
Gutenberg · ebook 17018
The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume II
by Burton Jesse Hendrick · English · public domain in the US
The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume II by Burton Jesse Hendrick is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #17018). Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1905-1916]
CHAPTER XIV
THE "LUSITANIA"--AND AFTER
I
The news of the Lusitania was received at the American Embassy at four o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, 1915. At that time preparations were under way for a dinner in honour of Colonel and Mrs. House; the first Lusitania announcement declared that only the ship itself had been destroyed and that all the passengers and members of the crew had been saved; there was, therefore, no good reason for abandoning this dinner.
At about seven o'clock, the Ambassador came home; his manner showed that something extraordinary had taken place; there were no outward signs of emotion, but he was very serious. The first news, he now informed Mrs.
Page, had been a mistake; more than one thousand men, women, and children had lost their lives, and more than one hundred of these were American citizens. It was too late to postpone the dinner but that affair was one of the most tragic in the social history of London. The Ambassador was constantly receiving bulletins from his Chancery, and these, as quickly as they were received, he read to his guests. His voice was quiet and subdued; there were no indications of excitement in his manner or in that of his friends, and hardly of suppressed emotion.
The atmosphere was rather that of dumb stupefaction. The news seemed to have dulled everyone's capacity for thought and even for feeling. If any one spoke, it was in whispers. Afterward, in the drawing room, this same mental state was the prevailing one; there was little denunciation of Germany and practically no discussion as to the consequences of the crime; everyone's thought was engrossed by the harrowing and unbelievable facts which the Ambassador was reading from the little yellow slips that were periodically brought in. An irresistible fascination evidently kept everybody in the room; the guests stayed late, eager for every new item.
When they finally left, one after another, their manner was still abstracted and they said their good-nights in low voices. There were two reasons for this behaviour.
The first was that the Ambassador and his guests had received the details of the greatest infamy which any supposedly civilized state had perpetrated since the massacre of Saint Bartholomew. The second was the conviction that the United States would at once declare war on Germany.
On this latter point several of the guests expressed their ideas and one of the most shocked and outspoken was Colonel House. For a month the President's personal representative had been discussing with British statesmen possible openings for mediation, but all his hopes in this direction now vanished. That President Wilson would act with the utmost energy Colonel House took for granted. This act, he evidently believed, left the United States no option. "We shall be at war with Germany within a month," he declared.
The feeling that prevailed in the Embassy this evening was the one that existed everywhere in London for several days. Emotionally the event acted like an anæsthetic. This was certainly the condition of all Americans associated with the American Embassy, especially Page himself. A day or two after the sinking the Ambassador went to Euston Station, at an early hour in the morning, to receive the American survivors. The hundred or more men and women who shambled from the train made a listless and bedraggled gathering.
Their grotesque clothes, torn and unkempt--for practically none had had the opportunity of obtaining a change of dress--their expressionless faces, their lustreless eyes, their uncertain and bewildered walk, faintly reflected an experience such as comes to few people in this world.
The most noticeable thing about these unfortunates was their lack of interest in their surroundings; everything had apparently been reduced to a blank; the fact that practically none made any reference to their ordeal, or could be induced to discuss it, was a matter of common talk in London. And something of this disposition now became noticeable in Page himself.
He wrote his dispatches to Washington in an abstracted mood; he went through his duties almost with the detachment of a sleep-walker; like the Lusitania survivors, he could not talk much at that time about the scenes that had taken place off the coast of Ireland. Yet there were many indications that he was thinking about them, and his thoughts, as his letters reveal, were concerned with more things than the tragedy itself. He believed that his country was now face to face with its destiny. What would Washington do?
Page had a characteristic way of thinking out his problems. He performed his routine work at the Chancery in the daytime, but his really serious thinking he did in his own room at night. The picture is still a vivid one in the recollection of his family and his other intimates. Even at this time Page's health was not good, yet he frequently spent the evening at his office in Grosvenor Gardens, and when the long day's labours were finished, he would walk rather wearily to his home at No. 6 Grosvenor Square.
He would enter the house slowly--and his walk became slower and more tired as the months went by--go up to his room and cross to the fireplace, so apparently wrapped up in his own thoughts that he hardly greeted members of his own family. A wood fire was kept burning for him, winter and summer alike; Page would put on his dressing gown, drop into a friendly chair, and sit there, doing nothing, reading nothing, saying nothing--only thinking.
Sometimes he would stay for an hour; not infrequently he would remain till two, three, or four o'clock in the morning; occasions were not unknown when his almost motionless figure would be in this same place at daybreak. He never slept through these nights, and he never even dozed; he was wide awake, and his mind was silently working upon the particular problem that was uppermost in his thoughts. He never rose until he had solved it or at least until he had decided upon a course of action. He would then get up abruptly, go to bed, and sleep like a child.
The one thing that made it possible for a man of his delicate frame, racked as it was by anxiety and over work, to keep steadily at his task, was the wonderful gift which he possessed of sleeping.
Page had thought out many problems in this way. The tension caused by the sailing of the Dacia, in January, 1915, and the deftness with which the issue had been avoided by substituting a French for a British cruiser, has already been described. Page discovered this solution on one of these all-night self-communings. It was almost two o'clock in the morning that he rose, said to himself, "I've got it!" and then went contentedly to bed. And during the anxious months that followed the Lusitania, the Arabic, and those other outrages which have now taken their place in history, he spent night after night turning the matter over in his mind.
But he found no way out of the humiliations presented by the policy of Washington.
"Here we are swung loose in time," he wrote to his son Arthur, a few days after the first Lusitania note had been sent to Germany, "nobody knows the day or the week or the month or the year--and we are caught on this island, with no chance of escape, while the vast slaughter goes on and seems just beginning, and the degradation of war goes on week by week; and we live in hope that the United States will come in, as the only chance to give us standing and influence when the reorganization of the world must begin. (Beware of betraying the word 'hope'!) It has all passed far beyond anybody's power to describe.
I simply go on day by day into unknown experiences and emotions, seeing nothing before me very clearly and remembering only dimly what lies behind. I can see only one proper thing: that all the world should fall to and hunt this wild beast down.
"Two photographs of little Mollie[1] on my mantelpiece recall persons and scenes and hopes unconnected with the war: few other things can.
Bless the baby, she couldn't guess what a sweet purpose she serves."
- * * * *
The sensations of most Americans in London during this crisis are almost indescribable. Washington's failure promptly to meet the situation affected them with astonishment and humiliation. Colonel House was confident that war was impending, and for this reason he hurried his preparations to leave England; he wished to be in the United States, at the President's side, when the declaration was made. With this feeling about Mr.
Wilson, Colonel House received a fearful shock a day or two after the Lusitania had gone down: while walking in Piccadilly, he caught a glimpse of one of the famous sandwich men, bearing a poster of an afternoon newspaper. This glaring broadside bore the following legend: "We are too proud to fight--Woodrow Wilson." The sight of that placard was Colonel House's first intimation that the President might not act vigorously. He made no attempt to conceal from Page and other important men at the American Embassy the shock which it had given him.
Soon the whole of England was ringing with these six words; the newspapers were filled with stinging editorials and cartoons, and the music halls found in the Wilsonian phrase materials for their choicest jibes. Even in more serious quarters America was the subject of the most severe denunciation. No one felt these strictures more poignantly than President Wilson's closest confidant.
A day or two before sailing home he came into the Embassy greatly depressed at the prevailing revulsion against the United States. "I feel," Colonel House said to Page, "as though I had been given a kick at every lamp post coming down Constitution Hill." A day or two afterward Colonel House sailed for America.
II
And now came the period of distress and of disillusionment. Three Lusitania notes were sent and were evasively answered, and Washington still seemed to be marking time. The one event in this exciting period which gave Page satisfaction was Mr. Bryan's resignation as Secretary of State. For Mr. Bryan personally Page had a certain fondness, but as head of the State Department the Nebraska orator had been a cause of endless vexation. Many of Page's letters, already printed, bear evidence of the utter demoralization which existed in this branch of the Administration and this demoralization became especially glaring during the Lusitania crisis.
No attempt was made even at this momentous period to keep the London Embassy informed as to what was taking place in Washington;
Page's letters and cablegrams were, for the most part, unacknowledged and unanswered, and the American Ambassador was frequently obliged to obtain his information about the state of feeling in Washington from Sir Edward Grey. It must be said, in justice to Mr. Bryan, that this carelessness was nothing particularly new, for it had worried many ambassadors before Page. Readers of Charles Francis Adams's correspondence meet with the same complaints during the Civil War; even at the time of the Trent crisis, when for a fortnight Great Britain and the United States were living on the brink of war, Adams was kept entirely in the dark about the plans of Washington[2].
The letters of John Hay show a similar condition during his brief ambassadorship to Great Britain in 1897-1898[3].
But Mr. Bryan's incumbency was guilty of diplomatic vices which were peculiarly its own. The "leaks" in the State Department, to which Page has already referred, were constantly taking place; the Ambassador would send the most confidential cipher dispatches to his superior, cautioning the Department that they must be held inviolably secret, and then he would pick up the London newspapers the next morning and find that everything had been cabled from Washington.
To most readers, the informal method of conducting foreign business, as it is disclosed in these letters, probably comes as something of a shock. Page is here discovered discussing state matters, not in correspondence with the Secretary of State, but in private unofficial communications to the President, and especially to Colonel House--the latter at that time not an official person at all. All this, of course, was extremely irregular and, in any properly organized State Department, it would have been even reprehensible.
But the point is that there was no properly organized State Department at that time, and the impossibility of conducting business through the regular channels compelled Page to adopt other means. "There is only one way to reform the State Department," he informed Colonel House at this time. "That is to raze the whole building, with its archives and papers, to the ground, and begin all over again."
This state of affairs in Washington explains the curious fact that the real diplomatic history of the United States and Great Britain during this great crisis is not to be found in the archives of the State Department, for the official documents on file there consist of the most routine telegrams, which are not particularly informing, but in the Ambassador's personal correspondence with the President, Colonel House, and a few other intimates. The State Department did not have the first requisite of a properly organized foreign office, for it could not be trusted with confidential information.
The Department did not tell Page what it was doing, but it apparently told the whole world what Page was doing. It is an astonishing fact that Page could not write and cable the most important details, for he was afraid that they would promptly be given to the reporters.
- * * * *
"I shall not send another confidential message to the State Department," Page wrote to Colonel House, September 15, 1914; "it's too dangerous.
Time and time again now the Department has leaked. Last week, I sent a dispatch and I said in the body of it, 'this is confidential and under no condition to be given out or made public, but to be regarded as inviolably secret.' The very next morning it was telegraphed from Washington to the London newspapers. Bryan telegraphed me that he was sure it didn't get out from the Department and that he now had so fixed it that there could be no leak. He's said that at least four times before. The Department swarms with newspaper men, I hear. But whether it does or not the leak continues.
I have to go with my tail between my legs and apologize to Sir Edward Grey and to do myself that shame and to do my very best to keep his confidence--against these unnecessary odds.
The only way to be safe is to do the job perfunctorily, to answer the questions the Department sends and to do nothing on your own account.
That's the reason so many of our men do their jobs in that way--or one reason and a strong one. We can never have an alert and energetic and powerful service until men can trust the Department and until they can get necessary information from it. I wrote the President that of course I'd go on till the war ended and all the questions growing out of it were settled, and that then he must excuse me, if I must continue to be exposed to this danger and humiliation. In the meantime, I shall send all my confidential matter in private letters to him."
- * * * *
Page did not regard Mr. Bryan's opinions and attitudes as a joke: to him they were a serious matter and, in his eyes, Bryan was most interesting as a national menace. He regarded the Secretary as the extreme expression of an irrational sentimentalism that was in danger of undermining the American character, especially as the kind of thought he represented was manifest in many phases of American life. In a moment of exasperation, Page gave expression to this feeling in a letter to his son:
To Arthur W. Page
London, June 6, 1915.
DEAR ARTHUR:
... We're in danger of being feminized and fad-ridden--grape juice
(God knows water's good enough: why grape juice?); pensions;
Christian Science; peace cranks; efficiency-correspondence schools;
aid-your-memory; women's clubs; co-this and co-t'other and coddling
in general; Billy Sunday; petticoats where breeches ought to be and
breeches where petticoats ought to be; white livers and soft heads
and milk-and-water;--I don't want war: nobody knows its horrors or
its degradations or its cost.
But to get rid of hyphenated
degenerates perhaps it's worth while, and to free us from 'isms and
soft folk. That's the domestic view of it. As for being kicked by a
sauerkraut caste--O Lord, give us backbone!
Heartily yours,
W.H.P.
In the bottom of this note, Page has cut a notch in the paper and against it he has written: "This notch is the place to apply a match to this letter."
- * * * *
"Again and ever I am reminded," Page also wrote in reference to Bryan's resignation, "of the danger of having to do with cranks. A certain orderliness of mind and conduct seems essential for safety in this short life. Spiritualists, bone-rubbers, anti-vivisectionists, all sort of anti's in fact, those who have fads about education or fads against it, Perfectionists, Daughters of the Dove of Peace, Sons of the Roaring Torrent, itinerant peace-mongers--all these may have a real genius among them once in forty years; but to look for an exception to the common run of yellow dogs and damfools among them is like opening oysters with the hope of finding pearls.
It's the common man we want and the uncommon common man when we can find him--never the crank. This is the lesson of Bryan."
- * * * *
At one time, however, Mr. Bryan's departure seemed likely to have important consequences for Page. Colonel House and others strongly urged the President to call him home from London and make him Secretary of State. This was the third position in President Wilson's Cabinet for which Page had been considered. The early plans to make him Secretary of the Interior or Secretary of Agriculture have already been described. Of all cabinet posts, however, the one that would have especially attracted him would have been the Department of State.
But President Wilson believed that the appointment of an Ambassador at one of the belligerent capitals, especially of an Ambassador whose sympathies for the Allies were so pronounced as were Page's, would have been an "un-neutral" act, and, therefore, Colonel House's recommendation was not approved.
From Edward M. House
Roslyn, Long Island,
June 25th, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
The President finally decided to appoint Lansing to succeed Mr.
Bryan. In my opinion, he did wisely, though I would have preferred
his appointing you.
The argument against your appointment was the fact that you are an
Ambassador at one of the belligerent capitals. The President did
not think it would do, and from what I read, when your name was
suggested I take it there would have been much criticism. I am
sorry--sorrier than I can tell you, for it would have worked
admirably in the general scheme of things.
However, I feel sure that Lansing will do the job, and that you
will find your relations with him in every way satisfactory.
The President spent yesterday with me and we talked much of you. He
is looking well and feeling so. I read the President your letter
and he enjoyed it as much as I did.
I am writing hastily, for I am leaving for Manchester,
Massachusetts, where I shall be during July and August.
Your sincere friend,
E.M. HOUSE.
III
But, in addition to the Lusitania crisis, a new terror now loomed on the horizon. Page's correspondence reveals that Bryan had more reasons than one for his resignation; he was now planning to undertake a self-appointed mission to Europe for the purpose of opening peace negotiations entirely on his own account.
From Edward M. House
Manchester, Massachusetts,
August 12th, 1915.
DEAR PAGE:
The Bryans have been stopping with the X's. X writes me that Bryan
told him that he intended to go to Europe soon and try peace
negotiations. He has Lloyd George in mind in England, and it is
then his purpose to go to Germany.
I take it he will want credentials from the President which, of
course, he will not want to give, but just what he will feel
obliged to give is another story. I anticipated this when he
resigned. I knew it was merely a matter of time when he would take
this step.
He may find encouragement in Germany, for he is in high favour now
in that quarter. It is his purpose to oppose the President upon the
matter of "preparedness," and, from what we can learn, it will not
be long before there will be open antagonism between the
Administration and himself.
It might be a good thing to encourage his going to Europe. He would
probably come back a sadder and wiser man. I take it that no one in
authority in England would discuss the matter seriously with him,
and, in France, I do not believe he could even get a hearing.
Please let me have your impressions upon this subject.
I wish I could be near you to-day for there are so many things I
could tell that I cannot write.
Your friend,
E.M. House.
To Edward M. House
American Embassy, London [Undated].
DEAR HOUSE:
Never mind about Bryan. Send him over here if you wish to get rid
of him. He'll cut no more figure than a tar-baby at a Negro
camp-meeting. If he had come while he was Secretary, I should have
jumped off London Bridge and the country would have had one
ambassador less. But I shall enjoy him now. You see some peace
crank from the United States comes along every week--some crank or
some gang of cranks. There've been two this week. Ever since the
Daughters of the Dove of Peace met at The Hague, the game has
become popular in America; and I haven't yet heard that a single
one has been shot--so far.
I think that some of them are likely
soon to be hanged, however, because there are signs that they may
come also from Germany. The same crowd that supplies money to buy
labour-leaders and the press and to blow up factories in the United
States keeps a good supply of peace-liars on tap. It'll be fun to
watch Bryan perform and never suspect that anybody is lying to him
or laughing at him; and he'll go home convinced that he's done the
job and he'll let loose doves all over the land till they are as
thick as English sparrows. Not even the President could teach him
anything permanently.
He can do no harm on this side the world.
It's only your side that's in any possible danger; and, if I read
the signs right, there's a diminishing danger there.
No, there's never yet come a moment when there was the slightest
chance of peace. Did the Emperor not say last year that peace would
come in October, and again this year in October? Since he said it,
how can it come?
The ambitions and the actions of men, my friend, are determined by
their antecedents, their surroundings, and their opportunities--the
great deeds of men before them whom consciously or unconsciously
they take for models, the codes they are reared by, and the chances
that they think they see. These influences shaped Alexander and
Cæsar, and they shaped you and me. Now every monarch on the
Continent has behind him the Napoleonic example. "Can I do that?"
crosses the mind of every one.
Of course every one thinks of
himself as doing it beneficently--for the good of the world.
Napoleon, himself, persuaded himself of his benevolent intentions,
and the devil of it was he persuaded other people also. Now the
only monarch in Europe in our time who thought he had a chance is
your friend in Berlin. When he told you last year (1914) that of
course he didn't want war, but that he was "ready," that's what he
meant. A similar ambition, of course, comes into the mind of every
professional soldier of the continent who rises to eminence.
In
Berlin you have both--the absolute monarch and the military class
of ambitious soldiers and their fighting machine. Behind these men
walks the Napoleonic ambition all the time, just as in the United
States we lie down every night in George Washington's feather-bed
of no entangling alliances.
