The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915
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Title: The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915
Author: Various
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The New York Times
CURRENT HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WAR
JANUARY 9, 1915.
What Americans Say to Europe
[Illustration: CHARLES W. ELIOT
_(Photo (c) by Paul Thompson.)_
_See Page 473_]
[Illustration: JAMES M. BECK
_See Page 413_]
In the Supreme Court of Civilization
Argued by James M. Beck.
THE NEW YORK TIMES _submitted the evidence contained in the official
"White Paper" of Great Britain, the "Orange Paper" of Russia, and the
"Gray Paper" of Belgium to James M. Beck, late Assistant Attorney
General of the United States and a leader of the New York bar, who has
argued many of the most important cases before the Supreme Court. On
this evidence Mr. Beck has argued in the following article the case of
Dual Alliance vs. Triple Entente. It has been widely circulated in
France and Great Britain._
Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, Nineteen Hundred and
Fourteen, there had existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a
Supreme Court of Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could
litigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous and less
effective appeal to the arbitrament of arms.
Let us further suppose that each of the contending nations had a
sufficient leaven of Christianity to have its grievances adjudged not by
the ethics of the cannon or the rifle, but by the eternal criterion of
justice.
What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?
Any discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must
start with the assumption that there is an international morality.
This fundamental axiom, upon which the entire basis of civilization
necessarily rests, is challenged by a small class of intellectual
perverts.
Some hold that moral considerations must be subordinated either to
military necessity or so-called manifest destiny. This is the Bernhardi
doctrine.
Others teach that war is a beneficent fatality and that all nations
engaged in it are therefore equally justified. On this theory all of the
now contending nations are but victims of an irresistible current of
events, and the highest duty of the State is to prepare itself for the
systematic extermination, when necessary or expedient, of its neighbors.
Notwithstanding the clever platitudes under which both these doctrines
are veiled, all morally sane minds are agreed that this war is a great
crime against civilization, and the only open question is, which of the
two contending groups of powers is morally responsible for that crime?
Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?
Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?
Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?
As the last of these questions is the most easily disposed of, it may be
considered first.
England's Justification.
England's justification rests upon the solemn Treaty of 1839, whereby
Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia "became the guarantors" of
the "perpetual neutrality" of Belgium, as reaffirmed by Count Bismarck,
then Chancellor of the North German Confederation, on July 22, 1870, and
as even more recently reaffirmed in the striking fact disclosed in the
Belgian "Gray Book."
In the Spring of 1913 a debate was in progress in the Budget Committee
of the Reichstag with reference to the Military Budget. In the course of
the debate the German Secretary of State said:
"The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international
conventions, _and Germany is resolved to respect these
conventions_."
To confirm this solemn assurance, the Minister of War added in the same
debate:
"Belgium does not play any part in the justification of the
German scheme of military reorganization. The scheme is
justified by the position of matters in the East. _Germany
will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is
guaranteed by international treaties._"
A year later, on July 31, 1914, Herr von Below, the German Minister at
Brussels, assured the Belgian Department of State that he knew of a
declaration which the German Chancellor had made in 1911, to the effect
"that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality," and "that
he was certain that the sentiments to which expression was given at that
time _had not changed_." (See Belgian "Gray Book," Nos. 11 and 12.)
Apart from these treaty stipulations, which are only declaration of
Belgium's rights as sovereign nations, The Hague Conference, in which
forty-four nations (including Germany) participated, reaffirmed as an
axiom of international law the inherent right of a nation to the
sanctity of its territory.
It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn
obligations and protestations, when the present Chancellor of the German
Empire, in his speech to the Reichstag and to the world on Aug. 4, 1914,
frankly admitted that the action of the German military machine in
invading Belgium was a wrong. He said:
"We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no
law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are
already on Belgian soil. _Gentlemen, that is contrary to the
dictates of international law._ It is true that the French
Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to
respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her opponent
respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for
invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French
movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been
disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest
of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. _The wrong--I speak
openly--that we are committing_ we will endeavor to make good
as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is
threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his
highest possessions, can only have one thought--how he is to
hack his way through."
This defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a
plea of "Guilty" at the bar of the world. It has one merit, that it
does not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. It virtually
rests the case of Germany upon the gospel of Treitschke and Bernhardi,
that each nation is justified in exerting its physical power to the
utmost in defense of its selfish interests and without any regard to
considerations of conventional morality. Might as between nations is the
sole criterion of right. There is no novelty in this gospel. Its only
surprising feature is its revival in the twentieth century. It was
taught far more effectively by Machiavelli in his treatise, "The
Prince," wherein he glorified the policy of Cesare Borgia in trampling
the weaker States of Italy under foot by ruthless terrorism, unbridled
ferocity, and the basest deception. Indeed, the wanton destruction of
Belgium is simply Borgiaism amplified ten-thousandfold by the mechanical
resources of modern war.
This Answer Cannot Satisfy.
Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of barbarism;
unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and
the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind after uncounted centuries
has made no real advance in political morality beyond that of the cave
dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot satisfy the "decent respect
to the opinions of mankind." Germany's contention that a treaty of peace
is "a scrap of paper," to be disregarded at will when required by the
selfish interests of one contracting party, is the negation of all that
civilization stands for.
Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of
any offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its
voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will
"plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation of its
taking off." On that issue the Supreme Court could have no ground for
doubt or hesitation. Its judgment would be speedy and inexorable.
The remaining two issues, above referred to, are not so simple.
Primarily and perhaps exclusively, the ethical question turns upon the
issues raised by the communications which passed between the various
Chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is the amazing
feature of this greatest of all wars that it was precipitated by
diplomats and rulers, and, assuming that all these statesmen sincerely
desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian
ultimatum, (which is by no means clear,) it was the result of
ineffective diplomacy and clumsy diplomacy at that.
I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war
and the anterior and more fundamental causes; nevertheless, with the
world in a state of Summer peace on July 23, 1914, an issue, gravely
affecting the integrity of nations and the balance of power in Europe,
is suddenly precipitated by the Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and
for the space of about a week a series of diplomatic communications
passed between the Chancelleries of Europe, designed on their face to
prevent a war and yet so ineffective that the war is precipitated and
the fearful Rubicon crossed before the world knew, except imperfectly,
the nature of the differences between the Governments involved. The
ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the
record that has been made up by the official communications which can,
therefore, be treated as documentary evidence in a litigated case.
A substantial part of that record is already before the court of public
opinion in the British and German "White Papers," the Russian "Orange
Paper," and the Belgian "Gray Paper," and the purpose of this article is
to discuss what judgment an impartial and dispassionate court would
render upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted.
Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the
record as thus made up discloses, _but also by the significant omissions
of documents known to be in existence_.
The official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any
failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their
possession, _but the German "White Paper" on its face discloses the
suppression of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as yet
failed to submit any of the documentary evidence in its possession_.
We know from the German "White Paper"--even if we did not conclude as a
matter of irresistible inference--that many important communications
passed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable
that some communications must also have passed between those two
countries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarrassing position, owes to
the world the duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would
probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion that her allies
had commenced an _aggressive_ war, which released her from any
obligation under the Triple Alliance.
The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text
of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture.
Germany admits and asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully
exercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such
mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such
mediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in
the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.
Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of
the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to
treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"
"we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the _utmost_
and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent
with the dignity of the Monarchy."
[German "White Paper."]
This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office in giving
other diplomatic documents had only added the _text_ of the advice which
it thus gave Vienna.
The same significant omission will be found when the same official
defense states that on July 29 the German Government advised Austria "to
begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again _the text_ is
not found among the documents which the German Foreign Office has given
to the world. The communications, which passed between that office and
its Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given _in
extenso_, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the
German official defense it is most significant that not a single
communication is given of the many which passed from Berlin to Vienna
and only two that passed from Vienna to Berlin.
This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of
secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although
professing to give the purport of a few of them.
Until Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its
possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world,
remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated
the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of
Germany's mediatory efforts.
Austria's Case Against Servia.
To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take
us outside the documentary record and into the realm of disputed facts
and would expand this discussion far beyond reasonable length.
Let us therefore suppose _arguendo_ that our imaginary court would
commence its consideration with the assumption that Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, and that the murder of the Archduke on June
28, 1914, while in fact committed by Austrian citizens of Servian
sympathies on Austrian soil, had its inspiration and encouragement in
the political activities either of the Servian Government or of
political organizations of that country.
The question for decision would then be not whether Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, but whether having regard to the obligations
which Austria, as well as every other country, owes to civilization, she
proceeded in the right manner to redress her grievance.
On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.
For nearly a month there was no action by Austria, and no public
statement whatever of its intentions. The world profoundly sympathized
with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch,
who, like King Lear, was "as full of grief as years and wretched in
both."
The Servian Government had formerly disclaimed any complicity with the
assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen
implicated therein.
From time to time, from June 28 to July 23, there came semi-inspired
intimations from Vienna that that country intended to act with great
self-restraint and in the most pacific manner. In his speech to the
French Chamber of Deputies, Viviani says that Europe had in the interval
preceding July 23 express assurances from Austria that its course would
be moderate and conciliatory. Never was it even hinted that Germany and
Austria were about to apply in a time of profound peace a match to the
powder magazine of Europe.
This is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English "White
Paper" from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. It
is one of the most significant documents in the entire correspondence.
At the time this letter was written it is altogether probable that
Austria's arrogant and most unreasonable ultimatum had already been
framed and approved in Vienna, and possibly in Berlin, and yet Sir
Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had
so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he
"asked the German Ambassador today (July 20) if he had any
news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia."
The German Ambassador replied "that he had not, but Austria
was certainly going to take some step."
Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had
learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,
"in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had
deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but
had said that it should be cleared up."
The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia
could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first
suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the
German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told the
German Ambassador that he
"assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything
until they had first disclosed to the public their case
against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had
discovered at the trial,"
and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.
[English "White Paper," No. 1.]
Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, on the
theory that the true function of an Ambassador is "to lie for his
country," or the thunderbolt was being launched with such secrecy that
even the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in
progress.
The British Ambassador at Vienna reports to Sir Edward Grey:
"The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d July of the note to
Servia was preceded by a period of _absolute silence_ at the
Ballplatz."
He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at
Vienna--note the significance of the exception--not a single member of
the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that
the French Ambassador when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on
July 23 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually
been issued, but was given the impression that its tone was moderate.
Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's
confidence.
[Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1,
1914.]
No better proof of this sense of security need be adduced than that the
French President and her Foreign Minister were thousands of miles from
Paris, and the Russian Minister had, after the funeral of the Austrian
Archduke, left Vienna for his annual holiday.
The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether
Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum.
If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St.
Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express
assurance that
"the German Government _had no knowledge of the text of the
Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised
any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to
Germany a threatening attitude_."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 18.]
This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the
two allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face
of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme
measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize
Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a
probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have
committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war
without first consulting Germany.
Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private
information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it
to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador himself "indorses
every line of it." [English "White Paper," No. 95.] As he does not
disclose the source of his "private information," this testimony would
not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official
defense in the German "White Paper," _we find that the German Foreign
Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum
and not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave her a
carte blanche to proceed_.
This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's
attitude and pacific protestations that we quote _in extenso_. After
referring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the
German "White Paper" says:
"In view of these circumstances, Austria had to admit that it would not
be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the
monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the
border without taking action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government advised
us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We
were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her
view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might
consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in
Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
would receive our approval._ We were fully aware in this connection that
warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring
Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with
our duties as an ally."
Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact
that the British Ambassador at Berlin, in his letter of July 22 to Sir
Edward Grey, states that _on the preceding night_ (July 21) he had met
the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was
made to a possible action by Austria.
"His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on
Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that
the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia
and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference
from outside in the discussions between those two countries."
He adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country
should approach Austria-Hungary in the matter, he had
"on several occasions in conversation with the Servian
Minister emphasized the extreme importance that
Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing."
[English "White Paper," No. 2.]
Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a
position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to
which Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to
precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European
civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse
continuing through many centuries a United European State exists, even
though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that
Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against
Servia without interference from any other power, even though, as was
inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of the
Balkan States and even threaten the European balance of power.
No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this
Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in
its demands. It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive
document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which
it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to answer
whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its
complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. As the full text
of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly
twenty-four hours after its service upon Servia, the other European
nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the
peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.
[English "White Paper," No. 5; Russian "Orange Paper," No. 3.]
Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance
knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the
fact that on the same day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the
German Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris, London, and
St. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian Governments
that
"the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian
Government cannot but be looked upon as justified."
[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]
How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the
substance of the ultimatum?
The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does
not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to
the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the
ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following
day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable
that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully
prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless
it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum
but also at least of the substance thereof.
While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of
Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the
communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not
responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the
discreditable character of the whole business--yet the more reasonable
assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at
Belgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a
concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning
along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this
conclusion for a moment.
The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to
anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these demands"--why,
if they were justified?--and Germany suggests to France, England, and
Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has
"recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left
to it."
The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed
"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question
is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon
Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should
earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,"
and he added that Germany strongly desired
"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of
another power, on account of the various alliance obligations,
would bring consequences impossible to measure."
This is one of the most significant documents in the whole
correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London
affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was
not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why
should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon
England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war
upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker
nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?
[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]
A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated
Governments of Germany a _confidential communication_ in which he
recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the
part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if
Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added
that
"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this
conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,"
but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would
therefore alone--
"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the
Austro-Servian question, _which all the rest of the great
European powers wish to localize_."
In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor
declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of
Servia by Austria. He says "_our closest interests therefore summon us
to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that
"if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the
intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we
should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the
entire might of the German Empire."
[German "White Paper," Annex 2.]
In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little
attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an
individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art
thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be
betrayed by a Judas kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of
diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.
No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending
that his nation wished nothing but peace and invoking Divine aid for its
murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted
occasion when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of "honor," it might be as
well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question.
Let us, then, analyze the record as already made up; and for the sake of
clearness the events which preceded the war will be considered
chronologically.
Immediately upon the receipt of the ultimatum in St. Petersburg on July
24, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a formal communication
to Austria-Hungary, suggested that the abrupt time limit "leaves to the
powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps
whatever for the straightening out of the complications that have
arisen," and added:
"To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disastrous
for all the powers, which can follow the method of action of
the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us
that, above all, the delay given to Servia to reply should be
extended."
Sazonof further suggested that time should be given for the powers to
examine the results of the inquiry that the Austro-Hungarian Government
had made in the matter of the Serajevo assassination, and stated that if
the powers were convinced
"of the well-groundedness of certain of the Austrian demands
they would find themselves in a position to send to the
Servian Government consequential advice."
He justly observes that
"a refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum ... would be
in contradiction with the very bases of international
relations."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 4.]
Could any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of
the world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done to
preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the uttermost
farthing.
Concurrently with Sazonof's plea for a little time to preserve the peace
of the world, Sir Edward Grey had seen the German Ambassador on July 24
and had suggested to him that the only method of preventing the
catastrophe was
"that the four powers, Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves,
(England,) should work together simultaneously at Vienna and
St. Petersburg."
[English "White Paper," No. 11.]
Germany had only to intimate to Austria that "a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind," as well as common courtesy to great and friendly
nations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia, but
to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially as the
period was one of Summer dullness and many of the leading rulers and
statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.
Under these circumstances was it not natural that Russia should announce
on July 24
"that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia would
not leave Russia indifferent,"
and that on the same day the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna
suggested to the Austrian Foreign Office
"that the Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it
impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both
unusual and peremptory in its terms"?
To which the only reply of the Austrian Foreign Minister was that their
representative in Servia
"was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian
demands were accepted in their integrity by 4 P.M. tomorrow."
[English "White Paper," No. 7.]
Austria's only concession then or subsequently to the cause of peace was
the assurance that Austria would not _after its conquest_ of Servia
demand any territory.
The action of Germany on this day, July 24, is most significant. Its
Ambassador in England communicated a note to Sir Edward Grey in which it
justified Austro-Hungarian grievances and ultimatum by saying that
"under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands
of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as
equitable and moderate."
The note added:
"The Imperial Government [Germany] want to emphasize their
opinion that in the present case there is only question of a
matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and
Servia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor
to reserve it to those two immediately concerned."
[English "White Paper," No. 9.]
