them, convinced the
Egyptians of their goodwill, induced all parties of Egyptian
Nationalists to come to London, and there negotiated the basis of the
Treaty which was described in the Report. The main points were that
there must be a British force in the country--not an army of occupation,
but a force to guard Imperial communications--that there must be British
liaison officers for law and order and finance, that the control of
foreign policy must remain in the hands of Great Britain, and that the
Soudan settlement of 1898 must remain untouched, but that with these
exceptions the Government of Egypt should be in fact what it had always
been in theory: a Government of Egyptians by Egyptians.

Had the Government accepted this in December, 1920 (instead of in March,
1922), and instructed Lord Milner to go forward and draft a treaty on
this basis, it is extremely probable that a settlement would have been
reached in a few weeks; but Ministers, unhappily, were unable to make up
their minds, and there was a further delay of three months before the
Egyptian Prime Minister, Adli Pasha, was invited to negotiate with the
Foreign Office. By this time the Nationalist parties which the Mission
had succeeded in uniting on a common platform had fallen apart, and the
extremists once more started a violent agitation and upbraided the
moderates for tamely waiting on the British Government, which had
evidently meant to deceive them. The situation had, therefore, changed
again for the worse when Adli came to London in April, 1921, and it was
made worse still by what followed. The negotiations dragged over six
months, and finally broke down for reasons that have never been
explained, but the probability is that Egypt had now got entangled in
Coalition domestic politics, and that the "Die-Hards" claimed to have
their way in Egypt in return for their consent to the Irish settlement.
The door was now banged in the face of all schools of Egyptian
Nationalists, and Lord Allenby was instructed to send to the Sultan the
unhappy letter in which Egypt was peremptorily reminded that she was a
"part of the communications of the British Empire," and many other
things said which were specially calculated to wound Egyptian
susceptibilities.

The Egyptian Prime Minister resigned, and for the next five months Lord
Allenby endeavoured to govern the country by martial law without an
Egyptian Ministry. Then he came to London with the unanimous support of
British officials in Egypt to tell the Government that the situation was
impossible and a settlement imperative. The Government gave way and
British policy was again reversed, but three opportunities had now been
thrown away, and at the fourth time of asking the difficulties were
greatly increased. The Nationalists were now divided and the Moderates
in danger of being violently attacked if they accepted a moderate
solution. It was found necessary to deport Zaghlul Pasha and to put
several of his chief adherents on trial. Suspicions had been aroused by
the delays and vacillations of the British Government. A settlement by
treaty was now impossible, and Lord Allenby had to give unconditionally
the recognition of sovereignty which the Mission intended to be part of
the treaty, putting the Egyptians under an honourable pledge to respect
British rights and interests. In the circumstances there was nothing
else to do, but it is greatly to be desired that when the constitution
has been completed and the new Assembly convened, an effort should be
made to revert to the method of the treaty which particularly suited the
Egyptian character and would be regarded as a binding obligation by
Egyptians.


THE HOPE OF THE FUTURE

In regard to the future, there is only one thing to do and that is to
work honestly to its logical conclusion the theory now adopted, that
Egypt is a self-governing independent State. Egyptians must be
encouraged to shoulder the full responsibilities of a self-governing
community. It would be folly to maintain a dual system which enabled an
Egyptian Government to shunt the difficult or disagreeable part of its
task on to a British High Commissioner. Whatever the system of
Government, there is no escape for either party from the most intimate
mutual relations. Geography and circumstances decree them, but there is
no necessary clash between the imperial interests which require us to
guard the highway to the East that runs through Egyptian territory, and
the full exercise of their national rights by Egyptians. Egyptians must
remember that for many years to come the world will hold us responsible
for law and order and solvency in Egypt, and we on our part must
remember that Egyptians have the same pride in their country as other
peoples, and that they will never consent to regard it as merely and
primarily "a communication of the British Empire." In any wise solution
of the question any sudden breach with the past will be avoided, and
Egyptians will of their own free will enlist the aid of British
officials who have proved their devotion to the country by loyal and
skilful service. The hope of the future lies in substituting a free
partnership for a domination of one race by the other, and with a genial
and good-humoured people, such as the Egyptians essentially are, there
should be no difficulty in restoring friendship and burying past
animosities. But there must be a real determination on both sides to
make Egyptian independence a success and no disposition on either to
give merely a reluctant consent to the conditions agreed upon by them
and then to throw the onus of failure on the others.