Then remember, too, that the German monarchy is a cross between the
Napoleonic ambition and its inheritance from Frederick the Great
and Bismarck. I suppose the three damnedest liars that were ever
born are these three--old Frederick, Napoleon, and Bismarck--not, I
take it, because they naturally loved lying, but because the game
they played constantly called for lying. There was no other way to
play it: they had to fool people all the time. You have abundant
leisure--do this: Read the whole career of Napoleon and write down
the startling and exact parallels that you will find there to what
is happening to-day.
The French were united and patriotic, just as
the Germans now are. When they invaded other people's territory,
they said they were attacked and that the other people had brought
on war. They had their lying diplomats, their corruption funds;
they levied money on cities and states; they took booty; and they
were God's elect. It's a wonderful parallel--not strangely, because
the game is the same and the moral methods are the same. Only the
tools are somewhat different--the submarine, for example.
Hence the
Lusitania disaster (not disavowed, you will observe), the
Arabic disaster, the propaganda, underground and above, in the
United States. And there'll be more. The Napoleonic Wars were
about eleven years long. I fancy that we shall have war and wars
from this attempt to dominate Europe, for perhaps as long a period.
The Balkans can't be quieted by this war only, nor Russia and Italy
perhaps. And Germany may have a series of earthquakes
herself--internal explosions. Then Poland and perhaps some of the
Scandinavian States. Nobody can tell.
I cannot express my admiration of the President's management, so
far at least, of his colossal task of leading us right. He has
shown his supreme wisdom up to this point and I have the
profoundest confidence in his judgment. But I hope he doesn't fool
himself about the future; I'm sure he doesn't. I see no possible
way for us to keep out, because I know the ignorance and falseness
of the German leaders. They'll drown or kill more Americans--on the
sea and in America.
They may at last even attack one of our own
passenger ships, or do something that will dramatically reveal them
to the whole American people. Then, of course, the tune will be
called. It's only a question of time; and I am afraid the war will
last long enough to give them time. An early peace is all that can
prevent them from driving us at last into war; and I can see no
chance of an early peace. You had as well prepare as fast as the
condition of public opinion will permit.
There could be no better measure of the immeasurable moral advance
that the United States has made over Europe than the incredulity of
our people. They simply can't comprehend what the Napoleonic legend
can do, nor the low political morality of the Continent--of Berlin
in particular. Hence they don't believe it. We have gone on for 100
years working might and main to better our condition and the
condition of people about us--the greatest effort made by the
largest number of people since the world began to further the mood
and the arts of peace.
There is no other such chapter in human
history as our work for a hundred years. Yet just a hundred years
ago the Capitol at Washington was burned by--a political oligarchy
in the freest country of Europe--as damnable an atrocity as you
will find in history. The Germans are a hundred years behind the
English in political development and political morality.
So, let Willum J. come. He can't hurt Europe--nor help it; and you
can spare him. Let all the Peace-gang come. You can spare them,
too; and they can do no harm here. Let somebody induce Hoke Smith
to come, too. You have hit on a great scheme--friendly deportation.
And Bryan won't be alone. Daughters of the Dove of Peace and Sons
of the Olive Branch come every week. The latest Son came to see me
to-day. He said that the German Chancellor told him that he wanted
peace--wants it now and wants it bad, and that only one thing stood
in the way--if England would agree not to take Belgium, Germany
would at once make peace! This otherwise sensible American wanted
me to take him to see Sir Edward to tell him this, and to suggest
to him to go over to Holland next week to meet the German
Chancellor and fix it up.
A few days ago a pious preacher chap
(American) who had come over to "fix it all up," came back from
France and called on me. He had seen something in France--he was
excited and he didn't quite make it clear what he had seen; but he
said that if they'd only let him go home safely and quickly he'd
promise not to mention peace any more--did I think the American
boats entirely safe?--So, you see, I do have some fun even in
these dark days.
Yours heartily,
W.H. PAGE.
IV
This letter discloses that Page was pinning his faith in President Wilson, and that he still had confidence in the President's determination to uphold the national honour. Page was not one of those who thought that the United States should declare war immediately after the Lusitania. The President's course, in giving Germany a chance to make amends, and to disavow the act, met with his approval, and he found, also, much to admire in Mr. Wilson's first Lusitania note.
His judgment in this matter was based first of all upon the merits of the case; besides this, his admiration for Mr. Wilson as a public man was strong. To think otherwise of the President would have been a great grief to the Ambassador and to differ with his chief on the tremendous issue of the war would have meant for Page the severance of one of the most cherished associations of his life.
The interest which he had shown in advocating Wilson's presidential candidacy has already been set forth; and many phases of the Wilson administration had aroused his admiration. The President's handling of domestic problems Page regarded as a masterpiece in reconciling statesmanship with practical politics, and his energetic attitude on the Panama Tolls had introduced new standards into American foreign relations.
Page could not sympathize with all the details of the Wilsonian Mexican policy, yet he saw in it a high-minded purpose and a genuine humanitarianism. But the outbreak of war presented new aspects of Mr. Wilson's mind. The President's attitude toward the European struggle, his conception of "neutrality," and his failure to grasp the meaning of the conflict, seemed to Page to show a lack of fundamental statesmanship; still his faith in Wilson was deep-seated, and he did not abandon hope that the President could be brought to see things as they really were.
Page even believed that he might be instrumental in his conversion.
But in the summer and autumn of 1915 one agony followed another. The "too proud to fight" speech was in Page's mind nothing less than a tragedy. The president's first Lusitania note for a time restored the Ambassador's confidence; it seemed to show that the President intended to hold Germany to that "strict accountability" which he had threatened.
But Mr. Wilson's course now presented new difficulties to his Ambassador. Still Page believed that the President, in his own way and in his own time, would find a path out of his dilemma that would protect the honour and the safety of the United States. If any of the Embassy subordinates became impatient over the procedure of Washington, he did not find a sympathetic listener in the Ambassador.
The whole of London and of Europe might be resounding with denunciations of the White House, but Page would tolerate no manifestations of hostility in his presence. "The problem appears different to Washington than it does to us," he would say to his confidants. "We see only one side of it; the President sees all sides. If we give him all the facts, he will decide the thing wisely." Englishmen with whom the Ambassador came into contact soon learned that they could not become flippant or critical about Mr.
Wilson in his presence; he would resent the slightest hostile remark, and he had a way of phrasing his rebukes that usually discouraged a second attempt. About this time Page began to keep closely to himself, and to decline invitations to dinners and to country houses, even those with which he was most friendly.
The reason was that he could not meet Englishmen and Englishwomen, or even Americans who were resident in England, on his old easy familiar terms; he knew the ideas which everybody entertained about his country, and he knew also what they were saying, when he was not among them; the restraint which his presence necessarily put upon his friends produced an uncongenial atmosphere, and the Ambassador therefore gave up, for a time, those distractions which had ordinarily proved such a delightful relief from his duties.
For the first time since he had come to England he found himself a solitary man.
He even refused to attend the American Luncheon Club in London because, in speeches and in conversation, the members did not hesitate to assail the Wilson policies.
Events, however, eventually proved too strong for the most devoted supporter of President Wilson. After the Arabic and the Hesperian, Page's official intimates saw signs that the Ambassador was losing confidence in his old friend. He would discuss Mr. Wilson occasionally, with those secretaries, such as Mr. Laughlin, in whom his confidence was strongest; his expressions, however, were never flippant or violent.
That Page could be biting as well as brilliant in his comments on public personages his letters abundantly reveal, yet he never exercised his talent for sarcasm or invective at the expense of the White House. He never forgot that Mr. Wilson was President and that he was Ambassador; he would still defend the Administration; and he even now continued to find consolation in the reflection that Mr. Wilson was living in a different atmosphere and that he had difficulties to confront of which a man in London could know nothing.
The Ambassador's emotion was rather one of disappointment and sorrow, mingled with anxiety as to the plight into which his country was being led. As to his duty in this situation, however, Page never hesitated. In his relations with his Embassy and with the British world he maintained this non-critical attitude; but in his letters to President Wilson and Colonel House, he was describing the situation, and expressing his convictions, with the utmost freedom and frankness. In both these attitudes Page was consistent and absolutely loyal.
It was his duty to carry out the Wilson instructions and he had too high a conception of the Ambassadorial office to show to the world any unfavourable opinions he may have held about his country's course.
His duty to his post made it just as imperative that he set forth to the President the facts exactly as they were. And this the Ambassador now proceeded to do. For the mere ornamental dignities of an Ambassadorship Page cared nothing; he was wasting his health in his duties and exhausting his private resources; much as he loved the English and congenial as were his surroundings, the fear of being recalled for "disloyalty" or insubordination never influenced him.
The letters which he now wrote to Colonel House and to President Wilson himself are probably without parallel in the diplomatic annals of this or of any other country. In them he told the President precisely what Englishmen thought of him and of the extent to which the United States was suffering in European estimation from the Wilson policy. His boldness sometimes astounded his associates. One day a friend and adviser of President Wilson's came into the Ambassador's office just as Page had finished one of his communications to Washington.
"Read that!" the Ambassador said, handing over the manuscript to his visitor.
As the caller read, his countenance displayed the progressive stages of his amazement. When he had finished, his hands dropped helplessly upon his knees.
"Is that the way you write to the President?" he gasped.
"Of course," Page replied, quietly. "Why not? Why shouldn't I tell him the truth? That is what I am here for."
"There is no other person in the world who dare talk to him like that!" was the reply.
This is unquestionably the fact. That President Wilson did not like people about him whose views were opposed to his own is now no secret, and during the period when his policy was one of the great issues of the world there was probably no one except Page who intruded upon his solitude with ideas that so abruptly disagreed with the opinions of the White House. The letters which Page wrote Colonel House were intended, of course, for the President himself, and practically all of them Colonel House read aloud to the head of the nation.
The two men would closet themselves in the old cabinet room on the second floor of the White House--that same room in which Lincoln had met his advisers during Civil War days; and here Colonel House would quietly read the letters in which Page so mercilessly portrayed the situation as it appeared in English and European eyes. The President listened impassively, giving no sign of approval or disapproval, and hardly, at times, of much interest.
In the earlier days, when Page's letters consisted of pictures of English life and English men, and colourful descriptions of England under the stress of war, the President was vastly entertained; he would laugh loudly at Page's wit, express his delight at his graphic and pungent style and feel deeply the horrors of war as his Ambassador unfolded them. "I always found Page compelling on paper," Mr. Wilson remarked to Mr. Laughlin, during one of the latter's visits to Washington.
"I could never resist him--I get more information from his letters than from any other single source. Tell him to keep it up." It was during this period that the President used occasionally to read Page's letters to the Cabinet, expressing his great appreciation of their charm and historical importance. "The President quoted from one of the Ambassador's letters to the Cabinet to-day," a member of the Cabinet wrote to Mrs. Page in February, 1915. "'Some day,' the President said, 'I hope that Walter Page's letters will be published.
They are the best letters I have ever read. They make you feel the atmosphere in England, understand the people, and see into the motives of the great actors.'" The President repeated this statement many times, and his letters to Page show how greatly he enjoyed and profited from this correspondence.
But after the sinking of the Lusitania and the Arabic his attitude toward Page and his letters changed.
He now found little pleasure or satisfaction in the Page communications.
When Mr. Wilson found that one of his former confidants had turned out to be a critic, that man instantaneously passed out of his life. And this was now Page's fate; the friendship and associations of forty years were as though they had never been. Just why Mr. Wilson did not recall his Ambassador is a question that has puzzled Page's friends. He would sometimes refer to him as a man who was "more British than the British," as one who had been taken completely captive by British blandishments, but he never came to the point of dismissing him.
Perhaps he did not care to face the public scandal that such an act would have caused; but a more plausible reason is that Page, despite the causes which he had given for irritation, was indispensable to him. Page's early letters had furnished the President ideas which had taken shape in Wilson's policies, and, disagreeable as the communications now became, there are evidences that they influenced the solitary statesman in the White House, and that they had much to do in finally forcing Mr. Wilson into the war.
The alternative question, as to why Page did not retire when he found himself so out of sympathy with the President, will be sufficiently answered in subsequent chapters; at present it may be said that he did resign and only consented to remain at the urgent request of Washington. In fact, all during 1915 and 1916, there seemed to be a fear in Washington that Page would definitely abandon the London post. On one occasion, when the newspapers published rumours to this effect, Page received an urgent despatch from Mr. Lansing.
The message came at a time--the date was October 26, 1915--when Page was especially discouraged over the Washington policy. "Representatives of the press," said Mr. Lansing, "have repeated rumours that you are planning to resign. These have been brought to the President's attention, and both he and I have denied them. Still these rumours persist, and they cause both the President and me great anxiety. We cannot believe that they are well founded.
"In view of the fact that they are so persistent, we have thought it well to inform you of them and to tell you how earnestly we hope that they are baseless. We trust that you will set both our minds at rest."
If Page had ever had any compunction about addressing the President in blunt phrases these expressions certainly convinced him that he was a free agent.
Yet Page himself at times had his doubts as to the value of this correspondence. He would frequently discuss the matter with Mr.
Laughlin. "That's a pretty harsh letter," he would say. "I don't like to talk that way to the President, yet it doesn't express half what I feel."
"It's your duty to tell the President the real state of affairs," Mr.
Laughlin would urge.
"But do you suppose it does any good?" Page would ask.
"Yes, it's bound to, and whether it does or not, it's your business to keep him informed."
If in these letters Page seems to lay great stress on the judgment of Great Britain and Europe on American policy, it must be remembered that that was his particular province. One of an Ambassador's most important duties is to transmit to his country the public opinion of the country to which he is accredited. It was Page's place to tell Washington what Great Britain thought of it; it was Washington's business to formulate policy, after giving due consideration to this and other matters.
To Edward M. House
July 21, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
I enclose a pamphlet in ridicule of the President. I don't know who
wrote it, for my inquiries so far have brought no real information.
I don't feel like sending it to him. I send it to you--to do with
as you think best. This thing alone is, of course, of no
consequence. But it is symptomatic. There is much feeling about the
slowness with which he acts. One hundred and twenty people
(Americans) were drowned on the Lusitania and we are still
writing notes about it--to the damnedest pirates that ever blew up
a ship.
Anybody who knows the Germans knows, of course, that they
are simply playing for time, that they are not going to "come
down," that Von Tirpitz is on deck, that they'd just as lief have
war with us as not--perhaps had rather--because they don't want any
large nation left fresh when the war ends. They'd like to have the
whole world bankrupt. There is a fast growing feeling here,
therefore, that the American Government is pusillanimous--dallies
with 'em, is affected by the German propaganda, etc., etc. Of
course, such a judgment is not fair.
It is formed without knowing
the conditions in the United States. But I think you ought to
realize the strength of this sentiment. No doubt before you receive
this, the President will send something to Germany that will amount
to an ultimatum and there will be at least a momentary change of
sentiment here. But looking at the thing in a long-range way, we're
bound to get into the war. For the Germans will blow up more
American travellers without notice.
And by dallying with them we do
not change the ultimate result, but we take away from ourselves the
spunk and credit of getting in instead of being kicked and cursed
in. We've got to get in: they won't play the game in any other way.
I have news direct from a high German source in Berlin which
strongly confirms this....
It's a curious thing to say. But the only solution that I see is
another Lusitania outrage, which would force war.
W.H.P.
P.S. The London papers every day say that the President will send a
strong note, etc. And the people here say, "Damn notes: hasn't he
written enough?" Writing notes hurts nobody--changes nothing. The
Washington correspondents to the London papers say that Burleson,
the Attorney-General, and Daniels are Bryan men and are holding the
President back.
- * * * *
The prophecy contained in this letter was quickly fulfilled. A week or two after Colonel House had received it, the Arabic was sunk with loss of American life.
Page was taking a brief holiday with his son Frank in Rowsley, Derbyshire, when this news came. It was telegraphed from the Embassy.
"That settles it," he said to his son. "They have sunk the Arabic.
That means that we shall break with Germany and I've got to go back to London."
To Edward M. House
American Embassy, London, August 23, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
The sinking of the Arabic is the answer to the President and to
your letter to me. And there'll be more such answers. You said to
me one day after you had got back from your last visit to Berlin:
"They are impossible." I think you told the truth, and surely you
know your German and you know your Berlin--or you did know them
when you were here.
The question is not what we have done for the Allies, not what any
other neutral country has done or has failed to do--such
comparisons, I think, are far from the point. The question is when
the right moment arrives for us to save our self-respect, our
honour, and the esteem and fear (or the contempt) in which the
world will hold us.
Berlin has the Napoleonic disease. If you follow Napoleon's
career--his excuses, his evasions, his inventions, the wild French
enthusiasm and how he kept it up--you will find an exact parallel.
That becomes plainer every day. Europe may not be wholly at peace
in five years--may be ten.
Hastily and heartily,
W.H.P.
I have your note about Willum J.... Crank once, crank always. My
son, never tie up with a crank.
W.H.P.
To Edward M. House
London, September 2nd, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
You write me about pleasing the Allies, the big Ally in particular.
That doesn't particularly appeal to me. We don't owe them
anything. There's no obligation. I'd never confess for a moment
that we are under any obligation to any of them nor to anybody. I'm
not out to "please" anybody, as a primary purpose: that's not my
game nor my idea--nor yours either. As for England in particular,
the account was squared when she twice sent an army against us--in
her folly--especially the last time when she burnt our Capitol.
There's been no obligation since.
The obligation is on the other
foot. We've set her an example of what democracy will do for men,
an example of efficiency, an example of freedom of opportunity. The
future is ours, and she may follow us and profit by it. Already we
have three white English-speaking men to every two in the British
Empire: we are sixty per cent. of the Anglo-Saxons in the world. If
there be any obligation to please, the obligation is on her to
please us. And she feels and sees it now.
My point is not that, nor is it what we or any other neutral nation
has done or may do--Holland or any other. This war is the direct
result of the over-polite, diplomatic, standing-aloof,
bowing-to-one-another in gold lace, which all European nations are
guilty of in times of peace--castes and classes and uniforms and
orders and such folderol, instead of the proper business of the
day. Every nation in Europe knew that Germany was preparing for
war.
If they had really got together--not mere Hague Sunday-school
talk and resolutions--but had really got together for business and
had said to Germany, "The moment you fire a shot, we'll all fight
against you; we have so many millions of men, so many men-of-war,
so many billions of money; and we'll increase all these if you do
not change your system and your building-up of armies"--then there
would have been no war.