On July 25, probably to the great surprise of both Germany and Austria,
which had definitely calculated upon Servians non-compliance with the
ultimatum, the latter country, under the conciliatory advice of Russia
and England, made a reply in which, at some sacrifice of its
self-respect as a sovereign State, it substantially accepted all but one
of the demands of Austria, and as to that it did not, in terms, refuse
it, but expressed its willingness to refer it either to arbitration or
to a conference of the powers.
[English "White Paper," No. 39.]
No court would question for a moment the conclusion that the reply was a
substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands, nor indeed did
either Germany or Austria seriously contend that it was not. They
contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the assurances,
calling the concessions "shams," and of this it is enough to say that if
Germany and Austria had accepted Servians reply as sufficient, and
Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises thus made in the
utmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and
no general war. Indeed, both Russia and England pledged their influence
to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of
Austria. The outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate or
leave to the powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in the
Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem. Austria's
professed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily
attained by having the neutral powers appoint a commission of jurists to
make such investigation.
On July 24 Sir Edward Grey also had asked the German Ambassador to use
his good influences at Vienna to secure an extension of time. To this
most reasonable request the answer and action of the German Government
was disingenuous in the extreme. They agreed to "pass on" the
suggestion, but the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added
that as the Austrian Prime Minister was away from Vienna there would be
delay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended, and
"he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government
_wished to give the Servians a lesson and that they meant to
take military action. He also admitted that the Servian
Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian
demands_."
He added that Germany did not want a general war and "he would do all in
his power to prevent such a calamity."
[English "White Paper," Nos. 11 and 18.]
Immediately on the issuance of the ultimatum the Austrian Foreign
Minister, Count Berchtold, had most inopportunely taken himself to
Ischl, where he remained until after the expiration of the time limit.
Access to him proved difficult, and the Russian Chargé at Vienna, having
lodged a pacific protest with the Acting Foreign Minister in order to
take no chances, telegraphed it to Berchtold at Ischl. Nevertheless,
Berchtold's apparently designed absence from the capital was Germany's
excuse for its failure to get the time limit extended.
If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of peace
the text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to
Vienna would have given the additional time which, with sincerely
pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace.
Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word.
Contrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose Foreign Minister on
the morning of July 25 offered
"to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of
England, France, Germany, and Italy."
[English "White Paper," No. 17.]
As Russia was the member of the Triple Entente most interested in the
fate of Servia, what proposal could have been more conciliatory or
magnanimous?
On July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four powers (including
Germany) should unite
"in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross
the frontier and to give time for the four powers, acting at
Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If
Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and
ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly
co-operate."
[English "White Paper," Nos. 24 and 25.]
To this reasonable request the Imperial German Chancellor replied:
"First and last, we take the ground that this question must be
localized _by the abstention of all the powers from
intervention in it_,"
but added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose,
"co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between
Russia and Austria."
[German "White Paper," Annex 13.]
This distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the
difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's difference with
Austria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Servia. Germany
would not interfere in the latter, but would as an abstract proposition
mediate between Russia and Austria. For all practical purposes the two
things were indistinguishable.
How she "co-operated" we shall presently see.
All that Germany _did_ on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was
to "pass on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but
subsequent events indicate that it was "passed on" without any
indorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its
ally's request for more time if it had ever been made?
The Austrian Foreign Minister, having launched the ultimatum, absented
himself from the capital, but the Russian Minister at Vienna, as already
stated, succeeded in submitting this most reasonable request verbally to
the Acting Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would submit it to
Count Berchtold, _but that he could predict with assurance a categorical
refusal_. Later on that day (July 25) Russia was definitely advised that
no time extension would be granted.
[Russian "Orange Paper," Nos. 11 and 12.]
Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A
little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to
preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.
A colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging
diplomats. A timely word from the German Chancellor would have saved the
flower of the youth of Germany and Austria from perishing. It would be
difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a
friendly power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.
Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France,
and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily
arresting military proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could
be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy
that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the
frontier "until we had had time to try and arrange matters between
them," but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he
had received from the German Foreign Office that "once she [Austria] had
launched that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not draw back."
[English "White Paper," No. 25.]
As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought
in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession. Its
attitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that
Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany
approved its point of view,
"and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany could not
allow herself to be guided except by her duty to her ally."
This seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that its duties to
civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria,
whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it
carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war
may be defensible, but to support it in times of peace in an iniquitous
demand and a policy of gross discourtesy offends every sense of
international morality.
On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter
into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in
common of some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. _To this Austria
never even replied._ The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion
to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he
would "find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this
did not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador
in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in
reply to a similar suggestion that Germany should suggest to Vienna to
meet Servia in the same conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown, the
Ambassador answered that that "was not possible in view of the
resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict."
On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in
London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and
to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved the peace of Europe,
the German Chancellor replied with the pitiful quibble that "it is
impossible to bring our ally before a European court in its difference
with Servia," although it affected to accept "in principle" the policy
of mediation.
Germany's acceptance "in principle" of a policy which she in practice
thwarted suggests the law-abiding tendencies of that Maine statesman who
was "for the Maine prohibition liquor law, but against its enforcement."
[English "White Paper," No. 46.]
Germany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the powers even for
their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that the
German Ambassador at London quoted to Sir Edward Grey the German
Secretary of State as saying
"that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia
could hardly be expected to accept,"
thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust.
Sir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention to the
fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia and
marched into that country
"it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all
costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be
involved."
He added that the Servian reply
"should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and
pause,"
and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna, but the
German Secretary of State on July 27 replied that such a conference "was
not practicable," and that it "would practically amount to a court of
arbitration," and could not, in his opinion, be called together "except
at the request of Austria and Russia."
[English "White Paper," Nos. 43 and 46.]
That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew
that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had
already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had
actually commenced its military operations. Germany's attitude is best
indicated by the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to the
Russian Foreign Office in which he states that on July 27 he called at
the German Foreign Office and asked it
"to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up
this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not
advise Austria to yield."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 38.]
Why not? Russia had advised Servia to yield, and Servia had conceded
nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign Office advise
Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace
were sincere? All that Russia and England desired was that a little time
and consideration should be given, without prejudice to the rights or
claims of Austria, before the peace of the world was hopelessly
shattered.
Before this interview took place the French Ambassador had called at the
German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English
suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany,
Russia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that
Austria and Servia
"should abstain from any act which might aggravate the
situation at the present hour."
By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no
invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. _To this
the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal._
On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had "a long and earnest
conversation" with the Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that
"something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.
Baron Machio replied that this would now be difficult, as a
skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the
Servians had been aggressors."
The Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it could
to keep the Servians quiet,
"and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to
gain time."
He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be
furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
"who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could
be fairly asked of her as an independent power."
The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be
submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[English "White Paper," No. 56.]
On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the French
Foreign Office and strongly insisted on the "_exclusion of all
possibility of mediation or of conference_," and yet contemporaneously
the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had
"started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna, immediately
in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further
communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the
Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna."
What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the official apologist for
that country, after stating his conviction
"that an act of mediation could not take into consideration
the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an
Austro-Hungarian affair,"
claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further
suggestion to Vienna, in which Austria-Hungary was urged
"either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or
to look upon it as a basis for further conversations";
but the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the rôle of the wicked
partner of the combination--"in full appreciation of our mediatory
activity," (so says the German "White Paper" with sardonic humor,)
replied to this proposition that, coming as it did after the opening of
hostilities, "_it was too late_."
Does any reasonable man question for a moment that, if Germany had done
something more than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific
suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its
powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military
operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?
On the following day, July 28, the door was further closed on any
possibility of compromise when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs
"said, quietly but firmly, _that no discussion could be
accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would be
declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of
the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be
accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and
inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled
directly between the two parties immediately concerned."
To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the
guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of
Austria's quarrel the British Ambassador suggested "the larger aspect of
the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this "larger aspect,"
which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause,
the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he
"had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to
oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at
territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be
postponed."
[English "White Paper," No. 62.]
The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed,
Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve
its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 had a conference with
Berchtold and pointed to the dangers to the peace of Europe and the
desirability of good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
To this Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the
seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation
with the Cabinet at St. Petersburg.
"He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian
Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the
energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, _could
now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."_
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 45.]
On the same day, July 28, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the
English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposal of
conference of the neutral powers, on the ground that he did not think it
would be effective,
"because such a conference would in his opinion have the
appearance of an 'Areopagus' consisting of two powers of each
group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers."
After engaging in this pitiful and insincere quibble, and when reminded
of Servia's conciliatory reply, amounting to a virtual surrender,
"his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the
Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he
agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian
concern, _with which Russia had nothing to do_."
[English "White Paper," No. 71.]
At this point the rules of the countries intervened in the dispute. The
Kaiser, having returned from Norway, telegraphed the Czar, under date of
July 28, that he was
"exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary
come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia,"
and invoked the Czar's aid.
[German "White Paper," Annex 20.]
If the Kaiser were sincere, and he may have been, _his attitude was not
that of his Foreign Office_. Upon the face of the record we have only
his own assurance that he was doing everything to preserve peace, but
the steps that he took or the communications he made to influence
Austria _are not found in the formal defense which the German Government
has given to the world_. The Kaiser can only convince the world of his
innocence of the crime of his Potsdam camarilla by giving the world _the
text_ of any advice he gave the Austrian officials. He has produced his
telegrams to the Czar. _Where are those he presumably sent to Francis
Joseph or Count Berchtold? Where are the instructions he gave his own
Ambassadors or Foreign Minister?_
It is significant that on the same day Sazonof telegraphed to Count
Benckendorff:
"My conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my
impression that Germany is rather favorable to the
uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria,"
and he adds, and history will vindicate him in the conclusion, that
"the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the
whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action
on its ally."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 43.]
On July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had
that night seen the German Chancellor, who had "just returned from
Potsdam," where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor
then showed clearly how the wind was blowing in making the suggestion to
Sir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral, Germany would
agree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When
asked about the French colonies, no assurance was given.
[English "White Paper," No. 85.]
Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Ambassador,
and expressed regret
"that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was
therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's]
suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of
discussion."
[English "White Paper," No. 75.]
On the same day the Ambassador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon
Sazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between
Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented. [Russian "Orange
Paper," No. 49.] On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German
Government
"_to suggest any form of procedure_ under which the idea of
mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the
German Government in principle, _could be applied_."
To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for
fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like
pressure it might "_cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and
present a fait accompli_." [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir
Edward Grey, July 29--English "White Paper," No. 70.]
This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while
Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria
might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of
its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's
wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German
Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic
pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is
it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary
of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not
sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war,
as though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and
expected from the first.
As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambassador at Berlin
then suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige,
the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to
discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing
graver complications.
To this proposal the German Secretary of State seemingly acquiesced,
but, as usual, _nothing whatever was done_. [English "White Paper," No.
76.] It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was assured by the
German Ambassador that the German Foreign Office was
"endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at
St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings
in Servia,"
but again the communications which the German Foreign Office sent to
Vienna on this point _have never yet been disclosed to the world_.
[English "White Paper," No. 84.]
In this same conference Sir Edward Grey
"urged that the _German Government should suggest any method_
by which the influence of the four powers could be used
together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France
agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating
influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method
that Germany could suggest_ if mine were not acceptable. In
fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method
that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press
the button' in the interests of peace."
[English "White Paper," No. 84.]
The difficulty was, however, that Germany never "pressed the button,"
although obviously it would have been easy for her to do so, as the
stronger and more influential member of the Double Alliance.
On the same day the Austrian Government left a memorandum with Sir
Edward Grey to the effect that Count Mensdorff said that the war with
Servia must proceed.
On the night of July 29 the British Ambassador at Berlin was informed
that the German Foreign Office "_had not had time to send an answer
yet_" to the proposal that Germany suggest the form of mediation, but
that the question had been referred to the Austro-Hungarian Government
with a request as to "what would satisfy them."
[English "White Paper," No. 107.]
On the following day the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey that
the German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking
Belgrade and Servian territory in the region of the frontier, to promise
not to advance further, while the powers endeavored to arrange that
Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria, but if
Germany ever exercised any such pressure upon Vienna, _no evidence of it
has ever been given to the world_. Certainly it was not very effective,
and for the reasons mentioned it is impossible to conclude that the
advice of Germany, if in good faith, would not have been followed by its
weaker ally.
From all that appears in the record, Austria made no reply to this most
conciliatory suggestion of England, but, in the meantime, the
irrepressible Kaiser made the crisis more acute by cabling to the Czar
that the mobilization of Russia to meet the mobilization of Austria was
affecting his position of mediator, to which the Czar made a
conciliatory reply, stating that Russia's mobilization was only for a
defense against Austria.
The Czar, to put at rest any anxiety of the Kaiser as to Russia's
intentions with respect to Germany, added:
"I thank you cordially for your mediation which permits the
hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically
impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have
been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far
from us to want war. _As long as the negotiations between
Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no
provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon._ I
confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for
the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our
countries and the peace of Europe."
What more could Russia do? If Austria continued to mobilize, why not
Russia?
On this day, July 30, the German Ambassador had two interviews at St.
Petersburg with Sazonof, and it was then that Sazonof drew up the
following formula as a basis for peace:
"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has
assumed character of question of European interest, declares
herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which
violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, _Russia engages to
stop all military preparations_."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 60.]
At this stage King George telegraphed Prince Henry of Prussia that
"the English Government was doing its utmost, suggesting to
Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if
Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of
Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for
satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries
meanwhile suspending their war preparation."
The King adds a hope that the Kaiser
"will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept
this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are
working together to prevent what would be an international
catastrophe."
[Second German "White Paper."]
This last proposition, however, was never accepted or declined, for the
impetuous Kaiser gave his twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia to demobilize,
and this was an arrogant demand which no self-respecting power, much
less so great a one as Russia, could possibly accept.
While this demand was in progress Sir Edward Grey was making his last
attempt to preserve peace by asking Germany to sound Vienna, as he would
sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four
disinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would
"undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her
demands on Servia, provided they did not embarrass Servian
sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory."
Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that if
this was not satisfactory, and if Germany would make any reasonable
proposals to preserve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that
"his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the
consequences,"
which obviously meant either neutrality or actual intervention in behalf
of Germany and Austria.
On the same day the British Ambassador at Berlin besought the German
Foreign Office to
"put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in
the general interest to reassure Russia and to show themselves
disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis."
And Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German Foreign Minister replied
that last night he had
"begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he
had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister
for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this
morning in the matter."
_Again the text of the letter in which Germany "begged" Austria to be
conciliatory is not found in the record._
The excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia compelled it to
mobilize does not justify the war. Mobilization does not necessarily
mean aggression, but simply preparation. If Russia had the right to
mobilize because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the right to
mobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not follow that either of
the three nations could justify a war to compel the other parties to
demobilize. Mobilization is only a preparation against eventualities. It
is the right of the sovereign State and by no code of ethics a _casus
belli_. The demand of Germany that Russia could not arm to defend
itself, when Austria was preparing for a possible attack on Russia, has
few, if any, parallels in history for bullying effrontery. It treated
Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State.
It must be observed that, while Germany insisted that Russia should
demobilize, the Kaiser offered no reciprocal promise. On his theory
Germany and Austria were to be left free to complete their preparations,
but Russia was to tie her own hands and leave herself "naked to her
enemies." This is shown by the last telegrams which passed between the
Czar and Kaiser. The Czar telegraphed:
"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are
forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the
same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these
measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to
negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the
universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid
of God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to
prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence
your urgent reply."
To this the Kaiser replied:
"I thank you for your telegram. I have shown yesterday to your
Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.
Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from
my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of your
Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army.
An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of your Government
is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this
reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the
subject of your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you,
without delay, order your troops to commit, under no
circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."
This impetuous step of Germany to compel its great neighbor to desist
from military preparations to defend itself came most inopportunely, for
on Aug. 1 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador _for the first time_ declared
to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was then suggested that the form of
the ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in
London. (Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey,
dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English
Ambassador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible
to maintain peace
"if only a little respite in time can be gained before any
great power begins war,"
[English "White Paper," No. 131.]
but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to
demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and, spurred
on by the arrogant Potsdam military party, he "let slip the dogs of
war." After the fatal Rubicon had been crossed and the die was cast the
Czar telegraphed King George:
"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more I have done all in
my power to avert war."
Such will be the verdict of history.
The Judgment.
