The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence
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Title: The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence
Author: A. T. Mahan
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE ***
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THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
BY
A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.
CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY
AUTHOR OF 'THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783,'
'THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE,
1783-1812,' 'THE RELATIONS OF SEA POWER TO THE WAR OF 1812,' 'NAVAL
STRATEGY' ETC.
_WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND BATTLE PLANS_
LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, LIMITED
OVERY HOUSE, 100 SOUTHWARK STREET, S.E.
[Illustration: (frontispiece)]
_Copyright, 1913_, By A.T. MAHAN
_All rights reserved_
Published, October, 1913
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., U.S.A.
PREFACE
The contents of this volume were first contributed as a chapter, under
the title of "Major Operations, 1762-1783," to the "History of the
Royal Navy," in seven volumes, published by Messrs. Sampson Low,
Marston, and Company, under the general editorship of the late Sir
William Laird Clowes. For permission to republish now in this separate
form, the author has to express his thanks to the publishers of that
work.
In the Introduction following this Preface, the author has summarized
the general lesson to be derived from the course of this War of
American Independence, as distinct from the particular discussion
and narration of the several events which constitute the body of the
treatment. These lessons he conceives to carry admonition for the
present and future based upon the surest foundations; namely, upon
the experience of the past as applicable to present conditions. The
essential similarity between the two is evident in a common dependence
upon naval strength.
There has been a careful rereading and revision of the whole text; but
the changes found necessary to be made are much fewer than might have
been anticipated after the lapse of fifteen years. Numerous footnotes
in the History, specifying the names of ships in fleets, and of their
commanders in various battles, have been omitted, as not necessary to
the present purpose, though eminently proper and indeed indispensable
to an extensive work of general reference and of encyclopædic scope,
such as the History is. Certain notes retained with the initials
W.L.C. are due to the editor of that work.
A.T. MAHAN.
DECEMBER, 1912.
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xix
LIST OF MAPS xxi
LIST OF BATTLE-PLANS xxiii
INTRODUCTION
THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD
Macaulay quoted on the action of Frederick the Great 1
Illustration from Conditions of the Turkish Empire 2
Lesson from the Recent War in the Balkans, 1912-1913 2
The War of American Independence a striking example of the
Tendency of Wars to Spread 3
Origin and Train of Events in that War, Traced 3
Inference as to possible Train of Future Events in the History of
the United States 4
The Monroe Doctrine Simply a Formulated Precaution against the
Tendency of Wars to Spread 4
National Policy as to Asiatic Immigration 4
Necessity of an Adequate Navy if these two National Policies are
to be sustained 4
Dependence on Navy Illustrated in the Two Great National Crises;
in the War of Independence and in the War of Secession
4
The United States not great in Population in proportion to
Territory 5
Nor Wealthy in Proportion to exposed Coast-Line 5
Special Fitness of a Navy to meet these particular conditions 5
The Pacific a great World Problem, dependent mainly on Naval Power
5
CHAPTER I
THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN
1775-1776
Preponderant effect of Control of the Water upon the Struggle for
American Independence 6
Deducible then from Reason and from Experience 6
Consequent Necessity to the Americans of a Counterpoise to British
Navy 6
This obtained through Burgoyne's Surrender 6
The Surrender of Burgoyne traceable directly to the Naval
Campaigns on Lake Champlain, 1775, 1776 7
The subsequent Course of the War in all Quarters of the world due
to that decisive Campaign 7
The Strategic Problem of Lake Champlain familiar to Americans from
the Wars between France and Great Britain prior to 1775
8
Consequent prompt Initiative by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold
8
Energetic Pursuit of first Successes by Arnold 9
Complete Control of Lake Champlain thus secured 9
Invasion of Canada by Montgomery, 1775 9
Arnold marches through Maine Wilderness and joins Montgomery
before Quebec 10
Assault on Quebec. Failure, and Death of Montgomery 10
Arnold maintains Blockade of Quebec, 1776 10
Relief of the Place by British Navy 11
Arnold Retreats to Crown Point 12
Arnold's Schemes and Diligence to create a Lake Navy, 1776 13
Difficulties to be overcome 13
Superior Advantages of the British 13
The British by building acquire Superiority, but too late for
effect in 1776 13
Ultimate Consequences from this Retardation 14
Constitution of the Naval Force raised by Arnold 14
He moves with it to the foot of Lake Champlain 15
Takes position for Defence at Valcour Island 15
Particular Difficulties encountered by British 15
Constitution of the British Lake Navy 16
Land Forces of the Opponents 17
Naval Forces of the Two at the Battle of Valcour Island 17
Magnitude of the Stake at Issue 18
Arnold's Purposes and Plans 18
Advance of the British 19
Arnold's Disposition of his Flotilla to receive Attack 20
The Battle of Valcour Island 21
The Americans Worsted 22
Arnold Retreats by night Undetected 23
Pursuit by the British 24
Destruction of the American Vessels 25
British Appreciation of the Importance of the Action, as shown
26
Criticism of the conduct of the Opposing Leaders 26
Arnold's Merit and Gallantry 27
End of the Naval Story of the Lakes 27
Effect of the Campaign upon the Decisive Events of 1777 28
CHAPTER II
NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETT
BAY--ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS, TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON
1776
Necessity that Force, if resorted to, be from the first Adequate
29
Application to National Policy in peace 29
To the Monroe Doctrine 29
Failure of the British Government of 1775 in this respect 30
Consequences of such failure 30
General Howe evacuates Boston and retires to Halifax. Extent of
his Command 30
Dissemination of Effort by British Government 30
Expedition against South Carolina 31
Local Conditions about Charleston 32
Description of Fort Moultrie 33
Plan of British Naval Attack 33
The Battle of Fort Moultrie 34
Failure of the Attack. British Losses 36
Comment upon the Action 37
The Expedition retires to New York 38
The Howes, Admiral and General, arrive in New York Bay 39
Operations about the City 39
Continuous and Decisive, but Inconspicuous, Part played by the
British Navy 40
Description of Local Conditions about New York 40
American Preparations for Defence 41
Crucial Weakness of the Scheme 42
The Advance of the British 42
Washington withdraws his Army from the Brooklyn side 43
Success of this Withdrawal due to British Negligence 44
Subsequent Operations, and Retreat of Washington to New Jersey
45
Retreat continued to Pennsylvania, where he receives
reinforcements 46
Slackness of Sir William Howe's actions 47
The British take possession of Narragansett Bay. Importance of
that position 48
Washington suddenly takes the Offensive. Battle of Trenton 48
He recovers most of the State of New Jersey 49
CHAPTER III
THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE WAR. SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AND CAPTURE OF
PHILADELPHIA BY HOWE. THE NAVAL PART IN EACH OPERATION
1777
British Object in Campaign of 1777 the same as that in 1776 50
Part assigned to Burgoyne 50
Slowness of his Progress at the beginning 51
Sir William Howe, instead of coöperating, takes his Army to the
Chesapeake 52
Criticism of this Course 52
Howe's Progress to Philadelphia, and Capture of that City 53
Admiral Lord Howe takes the Fleet from the Chesapeake to the
Delaware 53
Surrender of Burgoyne and his Army 53
British Naval Operations in Delaware Bay 54
Brief Tenure--Nine Months--of Philadelphia by British 55
The general Failure of the British Campaign determined by Howe's
move to the Chesapeake 55
General Results of the Campaign 56
Part played by the British Navy. Analogous to that in Spain,
1808-1812, and in many other instances 57
CHAPTER IV
WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATE
PHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D'ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK,
NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICAN
DISAPPOINTMENT IN D'ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND
1778
France recognizes the Independence of the United States, and makes
with them a defensive Alliance 58
A French Fleet sails for America under Comte d'Estaing 59
Unprepared condition of the British Navy 59
Admiral Byron sails with a Reinforcement for America 59
Ill effect of Naval Unreadiness upon British Commerce; and
especially on the West Indies 60
Admiral Keppel puts to Sea with the British Channel Fleet 61
First Guns of the War with France 62
Extreme Length of Byron's Passage 62
He turns back to Halifax 62
D'Estaing's slowness allows Howe to escape from Delaware Bay.
Howe's Celerity 62
Evacuation of Philadelphia by British Army, and its precipitate
Retreat to New York 63
Escape of both Army and Fleet due to d'Estaing's Delays 63
Rapid Action of Lord Howe 64
D'Estaing Arrives off New York 64
Howe's elaborate Dispositions for the Defence of New York Bay
65
Statement of British and French Naval Force 66
D'Estaing decides not to attempt Passage of the Bar, and puts to
Sea 67
Anchors off Narragansett Bay 69
Forces the Entrance to Newport and Anchors inside the Bay 70
The British garrison besieged by superior American and French
forces 70
Howe appears with his Fleet and anchors off the entrance, at Point
Judith 71
Sustained Rapidity of his action at New York 71
D'Estaing Withdraws from Siege of Newport and puts to Sea 73
Manoeuvres of the two Opponents 74
D'Estaing quits the Field, and both Fleets are scattered by a
heavy Gale 75
Howe returns to New York and collects his Fleet 76
D'Estaing calls oft Newport; but abandons the Siege finally,
taking his Fleet to Boston 77
Critical Condition of British garrison in Newport. D'Estaing's
withdrawal compels Americans to raise the siege 77
Howe follows d'Estaing to Boston 77
Discussion of the Conduct of the opposing Admirals 78
Howe gives up his Command and returns to England 80
CHAPTER V
THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT
1778
Admirals Keppel and D'Orvilliers put to Sea from Portsmouth and
Brest 82
Instructions given to the French Admiral 83
Preliminary Manoeuvres after the two Fleets had sighted one
another 83
The Battle of Ushant 84
A Drawn Battle. The respective Losses 91
The Significance of the Battle in the fighting Development of the
British Navy 93
The "Order of Battle" 93
The Disputes and Courts Martial in Great Britain arising from the
Battle of Ushant 94
Keppel Resigns his Command 97
CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1778-1779. THE BRITISH INVASION OF
GEORGIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA
Influence of Seasonal Conditions upon Naval Operations in America
98
Commercial Importance of the West Indies 98
The French seize Dominica 99
D'Estaing Sails with his Fleet from Boston for Martinique 100
A British Squadron under Hotham sails the same day for Barbados,
with Five Thousand Troops 100
Admiral Barrington's Seizure of Santa Lucia 101
D'Estaing sails to Recapture it 102
Rapidity and Skill shown in Barrington's Movements and
Dispositions 102
D'Estaing's attacks Foiled, both on Sea and on Shore 103
He Abandons the attempt and Returns to Martinique 104
Importance of Santa Lucia in Subsequent Operations 104
Byron Reaches Barbados, and takes over Command from Barrington
105
D'Estaing Captures the British Island Grenada 105
Byron goes to its Relief 106
The Action between the two Fleets, of Byron and d'Estaing, July 6,
1779 106
Criticism of the two Commanders-in-Chief 110
D'Estaing returns to Grenada, which remains French 112
Byron returns to England. British North American Station assigned
to Admiral Arbuthnot, Leeward Islands to Rodney 113
British Operations in Georgia and South Carolina. Capture of
Savannah 113
Fatal Strategic Error in these Operations 114
D'Estaing's attempt to Retake Savannah Foiled 115
His appearance on the coast, however, causes the British to
abandon Narragansett Bay 115
D'Estaing succeeded by de Guichen in North America. Rodney also
arrives 115
CHAPTER VII
THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1779. ALLIED FLEETS INVADE THE
ENGLISH CHANNEL. RODNEY DESTROYS TWO SPANISH SQUADRONS AND RELIEVES
GIBRALTAR
Spain declares War against Great Britain 116
Delays in Junction of French and Spanish Fleets 116
They enter the Channel. Alarm in England 117
Plans of the French Government 118
Their Change and Failure. The Allied Fleets return to Brest 119
Criticism of the British Ministry 120
Divergent views of France and Spain 120
Prominence given to Gibraltar, and the resulting Effect upon the
general War 121
Exhaustion of Supplies at Gibraltar 121
Rodney with the Channel Fleet Sails for its Relief, with ultimate
Destination to Leeward Islands Command 121
He Captures a large Spanish Convoy 122
And Destroys a Second Spanish Squadron of Eleven Sail-of-the-Line
123
Distinction of this Engagement 124
Gibraltar and Minorca Relieved 125
Rodney proceeds to the West Indies 126
The Channel Fleet returns to England 126
CHAPTER VIII
RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN'S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHEN
RETURNS TO EUROPE AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THE
CAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNS
TO WEST INDIES
1780
Rodney's Force upon arrival in West Indies 128
Action between British and French Squadrons prior to his arrival
129
Rodney and de Guichen put to sea 130
Action between them of April 17, 1780 131
Cause of Failure of Rodney's Attack 133
His Disappointment in his Subordinates 135
His Expression of his Feelings 135
Discussion of the Incidents and Principles involved 137
The Losses of the Respective Fleets 140
They Continue to Cruise 141
The Action of May 15, 1780 142
That of May 19, 1780 144
The Results Indecisive 144
Contrary Personal Effect produced upon the two Admirals by the
encounters 145
De Guichen asks to be Relieved 145
Rodney's Chary Approval of his Subordinates in these two instances
145
Suspicion and Distrust rife in the British Navy at this period
146
Twelve Spanish Sail-of-the-Line, with Ten Thousand Troops, Arrive
at Guadeloupe 147
They refuse Coöperation with de Guichen in the Windward Islands
147
De Guichen Accompanies them to Haïti with his Fleet 147
He declines to Coöperate on the Continent with the Americans, and
sails for Europe 148
Rodney Arranges for the protection of the Homeward West India
Trade, and then proceeds to New York 149
Effect of his coming 150
The Year 1780 one of great Discouragement to Americans 151
Summary of the Operations in the Carolinas and Virginia, 1780,
which led to Lord Cornwallis's Surrender in 1781 151
Two Naval Actions sustained by Commodore Cornwallis against
superior French forces, 1780 153
The Year 1780 Uneventful in European seas 157
Capture of a great British Convoy 157
The Armed Neutrality of the Baltic Powers 158
The Accession of Holland to this followed by a Declaration of War
by Great Britain 158
The French Government withdraws all its Ships of War from before
Gibraltar 158
CHAPTER IX
NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES IN 1781. CAPTURE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BY
RODNEY. DE GRASSE ARRIVES IN PLACE OF DE GUICHEN. TOBAGO SURRENDERS TO
DE GRASSE
Effects of the Great Hurricanes of 1780 in West Indies 159
Rodney's Diminished Force. Arrival of Sir Samuel Hood with
reinforcements 160
Rodney receives Orders to seize Dutch Possessions in Caribbean
160
Capture of St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba 161
The large Booty and Defenceless state of St. Eustatius 161
Effect of these Conditions upon Rodney 161
Hood detached to cruise before Martinique 162
De Grasse arrives there with Twenty Ships-of-the-Line 163
Indecisive Action between de Grasse and Hood 164
Criticism of the two Commanders 166
Junction of Rodney and Hood 166
De Grasse attempts Santa Lucia, and Fails 167
He captures Tobago 168
He decides to take his Meet to the American Continent 168
CHAPTER X
NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN.
CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS
1781
Summary of Land Operations in Virginia early in 1781 169
Portsmouth Occupied 170
A French Squadron from Newport, and a British from Gardiner's Bay,
proceed to the Scene 170
They meet off the Chesapeake 171
Action between Arbuthnot and des Touches, March 16, 1781 171
The Advantage rests with the French, but they return to Newport.