My point is not sentimental. It is:
(1) We must maintain our own self-respect and safety. If we submit
to too many insults, that will in time bring Germany against us.
We've got to show at some time that we don't believe, either, in
the efficacy of Sunday-School resolves for peace--that we are
neither Daughters of the Dove of Peace nor Sons of the Olive
Branch, and
(2) About nagging and forever presenting technical legal points as
lawyers do to confuse juries--the point is the point of efficiency.
If we do that, we can't carry our main points. I find it harder and
harder to get answers now to important questions because we ask so
many unimportant and nagging ones.
I've no sentiment--perhaps not enough. My gushing days are gone, if
I ever had 'em. The cutting-out of the "100 years of peace"
oratory, etc., etc., was one of the blessings of the war. But we
must be just and firm and preserve our own self-respect and keep
alive the fear that other nations have of us; and we ought to have
the courage to make the Department of State more than a bureau of
complaints. We must learn to say "No" even to a Gawdamighty
independent American citizen when he asks an improper or
impracticable question.
Public Opinion in the United States
consists of something more than the threats of Congressmen and the
bleating of newspapers; it consists of the judgment of honourable
men on courageous and frank actions--a judgment that cannot be made
up till action is taken.
Heartily yours,
W.H.P.
To Edward M. House
American Embassy, London, Sept. 8, 1915.
(This is not prudent. It is only true--nothing more.)
DEAR HOUSE:
I take it for granted that Dumba[4] is going, of course. But I must
tell you that the President is being laughed at by our best friends
for his slowness in action. I hardly ever pick up a paper without
seeing some sarcastic remark. I don't mean they expect us to come
into the war. They only hoped we would be as good as our
word--would regard another submarine attack on a ship carrying
Americans as an unfriendly act and would send Bernstorff home.
Yet
the Arabic and now the Hesperian have had no effect in action.
Bernstorff's personal note to Lansing[5], even as far as it goes,
does not bind his Government.
The upshot of all this is that the President is fast losing in the
minds of our best friends here all that he gained by his courageous
stand on the Panama tolls. They feel that if he takes another
insult--keeps taking them--and is satisfied with Bernstorff's
personal word, which is proved false in four days--he'll take
anything. And the British will pay less attention to what we say.
That's inevitable.
If the American people and the President accept
the Arabic and the Hesperian and do nothing to Dumba till the
Government here gave out his letter, which the State Department had
(and silently held) for several days--then nobody on this side the
world will pay much heed to anything we say hereafter.
This, as I say, doesn't mean that these (thoughtful) people wish or
expect us to go to war. They wish only that we'd prove ourselves as
good as the President's word. That's the conservative truth; we're
losing influence more rapidly than I supposed it were possible.
Dumba's tardy dismissal will not touch the main matter, which is
the rights of neutrals at sea, and keeping our word in action.
Yours sincerely,
W.H.P.
P.S. They say it's Mexico over again--watchful waiting and nothing
doing. And the feeling grows that Bryan has really conquered, since
his programme seems to prevail.
To Edward M. House
London, Tuesday night, Sept. 8, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
The Germans seem to think it a good time to try to feel about for
peace. They have more to offer now than they may have again. That's
all. A man who seriously talks peace now in Paris or in London on
any terms that the Germans will consider, would float dead that
very night in the Seine or in the Thames.
The Germans have for the
time being "done-up" the Russians; but the French have shells
enough to plough the German trenches day and night (they've been at
it for a fortnight now); Joffre has been to see the Italian
generalissimo; and the English destroy German submarines now almost
as fast as the Germans send them out. I am credibly told that
several weeks ago a group of Admiralty men who are in the secret
had a little dinner to celebrate the destruction of the 50th
submarine.
While this is going on, you are talking on your side of the water
about a change in German policy! The only change is that the number
of submarines available becomes smaller and smaller, and that they
wish to use Uncle Sam's broad, fat back to crawl down on when they
have failed.
Consequently, they are laughing at Uncle Sam here--it comes near to
being ridicule, in fact, for seeming to jump at Bernstorff's
unfrank assurances. And, as I have telegraphed the President,
English opinion is--well, it is very nearly disrespectful. Men say
here (I mean our old friends) that with no disavowal of the
Lusitania, the Falaba, the Gulflight, or the Arabic or of
the Hesperian, the Germans are "stuffing" Uncle Sam, that Uncle
Sam is in the clutches of the peace-at-any-price public opinion,
that the United States will suffer any insult and do nothing.
I
hardly pick up a paper that does not have a sarcastic paragraph or
cartoon. We are on the brink of convincing the English that we'll
not act, whatever the provocation. By the English, I do not mean
the lighter, transitory public opinion, but I mean the thoughtful
men who do not wish us or expect us to fire a gun. They say that
the American democracy, since Cleveland's day, has become a mere
agglomeration of different races, without national unity, national
aims, and without courage or moral qualities.
And (I deeply regret
to say) the President is losing here the high esteem he won by his
Panama tolls repeal. They ask, why on earth did he raise the issue
if under repeated provocation he is unable to recall Gerard or to
send Bernstorff home? The Hesperian follows the Arabic; other
"liners" will follow the Hesperian, if the Germans have
submarines. And, when Sackville-West[6] was promptly sent home for
answering a private citizen's inquiry about the two political
parties, Dumba is (yet awhile) retained in spite of a far graver
piece of business.
There is a tone of sad disappointment here--not
because the most thoughtful men want us in the war (they don't),
but because for some reason, which nobody here understands, the
President, having taken a stand, seems unable to do anything.
All this is a moderate interpretation of sorrowful public opinion
here. And the result will inevitably be that they will pay far less
heed to anything we may hereafter say. In fact men now say here
every day that the American democracy has no opinion, can form no
opinion, has no moral quality, and that the word of its President
never gets as far as action even of the mildest form. The
atmosphere is very depressing. And this feeling has apparently got
beyond anybody's control. I've even heard this said: "The voice of
the United States is Mr. Wilson's: its actions are controlled by
Mr. Bryan."
So, you see, the war will go on a long long time. So far as English
opinion is concerned, the United States is useful to make
ammunition and is now thought of chiefly in this connection. Less
and less attention is paid to what we say. Even the American
telegrams to the London papers have a languid tone.
Yet recent revelations have made it clearer than ever that the same
qualities that the English accuse us of having are in them and that
these qualities are directly to blame for this war. I recall that
when I was in Germany a few weeks, six years ago, I became
convinced that Germany had prepared to fight England; I didn't
know when, but I did know that was what the war-machine had in
mind. Of course, I had no opportunities to find out anything in
particular. You were told practically that same thing by the
Kaiser, before the war began. "We are ready," said he.
Of course
the English feared it and Sir Edward put his whole life into his
effort to prevent it. The day the war began, he told me with tears
that it seemed that his life had been wasted--that his life work
had gone for naught.--Nobody could keep from wondering why England
didn't--
(Here comes a parenthesis. Word came to me a little while ago that
a Zeppelin was on its way to London. Such a remark doesn't arouse
much attention. But just as I had finished the fifth line above
this, Frank and Mrs. Page came in and challenged me to play a game
of cards before we should go to bed. We sat down, the cards were
dealt, and bang! bang!--with the deep note of an explosion. A
third, a fourth shot. We went into the street. There the Zeppelin
was revealed by a searchlight--sailing along. I think it had
probably dropped its bombs; but the aircraft guns were cracking
away at it.
Some of them shot explosive projectiles to find the
range. Now and then one such explosive would almost reach the
Zeppelin, but it was too high for them and it sailed away, the air
guns doing their ineffectual best. I couldn't see whether airplanes
were trying to shoot it or not. The searchlight revealed the
Zeppelin but nothing else.--While we were watching this battle in
the air, the maids came down from the top of the house and went
into the cellar. I think they've already gone back. You can't
imagine how little excitement it caused. It produces less fright
than any other conceivable engine of war.
We came back as soon as the Zeppelin was out of sight and the
firing had ceased; we played our game of cards; and here I am
writing you the story-all within about half an hour.--There was a
raid over London last night, too, wherein a dozen or two women and
children and a few men were killed. I haven't the slightest idea
what harm this raid to-night has done. For all I know it may not be
all done. But of all imaginable war-experiences this seems the most
futile. It interrupted a game of cards for twenty minutes!)
Now--to go on with my story: I have wondered ever since the war
began why the Allies were not better prepared--especially England
on land. England has just one big land gun--no more. Now it has
turned out, as you have doubtless read, that the British Government
were as good as told by the German Government that Germany was
going to war pretty soon--this in 1912 when Lord Haldane[7] was
sent to make friends with Germany.
The only answer he brought back was a proposition that England
should in any event remain neutral--stand aside while Germany
whipped Russia and France. This insulting proposal was kept secret
till the other day. Now, why didn't the British Cabinet inform the
people and get ready? They were afraid the English people wouldn't
believe it and would accuse them of fomenting war. The English
people were making money and pursuing their sports. Probably they
wouldn't have believed it.
So the Liberal Cabinet went on in
silence, knowing that war was coming, but not exactly when it was
coming, and they didn't make even a second big gun.
Now here was the same silence in this "democracy" that they now
complain of in ours. Rather an interesting and discouraging
parallel--isn't it? Public opinion has turned Lord Haldane out of
office because he didn't tell the public what he declares they
wouldn't have believed. If the English had raised an army in 1912,
and made a lot of big guns, Austria would not have trampled Serbia
in the earth. There would have been no war now; and the strong
European Powers might have made then the same sort of protective
peace-insurance combine that they will try to make after this war
is ended.
Query: A democracy's inability to act--how much is this
apparently inherent quality of a democracy to blame for this war
and for--other things?
When I am asked every day "Why the United States doesn't do
something--send Dumba and Bernstorff home?"--Well, it is not the
easiest question in the world to answer.
Yours heartily,
W.H.P.
P.S. This is the most comical of all worlds: While I was writing
this, it seems the maids went back upstairs and lighted their
lights without pulling their shades down--they occupy three rooms,
in front. The doorbell rang furiously. Here were more than half a
dozen policemen and special constables--must investigate! "One
light would be turned on, another would go out; another one
on!"--etc., etc. Frank tackled them, told 'em it was only the maids
going to bed, forgetting to pull down the shades. Spies and
signalling were in the air!
So, in the morning, I'll have to send
over to the Foreign Office and explain. The Zeppelin did more
"frightfulness" than I had supposed, after all. Doesn't this strike
you as comical?
W.H.P.
Friday, September 10, 1915.
P.S. The news is just come that Dumba is dismissed. That will clear
the atmosphere--a little, but only a little. Dumba committed a
diplomatic offence. The German Government has caused the death of
United States citizens, has defied us, has declared it had changed
its policy and yet has gone on with the same old policy. Besides,
Bernstorff has done everything that Dumba did except employ
Archibald, which was a mere incident of the game. The President
took a strong stand: they have disregarded it--no apology nor
reparation for a single boat that has been sunk.
Now the English
opinion of the Germans is hardly a calm, judicial opinion--of
course not. There may be facts that have not been made known. There
must be good reasons that nobody here can guess, why the President
doesn't act in the long succession of German acts against us. But
I tell you with all solemnity that British opinion and the British
Government have absolutely lost their respect for us and their
former high estimate of the President. And that former respect is
gone for good unless he acts now very quickly[8].
They will pay
nothing more than formal and polite attention to anything we may
hereafter say. This is not resentful. They don't particularly care
for us to get into the war. Their feeling (I mean among our best
old friends) is not resentful. It is simply sorrowful. They had the
highest respect for our people and our President. The Germans defy
us; we sit in silence. They conclude here that we'll submit to
anything from anybody. We'll write strong notes--nothing more.
I can't possibly exaggerate the revulsion of feeling. Members of
the Government say (in private, of course) that we'll submit to any
insult. The newspapers refuse to publish articles which attempt to
make the President's silence reasonable. "It isn't defensible,"
they say, "and they would only bring us thousands of insulting
letters from our readers." I can't think of a paper nor of a man
who has a good word to say for us--except, perhaps, a few Quaker
peace-at-any-price people. And our old friends are disappointed and
sorrowful.
They feel that we have dropped out of a position of
influence in the world.
I needn't and can't write more. Of course there are more important
things than English respect. But the English think that every Power
has lost respect for us--the Germans most of all. And (unless the
President acts very rigorously and very quickly) we'll have to get
along a long time without British respect.
W.H.P.
P.S. The last Zeppelin raid--which interrupted the game of
cards--killed more than twenty persons and destroyed more than
seven million dollars' worth of private business property--all
non-combatants!
W.H.P.
To Edward M. House
21st of September, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
The insulting cartoon that I enclose (destroy it without showing
it) is typical of, I suppose, five hundred that have appeared here
within a month. This represents the feeling and opinion of the
average man. They say we wrote brave notes and made courageous
demands, to none of which a satisfactory reply has come, but only
more outrages and no guarantee for the future. Yet we will not even
show our displeasure by sending Bernstorff home.
We've simply
"gone out," like a snuffed candle, in the regard and respect of the
vast volume of British opinion. (The last Punch had six
ridiculing allusions to our "fall.")
It's the loneliest time I've had in England. There's a tendency to
avoid me.
They can't understand here the continued declaration in the United
States that the British Government is trying to take our trade--to
use its blockade and navy with the direct purpose of giving British
trade profit out of American detentions. Of course, the Government
had no such purpose and has done no such thing--with any such
purpose. It isn't thinking about trade but only about war.
The English think they see in this the effect on our Government and
on American opinion of the German propaganda. I have had this
trade-accusation investigated half a dozen times--the accusation
that this Government is using its military power for its own trade
advantage to our detriment: it simply isn't true. They stop our
cargoes, not for their advantage, but wholly to keep things from
the enemy. Study our own trade reports.
In a word, our importers are playing (so the English think)
directly into the hands of the Germans. So matters go on from bad
to worse.
Bryce[9] is very sad. He confessed to me yesterday the utter
hopelessness of the two people's ever understanding one another.
The military situation is very blue--very blue. The general feeling
is that the long war will begin next March and end--nobody dares
predict.
W.H.P.
P.S. There's not a moral shadow of a doubt (1) that the commander
of the submarine that sunk the Arabic is dead--although he makes
reports to his government! nor (2) that the Hesperian was
torpedoed. The State Department has a piece of the torpedo.
V
The letters which Page sent directly to the President were just as frank. "Incidents occur nearly every day," he wrote to President Wilson in the autumn of 1915, "which reveal the feeling that the Germans have taken us in. Last week one of our naval men, Lieutenant McBride, who has just been ordered home, asked the Admiralty if he might see the piece of metal found on the deck of the Hesperian. Contrary to their habit, the British officer refused. 'Take my word for it,' he said. 'She was torpedoed. Why do you wish to investigate?
Your country will do nothing--will accept any excuse, any insult and--do nothing.' When McBride told me this, I went at once to the Foreign Office and made a formal request that this metal should be shown to our naval attaché, who (since Symington is with the British fleet and McBride has been ordered home) is Lieutenant Towers. Towers was sent for and everything that the Admiralty knows was shown to him and I am sending that piece of metal by this mail. But to such a pass has the usual courtesy of a British naval officer come.
There are many such instances of changed conduct. They are not hard to endure nor to answer and are of no consequence in themselves but only for what they denote. They're a part of war's bitterness. But my mind runs ahead and I wonder how Englishmen will look at this subject five years hence, and it runs afield and I wonder how the Germans will regard it. A sort of pro-German American newspaper correspondent came along the other day from the German headquarters; and he told me that one of the German generals remarked to him: 'War with America? Ach no!
Not war. If trouble should come, we'd send over a platoon of our policemen to whip your little army.' (He didn't say just how he'd send 'em.)"
To the President
American Embassy, London, Oct. 5, 1915.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I have two letters that I have lately written to you but which I
have not sent because they utterly lack good cheer. After reading
them over, I have not liked to send them. Yet I should fail of my
duty if I did not tell you bad news as well as good.
The high esteem in which our Government was held when the first
Lusitania note to Germany was sent seems all changed to
indifference or pity--not hatred or hostility, but a sort of
hopeless and sad pity. That ship was sunk just five months ago; the
German Government (or its Ambassador) is yet holding conversations
about the principle involved, making "concessions" and promises for
the future, and so far we have done nothing to hold the Germans to
accountability[10].
In the meantime their submarine fleet has been
so reduced that probably the future will take care of itself and we
shall be used as a sort of excuse for their failure. This is what
the English think and say; and they explain our failure to act by
concluding that the peace-at-any-price sentiment dominates the
Government and paralyzes it. They have now, I think, given up hope
that we will ever take any action. So deeply rooted (and, I fear,
permanent) is this feeling that every occurrence is made to fit
into and to strengthen this supposition.
When Dumba was dismissed,
they said: "Dumba, merely the abject tool of German intrigue. Why
not Bernstorff?" When the Anglo-French loan[11] was oversubscribed,
they said: "The people's sympathy is most welcome, but their
Government is paralyzed." Their respect has gone--at least for the
time being.
It is not that they expect us to go to war: many, in fact, do not
wish us to. They expected that we would be as good as our word and
hold the Germans to accountability. Now I fear they think little of
our word. I shudder to think what our relations might be if Sir
Edward Grey were to yield to another as Foreign Minister, as, of
course, he must yield at some time.
The press has less to say than it had a few weeks ago. Punch, for
instance, which ridiculed and pitied us in six cartoons and
articles in each of two succeeding numbers, entirely forgets us
this week. But they've all said their say. I am, in a sense,
isolated--lonely in a way that I have never before been. I am not
exactly avoided, I hope, but I surely am not sought. They have a
polite feeling that they do not wish to offend me and that to make
sure of this the safest course is to let me alone. There is no
mistaking the great change in the attitude of men I know, both in
official and private life.
It comes down and comes back to this--that for five months after
the sinking of the Lusitania the Germans are yet playing with us,
that we have not sent Bernstorff home, and hence that we will
submit to any rebuff or any indignity. It is under these
conditions--under this judgment of us--that we now work--the
English respect for our Government indefinitely lessened and
instead of the old-time respect a sad pity. I cannot write more.
Heartily yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
"I have authoritatively heard," Page writes to President Wilson in early September, "of a private conversation between a leading member of the Cabinet and a group of important officials all friendly to us in which all sorrowfully expressed the opinion that the United States will submit to any indignity and that no effect is now to be hoped for from its protests against unlawful submarine attacks or against anything else.