I deeply regret the schism between the different schools of Nationalists
in Egypt. As we have seen in Ireland, Nationalism is threatened from
within as well as from without, and it is a great misfortune that in
settling the Egyptian problem we missed the moment in 1920 when the
different Nationalist parties were all but united on a common platform.
Extremist leaders have the power of compelling even their friends to
deport them and treat them as enemies, and I assume that Zaghlul put
Lord Allenby under this compulsion, when he decided that his deportation
was necessary. But Zaghlul was one of the few Nationalist leaders who
were of peasant origin, and his followers stand for something that needs
to be strongly represented in the Government if it is not to take its
complexion merely from the towns and the wealthy interests. The fellah
is a very different man from what he was in the days of Ismail, and it
is improbable that he will again submit to oppression as his forefathers
did but it is eminently desirable that there should be in the Government
men whom he would accept as leaders and whom he could trust to speak for
him.

Above all, it is to be hoped that, having conceded the independence of
Egypt, we shall not slip back into governing the country by martial law
with the aid of one party among the Egyptians. That would be merely an
evasion of the difficulty and a postponement of troubles. There are a
good many difficulties yet to be overcome, and the progress of events
will need careful watching by Liberals in and out of the House of
Commons, but if at length we steer a straight course and bring political
good sense to the details of the problem, there is no reason why we
should not satisfy the Egyptians and put Anglo-Egyptian relations on a
good and enduring basis. In dealing with Egypt as with all Eastern
countries, it should constantly be borne in mind that manners,
character, and personality are a chief part of good politics. To a very
large extent the estrangement has been caused by a failure to understand
and respect the feelings of the Egyptian people, and here, as in India,
it is important to understand that the demand of the Eastern man is not
only for self-government, but also for a new status which will enable
him to maintain his self-respect in his dealings with the West.




THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

BY RAMSAY MUIR

Professor of Modern History in the University of Manchester, 1913 to
1921.


Mr. Ramsay Muir said:--One of the most marked, and one of the most
ominous, features of the political situation to-day is that there is an
almost universal decline of belief in and respect for our system of
government. This undermining of the confidence that a healthy community
ought to feel in its institutions is a perturbing fact which it is the
plain duty of all good Liberals to consider seriously. We need not be
deterred by the old gibe that Liberalism has always cared more about
political machinery than about social reorganisation. The gibe was never
true. But, in any case, no projects of social reorganisation have much
chance of success unless the political machinery by means of which they
have to be carried into effect is working efficiently. Moreover, since
most of the projects of social reform which are being urged upon our
attention involve an enlargement of the activities of the State, it is
obvious that we shall be running the risk of a breakdown unless we make
sure that the machinery of the State is capable of meeting the demands
which are made upon it. We must be satisfied that our engine has
sufficient power before we require it to draw a double load. In truth,
one reason why the engine of government is not working well is that it
has been required to do a great deal more work than it was designed for.
The time has come to consider carefully the character and capacity of
our machinery of government in view of the increased demands which are
certain to be made upon it in the future.

Our national political system may be divided into two parts. On the one
hand, there is the working machine, which goes on, year in, year out,
whether Parliament is sitting or not, and which would still go on quite
well for a time if Parliament never met again. We call it the
Government, and we habitually and rightly hold it responsible for every
aspect of national policy and action, for legislation and finance as
well as for foreign policy and internal administration. On the other
hand, there is what Burke used to call "the control on behalf of the
nation," mainly exercised through Parliament, whose chief function is to
criticise and control the action of Government, and to make the
responsibility of Government to the nation a real and a felt
responsibility. The discontents of to-day apply to both parts of the
system, and I propose to deal with them in turn, first inquiring what is
wrong with the working machine of government and how it can be amended,
and then turning to consider how far the control on behalf of the nation
is working badly, and how it can be made more efficient.

In what I have called the "working machine" of government there are two
distinct elements. First, there is the large, permanent, professional
staff, the Civil Service; secondly, there is the policy-directing body,
the Cabinet. Both of these are the objects of a great deal of
contemporary criticism. On the one hand, we are told that we are
suffering from "bureaucracy," which means that the permanent officials
have too much independent and uncontrolled, or imperfectly controlled,
authority. On the other hand, we are told that we are suffering from
Cabinet dictatorship, or, alternatively, that the Cabinet system is
breaking down and being replaced by the autocracy of the Prime Minister.
There is a good deal of _prima facie_ justification for all these
complaints.