Arbuthnot enters the Chesapeake 174
Cornwallis reaches Petersburg, Virginia, May 20 175
Under the directions of Sir Henry Clinton he evacuates Portsmouth
and concentrates his forces at Yorktown, August 22
175
The French Fleet under de Grasse Anchors in the Chesapeake, August
30 176
British Naval Movements, in July and August, affecting conditions
in the Chesapeake 176
Admiral Graves, successor to Arbuthnot at New York, joined there
by Sir Samuel Hood, August 28 177
Washington and Rochambeau move upon Cornwallis 178
The British Fleet under Graves arrives off the Chesapeake 179
Action between de Grasse and Graves, September 5 179
Hood's Criticism of Graves's Conduct 181
The British, worsted, return to New York. De Grasse, reinforced,
re-enters the Chesapeake, September 11 184
Cornwallis Surrenders, October 19 184
De Grasse and Hood Return to West Indies 185
CHAPTER XI
NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THE
BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK
Leading Objects of the Belligerents in 1781 186
The Relief of Gibraltar by Admiral Darby 186
Capture of British Convoy with the spoils of St. Eustatius 188
The French and Spanish Fleet under Admiral de Cordova again enters
the English Channel 188
Darby in inferior Force shut up in Tor Bay 188
The Allies Decide not to attack him, but to turn their Efforts
against British Commerce 189
Minorca Lost by British 189
The Battle of the Dogger Bank, between British and Dutch Fleets
190
CHAPTER XII
THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRASSE.
RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782
Capture and Destruction near Ushant of a great French Convoy for
the West Indies opens the Naval Campaign of 1782 195
Attack upon the Island of St. Kitts by de Grasse and de Bouillé
197
Hood sails for its Relief from Barbados 197
His Plan of procedure 198
Balked by an Accident 199
He Succeeds in dislodging de Grasse and taking the Anchorage left
by the French 200
Unsuccessful Attempt by de Grasse to shake Hood's position 203
St. Kitts nevertheless compelled to Surrender owing to having
insufficient Land Force 205
Hood Extricates himself from de Grasse's Superior Force and
Retires 205
Rodney arrives from England and joins Hood 205
Project of French and Spaniards against Jamaica 206
De Grasse sails from Martinique with his whole Fleet and a large
Convoy 207
Rodney's Pursuit 208
Partial Actions of April 9, 1782 209
British Pursuit continues 211
It is favored by the Lagging of two Ships in the French Fleet,
April 11 211
An Accident that night induces de Grasse to bear down, and enables
Rodney to force Action 212
The Battle of April 12 begins 214
A Shift of Wind enables the British to Break the French Order in
three places 217
Consequences of this Movement 218
Resultant Advantages to the British 219
Practices of the opposing Navies in regard to the Aims of Firing
219
Consequences Illustrated in the Injuries received respectively
220
Inadequate Use made by Rodney of the Advantage gained by his Fleet
220
Hood's Criticisms 220
Hood's Opinion shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's
Chief-of-Staff 222
Rodney's own Reasons for his Course after the Battle 222
His Assumptions not accordant with the Facts 223
Actual Prolonged Dispersion of the French Fleet 224
Hood, Detached in Pursuit, Captures a small French Squadron 224
Rodney Superseded in Command before the news of the victory
reached England 225
The general War Approaches its End 226
CHAPTER XIII
HOWE AGAIN GOES AFLOAT. THE FINAL RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR
1782
Howe appointed to Command Channel Fleet 227
Cruises first in North Sea and in Channel 228
The Allied Fleets in much superior force take Position in the
Chops of the Channel, but are successfully evaded by Howe
229
The British Jamaica Convoy also escapes them 229
Howe ordered to Relieve Gibraltar 229
Loss of the _Royal George_, with Kempenfelt 229
Howe Sails 229
Slow but Successful Progress 230
Great Allied Fleet in Bay of Gibraltar 230
Howe's Success in Introducing the Supplies 231
Negligent Mismanagement of the Allies 231
Partial Engagement when Howe leaves Gibraltar 232
Estimate of Howe's Conduct, and of his Professional Character
232
French Eulogies 232
CHAPTER XIV
THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THE
BAILLI DE SUFFREN
Isolation characteristic of Military and Naval Operations in India
234
Occurrences in 1778 234
Sir Edward Hughes sent to India with a Fleet, 1779 235
The Years prior to 1781 Uneventful 235
A British Squadron under Commodore Johnstone sent in 1781 to seize
Cape of Good Hope 236
A Week Later, a French Squadron under Suffren sails for India
236
Suffren finds Johnstone Anchored in Porto Praya, and attacks at
once 237
The immediate Result Indecisive, but the Cape of Good Hope is
saved by Suffren arriving first 238
Suffren reaches Mauritius, and the French Squadron sails for India
under Comte d'Orves 239
D'Orves dies, leaving Suffren in Command 240
Trincomalee, in Ceylon, captured by Hughes 240
First Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782
240
Second Engagement, April 12 242
Third Engagement, July 6 244
Suffren captures Trincomalee 247
Hughes arrives, but too late to save the place 247
Fourth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, September 3 248
Having lost Trincomalee, Hughes on the change of monsoon is
compelled to go to Bombay 251
Reinforced there by Bickerton 251
Suffren winters in Sumatra, but regains Trincomalee before Hughes
returns. Also receives Reinforcements 251
The British Besiege Cuddalore 252
Suffren Relieves the Place 253
Fifth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, June 20, 1783 253
Comparison between Hughes and Suffren 254
News of the Peace being received, June 29, Hostilities in India
cease 255
GLOSSARY OF NAUTICAL AND NAVAL TERMS USED IN THIS BOOK 257
INDEX 267
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Remains of the _Revenge_, one of Benedict Arnold's Schooners on
Lake Champlain in 1776. Now in Fort Ticonderoga. _Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
Major-General Philip Schuyler 12
Edward Pellew, afterwards Admiral, Lord Exmouth 12
Benedict Arnold 27
Attack on Fort Moultrie in 1776 33
Richard, Earl Howe 78
Charles Henri, Comte d'Estaing 78
Admiral, the Honourable Samuel Barrington 104
Comte de Guichen 144
George Brydges, Lord Rodney 144
François-Joseph-Paul, Comte de Grasse, Marquis de Tilly 204
Admiral, Lord Hood 204
Sir Edward Hughes, K.B. 254
Pierre André de Suffren de Saint Tropez 254
LIST OF MAPS
FACING PAGE
Lake Champlain and Connected Waters 8
New York and New Jersey: to illustrate Operations of 1776,
1777, and 1778 40
Narragansett Bay 70
Leeward Islands (West Indies) Station 99
Island of Santa Lucia 101
Island of Martinique 164
Peninsula of India, and Ceylon 234
North Atlantic Ocean. General Map to illustrate Operations in
the War of American Independence 280
LIST OF BATTLE-PLANS
FACING PAGE
D'Orvilliers and Keppel, off Ushant, July 27, 1778
Figure 1 86
Figures 2 and 3 90
D'Estaing and Byron, July 6, 1779 106
Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780, Figures 1 and 2 132
Rodney and De Guichen, May 15, 1780 143
Cornwallis and De Ternay, June 20, 1780 156
Arbuthnot and Des Touches, March 16, 1781 172
Graves and De Grasse, September 5, 1781 180
Hood and De Grasse, January 25, 1782, Figures 1 and 2 201
Hood and De Grasse, January 26, 1782, Figure 3 203
Rodney and De Grasse, April 9 and 12, 1782
Figures 1 and 2 210
Figure 3 212
Figures 4 and 5 215
Figure 6 218
Johnstone and Suffren, Porto Praya, April 16, 1781 237
Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782 240
Hughes and Suffren, April 12, 1782 243
Hughes and Suffren, July 6, 1782 243
Hughes and Suffren, September 3, 1782 249
* * * * *
THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD
Macaulay, in a striking passage of his Essay on Frederick the Great,
wrote, "The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in lands
where the name of Prussia was unknown. In order that he might rob
a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the
coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes
of North America."
Wars, like conflagrations, tend to spread; more than ever perhaps
in these days of close international entanglements and rapid
communications. Hence the anxiety aroused and the care exercised by
the governments of Europe, the most closely associated and the
most sensitive on the earth, to forestall the kindling of even the
slightest flame in regions where all alike are interested, though with
diverse objects; regions such as the Balkan group of States in their
exasperating relations with the Turkish empire, under which the Balkan
peoples see constantly the bitter oppression of men of their own blood
and religious faith by the tyranny of a government which can neither
assimilate nor protect. The condition of Turkish European provinces
is a perpetual lesson to those disposed to ignore or to depreciate
the immense difficulties of administering politically, under one
government, peoples traditionally and racially distinct, yet living
side by side; not that the situation is much better anywhere in the
Turkish empire. This still survives, though in an advanced state of
decay, simply because other States are not prepared to encounter the
risks of a disturbance which might end in a general bonfire, extending
its ravages to districts very far remote from the scene of the
original trouble.
Since these words were written, actual war has broken out in the
Balkans. The Powers, anxious each as to the effect upon its own
ambitions of any disturbance in European Turkey, have steadily
abstained from efficient interference in behalf of the downtrodden
Christians of Macedonia, surrounded by sympathetic kinsfolk.
Consequently, in thirty years past this underbrush has grown drier
and drier, fit kindling for fuel. In the Treaty of Berlin, in 1877,
stipulation was made for their betterment in governance, and we
are now told that in 1880 Turkey framed a scheme for such,--and
pigeonholed it. At last, under unendurable conditions, spontaneous
combustion has followed. There can be no assured peace until it is
recognised practically that Christianity, by the respect which it
alone among religions inculcates for the welfare of the individual,
is an essential factor in developing in nations the faculty of
self-government, apart from which fitness to govern others does not
exist. To keep Christian peoples under the rule of a non-Christian
race, is, therefore, to perpetuate a state hopeless of reconcilement
and pregnant of sure explosion. Explosions always happen
inconveniently. _Obsta principiis_ is the only safe rule; the
application of which is not suppression of overt discontent but relief
of grievances.
The War of American Independence was no exception to the general rule
of propagation that has been noted. When our forefathers began to
agitate against the Stamp Act and the other measures that succeeded
it, they as little foresaw the spread of their action to the East and
West Indies, to the English Channel and Gibraltar, as did the British
ministry which in framing the Stamp Act struck the match from which
these consequences followed. When Benedict Arnold on Lake Champlain by
vigorous use of small means obtained a year's delay for the colonists,
he compassed the surrender of Burgoyne in 1777. The surrender of
Burgoyne, justly estimated as the decisive event of the war, was due
to Arnold's previous action, gaining the delay which is a first object
for all defence, and which to the unprepared colonists was a vital
necessity. The surrender of Burgoyne determined the intervention of
France, in 1778; the intervention of France the accession of Spain
thereto, in 1779. The war with these two Powers led to the maritime
occurrences, the interferences with neutral trade, that gave rise to
the Armed Neutrality; the concurrence of Holland in which brought war
between that country and Great Britain, in 1780. This extension of
hostilities affected not only the West Indies but the East, through
the possessions of the Dutch in both quarters and at the Cape of
Good Hope. If not the occasion of Suffren being sent to India, the
involvement of Holland in the general war had a powerful effect upon
the brilliant operations which he conducted there; as well as at, and
for, the Cape of Good Hope, then a Dutch possession, on his outward
voyage.
In the separate publication of these pages, my intention and hope are
to bring home incidentally to American readers this vast extent of
the struggle to which our own Declaration of Independence was but the
prelude; with perchance the further needed lesson for the future,
that questions the most remote from our own shores may involve us
in unforeseen difficulties, especially if we permit a train of
communication to be laid by which the outside fire can leap step by
step to the American continents. How great a matter a little fire
kindleth! Our Monroe Doctrine is in final analysis merely the
formulation of national precaution that, as far as in its power
to prevent, there shall not lie scattered about the material which
foreign possessions in these continents might supply for the extension
of combustion originating elsewhere; and the objection to Asiatic
immigration, however debased by less worthy feelings or motives, is
on the part of thinking men simply a recognition of the same danger
arising from the presence of an inassimilable mass of population,
racially and traditionally distinct in characteristics, behind which
would lie the sympathies and energy of a powerful military and naval
Asiatic empire.
Conducive as each of these policies is to national safety and peace
amid international conflagration, neither the one nor the other can be
sustained without the creation and maintenance of a preponderant navy.
In the struggle with which this book deals, Washington at the
time said that the navies had the casting vote. To Arnold on Lake
Champlain, to DeGrasse at Yorktown, fell the privilege of exercising
that prerogative at the two great decisive moments of the War. To the
Navy also, beyond any other single instrumentality, was due eighty
years later the successful suppression of the movement of Secession.
The effect of the blockade of the Southern coasts upon the financial
and military efficiency of the Confederate Government has never
been closely calculated, and probably is incalculable. At these
two principal national epochs control of the water was the most
determinative factor. In the future, upon the Navy will depend the
successful maintenance of the two leading national policies mentioned;
the two most essential to the part this country is to play in the
progress of the world.
For, while numerically great in population, the United States is
not so in proportion to territory; nor, though wealthy, is she so in
proportion to her exposure. That Japan at four thousand miles distance
has a population of over three hundred to the square mile, while our
three great Pacific States average less than twenty, is a portentous
fact. The immense aggregate numbers resident elsewhere in the
United States cannot be transfered thither to meet an emergency, nor
contribute effectively to remedy this insufficiency; neither can a
land force on the defensive protect, if the way of the sea is open.
In such opposition of smaller numbers against larger, nowhere do
organisation and development count as much as in navies. Nowhere so
well as on the sea can a general numerical inferiority be compensated
by specific numerical superiority, resulting from the correspondence
between the force employed and the nature of the ground. It follows
strictly, by logic and by inference, that by no other means can safety
be insured as economically and as efficiently. Indeed, in matters of
national security, economy and efficiency are equivalent terms. The
question of the Pacific is probably the greatest world problem of
the twentieth century, in which no great country is so largely and
directly interested as is the United States. For the reason given it
is essentially a naval question, the third in which the United States
finds its well-being staked upon naval adequacy.
CHAPTER I
THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 1775-1776
At the time when hostilities began between Great Britain and her
American Colonies, the fact was realised generally, being evident to
reason and taught by experience, that control of the water, both ocean
and inland, would have a preponderant effect upon the contest. It was
clear to reason, for there was a long seaboard with numerous interior
navigable watercourses, and at the same time scanty and indifferent
communications by land. Critical portions of the territory involved
were yet an unimproved wilderness. Experience, the rude but efficient
schoolmaster of that large portion of mankind which gains knowledge
only by hard knocks, had confirmed through the preceding French wars
the inferences of the thoughtful. Therefore, conscious of the great
superiority of the British Navy, which, however, had not then attained
the unchallenged supremacy of a later day, the American leaders early
sought the alliance of the Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, the
hereditary enemies of Great Britain. There alone could be found the
counterpoise to a power which, if unchecked, must ultimately prevail.
Nearly three years elapsed before the Colonists accomplished this
object, by giving a demonstration of their strength in the enforced
surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. This event has merited
the epithet "decisive," because, and only because, it decided the
intervention of France. It may be affirmed, with little hesitation,
that this victory of the colonists was directly the result of naval
force,--that of the colonists themselves. It was the cause that naval
force from abroad, entering into the contest, transformed it from
a local to a universal war, and assured the independence of the
Colonies. That the Americans were strong enough to impose the
capitulation of Saratoga, was due to the invaluable year of delay
secured to them by their little navy on Lake Champlain, created by the
indomitable energy, and handled with the indomitable courage, of the
traitor, Benedict Arnold. That the war spread from America to Europe,
from the English Channel to the Baltic, from the Bay of Biscay to the
Mediterranean, from the West Indies to the Mississippi, and ultimately
involved the waters of the remote peninsula of Hindustan, is
traceable, through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla which in 1776
anticipated its enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain. The events
which thus culminated merit therefore a clearer understanding, and
a fuller treatment, than their intrinsic importance and petty scale
would justify otherwise.