The inactivity of our Government, or its delay, which they assume is the same as inactivity, is attributed to domestic politics or to the lack of national, consciousness or unity.
"No explanation has appeared in the British press of our Government's inactivity or of any regret or promise of reparation by Germany for the sinking of the Lusitania, the Falaba, the Gulflight, the Nebraskan, the Arabic, or the Hesperian, nor any explanation of a week's silence about the Dumba letter; and the conclusion is drawn that, in the absence of action by us, all these acts have been practically condoned.
"I venture to suggest that such explanations be made public as will remove, if possible, the practically unanimous conclusion here that our Government will permit these and similar future acts to be explained away. I am surprised almost every hour by some new evidence of the loss of respect for our Government, which, since the sinking of the Arabic, has become so great as to warrant calling it a complete revulsion of English feeling toward the United States. There is no general wish for us to enter the war, but there is genuine sorrow that we are thought to submit to any indignity, especially after having taken a firm stand.
I conceive I should be lacking in duty if I did not report this rapid and unfortunate change in public feeling, which seems likely to become permanent unless facts are quickly made public which may change it."
- * * * *
There are many expressions of such feelings in Page's letters of this time. They brought only the most perfunctory acknowledgment from the White House. On January 3, 1916, Page sent the President a mass of clippings from the British press, all criticizing the Wilson Administration in unrestrained terms. In his comment on these, he writes the President:
"Public opinion, both official and unofficial, is expressed by these newspaper comments, with far greater restraint than it is expressed in private conversation. Ridicule of the Administration runs through the programmes of the theatres; it inspires hundreds of cartoons; it is a staple of conversation at private dinners and in the clubs. The most serious class of Englishmen, including the best friends of the United States, feel that the Administration's reliance on notes has reduced our Government to a third-or fourth-rate power.
There is even talk of spheres of German influence in the United States as in China. No government could fall lower in English opinion than we shall fall if more notes are sent to Austria or to Germany. The only way to keep any shred of English respect is the immediate dismissal without more parleying of every German and Austrian official at Washington. Nobody here believes that such an act would provoke war.
"I can do no real service by mincing matters. My previous telegrams and letters have been purposely restrained as this one is. We have now come to the parting of the ways. If English respect be worth preserving at all, it can be preserved only by immediate action. Any other course than immediate severing of diplomatic relations with both Germany and Austria will deepen the English opinion into a conviction that the Administration was insincere when it sent the Lusitania notes and that its notes and protests need not be taken seriously on any subject.
And English opinion is allied opinion. The Italian Ambassador[12] said to me, 'What has happened? The United States of to-day is not the United States I knew fifteen years ago, when I lived in Washington.' French officers and members of the Government who come here express themselves even more strongly than do the British. The British newspapers to-day publish translations of ridicule of the United States from German papers."
To the President
London,
January 5, 1916.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I wish--an impossible thing of course--that some sort of guidance
could be given to the American correspondents of the English
newspapers. Almost every day they telegraph about the visits of the
Austrian Chargé or the German Ambassador to the State Department to
assure Mr. Lansing that their governments will of course make a
satisfactory explanation of the latest torpedo-act in the
Mediterranean or to "take one further step in reaching a
satisfactory understanding about the Lusitania." They usually go
on to say also that more notes are in preparation to Germany or to
Austria.
The impression made upon the European mind is that the
German and Austrian officials in Washington are leading the
Administration on to endless discussion, endless notes, endless
hesitation.
Nobody in Europe regards their pledges or promises as
worth anything at all: the Arabic follows the Lusitania, the
Hesperian follows the Arabic, the Persia follows the
Ancona. "Still conferences and notes continue," these people say,
"proving that the American Government, which took so proper and
high a stand in the Lusitania notes, is paralyzed--in a word is
hoodwinked and 'worked' by the Germans." And so long as these
diplomatic representatives are permitted to remain in the United
States, "to explain," "to parley" and to declare that the
destruction of American lives and property is disavowed by their
governments, atrocities on sea and land will of course continue;
and they feel that our Government, by keeping these German and
Austrian representatives in Washington, condones and encourages
them and their governments.
This is a temperate and even restrained statement of the English
feeling and (as far as I can make out) of the whole European
feeling.
It has been said here that every important journal published in
neutral or allied European countries, daily, weekly, or monthly,
which deals with public affairs, has expressed a loss of respect
for the United States Government and that most of them make
continuous severe criticisms (with surprise and regret) of our
failure by action to live up to the level of our Lusitania notes.
I had (judiciously) two American journalists, resident here--men of
judgment and character--to inquire how true this declaration is.
After talking with neutral and allied journalists here and with men
whose business it is to read the journals of the Continent, they
reported that this declaration is substantially true--that the
whole European press (outside Germany and its allies) uses the same
tone toward our Government that the English press uses--to-day,
disappointment verging on contempt; and many of them explain our
keeping diplomatic intercourse with Germany by saying that we are
afraid of the German vote, or of civil war, or that the
peace-at-any-price people really rule the United States and have
paralyzed our power to act--even to cut off diplomatic relations
with governments that have insulted and defied us.
Another (similar) declaration is that practically all men of public
influence in England and in the European allied and neutral
countries have publicly or privately expressed themselves to the
same effect. The report that I have about this is less definite
than about the newspapers, for, of course, no one can say just what
proportion of men of public influence have so expressed themselves;
but the number who have so expressed themselves is overwhelming.
In this Kingdom, where I can myself form some opinion more or less
accurate, and where I can check or verify my opinion by various
methods--I am afraid, as I have frequently already reported, that
the generation now living will never wholly regain the respect for
our Government that it had a year ago. I will give you three little
indications of this feeling; it would be easy to write down
hundreds of them:
(One) The governing class: Mr. X [a cabinet member] told Mrs. Page
a few nights ago that for sentimental reasons only he would be
gratified to see the United States in the war along with the
Allies, but that merely sentimental reasons were not a sufficient
reason for war--by no means; that he felt most grateful for the
sympathetic attitude of the large mass of the American people, that
he had no right to expect anything from our Government, whose
neutral position was entirely proper.
Then he added; "But what I
can't for the life of me understand is your Government's failure
to express its disapproval of the German utter disregard of its
Lusitania notes. After eight months, it has done nothing but
write more notes. My love for America, I must confess, is offended
at this inaction and--puzzled. I can't understand it. You will
pardon me, I am sure."
(Two) "Middle Class" opinion: A common nickname for Americans in
the financial and newspaper districts of London is "Too-prouds."
(Three) The man in the street: At one of the moving picture shows
in a large theatre a little while ago they filled in an interval by
throwing on the screen the picture of the monarch, or head of
state, and of the flag of each of the principal nations. When the
American picture appeared, there was such hissing and groaning as
caused the managers hastily to move that picture off the screen.
Some time ago I wrote House of some such incidents and expressions
as these; and he wrote me that they were only part and parcel of
the continuous British criticism of their own Government--in other
words, a part of the passing hysteria of war. This remark shows how
House was living in an atmosphere of illusion.
As the matter stands to-day our Government has sunk lower, as
regards British and European opinion, than it has ever been in our
time, not as a part of the hysteria of war but as a result of this
process of reasoning, whether it be right or wrong:
We said that we should hold the Germans to strict accountability on
account of the Lusitania. We have not settled that yet and we
still allow the German Ambassador to discuss it after the
Hesperian and other such acts showed that his Arabic pledge was
worthless.
The Lusitania grows larger and larger in European memory and
imagination. It looks as if it would become the great type of war
atrocities and barbarities. I have seen pictures of the drowned
women and children used even on Christmas cards. And there is
documentary proof in our hands that the warning, which was really
an advance announcement, of that disaster was paid for by the
German Ambassador and charged to his Government. It is the
Lusitania that has caused European opinion to regard our foreign
policy as weak. It is not the wish for us to go to war. No such
general wish exists.
I do not know, Mr. President, who else, if anybody, puts these
facts before you with this complete frankness. But I can do no less
and do my duty.
No Englishman--except two who were quite intimate friends--has
spoken to me about our Government for months, but I detect all the
time a tone of pity and grief in their studied courtesy and in
their avoidance of the subject. And they talk with every other
American in this Kingdom. It is often made unpleasant for Americans
in the clubs and in the pursuit of their regular business and
occupations; and it is always our inaction about the Lusitania.
Our controversy with the British Government causes little feeling
and that is a sort of echo of the Lusitania.
They feel that we
have not lived up to our promises and professions.
That is the whole story.
Believe me always heartily,
WALTER H. PAGE.
- * * * *
This dismissal of Dumba and of the Attachés has had little more effect on opinion here than the dismissal of the Turkish Ambassador[13].
Sending these was regarded as merely kicking the dogs of the man who had stolen our sheep.
VI
One of the reasons why Page felt so intensely about American policy at this time was his conviction that the severance of diplomatic relations, in the latter part of 1915, or the early part of 1916, in itself would have brought the European War to an end. This was a conviction from which he never departed. Count Bernstorff was industriously creating the impression in the United States that his dismissal would immediately cause war between Germany and the United States, and there is little doubt that the Administration accepted this point of view.
But Page believed that this was nothing but Prussian bluff. The severance of diplomatic relations at that time, in Page's opinion, would have convinced the Germans of the hopelessness of their cause. In spite of the British blockade, Germany was drawing enormous quantities of food supplies from the United States, and without these supplies she could not maintain indefinitely her resistance. The severance of diplomatic relations would naturally have been accompanied by an embargo suspending trade between the United States and the Fatherland.
Moreover, the consideration that was mainly leading Germany to hope for success was the belief that she could embroil the United States and Great Britain over the blockade. A break with Germany would of course mean an end to that manoeuvre. Page regarded all Mr. Wilson's attempts to make peace in 1914 and early 1915--before the Lusitania--as mistakes, for reasons that have already been set forth. Now, however, he believed that the President had a real opportunity to end the war and the unparalleled suffering which it was causing.
The mere dismissal of Bernstorff, in the Ambassador's opinion, would accomplish this result.
In a communication sent to the President on February 15, 1916, he made this plain.
To the President
February 15, 7 P.M.
The Cabinet has directed the Censor to suppress, as far as he can
with prudence, comment which is unfavourable to the United States.
He has taken this action because the public feeling against the
Administration is constantly increasing. Because the Lusitania
controversy has been going on so long, and because the Germans are
using it in their renewed U-boat campaign, the opinion of this
country has reached a point where only prompt action can bring a
turn in the tide.
Therefore my loyalty to you would not be complete
if I should refrain from sending, in the most respectful terms, the
solemn conviction which I hold about our opportunity and our duty.
If you immediately refuse to have further parley or to yield one
jot or tittle of your original Lusitania notes, and if you at
once break diplomatic relations with the German Empire, and then
declare the most vigorous embargo of the Central Powers, you will
quickly end the war. There will be an immediate collapse in German
credit. If there are any Allies who are wavering, such action will
hold them in line. Certain European neutrals--Sweden, Rumania,
Greece, and others--will put up a firm resistance to Germanic
influences and certain of them will take part with Great Britain
and France.
There will be an end at once to the German propaganda,
which is now world-wide. The moral weight of our country will be a
determining influence and bring an early peace. The credit you
will receive for such a decision will make you immortal and even
the people of Germany will be forever grateful.
It is my conviction that we would not be called upon to fire a gun
or to lose one human life.
Above all, such an action will settle the whole question of
permanent peace. The absolute and grateful loyalty of the whole
British Empire, of the British Fleet, and of all the Allied
countries will be ours. The great English-speaking nations will be
able to control the details of the peace and this without any
formal alliance. There will be an incalculable saving of human life
and of treasure. Such an act will make it possible for Germany to
give in honourably and with good grace because the whole world will
be against her.
Her bankrupt and blockaded people will bring such
pressure to bear that the decision will be hastened.
The sympathies of the American people will be brought in line with
the Administration.
If we settle the Lusitania question by compromising in any way
your original demands, or if we permit it to drag on longer,
America can have no part in bringing the war to an end. The current
of allied opinion will run so strongly against the Administration
that no censorship and no friendly interference by an allied
government can stem the distrust of our Government which is now so
strong in Europe.
We shall gain by any further delay only a dangerous, thankless, and
opulent isolation. The Lusitania is the turning point in our
history. The time to act is now.
PAGE.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: The Ambassador's granddaughter.]
[Footnote 2: "A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865," edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford. Vol. I, p. 84.]
[Footnote 3: "The Life and Letters of John Hay," by William Roscoe Thayer. Vol. II, p. 166.]
[Footnote 4: On September 6th, certain documents seriously compromising Dr. Constantin Dumba, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States, were published in the British press. They disclosed that Dr. Dumba was fomenting strikes in the United States and conducting other intrigues.
The American Government gave Dr. Dumba his passports on September 17th.]
[Footnote 5: August 26th, Count Bernstorff gave a pledge to the United States Government, that, in future, German submarines would not attack liners without warning. This promise was almost immediately violated.]
[Footnote 6: Sir Lionel Sackville-West was British Minister to the United States from 1881 to 1888. In the latter year a letter was published which he had written to an American citizen of British origin, the gist of which was that the reëlection of President Cleveland would be of advantage to British interests. For this gross interference in American domestic affairs, President Cleveland immediately handed Sir Lionel his passports. The incident ended his diplomatic career.]
[Footnote 7: In this passage the Ambassador touches on one of the bitterest controversies of the war. In order completely to understand the issues involved and to obtain Lord Haldane's view, the reader should consult the very valuable book recently published by Lord Haldane: "Before the War." Chapter II tells the story of Lord Haldane's visit to the Kaiser, and succeeding chapters give the reasons why the creation of a huge British army in preparation for the war was not a simple matter.]
[Footnote 8: The italics are Page's.]
[Footnote 9: Viscount Bryce, author of "The American Commonwealth" and British Ambassador to the United States, 1907-1913.]
[Footnote 10: In a communication sent February 10, 1915, President Wilson warned the German Government that he would hold it to a "strict accountability" for the loss of American lives by illegal submarine attack.]
[Footnote 11: A reference to the Anglo-French loan for $500,000,000, placed in the United States in the autumn of 1915.]
[Footnote 12: The Marquis Imperiali.]
[Footnote 13: Rustem Bey, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, was sent home early in the war, for publishing indiscreet newspaper and magazine articles.]
CHAPTER XV
THE AMBASSADOR AND THE LAWYERS
References in the foregoing letters show that Page was still having his troubles over the blockade. In the latter part of 1915, indeed, the negotiations with Sir Edward Grey on this subject had reached their second stage. The failure of Washington to force upon Great Britain an entirely new code of naval warfare--the Declaration of London--has already been described. This failure had left both the British Foreign Office and the American State Department in an unsatisfactory frame of mind.
The Foreign Office regarded Washington with suspicion, for the American attempt to compel Great Britain to adopt a code of naval warfare which was exceedingly unfavourable to that country and exceedingly favourable to Germany, was susceptible of a sinister interpretation. The British rejection of these overtures, on the other hand, had evidently irritated the international lawyers at Washington.
Mr. Lansing now abandoned his efforts to revolutionize maritime warfare and confined himself to specific protests and complaints. His communications to the London Embassy dealt chiefly with particular ships and cargoes. Yet his persistence in regarding all these problems from a strictly legalistic point of view Page regarded as indicating a restricted sense of statesmanship.
To Edward M. House
London, August 4, 1915.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
... The lawyer-way in which the Department goes on in its dealings
with Great Britain is losing us the only great international
friendship that we have any chance of keeping or that is worth
having. Whatever real principle we have to uphold with Great
Britain--that's all right. I refer only to the continuous series of
nagging incidents--always criticism, criticism, criticism of small
points--points that we have to yield at last, and never anything
constructive. I'll illustrate what I mean by a few incidents that I
can recall from memory. If I looked up the record, I should find a
very, very much larger list.
(1) We insisted and insisted and insisted, not once but half a
dozen times, at the very beginning of the war, on England's
adoption of the Declaration of London entire in spite of the fact
that Parliament had distinctly declined to adopt it. Of course we
had to give in--after we had produced a distinctly unfriendly
atmosphere and much feeling.
(2) We denied the British right to put copper on the contraband
list--much to their annoyance. Of course we had at last to
acquiesce. They were within their rights.
(3) We protested against bringing ships into port to examine them.
Of course we had to give in--after producing irritation.
(4) We made a great fuss about stopped telegrams. We have no case
at all; but, even after acknowledging that we have no case, every
Pouch continues to bring telegrams with the request that I ask an
explanation why they were stopped. Such explanations are
practically refused. I have 500 telegrams. Periodically I wire the
state of the case and ask for more specific instructions. I never
get an answer to these requests. But the Department continues to
send the telegrams! We confessedly have no case here; and this
method can produce nothing but irritation.
I could extend this list to 100 examples--of mere lawyer-like
methods--mere useless technicalities and objections which it is
obvious in the beginning cannot be maintained. A similar method is
now going on about cotton. Now this is not the way Sir Edward Grey
takes up business. It's not the way I've done business all my life,
nor that you have, nor other frank men who mean what they say and
do not say things they do not mean. The constant continuation of
this method is throwing away the real regard and confidence of the
British Government and of the British public--very fast, too.
I sometimes wish there were not a lawyer in the world. I heard the
President say once that it took him twenty years to recover from
his legal habit of mind. Well, his Administration is suffering from
it to a degree that is pathetic and that will leave bad results for
100 years.
I suspect that in spite of all the fuss we have made we shall at
last come to acknowledge the British blockade; for it is pretty
nearly parallel to the United States blockade of the South during
our Civil War. The only difference is--they can't make the blockade
of the Baltic against the traffic from the Scandinavian neutral
states effective. That's a good technical objection; but, since
practically all the traffic between those States and Germany is in
our products, much of the real force of it is lost.
If a protest is made against cotton being made contraband--it'll
amount to nothing and give only irritation. It will only play into
Hoke Smith[14]--German hands and accomplish nothing here. We make
as much fuss about points which we have silently to yield later as
about a real principle. Hence they all say that the State
Department is merely captious, and they pay less and less attention
to it and care less and less for American opinion--if only they can
continue to get munitions. We are reducing English regard to this
purely mercenary basis....
We are--under lawyers' quibbling--drifting apart very rapidly, to
our complete isolation from the sympathy of the whole world.
Yours forever sincerely,
W.H.P.
Page refers in this letter to the "blockade"; this was the term which the British Government itself used to describe its restrictive measures against German commerce, and it rapidly passed into common speech. Yet the truth is that Great Britain never declared an actual blockade against Germany. A realization of this fact will clear up much that is obscure in the naval warfare of the next two years.