These are _the facts_ as shown by the record, and upon them, in my
judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following
judgment:
1--_That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly
concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a
matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing
they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of
Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of
conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable
by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and
disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to
Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and
obligations of all interested nations._
2--_That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to
preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time
effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly
abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course._
3--_That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely
worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original
misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope
of preserving peace._
4--_That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably
justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the
right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not
cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any
just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar
preparations._
5--_That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure
to demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable
concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the
war._
6--_That Belgium as a sovereign State has as an inherent right the power
to determine when and under what conditions an alien can cross her
frontiers. This right exists independently of treaties, but is, in the
case of Belgium, reinforced by the Treaty of 1839 and The Hague
Convention, whereby the leading European nations (including Germany)
guarantee its "perpetual neutrality." The invasion of Belgium by Germany
was in violation of these rights, and England only respected its own
solemn covenant when, in defense of that neutrality, it declared war
against Germany._
In Conclusion.
The writer of this article has reached these conclusions with
reluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for the German people
and equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more
he admires the magnificent courage with which the German Nation, beset
on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as
a nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is
worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this
cannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from any
considerations of nationality; nor can it affect the conclusion that the
German Nation has been plunged into this abyss by its scheming statesmen
and its self-centred and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth
century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty God on
earth, and therefore infallible.
In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should
therefore distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser
and the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the
German people.
The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the
failure to disclose to the German people the diplomatic communications
hereinbefore quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not
merely a crime against civilization, _but also against the deceived and
misled German people_. They have a vision and are essentially
progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while
the ideals of their military caste are those of the Dark Ages.
One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will
be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble and
peace-loving nation into this fathomless chasm of misfortune.
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,
Yet they grind exceeding small,
Though with patience He stands waiting,
With exactness grinds He all."
Critics Dispute Mr. Beck
_To the Editor of The New York Times:_
It is regrettable that President Wilson's admirable policy of strict
neutrality is not more sincerely and carefully observed by the press and
public of this country.
We are a cosmopolitan nation. Citizens of the five great warring
countries and their descendants, to a very great extent, constitute our
population. Partiality of any kind tends to destroy the elemental ties
which bind us together, to disrupt our Union, and to make us a house
divided against itself. James M. Beck's article in last Sunday's TIMES
is of the kind which, serving no good purpose, helps to loosen, if not
sever, our most vital domestic ties. While not for an instant doubting
Mr. Beck's sincerity, we must take issue with his inadvertently
ill-timed expression of opinion.
The article in question is based on the following statement: "Any
discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must start
with the assumption that there is such a thing as international
morality." How does Mr. Beck define "international morality"? How can he
assume that to exist which each of the contending nations by their
diverse actions prove to be non-extant? How can he claim that there is
an "international morality" of accepted form when each nation claims
that its interpretation must be accepted by the others?
Mr. Beck's allegation that the question "Was England justified in
declaring war against Germany?" is more easily disposed of than the
questions "Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?" and
"Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?"
proves two things--first, that his interest lies primarily in the
vindication of England; second, that he disregards the fundamental
causes and recognizes only the precipitating causes of the war.
The precipitating cause of the war between England and Germany is
verbosely if inadequately covered by his article. We must admit that a
treaty was broken by Germany, yet we contend that this broken agreement
was a pretext for a war fomented and impelled by basic economic causes.
At the outset, let us distinguish between a contract and a treaty. A
contract is an agreement between individuals contemplating enforcement
by a court of law; punishment by money damages in the great majority of
cases, by a specific performance in a very few. A treaty is an agreement
between nations contemplating enforcement by a court of international
public opinion; punishment by money indemnity in the great majority of
cases, by specific performance (i.e., force of arms) in a very few.
Germany's Existence Threatened.
Germany contends that her breach of treaty obligation is punishable by
the payment of money indemnity to the aggrieved party. This she has
offered to do in the case of Belgium, as she has already done in the
case of Luxemburg. Germany's existence was so seriously threatened that
her action seems justifiable, and there remains a sole moral obligation
to compensate any neutral country injured by her.
The mere fact that Belgium had made an unfortunate alliance with England
is deplorable in that Belgium has suffered terribly; but this suffering
is not attributable to Germany. When Japan violated Chinese neutrality,
China protested. Though she was entitled to a money indemnity, there is
no valid reason under the sun why the United States as a guarantor of
the integrity of China should declare war against Japan. England's
justification, in so far as there can be any justification for adding to
the toll of death, is the same as that of Germany, the preservation of
national sovereignty.
Further: "It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these
solemn obligations." There can be nothing wanton in a struggle for
existence, and that this European war is such a struggle is the only
possible explanation of its magnitude, ferocity, and vast possible
consequences. Then, too, though deplorable, treaty obligations are not
solemn, as Italy has proved to the complete satisfaction of so many.
Italy's contention that this is an aggressive war on the part of Germany
and Austria is as untenable as the German contention that it is an
aggressive war on the part of England. For this war was not an
aggressive war on the part of any nation, but an unavoidable war caused
by the simultaneous bursting of the long-gathering economic storm
clouds.
Again: "The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend
upon the record that has been made up by the official communications."
This is similar to a contention that the ethical rights in a case in
court must depend upon the astuteness of counsel in summing up to the
jury. "A court would be deeply impressed ... by the significant
omissions of documents known to be in existence." A court of law, as our
former Assistant Attorney General of the United States surely knows,
compels no one to give testimony that tends to incriminate, and,
furthermore, does not construe failure to testify on the grounds that it
will tend to incriminate against the defendant. In the law the defendant
is entitled to every reasonable doubt. It is also conceivable that a
reasonable time for the defense to present its case would be granted
before passing judgment.
Passing on: "To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against
Servia would take us ... into the realm of disputed facts." This seems a
delectable bit of humor. We respectfully submit that Mr. Beck's other
assertions might also be considered as "in the realm of disputed facts."
Mr. Beck admits that Austria had a just grievance against Servia, though
he questions her method of redress. Though we conceive that in the
unfortunate European tangle Austria relied on German support in the
event of international conflict, we submit that reliance on Russian
support was a bigger factor in encouraging little Servia to defy her big
neighbor than the remoter help that Germany would furnish Austria in the
event of the conflict spreading.
Austria, in the exercise of her right to engage in a punitive expedition
against Servia, guaranteed that she would do nothing to generalize the
conflict by her assurances to Russia and to the world that there would
be no annexation of Servian territory or annihilation of the Servian
Kingdom. Whether these assurances were genuine or not is impossible of
determination. We have no right to constitute ourselves arbiters of
their sincerity.
No European Solidarity.
Mr. Beck speaks of "the solidarity of European civilization and the fact
that by policy and diplomatic intercourse ... a United European State
exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate." This
solidarity is conspicuous only by its utter non-existence. Whatever may
have been achieved by policy and diplomatic intercourse has been marred
and rendered useless by the lines of demarkation of the spheres of
influence of the great powers of Europe and by the racial and
temperamental incongruities of Europe's population.
We read: "Servia had forty-eight hours to answer; ... the other European
nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the
peace of Europe. Why should an Austro-Servian war compromise the peace
of Europe?" Was it not because of the tangled web of international
diplomacy, the Triple Entente as well as the Triple Alliance?
Referring to a German warning in regard to Austria's demands on Servia,
"the German Foreign Office anticipates that Servia 'will refuse to
comply with these demands'--why, if they were justified?" We grieve at
the shattered ideal of Mr. Beck, who, in the face of the international
calamity which has befallen the world, still can believe that all
justifiable demands are complied with.
Again, quoting German "White Paper," Annex 1B, Germany desired "that
the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on
account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences
impossible to measure." The explanation of this statement is not--an
aggressor threatens his adversary, but, rather, a prudent man begs
opposing factions to keep cool.
Great space is devoted in the article in question to Germany's
unwillingness to place the Austro-Servian controversy in the hands of
France, England, Germany, and Italy. As Germany disavows all interest in
the controversy, if she speaks truly, it was not within her power to
dictate to her ally in a matter which she could in nowise control except
by force of arms. Furthermore, had she had the power, how could she be
expected to exert pressure on her ally to leave a vital controversy to a
court of four, two of whom were bound by alliances with Russia,
Austria's real antagonist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events
have shown, Austria's natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy? At
best, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have
been a deadlock.
Further: "The Russian Minister ... called at the German Foreign Office
and asked it 'to urge upon Vienna ... to take up this line of
conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.'"
Elsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and
Austro-Russian questions "for all practical purposes ... were
indistinguishable." This inconsistency of having Servia in the light of
a principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest
stumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the
war. The logical explanation of Servia's position is that of Russia's
agent. Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on
an allied principal that Russia could exert on her agent.
It is true that Germany engaged in many blundering diplomatic quibbles
in the final stages of preparation for the war; but it is also true that
England quibbled, though with greater diplomatic finesse; for instance,
"Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that ...
if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace, and
Russia and France rejected it, that 'his Majesty's Government would have
nothing to do with the consequences.'" Here it is apparent to every one
that the word "reasonable" begs the questions.
Slav and Teuton.
The German people were encouraged to relish the idea of a war against
Russia once that war became likely, for sooner or later it seemed
inevitable that Slav and Teuton would clash, and Germany felt confident
that at the present time she outmatched her enemy. The Russians, too,
were encouraged to desire the Slav provinces of Austria, which racially
are a part of the Russian domain. The English people were made to relish
this opportunity to strike their great commercial competitor, especially
when they could do so with little likelihood of unfavorable criticisms.
Finally, the impressionable French people were stirred to thoughts of
revenge and recovery of their lost provinces.
Sympathy with any country in this most disgraceful yet most inevitable
of wars brands the sympathizer as a party to the material and lustful
purposes of at least one of the combatants. There is no ethical
justification of this war from any standpoint. There is no justification
of this war from any standpoint. There is only an explanation of the war
from an economic standpoint. All these specious arguments on the
precipitating causes of the war can be but for the display of brilliant
forensic oratory and matchless diction. Let us thrust aside in these
dark moments of peril and horror all subterfuge.
England, overburdened with taxation, was on the verge of civil war.
Russia, whose masses were overridden roughshod by a bureaucracy
weighting down the peasants with onerous national burdens, expected
sooner or later the cataclysmic upheaval with which the Nihilistic
societies have long been threatening its tyrannical Government. France,
seriously financially embarrassed because of crop impoverishment and
bad foreign investments in Brazil, Russia, and the Balkans, was subject
to continued internal political upheavals, with ever-changing Ministries
and a growing Socialist Party.
Austria, "the ramshackle empire," was in danger of disintegrating from a
variety of causes, not the least of which was the infusibility of its
racially different elements. Germany, in a blind race for commercial
supremacy, suffered from industrial overproduction, thus creating an
unhealthy financial condition which fortified the Socialist Party to an
extent which threatened her imperialistic form of government itself.
So these monarchies whose days were numbered, because of dissatisfaction
at the waste and extravagance of a world gone mad with national excesses
committed in the name of civilization, in reality the price of our
modernization, in a final desperate effort to rally their waning
fortunes stampeded their awakening masses into a ruinous interracial war
in order to stave off the torch and the guillotine.
GEORGE E. BERNHEIMER.
New York, Oct. 30, 1914.
Russia to Blame
_To the Editor of The New York Times:_
Allow me to submit the following in answer to the article of James M.
Beck, entitled "Case of the Double Alliance vs. the Triple Entente,"
published in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 25, 1914:
The case of "Russian Mobilization vs. German Mediation." Q.--Upon whom
was the duty to yield?
Mr. Beck has spent considerable time and effort to prove, at least by
inference, that Germany must have been informed beforehand of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Personally, I am convinced that the
ultimatum in question was sent with the full knowledge and consent of
Germany; and, whether this is true or not, I maintain that it was
Austria's duty to inform her ally before taking a step which was likely
to endanger the peace of Europe.
The concession of this point takes me immediately to the ultimatum
itself and to the question, "Was the tenor of the ultimatum justified?"
Mr. Beck, in his judgment, says: "The ultimatum is grossly unreasonable
and disappropriate to any grievance that Austria had." Perhaps Mr. Beck
is right, but I have good reasons to think that the tenor of the
ultimatum was fully justified, in view of Servia's former conduct.
Austria was dealing here with a Government the real spirits of which had
come into power by the commission of one of the most dastardly crimes of
modern times. A crime which, at the time of its commission, sent a shock
of horror through the entire civilized world, to wit, "the outrageous
murder of the former King and Queen of Servia," outrageous because it
was perpetrated by the so-called aristocracy of Servia. The
long-continued agitation carried on by Servia against Austria, at the
instigation of Russia, which finally culminated in another no less
outrageous assassination, that of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his
consort, to my idea fully justified Austria in making demands which
under ordinary circumstances might have been termed "unreasonable."
The question whether Austria was justified in going to war against
Servia is a debatable one, but I respectfully refer to the fact that our
own country, the United States, was only very recently on the verge of
precipitating war with a "much weaker" nation than ours, on account of
the latter's refusal to salute the American flag. Neither did we stop on
that occasion with the ultimatum, but we followed it up with dispatching
a fleet of warships, the landing of troops, and the seizure of Vera
Cruz.
From the time Austria's ultimatum was sent all the great powers seemed
to have professed a great eagerness for the preservation of peace. Mr.
Beck asserts that Germany was not sincere in its desire for peace and
could have avoided the war if it had seriously tried to exert its
influence over Austria. This finding is based on the inference drawn
from the fact that Germany failed to achieve any results.
To determine whether Mr. Beck is justified in finding as he does, it is
necessary, first of all, to examine the exact status of the powers at
the time the ultimatum was sent. We find that Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, for which it was seeking redress. An issue was
therefore raised between Austria and Servia. Germany, although Austria's
ally, immediately defined its attitude by declaring emphatically that
"the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria
alone."
Why Did Russia Mobilize?
I beg to ask Mr. Beck to answer the following question: By what
right--moral, legal, or equitable--did Russia make Servia's cause its
own? Did Russia have any alliance with Servia? I further ask: What
privity existed between Austria, Servia, and Russia?
Suppose Mr. Beck can justify the action of Russia, although a "rank
outsider," in taking Servia's part, how can he possibly justify the
positively unreasonable and, under the circumstances, most dangerous
step of "actual mobilization" on the part of Russia?
Mr. Beck has tried to justify the mobilization by quoting the Russian
excuse "that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against
Austria." On close examination what does this amount to? It resolves
itself into a situation somewhat like this: A sends an ultimatum to B
seeking redress for a wrong committed by B upon A, whereupon C mobilizes
"for defense against A." I leave it to the average American of ordinary
intelligence to find a reason for C's mobilization "for defense against
A." Mr. Beck might as well try to justify a mobilization on the part of
Japan if the United States was preparing to invade Mexico for the
purpose of redressing an insult to the American flag. Does Mr. Beck
realize the seriousness of actual mobilization by Russia at that
critical moment? Not one of the other powers dared to take this one step
which among nations is regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war.
And what did the Kaiser do at this moment? He did the only thing he
could do, and, I dare say, the only thing our American Nation could have
done under the same circumstances. He wired the Czar and stated: "I am
willing to bring my influences to bear upon Austria, provided you agree
to cease mobilization." Was this demand unreasonable? What else could
Germany have done, I ask, with the Russian bear standing on the border
with the sword already drawn? This moment was the crucial and decisive
one in the prologue to this awful world drama.
The only question therefore and the all-important one to be submitted to
the Court of Civilization, is, Whose duty was it to yield? Was it
Russia's, with the sword already drawn against a country which had not
attacked it, not even threatened it, or was it Germany's, with the sword
in the sheath?
In his "conclusion," Mr. Beck speaks of Germany as "beset on every hand
by powerful antagonists." Does he really mean to deprive the German
Emperor of the right to demand as a condition precedent to mediation on
his part the discontinuance of mobilization by Russia?
Mr. Beck in his "judgment" under Paragraph 4 says "that Austria, having
mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its
forces." The use of the qualifying word "reasonably" seems to indicate
that even Mr. Beck is not quite certain that Russia was in fact
justified in mobilizing its forces.
Is it reasonable, just, and fair of Mr. Beck to expect Germany, "beset
on every hand by powerful antagonists," to permit Russia to continue
mobilizing its 18,000,000 soldiers and have Germany believe that Russia
was sincere in its "peaceful intentions" in the face of actual
mobilization? At this moment the German Kaiser made a very reasonable
demand upon Russia to cease mobilization, and I ask every fair-minded
American, whether lawyer or layman, "whose duty it was to yield" at this
moment. The answer to this question will settle the much-disputed point
as to the actual cause of the war.