In 1775, only fifteen years had elapsed since the expulsion of the
French from the North American continent. The concentration of their
power, during its continuance, in the valley of the St. Lawrence, had
given direction to the local conflict, and had impressed upon men's
minds the importance of Lake Champlain, of its tributary Lake
George, and of the Hudson River, as forming a consecutive, though not
continuous, water line of communications from the St. Lawrence to
New York. The strength of Canada against attack by land lay in its
remoteness, in the wilderness to be traversed before it was reached,
and in the strength of the line of the St. Lawrence, with the
fortified posts of Montreal and Quebec on its northern bank. The
wilderness, it is true, interposed its passive resistance to attacks
from Canada as well as to attacks upon it; but when it had been
traversed, there were to the southward no such strong natural
positions confronting the assailant. Attacks from the south fell upon
the front, or at best upon the flank, of the line of the St. Lawrence.
Attacks from Canada took New York and its dependencies in the rear.
[Illustration]
These elements of natural strength, in the military conditions of the
North, were impressed upon the minds of the Americans by the prolonged
resistance of Canada to the greatly superior numbers of the British
Colonists in the previous wars. Regarded, therefore, as a base for
attacks, of a kind with which they were painfully familiar, but to be
undergone now under disadvantages of numbers and power never before
experienced, it was desirable to gain possession of the St. Lawrence
and its posts before they were strengthened and garrisoned. At this
outset of hostilities, the American insurgents, knowing clearly their
own minds, possessed the advantage of the initiative over the British
government, which still hesitated to use against those whom it styled
rebels the preventive measures it would have taken at once against a
recognised enemy.
Under these circumstances, in May, 1775, a body of two hundred and
seventy Americans, led by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, seized
the posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which were inadequately
garrisoned. These are on the upper waters of Lake Champlain, where it
is less than a third of a mile wide; Ticonderoga being on a peninsula
formed by the lake and the inlet from Lake George, Crown Point on
a promontory twelve miles lower down.[1] They were positions of
recognised importance, and had been advanced posts of the British in
previous wars. A schooner being found there, Arnold, who had been a
seaman, embarked in her and hurried to the foot of the lake. The wind
failed him when still thirty miles from St. John's, another fortified
post on the lower narrows, where the lake gradually tapers down to
the Richelieu River, its outlet to the St. Lawrence. Unable to advance
otherwise, Arnold took to his boats with thirty men, pulled through
the night, and at six o'clock on the following morning surprised the
post, in which were only a sergeant and a dozen men. He reaped the
rewards of celerity. The prisoners informed him that a considerable
body of troops was expected from Canada, on its way to Ticonderoga;
and this force in fact reached St. John's on the next day. When it
arrived, Arnold was gone, having carried off a sloop which he found
there and destroyed everything else that could float. By such trifling
means two active officers had secured the temporary control of the
lake itself and of the approaches to it from the south. There being
no roads, the British, debarred from the water line, were unable to
advance. Sir Guy Carleton, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Canada,
strengthened the works at St. John's, and built a schooner; but his
force was inadequate to meet that of the Americans.
The seizure of the two posts, being an act of offensive war, was not
at once pleasing to the American Congress, which still clung to the
hope of reconciliation; but events were marching rapidly, and
ere summer was over the invasion of Canada was ordered. General
Montgomery, appointed to that enterprise, embarked at Crown Point with
two thousand men on September 4th, and soon afterwards appeared before
St. John's, which after prolonged operations capitulated on the 3d of
November. On the 13th Montgomery entered Montreal, and thence pressed
down the St. Lawrence to Pointe aux Trembles, twenty miles above
Quebec. There he joined Arnold, who in the month of October had
crossed the northern wilderness, between the head waters of the
Kennebec River and St. Lawrence. On the way he had endured immense
privations, losing five hundred men of the twelve hundred with whom he
started; and upon arriving opposite Quebec, on the 10th of November,
three days had been unavoidably spent in collecting boats to pass the
river. Crossing on the night of the 13th, this adventurous soldier
and his little command climbed the Heights of Abraham by the same
path that had served Wolfe so well sixteen years before. With
characteristic audacity he summoned the place. The demand of course
was refused; but that Carleton did not fall at once upon the little
band of seven hundred that bearded him shows by how feeble a tenure
Great Britain then held Canada. Immediately after the junction
Montgomery advanced on Quebec, where he appeared on the 5th of
December. Winter having already begun, and neither his numbers nor
his equipments being adequate to regular siege operations, he very
properly decided to try the desperate chance of an assault upon the
strongest fortress in America. This was made on the night of December
31st, 1775. Whatever possibility of success there may have been
vanished with the death of Montgomery, who fell at the head of his
men.
The American army retired three miles up the river, went into
winter-quarters, and established a land blockade of Quebec, which was
cut off from the sea by the ice. "For five months," wrote Carleton to
the Secretary for War, on the 14th of May, 1776, "this town has been
closely invested by the rebels." From this unpleasant position it was
relieved on the 6th of May, when signals were exchanged between it and
the _Surprise_, the advance ship of a squadron under Captain Charles
Douglas,[2] which had sailed from England on the 11th of March.
Arriving off the mouth of the St. Lawrence, on the morning of April
12th, Douglas found ice extending nearly twenty miles to sea, and
packed too closely to admit of working through it by dexterous
steering. The urgency of the case not admitting delay, he ran his
ship, the _Isis_, 50, with a speed of five knots, against a large
piece of ice about ten or twelve feet thick, to test the effect. The
ice, probably softened by salt water and salt air, went to pieces.
"Encouraged by this experiment," continues Douglas, somewhat
magnificently, "we thought it an enterprise worthy an English ship of
the line in our King and country's sacred cause, and an effort due to
the gallant defenders of Quebec, to make the attempt of pressing her
by force of sail, through the thick, broad, and closely connected
fields of ice, to which we saw no bounds towards the western part of
our horizon. Before night (when blowing a snow-storm, we brought-to,
or rather stopped), we had penetrated about eight leagues into it,
describing our path all the way with bits of the sheathing of the
ship's bottom, and sometimes pieces of the cutwater, but none of the
oak plank; and it was pleasant enough at times, when we stuck fast,
to see Lord Petersham exercising his troops on the crusted surface
of that fluid through which the ship had so recently sailed." It took
nine days of this work to reach Anticosti Island, after which the ice
seems to have given no more trouble; but further delay was occasioned
by fogs, calms, and head winds.
Upon the arrival of the ships of war, the Americans at once retreated.
During the winter, though reinforcements must have been received from
time to time, they had wasted from exposure, and from small-pox,
which ravaged the camp. On the 1st of May the returns showed nineteen
hundred men present, of whom only a thousand were fit for duty. There
were then on hand but three days' provisions, and none other nearer
than St. John's. The inhabitants would of course render no further
assistance to the Americans after the ships arrived. The Navy had
again decided the fate of Canada, and was soon also to determine that
of Lake Champlain.
[Illustration]
When two hundred troops had landed from the ships, Carleton marched
out, "to see," he said, "what these mighty boasters were about." The
sneer was unworthy a man of his generous character, for the boasters
had endured much for faint chances of success; and the smallness of
the reinforcement which encouraged him to act shows either an extreme
prudence on his part, or the narrow margin by which Quebec escaped.
He found the enemy busy with preparations for retreat, and upon his
appearance they abandoned their camp. Their forces on the two sides of
the river being now separated by the enemy's shipping, the Americans
retired first to Sorel, where the Richelieu enters the St. Lawrence,
and thence continued to fall back by gradual stages. It was not until
June 15th that Arnold quitted Montreal; and at the end of June the
united force was still on the Canadian side of the present border
line. On the 3d of July it reached Crown Point, in a pitiable state
from small-pox and destitution.
Both parties began at once to prepare for a contest upon Lake
Champlain. The Americans, small as their flotilla was, still kept the
superiority obtained for them by Arnold's promptitude a year before.
On the 25th of June the American General Schuyler, commanding the
Northern Department, wrote: "We have happily such a naval superiority
on Lake Champlain, that I have a confident hope the enemy will not
appear upon it this campaign, especially as our force is increasing
by the addition of gondolas, two nearly finished. Arnold,
however,"--whose technical knowledge caused him to be intrusted with
the naval preparations,--"says that 300 carpenters should be employed
and a large number of gondolas, row-galleys, etc., be built, twenty or
thirty at least. There is great difficulty in getting the carpenters
needed." Arnold's ideas were indeed on a scale worthy of the momentous
issues at stake. "To augment our navy on the lake appears to me of the
utmost importance. There is water between Crown Point and Pointe au
Fer for vessels of the largest size. I am of opinion that row-galleys
are the best construction and cheapest for this lake. Perhaps it may
be well to have one frigate of 36 guns. She may carry 18-pounders on
the Lake, and be superior to any vessel that can be built or floated
from St. John's."
Unfortunately for the Americans, their resources in men and means were
far inferior to those of their opponents, who were able eventually
to carry out, though on a somewhat smaller scale, Arnold's idea of a
sailing ship, strictly so called, of force as yet unknown in inland
waters. Such a ship, aided as she was by two consorts of somewhat
similar character, dominated the Lake as soon as she was afloat,
reversing all the conditions. To place and equip her, however,
required time, invaluable time, during which Arnold's two schooners
exercised control. Baron Riedesel, the commander of the German
contingent with Carleton, after examining the American position at
Ticonderoga, wrote, "If we could have begun our expedition four weeks
earlier, I am satisfied that everything would have been ended this
year (1776); but, not having shelter nor other necessary things, we
were unable to remain at the other [southern] end of Champlain." So
delay favors the defence, and changes issues. What would have been the
effect upon the American cause if, simultaneously with the loss of
New York, August 20th-September 15th, had come news of the fall of
Ticonderoga, the repute of which for strength stood high? Nor was
this all; for in that event, the plan which was wrecked in 1777 by
Sir William Howe's ill-conceived expedition to the Chesapeake would
doubtless have been carried out in 1776. In a contemporary English
paper occurs the following significant item: "London, September 26th,
1776. Advices have been received here from Canada, dated August 12th,
that General Burgoyne's army has found it impracticable to get across
the lakes this season. The naval force of the Provincials is too great
for them to contend with at present. They must build larger vessels
for this purpose, and these cannot be ready before next summer. The
design _was_[3] that the two armies commanded by Generals Howe and
Burgoyne should coöperate; that they should both be on the Hudson
River at the same time; that they should join about Albany, and
thereby cut off all communication between the northern and southern
Colonies."[4]
As Arnold's more ambitious scheme could not be realised, he had to
content himself with gondolas and galleys, for the force he was to
command as well as to build. The precise difference between the two
kinds of rowing vessels thus distinguished by name, the writer has
not been able to ascertain. The gondola was a flat-bottomed boat,
and inferior in nautical qualities--speed, handiness, and
seaworthiness--to the galleys, which probably were keeled. The latter
certainly carried sails, and may have been capable of beating to
windward. Arnold preferred them, and stopped the building of gondolas.
"The galleys," he wrote, "are quick moving, which will give us a
great advantage in the open lake." The complements of the galleys were
eighty men, of the gondolas forty-five; from which, and from their
batteries, it may be inferred that the latter were between one third
and one half the size of the former. The armaments of the two were
alike in character, but those of the gondolas much lighter. American
accounts agree with Captain Douglas's report of one galley captured
by the British. In the bows, an 18 and a 12-pounder; in the stern, two
9's; in broadside, from four to six 6's. There is in this a somewhat
droll reminder of the disputed merits of bow, stern, and broadside
fire, in a modern iron-clad; and the practical conclusion is much the
same. The gondolas had one 12-pounder and two 6's. All the vessels of
both parties carried a number of swivel guns.
Amid the many difficulties which lack of resources imposed upon all
American undertakings, Arnold succeeded in getting afloat with three
schooners, a sloop, and five gondolas, on the 20th of August. He
cruised at the upper end of Champlain till the 1st of September, when
he moved rapidly north, and on the 3d anchored in the lower narrows,
twenty-five miles above St. John's, stretching his line from shore
to shore. Scouts had kept him informed of the progress of the British
naval preparations, so that he knew that there was no immediate
danger; while an advanced position, maintained with a bold front,
would certainly prevent reconnoissances by water, and possibly might
impose somewhat upon the enemy. The latter, however, erected batteries
on each side of the anchorage, compelling Arnold to fall back to the
broader lake. He then had soundings taken about Valcour Island, and
between it and the western shore; that being the position in which he
intended to make a stand. He retired thither on the 23rd of September.
The British on their side had contended with no less obstacles than
their adversaries, though of a somewhat different character. To get
carpenters and materials to build, and seamen to man, were the
chief difficulties of the Americans, the necessities of the seaboard
conceding but partially the demands made upon it; but their vessels
were built upon the shores of the Lake, and launched into navigable
waters. A large fleet of transports and ships of war in the St.
Lawrence supplied the British with adequate resources, which were
utilized judiciously and energetically by Captain Douglas; but to get
these to the Lake was a long and arduous task. A great part of the
Richelieu River was shoal, and obstructed by rapids. The point
where lake navigation began was at St. John's, to which the nearest
approach, by a hundred-ton schooner, from the St. Lawrence, was
Chambly, ten miles below. Flat-boats and long-boats could be dragged
up stream, but vessels of any size had to be transported by land; and
the engineers found the roadbed too soft in places to bear the weight
of a hundred tons. Under Douglas's directions, the planking and frames
of two schooners were taken down at Chambly, and carried round by road
to St. John's, where they were again put together. At Quebec he found
building a new hull, of one hundred and eighty tons. This he took
apart nearly to the keel, shipping the frames in thirty long-boats,
which the transport captains consented to surrender, together with
their carpenters, for service on the Lake. Drafts from the ships of
war, and volunteers from the transports, furnished a body of seven
hundred seamen for the same employment,--a force to which the
Americans could oppose nothing equal, commanded as it was by regular
naval officers. The largest vessel was ship-rigged, and had a battery
of eighteen 12-pounders; she was called the _Inflexible_, and was
commanded by Lieutenant John Schanck. The two schooners, _Maria_,
Lieutenant Starke, and _Carleton_, Lieutenant James Richard Dacres,
carried respectively fourteen and twelve 6-pounders. These were
the backbone of the British flotilla. There were also a radeau, the
_Thunderer_, and a large gondola, the _Loyal Convert_, both heavily
armed; but, being equally heavy of movement, they do not appear to
have played any important part. Besides these, when the expedition
started, there were twenty gunboats, each carrying one fieldpiece,
from 24's to 9-pounders; or, in some cases, howitzers.[5]
"By all these means," wrote Douglas on July 21st, "our acquiring
an absolute dominion over Lake Champlain is not doubted of."
The expectation was perfectly sound. With a working breeze, the
_Inflexible_ alone could sweep the Lake clear of all that floated on
it. But the element of time remained. From the day of this writing
till that on which he saw the _Inflexible_ leave St. John's, October
4th, was over ten weeks; and it was not until the 9th that Carleton
was ready to advance with the squadron. By that time the American
troops at the head of the Lake had increased to eight or ten thousand.
The British land force is reported[6] as thirteen thousand, of which
six thousand were in garrison at St. John's and elsewhere.
Arnold's last reinforcements reached him at Valcour on the 6th of
October. On that day, and in the action of the 11th, he had with him
all the American vessels on the Lake, except one schooner and one
galley. His force, thus, was two schooners and a sloop, broadside
vessels, besides four galleys and eight gondolas, which may be assumed
reasonably to have depended on their bow guns; there, at least, was
their heaviest fire. Thus reckoned, his flotilla, disposed to the best
advantage, could bring into action at one time, two 18's, thirteen
12's, one 9, two 6's, twelve 4's, and two 2-pounders, independent of
swivels; total thirty-two guns, out of eighty-four that were mounted
in fifteen vessels. To this the British had to oppose, in three
broadside vessels, nine 12's and thirteen 6's, and in twenty gunboats,
twenty other brass guns, "from twenty-four to nines, some with
howitzers;"[7] total forty-two guns. In this statement the radeau and
gondola have not been included, because of their unmanageableness.