THE GROWTH OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

First, as to bureaucracy. It is manifest that there has been an immense
increase in the number, the functions, and the power of public
officials. This is not merely due to the war. It has been going on for a
long time--ever since, in fact, we began the deliberate process of
national reconstruction in the years following 1832. In itself this
increase has not been a bad thing; on the contrary, it has been the only
possible means of carrying into effect the great series of reforms which
marked the nineteenth century. And may I here underline the fact that we
Liberals, in particular, have no right to criticise the process, since
we have been mainly responsible for it, at any rate in all its early
stages. When our predecessors set up the first Factory Inspectors in
1833, and so rendered possible the creation of a whole code of factory
laws; when they created the first rudimentary Education Office in 1839,
and so set to work the men who have really moulded our national system
of education; when they set up a bureaucratic Poor Law Board in 1841,
which shaped our Poor Law Policy, and a Public Health Board in 1848,
which gradually worked out our system of Public Health--when they did
these things, they were beginning a process which has been carried
further with every decade. If you like, they were laying the foundations
of bureaucracy; but they were also creating the only machinery by which
vast, beneficial and desperately needed measures of social reform could
be carried into effect.

And there is yet another thing for which Liberalism must assume the
responsibility. When Gladstone instituted the Civil Service Commission
in 1853, and the system of appointment by competitive examination in
1870, he freed the Civil Service from the reputation for corruption and
inefficiency which had clung to it; and he ensured that it should
attract, as it has ever since done, much of the best intellect of the
nation. But this very fact inevitably increased the influence of the
Civil Service, and encouraged the expansion of its functions. If you put
a body of very able men in charge of a department of public service, it
is certain that they will magnify their office, take a disproportionate
view of its claims, and incessantly strive to increase its functions and
its staff. This is not only natural, it is healthy--so long as the
process is subjected to efficient criticism and control.

But the plain fact is that the control is inadequate. The vast machine
of government has outgrown the power of the controlling mechanism.

We trust for the control of the immense bureaucratic machine, almost
entirely to the presence, at the head of each department, of a political
minister directly responsible to Parliament. We hold the minister
responsible for everything that happens in his office, and we regard
this ministerial responsibility as one of the keystones of our system.
But when we reflect that the minister is distracted by a multitude of
other calls upon his time, and that he has to deal with officials who
are generally his equals in ability, and always his superiors in special
knowledge; when we realise how impossible it is that a tithe of the
multifarious business of a great department should come before him, and
that the business which does come before him comes with the
recommendations for action of men who know ten times more about it than
he does, it must be obvious that the responsibility of the minister must
be quite unreal, in regard to the normal working of the office. One
thing alone he can do, and it is an important thing, quite big enough to
occupy his attention. He can make sure that the broad policy of the
office, and its big new departures, are in accord with the ideas of the
majority in Parliament, and are co-ordinated, through the Cabinet, with
the policy of the other departments. That, indeed, is the true function
of a minister; and if he tries to make his responsibility real beyond
that, he may easily neglect his main work. Beyond this consideration of
broad policy, I do not hesitate to say that the theory of ministerial
responsibility is not a check upon the growth of bureaucracy, but is
rather the cover under which bureaucracy has grown up. For the position
of the minister enables him, and almost compels him, to use his
influence in Parliament for the purpose of diverting or minimising
parliamentary criticism.


A CHECK UPON BUREAUCRACY

How can this growth of inadequately controlled official power be
checked? Is it not apparent that this can only be done if a clear
distinction is drawn between the sphere of broad policy, in which the
minister both can be and ought to be responsible, and the sphere of
ordinary administrative work for which the minister cannot be genuinely
responsible? If that distinction is accepted, it ought not to be
impossible for Parliament without undermining ministerial or cabinet
responsibility, to devise a means of making its control over the
ordinary working of the departments effective, through a system of
committees or in other ways.

The current complaints of bureaucracy, however, are not directed mainly
against the ineffectiveness of the machinery of control, but against the
way in which public work is conducted by government officials--the
formalism and red-tape by which it is hampered, the absence of
elasticity and enterprise; and the methods of government departments are
often compared, to their disadvantage, with those of business firms. But
the comparison disregards a vital fact. The primary function of a
government department is not creative or productive, but regulative. It
has to see that laws are exactly carried out, and that public funds are
used for the precise purposes for which they were voted; and for this
kind of work a good deal of red-tape is necessary. Moreover, it is
essential that those who are charged with such functions should be above
all suspicion of being influenced by fear or favour or the desire to
make profit; and for this purpose fixed salaries and security of tenure
are essential.

In short, the fundamental principles upon which government departments
are organised are right for the regulative functions which they
primarily exist to perform. But they are altogether wrong for creative
and productive work, which demands the utmost elasticity, adaptability,
and freedom for experiment. And it is just because the ordinary
machinery of government has been used on a large scale for this kind of
work that the outcry against bureaucracy has recently been so vehement.
It is not possible to imagine a worse method of conducting a great
productive enterprise than to put it under the control of an evanescent
minister selected on political grounds, and supported by a body of men
whose work is carried on in accordance with the traditions of the Civil
Service.