At the beginning of the Civil War, President Lincoln laid an interdict on all the ports of the Confederacy; the ships of all nations were forbidden entering or leaving them: any ship which attempted to evade this restriction, and was captured doing so, was confiscated, with its cargo. That was a blockade, as the term has always been understood. A blockade, it is well to keep in mind, is a procedure which aims at completely closing the blockaded country from all commercial intercourse with the world.
A blockading navy, if the blockade is successful, or "effective," converts the whole country into a beleaguered fortress, just as an army, surrounding a single town, prevents goods and people from entering or leaving it. Precisely as it is the purpose of a besieging army to starve a particular city or territory into submission, so it is the aim of a blockading fleet to enforce the same treatment on the nation as a whole.
It is also essential to keep in mind that the question of contraband has nothing to do with a blockade, for, under this drastic method of making warfare, everything is contraband. Contraband is a term applied to cargoes, such as rifles, machine guns, and the like, which are needed in the prosecution of war.
That a belligerent nation has the right to intercept such munitions on the way to its enemy has been admitted for centuries. Differences of opinion have raged only as to the extent to which this right could be carried--the particular articles, that is, that constituted contraband, and the methods adopted in exercising it. But the important point to be kept in mind is that where there is a blockade, there is no contraband list--for everything automatically becomes contraband. The seizure of contraband on the high seas is a war measure which is availed of only in cases in which the blockade has not been established.
Great Britain, when she declared war on Germany, did not follow President Lincoln's example and lay the whole of the German coast under interdict. Perhaps one reason for this inaction was a desire not unduly to offend neutrals, especially the United States; but the more impelling motive was geographical. The fact is that a blockade of the German seacoast would accomplish little in the way of keeping materials out of Germany. A glance at the map of northwestern Europe will make this fact clear. In the first place the seacoast of Germany is a small affair.
In the North Sea the German coast is a little indentation, not more than two hundred miles long, wedged in between the longer coastlines of Holland and Denmark; in the Baltic it is somewhat more extensive, but the entrances to this sea are so circuitous and treacherous that the suggestion of a blockade here is not a practicable one. The greatest ports of Germany are located on this little North Sea coastline or on its rivers--Hamburg and Bremen.
It might therefore be assumed that any nation which successfully blockaded these North Sea ports would have strangled the commerce of Germany. That is far from being the case. The point is that the political boundaries of Germany are simply fictions, when economic considerations are involved. Holland, on the west, and Denmark, on the north, are as much a part of the German transportation system as though these two countries were parts of the German Empire.
Their territories and the territories of Germany are contiguous; the railroad and the canal systems of Germany, Holland, and Denmark are practically one. Such ports as Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Copenhagen are just as useful to Germany for purposes of commerce as are Hamburg and Bremen, and, in fact, a special commercial arrangement with Rotterdam has made that city practically a port of Germany since 1868. These considerations show how ineffective would be a blockade of the German coast which did not also comprehend the coast of Holland and Denmark.
Germany could still conduct her commerce through these neighbouring countries. And at this point the great difficulty arose. A blockade is an act of war and can be applied only to a country upon which war has been declared. Great Britain had declared war on Germany and could therefore legally close her ports; she had not declared war on Holland and Denmark, and therefore could not use the same measure against those friendly countries. Consequently the blockade was useless to Great Britain; and so, in the first six months of the war, the Admiralty fell back upon the milder system of declaring certain articles contraband of war and seizing ships that were suspected of carrying them to Germany.
A geographical accident had apparently largely destroyed the usefulness of the British fleet and had guaranteed Germany an unending supply of those foodstuffs without which she could not maintain her resistance for any extended period. Was Great Britain called upon to accept this situation and to deny herself the use of the blockade in this, the greatest struggle in her history?
Unless the British fleet could stop cargoes which were really destined to Germany but which were bound for neutral ports, Great Britain could not win the war; if the British fleet could intercept such cargoes, then the chances strongly favoured victory. The experts of the Foreign Office searched the history of blockades and found something which resembled a precedent in the practices of the American Navy during the Civil War.
In that conflict Nassau, in the Bahamas, and Matamoros, in Mexico, played a part not unlike that played by Rotterdam and Copenhagen in the recent struggle.
These were both neutral ports and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the United States, just as Rotterdam and Copenhagen were outside the jurisdiction of Great Britain. They were the ports of powers with which the United States was at peace, and therefore they could not be blockaded, just as Amsterdam and Copenhagen were ports of powers with which Great Britain was now at peace.
Trade from Great Britain to the Bahamas and Mexico was ostensibly trade from one neutral port to another neutral port in the same sense as was trade from the United States to Holland and Denmark. Yet the fact is that the "neutrality" of this trade, in the Civil War, from Great Britain to the Bahamas and Mexico, was the most transparent subterfuge; such trade was not "neutral" in the slightest degree. It consisted almost entirely of contraband of war and was intended for the armies of the Confederate States, then in arms against the Federal Government.
What is the reason, our Government asked, that these gentle and unwarlike inhabitants of the Bahamas have so suddenly developed such an enormous appetite for percussion caps, rifles, cannon, and other instruments of warfare? The answer, of course, lay upon the surface; the cargoes were intended for reshipment into the Southern States, and they were, in fact, immediately so reshipped.
The American Government, which has always regarded realities as more important than logic, brushed aside the consideration that this trade was conducted through neutral ports, unhesitatingly seized these ships and condemned both the ships and their cargoes.
Its action was without legal precedent, but our American courts devised a new principle of international law to cover the case--that of "continuous voyage" or "ultimate destination." Under this new doctrine it was maintained that cargoes of contraband could be seized anywhere upon the high seas, even though they were going from one neutral port to another, if it could be demonstrated that this contraband was really on its way to the enemy.
The mere fact that it was transshipped at an intermediate neutral port was not important; the important point was the "ultimate destination." British shippers naturally raged over these decisions, but they met with little sympathy from their own government. Great Britain filed no protest against the doctrine of "continuous voyage," but recognized its fundamental soundness, and since 1865 this doctrine has been a part of international law.
Great Britain's good sense in acquiescing in our Civil War practices now met its reward; for these decisions of American courts proved a godsend in her hour of trial. The one neutral from which trouble was anticipated was the United States. What better way to meet this situation than to base British maritime warfare upon the decisions of American courts?
What more ideal solution of the problem than to make Chief Justice Chase, of the United States Supreme Court, really the author of the British "blockade" against Germany? The policy of the British Foreign Office was to use the sea power of Great Britain to crush the enemy, but to do it in a way that would not alienate American sympathy and American support; clearly the one way in which both these ends could be attained was to frame these war measures upon the pronouncements of American prize courts.
In a broad sense this is precisely what Sir Edward Grey now proceeded to do. There was a difference, of course, which Great Britain's enemies in the American Senate--such men as Senator Hoke Smith, of Georgia, and Senator Thomas Walsh, of Montana--proceeded to point out; but it was a difference of degree. Great Britain based her blockade measures upon the American principle of "ultimate destination," but it was necessary considerably to extend that doctrine in order to meet the necessities of the new situation.
President Lincoln had applied this principle to absolute contraband, such as powder, shells, rifles, and other munitions of war. Great Britain now proceeded to apply it to that nebulous class of commodities known as "conditional contraband," the chief of which was foodstuffs. If the United States, while a war was pending, could evolve the idea of "ultimate destination" and apply it to absolute contraband, could not Great Britain, while another war was pending, carry it one degree further and make it include conditional contraband?
Thus reasoned the British Foreign Office. To this Mr.
Lansing replied that to stop foodstuffs on the way to Germany through a neutral port was simply to blockade a neutral port, and that this was something utterly without precedent. Seizing contraband is not an act of war against the nation whose ships are seized; blockading a port is an act of war; what right therefore had Great Britain to adopt measures against Holland, Denmark, and Sweden which virtually amounted to a blockade?
This is the reason why Great Britain, in the pronouncement of March 1, 1915, and the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, did not describe these measures as a "blockade." President Wilson described his attack on Mexico in 1914 as "measures short of war," and now someone referred to the British restrictions on neutral commerce as "measures short of blockade." The British sought another escape from their predicament by justifying this proceeding, not on the general principles of warfare, but on the ground of reprisal.
Germany declared her submarine warfare on merchant ships on February 4, 1915; Great Britain replied with her announcement of March 1st, in which she declared her intention of preventing "commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany."
The British advanced this procedure as a retaliation for the illegal warfare which Germany had declared on merchant shipping, both that of the enemy and of neutrals. "The British and French governments will therefore hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, and origin."
This sentence accurately describes the purposes of a blockade--to cut the enemy off from all commercial relations with the outside world; yet the procedure Great Britain now proposed to follow was not that of a blockade. When this interdict is classically laid, any ship that attempts to run the lines is penalized with confiscation, along with its cargo; but such a penalty was not to be exacted in the present instance.
Great Britain now proposed to purchase cargoes of conditional contraband discovered on seized ships and return the ships themselves to their owners, and this soon became the established practice. Not only did the Foreign Office purchase all cotton which was seized on its way to Germany, but it took measures to maintain the price in the markets of the world. In the succeeding months Southern statesmen in both Houses of Congress railed against the British seizure of their great staple, yet the fact was that cotton was all this time steadily advancing in price.
When Senator Hoke Smith made a long speech advocating an embargo on the shipment of munitions as a punishment to Great Britain for stopping American cotton on the way to Germany, the acute John Sharp Williams, of Mississippi, arose in the Senate and completely annihilated the Georgia politician by demonstrating how the Southern planters were growing rich out of the war.
That the so-called "blockade" situation was a tortuous one must be apparent from this attempt to set forth the salient facts. The basic point was that there could be no blockade of Germany unless the neutral ports of contiguous countries were also blockaded, and Great Britain believed that she had found a precedent for doing this in the operations of the American Navy in the Civil War. But it is obvious that the situation was one which would provide a great feast for the lawyers.
That Page sympathized with this British determination to keep foodstuffs out of Germany, his correspondence shows. Day after day the "protests" from Washington rained upon his desk. The history of our foreign relations for 1915 and 1916 is largely made up of an interminable correspondence dealing with seized cargoes, and the routine of the Embassy was an unending nightmare of "demands," "complaints," "precedents," "cases," "notes," "detentions" of Chicago meats, of Southern cotton, and the like.
The American Embassy in London contains hundreds of volumes of correspondence which took place during Page's incumbency; more material has accumulated for those five years than for the preceding century and a quarter of the Government's existence. The greater part of this mass deals with intercepted cargoes.
The following extract from a letter which Page wrote at this time gives a fair idea of the atmosphere that prevailed in London while this correspondence was engaging the Ambassador's mind:
The truth is, in their present depressed mood, the United States is
forgotten--everything's forgotten but the one great matter in hand.
For the moment at least, the English do not care what we do or what
we think or whether we exist--except those critics of
things-in-general who use us as a target since they must take a
crack at somebody. And I simply cannot describe the curious effect
that is produced on men here by the apparent utter lack of
understanding in the United States of the phase the war has now
entered and of the mood that this phase has brought.
I pick up an
American paper eight days old and read solemn evidence to show that
the British Government is interrupting our trade in order to
advance its own at our expense, whereas the truth is that the
British Government hasn't given six seconds' thought in six months
to anybody's trade--not even its own.
When I am asked to inquire
why Pfister and Schmidt's telegram from New York to Schimmelpfenig
and Johann in Holland was stopped (the reason is reasonably
obvious), I try to picture to myself the British Minister in
Washington making inquiry of our Government on the day after Bull
Run, why the sailing boat loaded with persimmon blocks to make golf
clubs is delayed in Hampton Roads.
I think I have neither heard nor read anything from the United
States in three months that didn't seem so remote as to suggest the
captain of the sailing ship from Hongkong who turned up at
Southampton in February and had not even heard that there was a
war.
All day long I see and hear women who come to ask if I can
make inquiry about their sons and husbands, "dead or missing," with
an interval given to a description of a man half of whose body was
splashed against a brick wall last night on the Strand when a
Zeppelin bomb tore up the street and made projectiles of the
pavement; as I walk to and from the Embassy the Park is full of
wounded and their nurses; every man I see tells me of a new death;
every member of the Government talks about military events or of
Balkan venality; the man behind the counter at the cigar store
reads me part of a letter just come from his son, telling how he
advanced over a pile of dead Germans and one of them grunted and
turned under his feet-they (the English alone) are spending
$25,000,000 a day to keep this march going over dead Germans; then
comes a telegram predicting blue ruin for American importers and a
cheerless Christmas for American children if a cargo of German toys
be not quickly released at Rotterdam, and I dimly recall the
benevolent unction with which American children last Christmas sent
a shipload of toys to this side of the world--many of them for
German children--to the tune of "God bless us all"--do you wonder
we often have to pinch ourselves to find out if we are we; and
what year of the Lord is it?
What is the vital thing--the killing
of fifty people last night by a Zeppelin within sight of St.
Paul's
on one side and of Westminster Abbey on the other, or is it making
representations to Sir Edward Grey, who has hardly slept for a week
because his despatches from Sofia, Athens, Belgrade, and Salonika
come at all hours, each possibly reporting on which side a new
government may throw its army--to decide perhaps the fate of the
canal leading to Asia, the vast British Asiatic empire at stake--is
it making representations to Sir Edward while his mind is thus
occupied, that it is of the greatest importance to the United
States Government that a particular German who is somewhere in this
Kingdom shall be permitted to go to the United States because he
knows how to dye sealskins and our sealskins are yet undyed and the
winter is coming?
There will be no new sealskins here, for every
man and woman must give half his income to keep the cigarman's son
marching over dead Germans, some of whom grunt and turn under his
feet. Dumba is at Falmouth to-day and gets just two lines in the
newspapers. Nothing and nobody gets three lines unless he or it in
some way furthers the war. Every morning the Washington despatches
say that Mr. Lansing is about to send a long note to England.
England won't read it till there comes a lull in the fighting or in
the breathless diplomatic struggle with the Balkans.
London and the
Government are now in much the same mood that Washington and
Lincoln's administration were in after Lee had crossed the Potomac
on his way to Gettysburg. Northcliffe, the Lord of Yellow Journals,
but an uncommonly brilliant fellow, has taken to his bed from sheer
nervous worry. "The revelations that are imminent," says he, "will
shake the world--the incompetence of the Government, the losses
along the Dardanelles, the throwing away of British chances in the
Balkans, perhaps the actual defeat of the Allies." I regard Lord
Northcliffe less as an entity than as a symptom.
But he is always
very friendly to us and he knows the United States better than any
Englishman that I know except Bryce. He and Bryce are both much
concerned about our Note's coming just "at this most distressing
time." "If it come when we are calmer, no matter; but now it cannot
receive attention and many will feel that the United States has hit
on a most unhappy moment--almost a cruel moment--to remind us of
our sins."--That's the substance of what they say.
Overwork, or perhaps mainly the indescribable strain on the nerves
and vitality of men, caused by this experience, for which in fact
men are not built, puts one of our staff after another in bed. None
has been seriously sick: the malady takes some form of "grip." On
the whole we've been pretty lucky in spite of this almost regular
temporary breakdown of one man after another. I've so far escaped.
But I am grieved to hear that Whitlock is abed--"no physical
ailment whatever--just worn out," his doctor says.
I have tried to
induce him and his wife to come here and make me a visit; but one
characteristic of this war-malady is the conviction of the victim
that he is somehow necessary to hold the world together. About
twice a week I get to the golf links and take the risk of the
world's falling apart and thus escape both illness and its
illusions.
"I cannot begin to express my deep anxiety and even uneasiness about the relations of these two great governments and peoples," Page wrote about this time. "The friendship of the United States and Great Britain is all that now holds the world together. It is the greatest asset of civilization left. All the cargoes of copper and oil in the world are not worth as much to the world.
Yet when a shipper's cargo is held up he does not think of civilization and of the future of mankind and of free government; he thinks only of his cargo and of the indignity that he imagines has been done him; and what is the American Government for if not to protect his rights? Of course he's right; but there must be somebody somewhere who sees things in their right proportion. The man with an injury rushes to the Department of State--quite properly. He is in a mood to bring England to book. Now comes the critical stage in the journey of his complaint.
The State Department hurries it on to me--very properly; every man's right must be guarded and defended--a right to get his cargo to market, a right to get on a steamer at Queenstown, a right to have his censored telegram returned, any kind of a right, if he have a right. Then the Department, not wittingly, I know, but humanly, almost inevitably, in the great rush of overwork, sends his 'demands' to me, catching much of his tone and apparently insisting on the removal of his grievance as a right, without knowing all the facts in the case.
The telegrams that come to me are full of 'protests' and 'demands'--protest and demand this, protest and demand that. A man from Mars who should read my book of telegrams received during the last two months would find it difficult to explain how the two governments have kept at peace. It is this serious treatment of trifling grievances which makes us feel here that the exactions and dislocations and necessary disturbances of this war are not understood at home.
"I assure you (and there are plenty of facts to prove it) that this Government (both for unselfish and selfish reasons) puts a higher value on our friendship than on any similar thing in the world. They will go--they are going--the full length to keep it. But, in proportion to our tendency to nag them about little things will the value set on our friendship diminish and will their confidence in our sincerity decline."
- * * * *
The note which Lord Bryce and Lord Northcliffe so dreaded reached the London Embassy in October, 1915. The State Department had spent nearly six months in preparing it; it was the American answer to the so-called blockade established by the Order in Council of the preceding March.
Evidently its contents fulfilled the worst forebodings:
To Edward M. House
London, November 12, 1915.
DEAR HOUSE:
I have a great respect for the British Navy. Admiral Jellicoe now
has under his command 3,000 ships of all sorts-far and away the
biggest fleet, I think, that was ever assembled. For the first time
since the ocean was poured out, one navy practically commands all
the seas: nothing sails except by its grace. It is this fleet of
course that will win the war. The beginning of the end--however far
off yet the end may be--is already visible by reason of the
economic pressure on Germany.
But for this fleet, by the way,
London would be in ruins, all its treasure looted; every French
seacoast city and the Italian peninsula would be as Belgium and
Poland are; and thousands of English women would be violated--just
as dead French girls are found in many German trenches that have
been taken in France. Hence I greatly respect the British fleet.
We have a good navy, too, for its size, and a naval personnel as
good as any afloat. I hear--with much joy--that we are going to
make our navy bigger--as much bigger (God save the mark!) as Bryan
will permit.