Included as broadside vessels, they would raise the British
armament--by three 24's, three 12's, four 9's, and a howitzer--to a
total of fifty-three guns. Actually, they could be brought into action
only under exceptional circumstances, and are more properly omitted.
These minutiæ are necessary for the proper appreciation of what
Captain Douglas justly called "a momentous event." It was a strife of
pigmies for the prize of a continent, and the leaders are entitled
to full credit both for their antecedent energy and for their
dispositions in the contest; not least the unhappy man who, having
done so much to save his country, afterwards blasted his name by a
treason unsurpassed in modern war. Energy and audacity had so far
preserved the Lake to the Americans; Arnold determined to have one
more try of the chances. He did not know the full force of the enemy,
but he expected that "it would be very formidable, if not equal to
ours."[8] The season, however, was so near its end that a severe check
would equal a defeat, and would postpone Carleton's further advance
to the next spring. Besides, what was the worth of such a force as
the American, such a flotilla, under the guns of Ticonderoga, the Lake
being lost? It was eminently a case for taking chances, even if the
detachment should be sacrificed, as it was.
Arnold's original purpose had been to fight under way; and it was
from this point of view that he valued the galleys, because of their
mobility. It is uncertain when he first learned of the rig and battery
of the _Inflexible_; but a good look-out was kept, and the British
squadron was sighted from Valcour when it quitted the narrows. It
may have been seen even earlier; for Carleton had been informed,
erroneously, that the Americans were near Grand Island, which led him
to incline to that side, and so open out Valcour sooner. The British
anchored for the night of October 10th, between Grand and Long[9]
Islands. Getting under way next morning, they stood up the Lake with
a strong north-east wind, keeping along Grand Island, upon which their
attention doubtless was fastened by the intelligence which they had
received; but it was a singular negligence thus to run to leeward with
a fair wind, without thorough scouting on both hands. The consequence
was that the American flotilla was not discovered until Valcour
Island, which is from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty
feet high throughout its two miles of length, was so far passed that
the attack had to be made from the south,--from leeward.
When the British were first made out, Arnold's second in command,
Waterbury, urged that in view of the enemy's superiority the flotilla
should get under way at once, and fight them "on a retreat in the main
lake;" the harbour being disadvantageous "to fight a number so much
superior, and the enemy being able to surround us on every side, we
lying between an island and the main." Waterbury's advice evidently
found its origin in that fruitful source of military errors of design,
which reckons the preservation of a force first of objects, making the
results of its action secondary. With sounder judgment, Arnold decided
to hold on. A retreat before square-rigged sailing vessels having a
fair wind, by a heterogeneous force like his own, of unequal speeds
and batteries, could result only in disaster. Concerted fire and
successful escape were alike improbable; and besides, escape, if
feasible, was but throwing up the game. Better trust to a steady,
well-ordered position, developing the utmost fire. If the enemy
discovered him, and came in by the northern entrance, there was a
five-foot knoll in mid-channel which might fetch the biggest of them
up; if, as proved to be the case, the island should be passed, and the
attack should be made from leeward, it probably would be partial and
in disorder, as also happened. The correctness of Arnold's decision
not to chance a retreat was shown in the retreat of two days later.
Valcour is on the west side of the Lake, about three quarters of a
mile from the main; but a peninsula projecting from the island at
mid-length narrows this interval to a half-mile. From the accounts,
it is clear that the American flotilla lay south of this peninsula.
Arnold therefore had a reasonable hope that it might be passed
undetected. Writing to Gates, the Commander-in-Chief at Ticonderoga,
he said: "There is a good harbour, and if the enemy venture up
the Lake it will be impossible for them to take advantage of
our situation. If we succeed in our attack upon them, it will be
impossible for any to escape. If we are worsted, our retreat is open
and free. In case of wind, which generally blows fresh at this season,
our craft will make good weather, while theirs cannot keep the Lake."
It is apparent from this, written three weeks before the battle, that
he then was not expecting a force materially different from his own.
Later, he describes his position as being "in a small bay on the west
side of the island, as near together as possible, and in such a form
that few vessels can attack us at the same time, and those will be
exposed to the fire of the whole fleet." Though he unfortunately gives
no details, he evidently had sound tactical ideas. The formation
of the anchored vessels is described by the British officers as a
half-moon.
When the British discovered the enemy, they hauled up for them.
Arnold ordered one of his schooners, the _Royal Savage_, and the
four galleys, to get under way; the two other schooners and the eight
gondolas remaining at their anchors. The _Royal Savage_, dropping
to leeward,--by bad management, Arnold says,--came, apparently
unsupported, under the distant fire of the _Inflexible_, as she drew
under the lee of Valcour at 11 A.M., followed by the _Carleton_, and
at greater distance by the _Maria_ and the gunboats. Three shots
from the ship's 12-pounders struck the _Royal Savage_, which then ran
ashore on the southern point of the island. The _Inflexible_, followed
closely by the _Carleton_, continued on, but fired only occasionally;
showing that Arnold was keeping his galleys in hand, at long
bowls,--as small vessels with one eighteen should be kept, when
confronted with a broadside of nine guns. Between the island and the
main the north-east wind doubtless drew more northerly, adverse to the
ship's approach; but, a flaw off the cliffs taking the fore and aft
sails of the _Carleton_, she fetched "nearly into the middle of the
rebel half-moon, where Lieutenant J.R. Dacres intrepidly anchored
with a spring on her cable." The _Maria_, on board which was Carleton,
together with Commander Thomas Pringle, commanding the flotilla, was
to leeward when the chase began, and could not get into close action
that day. By this time, seventeen of the twenty gunboats had come
up, and, after silencing the _Royal Savage_, pulled up to within
point-blank range of the American flotilla. "The cannonade was
tremendous," wrote Baron Riedesel. Lieutenant Edward Longcroft, of the
radeau _Thunderer_, not being able to get his raft into action, went
with a boat's crew on board the _Royal Savage_, and for a time turned
her guns upon her former friends; but the fire of the latter forced
him again to abandon her, and it seemed so likely that she might be
re-taken that she was set on fire by Lieutenant Starke of the _Maria_,
when already "two rebel boats were very near her. She soon after blew
up." The American guns converging on the _Carleton_ in her central
position, she suffered severely. Her commander, Lieutenant Dacres,
was knocked senseless; another officer lost an arm; only Mr. Edward
Pellew, afterwards Lord Exmouth, remained fit for duty. The spring
being shot away, she swung bows on to the enemy, and her fire was thus
silenced. Captain Pringle signalled to her to withdraw; but she was
unable to obey. To pay her head off the right way, Pellew himself had
to get out on the bowsprit under a heavy fire of musketry, to bear the
jib over to windward; but to make sail seems to have been impossible.
Two artillery boats were sent to her assistance, "which towed her off
through a very thick fire, until out of farther reach, much to the
honour of Mr. John Curling and Mr. Patrick Carnegy, master's mate
and midshipman of the _Isis_, who conducted them; and of Mr. Edward
Pellew, mate of the _Blonde_, who threw the tow-rope from the
_Carleton's_ bowsprit."[10] This service on board the _Carleton_
started Pellew on his road to fortune; but, singularly enough, the
lieutenancy promised him in consequence, by both the First Lord
and Lord Howe, was delayed by the fact that he stayed at the front,
instead of going to the rear, where he would have been "within their
jurisdiction."[11] The _Carleton_ had two feet of water in the hold,
and had lost eight killed and six wounded,--about half her crew,--when
she anchored out of fire. In this small but stirring business, the
Americans, in addition to the _Royal Savage_, had lost one gondola.
Besides the injuries to the _Carleton_, a British artillery boat,
commanded by a German lieutenant, was sunk. Towards evening the
_Inflexible_ got within point-blank shot of the Americans, "when five
broadsides," wrote Douglas, "silenced their whole line." One fresh
ship, with scantling for sea-going, and a concentrated battery, has an
unquestioned advantage over a dozen light-built craft, carrying one or
two guns each, and already several hours engaged.
At nightfall the _Inflexible_ dropped out of range, and the British
squadron anchored in line of battle across the southern end of the
passage between the island and the main; some vessels were extended
also to the eastward, into the open Lake. "The best part of my
intelligence," wrote Burgoyne next day from St. John's, to Douglas at
Quebec, "is that our whole fleet was formed in line above the enemy,
and consequently they must have surrendered this morning, or given us
battle on our own terms. The Indians and light troops are abreast
with the fleet; they cannot, therefore, escape by land." The British
squadron sharing this confidence, a proper look-out was not kept. The
American leader immediately held a conference with his officers, and
decided to attempt a retreat, "which was done with such secrecy,"
writes Waterbury, "that we went through them entirely undiscovered."
The movement began at 7 P.M., a galley leading, the gondolas and
schooners following, and Arnold and his second bringing up the rear
in the two heaviest galleys. This delicate operation was favoured by
a heavy fog, which did not clear till next morning at eight. As the
Americans stole by, they could not see any of the hostile ships. By
daylight they were out of sight of the British. Riedesel, speaking of
this event, says, "The ships anchored, secure of the enemy, who stole
off during the night, and sailing round the left wing, aided by
a favourable wind, escaped under darkness." The astonishment next
morning, he continues, was great, as was Carleton's rage. The latter
started to pursue in such a hurry that he forgot to leave orders
for the troops which had been landed; but, failing to discover the
fugitives, he returned and remained at Valcour till nightfall, when
scouts brought word that the enemy were at Schuyler's Island, eight
miles above.
The retreat of the Americans had been embarrassed by their injuries,
and by the wind coming out ahead. They were obliged to anchor on the
12th to repair damages, both hulls and sails having suffered severely.
Arnold took the precaution to write to Crown Point for bateaux, to tow
in case of a southerly wind; but time did not allow these to arrive.
Two gondolas had to be sunk on account of their injuries, making three
of that class so far lost. The retreat was resumed at 2 P.M., but the
breeze was fresh from the southward, and the gondolas made very
little way. At evening the British chased again. That night the wind
moderated, and at daybreak the American flotilla was twenty-eight
miles from Crown Point,--fourteen from Valcour,--having still five
miles' start. Later, however, by Arnold's report, "the wind again
breezed up to the southward, so that we gained very little either by
beating or rowing. At the same time the enemy took a fresh breeze from
northeast, and, by the time we had reached Split Rock, were alongside
of us." The galleys of Arnold and Waterbury, the _Congress_ and the
_Washington_, had throughout kept in the rear, and now received the
brunt of the attack, made by the _Inflexible_ and the two schooners,
which had entirely distanced their sluggish consorts. This fight was
in the upper narrows, where the Lake is from one to three miles wide;
and it lasted, by Arnold's report, for five glasses (two hours and a
half),[12] the Americans continually retreating, until about ten miles
from Crown Point. There, the _Washington_ having struck some time
before, and final escape being impossible, Arnold ran the _Congress_
and four gondolas ashore in a small creek on the east side; pulling to
windward, with the cool judgment that had marked all his conduct, so
that the enemy could not follow him--except in small boats with which
he could deal. There he set his vessels on fire, and stood by them
until assured that they would blow up with their flags flying. He then
retreated to Crown Point through the woods, "despite the savages;"
a phrase which concludes this singular aquatic contest with a quaint
touch of local colour.
In three days of fighting and retreating the Americans had lost one
schooner, two galleys, and seven gondolas,--in all, ten vessels out of
fifteen. The killed and wounded amounted to over eighty, twenty odd
of whom were in Arnold's galley. The original force, numbering seven
hundred, had been decimated. Considering its raw material and the
recency of its organisation, words can scarcely exaggerate the
heroism of the resistance, which undoubtedly depended chiefly upon the
personal military qualities of the leader. The British loss in killed
and wounded did not exceed forty.
The little American navy on Champlain was wiped out; but never had any
force, big or small, lived to better purpose or died more gloriously,
for it had saved the Lake for that year. Whatever deductions may be
made for blunders, and for circumstances of every character which made
the British campaign of 1777 abortive and disastrous, thus leading
directly to the American alliance with France in 1778, the delay, with
all that it involved, was obtained by the Lake campaign of 1776. On
October 15th, two days after Arnold's final defeat, Carleton dated
a letter to Douglas from before Crown Point, whence the American
garrison was withdrawn. A week later Riedesel arrived, and wrote that,
"were our whole army here it would be an easy matter to drive the
enemy from their entrenchments," at Ticonderoga, and--as has been
quoted already--four weeks sooner would have insured its fall. It is
but a coincidence that just four weeks had been required to set up the
_Inflexible_ at St. John's; but it typifies the whole story. Save for
Arnold's flotilla, the two British schooners would have settled the
business. "Upon the whole, Sir," wrote Douglas in his final letter
from Quebec before sailing for England, "I scruple not to say, that
had not General Carleton authorized me to take the extraordinary
measure of sending up the _Inflexible_ from Quebec, things could
not this year have been brought to so glorious a conclusion on Lake
Champlain." Douglas further showed the importance attached to this
success by men of that day, by sending a special message to the
British ambassador at Madrid, "presuming that the early knowledge of
this great event in the southern parts of Europe may be of advantage
to His Majesty's service." That the opinion of the government was
similar may be inferred from the numerous rewards bestowed. Carleton
was made a Knight of the Bath, and Douglas a baronet.
The gallantry shown by both sides upon Lake Champlain in 1776 is
evident from the foregoing narrative. With regard to the direction
of movements,--the skill of the two leaders,--the same equal credit
cannot be assigned. It was a very serious blunder, on October 11th, to
run to leeward, passing a concealed enemy, undetected, upon waters so
perfectly well known as those of Champlain were; it having been the
scene of frequent British operations in previous wars. Owing to
this, "the _Maria_, because of her distant situation (from which the
_Inflexible_ and _Carleton_ had chased by signal) when the rebels
were first discovered, and baffling winds, could not get into close
action."[13] For the same reason the _Inflexible_ could not support
the _Carleton_. The Americans, in the aggregate distinctly inferior,
were thus permitted a concentration of superior force upon part of
their enemies. It is needless to enlarge upon the mortifying
incident of Arnold's escape that evening. To liken small things to
great,--always profitable in military analysis,--it resembled Hood's
slipping away from de Grasse at St. Kitts.[14]
[Illustration]
In conduct and courage, Arnold's behavior was excellent throughout.
Without enlarging upon the energy which created the flotilla, and
the breadth of view which suggested preparations that he could not
enforce, admiration is due to his recognition of the fact--implicit
in deed, if unexpressed in word--that the one use of the Navy was to
contest the control of the water; to impose delay, even if it could
not secure ultimate victory. No words could say more clearly than do
his actions that, under the existing conditions, the navy was useless,
except as it contributed to that end; valueless, if buried in port.
Upon this rests the merit of his bold advance into the lower narrows;
upon this his choice of the strong defensive position of Valcour;
upon this his refusal to retreat, as urged by Waterbury, when the full
force of the enemy was disclosed,--a decision justified, or rather,
illustrated, by the advantages which the accidents of the day threw
into his hands. His personal gallantry was conspicuous there as at
all times of his life. "His countrymen," said a generous enemy of that
day, "chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention which he paid to a
nice point of honour, in keeping his flag flying, and not quitting his
galley till she was in flames, lest the enemy should have boarded, and
struck it." It is not the least of the injuries done to his nation in
after years, that he should have silenced this boast and effaced this
glorious record by so black an infamy.