In conclusion, I beg to ask Mr. Beck: Why expect so much of Germany and
nothing of Russia, when Germany had not merely professed her peaceful
intentions, but actually maintained peace for over forty years, during
which period not a foot of territory had been acquired by her through
conquest? This is a fact.
Coming into a court of law supported by such a reputation, does Mr. Beck
really believe that the decision of the court would have been in favor
of Russia? Does Mr. Beck really believe that the decision would have
been against Germany, whose war lord was begging the Czar almost on his
knees to avoid the awful calamity by the discontinuance of mobilization?
Picture the United States about to invade Mexico to redress an insult to
the American flag. Picture England as the ally of the United States, and
Japan supporting Mexico, without any alliance existing between the two
latter countries. To make this example conform to the actual facts under
discussion, we must, of course, assume that both Japan and England are
situated in the North American Continent, and across the border from the
United States and England. Japan, with an army of 18,000,000 soldiers,
(assumed for the purpose of argument,) mobilizes her army, professedly
for defense against the United States. Could any fair-minded American
possibly expect England to intercede with her ally, the United States,
without first demanding the demobilization of Japan? Whose duty was it
to yield?
The actual fact is that Germany even then did not declare war against
Russia until Russian soldiers had actually crossed not the Austrian but
the German border.
I may add that in writing the above I am prompted only by the very
natural desire, viz., to impress upon the jury composed of the American
people the one fact which should be given the most careful consideration
in order to enable it to arrive at a just verdict in the case submitted,
and this fact is "the mobilization of Russia."
FRANK SEGGEBRUCH.
New York, Oct. 29, 1914.
In Defense of Austria
_To the Editor of The New York Times:_
Referring to your editorial, "The Evidence Examined," in your Sunday
edition, I wish to protest emphatically against your assertion that a
"Court of Civilization" must inevitably come to the conclusion that
Germany precipitated the war. There are still millions of civilized
people who see these things quite differently.
Mr. Beck makes out a case from the viewpoint of the accusing party--of
course, nobody will doubt the legal abilities of Mr. Beck--but before
the Supreme Court of Civilization there is also a law: audiatur et
altera pars. Mr. Beck, as he presents the case to the court, has not
mentioned very important points which, for the decision of the Supreme
Court, would be most vital ones.
At first the breach of Belgian neutrality, admitted and regretted by the
German Government, has nothing to do with the question--who precipitated
the war? It constituted only an action of the war itself. On the other
hand, you call in your editorial the Austrian ultimatum a savage one
and take it for granted that this ultimatum started the stone rolling
and brought finally the general clash in Europe about. This presumption,
when presented to the court, will have to be thoroughly proved, because
there are many people, fair and just, as you consider yourself, who are
convinced of the ample justification of this ultimatum.
It is hardly describable how many criminal acts have been committed by
Servians against the very existence of the Dual Monarchy for the last
six years, under the eyes of the Servian Government and approved by it,
by intriguing against Austria's right to cultivate her own territory,
Bosnia, spreading secret societies all over the empire, &c.
The awful crime, the assassination of the heir to the throne, was only
the finish of a long chain of like acts. These facts, which immediately
lead up to the ultimatum, ought to be considered in the first place by
judging Austria's justification for sending this ultimatum to Servia. A
just Judge in the Court of Civilization will, I am convinced, carefully
study the ante-history and in all probability arrive at the conclusion
that the ultimatum was amply justified and Servia fully deserved the
severest punishment possible.
Mr. Beck presents to the court the Russian interference with this
intended punishment and forgets to tell the Judge that Russia had not
the least right to this interference. No foreign power had.
Therefore, Austria was entirely within her right to decline any
negotiations with Russia about this punishment before its completion.
Nevertheless, the German Government brought these negotiations about,
and, while these negotiations proceeded satisfactorily, Russia
mobilized, mobilized all along her western frontier against Austria and
Germany, notwithstanding the fact that she had promised not to do so and
officials in Petrograd had pledged their words to the contrary.
Russia knew there could be no such thing as a war with Austria alone, as
well as Germany knew that a war with Russia meant a war with France. If
the laws of morality rule in the Court of Civilization, they should
above all be applied to the conduct of Servia and Russia. Austria was in
a state of self-defense, when she decided not to bear any longer
Servia's treacherous and murderous attacks against her existence; this
is entirely within the boundaries of the laws of morality. Russia,
however, without the slightest right, moral or legal, attacked Austria
from the back by interfering with Austria's own affairs.
Therefore I wish to point out that a careful student of the papers, by
considering the ante-history of the war, which, as you will admit, is
very essential, may come to a quite different conclusion and Mr. Beck as
State's attorney will have a hard stand against the counsel of the
defendant.
EDWARD PICK.
New York, Oct. 27, 1914.
[Illustration]
Defense of the Dual Alliance--A Reply
By Dr. Edmund von Mach.
Instructor of Fine Arts, Harvard, 1899-1903; Instructor in
History of Art, Wellesley College, 1899-1902; Lecturer in
History of Art, Bradford Academy, Cambridge, Mass. Author of
many books on Greek and Roman sculpture and the history of
painting. Served in the German Army, 1889-91.
Hon. James M. Beck has eloquently argued the case of the Allies against
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and submitted his findings with confident
assurance of their acceptance by the Supreme Court of Civilization.
Carried away by his zeal he has at times used terms not warranted by the
evidence, such as "the irrepressible Kaiser," "stupid falsehood,"
"duplicity," and the like, but since the court can be trusted to
disregard such expressions no further attention will be paid to them.
To a certain extent this article is not a reply but a continuation of
Mr. Beck's argument, for, wherever our personal sympathies may lie, we
are all equally interested in discovering the truth. In the final
settlement of peace American public opinion may, nay, will, have a
prominent voice. If it is exerted on the strength of a true
understanding of European events, it will contribute to the
establishment of a lasting peace.
As to the evidence submitted Mr. Beck seems to err in believing that
Governments are accustomed to publish in their various white, gray, or
orange papers "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."
This is nowhere done, for there are many bits of information which come
to a Government through its diplomatic connections which it would be
indelicate, discourteous, or unwise to give to the public. The official
documents on American foreign relations and all white, gray, or orange
papers are "edited." They are understood to be so by Congress,
Parliament, the Reichstag, the Duma, &c., and no charge of dishonesty
can be maintained against the respective Governments on that score.
If the Chancellor says that Germany was using her good offices in
Vienna, this is as valuable a bit of evidence as the reprint of a
dispatch in the "White Paper," unless we wish to impugn his veracity,
and in that case the copy of a dispatch would be valueless, for he might
have forged it. The entire argument, therefore, against Germany and
Austria, based on what Mr. Beck calls the "suppression of vitally
important documents," is void, unless you will apply it equally to Great
Britain and the other countries.
In Sir Edward Grey's "White Paper" Mr. Beck has missed no important
documents because he looked at England's well-prepared case through
sympathetic eyes, and it did not occur to him to ask, "Where are all the
documents bearing on Italian neutrality?" Does he believe that England
was so little interested in the question whether she would have to fight
two or three foes, and whether her way to Egypt and India would be safe
or threatened? There are many dispatches to and from Rome included in
the "White Paper," but not a mention of Italy's position.
The first paper contains a letter to the British Ambassador in Berlin
concerning the Austro-Servian relations. Is it not probable that Sir
Edward Grey's attention was called to this question by his Ambassador in
Vienna? Where is his letter? Or, if Sir Edward thought of it himself,
why did he not mention his conversation also to Sir M. de Bunsen in
Vienna? Where is this note? Are we to assume that Sir M. de Bunsen made
his first report on July 23, although Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin had
an interesting report to make a day earlier?
We can thus go through the whole British "White Paper" and discover the
omission of many interesting documents.
No. 38 is a letter from Sir Rennell Rodd in Rome, dated on July 23 and
received on July 27. He had no doubt sent also a telegram. What did it
contain, and why was it not published under the date of its arrival
instead of the letter which had been delayed in transit?
Where Is No. 28?
In No. 29 Sir Edward Grey refers in a telegram to Sir R. Rodd to what "I
had said to the German Ambassador." Such a reference could have a
meaning for Sir R. Rodd only if he had been informed of this
conversation. There is no dispatch printed in the "White Paper"
containing this information. Possibly it was so entwined with other
instructions, which Sir Edward Grey did not care to have known, that it
could not be published. Was it perhaps sent to the printer first as No.
28, and removed at the last moment when it was too late to change the
subsequent numbers? Or, if this assumption is wrong, what was printed
originally as No. 28? Where is No. 28? There are other omissions, and
one especially noteworthy one between Nos. 80 and 106 which will be
discussed later.
Viewed in this light, the English "White Paper" loses much of the value
of a complete record, which it has had in the eyes of many. There is
absolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of those dispatches which
have been printed, but it becomes incumbent upon the searcher after the
truth to inquire whether the existence of unprinted (in the case of the
German "White Paper" Mr. Beck uses the term "suppressed") papers may not
at times alter the interpretation which should be given to those that
are printed.
Since we have no published records anywhere concerning the advice given
to Italy by the Allies, and the gradual steps leading up to Italy's
decision to remain neutral; nor any hint as to the day when her decision
was communicated to England and the other powers, it would be futile to
speculate on this subject. Since, however, the Queen of Italy and the
wife of the Commander in Chief of the Russian forces are sisters, and
since it was in the interest of the Allies to keep Italy neutral, it is
not unreasonable to assume that an exchange of opinion took place
between Italy and the Allies concerning the conditions under which Italy
would remain neutral.
If the actual opening of hostilities could be so managed that Germany
could be called the aggressor, then Italy probably declared that she
would not enter the war. This is a very important phase of the case, and
the omission from Sir Edward Grey's "White Paper" of all dispatches
dealing with Italian neutrality is much to be regretted.
Since we are dealing with the Italian dispatches here, it may be
advisable to consider at once all the communications which are published
as having passed between Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassador, Sir
Rennell Rodd, in Rome. They are numbered 19, (perhaps 28,) 29, 35, 36,
38, 49, 57, 63, 64, 80, 81, 86, 92, 100, and 106, of which the important
numbers are 38, 57, 64, 80, and 86.
On July 23 Sir Edward Grey was informed that "the gravity of the
situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that
it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many
disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to
score a definite success." (No. 38.)
Austria, in other words, believed that to let the murder of her
heir-apparent pass unpunished would have meant a deathblow to her
prestige, and consequently, as any one familiar with her conditions will
agree, to her existence. Russia, on the other hand, on July 25 said (see
No. 17, report from Sir G. Buchanan) that she could not "allow (note the
word) Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the
Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face
all the risks of war."
These two dispatches to Sir Edward Grey tell the whole story in a
nutshell. Austria believed, rightly or wrongly, that it was a question
of life or death for her, while Russia claimed the right of preventing
Austria from becoming the predominate power in the Balkans, and actually
threatened war. Russia did not claim to be concerned with the justice of
Austria's demands on Servia.
No such definite word of Russia's intention was sent to Germany, for on
July 26 Sir M. de Bunsen reported Germany's confident belief that
"Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia." (No. 32.)
On the next day Sir Rennell Rodd reports from Rome (No. 57) that the
Minister of Foreign Affairs believes that "if Servia will even now
accept it (the Austrian note) Austria will be satisfied" and refrain
from a punitive war. He, moreover, believes--and this is very
important--that Servia may be induced to accept the note in its entirety
on the advice of the four powers invited to the conference, and this
would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to
Austria-Hungary alone. Since Italy was to be one of the four powers, the
Minister's belief was doubtless based on accurate information. There is
then as late as July 27 no claim made by Servia that Austria's demands
are unreasonable. She only hates to yield to Austria alone. Austria, in
the meanwhile, (No. 57,) repeats her assurance that she demands no
territorial sacrifices from Servia.
On the next day, July 28, Sir Rennell Rodd reports (No. 64) that "Servia
might still accept the whole Austrian note, if some explanation were
given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to
intervene." Austria, on her part, had explained that "the co-operation
of the Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in
judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have willfully
misinterpreted this." (No. 64.)
From these reports it appears that the differences between Austria and
Servia were on the way to a solution. Austria claimed that her demands
were just, and Servia did not deny this. Austria further claimed that
her prestige, her very existence, demanded the prompt compliance with
her requests by Servia. She explained in a satisfactory way the one
point on which Servia had taken exceptions, and Servia was on the point
of complying, and would have complied, if the powers had been willing to
let her do so. Such a conclusion of the incident would have strengthened
Austria's prestige and assured the punishment of the murderers of
Serajevo.
Russia's Remark About Austria.
The reason why Servia was not allowed to submit was Russia's remark,
quoted above, that she would not "allow" Austria to become the
predominant power in the Balkans. It was, therefore, Russia's task to
prevent Servia from accepting Austria's note. Since war was her
alternative, baldly stated to England from the first, she had to do
three things--first, to secure as many allies as possible; secondly, to
weaken her enemies, preferably by detaching from them Italy, and,
thirdly, to get as much of a start in her mobilization as possible.
The treaties between Russia, France, and Great Britain, unlike those
between Germany, Austria, and Italy, have never been published. Whatever
their wording may be, Russia was at first apparently not absolutely sure
of the support of France, (No. 17,) and France, it would seem, was
unwilling to tempt fate without the help of England. That England should
be willing to join such a combination for such a cause seemed so
preposterous to Germany that she did not believe it. Without England no
France, without France no war, for alone Russia could not measure
herself against Austria. Austria would not have attacked her of her own
free will, but if Russia had attacked Austria, the whole world knew from
the published treaties that Germany was bound to come to the assistance
of her ally. It would have been two against one, and the two could have
waited until Russia had finished her cumbersome mobilization. For even
if she had her whole army of many million men on the frontier, Austria
and Germany together were strong enough to stem her advance.
Russia's only chance, therefore, when Servia was on the point of
yielding, and Austria had almost re-established her prestige, was to
secure the help of France, but this meant also the promise of England.
The demands made on England by Russia, some of which are quoted in the
"White Paper," are too well known to deserve repetition. This was the
chief thing that counted, to get England's promise. The next was to
detach Italy from her allies, (but of this there are no documents
available,) and the third to gain time for her mobilization. All the
other suggestions and counter-suggestions which fill the English "White
Paper" are insignificant, as soon as the fundamental positions of
Austria and Russia are understood.
Germany has claimed that England promised her support to Russia and
France on July 30, or in the night of July 29, and, to prove it, has
published the letter from the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg to his
Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in translation in THE NEW YORK
TIMES on Oct. 7. This letter, which has not been officially denied by
the Allies, states that the promise of England's support gave the
Russian war party the upper hand and resulted in the order of complete
mobilization.
English "White Paper's" Testimony.
Strangely enough, and doubtless by an oversight, the English "White
Paper" contains two dispatches (Nos. 80 and 106) which seem to confirm
the accuracy of M. de l'Escaille's statement, viz., that England
promised the Russian-French combination her support.
On July 29 Sir Rennell Rodd wrote to Sir Edward Grey (No. 80) that the
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him "there seemed to be a
difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As
Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves,
if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he
thought it would have a great effect."
In a later dispatch of the same day (No. 86) he deprecates Russia's
partial mobilization, which he fears has spoiled the chances of
Germany's exerting any pressure on Austria.
But on the next day, July 30, these remarkable words occur: "He [the
Italian Minister] had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to
give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that
we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid
issue with us." (No. 106.)
Readers of the "White Paper" will look in vain for an explanation of
such a change of heart on Germany's part. What does "now" mean in the
last letter? And why does Germany seem "convinced" that England will act
with Russia--if not that she has heard of the promise mentioned by M. de
l'Escaille, as given early on July 30 or late the 29th? The dates agree,
and unless Sir Edward Grey publishes further papers to explain the
change that had taken place between July 29 and July 30 one seems forced
to accept this explanation.
What is Germany's attitude? Does she rush into war? Not at all, for she
is "most anxious to avoid issue" with England. (No. 106.) Germany knew
that Russia had begun to mobilize. Every day, every hour counted; for
against the masses of Russia she had only her greater speed to match.
She knew that England had gone over to Russia, although she was probably
hoping that the alliance between the Saxon and the Slav was not yet
irrefragable. Still, the prospects were dark. But in spite of this the
efforts were renewed to see what could be done in Vienna.