Now, whatever the future bring, since any fighting enterprise that
may ever be thrust on us will be just and justified, we must see to
it that we win, as doubtless we shall and as hitherto we always
have won. We must be dead sure of winning. Well, whatever fight may
be thrust on us by anybody, anywhere, at any time, for any
reason--if it only be generally understood beforehand that our
fleet and the British fleet shoot the same language, there'll be no
fight thrust upon us. The biggest bully in the world wouldn't dare
kick the sorriest dog we have.
Here, therefore, is a Peace
Programme for you--the only basis for a permanent peace in the
world. There's no further good in having venerable children build
houses of sand at The Hague; there's no further good in peace
organizations or protective leagues to enforce peace. We had as
well get down to facts. So far as ensuring peace is concerned the
biggest fact in the world is the British fleet. The next biggest
fact is the American fleet, because of itself and still more
because of the vast reserve power of the United States which it
implies.
If these two fleets perfectly understand one another about
the undesirability of wars of aggression, there'll be no more big
wars as long as this understanding continues. Such an understanding
calls for no treaty--it calls only for courtesy.
And there is no other peace-basis worth talking about--by men who
know how the world is governed.
Since I have lived here I have spent my days and nights, my poor
brain, and my small fortune all most freely and gladly to get some
understanding of the men who rule this Kingdom, and of the women
and the customs and the traditions that rule these men--to get
their trick of thought, the play of their ideals, the working of
their imagination, the springs of their instincts. It is impossible
for any man to know just how well he himself does such a difficult
task--how accurately he is coming to understand the sources and
character of a people's actions.
Yet, at the worst, I do know
something about the British: I know enough to make very sure of the
soundness of my conclusion that they are necessary to us and we to
them. Else God would have permitted the world to be peopled in some
other way. And when we see that the world will be saved by such an
artificial combination as England and Russia and France and Japan
and Serbia, it calls for no great wisdom to see the natural way
whereby it must be saved in the future.
For this reason every day that I have lived here it has been my
conscious aim to do what I could to bring about a condition that
shall make sure of this--that, whenever we may have need of the
British fleet to protect our shores or to prevent an aggressive war
anywhere, it shall he ours by a natural impulse and necessity--even
without the asking.
I have found out that the first step toward that end is courtesy;
that the second step is courtesy, and the third step--such a fine
and high courtesy (which includes courage) as the President showed
in the Panama tolls controversy. We have--we and the
British--common aims and character. Only a continuous and sincere
courtesy--over periods of strain as well as of calm--is necessary
for as complete an understanding as will be required for the
automatic guidance of the world in peaceful ways.
Now, a difference is come between us--the sort of difference that
handled as between friends would serve only to bind us together
with a sturdier respect. We send a long lawyer's Note, not
discourteous but wholly uncourteous, which is far worse. I am
writing now only of the manner of the Note, not of its matter.
There is not a courteous word, nor a friendly phrase, nor a kindly
turn in it, not an allusion even to an old acquaintance, to say
nothing of an old friendship, not a word of thanks for courtesies
or favours done us, not a hint of sympathy in the difficulties of
the time.
There is nothing in its tone to show that it came from an
American to an Englishman: it might have been from a Hottentot to a
Fiji-Islander.
I am almost sure--I'll say quite sure--that this uncourteous manner
is far more important than its endless matter. It has greatly hurt
our friends, the real men of the Kingdom. It has made the masses
angry--which is of far less importance than the severe sorrow that
our discourtesy of manner has brought to our friends--I fear to all
considerate and thoughtful Englishmen.
Let me illustrate: When the Panama tolls controversy arose, Taft
ceased to speak the language of the natural man and lapsed into
lawyer's courthouse zigzagging mutterings. Knox wrote a letter to
the British Government that would have made an enemy of the most
affectionate twin brother--all mere legal twists and turns, as
agreeable as a pocketful of screws. Then various bovine
"international lawyers" wrote books about it. I read them and
became more and more confused the further I went: you always do.
It
took me some time to recover from this word-drunk debauch and to
find my own natural intelligence again, the common sense that I was
born with. Then I saw that the whole thing went wrong from the
place where that Knox legal note came in. Congressmen in the
backwoods quoted cryptic passages from it, thought they were saying
something, and proceeded to make their audiences believe that
somehow England had hit us with a club--or would have hit us but
for Knox. That pure discourtesy kept us apart from English sympathy
for something like two years.
Then the President took it up. He threw the legal twaddle into the
gutter. He put the whole question in a ten-minutes' speech to
Congress, full of clearness and fairness and high courtesy. It won
even the rural Congressmen. It was read in every capital and the
men who conduct every government looked up and said, "This is a
real man, a brave man, a just man." You will recall what Sir Edward
Grey said to me: "The President has taught us all a lesson and set
us all a high example in the noblest courtesy."
This one act brought these two nations closer together than they
had ever been since we became an independent nation. It was an act
of courtesy....
My dear House, suppose the postman some morning were to leave at
your door a thing of thirty-five heads and three appendices, and
you discovered that it came from an old friend whom you had long
known and greatly valued--this vast mass of legal stuff, without a
word or a turn of courtesy in it--what would you do? He had a
grievance, your old friend had. Friends often have. But instead of
explaining it to you, he had gone and had his lawyers send this
many-headed, much-appendiced ton of stuff. It wasn't by that method
that you found your way from Austin, Texas, to your present
eminence and wisdom.
Nor was that the way our friend found his way
from a little law-office in Atlanta, where I first saw him, to the
White House.
More and more I am struck with this--that governments are human.
They are not remote abstractions, nor impersonal institutions. Men
conduct them; and they do not cease to be men. A man is made up of
six parts of human nature and four parts of facts and other
things--a little reason, some prejudice, much provincialism, and of
the particular fur or skin that suits his habitat.
When you wish to
win a man to do what you want him to do, you take along a few
well-established facts, some reasoning and such-like, but you take
along also three or four or five parts of human nature--kindliness,
courtesy, and such things--sympathy and a human touch.
If a man be six parts human and four parts of other things, a
government, especially a democracy, is seven, or eight, or nine
parts human nature. It's the most human thing I know. The best way
to manage governments and nations--so long as they are disposed to
be friendly--is the way we manage one another. I have a
confirmation of this in the following comment which came to me
to-day. It was made by a friendly member of Parliament.
"The President himself dealt with Germany. Even in his severity he
paid the Germans the compliment of a most courteous tone in his
Note. But in dealing with us he seems to have called in the lawyers
of German importers and Chicago pork-packers. I miss the high
Presidential courtesy that we had come to expect from Mr. Wilson."
An American banker here has told me of the experience of an
American financial salesman in the city the day after our Note was
published. His business is to make calls on bankers and other
financial men, to sell them securities. He is a man of good address
who is popular with his clients. The first man he called on, on
that day, said: "I don't wish to be offensive to you. But I have
only one way to show my feeling of indignation toward the United
States, and that is, to have nothing more to do with Americans."
The next man said: "No, nothing to-day, I thank you. No--nor
to-morrow either; nor the next day. Good morning."
After four or five such greetings, the fellow gave it up and is now
doing nothing.
I don't attach much importance to such an incident as this, except
as it gives a hint of the general feeling. These financial men
probably haven't even read our Note. Few people have. But they have
all read the short and sharp newspaper summary which preceded it in
the English papers. But what such an incident does indicate is the
prevalence of a state of public feeling which would prevent the
Government from yielding any of our demands even if the Government
so wished. It has now been nearly a week since the Note was
published. I have seen most of the neutral ministers.
Before the
Note came they expressed great eagerness to see it: it would
champion their cause. Since it came not one of them has mentioned
it to me. The Secretary of one of them remarked, after being
invited to express himself: "It is too--too--long!" And, although I
have seen most of the Cabinet this week, not a man mentioned it to
me. People seem studiously to avoid it, lest they give offense.
I have, however, got one little satisfaction. An American--a
half-expatriated loafer who talks "art"--you know the
intellectually affected and degenerate type--screwed his courage up
and told me that he felt ashamed of his country. I remarked that I
felt sure the feeling was mutual. That, I confess, made me feel
better.
As nearly as I can make out, the highwater mark of English
good-feeling toward us in all our history was after the President's
Panama tolls courtesy. The low-water mark, since the Civil War, I
am sure, is now. The Cleveland Venezuela message came at a time of
no nervous strain and did, I think, produce no long-lasting
effect. A part of the present feeling is due to the English
conviction that we have been taken in by the Germans in the
submarine controversy, but a large part is due to the lack of
courtesy in this last Note--the manner in which it was written even
more than its matter.
As regards its matter, I have often been over
what I conceive to be the main points with Sir Edward Grey--very
frankly and without the least offense. He has said: "We may have to
arbitrate these things," as he might say, "We had better take a cab
because it is raining." It is easily possible--or it was--to
discuss anything with this Government without offense. I have, in
fact, stood up before Sir Edward's fire and accused him of stealing
a large part of the earth's surface, and we were just as good
friends afterward as before.
But I never drew a lawyer's indictment
of him as a land-thief: that's different.
I suppose no two peoples or governments ever quite understand one
another. Perhaps they never will. That is too much to hope for. But
when one government writes to another it ought to write (as men do)
with some reference to the personality of the other and to their
previous relations, since governments are more human than men. Of
course I don't know who wrote the Note. Hence I can talk about it
freely to you without implying criticism of anybody in particular.
But the man who wrote it never saw the British Government and
wouldn't know it if he met it in the road.
To him it is a mere
legal entity, a wicked, impersonal institution against which he has
the task of drawing an indictment--not the task of trying to
persuade it to confess the propriety of a certain course of
conduct. In his view, it is a wicked enemy to start with--like the
Louisiana lottery of a previous generation or the Standard Oil
Company of our time.
One would have thought, since we were six months in preparing it,
that a draft of the Note would have been sent to the man on the
ground whom our Government keeps in London to study the situation
at first hand and to make the best judgment he can about the most
effective methods of approach on delicate and difficult matters.
If
that had been done, I should have suggested a courteous short Note
saying that we are obliged to set forth such and such views about
marine law and the rights of neutrals, to His Majesty's Government;
and that the contention of the United States Government was
herewith sent--etc., etc.--Then this identical Note (with certain
court-house, strong, shirt-sleeve adjectives left out) could have
come without arousing any feeling whatsoever. Of course I have no
personal vanity in saying this to you. I am sure I outgrew that
foible many years ago.
But such a use of an ambassador--of any
ambassador--is obviously one of the best and most natural uses he
could be put to; and all governments but ours do put their
ambassadors to such a use: that's what they have 'em for.
Per contra: a telegram has just come in saying that a certain
Lichtenstein in New York had a lot of goods stopped by the British
Government, which (by an arrangement made with their attorney here)
agreed to buy them at a certain price: will I go and find out why
the Government hasn't yet paid Lichtenstein and when he may expect
his money? Is it an ambassadorial duty to collect a private bill
for Lichtenstein, in a bargain with which our Government has had
nothing to do? I have telegraphed the Department, quite calmly,
that I don't think it is.
I venture to say no ambassador ever had
such a request as that before from his Government.
My dear House, I often wonder if my years of work here--the kind of
high good work I've tried to do--have not been thrown away. I've
tried to take and to busy myself with a long-range view of great
subjects. The British Empire and the United States will be here
long after we are dead, and their relations will continue to be one
of the most important matters--perhaps the most important
matter--in the world. Well, now think of Lichtenstein's bill!
To get back where I started--I fear, therefore, that, when I next
meet the Admiral of the Grand Fleet (with whom I used to discuss
everything quite freely before he sailed away to the war), he may
forget to mention that we may have his 3,000 ships at our need.
Since this present difference is in danger of losing the healing
influence of a kindly touch--has become an uncourteous monster of
35 heads and 3 appendices--I see no early end of it. The British
Foreign Office has a lot of lawyers in its great back offices. They
and our lawyers will now butt and rebut as long as a goat of them
is left alive on either side. The two governments--the two human,
kindly groups--have retired: they don't touch, on this matter, now.
The lawyers will have the time of their lives, each smelling the
blood of the other.
If more notes must come--as the English papers report over and over
again every morning and every afternoon--the President might do
much by writing a brief, human document to accompany the
Appendices. If it be done courteously, we can accuse them of
stealing sheep and of dyeing the skins to conceal the theft-without
provoking the slightest bad feeling; and, in the end, they'll pay
another Alabama award without complaint and frame the check and
show it to future ambassadors as Sir Edward shows the Alabama
check to me sometimes.
And it'll be a lasting shame (and may bring other Great Wars) if
lawyers are now permitted to tear the garments with which Peace
ought to be clothed as soon as she can escape from her present rags
and tatters.
Yours always heartily,
W.H.P.
P.S. My dear House: Since I have--in weeks and months past--both
telegraphed and written the Department (and I presume the President
has seen what I've sent) about the feeling here, I've written this
letter to you and not to the President nor Lansing. I will not run
the risk of seeming to complain--nor even of seeming to seem to
complain. But if you think it wise to send or show this letter to
the President, I'm willing you should. This job was botched:
there's no doubt about that. We shall not recover for many a long,
long year.
The identical indictment could have been drawn with
admirable temper and the way laid down for arbitration and for
keeping our interpretation of the law and precedents intact--all
done in a way that would have given no offense.
The feeling runs higher and higher every day--goes deeper and
spreads wider.
Now on top of it comes the Ancona[15]. The English press,
practically unanimously, makes sneering remarks about our
Government. After six months it has got no results from the
Lusitania controversy, which Bernstorff is allowed to prolong in
secret session while factories are blown up, ships supplied with
bombs, and all manner of outrages go on (by Germans) in the United
States. The English simply can't understand why Bernstorff is
allowed to stay. They predict that nothing will come of the
Ancona case, nor of any other case.
Nobody wants us to get into
the war--nobody who counts--but they are losing respect for us
because we seem to them to submit to anything.
We've simply dropped out. No English person ever mentions our
Government to me. But they talk to one another all the time about
the political anæmia of the United States Government. They think
that Bernstorff has the State Department afraid of him and that the
Pacifists dominate opinion--the Pacifists-at-any-price. I no longer
even have a chance to explain any of these things to anybody I
know.
It isn't the old question we used to discuss of our having no
friend in the world when the war ends. It's gone far further than
that. It is now whether the United States Government need be
respected by anybody.
W.H.P.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 14: Senator Hoke Smith, of Georgia, was at this time--and afterward--conducting bitter campaign against the British blockade and advocating an embargo as a retaliation.]
[Footnote 15: Torpedoed off Sardinia on Nov. 7, 1915, by the Austrians.
There was a large toss of life, including many Americans.]
CHAPTER XVI
DARK DAYS FOR THE ALLIES
To Edward M. House
June 30, 1915.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
There's a distinct wave of depression here--perhaps I'd better say
a period of setbacks has come. So far as we can find out only the
Germans are doing anything in the war on land. The position in
France is essentially the same as it was in November, only the
Germans are much more strongly entrenched. Their great plenty of
machine guns enables them to use fewer men and to kill more than
the Allies. The Russians also lack ammunition and are yielding more
and more territory.
The Allies--so you hear now--will do well if
they get their little army away from the Dardanelles before the
German-Turks eat 'em alive, and no Balkan state comes in to help
the Allies. Italy makes progress-slowly, of course, over almost
impassable mountains--etc., etc. Most of this doleful recital I
think is true; and I find more and more men here who have lost hope
of seeing an end of the war in less than two or three years, and
more and more who fear that the Germans will never be forced out of
Belgium.
And the era of the giant aeroplane seems about to come--a
machine that can carry several tons and several men and go great
distances--two engines, two propellers, and the like. It isn't at
all impossible, I am told, that these machines may be the things
that will at last end the war--possibly, but I doubt it.
At any rate, it is true that a great wave of discouragement is
come. All these events and more seem to prove to my mind the rather
dismal failure the Liberal Government made--a failure really to
grasp the problem. It was a dead failure. Of course they are waking
up now, when they are faced with a certain dread lest many soldiers
prefer frankly to die rather than spend another winter in
practically the same trenches. You hear rumours, too, of great
impending military scandals--God knows whether there be any truth
in them or not.
In a word, while no Englishman gives up or will ever give
up--that's all rot--the job he has in hand is not going well. He's
got to spit on his hands and buckle up his belt two holes tighter
yet. And I haven't seen a man for a month who dares hope for an end
of the fight within any time that he can foresee.
I had a talk to-day with the Russian Ambassador[16]. He wished to
know how matters stood between the United States and Great Britain.
I said to him: "I'll give you a task if you have leisure. Set to
and help me hurry up your distinguished Ally in dealing with our
shipping troubles."
The old man laughed--that seemed a huge joke to him; he threw up
his hands and exclaimed--"My God! He is slow about his own
business--has always been slow--can't be anything else."
After more such banter, the nigger in his wood-pile poked his head
out: "Is there any danger," he asked, "that munitions may be
stopped?"
The Germans have been preparing northern France for German
occupation. No French are left there, of course, except women and
children and old men. They must be fed or starved or deported. The
Germans put them on trains--a whole village at a time--and run
them to the Swiss frontier. Of course the Swiss pass them on into
France. The French have their own and--the Germans will have
northern France without any French population, if this process goes
on long enough.
The mere bang! bang! frightful era of the war is passed. The
Germans are settling down to permanent business with their great
organizing machine. Of course they talk about the freedom of the
seas and such mush-mush; of course they'd like to have Paris and
rob it of enough money to pay what the war has cost them, and
London, too. But what they really want for keeps is
seacoast--Belgium and as much of the French coast as they can win.
That's really what they are out gunning for. Of course, somehow at
some time they mean to get Holland, too, and Denmark, if they
really need it.
Then they'll have a very respectable seacoast--the
thing that they chiefly lack now.
More and more people are getting their nerves knocked out. I went
to a big hospital on Sunday, twenty-five miles out of London. They
showed me an enormous, muscular Tommy sitting by himself in a chair
under the trees. He had had a slight wound which quickly got well.
But his speech was gone. That came back, too, later. But then he
wouldn't talk and he'd insist on going off by himself. He's just
knocked out--you can't find out just how much gumption he has left.
That's what the war did for him: it stupefied him. Well, it's
stupefied lots of folks who have never seen a trench.
That's what's
happened. Of all the men who started in with the game, I verily
believe that Lloyd George is holding up best. He organized British
finance. Now he's organizing British industry.