With the destruction of the flotilla ends the naval story of the Lakes
during the War of the American Revolution. Satisfied that it was too
late to proceed against Ticonderoga that year, Carleton withdrew
to St. John's and went into winter-quarters. The following year the
enterprise was resumed under General Burgoyne; but Sir William Howe,
instead of coöperating by an advance up the Hudson, which was the plan
of 1776, carried his army to Chesapeake Bay, to act thence against
Philadelphia. Burgoyne took Ticonderoga and forced his way as far as
Saratoga, sixty miles from Ticonderoga and thirty from Albany, where
Howe should have met him. There he was brought to a stand by the army
which the Americans had collected, found himself unable to advance or
to retreat, and was forced to lay down his arms on October 17th, 1777.
The garrison left by him at Ticonderoga and Crown Point retired to
Canada, and the posts were re-occupied by the Americans. No further
contest took place on the Lake, though the British vessels remained
in control of it, and showed themselves from time to time up to 1781.
With the outbreak of war between Great Britain and France, in 1778,
the scene of maritime interest shifted to salt water, and there
remained till the end.
[Footnote 1: In customary representation of maps, North is upper,
and movement northward is commonly spoken of as up. It is necessary
therefore to bear in mind that the flow of water from Lake George to
the St. Lawrence, though northward, is _down_.]
[Footnote 2: Afterwards Captain of the Fleet (Chief of Staff) to
Rodney in his great campaign of 1782. _Post_, p. 222. He died a
Rear-Admiral and Baronet in 1789.]
[Footnote 3: Author's italics.]
[Footnote 4: _Remembrancer_, iv. 291.]
[Footnote 5: The radeau had six 24-pounders, six 12's, and two
howitzers; the gondola, seven 9-pounders. The particulars of armament
are from Douglas's letters.]
[Footnote 6: By American reports. Beatson gives the force sent out, in
the spring of 1776, as 13,357. ("Mil. and Nav. Memoirs," vi. 44.)]
[Footnote 7: Douglas's letters.]
[Footnote 8: Douglas thought that the appearance of the _Inflexible_
was a complete surprise; but Arnold had been informed that a third
vessel, larger than the schooners, was being set up. With a man of
his character, it is impossible to be sure, from his letters to his
superior, how much he knew, or what he withheld.]
[Footnote 9: called North Hero.]
[Footnote 10: Douglas's letter. The _Isis_ and the _Blonde_ were
vessels of the British squadron under Douglas, then lying in the St.
Lawrence. The officers named were temporarily on the lake service.]
[Footnote 11: Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, to Pellew.]
[Footnote 12: Beatson, "Nav. and Mil. Memoirs," says two hours.]
[Footnote 13: Douglas's letters. The sentence is awkward, but
carefully compared with the copy in the author's hands. Douglas says,
of the details he gives, that "they have been collected with the most
scrupulous circumspection."]
[Footnote 14: _Post_, p. 205.]
CHAPTER II
NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETT
BAY--ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS UP TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON
1776
The opening conflict between Great Britain and her North American
Colonies teaches clearly the necessity, too rarely recognised in
practice, that when a State has decided to use force, the force
provided should be adequate from the first. This applies with equal
weight to national policies when it is the intention of the nation to
maintain them at all costs. The Monroe Doctrine for instance is such
a policy; but unless constant adequate preparation is maintained also,
the policy itself is but a vain form of words. It is in preparation
beforehand, chiefly if not uniformly, that the United States has
failed. It is better to be much too strong than a little too weak.
Seeing the evident temper of the Massachusetts Colonists, force would
be needed to execute the Boston Port Bill and its companion measures
of 1774; for the Port Bill especially, naval force. The supplies for
1775 granted only 18,000 seamen,--2000 less than for the previous
year. For 1776, 28,000 seamen were voted, and the total appropriations
rose from £5,556,000 to £10,154,000; but it was then too late. Boston
was evacuated by the British army, 8000 strong on the 17th of March,
1776; but already, for more than half a year, the spreading spirit of
revolt in the thirteen Colonies had been encouraged by the sight
of the British army cooped up in the town, suffering from want
of necessaries, while the colonial army blockading it was able to
maintain its position, because ships laden with stores for the one
were captured, and the cargoes diverted to the use of the other. To
secure free and ample communications for one's self, and to interrupt
those of the opponent, are among the first requirements of war. To
carry out the measures of the British government a naval force
was needed, which not only should protect the approach of its own
transports to Boston Bay, but should prevent access to all coast ports
whence supplies could be carried to the blockading army. So far from
this, the squadron was not equal, in either number or quality, to the
work to be done about Boston; and it was not until October, 1775, that
the Admiral was authorized to capture colonial merchant vessels, which
therefore went and came unmolested, outside of Boston, carrying often
provisions which found their way to Washington's army.
After evacuating Boston, General Howe retired to Halifax, there to
await the coming of reinforcements, both military and naval, and of
his brother, Vice-Admiral Lord Howe, appointed to command the North
American Station. General Howe was commander-in-chief of the forces
throughout the territory extending from Nova Scotia to West Florida;
from Halifax to Pensacola. The first operation of the campaign was to
be the reduction of New York.
The British government, however, had several objects in view, and
permitted itself to be distracted from the single-minded prosecution
of one great undertaking to other subsidiary operations, not always
concentric. Whether the control of the line of the Hudson and Lake
Champlain ought to have been sought through operations beginning at
both ends, is open to argument; the facts that the Americans were back
in Crown Point in the beginning of July, 1776, and that Carleton's
13,000 men got no farther than St. John's that year, suggest that the
greater part of the latter force would have been better employed in
New York and New Jersey than about Champlain. However that may be, the
diversion to the Carolinas of a third body, respectable in point
of numbers, is scarcely to be defended on military grounds. The
government was induced to it by the expectation of local support from
royalists. That there were many of these in both Carolinas is
certain; but while military operations must take account of political
conditions, the latter should not be allowed to overbalance elementary
principles of the military art. It is said that General Howe
disapproved of this ex-centric movement.
The force destined for the Southern coasts assembled at Cork towards
the end of 1775, and sailed thence in January, 1776. The troops were
commanded by Lord Cornwallis, the squadron by Nelson's early patron,
Commodore Sir Peter Parker, whose broad pennant was hoisted on board
the _Bristol_, 50. After a boisterous passage, the expedition arrived
in May off Cape Fear in North Carolina, where it was joined by two
thousand men under Sir Henry Clinton, Cornwallis's senior, whom Howe
by the government's orders had detached to the southward in January.
Upon Clinton's appearance, the royalists in North Carolina had risen,
headed by the husband of Flora Macdonald, whose name thirty years
before had been associated romantically with the escape of the young
Pretender from Scotland. She had afterwards emigrated to America. The
rising, however, had been put down, and Clinton had not thought
it expedient to try a serious invasion, in face of the large force
assembled to resist him. Upon Parker's coming, it was decided to make
an attempt upon Charleston, South Carolina. The fleet therefore
sailed from Cape Fear on the 1st of June, and on the 4th anchored off
Charleston Bar.
Charleston Harbour opens between two of the sea-islands which fringe
the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia. On the north is Sullivan's
Island, on the south James Island. The bar of the main entrance was
not abreast the mouth of the port, but some distance south of it.
Inside the bar, the channel turned to the northward, and thence led
near Sullivan's Island, the southern end of which was therefore chosen
as the site of the rude fort hastily thrown up to meet this attack,
and afterwards called Fort Moultrie, from the name of the commander.
From these conditions, a southerly wind was needed to bring ships
into action. After sounding and buoying the bar, the transports
and frigates crossed on the 7th and anchored inside; but as it was
necessary to remove some of the _Bristol's_ guns, she could not follow
until the 10th. On the 9th Clinton had landed in person with five
hundred men, and by the 15th all the troops had disembarked upon Long
Island, next north of Sullivan's. It was understood that the inlet
between the two was fordable, allowing the troops to coöperate with
the naval attack, by diversion or otherwise; but this proved to be a
mistake. The passage was seven feet deep at low water, and there were
no means for crossing; consequently a small American detachment in
the scrub wood of the island sufficed to check any movement in that
quarter. The fighting therefore was confined to the cannonading of the
fort by the ships.
Circumstances not fully explained caused the attack to be fixed
for the 23d; an inopportune delay, during which Americans were
strengthening their still very imperfect defences. On the 23d the wind
was unfavourable. On the 25th the _Experiment_, 50, arrived, crossed
the bar, and, after taking in her guns again, was ready to join in
the assault. On the 27th, at 10 A.M., the ships got under way with a
south-east breeze, but this shifted soon afterwards to north-west, and
they had to anchor again, about a mile nearer to Sullivan's Island. On
the following day the wind served, and the attack was made.
In plan, Fort Moultrie was square, with a bastion at each angle. In
construction, the sides were palmetto logs, dovetailed and bolted
together, laid in parallel rows, sixteen feet apart; the interspace
being filled with sand. At the time of the engagement, the south and
west fronts were finished; the other fronts were only seven feet
high, but surmounted by thick planks, to be tenable against escalade.
Thirty-one guns were in place, 18 and 9-pounders, of which twenty-one
were on the south face, commanding the channel. Within was a traverse
running east and west, protecting the gunners from shots from the
rear; but there was no such cover against enfilading fire, in case
an enemy's ship passed the fort and anchored above it. "The general
opinion before the action," Moultrie says, "and especially among
sailors, was that two frigates would be sufficient to knock the town
about our ears, notwithstanding our batteries." Parker may have shared
this impression, and it may account for his leisureliness. When the
action began, the garrison had but twenty-eight rounds for each of
twenty-six cannon, but this deficiency was unknown to the British.
[Illustration]
Parker's plan was that the two 50's, _Bristol_ and _Experiment_, and
two 28-gun frigates, the _Active_ and the _Solebay_, should engage the
main front; while two frigates of the same class, the _Actæon_ and the
_Syren_, with a 20-gun corvette, the _Sphinx_, should pass the fort,
anchoring to the westward, up-channel, to protect the heavy vessels
against fire-ships, as well as to enfilade the principal American
battery. The main attack was to be further supported by a bomb-vessel,
the _Thunder_, accompanied by the armed transport _Friendship_, which
were to take station to the southeast of the east bastion of the
engaged front of the fort. The order to weigh was given at 10.30
A.M., when the flood-tide had fairly made; and at 11.15 the _Active_,
_Bristol_, _Experiment_, and _Solebay_, anchored in line ahead, in the
order named, the _Active_ to the eastward. These ships seem to have
taken their places skilfully without confusion, and their fire, which
opened at once, was rapid, well-sustained, and well-directed; but
their position suffered under the radical defect that, whether from
actual lack of water, or only from fear of grounding, they were too
far from the works to use grape effectively. The sides of ships being
much weaker than those of shore works, while their guns were much more
numerous, the secret of success was to get near enough to beat down
the hostile fire by a multitude of projectiles. The bomb-vessel
_Thunder_ anchored in the situation assigned her; but her shells,
though well aimed, were ineffective. "Most of them fell within the
fort," Moultrie reported, "but we had a morass in the middle, which
swallowed them instantly, and those that fell in the sand were
immediately buried." During the action the mortar bed broke, disabling
the piece.
Owing to the scarcity of ammunition in the fort, the garrison had
positive orders not to engage at ranges exceeding four hundred yards.
Four or five shots were thrown at the _Active_, while still under
sail, but with this exception the fort kept silence until the ships
anchored, at a distance estimated by the Americans to be three hundred
and fifty yards. The word was then passed along the platform, "Mind
the Commodore; mind the two 50-gun ships,"--an order which was
strictly obeyed, as the losses show. The protection of the work proved
to be almost perfect,--a fact which doubtless contributed to the
coolness and precision of fire vitally essential with such deficient
resources. The texture of the palmetto wood suffered the balls to sink
smoothly into it without splintering, so that the facing of the work
held well. At times, when three or four broadsides struck together,
the merlons shook so that Moultrie feared they would come bodily in;
but they withstood, and the small loss inflicted was chiefly through
the embrasures. The flagstaff being shot away, falling outside into
the ditch, a young sergeant, named Jasper, distinguished himself by
jumping after it, fetching back and rehoisting the colours under a
heavy fire.
In the squadron an equal gallantry was shown under circumstances which
made severe demands upon endurance. Whatever Parker's estimate of
the worth of the defences, no trace of vain-confidence appears in his
dispositions, which were thorough and careful, as the execution of
the main attack was skilful and vigorous; but the ships' companies,
expecting an easy victory, had found themselves confronted with a
resistance and a punishment as severe as were endured by the leading
ships at Trafalgar, and far more prolonged. Such conditions impose
upon men's tenacity the additional test of surprise and discomfiture.
The _Experiment_, though very small for a ship of the line, lost 23
killed and 56 wounded, out of a total probably not much exceeding 300;
while the _Bristol_, having the spring shot away, swung with her head
to the southward and her stern to the fort, undergoing for a long
time a raking fire to which she could make little reply. Three
several attempts to replace the spring were made by Mr. James
Saumarez,--afterwards the distinguished admiral, Lord de Saumarez,
then a midshipman,--before the ship was relieved from this grave
disadvantage. Her loss was 40 killed and 71 wounded; not a man
escaping of those stationed on the quarter-deck at the beginning of
the action. Among the injured was the Commodore himself, whose cool
heroism must have been singularly conspicuous, from the notice it
attracted in a service where such bearing was not rare. At one
time when the quarter-deck was cleared and he stood alone upon the
poop-ladder, Saumarez suggested to him to come down; but he replied,
smiling, "You want to get rid of me, do you?" and refused to move.
The captain of the ship, John Morris, was mortally wounded. With
commendable modesty Parker only reported himself as slightly bruised;
but deserters stated that for some days he needed the assistance of
two men to walk, and that his trousers had been torn off him by shot
or splinters. The loss in the other ships was only one killed, 14
wounded. The Americans had 37 killed and wounded.
The three vessels assigned to enfilade the main front of the fort did
not get into position. They ran on the middle ground, owing, Parker
reported, to the ignorance of the pilots. Two had fouled each other
before striking. Having taken the bottom on a rising tide, two floated
in a few hours, and retreated; but the third, the _Actæon_, 28,
sticking fast, was set on fire and abandoned by her officers. Before
she blew up, the Americans boarded her, securing her colours, bell,
and some other trophies. "Had these ships effected their purpose,"
Moultrie reported, "they would have driven us from our guns."
The main division held its ground until long after nightfall, firing
much of the time, but stopping at intervals. After two hours it had
been noted that the fort replied very slowly, which was attributed to
its being overborne, instead of to the real cause, the necessity for
sparing ammunition. For the same reason it was entirely silent from
3.30 P.M. to 6, when fire was resumed from only two or three guns,
whence Parker surmised that the rest had been dismounted. The
Americans were restrained throughout the engagement by the fear of
exhausting entirely their scanty store.
"About 9 P.M.," Parker reported, "being very dark, great part of our
ammunition expended, the people fatigued, the tide of ebb almost
done, no prospect from the eastward (that is, from the army), and no
possibility of our being of any further service, I ordered the ships
to withdraw to their former moorings." Besides the casualties among
the crew, and severe damage to the hull, the _Bristol's_ mainmast,
with nine cannon-balls in it, had to be shortened, while the
mizzen-mast was condemned. The injury to the frigates was immaterial,
owing to the garrison's neglecting them.
The fight in Charleston Harbour, the first serious contest in which
ships took part in this war, resembles generically the battle of
Bunker's Hill, with which the regular land warfare had opened a year
before. Both illustrate the difficulty and danger of a front attack,
without cover, upon a fortified position, and the advantage conferred
even upon untrained men, if naturally cool, resolute, and intelligent,
not only by the protection of a work, but also, it may be urged, by
the recognition of a tangible line up to which to hold, and to abandon
which means defeat, dishonour, and disaster. It is much for untried
men to recognise in their surroundings something which gives the unity
of a common purpose, and thus the coherence which discipline imparts.