The famous exchange of telegrams between royalty began in the evening of
July 29; and here it is wise to halt for a moment. On July 30 the Czar
telegraphed to the Emperor in reply to the Emperor's expression of
regret that Russia should be mobilizing, as follows: "The military
measures in force now were decreed five days ago." That is, according to
the Czar, the Russian mobilization had begun on July 25. On July 27,
however, the Russian Minister of War, M. Suchomlinow, had declared to
the German Military Attaché "on his word of honor" that no mobilization
order had been issued. July 25, however, it will be remembered, was the
day on which Sir G. Buchanan had reported from St. Petersburg that
Russia will "face all risks of war" if she can feel sure of the support
of France.
On July 31 Russia mobilized her entire army, which led to Germany's
ultimatum that Russia demobilize within twelve hours. No reply was
received to the request, and orders for the mobilization of the German
Army were issued at 5:15 P.M., Aug. 1, after the German Ambassador in
St. Petersburg had been instructed to declare that, owing to the
continued mobilization of the Russian Army, a state of war existed
between the two countries.
Kaiser Tried to Keep Peace.
In order to understand this step one should read the book "La France
Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain," ("France Victorious in the Next
War,") by Col. Arthur Boucher, published in 1911. Col. Boucher has
stated the case baldly and so simply that every one can understand it.
In substance his argument is this: "Alone France has no chance, but
together with Russia she will win against Germany. Suppose the three
countries are beginning mobilization on the same day. Germany finishes
first, France second, and Russia last. Germany must leave some of her
troops on her eastern frontier, the rest she throws against France. All
France has to do is to hold them for a few days. [Col. Boucher mentions
the exact number of days. This book is not at hand, and the writer
prefers not to quote from memory.] Then Russia comes into play, more
German troops will be needed in the East, the French proceed to an
attack on their weakened enemy, and La France sera victorieuse."
Everything hinges on just a couple of days or so. A couple of days! And
how much of a start had Russia? She had begun on July 25; on July 27
definite news of the Russian mobilization was reported in Berlin,
although the Minister of War denied it "on his honor." On July 30
England was understood to have promised her support to Russia, and the
Czar acknowledged that Russia had been mobilizing for the past five
days. Five days! And Col. Boucher, expressing the opinion of military
experts, had counted on victory on a much smaller margin!
Do the Judges of the Supreme Court of Civilization realize the almost
super-human efforts in the interest of peace made by the German Emperor?
Russia has a start of five days, and on July 31 a start of six days. Can
we not hear all the military leaders imploring the Emperor not to
hesitate any longer? But in the interest of peace the Emperor delays. He
has kept the peace for Germany through the almost thirty years of his
reign. He prays to his God, in Whom he has placed his trust through all
his upright life, with a fervor which has often brought him ridicule.
Also, he still believes in England, and hopes through her efforts to be
able to keep the peace. He waits another day. A start of seven days for
Russia! The odds against Germany have grown tremendously. At last he
orders mobilization. For a longer delay he would not have been able to
answer to his country. As it is, there are many people who blame him
severely for having waited so long.
But William II. was right, for when the world will begin to realize the
agonies through which he must have passed during these days of waiting,
and the sacrifices he made in his effort to preserve peace, it will
judge Germany rightly, and call the Emperor the great prince of peace
that he is.
But, it has been said, why did he not avoid war, either by forcing
Austria to yield to Russia, or, if she refused, by withdrawing from her?
In common with the whole of Germany, he probably felt that Austria's
position was right. Servia herself, as has been seen above, did not
claim that she was unjustly treated, whatever outsiders thought of
Austria's demands; and Austria was fully justified by past events in
believing that it was with her a question of life and death. Should
Germany sacrifice her faithful friend under such circumstances, and for
what? For the arrogance of Russia, who would not "allow" her to
re-establish her prestige in a righteous cause? The word "righteous" is
used advisedly, because in the early stages of the controversy nobody,
not even Russia nor Servia herself, denied the justice of Austria's
demands. The writer is informed that even the liberal English press
found no fault with the course taken by Austria, although it commented
adversely on the language used in the note.
What would have been the result of peace bought by Germany at such a
cost? It would have alienated her only faithful friend without laying
the foundations for a lasting friendship with her opponents. This at
least was Germany's honest belief. She may have been wrong. History more
probably will call her right. To desert Austria might have postponed the
war, but when it would have come Germany would have stood alone, and,
worse, she would have lost her self-respect.
This claim may sound strange in the ears of those who have just
witnessed and will never forget the suffering of that beautiful little
country, Belgium. They hold that, since Germany invaded Belgium, it is
Germany who broke a treaty and who is to blame.
Mr. Beck considers this to be so self-evident that he deems it
unnecessary to advance any proof. He quotes the Chancellor's speech,
and, moving for a quick verdict, declares his motion of guilty carried.
The matter, however, is not quite so simple for the man who is seeking
for the whole truth. Let us look at the facts.
Belgium was a neutral country, just as any country has the right to
declare itself neutral, with this difference: that in 1839 she had
promised to five powers--Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia--that she would remain perpetually neutral. These five powers in
their turn had promised to guarantee her neutrality. She was, however, a
sovereign State, and as such had the undoubted right to cease being
neutral whenever she chose by abrogating the Treaty of 1839. If the
other high contracting parties did not agree with her, it was their
right to try to coerce Belgium to keep to her pledges, although this
would undoubtedly have been an infringement of her sovereignty.
The Treaty of 1839 contains the word "perpetual," but so does the treaty
between France and Germany, in which Alsace and Lorraine are ceded by
France to be perpetually an integral part of the German Empire. Does
this mean that France, if the Allies should win, could not retake these
provinces? Nobody probably will believe this.
The Treaty of 1839 was a treaty just like the Treaty of 1871, with this
difference, that the latter treaty was concluded between two powers, and
the earlier one between five powers on one side and Belgium and Holland
on the other. This gave certain rights to all the signatory powers, any
one of whom had the right to feel itself sufficiently aggrieved to go to
war if any other power disregarded the treaty.
Rights of Neutrals.
There was once another neutral State, the city and district of Cracow,
also established by a treaty to which Great Britain was a signatory.
Three of the signers considered the conditions developing in Cracow to
be so threatening that they abolished Cracow as an independent State.
Great Britain sent a polite note of protest, and dropped the matter.
Since that time, however, two Hague Conferences have been held and
certain rules agreed upon concerning the rights and duties of neutrals.
The Belgian status of inviolability rests on these rules, called
conventions, rather than on the Treaty of 1839. During the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870 Mr. Gladstone very clearly stated that he
did not consider the Treaty of 1839 enforceable. Great Britain,
therefore, made two new treaties, one with France and one with Prussia
(quoted and discussed in Boston Evening Transcript, Oct. 14, 1914) in
which she promised to defend Belgian neutrality, by the side of either
France or Prussia, against that one of them who should infringe the
neutrality.
These treaties were to terminate one year after peace had been
concluded between the contestants. A treaty, like the one of 1839,
however, which was considered unenforceable in 1870, can hardly be
claimed to have gained new rights in 1914. In calm moments nobody will
claim that a greater sanctity attaches to it than to the treaty in which
Alsace and Lorraine are ceded forever to Germany.
No, it is The Hague Conventions to which we must look. The first
convention (1899) contained no rules forbidding belligerents from
entering neutral territory. In the second conference it was thought
desirable to formulate such rules, because it was felt that in war
belligerents are at liberty to do what is not expressly forbidden. At
the request of France, therefore, a new set of rules was suggested, to
which Great Britain and Belgium offered valuable amendments. The rules
were finally accepted, and are today parts of international law. They
read; "Article I. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Article
II. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either
munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power."
These articles, together with the whole convention called "Rights and
duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land," have been
ratified and therefore accepted as law by the United States of America,
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia and other minor
powers. Great Britain experienced a change of heart, and, although her
own delegates had moved these articles, she refused to ratify them, when
she ratified most of the other conventions on Nov. 27, 1909. (A table
showing the ratifications of conventions has been published by The World
Peace Foundation, Boston.)
The Case of Belgium.
Since Great Britain did not accept these articles as law, she was not
bound by them, for the principle of The Hague Conferences is that a
nation is bound only by those laws which it accepts. The remarkable
fact, therefore, appears that the only one of the big nations which had
refused to accept these articles, and which, therefore, might have moved
her troops across a neutral country and have claimed that she could do
so with a clear conscience because she broke no law which was binding on
her, was Great Britain. And the world now sees the spectacle of Great
Britain claiming to have gone to war because another power did what she
herself could have done, according to her own interpretation, with
impunity. Japan has broken the international law by infringing the
neutrality of China, but Great Britain can claim that she did not break
a law by doing exactly what Japan did.
It is not asserted here that the citizens of Great Britain are not
absolutely sincere in their belief of the causes which have allied them
with the Russians and the Japanese, and the Indians and the Zouaves, and
the negroes and the French and the Belgians against Germany. Their
Government, however, should have known that the presumption of
insincerity exists when one charges against others a crime which one
would have felt at liberty to commit one's self. Yet, more, the British
Government knew better than anybody else that Germany had not even
committed this crime; for, according to all laws of justice, no person
or nation can claim the inviolability of a neutral when he has committed
"hostile acts against a belligerent, or acts in favor of a belligerent."
(Article XVII. of The Hague Conference of 1907.)
The question, therefore, arises, "Did Belgium commit acts in favor of
one of Germany's opponents, if not actually hostile acts against
Germany?" In order to understand Germany's charge that Belgium had
committed such acts, attention must be directed to one of the most
unfortunate stipulations of the Treaty of 1839, which compelled Belgium
to maintain several fortresses. This meant that a small neutral people,
sandwiched in between two great powers, had to keep itself informed on
military affairs. Instead of being able to foster a peaceful state of
mind, which is the surest guarantee of neutrality, the Belgians were
forced to think military thoughts.
[Illustration: ANDREW CARNEGIE
_(Photo (c) by Underwood & Underwood.)_
_See Page 415_]
[Illustration: JACOB H. SCHIFF
_(Photo by American Press Assn.)_
_See Page 459_]
In the eighties and early nineties they suspected France of designs on
their integrity. Since then a change in the popular feeling has taken
place and in recent years the instruction of the Belgian artillery, for
instance, was intrusted to French officers in active service. These
officers were constantly at home and very properly concerned with
solving military problems such as a future war with Germany might
present. What was more natural than that these same officers, when they
were detached for a few months or years to Liège or Namur or Huy, taught
their Belgian charges to prepare against a German attack, and to look
upon the French as their friends and the Germans as their enemies? If
conditions had been different, and German officers had been in charge of
Belgian fortresses, the Belgian guns in practice would always have been
trained on imaginary French invaders.
French Officers in Belgian Forts.
If this is understood it will be seen that in the case of war the actual
neutrality of the Belgian garrisons would naturally be determined by the
position taken by that nation whose officers had been in charge of the
Belgian fortresses. And this might be entirely independent of the
professed wishes of the Belgian people or their Government. If French
officers in active service remained in the several fortresses, or even
only in one after the beginning of hostilities, and if the French
campaign plans contemplated an attack through Belgium, then Belgium had
committed an "act in favor of France" by not forcing the French officers
to leave, and had forfeited the rights and privileges granted by The
Hague Convention of 1907 to a neutral State.
Did French officers remain in Liège or in any other Belgian fortress
after hostilities had begun, and did France plan to go through Belgium?
Germany has officially made both claims. The first can easily be
substantiated by the Supreme Court of Civilization by an investigation
of the prisoners of war taken in Belgium. Until an impartial
investigation becomes possible no further proof than the claim made by
the German Government can be produced.
The second charge is contained in No. 157 of the English "White Paper"
in these words of instruction from the German Foreign Secretary to the
German Ambassador in London: "Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that
German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which
was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information."
Sir Edward Grey has attacked Germany for invading Belgium, but has
nowhere denied that Germany had the unimpeachable evidence she said she
had, and which of course nullified any previous assurance from France.
It is not known whether Sir Edward Grey was shown this evidence or not,
but if the preservation of Belgian neutrality was Great Britain's chief
concern, why did she not offer to negotiate treaties with Germany and
France as she had done in 1870? It will be remembered that then she
bound herself to join with either of the contestants in defending
Belgian neutrality against the attacks of the other.
As the case stands today, on the evidence of Sir Edward Grey's own
"White Paper" and speeches, Great Britain is making war on Germany
because:
1. She broke the Treaty of 1839, although her own Gladstone had declared
this treaty to be without force, and although the status of neutral
States had been removed by The Hague Convention from the uncertainty of
treaties to the security of international law.
2. Great Britain makes war against Germany because Germany has broken
Articles I. and II. of Chapter 1 of The Hague Convention referring to
neutrals, although Great Britain herself has refused to recognize these
articles as binding upon her own conduct.
3. She makes war on Germany although she has never denied the
correctness of Germany's assertion that she had unimpeachable proof of
France's intentions of going through Belgium, which, together with the
sojourn of French officers in Belgium, constitutes the offense which,
according to The Hague Convention, deprives a so-called neutral State of
the privileges granted in Articles I. and II.
It is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are which Germany
possesses, and which for military reasons she has not yet been able to
divulge. She has published some of them, namely, the proof of the
continued presence of French officers on Belgian soil, and has given the
names and numbers of the several army corps which France had planned to
push through Belgium.
The case then stands as follows:
1. Was the inviolability of Belgium guaranteed by Articles I. and II. of
The Hague Convention? Yes.
2. Had Germany ratified these articles? Yes.
3. Had Great Britain ratified these articles? No.
4. Would Belgium have forfeited the right of having her country held
inviolable if she had committed "acts in favor of France," even if these
acts were not actually hostile acts? Yes, according to Article XVII. of
The Hague Convention.
5. Did Belgium commit "acts in favor of France," and was Germany,
therefore, justified in disregarding the inviolability of her territory?
The Main Question.
This is the important question, and the answer must be left to the
Supreme Court of Civilization. The weight of the evidence would seem to
point to a justification of Germany. Yet no friend of Germany can find
fault with those who would wish to defer a verdict until such a time
when Germany can present her complete proof to the world, and this may
be when the war is over.
Throughout this argument the famous passage of the Chancellor's speech
in the Reichstag has been disregarded. It reads:
Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on
Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of
international law. It is true that the French Government has
declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the
neutrality of Belgium so long as her opponents respect it. We
knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. The
wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing we will endeavor
to make good.
This has been understood to mean that the Chancellor acknowledged that
Germany was breaking the Treaty of 1839 without warrant, and that
Germany, therefore, deserved the contempt of the world. May it not bear
another interpretation? Thus:
The Chancellor, like Gladstone in 1870, did not consider the 1839 Treaty
enforceable, but saw the guarantee for Belgium in The Hague Convention.
He did not wish to offend Belgium by announcing to the world that she
had lost her rights as a neutral because of her acts favorable to
France, for when he spoke he was still of the opinion that she would
accept the German offer which guaranteed to her both her independence
and integrity.
And just as Servia would have accepted Austria's note if Russia had
permitted her, so Belgium would not have resisted the German demand if
it had not been for England.
This can be proved by the British "White Paper," Nos. 153 and 155. In
the former the King of the Belgians appeals "to the diplomatic
intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of
Belgium," being apparently of the impression that Germany wished to
annex parts, if not the whole, of his country. The London reply advises
the Belgians "to resist by any means in their power, and that his
Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and
that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia
and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once
common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany
against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and
integrity in future years."
Has Mr. Beck really not noticed in this promise the omission of the word
neutrality? By the Treaty of 1839 Belgium enjoyed not only independence
and integrity, but also perpetual neutrality. Does Great Britain offer
to fight Germany for the enforcement of the Treaty of 1839? No! Because
hereafter the word neutrality is dropped from her guarantee, and since
she alone of all the great powers has not ratified the articles of The
Hague Convention concerning neutrals she alone will be able to disregard
the inviolability of Belgian soil, even though Belgium kept strictly
neutral in a future war.
And what, finally, does she guarantee her? Independence and integrity!
That is exactly the same that Germany had promised her. For this Belgium
had to be dragged through the horrors of war, and the good name of
Germany as that of an honest nation had to be dragged through the mire,
and hatred and murder had to be started, that Belgium might get on the
battlefield, from the insufficient support of Russia and France and
England, what Germany had freely offered her--independence and
integrity.