It's got hot in London--hotter than I've ever known it. It gets
lonelier (more people going away) and sadder--more wounded coming
back and more visible sorrow. We seem to be settling down to
something that is more or less like Paris--so far less, but it may
become more and more like it. And the confident note of an earlier
period is accompanied by a dull undertone of much less
cheerfulness. The end is--in the lap of the gods.
W.H.P.
To Arthur W. Page
American Embassy, London,
July 25, 1915.
DEAR ARTHUR:
... Many men here are very active in their thought about the future
relations of the United States and Great Britain. Will the war
bring or leave them closer together? If the German machine be
completely smashed (and it may not be completely smashed) the
Japanese danger will remain. I do not know how to estimate that
danger accurately. But there is such a danger. And, if the German
wild beast ever come to life again, there's an eternal chance of
trouble with it.
For defensive purposes it may become of the very
first importance that the whole English-speaking world should stand
together--not in entangling alliance, but with a much clearer
understanding than we have ever yet had. I'll indicate to you some
of my cogitations on this subject by trying to repeat what I told
Philip Kerr[17] a fortnight ago--one Sunday in the country.
I can
write this to you without seeming to parade my own opinions.--Kerr
is one of "The Round Table," perhaps the best group of men here for
the real study and free discussion of large political subjects.
Their quarterly, The Round Table, is the best review, I dare
say, in the world. Kerr is red hot for a close and perfect
understanding between Great Britain and the United States.
I told
him that, since Great Britain had only about forty per cent. of the
white English-speaking people and the United States had about sixty
per cent., I hoped in his natural history that the tail didn't wag
the dog. I went on:
"You now have the advantage of us in your aggregation of three
centuries of accumulated wealth--the spoil of all the world--and in
the talent that you have developed for conserving it and adding to
it and in the institutions you have built up to perpetuate it--your
merchant ships, your insurance, your world-wide banking, your
mortgages on all new lands; but isn't this the only advantage you
have? This advantage will pass. You are now shooting away millions
and millions, and you will have a debt that is bound to burden
industry.
On our side, we have a more recently mixed race than
yours; you've begun to inbreed. We have also (and therefore) more
adaptability, a greater keenness of mind in our masses; we are
Old-World men set free--free of classes and traditions and all that
they connote. Your so-called democracy is far behind ours. Your
aristocracy and your privileges necessarily bring a social and
economic burden. Half your people look backward.
"Your leadership rests on your wealth and on the power that you've
built on your wealth."
When he asked me how we were to come closer together--"closer
together, with your old-time distrust of us and with your
remoteness?"--I stopped him at "remoteness."
"That's the reason," I said. "Your idea of our 'remoteness.'
'Remoteness' from what? From you? Are you not betraying the only
real difficulty of a closer sympathy by assuming that you are the
centre of the world? When you bring yourself to think of the
British Empire as a part of the American Union--mind you, I am not
saying that you would be formally admitted--but when you are
yourselves in close enough sympathy with us to wish to be admitted,
the chief difficulty of a real union of thought will be gone.
You
recall Lord Rosebery's speech in which he pictured the capital of
the British Empire being moved to Washington if the American
Colonies had been retained under the Crown? Well, it was the Crown
that was the trouble, and the capital of English-speaking folk has
been so moved and you still remain 'remote.' Drop 'remote' from
your vocabulary and your thought and we'll actually be closer
together."
It's an enormous problem--just how to bring these countries closer
together. Perhaps nothing can do it but some great common danger or
some great common adventure. But this is one of the problems of
your lifetime. England can't get itself clean loose from the
continent nor from continental mediævalism; and with that we can
have nothing to do. Men like Kerr think that somehow a great push
toward democracy here will be given by the war. I don't quite see
how. So far the aristocracy have made perhaps the best showing in
defence of English liberty.
They are paying the bills of the war;
they have sent their sons; these sons have died like men; and their
parents never whimper. It's a fine breed for such great uses as
these. There was a fine incident in the House of Lords the other
day, which gave the lie to the talk that one used to hear here
about "degeneracy." Somebody made a perfectly innocent proposal to
complete a list of peers and peers' sons who had fallen in the
war--a thing that will, of course, be done, just as a similar list
will be compiled of the House of Commons, of Oxford and Cambridge
Universities.
But one peer after another objected vigorously lest
such a list appear immodest. "We are but doing our duty. Let the
matter rest there."
In a time like this the aristocracy proves its worth. In fact, all
aristocracies grew chiefly out of wars, and perhaps they are better
for wars than a real democracy. Here, you see, you run into one of
those contradictions in life and history which make the world so
hard to change....
You know there are some reasons why peace, whenever it may come,
will bring problems as bad as the problems of the war itself. I can
think of no worse task than the long conferences of the Allies with
their conflicting interests and ambitions. Then must come their
conferences with the enemy. Then there are sure to be other
conferences to try to make peace secure. And, of course, many are
going to be dissatisfied and disappointed, and perhaps out of these
disappointments other wars may come. The world will not take up its
knitting and sit quietly by the fire for many a year to come....
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
One happiness came to Mr. and Mrs. Page in the midst of all these war alarums. On August 4, 1915, their only daughter, Katharine, was married to Mr. Charles G. Loring, of Boston, Massachusetts. The occasion gave the King an opportunity of showing the high regard in which Page and his family were held. It had been planned that the wedding should take place in Westminster Abbey, but the King very courteously offered Miss Page the Royal chapel in St. James's Palace.
This was a distinguished compliment, as it was the first time that any marriage, in which both bride and bridegroom were foreigners, had ever been celebrated in this building, which for centuries has been the scene of royal weddings. The special place which his daughter had always held in the Ambassador's affections is apparent in the many letters that now followed her to her new home in the United States. The unique use Page made of the initials of his daughter's name was characteristic.
To Mrs. Charles G. Loring
London, September 1, 1915.
MY DEAR K.A. P-TAIN:
Here's a joke on your mother and Frank: We three (and Smith) went
up to Broadway in the car, to stay there a little while and then to
go on into Wales, etc.
The hotel is an old curiosity shop; you sit
on Elizabethan chairs by a Queen Anne table, on a drunken floor,
and look at the pewter platters on the wall or do your best to look
at them, for the ancient windows admit hardly any light. "Oh!
lovely," cries Frank; and then he and your mother make out in the
half-darkness a perfectly wonderful copper mug on the mantelpiece;
and you go out and come in the ramshackle door (stooping every
time) after you've felt all about for the rusty old iron latch, and
then you step down two steps (or fall), presently to step up two
more.
Well, for dinner we had six kinds of meat and two meat pies
and potatoes and currants! My dinner was a potato. I'm old and
infirm and I have many ailments, but I'm not so bad off as to be
able to live on a potato a day. And since we were having a
vacation, I didn't see the point. So I came home where I have seven
courses for dinner, all good; and Mrs. Leggett took my place in the
car. That carnivorous company went on. They've got to eat six
kinds of meat and two meat pies and--currants! I haven't.
Your
mother calls me up on the phone every morning--me, who am living
here in luxury, seven courses at every dinner--and asks anxiously,
"And how are you, dear?" I answer: "Prime, and how are you?" We
are all enjoying ourselves, you see, and I don't have to eat six
kinds of meat and two meat pies and--currants! They do; and may
Heaven save 'em and get 'em home safe!
[Illustration: Col. Edward M. House. From a painting by P.A.
Laszlo]
[Illustration: The Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister
of Great Britain, 1908-1916]
It's lovely in London now--fine, shining days and showers at night
and Ranelagh beautiful, and few people here; but I don't deny its
loneliness--somewhat. Yet sleep is good, and easy and long. I have
neither an ocean voyage nor six kinds of meat and two meat pies and
currants. I congratulate myself and write to you and mother.
You'll land to-morrow or next day--good; I congratulate you. Salute
the good land for me and present my respectful compliments to
vegetables that have taste and fruit that is not sour--to the
sunshine, in fact, and to everything that ripens and sweetens in
its glow.
And you're now (when this reaches you) fixing up your home--your
own home, dear Kitty. Bless your dear life, you left a home
here--wasn't it a good and nice one?--left it very lonely for the
man who has loved you twenty-four years and been made happy by your
presence. But he'll love you twenty-five more and on and
on--always. So you haven't lost that--nor can you. And it's very
fit and right that you should build your own nest; that adds
another happy home, you see. And I'm very sure it will be very
happy always. Whatever I can do to make it so, now or ever, you
have only to say.
But--your mother took your photograph with her
and got it out of the bag and put it on the bureau as soon as she
went to her room--a photograph taken when you were a little girl.
Hodson[18] came up to see me to-day and with tears of gratitude in
his voice told me of the present that you and Chud had made him. He
is very genuinely pleased. As for the rest, life goes on as usual.
I laugh as I think of all your new aunts and cousins looking you
over and wondering if you'll fit, and then saying to one another as
they go to bed: "She is lovely--isn't she?" I could tell 'em a
thing or two if I had a whack at 'em.
And you'll soon have all your pretty things in place in your pretty
home, and a lot more that I haven't seen. I'll see 'em all before
many years--and you, too! Tell me, did Chud get you a dinner book?
Keep your record of things: you'll enjoy it in later years. And
you'll have a nice time this autumn--your new kinsfolk, your new
friends and old and Boston and Cambridge. If you run across Mr.
Muffin, William Roscoe Thayer, James Ford Rhodes, President
Eliot--these are my particular old friends whose names occur at the
moment.
My love to you and Chud too,
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
The task of being "German Ambassador to Great Britain" was evidently not without its irritations.
To Arthur W. Page
September 15, 1915.
DEAR ARTHUR:
Yesterday was my German day. When the boy came up to my room, I
told him I had some official calls to make. "Therefore get out my
oldest and worst suit." He looked much confused; and when I got up
both my worst and best suits were laid out. Evidently he thought he
must have misunderstood me.
I asked your mother if she was ready to
go down to breakfast. "Yes."--"Well, then I'll leave you." She
grunted something and when we both got down she asked: "What did
you say to me upstairs?" I replied: "I regard the incident as
closed." She looked a sort of pitying look at me and a minute or
two later asked: "What on earth is the matter with you? Can't you
hear at all?" I replied: "No. Therefore let's talk." She gave it
up, but looked at me again to make sure I was all there.
I stopped at the barber shop, badly needing a shave. The barber got
his brush and razor ready. I said: "Cut my hair." He didn't talk
for a few minutes, evidently engaged in deep thought.
When I got to my office, a case was brought to me of a runaway
American who was caught trying to send news to Germany. "Very
good," said I, "now let it be made evident that it shall appear
therefore that his innocence having been duly established he shall
be shot."
"What, sir?"
"That since it must be evident that his guilt is genuine therefore
see that he be acquitted and then shot."
Laughlin and Bell and Stabler were seen in an earnest conference in
the next room for nearly half an hour.
Shoecraft brought me a letter. "This is the most courteous
complaint about the French passport bureau we have yet had. I
thought you'd like to see this lady's letter. She says she knows
you."
"Do not answer it, then."
He went off and conferred with the others.
Hodson spoke of the dog he sold to Frank. "Yes," said I, "since he
was a very nice dog, therefore he was worthless."
"Sir?"
And he went off after looking back at me in a queer way.
The day went on in that fashion. When I came out to go to lunch,
the stairs down led upward and I found myself, therefore, stepping
out of the roof on to the sidewalk--the house upside down. Smith
looked puzzled. "Home, Sir?"
"No. Go the other way." After he had driven two or three blocks, I
told him to turn again and go the other way--home!
Your mother said almost as soon as I got into the door--"What was
the matter with you this morning?"
"Oh, nothing. You forget that I am the German Ambassador."
Now this whole narrative is a lie. Nothing in it occurred. If it
were otherwise it wouldn't be German.
Affectionately,
W.H.P.
To Mrs. Charles G. Loring
London, 6 Grosvenor Square.
Sunday, September 19, 1915.
DEAR KITTY:
You never had a finer autumnal day in the land of the free than
this day has been in this old kingdom--fresh and fair; and so your
mother said to herself and me: "Let's go out to the Laughlins' to
lunch," and we went. There never was a prettier drive. We found out
among other things that you pleased Mrs. Laughlin very much by your
letter. Her garden changes every week or so, and it never was
lovelier than it is now.--Then we came back home and dined alone.
Well, since we can't have you and Chud and Frank, I don't care if
we do dine alone sometimes for some time to come.
Your mother's
monstrous good company, and sometimes three is a crowd. And now is
a good time to be alone. London never was so dull or deserted since
I've known it, nor ever so depressed. The military (land)
operations are not cheerful; the hospitals are all full; I see more
wounded soldiers by far than at any previous time; the Zeppelins
came somewhere to this island every night for a week--one of them,
on the night of the big raid, was visible from our square for
fifteen or twenty minutes--in general it is a dull and depressing
time.
I have thought that since you were determined to run off with
a young fellow, you chose a pretty good time to go away. I'm afraid
there'll be no more of what we call "fun" in this town as long as
we stay here.
Worse yet: in spite of the Coalition Government and everybody's
wish to get on smoothly and to do nothing but to push the war,
since Parliament convened there's been a great row, which doesn't
get less. The labour men give trouble; people blame the
politicians: Lloyd George is saving the country, say some; Lloyd
George ought to be hanged, say others. Down with Northcliffe! They
seem likely to burn him at the stake--except those who contend that
he has saved the nation. Some maintain that the cabinet is too
big--twenty-two. More say that it has no leadership.
If you favour
conscription, you are a traitor: if you don't favour it, you are
pro-German. It's the same sort of old quarrel they had before the
war, only it is about more subjects. In fact, nobody seems very
clearly to know what it's about. Meantime the Government is
spending money at a rate that nobody ever dreamed of before. Three
million pounds a day--some days five million. The Germans,
meantime are taking Russia; the Allies are not taking the
Dardanelles; in France the old deadlock continues. Boston at its
worst must be far more cheerful than this.
Affectionately and with my love to Chud,
W.H.P.
To the President
London, September 26, 1915.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
The suppression of facts about the military situation is more
rigorous than ever since the military facts have become so
discouraging. The volume of pretty well authenticated news that I
used to hear privately has become sensibly diminished. Rumours that
reach me by the back door, in all sorts of indirect ways, are not
fewer, but fewer of them are credible. There is great confusion,
great fear, very great depression--far greater, I think, than
England has felt, certainly since the Napoleonic scare and probably
since the threat of the Armada.
Nobody, I think, supposes that
England herself will be conquered: confidence in the navy is
supreme. But the fear of a practical defeat of the Allies on the
continent is become general.
Russia may have to pay a huge
indemnity, going far to reimburse Germany for the cost of the war;
Belgium may be permanently held unless Germany receive an indemnity
to evacuate, and her seaports may be held anyhow; the Germans may
reach Constantinople before the Allies, and Germany may thus hold,
when the war ends, an open way to the East; and France may have to
pay a large sum to regain her northern territory now held by the
Germans.
These are not the convictions of men here, but they have
distinctly become the fears; and many men's mind are beginning to
adjust themselves to the possible end of the war, as a draw, with
these results. Of course such an end would be a real German
victory and--another war as soon as enough men grow up to fight it.
When the more cheerful part of public opinion, especially when any
member of the Government, affects to laugh at these fears, the
people say: "Well, make known the facts that you base your hope on.
Precisely how many men have volunteered? Is the voluntary system a
success or has it reached its limit? Precisely what is the
situation in the Dardanelles? Are the allied armies strong enough
to make a big drive to break through the German line in France?
Have they big guns and ammunition enough? What are the facts about
the chance in the Dardanelles?
What have we done with reference to
the Balkan States?" Thus an angry and ominous political situation
is arising. The censorship on war news apparently becomes severer,
and the general fear spreads and deepens.
The air, of course,
becomes heavily charged with such rumours as these: that if the
Government continue its policy of secrecy, Lloyd George will
resign, seeing no hope of a real victory: that, if he do resign,
his resignation will disrupt the Government--cause a sort of
earthquake; that the Government will probably fall and Lloyd George
will be asked to form another one, since he is, as the public sees
it, the most active and efficient man in political life; that, if
all the Balkan States fail the Allies, Sir Edward Grey will be
reckoned a failure and must resign; and you even now hear talk of
Mr.
Balfour's succeeding him.
It is impossible to say what basis there is for these and other
such rumours, but they show the general very serious depression and
dissatisfaction. Of that there is no doubt. Nor is there any doubt
about grave differences in the Cabinet about conscription nor of
grave fear in the public mind about the action of labour unions in
hindering the utmost production of ammunition, nor of the
increasing feeling that the Prime Minister doesn't lead the nation.
Except Lloyd George and the Chancellor of the Exchequer[19] the
Cabinet seems to suffer a sort of paralysis.
Lord Kitchener's
speech in the House of Lords, explaining the military situation,
reads like a series of month-old bulletins and was a great
disappointment. Mr. Asquith's corresponding speech in the House
seemed to lack complete frankness. The nation feels that it is
being kept in the dark, and all the military information that it
gets is discouraging.
Sir Edward Grey, as philosophic and enduring
a man as I know, seems much more depressed than I have ever known
him to be; Bryce is very very far from cheerful; Plunkett[20], whom
also you know, is in the dumps--it's hard to find a cheerful or a
hopeful man.
The secrecy of official life has become so great and successful
that prophecy of political changes must be mere guess work. But,
unless good news come from the Dardanelles in particular, I have a
feeling that Asquith may resign--be forced out by the gradual
pressure of public opinion; that Lloyd George will become Prime
Minister, and that (probably) Sir Edward Grey may resign. Yet I
cannot take the prevailing military discouragement at its face
value. The last half million men and the last million pounds will
decide the contest, and the Allies will have these.
This very
depression strengthens the nation's resolution to a degree that
they for the moment forget. The blockade and the armies in the
field will wear Germany down--not absolutely conquer her, but wear
her down--probably in another year.
In the meantime our prestige (if that be the right word), in
British judgment, is gone.
As they regard it, we have permitted
the Germans to kill our citizens, to carry on a world-wide underhand
propaganda from our country (as well as in it), for which they have
made no apology and no reparation but only vague assurances for the
future now that their submarine fleet has been almost destroyed.
They think that we are credulous to the point of simplicity to
accept any assurances that Bernstorff may give--in a word, that the
peace-at-any-price sentiment so dominates American opinion and the
American Government that we will submit to any indignity or
insult--that we will learn the Germans' real character when it is
too late to save our honour or dignity.
There is no doubt of the
definiteness or depth of this opinion.