Although there was in Parker's dispositions nothing open to serious
criticism,--nothing that can be ascribed to undervaluing his
opponent,--and although, also, he had good reason to expect from the
army active coöperation which he did not get, it is probable that he
was very much surprised, not only at the tenacity of the Americans'
resistance, but at the efficacy of their fire. He felt, doubtless,
the traditional and natural distrust--and, for the most part,
the justified distrust--with which experience and practice regard
inexperience. Some seamen of American birth, who had been serving in
the _Bristol_, deserted after the fight. They reported that her crew
said, "We were told the Yankees would not stand two fires, but we
never saw better fellows;" and when the fire of the fort slackened and
some cried, "They have done fighting," others replied, "By God, we are
glad of it, for we never had such a drubbing in our lives." "All the
common men of the fleet spoke loudly in praise of the garrison,"--a
note of admiration so frequent in generous enemies that we may be
assured that it was echoed on the quarter-deck also. They could afford
it well, for there was no stain upon their own record beyond the
natural mortification of defeat; no flinching under the severity of
their losses, although a number of their men were comparatively raw,
volunteers from the transports, whose crews had come forward almost
as one man when they knew that the complements of the ships were short
through sickness. Edmund Burke, a friend to both sides, was justified
in saying that "never did British valour shine more conspicuously,
nor did our ships in an engagement of the same nature experience
so serious an encounter." There were several death-vacancies for
lieutenants; and, as the battle of Lake Champlain gave Pellew his
first commission, so did that of Charleston Harbour give his to
Saumarez, who was made lieutenant of the _Bristol_ by Parker. Two
years later, when the ship had gone to Jamaica, he was followed on her
quarter-deck by Nelson and Collingwood, who also received promotion in
her from the same hand.
The attack on Fort Moultrie was not resumed. After necessary repairs,
the ships of war with the troops went to New York, where they
arrived on the 4th of August, and took part in the operations for the
reduction of that place under the direction of the two Howes.
* * * * *
The occupation of New York Harbour, and the capture of the city were
the most conspicuous British successes of the summer and fall of 1776.
While Parker and Clinton were meeting with defeat at Charleston, and
Arnold was hurrying the preparation of his flotilla on Champlain, the
two brothers, General Sir William Howe and the Admiral, Lord Howe,
were arriving in New York Bay, invested not only with the powers
proper to the commanders of great fleets and armies, but also with
authority as peace commissioners, to negotiate an amicable arrangement
with the revolted Colonies.
Sir William Howe had awaited for some time at Halifax the arrival of
the expected reinforcements, but wearying at last he sailed thence
on the 10th of June, 1776, with the army then in hand. On the 25th
he himself reached Sandy Hook, the entrance to New York Bay, having
preceded the transports in a frigate. On the 29th, the day after
Parker's repulse at Fort Moultrie, the troops arrived; and on July 3d,
the date on which Arnold, retreating from Canada, reached Crown Point,
the British landed on Staten Island, which is on the west side of the
lower Bay. On the 12th came in the _Eagle_, 64, carrying the flag of
Lord Howe. This officer was much esteemed by the Americans for his own
personal qualities, and for his attitude towards them in the present
dispute, as well as for the memory of his brother, who had endeared
himself greatly to them in the campaign of 1758, when he had fallen
near Lake Champlain; but the decisive step of declaring their
independence had been taken already, on July 4th, eight days before
the Admiral's arrival. A month was spent in fruitless attempts to
negotiate with the new government, without recognising any official
character in its representatives. During that time, however, while
abstaining from decisive operations, cruisers were kept at sea
to intercept American traders, and the Admiral, immediately upon
arriving, sent four vessels of war twenty-five miles up the Hudson
River, as far as Tarrytown. This squadron was commanded by Hyde
Parker, afterwards, in 1801, Nelson's commander-in-chief at
Copenhagen. The service was performed under a tremendous cannonade
from all the batteries on both shores, but the ships could not
be stopped. Towards the middle of August it was evident that the
Americans would not accept any terms in the power of the Howes to
offer, and it became necessary to attempt coercion by arms.
[Illustration]
In the reduction of New York in 1776, the part played by the British
Navy, owing to the nature of the campaign in general and of the
enemy's force in particular, was of that inconspicuous character which
obscures the fact that without the Navy the operations could not have
been undertaken at all, and that the Navy played to them the part
of the base of operations and line of communications. Like the
foundations of a building, these lie outside the range of superficial
attention, and therefore are less generally appreciated than the
brilliant fighting going on at the front, to the maintenance of
which they are all the time indispensable. Consequently, whatever of
interest may attach to any, or to all, of the minor affairs, which
in the aggregate constitute the action of the naval force in such
circumstances, the historian of the major operations is confined
perforce to indicating the broad general effect of naval power upon
the issue. This will be best done by tracing in outline the scene of
action, the combined movements, and the Navy's influence in both.
The harbour of New York divides into two parts--the upper and lower
Bays--connected by a passage called the Narrows, between Long and
Staten Islands, upon the latter of which the British troops were
encamped. Long Island, which forms the eastern shore of the Narrows,
extends to the east-north-east a hundred and ten miles, enclosing
between itself and the continent a broad sheet of water called Long
Island Sound, that reaches nearly to Narragansett Bay. The latter,
being a fine anchorage, entered also into the British scheme of
operations, as an essential feature in a coastwise maritime campaign.
Long Island Sound and the upper Bay of New York are connected by a
crooked and difficult passage, known as the East River, eight or ten
miles in length, and at that time nearly a mile wide[15] abreast the
city of New York. At the point where the East River joins New York
Bay, the Hudson River, an estuary there nearly two miles wide, also
enters from the north,--a circumstance which has procured for it
the alternative name of the North River. Near their confluence is
Governor's Island, half a mile below the town, centrally situated to
command the entrances to both. Between the East and North rivers, with
their general directions from north and east-north-east, is embraced
a long strip of land gradually narrowing to the southward. The end of
this peninsula, as it would otherwise be, is converted into an island,
of a mean length of about eight miles, by the Harlem River,--a narrow
and partially navigable stream connecting the East and North rivers.
To the southern extreme of this island, called Manhattan, the city of
New York was then confined.
As both the East and North rivers were navigable for large ships,
the former throughout, the latter for over a hundred miles above its
mouth, it was evident that control of the water must play a large
part in warlike operations throughout the district described. With the
limited force at Washington's disposal, he had been unable to push the
defences of the city as far to the front as was desirable. The
lower Bay was held by the British Navy, and Staten Island had been
abandoned, necessarily, without resistance, thereby giving up the
strong defensive position of the Narrows. The lines were contracted
thus to the immediate neighbourhood of New York itself. Small detached
works skirted the shores of Manhattan Island, and a line of redoubts
extended across it, following the course of a small stream which then
partly divided it, a mile from the southern end. Governor's Island was
also occupied as an outpost. Of more intrinsic strength, but not at
first concerned, strong works had been thrown up on either side of the
North River, upon commanding heights eight miles above New York, to
dispute the passage of ships.
The crucial weakness in this scheme of defence was that the shore of
Long Island opposite the city was much higher than that of Manhattan.
If this height were seized, the city, and all below it, became
untenable. Here, therefore, was the key of the position and the chief
station for the American troops. For its protection a line of works
was thrown up, the flanks of which rested upon Wallabout Bay and
Gowanus Cove, two indentations in the shores of Long Island. These
Washington manned with nine thousand of the eighteen thousand men
under his command. By the arrival of three divisions of Hessian
troops, Howe's army now numbered over thirty-four thousand men, to
which Clinton brought three thousand more from before Charleston.[16]
On the 22d of August the British crossed from Staten Island to
Gravesend Bay, on the Long Island shore of the Narrows. The Navy
covered the landing, and the transportation of the troops was under
the charge of Commodore William Hotham, who, nineteen years later,
was Nelson's commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. By noon fifteen
thousand men and forty field-guns had been carried over and placed on
shore. The force of the Americans permitted little opposition to the
British advance; but General Howe was cautious and easy-going, and
it was not till the 27th that the army, now increased to twenty-five
thousand, was fairly in front of the American lines, having killed,
wounded, and taken about 1,500 men. Hoping that Howe would be tempted
to storm the position, Washington replaced these with two thousand
drawn from his meagre numbers; but his opponent, who had borne a
distinguished part at Bunker's Hill, held back his troops, who were
eager for the assault. The Americans now stood with their backs to
a swift tidal stream, nearly a mile wide, with only a feeble line of
works between them and an enemy more than double their number.
On the morning of the 27th, Sir Peter Parker, with a 64-gun ship, two
50's, and two frigates, attempted to work up to New York, with a view
of supporting the left flank of the army; but the wind came out from
the north, and, the ebb-tide making, the ships got no nearer than
three miles from the city. Fortunately for the Americans, they either
could not or would not go farther on the following two days.
After dark of the 28th, Howe broke ground for regular approaches.
Washington, seeing this, and knowing that there could be but one
result to a siege under his condition of inferiority, resolved to
withdraw. During the night of the 29th ten thousand men silently
quitted their positions, embarked, and crossed to Manhattan Island,
carrying with them all their belongings, arms, and ammunition. The
enemy's trenches were but six hundred yards distant, yet no suspicion
was aroused, nor did a single deserter give treacherous warning. The
night was clear and moonlit, although a heavy fog towards daybreak
prolonged the period of secrecy which shrouded the retreat. When
the fog rose, the last detachment was discovered crossing, but a few
ineffectual cannon-shot were the only harassment experienced by the
Americans in the course of this rapid and dexterous retirement. The
garrison of Governor's Island was withdrawn at the same time.
The unmolested use of the water, and the nautical skill of the
fishermen who composed one of the American regiments, were essential
to this escape; for admirable as the movement was in arrangement
and execution, no word less strong than escape applies to it. By it
Washington rescued over half his army from sure destruction, and,
not improbably, the cause of his people from immediate collapse. An
opportunity thus seized implies necessarily an opportunity lost on the
other side. For that failure both army and navy must bear their share
of the blame. It is obvious that when an enemy is greatly outnumbered
his line of retreat should be watched. This was the business of both
commanders-in-chief, the execution of it being primarily the duty of
the navy, as withdrawal from the American position could be only
by water. It was a simple question of look-out, of detection, of
prevention by that means. To arrest the retreat sailing ships were
inadequate, for they could not have remained at anchor under the guns
of Manhattan Island, either by day or night; but a few boats
with muffled oars could have watched, could have given the alarm,
precipitating an attack by the army, and such a movement interrupted
in mid-course brings irretrievable disaster.
Washington now withdrew the bulk of his force to the line of the
Harlem. On his right, south of that river and commanding the Hudson,
was a fort called by his name; opposite to it on the Jersey shore was
Fort Lee. A garrison of four thousand men occupied New York. After
amusing himself with some further peace negotiations, Howe determined
to possess the city. As a diversion from the main effort, and to cover
the crossing of the troops, two detachments of ships were ordered to
pass the batteries on the Hudson and East rivers. This was done on
the 13th and the 15th of September. The East River division suffered
severely, especially in spars and rigging;[17] but the success of
both, following upon that of Hyde Parker a few weeks earlier, in his
expedition to Tarrytown, confirmed Washington in the opinion which he
expressed five years later to de Grasse, that batteries alone could
not stop ships having a fair wind. This is now a commonplace of naval
warfare; steam giving always a fair wind. On the 15th Howe's army
crossed under cover of Parker's ships, Hotham again superintending the
boat work. The garrison of New York slipped along the west shore of
the island and joined the main body on the Harlem; favored again,
apparently, in this flank movement a mile from the enemy's front,
by Howe's inertness, and fondness for a good meal, to which a shrewd
American woman invited him at the critical moment.
Despite these various losses of position, important as they were, the
American army continued to elude the British general, who apparently
did not hold very strongly the opinion that the most decisive factor
in war is the enemy's organised force. As control of the valley of
the Hudson, in connection with Lake Champlain, was, very properly, the
chief object of the British government, Howe's next aim was to loosen
Washington's grip on the peninsula north of the Harlem. The position
seeming to him too strong for a front attack, he decided to strike for
its left flank and rear by way of Long Island Sound. In this, which
involved the passage of the tortuous and dangerous channel called
Hell Gate, with its swift conflicting currents, the Navy again bore
an essential part. The movement began on October 12th, the day after
Arnold was defeated at Valcour. So far as its leading object went it
was successful, Washington feeling obliged to let go the line of the
Harlem, and change front to the left. As the result of the various
movements and encounters of the two armies, he fell back across the
Hudson into New Jersey, ordering the evacuation of Fort Washington,
and deciding to rest his control of the Hudson Valley upon West Point,
fifty miles above New York, a position of peculiar natural strength,
on the west bank of the river. To these decisions he was compelled
by his inferiority in numbers, and also by the very isolated and
hazardous situation in which he was operating, between two navigable
waters, absolutely controlled by the enemy's shipping. This conclusion
was further forced upon him by another successful passage before the
guns of Forts Washington and Lee by Hyde Parker, with three ships, on
the 9th of October. On this occasion the vessels, two of which were
frigates of the heaviest class, suffered very severely, losing nine
killed and eighteen wounded; but the menace to the communications of
the Americans could not be disregarded, for their supplies came mostly
from the west of the Hudson.
It was early in November that Washington crossed into New Jersey with
five thousand men; and soon afterwards he directed the remainder of
his force to follow. At that moment the blunder of one subordinate,
and the disobedience of another, brought upon him two serious blows.
Fort Washington not being evacuated when ordered, Howe carried it by
storm, capturing not only it but its garrison of twenty-seven hundred
men; a very heavy loss to the Americans. On the other hand, the most
explicit orders failed to bring the officer left in command on
the east of the Hudson, General Charles Lee, to rejoin the
commander-in-chief. This criminal perverseness left Washington with
only six thousand men in New Jersey, seven thousand being in New York.
Under these conditions nothing remained but to put the Delaware also
between himself and the enemy. He therefore retreated rapidly through
New Jersey, and on the 8th of December crossed into Pennsylvania
with an army reduced to three thousand by expiry of enlistments. The
detachment beyond the Hudson, diminishing daily by the same cause,
gradually worked its way to him; its commander luckily being captured
on the road. At the time it joined, a few battalions also arrived
from Ticonderoga, released by Carleton's retirement to the foot of
Champlain. Washington's force on the west bank of the Delaware was
thus increased to six thousand men.
In this series of operations, extending from August 22d to December
14th, when Howe went into winter-quarters in New Jersey, the British
had met with no serious mishaps, beyond the inevitable losses
undergone by the assailants of well-chosen positions. Nevertheless,
having in view the superiority of numbers, of equipment, and of
discipline, and the command of the water, the mere existence of the
enemy's army as an organised body, its mere escape, deprives the
campaign of the claim to be considered successful. The red ribbon of
the Bath probably never was earned more cheaply than by Sir William
Howe that year. Had he displayed anything like the energy of his two
elder brothers, Washington, with all his vigilance, firmness,
and enterprise, could scarcely have brought off the force, vastly
diminished but still a living organism, around which American
resistance again crystallised and hardened. As it was, within a month
he took the offensive, and recovered a great part of New Jersey.
Whatever verdict may be passed upon the merit of the military conduct
of affairs, there is no doubt of the value, or of the unflagging
energy, of the naval support given. Sir William Howe alludes to it
frequently, both in general and specifically; while the Admiral sums
up his always guarded and often cumbrous expressions of opinion in
these words: "It is incumbent upon me to represent to your Lordships,
and I cannot too pointedly express, the unabating perseverance and
alacrity with which the several classes of officers and seamen have
supported a long attendance and unusual degree of fatigue, consequent
of these different movements of the army."