Casual readers would not miss the word neutrality from Sir Edward Grey's
guarantee, because they do not differentiate between the words
integrity, independence, and neutrality. Great Britain and her ally
Japan, marching through China into Kiao-Chau, may be said to have
violated China's neutrality, but not her independence, nor, so long as
they refrain from annexing any Chinese territory, her integrity.
Fixing the Blame.
Nobody familiar with the careful work of Sir Edward Grey can for one
moment believe that Sir Edward inadvertently dropped the word, just as
little as J. Ramsay Macdonald and other British leaders believe that he
inadvertently dropped one of the two remaining words, integrity and
independence, when he told Parliament of Germany's guarantee, and why
Great Britain should not accept it, but go to war.
When the blame for the horrors committed in Belgium are assessed these
facts must be remembered:
1. Belgium was by treaty bound to maintain fortresses.
2. France tempted her to commit "acts friendly" to herself, by which
Belgium forfeited her rights to the protection of The Hague articles
governing the rights and duties of neutrals.
3. England urged her to take up arms, when she had only asked to have
her integrity guaranteed by diplomatic intervention. (Nos. 153, 155.)
4. Germany promised her independence and integrity and peace, while
England, quietly dropping her guarantee of neutrality "in future years,"
promised her independence and integrity and war.
5. And Sir Edward Grey was able to sway Parliament, according to one of
the leaders of Parliament himself, only because he misrepresented
Germany's guarantee, and, having dropped, in his note to Belgium, the
word "neutrality," dropped yet another of the two remaining words,
integrity and independence.
This is the case as it appears on the evidence contained in the various
"White Papers." Austria was attending properly to her own affairs;
Servia was willing to yield; Russia, however, was determined to
humiliate Austria or to go to war. Germany proved a loyal friend to her
ally, Austria; she trusted in the British professions of friendship to
the last, and sacrificed seven valuable days in the interest of peace.
France was willing to do "what might be required by her interests,"
while Great Britain yielded to Russia and France, promising them their
support without which France, and therefore Russia, would not have
decided on war.
As to Belgium, Germany told Sir Edward Grey that she had unimpeachable
evidence that France was planning to go through Belgium, and she
published her evidence concerning the French officers who remained in
Belgium. Although Belgium had thus lost any rights attaching to her
state of neutrality, Germany promised to respect her integrity and
independence, and to pay for any damage done. She preferred, however, to
listen to Great Britain, who promised exactly the same except pay for
any damage done.
Unlike Mr. Beck, who in the same article pleads his case as the counsel
for the Allies and casts his verdict as the Supreme Court of
Civilization, the present writer prefers to leave the judgment to his
readers as a whole, and further still, to the whole American
people--yea, to all the peoples of the world. Nor is he in a hurry, for
he is willing to wait and have the Judges weigh the evidence and call
for more, if they consider insufficient what has already been submitted.
Snap judgments are ever unsatisfactory. They have often to be reversed.
The present case, however, is too important to warrant a hasty decision.
The final judgment, if it is based on truth, will very strongly
influence the nature of the peace, which will either establish good-will
and stable conditions in the world, or lead to another and even more
complete breakdown of civilization.
What Gladstone Said About Belgium
By George Louis Beer.
Historian; winner of the first Loubat Prize, 1913, for his
book on the origins of the British Colonial system.
In the course of his solemn speech of Aug. 8, 1914, in the House of
Commons Sir Edward Grey quoted some remarks made by Gladstone in 1870 on
the extent of the obligation incurred by the signatory powers to the
Quintuple Treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Shorn
from their context as they were, these sentences are by no means
illuminating, and it cannot be said that their citation in this form by
Sir Edward Grey was a very felicitous one. During the paper polemics of
the past months these detached words of Gladstone have been freely used
by Germany's defenders and apologists to maintain that Great Britain of
1870 would not have deemed the events of 1914 a casus belli, and that
its entrance into the present war on account of the violation of
Belgium's neutrality was merely a pretext. During the course of this
controversy Gladstone's attitude has in various ways been grossly
misrepresented, Dr. von Mach of Harvard even stating in the columns of
THE NEW YORK TIMES that Gladstone had declared the Treaty of 1839 "to be
without force." But, apart from such patent distortions, Gladstone's
real position is apparently not clearly defined in the mind of the
general public, which is merely seeking for the unadulterated truth,
regardless of its effect upon the case of any one of the belligerents.
Shortly after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 the
Prussian Ambassador in London informed Gladstone, then Prime Minister,
that some time prior to the existing war France had asked Prussia to
consent to the former country's absorption of Belgium, and that there
was in the possession of the Prussian Government the draft of a treaty
to this effect in the handwriting of M. Benedetti, then French
Ambassador at Berlin. This communication was obviously made, as Lord
Morley tells us, with the object of prompting Gladstone to be the agent
in making the evil news public and thus of prejudicing France in the
judgment of Europe. Gladstone thought this "no part of his duty," and
very shortly thereafter, at the direct instance of Bismarck, this draft
treaty of 1866-7 was communicated by Baron Krause of the Prussian
Embassy in London to Delane, the editor of The Times. On July 25, 1870,
it was published in the columns of that paper and aroused considerable
anxiety in England.
It immediately became imperative upon the British Government to take
some action. As Gladstone wrote to Bright, the publication of this
treaty
has thrown upon us the necessity of doing something fresh to
secure Belgium, or else of saying that under no circumstances
would we take any step to secure her from absorption. This
publication has wholly altered the feeling of the House of
Commons, and no Government could at this moment venture to
give utterance to such an intention about Belgium. But neither
do we think it would be right, even if it were safe, to
announce that we would in any case stand by with folded arms
and see actions done which would amount to a total extinction
of the public right in Europe.
The Special Identical Treaties.
A simple declaration of Great Britain's intention to defend the
neutrality of Belgium by arms in case it were infringed seemed to
Gladstone not to meet the special requirements of the case as revealed
by the proposed Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and France. His main
object was to prevent the actual execution of such an agreement, by
means of which the two belligerent powers would settle their quarrels
and satisfy their ambitions at the expense of helpless Belgium. Hence,
on July 30, the British Government opened negotiations with France and
Prussia and within a fortnight had concluded separate but identical
treaties with each of these powers. According to these treaties, in case
the neutrality of Belgium were violated by either France or Germany,
Great Britain agreed to co-operate with the other in its defense. The
preamble of these treaties states that the contracting powers
being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn
act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and
neutrality of Belgium,
as provided in the Treaty of 1839, have concluded this separate treaty,
which,
without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said
Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it.
Article III. further provided that these Treaties of 1870 were to expire
twelve months after the conclusion of the existing war, and that
thereafter the independence and neutrality of Belgium would "continue to
rest, as heretofore," on the Treaty of 1839.
These documents tell a plain tale, which is amply confirmed by the
proceedings in Parliament in connection with this matter. On Aug. 5,
1870, while the negotiations leading to the above-mentioned treaties
were still pending, questions were raised in the House of Commons about
the recently published abortive Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and
France. In reply Gladstone stated that
the Treaty of 1839 is that under which the relations of the
contracting powers with Belgium are at present regulated;
and that, while he could not explain the intentions of the Government
"in a matter of this very grave character in answer to a question," he
hoped to be able to communicate some further information in an authentic
manner. Three days later, as these treaties with France and Prussia had
been virtually concluded, Gladstone was able to satisfy the anxiety of
the House and outlined their terms. He explicitly stated that, after
their expiration,
the respective parties, being parties to the Treaty of 1839,
shall fall back upon the obligations they took upon themselves
under that treaty.
After Gladstone had finished speaking the leader of the opposition,
Disraeli, took the floor and pointed out that, as a general proposition,
when there is a treaty guarantee so explicit as that expressed
in the Treaty of 1839, I think the wisdom of founding on that
another treaty which involves us in engagements may be open to
doubt.
But he accepted Gladstone's statement
as the declaration of the Cabinet, that they are resolved to
maintain the neutrality and independence of Belgium, I accept
it as a wise and spirited policy, and a policy, in my opinion,
not the less wise because it is spirited.
Gladstone then replied, saying that the reason the Government had not
made a general declaration of its intentions regarding Belgium was that
much danger might arise from such a declaration and that inadvertently
they might have given utterance to words
that might be held to import obligations almost unlimited and
almost irrespectively of circumstances.
We had made up our minds, he continued, that we had a duty to perform,
and we thought a specific declaration of what we thought the obligations
of this country better than any general declaration. Referring to the
two treaties in process of ratification, he concluded:
We thought that by contracting a joint engagement we might
remove the difficulty and prevent Belgium from being
sacrificed.
The policy of the Government continued, however, to be criticised,
mainly on the ground that the Treaty of 1839 amply covered the case. On
Aug. 10 Gladstone defended his policy in the House of Commons in a
speech pitched on a high moral plane, in which he dilated upon Belgium's
historic past and splendid present and on Great Britain's duty to this
little nation irrespective of all questions of its own self-interest.
With genuine fervor, he exclaimed:
If, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandisement,
coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that
witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right
and public law in Europe.... We have an interest in the
independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may
have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in
answer to the question whether under the circumstance of the
case this country, endowed as it is with influence and power,
would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the
direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus
become participators in the sin.
What Gladstone Had in Mind.
What Gladstone had in mind was the scheme of 1866-7, by which France was
to absorb Belgium, with Prussia's consent and aid. He distinctly stated
that the Treaties of 1870 were devised to meet the new state of affairs
disclosed by the publication of this incomplete treaty. It was in order
to prevent the revival of such a conspiracy that Gladstone made separate
and identical treaties in 1870 with France and Prussia. They were a
practical device to secure an effectual enforcement of the Treaty of
1839 under unforeseen and difficult circumstances. The agreement of 1870
was, as Gladstone said, a cumulative treaty added to that of 1839, and
the latter treaty
loses nothing of its force, even during the existence of this
present treaty.
During the course of this speech defending the Government's action
against those critics who claimed that the Treaty of 1839 adequately met
the situation, Gladstone made some general remarks about the extent of
the obligation incurred by the signatories to the Treaty of 1839:
It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into
the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of
that treaty, but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of
those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an
assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee
is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of
the particular position in which it may find itself at the
time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.
It is, of course, impossible to state precisely what were those
unuttered thoughts that passed through Gladstone's mind as he spoke
these characteristically cautious words, but what in general they were
can be satisfactorily gleaned from a letter that he had written six days
before this to John Bright:
That we should simply declare _we_ will defend the neutrality
of Belgium by arms in case it should be attacked. Now, the
sole or single-handed defense of Belgium would be an
enterprise which we incline to think quixotic; if these two
great military powers [France and Prussia] combined against
it--that combination is the only serious danger; and this it
is which by our proposed engagements we should, I hope, render
improbable to the very last degree. I add for myself this
confession of faith: If the Belgian people desire, on their
own account, to join France or any other country, I for one
will be no party to taking up arms to prevent it. But that the
Belgians, whether they would or not, should go "plump" down
the maw of another country to satisfy dynastic greed is
another matter. The accomplishment of such a crime as this
implies would come near to an extinction of public right in
Europe, and I do not think we could look on while the
sacrifice of freedom and independence was in course of
consummation.
Fight to the Bitter End
AN INTERVIEW WITH ANDREW CARNEGIE.
Retired ironmaster and philanthropist; builder of the Peace
Temple at The Hague; founder of the Carnegie Institution at
Washington; founder and patron of a chain of libraries in the
United States and Great Britain, and benefactor of many
societies and institutions.
By Edward Marshall.
Here is the report of a truly remarkable statement by Mr. Carnegie. He
is the world's most notable peace advocate, and in this interview he
voices the reflections suggested to him by the great European war.
They are unusual, and make this interview especially worthy of a place
upon the pages of the Christmas issue of THE TIMES, although it
principally deals with war, and Christmas is the festival of peace.
"Has war ever settled anything which might not have been settled better
by arbitration?" I asked Mr. Carnegie.
"No; never," he replied. "No truer inference was ever made than may be
found in Milton's query, penned three centuries ago and never answered:
'What can war but wars breed?'
"War can breed only war. Of course, peace inevitably must follow war,
but, truly, no peace ever was born of war. We all revere the memory of
him who voiced the warning: 'In time of peace prepare for war'; but, as
a matter of fact, we all know that when one nation prepares for war
others inevitably must follow its dangerous lead.
"Hence, and hence only, the huge armaments which have oppressed the
world, making its most peaceful years a spectacle of sadness--a
spectacle of men preparing and prepared to fight with one another.
Sooner or later men prepared to fight will fight; huge armaments and
armies mean huge battles; huge battles mean huge tragedies.
"This never has been otherwise, and never can be. Peace can come only
when mankind abandons warful preparation. And so I seem to have replied
to your inquiry with an answer with a tail to it; and the tail is more
important than the answer, for the answer merely says that war never
settled anything which might not have been settled better by
arbitration, while the tail proclaims the folly of a world prepared for
war."
How to Prevent War.
"Armament must mean the use of armament, and that is war. If we are to
prevent war we must prevent preparation for war, just as if we are to
prevent burglary we must prevent preparation for burglary by prohibiting
the carrying of the instruments of burglary. The only cure for war" [Mr.
Carnegie in speaking italicized the word "cure"] "is war which defeats
some one; but two men who are unarmed are certain not to shoot at one
another. Here, as in medicine, prevention is much better than cure.
"Plainly it must be through such prevention, not through such a cure as
victory sometimes is supposed to represent, that warfare can be stopped.
Warfare means some one's defeat, of course, and that implies his
temporary incapacity for further war, but it goes without saying that
all conquered nations must be embittered by their defeat.
"Few nations ever have fought wars in which the majority of at least
their fighting men did not believe the side they fought for to be in the
right. Defeat by force of arms, therefore, always has meant the general
conviction throughout conquered nations that injustice has been done."
Nations Like Individuals.
"In such circumstances nations must be like individuals under similar
conditions. The individual believing himself to have been in the right,
yet finding himself beaten in his efforts to maintain it, will not
accept the situation philosophically; he will be angry and rebellious;
he will nurse what he believes to be his wrong.
"To nurse a wrong, whether it be real or fancied, is to help it grow in
the imagination, and that must mean at least the wish to find some
future means of righting it, either by strategy or increased strength.
"There are two things which humanity does not forget--one is an injury,
and, no matter how strongly some may argue against the truth of this
contention, the other is a kindness.
"In the long run both will be repaid. And nations, like individuals,
prefer the coin which pays the latter debt. Military force never has
accomplished kindness. Kindness means industrial armies decked with the
garlands of peace; military armies, armed and epauletted, must mean
minds obsessed with the spirit of revenge or conquest, hands clenched to
strike, hearts eager to invade.
"Every military implement is designed to cut or crush, to wound and
kill. Nations at peace help one another with humanity's normal
tenderness of heart at times of pestilence, of famine, of disaster.
Nations at war exert their every ounce of strength to force upon their
adversaries hunger, destruction, and death. Starvation of the enemy
becomes a detail of what is considered good military strategy in war
time, just as world-embracing charity has become a characteristic of
all civilization during times of peace. Must we not admit flotillas
carrying grain to famine-stricken peoples to be more admirable than
fleets which carry death to lands in which prosperity might reign if
undisturbed by war?"
"But do you not admit that wars sometimes have helped the forces of
civilization in their conquest against barbarism?"
"War has not been the chief force of civilization against barbarism,"
Mr. Carnegie replied with emphasis. Then he continued more thoughtfully:
"That is one way of saying it. Another is, no effort of the forces of
civilization against barbarism is war in the true sense of the word.
"Such an armed effort is a part of the force pushing barbarism backward,
and therefore, in the last analysis, tends toward kindness and peace;
while, in the sense in which we use the word, war means the
retrogression of civilization into barbarism. It is usually born of
greed--greed for territory or for power.
"Such war as that of which we all are thinking in these days is war
between civilized men. One civilized man cannot improve another
civilized man by killing him, although it is not inconceivable that a
civilized man may do humanity a service by destroying human savages, for
with the savages he must destroy their savagery.
"But a war in civilized Europe destroys no savagery; it breeds it, so
that it and its spawn may defile future generations.
"There has been much balderdash in talk about unselfish motives as the
origin of warfare. It is safe to say that 99 per cent of all the
slaughter wrought by civilization under the cloak of a desire to better
bad conditions really has been evil. It is impossible to conceive of
general betterment through general slaughter. There have been few
altruistic wars."