And I am afraid that this feeling will show itself in our future
dealings with this government. The public opinion of the nation as
well as the Government accepts their blockade as justified as well
as necessary.
They will not yield on that point, and they will
regard our protests as really inspired by German influence--thus
far at least: that the German propaganda has organized and
encouraged the commercial objection in the United States, and that
this propaganda and the peace-at-any-price sentiment demand a stiff
controversy with England to offset the stiff controversy with
Germany; and, after all, they ask, what does a stiff controversy
with the United States amount to? I had no idea that English
opinion could so quickly become practically indifferent as to what
the United States thinks or does.
And as nearly as I can make it
out, there is not a general wish that we should go to war. The
prevalent feeling is not a selfish wish for military help. In fact
they think that, by the making of munitions, by the taking of
loans, and by the sale of food we can help them more than by
military and naval action. Their feeling is based on their
disappointment at our submitting to what they regard as German
dallying with us and to German insults.
They believe that, if we
had sent Bernstorff home when his government made its
unsatisfactory reply to our first Lusitania note, Germany would
at once have "come down"; opportunist Balkan States would have come
to the help of the Allies; Holland and perhaps the Scandinavian
States would have got some consideration at Berlin for their losses
by torpedoes; that more attention would have been paid by Turkey to
our protest against the wholesale massacre of the Armenians; and
that a better settlement with Japan about Pacific islands and
Pacific influence would have been possible for the English at the
end of the war.
Since, they argue, nobody is now afraid of the
United States, her moral influence is impaired at every capital;
and I now frequently hear the opinion that, if the war lasts
another year and the Germans get less and less use of the United
States as a base of general propaganda in all neutral countries,
especially all American countries, they are likely themselves to
declare war on us as a mere defiance of the whole world and with
the hope of stirring up internal trouble for our government by the
activity of the Germans and the Irish in the United States, which
may hinder munitions and food and loans to the Allies.
I need not remark that the English judgment of the Germans is
hardly judicial. But they reply to this that every nation has to
learn the real, incredible character of the Prussian by its own
unhappy experience. France had so to learn it, and England, Russia,
and Belgium; and we (the United States), they say, fail to profit
in time by the experience of these.
After the Germans have used us
to the utmost in peace, they will force us into war--or even flatly
declare war on us when they think they can thus cause more
embarrassment to the Allies, and when they conclude that the time
is come to make sure that no great nation shall emerge from the war
with a clear commercial advantage over the others; and in the
meantime they will prove to the world by playing with us that a
democracy is necessarily pacific and hence (in their view)
contemptible.
I felt warranted the other day to remark to Lord
Bryce on the unfairness of much of the English judgment of us (he
is very sad and a good deal depressed). "Yes," he said, "I have
despaired of one people's ever really understanding another even
when the two are as closely related and as friendly as the
Americans and the English."
You were kind enough to inquire about my health in your last note.
If I could live up to the popular conception here of my labours and
responsibilities and delicate duties (which is most flattering and
greatly exaggerated), I should be only a walking shadow of a man.
But I am most inappreciately well. I imagine that in some year to
come, I may enjoy a vacation, but I could not enjoy it now.
Besides
since civilization has gone backward several centuries, I suppose
I've gone back with it to a time when men knew no such thing as a
vacation. (Let's forgive House for his kindly, mistaken
solicitude.) The truth is, I often feel that I do not know
myself--body or soul, boots or breeches. This experience is making
us all here different from the men we were--but in just what
respects it is hard to tell. We are not within hearing of the guns
(except the guns that shoot at Zeppelins when they come); but the
war crowds itself in on us sensibly more and more.
There are more
wounded soldiers on the streets and in the parks. More and more
families one knows lose their sons, more and more women their
husbands. Death is so common that it seems a little thing. Four
persons have come to my house to-day (Sunday) in the hope that I
may find their missing kinsmen, and two more have appealed to me on
the telephone and two more still have sent me notes. Since I began
this letter, Mrs. Page insisted on my going out on the edge of the
city to see an old friend of many years who has just lost both his
sons and whose prospective son-in-law is at home wounded.
The first
thing he said was: "Tell me, what is America going to do?" As we
drove back, we made a call on a household whose nephew is
"missing."--"Can't you possibly help us hear definitely about him?"
This sort of thing all day every day must have some effect on any
man. Then--yesterday morning gave promise of a calm, clear day. I
never know what sensational experience awaits me around the next
corner. Then there was put on my desk the first page of a reputable
weekly paper which was filled with an open letter to me written by
the editor and signed. After the usual description of my
multitudinous and delicate duties, I was called on to insist that
my government should protest against Zeppelin raids on London
because a bomb might kill me!
Humour doesn't bubble much now on
this side the world, for the censor had forbidden the publication
of this open letter lest it should possibly cause American-German
trouble! Then the American correspondents came in to verify a
report that a news agency is said to have had that I was deluged
with threatening letters!--More widows, more mothers looking for
lost sons!... Once in a while--far less often than if I lived in a
sane and normal world--I get a few hours off and go to a lonely
golf club.
Alas! there is seldom anybody there but now and then a
pair of girls and now and then a pair of old fellows who have
played golf for a century. Yet back in London in the War Office I
hear they indulge in disrespectful hilarity at the poor game I
play. Now how do they know? (You'd better look to your score with
Grayson: the English have spies in America. A major-general in
their spy-service department told Mrs. Page that they knew all
about Archibaldi[21] before he got on the ship in New York.)
All this I send you not because it is of the slightest permanent
importance (except the English judgment of us) but because it will
prove, if you need proof, that the world is gone mad. Everything
depends on fighting power and on nothing else. A victory will save
the Government. Even distinctly hopeful military news will. And
English depression will vanish with a turn of the military tide. If
it had been Bernstorff instead of Dumba--that would have affected
even the English judgment of us.
Tyrrell[22] remarked to me--did I
write you? "Think of the freaks of sheer, blind Luck; a man of
considerable ability like Dumba caught for taking a risk that an
idiot would have avoided, and a fool like Bernstorff escaping!"
Then he added: "I hope Bernstorff will be left.
No other human
being could serve the English as well as he is serving them." So,
you see, even in his depression the Englishman has some humour
left--e.g., when that old sea dog Lord Fisher heard that Mr.
Balfour was to become First Lord of the Admiralty, he cried out:
"Damn it! he won't do: Arthur Balfour is too much of a gentleman."
So John Bull is now, after all, rather pathetic--depressed as he
has not been depressed for at least a hundred years.
The nobility
and the common man are doing their whole duty, dying on the
Bosphorus or in France without a murmur, or facing an insurrection
in India; but the labour union man and the commercial class are
holding hack and hindering a victory. And there is no great
national leader.
Sincerely yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 16: Count Beckendorff.]
[Footnote 17: Afterward private secretary to Premier Lloyd George.]
[Footnote 18: A messenger in the American Embassy.]
[Footnote 19: The Rt. Hon. Reginald McKenna.]
[Footnote 20: Sir Horace Plunkett.]
[Footnote 21: It was Archibald's intercepted baggage that furnished the documents which caused Dumba's dismissal.]
[Footnote 22: Sir William Tyrrell, private secretary to Sir Edward Grey.]
CHAPTER XVII
CHRISTMAS IN ENGLAND, 1915
To Edward M. House
London, December 7, 1915.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
I hear you are stroking down the Tammany tiger--an easier job than
I have with the British lion. You can find out exactly who your
tiger is, you know the house he lives in, the liquor he drinks, the
company he goes with. The British lion isn't so easy to find. At
times in English history he has dwelt in Downing Street--not so
now. So far as our struggle with him is concerned, he's all over
the Kingdom; for he is public opinion. The governing crowd in usual
times and on usual subjects can here overrun public opinion--can
make it, turn it, down it, dodge it. But it isn't so now--as it
affects us.
Every mother's son of 'em has made up his mind that
Germany must and shall be starved out, and even Sir Edward's scalp
isn't safe when they suspect that he wishes to be lenient in that
matter. They keep trying to drive him out, on two counts: (1) he
lets goods out of Germany for the United States "and thereby
handicaps the fleet"; and (2) he failed in the Balkans. Sir Edward
is too much of a gentleman for this business of rough-riding over
all neutral rights and for bribing those Balkan bandits.
I went to see him to-day about the Hocking, etc. He asked me: "Do
you know that the ships of this line are really owned, in good
faith, by Americans?"
"I'll answer your question," said I, "if I may then ask you one.
No, I don't know of my own knowledge. Now, do you know that they
are not owned by Americans?"
He had to confess that he, of his own knowledge, didn't know.
"Then," I said, "for the relief of us both, I pray you hurry up
your prize court."
When we'd got done quarrelling about ships and I started to go, he
asked me how I liked Wordsworth's war poems. "The best of all war
poems," said he, "because they don't glorify war but have to do
with its philosophy." Then he told me that some friend of his had
just got out a little volume of these war poems selected from
Wordsworth; "and I'm going to send you a copy."
"Just in time," said I, "for I have a copy of 'The Life and Letters
of John Hay'[23] that I'm sending to you."
He's coming to dine with me in a night or two: he'll do anything
but discuss our Note with me. And he's the only member of the
Government who, I think, would like to meet our views; and he
can't. To use the language of Lowell about the campaign of Governor
Kent--these British are hell-bent on starving the Germans out, and
neutrals have mighty few rights till that job's done.
The worst of it is that the job won't be done for a very long time.
I've been making a sort of systematic round of the Cabinet to see
what these fellows think about things in general at this stage of
the game. Bonar Law (the Colonies) tells me that the news from the
Balkans is worse than the public or the newspapers know, and that
still worse news will come. Germany will have it all her own way in
that quarter.
"And take Egypt and the canal?"
"I didn't say that," he replied. But he showed that he fears even
that.
[Illustration: Herbert C. Hoover, in 1914]
[Illustration: A facsimile page from the Ambassador's letter of
November 24. 1916, resigning his Ambassadorship]
I could go on with a dozen of 'em; but I sat down to write you a
Christmas letter, and nothing else. The best news I have for you is
not news at all, but I conceive it to be one of the best hopes of
the future.
In spite of Irishmen past, present, and to come; in
spite of Germans, whose fuss will soon be over; in spite of
lawyers, who (if left alone) would bankrupt empires as their
clients and think they'd won a victory; I'm going to leave things
here in a year and a half so that, if wise men wish to lay a plan
for keeping the peace of the world, all they need to do will be to
say first to Uncle Sam: "This fellow or that must understand that
he can't break loose like a wild beast." If Uncle Sam agrees (and
has a real navy himself), he'll wink at John Bull, and John will
follow after.
You see our blackleg tail-twisters have the whole
thing backward. They say we truckle to the British. My plan is to
lead the British--not for us to go to them but to have them come to
us. We have three white men to every two white men in their whole
Empire; and, when peace comes, we'll be fairly started on the road
to become as rich as the war will leave them. There are four clubs
in London which have no other purpose than this; and the best
review[24] in the world exists chiefly for this purpose. All we
need to do is to be courteous (we can do what we like if we do it
courteously).
Our manners, our politicians, and our newspapers are
all that keep the English-speaking white man, under our lead, from
ruling the world, without any treaty or entangling alliance
whatsoever.
If, when you went to Berlin to talk to your gentle and
timid friend, the Emperor, about disarmament before the war--if
about 200 American dreadnaughts and cruisers, with real grog on
'em, had come over to make a friendly call, in the North Sea, on
the 300 English dreadnaughts and cruisers--just a friendly call,
admirals on admirals--the "Star-Spangled Banner" and "God Save the
King"--and if General Bell, from the Philippines, had happened in
London just when Kitchener happened to be home from Egypt--then,
there wouldn't have been this war now.
Nothing need have been
said--no treaty, no alliance, nothing. For then 100 or more British
naval ships would have joined the Panama naval procession and any
possible enemy would have seen that combined fleet clean across the
Pacific.
Now this may all be a mere Christmas fancy--a mere yarn about what
might have been--because we wouldn't have sent ships here in our
old mood; the crew would have missed one Sunday School. But it's
this kind of thing that does the trick. But this means the
practice of courtesy, and we haven't acquired the habit. Two years
or more ago the training ships from Annapolis with the cadets
aboard anchored down the Thames and stayed several weeks and let
the boys loose in England. They go on such a voyage every two years
to some country, you know.
The English didn't know that fact and
they took the visit as a special compliment. Their old admirals
were all greatly pleased, and I hear talk about that yet. We ought
to have two or three of our rear-admirals here on their fleet now.
Symington, of course, is a good fellow; but he's a mere commander
and attaché--not an admiral--in other words, not any particular
compliment or courtesy to the British Navy. (As soon as the war
began, a Japanese admiral turned up here and he is here now.) We
sent over two army captains as military observers. The Russians
sent a brigadier-general.
We ought to have sent General Wood. You
see the difference? There was no courtesy in our method. It would
be the easiest and prettiest job in the world to swallow the whole
British organization, lock, stock, and barrel--King, Primate,
Cabinet, Lords, and Commons, feathers and all, and to make 'em
follow our courteous lead anywhere. The President had them in
this mood when the war started and for a long time after--till the
Lusitania seemed to be forgotten and till the lawyers began to
write his Notes.
He can get 'em back, after the war ends, by
several acts of courtesy--if we could get into the habit of doing
such things as sending generals and admirals as compliments to
them. The British Empire is ruled by a wily use of courtesies and
decorations. If I had the President himself to do the
correspondence, if I had three or four fine generals and admirals
and a good bishop or two, a thoroughbred senator or two and now and
then a Supreme Court Justice to come on proper errands and be
engineered here in the right way--we could do or say anything we
liked and they'd do whatever we'd say.
I'd undertake to underwrite
the whole English-speaking world to keep peace, under our
leadership. Instead whereof, every move we now make is to follow
them or to drive them. The latter is impossible, and the former
is unbecoming to us.
But to return to Christmas.--I could go on writing for a week in
this off-hand, slap-dash way, saying wise things flippantly. But
Christmas--that's the thing now. Christmas! What bloody irony it is
on this side the world! Still there will be many pleasant and
touching things done. An Englishman came in to see me the other day
and asked if I'd send $1,000 to Gerard[25] to use in making the
English prisoners in Germany as happy as possible on Christmas
Day--only I must never tell anybody who did it. A lady came on the
same errand--for the British prisoners in Turkey, and with a less
but still a generous sum.
The heroism, the generosity, the
endurance and self-restraint and courtesy of these people would
melt a pyramid to tears. Of course there are yellow dogs among 'em,
here and there; but the genuine, thoroughbred English man or woman
is the real thing--one of the realest things in this world. So
polite are they that not a single English person has yet mentioned
our Note to me--not one.
But every one I've met for two days has mentioned the sending of
Von Papen and Boy-Ed[26] home--not that they expect us to get into
the war, but because they regard this action as maintaining our
self-respect.
Nor do they neglect other things because of the war. I went to the
annual dinner of the Scottish Corporation the other night-an
organization which for 251 years has looked after Scotchmen
stranded in London; and they collected $20,000 then and there.
There's a good deal of Christmas in 'em yet. One fellow in a little
patriotic speech said that the Government is spending twenty-five
million dollars a day to whip the Germans.--"Cheap work, very cheap
work. We can spend twice that if necessary. Why, gentlemen, we
haven't exhausted our pocket-change yet."
Somehow I keep getting away from Christmas. It doesn't stay put.
It'll be a memorable one here for its sorrows and for its grim
determination--an empty chair at every English table. But nowhere
in the world will it be different except in the small neutral
states here and in the lands on your side the world.
How many Christmases the war may last, nobody's wise enough to
know. That depends absolutely on Germany. The Allies announced
their terms ten months ago, and nothing has yet happened to make
them change them. That would leave the Germans with Germany and a
secure peace--no obliteration or any other wild nonsense, but only
a secure peace. Let 'em go back home, pay for the damage they've
done, and then stay there. I do hope that the actual fighting will
be ended by Christmas of next year.
Of course it may end with
dramatic suddenness at any time, this being the only way, perhaps,
for the Kaiser to save his throne. Or it may go on for two or three
years. My guess is that it'll end next year--a guess subject to
revision, of course, by events that can't be foreseen.
But as I said before--to com
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Front matter as received (title page, contents)
[Illustration: Sir Edward Grey (now Viscount Grey of Fallodon),
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1905-1916]
THE
LIFE AND LETTERS OF
WALTER H. PAGE
BY
BURTON J. HENDRICK
VOLUME
II
GARDEN CITY NEW YORK
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
1924
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES
AT
THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS, GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
CONTENTS
VOLUME II
CHAPTER PAGE
XIV. THE "LUSITANIA" AND AFTER 1
XV. THE AMBASSADOR AND THE LAWYERS 53
XVI. DARK DAYS FOR THE ALLIES 81
XVII. CHRISTMAS IN ENGLAND, 1915 103
XVIII. A PERPLEXED AMBASSADOR 128
XIX. WASHINGTON IN THE SUMMER OF 1916 148
XX. "PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY" 189
XXI. THE UNITED STATES AT WAR 215
XXII. THE BALFOUR MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES 248
XXIII. PAGE--THE MAN 295
XXIV. A RESPITE AT ST. IVES 321
XXV. GETTING THE AMERICAN TROOPS TO FRANCE 349
XXVI. LAST DAYS IN ENGLAND 374
XXVII. THE END 404
APPENDIX 407
INDEX 425
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Sir Edward Grey _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
Col. Edward M. House. From a painting by P.A.
Laszlo 88
The Rt. Hon. Herbert Henry Asquith, Prime Minister
of Great Britain, 1908-1916 89
Herbert C. Hoover, in 1914 104
A facsimile page from the Ambassador's letter of
November 24, 1916, resigning his Ambassadorship 105
Walter H. Page, at the time of America's entry into
the war, April, 1917 216
Resolution passed by the two Houses of Parliament,
April 18, 1917, on America's entry into the war 217
The Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, Prime Minister
of Great Britain, 1916-- 232
The Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour (now the Earl of
Balfour), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
1916-1919 233
Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade, 1916-1918,
Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
1918 344
General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of
the American Expeditionary Force in the Great
War 345
Admiral William Sowden Sims, Commander of
American Naval Forces operating in European
waters during the Great War 360
A silver model of the _Mayflower_, the farewell gift
of the Plymouth Council to Mr. Page 361
THE
LIFE AND LETTERS
OF
WALTER H. PAGE
THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF
WALTER H. PAGEHeader as received
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