The final achievement of the campaign, and a very important one, was
the occupation of Rhode Island and Narragansett Bay by a combined
expedition, which left New York on the 1st of December, and on the 8th
landed at Newport without opposition. The naval force, consisting
of five 50-gun ships and eight smaller vessels, was commanded by
Sir Peter Parker; the troops, seven thousand in number, by
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton. The immediate effect was to
close a haven of privateers, who centred in great numbers around an
anchorage which flanked the route of all vessels bound from Europe
to New York. The possession of the bay facilitated the control of the
neighbouring waters by British ships of war, besides giving them
a base central for coastwise operations and independent of tidal
considerations for entrance or exit. The position was abandoned
somewhat precipitately three years later. Rodney then deplored its
loss in the following terms: "The evacuating Rhode Island was the most
fatal measure that could possibly have been adopted. It gave up the
best and noblest harbor in America, capable of containing the whole
Navy of Britain, and where they could in all seasons lie in perfect
security; and from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hours, could
blockade the three capital cities of America; namely, Boston, New
York, and Philadelphia."
At the end of 1776 began the series of British reverses which
characterised the year 1777, making this the decisive period of the
war, because of the effect thus produced upon general public opinion
abroad; especially upon the governments of France and Spain. On the
20th of December, Howe, announcing to the Ministry that he had
gone into winter-quarters, wrote: "The chain, I own, is rather too
extensive, but I was induced to occupy Burlington to cover the county
of Monmouth; and trusting to the loyalty of the inhabitants, and the
strength of the corps placed in the advanced posts, I conclude the
troops will be in perfect security." Of this unwarranted security
Washington took prompt advantage. On Christmas night a sudden descent,
in a blinding snow-storm, upon a British outpost at Trenton, swept off
a thousand prisoners; and although for the moment the American leader
again retired behind the Delaware, it was but to resume the offensive
four days later. Cornwallis, who was in New York on the point of
sailing for England, hurried back to the front, but in vain. A series
of quick and well-directed movements recovered the State of New
Jersey; and by the 5th of January the American headquarters, and main
body of the army, were established at Morristown in the Jersey hills,
the left resting upon the Hudson, thus recovering touch with the
strategic centre of interest. This menacing position of the Americans,
upon the flank of the line of communications from New York to the
Delaware, compelled Howe to contract abruptly the lines he had
extended so lightly; and the campaign he was forced thus reluctantly
to reopen closed under a gloom of retreat and disaster, which
profoundly and justly impressed not only the generality of men but
military critics as well. "Of all the great conquests which his
Majesty's troops had made in the Jersies," writes Beatson, "Brunswick
and Amboy were the only two places of any note which they retained;
and however brilliant their successes had been in the beginning of
the campaign, they reaped little advantage from them when the winter
advanced, and the contiguity of so vigilant an enemy forced them to
perform the severest duty." With deliberate or unconscious humour
he then immediately concludes the chronicle of the year with this
announcement: "His Majesty was so well pleased with the abilities and
activity which General Howe had displayed this campaign, that on the
25th of October he conferred upon him the Most Honourable Order of the
Bath."
[Footnote 15: At the present day reduced by reclaimed land.]
[Footnote 16: Beatson's "Military and Naval Memoirs," vi. 44, give
34,614 as the strength of Howe's army. Clinton's division is not
included in this. vi. 45.]
[Footnote 17: Admiral James's Journal, p. 30. (Navy Records Society.)]
CHAPTER III
THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE WAR. SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AND CAPTURE OF
PHILADELPHIA BY HOWE. THE NAVAL PART IN EACH OPERATION
1777
The leading purpose of the British government in the campaign of 1777
was the same as that with which it had begun in 1776,--the control
of the line of the Hudson and Lake Champlain, to be mastered by two
expeditions, one starting from each end, and both working towards a
common centre at Albany, near the head of navigation of the River.
Preliminary difficulties had been cleared away in the previous year,
by the destruction of the American flotilla on the Lake, and by the
reduction of New York. To both these objects the Navy had contributed
conspicuously. It remained to complete the work by resuming the
advance from the two bases of operations secured. In 1777 the
fortifications on the Hudson were inadequate to stop the progress of a
combined naval and military expedition, as was shown in the course of
the campaign.
The northern enterprise was intrusted to General Burgoyne. The
impossibility of creating a new naval force, able to contend with
that put afloat by Carleton, had prevented the Americans from further
building. Burgoyne therefore moved by the Lake without opposition to
Ticonderoga, before which he appeared on the 2d of July. A position
commanding the works was discovered, which the Americans had neglected
to occupy. It being seized, and a battery established, the fort had to
be evacuated. The retreat being made by water, the British Lake Navy,
under Captain Skeffington Lutwidge, with whom Nelson had served a
few years before in the Arctic seas, had a conspicuous part in the
pursuit; severing the boom blockading the narrow upper lake and
joining impetuously in an attack upon the floating material, the
flat-boat transports, and the few relics of Arnold's flotilla which
had escaped the destruction of the previous year. This affair took
place on the 6th of July. From that time forward the progress of the
army was mainly by land. The Navy, however, found occupation upon Lake
George, where Burgoyne established a dépôt of supplies, although he
did not utilise its waterway for the march of the army. A party
of seamen under Edward Pellew, still a midshipman, accompanied the
advance, and shared the misfortunes of the expedition. It is told that
Burgoyne used afterwards to chaff the young naval officer with being
the cause of their disaster, because he and his men, by rebuilding a
bridge at a critical moment, had made it possible to cross the upper
Hudson. Impeded in its progress by immense difficulties, both natural
and imposed by the enemy, the army took twenty days to make twenty
miles. On the 30th of July it reached Fort Edward, forty miles from
Albany, and there was compelled to stay till the middle of September.
Owing to neglect at the War Office, the peremptory orders to Sir
William Howe, to move up the Hudson and make a junction with
Burgoyne, were not sent forward. Consequently, Howe, acting upon
the discretionary powers which he possessed already, and swayed by
political reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, determined
to renew his attempt upon Philadelphia. A tentative advance into New
Jersey, and the consequent manoeuvres of Washington, satisfied him
that the enterprise by this route was too hazardous. He therefore
embarked fourteen thousand men, leaving eight thousand with Sir Henry
Clinton to hold New York and make diversions in favor of Burgoyne;
and on the 23d of July sailed from Sandy Hook, escorted by five 64-gun
ships, a 50, and ten smaller vessels, under Lord Howe's immediate
command. The entire expedition numbered about 280 sail. Elaborate
pains were taken to deceive Washington as to the destination of the
armament; but little craft was needed to prevent a competent opponent
from imagining a design so contrary to sound military principle,
having regard to Burgoyne's movements and to the well-understood
general purpose of the British ministry. Accordingly Washington wrote,
"Howe's in a manner abandoning Burgoyne is so unaccountable a matter,
that till I am fully assured of it, I cannot help casting my eyes
continually behind me." He suspected an intention to return upon New
York.
On the 31st of July, just as Burgoyne reached Fort Edward, where he
stuck fast for six weeks, Howe's armament was off the Capes of
the Delaware. The prevailing summer wind on the American coast is
south-south-west, fair for ascending the river; but information was
received that the enemy had obstructed the channel, which lends itself
to such defences for some distance below Philadelphia. Therefore,
although after occupying the city the free navigation of the river to
the sea would be essential to maintaining the position,--for trial had
shown that the whole army could not assure communications by land
with New York, the other sea base,--Howe decided to prosecute his
enterprise by way of the Chesapeake, the ascent of which, under all
the conditions, could not be seriously impeded. A fortnight more was
consumed in contending against the south-west winds and calms, before
the fleet anchored on the 15th of August within the Capes of the
Chesapeake; and yet another week passed before the head of the Bay was
reached. On the 25th the troops landed. Washington, though so long
in doubt, was on hand to dispute the road, but in inferior force;
and Howe had no great difficulty in fighting his way to Philadelphia,
which was occupied on the 26th of September. A week earlier Burgoyne
had reached Stillwater, on the west bank of the Hudson, the utmost
point of his progress, where he was still twenty miles from Albany.
Three weeks later, confronted by overwhelming numbers, he was forced
to capitulate at Saratoga, whither he had retreated.
Lord Howe held on at the head of the Chesapeake until satisfied that
his brother no longer needed him. On the 14th of September he started
down the Bay with the squadron and convoy, sending ahead to the
Delaware a small division, to aid the army, if necessary. The winds
holding southerly, ten days were required to get to sea; and outside
further delay was caused by very heavy weather. The Admiral there
quitted the convoy and hastened up river. On the 6th of October he was
off Chester, ten miles below Philadelphia. The navy had already been
at work for a week, clearing away obstructions, of which there were
two lines; both commanded by batteries on the farther, or Jersey,
shore of the Delaware. The lower battery had been carried by troops;
and when Howe arrived, the ships, though meeting lively opposition
from the American galleys and fire-rafts, had freed the channel for
large vessels to approach the upper obstructions. These were defended
not only by a work at Red Bank on the Jersey shore, but also, on
the other side of the stream, by a fort called Fort Mifflin, on Mud
Island.[18] As the channel at this point, for a distance of half a
mile, was only two hundred yards wide, and troops could not reach the
island, the position was very strong, and it detained the British for
six weeks. Fort Mifflin was supported by two floating batteries and
a number of galleys. The latter not only fought, offensively and
defensively, but maintained the supplies and ammunition of the
garrison.
On the 22d of October, a concerted attack, by the army on the works at
Red Bank, and by the Navy on Fort Mifflin, resulted disastrously. The
former was repulsed with considerable loss, the officer commanding
being killed. The squadron, consisting of a 64, three frigates, and
a sloop, went into action with Mud Island at the same time; but,
the channel having shifted, owing possibly to the obstructions, the
sixty-four and the sloop grounded, and could not be floated that day.
On the 23d the Americans concentrated their batteries, galleys, and
fire-rafts upon the two; and the larger ship took fire and blew up in
the midst of the preparations for lightening her. The sloop was then
set on fire and abandoned.
So long as this obstacle remained, all supplies for the British
army in Philadelphia had to be carried by boats to the shore, and
transported considerable distances by land. As direct attacks had
proved unavailing, more deliberate measures were adopted. The army
built batteries, and the navy sent ashore guns to mount in them; but
the decisive blow to Mud Island was given by a small armed ship, the
_Vigilant_, 20, which was successfully piloted through a channel on
the west side of the river, and reached the rear of the work, towing
with her a floating battery with three 24-pounders. This was on the
15th of November. That night the Americans abandoned Fort Mifflin.
Their loss, Beatson says, amounted to near 400 killed and wounded;
that of the British to 43. If this be correct, it should have
established the invincibility of men who under such prodigious
disparity of suffering could maintain their position so tenaciously.
After the loss of Mud Island, Red Bank could not be held to advantage,
and it was evacuated on the 21st, when an attack was imminent. The
American vessels retreated up the river; but they were cornered,
and of course ultimately were destroyed. The obstructions being now
removed, the British water communications by the line of the Delaware
were established,--eight weeks after the occupation of the city, which
was to be evacuated necessarily six months later.
While these things were passing, Howe's triumph was marred by the news
of Burgoyne's surrender on the 17th of October. For this he could
not but feel that the home government must consider him largely
responsible; for in the Chesapeake, too late to retrieve his false
step, he had received a letter from the minister of war saying that,
whatever else he undertook, support to Burgoyne was the great object
to be kept in view.
During the operations round Philadelphia, Sir Henry Clinton in New
York had done enough to show what strong probabilities of success
would have attended an advance up the Hudson, by the twenty thousand
men whom Howe could have taken with him. Starting on the 3d of October
with three thousand troops, accompanied by a small naval division of
frigates, Clinton in a week had reached West Point, fifty miles up
the river. The American fortifications along the way were captured,
defences levelled, stores and shipping burned; while an insignificant
detachment, with the light vessels, went fifty miles further up,
and there destroyed more military stores without encountering any
resistance worth mentioning. Certainly, had Howe taken the same line
of operations, he would have had to reckon with Washington's ten
thousand men which confronted him on the march from the Chesapeake to
Philadelphia; but his flank would have been covered, up to Albany, by
a navigable stream on either side of which he could operate by that
flying bridge which the presence and control of the navy continually
constituted. Save the fortifications, which Clinton easily carried,
there was no threat to his communications or to his flank, such as the
hill country of New Jersey had offered and Washington had skilfully
utilised.
The campaign of 1777 thus ended for the British with a conspicuous
disaster, and with an apparent success which was as disastrous as a
failure. At its close they held Narragansett Bay, the city and harbour
of New York, and the city of Philadelphia. The first was an admirable
naval base, especially for sailing ships, for the reasons given by
Rodney. The second was then, as it is now, the greatest military
position on the Atlantic coast of the United States; and although
the two could not communicate by land, they did support each other
as naval stations in a war essentially dependent upon maritime power.
Philadelphia served no purpose but to divide and distract British
enterprise. Absolutely dependent for maintenance upon the sea, the
forces in it and in New York could not coöperate; they could not even
unite except by sea. When Clinton relieved Howe as commander-in-chief,
though less than a hundred miles away by land, he had to take a voyage
of over two hundred miles, from New York to Philadelphia, half of
it up a difficult river, to reach his station; and troops were
transferred by the same tedious process. In consequence of these
conditions, the place had to be abandoned the instant that war with
France made control of the sea even doubtful. The British held it for
less than nine months in all.
During 1777 a number of raids were made by British combined land and
sea forces, for the purpose of destroying American dépôts and other
resources. Taken together, such operations are subsidiary to, and aid,
the great object of interrupting or harassing the communications of
an enemy. In so far, they have a standing place among the major
operations of war; but taken singly they cannot be so reckoned, and
the fact, therefore, is simply noted, without going into details.
It may be remarked, however, that in them, although the scale was
smaller, the Navy played the same part that it now does in the many
expeditions and small wars undertaken by Great Britain in various
parts of the world; the same that it did in Wellington's campaigns
in the Spanish peninsula, 1808-1812. The land force depended upon the
water, and the water was controlled by the Navy.
[Footnote 18: This was just below the mouth of the Schuylkill, a short
distance below the present League Island navy yard.]
CHAPTER IV
WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATE
PHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D'ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK,
NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICAN
DISAPPOINTMENT IN D'ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND.
1778
The events of 1777 satisfied the French government that the Americans
had strength and skill sufficient to embarrass Great Britain
seriously, and that the moment, therefore, was opportune for taking
steps which scarcely could fail to cause war. On the 6th of February,
1778, France concluded with the United States an open treaty of
amity and commerce; and at the same time a second secret treaty,
acknowledging the independence of the late Colonies, and contracting
with them a defensive alliance. On the 13th of March, the French
Ambassador in London communicated the open treaty to the British
government, with the remark that "the United States were in full
possession of the independence proclaimed by their declaration of July
4th, 1776." Great Britain at once recalled her Ambassador, and both
countries prepared for war, although no declaration was issued. On
the 13th of April, a French fleet of twelve ships of the line and five
frigates, under the command of the Count d'Estaing,[19] sailed from
Toulon for the American coast. It was destined to Delaware Bay,
hoping to intercept Howe's squadron. D'Estaing was directed to begin
hostilities when forty leagues west of Gibraltar.