"But how about our Spanish war?" I asked. "Surely it was not greed which
sent our men and ships to Cuba."
"No," said Mr. Carnegie, "that was not war, but world-police work.
"Our skirmish with Spain was a most unusual international episode. We
harmed none of the people of the land wherein we fought, but taught them
what we could of wise self-government and gave them independence. To
battle for the liberation of the slave is worthy work, and this of ours
was such a battle.
"Our Spanish war was not the outgrowth of our rivalry with any one or
any one's with us; it was the manifestation of our high sense of
responsibility as strong and healthy human beings for the welfare of the
weak and oppressed."
That Was Police Work.
"It did not make toward militarism on this continent, but the reverse;
in a few months it established permanent peace where peace had been a
stranger. It was police work on the highest plane, substituting order
for disorder."
"But did it not emphasize the need for the maintenance, even here, of a
competent and efficient naval and military force?" I asked.
Mr. Carnegie shook his head emphatically.
"That is the old, old argument cropping up again," said he, "the
argument that a provocative is a preventive. For us to maintain a great
army for the purpose of preventing war thereby would be as sensible as
for each of us to be afraid to walk about except with a lightning rod
down his back, since men have been struck by lightning. No nation wants
to fight us. We have friends throughout the world.
"Millions now resident in military nations are hoping that some day they
may be able to become citizens of our beloved republic, principally
because it now is not, nor is it every likely to be, military. Humanity
loves peace. Here peace abides, and, if we follow reason, will remain
unbroken.
"Note the advantages of our own position. Imagine what the task would be
of landing seventy thousand hostile soldiers on our shores! First they
would need to cross three thousand miles of the Atlantic or five
thousand miles of the Pacific.
"And what if they should come? My plan of operation would be to bid them
welcome as our visitors, considering them as men, not soldiers; to take
them to our great interior, say, as far west as Chicago, and there to
say to them:
"'Here we shall leave you. Make yourselves at home, if that thought
pleases you; fight us if it does not. If you think you can conquer us,
try it.'
"They would make themselves at home and, learning the advantages of
staying with us, would become applicants for our citizenship, rather
than our opponents in warfare.
"And if they tried to fight us, what would happen to them? Our nation is
unique in an important respect. Its individuals are the best armed in
the world. Not only, for example, are its farmers armed, but they can
shoot, which is far more than can be said of those of Britain or of any
other nation.
"The Governments of Europe cannot afford to give their citizenry arms,
and, as for the European citizenry, it not only cannot afford to
purchase arms, but cannot afford even to pay the license fees which
Government demands of those possessing arms with the right to use them.
"But ours? Most Americans can afford to and do own guns with which to
shoot, and, furthermore, most Americans, when they shoot, can hit the
things at which they shoot.
"Combine this powerful protective influence with the fact that thousands
of any army coming to invade us would not want to fight when once they
got here, but would want to settle here and enjoy peace, and we find
that we thus are protected as no nation in the world ever has been
protected or can be.
"Imagine the effect upon the European fighting man's psychology if he
found that an army transport had conveyed him to a land where one man's
privilege is every man's right! Learning this, it is not a joke to say,
but is a statement of the probable fact, that the invading soldiery
would not want to fire its first volleys, but would want to file its
first papers. They would not ask for cartridges, but for citizenship.
"America is protected by a force incomparable, which I may call its
peaceful militia, and the man who, above all other men, I most should
wish to see appointed to its command would be Gen. Leonard Wood were it
not for the fact that there would be some danger that in such an
eventuation his professional training would carry him beyond the rule of
reason.
"That is likely to be the most serious trouble with the trained soldier.
The doctor wants to dose, the parson to preach, and the soldier to
fight. Professional habit may make any of us dangerous.
"But if it came to fighting I do not consider it within the bounds of
possibility that we could lose. I once asked Gen. Sherman how the troops
which he commanded during the civil war compared for efficiency with
European troops. His answer was:
"'The world never has seen the army that I would be afraid to trust my
boys with, man for man.'"
Would Surprise the Enemy.
"That thought of welcoming an invading army appeals strongly to me. The
hostile General would be amazed by the ease with which he got his forces
in, but he would be more startled by the difficulty he would find if he
tried to get them out. If they once learned the advantages of our
liberties they would find it hard not to get away, but to go away. I
restrain my temper with difficulty when I contemplate the foolishness of
the people who discuss with gravity the possibility of a successful
invasion of these United States by a foreign foe. The thought always
arises when I hear these cries from our army and naval officers for a
greater armament: 'Are these men cowards?' I don't believe it. It is
their profession which makes them alarmists.
"Not only are the physical difficulties which would hamper an invasion
practically insuperable, but the reception enemies would get, if any of
them landed, would be wholly without parallel in the world's history.
"If our liberties really were threatened, every man, and very nearly
every woman, in our vast population would rise to their defense as never
any people yet has risen to any national defense. Americans, young and
old, en masse, would sweep to the protection of what they know, and what
the world knows, would be the cause of right and human liberty.
"I, myself, should wish to be invited to advance and meet invading
forces if they came. I would approach them without any weapons on my
person. I would not shoot at them. I would make a speech to them.
"'Gentlemen,' I would say, 'here's the chance of your life to win life's
chief prize. Now you are peasant soldiers. You have the opportunity to
become citizen kings. We are all kings here. Here the least of you can
take a rank much higher than that of any General in your army. He can
become a sovereign in a republic.'
"I think they would hurrah for me, not harm me, after they had heard my
speech.
"Striving for peace, we shall become so powerful that if war comes we
shall be invincible. Peace, not war, makes riches; the rich nation is
the powerful nation.
"Perhaps I was as much a peace man in my youth as I am now, but when I
was asked, during the civil war, to organize a corps of telegraph
operators and railroad conductors and engineers and take them to
Washington, I considered it the greatest of all privileges to obey the
order.
"I was the last man to get on the last train leaving Burkes Station,
after Bull Run, and, now, if the country ever should be invaded, I would
be, I hope, one of the first to rush to meet the enemy--but I think my
haste would be to convert, not to kill, him.
"The man who has done well in business, however, learns to abhor all
waste, and I must admit that it does pain me to see hundreds of millions
of our dollars spent on battleships which will but rust away, and
thousands of our able men vegetating on them or in an army.
"The men who urge this vast waste of our money and men mean well, no
doubt, but they do not know the nation of which they have the good
fortune to be citizens--they do not realize how very potent a force we
have become in the wide world, nor the fact that one of the great
reasons why we have become a force lies in the circumstance that our
national development has not been hampered by the vast expense of
militarism."
Mr. Carnegie paused.
Some weeks ago, in an interview granted me for publication in THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia
University, predicted that the present war would find its final outcome
in the establishment of the United States of Europe. I asked Mr.
Carnegie to express his view upon this subject.
"Nothing else could occur which would be of such immense advantage to
Europe," he replied.
"United we stand, and divided they fall. If the territory now occupied
by the homogeneous and co-operative federation known as the United
States of America were occupied instead by a large number of small,
independent competitive nations, that is, if each section of our
territory which now is a State were an independent country, America
would be constantly in turmoil.
"Europe has been set back a century because she substituted the present
war of nations for the promotion of a federation plan. The latter would
have meant peace and prosperity, the former means ruin.
"If in Europe this year such a federation as Dr. Butler regards as a
future probability had been a present actuality, 1914 would have left a
record very different from that which it is making.
"For instance, it would have been as difficult for the State of Germany
to fight the State of Russia, or the State of France, or that of
England, or all of them, and to trample neutral Belgium, as it now
would be, here, for the State of Pennsylvania to declare war on the
States of New York and Connecticut and to wreck New Jersey as she sent
her troops to the invasion.
"Originally we had thirteen States, and thirteen only, but there was
other territory here, and the attractive force of the successful union
of the thirteen States brought the other territory in as it was
organized.
"Thus we started right. Europe had begun before men had become so wise,
and, having begun wrong, has found herself, through the centuries,
unable to correct old errors."
A Federation of Europe.
"Certainly I hope that out of the great crime of this vast war some good
will come. The greatest good which could come would be a general
European federation. I do not believe that this will come at once; but
the world will be infinitely the better if it comes at length--if the
natural law of mutual attraction for mutual advantage draws these
nations now at war into a union which shall make such wars impossible in
future, as wars between our States, here, are impossible.
"But before this can come peace must come, and before peace can come one
or the other of the nations now at war must at least ask for an
armistice.
"If I were in the place of that great General, Lord Kitchener, and
should receive the news that such a request had been made by the
commander of the opposing forces, I should say: 'No armistice!
Surrender!'
"But, then, if the surrender should be made, I should say, in effect:
"'Gentlemen, we have made up our minds that these terrible explosions
must mark the end of war between our civilized nations. Our sacrifices
in this war have been too great to permit us to be satisfied with less
than this.
"'If we now cannot feel assured of such a federation of nations as will
result in the settlement of all future disputes by peaceful arbitration
at The Hague, then we shall keep on fighting till the day comes when we
can achieve that end.
"'Upon the other side of the Atlantic,' I should continue if I were Lord
Kitchener and should be confronted by such a situation, 'we see in the
United States of America an example which must satisfy us that world
peace now can be maintained.
"'There,' I should go on, 'thirteen States were banded into union in
1776. Their total population was less than the present population of
their largest city and their area has spread until it links two oceans
and offers homes in forty-eight States to one hundred millions, and the
population still increases rapidly. An experiment of world significance
was tried, and is a success, for the aggregated nation has grown and now
is growing in power more rapidly than any other nation on the surface of
the earth.'"
Would Mean World Peace.
"'It is plain to me and should be plain to all of us,' I should
continue, if I were Lord Kitchener, so placed, 'that we in Europe have
but to follow this example which America has set for us in order to
achieve an ultimate result as notably desirable. When we have
accomplished it world peace will be enthroned and all the peoples of the
earth will be able safely to go about the pleasant and progressive
business of their lives without apprehension of their neighbors.
Humanity, thus freed of its most dreadful burden, will be able to leap
forward toward the realization of its ultimate possibilities of
progress.'"
"And do you really think there is the immediate possibility of an
effective European league for permanent peace and general disarmament?"
I asked Mr. Carnegie.
"Naturally my mind has dwelt much on this problem," he replied. "The
culmination of the European situation in the present war is very
dreadful, but no good ever came out of crying over spilled milk.
However, it seems safe to conclude that a majority of the people of the
civilized world will presently decide that a step forward must be taken.
"Everywhere in Europe, when the present conflict ends, this fact will be
emphasized by shell-wrecked, fire-blackened buildings; by the vacant
chairs of sons and fathers who have fallen victims; by innumerable
graves and by a general impoverishment, the inevitable result of war's
great waste, which will touch and punish every man, every woman, every
child.
"In the face of such an emphasis no denial of the facts will be among
the possibilities, and I scarcely think that any even will be attempted.
If the federation Dr. Butler has predicted does not come about at once,
it will be admitted almost universally that future disputes occurring
between the Governments of Europe shall be settled, not by force of
fighting men, but by arbitration at The Hague.
"And now a serious question obtrudes itself. Must there not be a
carefully considered and cautiously worked out understanding, which may
be considered the preliminary of peace? Later on the foremost men of
every nation can meet in conference to consider with an earnestness
hitherto unknown the great problems which will be involved in the
permanent abolition of war and establishment of peace; but for this the
way must be prepared.
"Here, again, I think The Hague Tribunal is the proper body to assemble
for the purpose of devising means for the accomplishment of the great
end, which must be such legislation as will accomplish, at the end of
this war, the ending of all war among the nations.
"An important duty of the conference would be some arrangement for a
union of the forces of the nations now at war, charged with and
qualified to perform the duty of maintaining peace pending the
completion of the final comprehensive plan."
For One Purpose Only.
"It is possible and even probable that as a part of the accomplishment
of this it may be found to be desirable and even necessary to organize
and provide for the maintenance of a joint naval and military body of
strength sufficient to enforce world peace during the period necessary
for the preparation of a plan to be submitted to all powers. But if this
force is to be established, it must be done with the clear understanding
that it is designed for one thing only, the maintenance of peace, and
must not be used at any time for any other service.
"In the selection of the commanding officer to be intrusted with this
task, it will be conceded that the victors in this war, or those who
have a notable advantage at the time of the beginning of the armistice,
shall have the right of his appointment.
"No protest ever will arise from the mass of the people of Europe
against the abolishment of militarism. Even the people of Germany, as a
whole, have not found militarism attractive. It has been the influence
of the military aristocracy of Germany, the most powerful caste in the
world, which not only has encouraged the national tendency, but has
forced the Emperor, as I believe, to action against his will and
judgment.
"But a change was notable in Germany before the war began, and will be
far more notable after it has ended. The socialistic movement waxes
strong throughout the nation, and the proceedings of the Reichstag show
us that the nation is marching steadily, though perhaps slowly, toward a
real democracy.
"I believe the first election to follow peace will result in a demand by
the Reichstag that it, alone, shall be given power to declare war. It
will be argued, and it is evident that it then will be amply provable,
that it is the people who suffer most through war, and that, therefore,
their representatives should utterly control it.
"That itself would be a most important step toward peace, and I feel
certain that it is among the probabilities.
"As things stand in Germany, although the Reichstag has its powerful
influence in regard to war expenditure and might accomplish important
results by refusing to vote amounts demanded, the fact remains that
until it has been given the power of making or withholding declaration
of war the most important results cannot be accomplished."
"In Fried's volume," I suggested to Mr. Carnegie, "you are credited with
saying that Emperor William, himself and by himself, might establish
peace. Granting that that might have been the fact before this war
began, is it your opinion that he, or any other one man, could now
control the situation to that extent?"
"Assuming that the Germans should come out victorious," Mr. Carnegie
replied, "the Emperor would become a stronger power than ever toward the
maintenance of peace among the nations. At one time I believed him to be
the anointed of God for this purpose, and did not fail to tell him so.
"Even if his forces should be defeated in this present carnage, I am
sure he would be welcomed by the conference I have suggested as the
proposer of the great world peace, thus fulfilling the glorious destiny
for which at one time I considered that he had been chosen from on
high."
I asked Mr. Carnegie what part he thought this country, the United
States, should play in the great movement which he has in mind and
thoroughly believes is even now upon its way.
"The United States," he answered, "although, happily, not a party to the
world crime which is now in progress, seems entitled to preference as
the one to call the nations of the world to the consideration of the
greatest of all blessings--universal, lasting peace."
Woman and War
"SHOT. TELL HIS MOTHER."
By W.E.P. French, Captain, U.S. Army.
What have I done to you, Brothers,--War-Lord and Land-Lord and Priest,--
That my son should rot on the blood-smeared earth where the raven and
buzzard feast?
He was my baby, my man-child, that soldier with shell-torn breast,
Who was slain for your power and profit--aye, murdered at your behest.
I bore him, my boy and my manling, while the long months ebbed away;
He was part of me, part of my body, which nourished him day by day.
He was mine when the birth-pang tore me, mine when he lay on my heart,
When the sweet mouth mumbled my bosom and the milk-teeth made it smart,
Babyhood, boyhood, and manhood, and a glad mother proud of her son--
See the carrion birds, too gorged to fly! Ah! Brothers, what have you
done?
You prate of duty and honor, of a patriot's glorious death,
Of love of country, heroic deeds--nay, for shame's sake, spare your
breath!
Pray, what have you done for your country? Whose was the blood that was
shed
In the hellish warfare that served your ends? My boy was shot in your
stead.
And for what were our children butchered, men makers of cruel law?
By the Christ, I am glad no woman made the Christless code of war!
Shirks and schemers, why don't you answer? Is the foul truth hard to
tell?
Then a mother will tell it for you, of a deed that shames fiends in
hell:--
Our boys were killed that some faction or scoundrel might win mad race
For goals of stained gold, shamed honors, and the sly self-seeker's
place;
That money's hold on our country might be tightened and made more sure;
That the rich could inherit earth's fullness and their loot be quite
secure;
That the world-mart be wider opened to the product mulct from toil;
That the labor and land of our neighbors should become your war-won
spoil;
That the eyes of an outraged people might be turned from your graft and
greed
In the misruled, plundered home-land by lure of war's ghastly deed;
And that priests of the warring nations could pray to the selfsame God
For His blessing on battle and murder and corpse-strewn, blood-soaked
sod.
Oh, fools! if God were a woman, think you She would let kin slay
For gold-lust and craft of gamesters, or cripple that trade might pay?