If we are to avoid a breakdown of our whole system, we must abstain from
placing productive enterprises under the control of the ordinary
machinery of government--Parliament, responsible political ministers,
and civil service staffs. But it does not follow that no productive
concern ought ever to be brought under public ownership and withdrawn
from the sphere of private enterprise. As we shall later note, such
concerns can, if it be necessary, be organised in a way which would
avoid these dangers.


THE CABINET

We turn next to the other element in the working machine of government,
the Cabinet, or policy-directing body, which is the very pivot of our
whole system. Two main functions fall to the Cabinet. In the first
place, it has to ensure an effective co-ordination between the various
departments of government; in the second place, it is responsible for
the initiation and guidance of national policy in every sphere, subject
to the watchful but friendly control of Parliament.

Long experience has shown that there are several conditions which must
be fulfilled if a Cabinet is to perform these functions satisfactorily.
In the first place, its members must, among them, be able to speak for
every department of government; failing this, the function of
co-ordination cannot be effectively performed. This principle was
discarded in the later stages of the war, when a small War Cabinet was
instituted, from which most of the ministers were excluded. The result
was confusion and overlapping, and the attempt to remedy these evils by
the creation of a staff of _liaison_ officers under the control of the
Prime Minister had very imperfect success, and in some respects only
added to the confusion. In the second place, the Cabinet must be
coherent and homogeneous, and its members must share the same ideals of
national policy. National business cannot be efficiently transacted if
the members of the Cabinet are under the necessity of constantly arguing
about, and making compromises upon, first principles. That is the
justification for drawing the members of a Cabinet from the leaders of a
single party, who think alike and understand one another's minds.
Whenever this condition has been absent, confusion, vacillation and
contradiction have always marked the conduct of public affairs, and
disastrous results have followed.

In the third place, the procedure of the Cabinet must be intimate,
informal, elastic, and confidential; every member must be able to feel
that he has played his part in all the main decisions of policy, whether
they directly concern his department or not, and that he is personally
responsible for these decisions. Constitutional usage has always
prescribed that it is the duty of a Cabinet Minister to resign if he
differs from his colleagues on any vital matter, whether relating to his
department or not, and this usage is, in truth, the main safeguard for
the preservation of genuine conjoint responsibility, and the main
barrier against irresponsible action by a Prime Minister or a clique.
When the practice of resignation in the sense of giving up office is
replaced by the other kind of resignation--shrugging one's shoulders and
letting things slide--the main virtue of Cabinet government has been
lost. In the fourth place, in order that every minister may fully share
in every important discussion and decision, it is essential that the
Cabinet should be small. Sir Robert Peel, in whose ministry of 1841-6
the system probably reached perfection, laid it down that nine was the
maximum number for efficiency, because not more than about nine men can
sit round a table in full view of one another, all taking a real share
in every discussion. When the membership of a Cabinet largely exceeds
this figure, it is inevitable that the sense of joint and several
responsibility for every decision should be greatly weakened.


MODERN CHANGES IN THE CABINET

I do not think any one will deny that the Cabinet has in a large degree
lost these four features which we have laid down as requisite for full
efficiency. The process has been going on for a long time, but during
the last six years it has been accelerated so greatly that the Cabinet
of to-day is almost unrecognisably different from what it was fifty
years ago. To begin with, it has grown enormously in size, owing to the
increase in the number of departments of government. This growth has
markedly diminished the sense of responsibility for national policy as a
whole felt by the individual members, and the wholesome practice of
resignation has gone out of fashion. It has led to frequent failures in
the co-ordination of the various departments, which are often seen
working at cross purposes. It has brought about a new formality in the
proceedings of the Cabinet, in the establishment of a Cabinet
Secretariat.

The lack of an efficient joint Cabinet control has encouraged a very
marked and unhealthy increase in the personal authority of the Prime
Minister and of the clique of more intimate colleagues by whom he is
surrounded; and this is strengthened by the working of the new
Secretariat. All these unhealthy features have been intensified by the
combination of the two strongest parties in Parliament to form a
coalition; for this has deprived the Cabinet of homogeneity and made it
the scene not of the definition of a policy guided by clear principles,
but rather the scene of incessant argument, bargaining, and compromise
on fundamentals. Finally, the responsibility of the Cabinet to
Parliament has been gravely weakened; it acts as the master of
Parliament, not as its agent, and its efficiency suffers from the fact
that its members are able to take their responsibility to Parliament
very lightly.

All these defects in the working of the Cabinet system have been much
more marked since the war than at any earlier time. But the two chief
among them--lessened coherence due to unwieldiness of size, and
diminished responsibility to Parliament--were already becoming apparent
during the generation before the war. On the question of responsibility
to Parliament we shall have something to say later. But it is worth
while to ask whether there is any means whereby the old coherence,
intimacy and community of responsibility can be restored. I

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