This quarrel was not the fighters':--the cheated, red pawns in your
game:--
You stay-at-homes garnered the plunder, but the pawns,--wounds, death,
and "Fame"!
You paid them a beggarly pittance, your substitute prey-of-the-sword,
But, ye canny beasts of prey, they paid, in life and limb, for your
hoard.
And, behold! you have other victims: a widow sobs by my side,
Who clasps to her breast a girl-child. Men, she was my slain son's
bride!
I can smell the stench of the shambles, where the mangled bodies lie;
I can hear the moans of the wounded; I can see the brave lads die;
And across the heaped, red trenches and the tortured, bleeding rows
I cry out a mother's pity to all mothers of dear, dead "foes."
In love and a common sorrow, I weep with them o'er our dead,
And invoke my sister woman for a curse on each scheming head.
Nay, why should we mothers curse you? Lo! flesh of our flesh are ye;
But, by soul of Mary who bore the Christ-man murdered at Calvary,
Into our own shall the mothers come, and the glad day speed apace
When the law of peace shall be the law of the women that bear the race;
When a man shall stand by his mother, for the worldwide common good,
And not bring her tears and heart-break nor make mock of her motherhood.
The Way to Peace
AN INTERVIEW WITH JACOB H. SCHIFF.
One of the leading American financiers and noted
philanthropist; founder of Jewish Theological Seminary and of
Semitic Museum at Harvard University; a native of Germany and
member of the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., bankers.
By Edward Marshall.
American as I am in every fibre, and in accord as I feel with every
interest of the country of my adoption, I cannot find myself in
agreement with what appears to be, to a considerable extent, American
opinion as to the origin and responsibility for the deplorable conflict
in which almost all of Europe has become involved.
For many reasons my personal sympathies are with Germany. I cannot feel
convinced that she has been the real aggressor; I believe that war was
forced upon her, almost as if by prearrangement among the nations with
whom she now contends; I cannot but believe that they had become jealous
and envious of her rapid and unprecedented peaceful development and had
concluded that the moment had arrived when all was favorable for a union
against her.
Although I left Germany half a century ago, I would think as little of
arraying myself against her, the country of my birth, in this the moment
of her struggle for existence, as of arraying myself against my parents.
But while I steadfastly believe this war to have been forced upon
Germany against her will, I also believe that circumstances which were
stronger than the Governments of England and France, her present
enemies, were necessary to overcome an equally definite reluctance upon
their part.
In other words, I cannot wholly blame the English Government, or the
French Government, any more than I can wholly blame the German
Government.
Let us see how the great tragedy came about. It is safe to pass rapidly
over the Servian-Bosnian-Herzegovinian-Austro-Hungarian complication
which served as the immediate precipitant of hostilities. It has been
detailed repeatedly in THE TIMES and other American publications.
It had reached a point at which the Austro-Hungarian Government felt
compelled to take extreme measures by means of which to safeguard the
integrity of the empire.
The firm but fatal ultimatum to Servia followed, the reply to which,
suffice it to say, was unsatisfactory to Austria, who could not accept
the suggestion of an investigation into the circumstances attending the
assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand through a commission or court on
which she was not represented.
Like Maine Case.
The situation really was analogous to that which existed between the
United States and Spain when the Maine was blown up in Havana Harbor. In
order to fix the responsibility for this dastardly affair we then
similarly demanded an investigation by Spain, to be carried out with the
assistance of representatives of this Government. Spain, too, then
offered to conduct an investigation, but she peremptorily declined to
allow us to take part in it.
This attitude on her part quickly brought about our declaration of war
against her. It is important that Americans should realize the
similarity in the two situations and the likeness of the Austrian action
of 1914 to that which our own Government took in 1898.
As soon as Austria had rejected as unsatisfactory Servia's reply to her
ultimatum she prepared to undertake a punitive armed expedition against
Servia, and Russia at once declared that she would rank herself as
Servia's protector.
Indeed, without any further parley, and to give effect to this threat,
Russia immediately mobilized her army. Since then it has been averred
that this mobilization had been in progress for several weeks previous
to Servia's rejection of the Austrian ultimatum.
This made it obligatory upon Germany to go to Austria's aid, under the
provisions of their treaty of alliance, although she was well aware that
such an action would bring France into the conflict under the terms of
her alliance with Russia. Indeed, an unsatisfactory reply had been
received from France as to the latter's intentions, but Germany
endeavored to secure at least an assurance of England's neutrality. This
proved to be impossible.
How the German Government could indulge for a moment in the hope that in
a war with Russia and France on the one side and Germany and Austria on
the other, England could be induced to remain neutral passes
comprehension, but that it did believe this seems a certainty.
The English Government, no doubt, correctly felt that without the aid of
its immense resources, and particularly without the operations of its
great navy against Germany and Austria, the latter nations would find it
not so very difficult a task to dispose of both Russia and France.
English statesmen very promptly must have become alive to the
probability that a Germany which had subdued Russia and France, and thus
had made itself master of the Continent, would be unlikely long to
tolerate a continuance of England's world leadership.
So, even if the neutrality of Belgium had not been violated, other
reasons would have been found by England for joining France and Russia
in the war against Germany, for England would not risk, without any
effort to protect them, the loss of her continued domination of the
high seas and her undisputed possession of her vast colonial empire.
Germany Fighting for Life.
I am not defending the violation of Belgian neutrality. This,
undeniably, was a most unjustifiable action, in spite of German claims
that she was forced into it by the necessities of the situation. But I
am explaining that, even had it not occurred, still England would have
gone to war.
That was the situation.
Germany is now fighting for her very existence, and I, who am not
without knowledge of German conditions, am convinced that never has
there been a war more wholly that of a whole people than is this present
conflict, as far as Germany is concerned.
Any one who has been in even superficial touch with German public
opinion and individual feeling in any part of the empire, since the war
began, must know that there is hardly a man, woman, or child throughout
the empire who would hesitate if called upon to sacrifice possessions or
life in order to insure victory to the Fatherland. Seventy million
people who are animated by unanimous sentiment of this sort cannot be
crushed, probably not subdued.
And England is confronted by the certainty that her world leadership is
the stake for which she is fighting; that her defeat would mean the end
of the vast dominance which she has exercised throughout the world,
since the time of the Armada, through the power of her great navy.
Is it not apparent, therefore, that these nations, if left to
themselves, inevitably must continue the war until one side or the
other, or both, shall become exhausted--an eventuation which may be
postponed not for mere months but for years?
In our own civil war Grant for almost two years stood within a hundred
or a hundred and fifty miles of Richmond, the heart of the Confederacy,
and was not able to sufficiently subdue Lee's forces to enable him to
get possession of the city until the complete exhaustion of the
Confederacy's resources in men and money had been accomplished.
[Illustration: VISCOUNT JAMES BRYCE
_(Photo from George G. Bain.)_
_See Page 477_]
[Illustration: DR. BERNHARD DERNBURG
_(Photo by Campbell Studios.)_
_See Page 487_]
[Illustration: DAVID STARR JORDAN
_See Page 502_]
[Illustration: JOHN GRIER HIBBEN
_(Photo by McManus.)_
_See Page 503_]
While that situation may not offer a true parallel in all respects to
that in which we find the belligerent forces in the present European
war, it nevertheless may be taken as a precedent proving that frontal
encounters of powerful opponents generally do not yield final results
until actual exhaustion compels one side or the other to abandon hope.
Such an exhaustion hardly can be expected within measurable time on the
part of either one or the other of the combatants in the existing
European conflict, and this means the probable continuation for a long
period of the merciless slaughter which has marked the last few months.
We hold up our hands in horror at the stories of human sacrifices in the
early ages when, after all, these were, perhaps, less brutal and less
appalling than the wholesale slaughter of the flower of these warring
peoples of which we now read almost daily.
As I see the situation there really are only three contestants in the
war--England, Russia, and Germany. France, Belgium, and Austria are
important auxiliaries, but they are playing to a certain extent
secondary rôles.
England's real object is the utter defeat of Germany--nothing more nor
less than that--and if this is accomplished England will have control of
Europe. It must be remembered that the English Government and English
people frequently have asserted that they would not be satisfied with
mere defeat of Germany's armed forces, but that her power must be
permanently paralyzed.
If England should accomplish this, with Germany, its army and its navy,
thus wholly out of the way, no one would be left for England to fear in
future upon the high seas.
That might be the chief significance of England's complete victory, and
its complete significance would be that every nation in the world would
have to do the British bidding, for should any one refuse she could
completely destroy its commerce and shut off its overseas supplies.
In the cases of most nations overseas supplies include material vital
to the continuance of life and happiness; to every nation, in these days
of a developed and habitual foreign trade, overseas supplies are
actually essential, even when they do not necessarily include meats and
wheat and other foodstuffs.
The effect upon the United States of such an English victory would be
most disastrous.
The alliance between England and Japan is likely to be permanent. That
is something which Americans cannot afford to forget for a moment.
England needs Japan in the Far East, especially as an ally in case of
need, which at some time is certain to arrive, against Russia; and Japan
for many reasons needs the strength of English backing, without which
her financial and political situation soon would become most dangerous,
if not collapse.
Such a permanent alliance would have this consequence upon us, that
without even the probability of difficulties with either England or
Japan--and, personally, I do not believe that such a probability need be
feared--we nevertheless year after year would be compelled to
increasingly prepare for what may be defined as the disagreeable
possibility of the eventuation of a disagreeable possibility.
Certainly we should be under the necessity of notably and, therefore,
very expensively, increasing our naval armament; we should be under the
necessity of large expenditures for coast defense.
Corollary military cost would be enormous and burdensome. The
preparation which would be imposed on us as a necessity by such a
permanent alliance would be sufficiently extensive and expensive to
burden our people heavily and handicap our national progress.
It might involve, perhaps, even a greater hardship in our case than
militarism has involved in Germany. It is improbable that the average
American realizes the part which absence of such burdens has played in
our national development so far; it would be difficult for the average
American who has not studied the whole subject carefully to estimate
accurately the part which the imposition of such a burden would be sure
to play in our future.
We have been measurably a free people. If we were under the necessity of
supporting vast military and naval establishments we should be that no
longer, no matter how completely we adhered to our democratic political
system and ideals. It is not Kings, but what they do, which burdens
countries, and the most burdensome, act of any King is to load his
country up with non-productive, threatening, and expensive war
machinery.
The Real Peril.
I fear that the American people as a whole have visualized only
slightly, if at all, the real peril involved in this contingency; but I
cannot feel otherwise than sure that soon they must awake to the great
danger that militarism and navalism may be imposed upon them through no
fault of their own.
American impulses trend away from armament toward peaceful development
along industrial lines, but even now political leaders in Washington
begin to see what may be coming. The propositions which already have
been made for considerable increases in our naval and military forces
may be regarded as only the forerunners of what is to be expected later.
My sympathies and interests, in other words my patriotic sentiments, are
definitely American. I must repeat that I am of German origin, and that
as regards the present struggle I am pro-German, yet it would be
impossible for me to say that I am anti-English, although I am
anti-Russian for reasons that are obvious.
I already have expressed the belief that the complete humiliation of
England would be disastrous to us. Now, it seems to me that if Germany
should be completely successful, if she should be able to wear out the
Allies, break down France, hold Russia in check, and cripple or even
invade England, (which many German leaders actually believe can be done,
incredible as it may seem to us,) Germany would acquire a position such
as never has been held by any nation since the beginning of history. Not
even the power of the Roman Empire would approach it.
The advance which has marked the development of every means of
communication, transportation, manufacturing, &c., since Rome's day
would give Germany, in the case of such an eventuation, a power which
would have been inconceivable to the most ambitious Roman Emperor. It
would make her a menace not only to her immediate neighbors, but to the
entire globe.
Could she be trusted with such power? Notwithstanding my personal
sympathies, which I have taken pains to clearly outline, I must admit
that I cannot think so. The German character is not only self-reliant,
which is admirable, but it readily becomes domineering, particularly
when in the ascendency.
In the rôle of a world conqueror Germany would become a world
dictator--would indulge in a domination which would be almost unbearable
to every other nation. Particularly would this be the case in respect to
her relations with the United States, a nation with which she always has
had and always must have intimate trade and commercial relations.
Should Germany make England impotent and France powerless we should
become more or less dependent upon German good-will, and it is highly
probable, indeed I regard it as a certainty, that before long, in such
an event, the Monroe Doctrine would cease to exercise any important
influence on world events. It would become a thing of the past--a "scrap
of paper."
You see that while I am not neutral to the extreme, while I fervently
hope and pray that Germany may not be wrecked and that she may emerge
from the war with full ability to maintain her own, I cannot believe
that it would be good for her or good for the world in general if she
found herself absolutely and incontrovertibly victorious at the end of
the great struggle. In other words, I wish Germany to be victorious, but
I do not wish her to be too victorious.
This brings us definitely to the question as to what can be done to stop
this war. Its continuance is infinitely costly of men and treasure; its
prosecution to the bitter end would mean complete disaster for one
contestant and only less complete destruction for the other, and it
would give to the victor, no matter what his sufferings and losses might
have been, a power dangerous to the entire world.
How shall it end? We do not want its end to mean a new European map.
Anything of the sort would include the seed of another European war, to
be fought out later and at even greater probable cost, with all the
world-disturbance implied in such an eventuation.
What the United States should desire and does desire is an understanding
between these nations, of just what they are fighting for, which I
almost believe they no longer know themselves, and a conference between
them now, a pause to think, which at least may help toward stimulating
each side to make concessions, before the ultimate of damage has been
done.
Such a conference might be called even without any interval in warfare
and induced without definite outside intervention from ourselves or any
one else. I believe it not to be beyond the bounds of possibility that
if this course could be brought about importantly enough, a way out of
this brutal struggle and carnage might be discovered even now, and I
know I am not alone in this belief.
The situation is unprecedented. No congress such as in former times more
than once has settled wars and brought about peace by the give-and-take
process could be of avail in the existing circumstances. Something far
higher than such a conference is needed. This peace must not be
temporary. It must mark not the ending of this war alone but the ending
of all war.
Some means must be devised and generally agreed to which, after the
re-establishment of peace, will do away with jealousies among European
nations, so that the continual increase of armament on land and sea no
longer will be necessary, and humanity will be freed from its tremendous
burden.
It is not at present possible to point out any concrete means by which
these things may be accomplished, but it is not impossible that, when
reason shall be returned to the Governments now at war, they themselves
may suggest to one another plans and ways and means how this may be
effectuated.
Toward this end America may help tremendously, and herein lies, it seems
to me, the greatest opportunity ever offered by events to the American
press.
Let the newspapers of America stop futile philosophizing upon the merits
and demerits of each case, let them measurably cease their comment upon
what each side has accomplished or failed to accomplish during the
tragic four months which have traced their bloody mark on history.
Let them begin to stimulate public opinion in favor of a rational
adjustment of the points at issue--such an adjustment as will leave each
contestant unhumiliated and intact, such an adjustment as will avoid, as
far as may be possible, the complete defeat of any one, such an
adjustment as will do what can be done toward righting wrongs already
wrought, and such an adjustment as will let the world return as soon as
may be to the paths of peace, productiveness, prosperity, and happiness.
In suggesting that America should regard this effort as an obligation I
am assuming for this country no rights which are not properly hers. We,
a nation of a hundred million people, laboring constantly for peace and
human progress, have a right to make our voice heard, and if we raise it
properly it will find listeners among those who can help toward the
accomplishment of what we seek. But if we would make it heard we must be
earnest, be honest, and be ceaseless in the reiteration of our demand.
Have we not the right to insist that the interests of neutral nations,
of whom, with our South American cousins, (for the better intercourse
with whom we have just spent several hundred millions upon the
construction of the Panama Canal,) we form so large a percentage, shall
before long be given some consideration by the nations whose great
quarrel is harming us incalculably?
Americans Should Speak Out.
The interruption of our economic development already has become marked
and the war's baneful influence upon moral conditions in our midst shows
itself through constantly increasing unemployment and, as a logical
consequence of that, the rapid filling of our eleemosynary and penal
institutions. May we not reasonably demand that this shall speedily be
brought to an end?
It probably is true that under the rules of the game the President of
the United States cannot offer his good offices again to the
belligerents without first being invited by one or the other side to do
this, but the people of the United States have a voice even more
powerful than his; if that of the people of South America should be
joined with it, and if
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