The British ministry was not insensible of the danger, the imminence
of which had been felt during the previous year; but it had not got
ready betimes, owing possibly to confident expectations of success
from the campaign of 1777. The ships, in point of numbers and
equipment, were not as far forward as the Admiralty had represented;
and difficulty, amounting for the moment to impossibility, was
experienced in manning them. The vessels of the Channel fleet had to
be robbed of both crews and stores to compose a proper reinforcement
for America. Moreover, the destination of the Toulon squadron was
unknown, the French government having given out that it was bound to
Brest, where over twenty other ships of the line were in an advanced
state of preparation. Not until the 5th of June, when d'Estaing was
already eight weeks out, was certain news brought by a frigate, which
had watched his fleet after it had passed Gibraltar, and which had
accompanied it into the Atlantic ninety leagues west of the Straits.
The reinforcement for America was then permitted to depart. On the
9th of June, thirteen ships of the line sailed for New York under the
command of Vice-Admiral John Byron.[20]
These delays occasioned a singular and striking illustration of the
ill effects upon commerce of inadequate preparation for manning
the fleet. A considerable number of West India ships, with stores
absolutely necessary for the preservation of the islands, waited at
Portsmouth for convoy for upwards of three months, while the whole
fleet, of eighty sail, was detained for five weeks after it had
assembled; "and, although the wind came fair on the 19th of May, it
did not sail till the 26th, owing to the convoying ships, the _Boyne_
and the _Ruby_, not being ready." Forty-five owners and masters signed
a letter to the Admiralty, stating these facts. "The convoy," they
said, "was appointed to sail April 10th." Many ships had been ready
as early as February. "Is not this shameful usage, my Lords, thus to
deceive the public in general? There are two hundred ships loaded with
provisions, etc., waiting at Spithead these three months. The average
expense of each ship amounts to £150 monthly, so that the expense of
the whole West India fleet since February amounts to £90,000."
The West Indies before the war had depended chiefly upon their fellow
colonies on the American continent for provisions, as well as for
other prime necessaries. Not only were these cut off as an incident of
the war, entailing great embarrassment and suffering, which elicited
vehement appeals from the planter community to the home government,
but the American privateers preyed heavily upon the commerce of the
islands, whose industries were thus smitten root and branch, import
and export. In 1776, salt food for whites and negroes had risen from
50 to 100 per cent, and corn, the chief support of the slaves,--the
laboring class,--by 400 per cent. At the same time sugar had fallen
from 25 to 40 per cent in price, rum over 37 per cent. The words
"starvation" and "famine" were freely used in these representations,
which were repeated in 1778. Insurance rose to 23 per cent; and this,
with actual losses by capture,[21] and by cessation of American trade,
with consequent fall of prices, was estimated to give a total loss
of £66 upon every £100 earned before the war. Yet, with all this,
the outward West India fleet in 1778 waited six weeks, April 10th-May
26th, for convoy. Immediately after it got away, a rigorous embargo
was laid upon all shipping in British ports, that their crews might
be impressed to man the Channel fleet. Market-boats, even, were not
allowed to pass between Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight.
Three days after Byron had sailed, Admiral Augustus Keppel also put
to sea with twenty-one ships of the line, to cruise off Brest. His
instructions were to prevent the junction of the Toulon and Brest
divisions, attacking either that he might meet. On the 17th of June,
two French frigates were sighted. In order that they might not report
his force or his movements, the British Admiral sent two of his own
frigates, with the request that they would speak him. One, the _Belle
Poule_, 36, refused; and an engagement followed between her and the
British ship, the _Arethusa_, 32. The King of France subsequently
declared that this occurrence fixed the date of the war's beginning.
Although both Keppel's and d'Estaing's orders prescribed acts of
hostility, no formal war yet existed.
Byron had a very tempestuous passage, with adverse winds, by which his
vessels were scattered and damaged. On the 18th of August, sixty-seven
days from Plymouth, the flagship arrived off the south coast of Long
Island, ninety miles east of New York, without one of the fleet in
company. There twelve ships were seen at anchor to leeward (north),
nine or ten miles distant, having jury masts, and showing other signs
of disability. The British vessel approached near enough to recognise
them as French. They were d'Estaing's squadron, crippled by a very
heavy gale, in which Howe's force had also suffered, though to a
less extent. Being alone, and ignorant of existing conditions,
Byron thought it inexpedient to continue on for either New York or
Narragansett Bay. The wind being southerly, he steered for Halifax,
which he reached August 26th. Some of his ships also entered there.
A very few had already succeeded in joining Howe in New York, being
fortunate enough to escape the enemy.
So far as help from England went, Lord Howe would have been crushed
long before this. He owed his safety partly to his own celerity,
partly to the delays of his opponent. Early in May he received advices
from home, which convinced him that a sudden and rapid abandonment of
Philadelphia and of Delaware Bay might become necessary. He therefore
withdrew his ships of the line from New York and Narragansett,
concentrating them at the mouth of Delaware Bay, while the transports
embarked all stores, except those needed for a fortnight's supply
of the army in a hostile country. The threatening contingency of
a superior enemy's appearing off the coast might, and did, make it
imperative not to risk the troops at sea, but to choose instead the
alternative of a ninety-mile march through New Jersey, which a year
before had been rejected as too hazardous for an even larger force.
Thus prepared, no time was lost when the evacuation became necessary.
Sir William Howe, who had been relieved on the 24th of May by Sir
Henry Clinton, and had returned to England, escaped the humiliation of
giving up his dearly bought conquest. On the 18th of June the British
troops, twelve thousand in number, were ferried across the Delaware,
under the supervision of the Navy, and began their hazardous march to
New York. The next day the transports began to move down the river;
but, owing to the intricate navigation, head winds, and calms, they
did not get to sea until the 28th of June. On the 8th of July, ten
days too late, d'Estaing anchored in the mouth of the Delaware. "Had a
passage of even ordinary length taken place," wrote Washington, "Lord
Howe with the British ships of war and all the transports in the river
Delaware must inevitably have fallen; and Sir Henry Clinton must have
had better luck than is commonly dispensed to men of his profession
under such circumstances, if he and his troops had not shared at least
the fate of Burgoyne."
Had Howe's fleet been intercepted, there would have been no naval
defence for New York; the French fleet would have surmounted the
difficulties of the harbour bar at its ease; and Clinton, caught
between it and the American army, must have surrendered. Howe's
arrival obviated this immediate danger; but much still needed to be
done, or the end would be postponed only, not averted. A fair wind
carried the fleet and the whole convoy from the Delaware to Sandy
Hook in forty-eight hours. On the morning of the 29th, as Howe was
approaching his port, he spoke a packet from England, which not only
brought definite news of d'Estaing's sailing, but also reported that
she herself had fallen in with him to the southward, not very far from
the American coast, and had been chased by his ships. His appearance
off New York, therefore, was imminent.
Howe's measures were prompt and thorough, as became his great
reputation. To watch for d'Estaing's approach, a body of cruisers was
despatched, numerous enough for some to bring frequent word of his
movements, while others kept touch with him. The ships at New York
were ordered down to Sandy Hook, where the defence of the entrance
was to be made. Clinton, who had been hard pressed by Washington
throughout his march, arrived on the 30th of June--the day after Howe
himself--on the heights of Navesink, on the seacoast, just south
of Sandy Hook. During the previous winter the sea had made a breach
between the heights and the Hook, converting the latter into an
island. Across this inlet the Navy threw a bridge of boats, by
which the army on the 5th of July passed to the Hook, and thence was
conveyed to the city.
On the same day the French fleet was sighted off the coast of Virginia
by a cruiser, which reached Howe on the 7th; and two days later
another brought word that the enemy had anchored on the 8th off the
Delaware. There d'Estaing again tarried for two days, which were
diligently improved by the British Admiral, who at the same time
sent off despatches to warn Byron, of whose coming he now had heard.
Despite all his energy, his preparations still were far from complete,
when on the morning of the 11th a third vessel arrived, announcing
that the French were approaching. That evening they anchored outside,
four miles south of Sandy Hook. Howe, who during all these days was
indefatigable, not only in planning but also in personal supervision
of details, hastened at once to place his vessels according to the
disposition which he had determined, and which he had carefully
explained to his captains, thus insuring an intelligent coöperation on
their part.
The narrow arm of land called Sandy Hook projects in a northerly
direction from the New Jersey coast, and covers the lower bay of New
York on the south side. The main ship-channel, then as now, ran nearly
east and west, at right angles to the Hook and close to its northern
end. Beyond the channel, to the north, there was no solid ground for
fortification within the cannon range of that day. Therefore such guns
as could be mounted on shore, five in number, were placed in battery
at the end of the Hook. These formed the right flank of the defence,
which was continued thence to the westward by a line of seven ships,
skirting the southern edge of the channel. As the approach of the
French, if they attacked, must be with an easterly wind and a rising
tide, the ships were placed with that expectation; and in such wise
that, riding with their heads to the eastward, each successive one,
from van to rear, lay a little outside--north--of her next ahead. The
object of this indented formation was that each ship might bring her
broadside to bear east, and yet fire clear of those to the east of
her. In order to effect this concentration of all the batteries in
an easterly direction, which would rake the approach of the enemy,
a spring[23] was run from the outer, or port quarter of every ship,
except the leader.[24] These springs were not taken to the bow cable
or anchor, as was often done, but to anchors of their own, placed
broad off the port bows. If, then, the enemy attacked, the ships, by
simply keeping fast the springs and veering the cables, would swing
with their broadsides facing east. If the enemy, which had no bow
fire, survived his punishment, and succeeded in advancing till abreast
the British line, it was necessary only to keep fast the cables and
let go the springs; the ships would swing head to the east wind, and
the broadsides would once more bear north, across the channel instead
of along it. These careful arrangements were subject, of course, to
the mischance of shot cutting away cables or springs; but this was
more than offset by the probable injury to the enemy's spars and
rigging, as well as hulls, before he could use his batteries at all.
Such was the main defence arranged by Howe; with which New York stood
or fell. In the line were five 64's, one 50, and an armed storeship.
An advanced line, of one fifty with two smaller vessels, was placed
just inside the bar--two or three miles outside the Hook--to rake
the enemy as he crossed, retiring as he approached; and four galleys,
forming a second line, were also stationed for the same purpose,
across the channel, abreast of the Hook.[25] The retreat of these was
secure into the shoal water, where they could not be followed. One 64
and some frigates were held as a reserve, inside the main line, to act
as occasion might require. The total available force was, six 64's,
three 50's, and six frigates. D'Estaing's fleet, in detail, consisted
of one 90-gun ship, one 80, six 74's and one 50. Great as was this
discrepancy between the opponents, it was counterbalanced largely by
Howe's skilful dispositions, which his enemy could not circumvent. If
the latter once got alongside, there was little hope for the British;
but it was impossible for the French to evade the primary necessity
of undergoing a raking fire, without reply, from the extreme range of
their enemies' cannon up to the moment of closing. The stake, however,
was great, and the apparent odds stirred to the bottom the fighting
blood of the British seamen. The ships of war being short-handed, Howe
called for volunteers from the transports. Such numbers came forward
that the agents of the vessels scarcely could keep a watch on board;
and many whose names were not on the lists concealed themselves in
the boats which carried their companions to the fighting ships. The
masters and mates of merchantmen in the harbour in like manner offered
their services, taking their stations at the guns. Others cruised off
the coast in small boats, to warn off approaching vessels; many of
which nevertheless fell into the enemy's hands.
Meanwhile d'Estaing was in communication with Washington, one of whose
aides-de-camp visited his flagship. A number of New York pilots also
were sent. When these learned the draught of the heavier French ships,
they declared that it was impossible to take them in; that there was
on the bar only twenty-three feet at high water. Had that been really
the case, Howe would not have needed to make the preparations for
defence that were visible to thousands of eyes on sea and on shore;
but d'Estaing, though personally brave as a lion, was timid in his
profession, which he had entered at the age of thirty, without serving
in the lower grades. The assurances of the pilots were accepted after
an examination by a lieutenant of the flagship, who could find nothing
deeper than twenty-two feet. Fortune's favors are thrown away, as
though in mockery, on the incompetent or the irresolute. On the 22d of
July a fresh north-east wind concurred with a spring tide to give the
highest possible water on the bar.[26]
"At eight o'clock," wrote an eye-witness in the British fleet,
"d'Estaing with all his squadron appeared under way. He kept
working to windward, as if to gain a proper position for
crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The wind
could not be more favourable for such a design; it blew from
the exact point from which he could attack us to the greatest
advantage. The spring tides were at the highest, and that
afternoon thirty feet on the bar. We consequently expected
the hottest day that had ever been fought between the two
nations. On our side all was at stake. Had the men-of-war been
defeated, the fleet of transports and victuallers must have
been destroyed, and the army, of course, have fallen with us.
D'Estaing, however, had not spirit equal to the risk; at three
o'clock we saw him bear off to the southward, and in a few
hours he was out of sight."
Four days later, Howe, reporting these occurrences, wrote: "The
weather having been favourable the last three days for forcing
entrance to this port, I conclude the French commander has desisted."
It is clear that the experienced British admiral did not recognise the
impossibility of success for the enemy.
After the demonstration of the 22d, d'Estaing stood to the southward,
with the wind at east. The British advice-boats brought back word
that they had kept company with him as far south as the Capes of
the Delaware, and there had left him ninety miles from land. When
their leaving freed him from observation, he turned, and made for
Narragansett Bay, an attack on which, in support of an American land
force, had been concerted between him and Washington. On the 29th
he anchored three miles south of Rhode Island, and there awaited a
suitable moment for forcing the entrance.
Narragansett Bay contains several islands. The two largest, near
the sea, are Rhode Island and Conanicut, the latter being the more
westerly. Their general direction, as that of the Bay itself, is north
and south; and by them the entrance is divided into three passages.
Of these, the eastern, called Seakonnet, is not navigable above Rhode
Island. The central, which is the main channel, is joined by the
western above Conanicut, and thus the two lead to the upper Bay. The
town of Newport is on the west side of Rhode Island, four miles from
the main entrance.
On the 30th of July, the day after the French fleet had arrived, two
of its ships of the line, under command of the afterwards celebrated
Suffren, went up the western channel, anchoring within it near the
south end of Conanicut. One of them, as she passed, was hulled
twice by the British batteries. At the same time, two frigates and
a corvette entered Seakonnet; whereupon the British abandoned and
burned a sloop of war, the _Kingfisher_, 16, and some galleys there
stationed. The British general, Sir Robert Pigot, now withdrew his
detachments from Conanicut, after disabling the guns, and concentrated
the bulk of his force in the southern part of Rhode Island and about
Newport. Goat Island, which covers the inner harbour of the town, was
still occupied, the main channel being commanded by its batteries, as
well as by those to the north and south of it upon Rhode Island. On
the 5th of August, Suffren's two ships again got under way, sailed
through the western passage, and anchored in the main channel, north
of Conanicut; their former positions being taken by two other ships
of the line.[27] The senior British naval officer, seeing retreat cut
off both north and south, now destroyed those ships of war[28] which
could not enter the inner harbour, sinking two between Goat and Rhode
Islands, to prevent any enemy passing there. Five transports also
were sunk north of Goat Island, between it and Coaster's Harbour,
to protect the inside anchorage in that direction. These preliminary
operations cost the British five frigates and two sloops, besides
some galleys. Guns and ammunition taken from them went to increase
the defences; and their officers and crews, over a thousand in number,
served in the fortifications.
[Illustration]
On the 8th of August the eight remaining French ships of the line ran
the batteries on Rhode and Goat Islands, anchoring above the latter,
between it and Conanicut, and were rejoined there by the four
previously detached to the western passage. Ten thousand American
troops having by this time crossed from the mainland to the northern
part of Rhode Island, d'Estaing immediately landed four thousand
soldiers and seamen from the fleet upon Conanicut, for a preliminary
organisation; after which they also were to pass to Rhode Island
and join in the operations. For the moment, therefore, the British
garrison, numbering probably six thousand men,[29] was hemmed in
by vastly superior forces, by land and by water. Its embarrassment,
however, did not last long. On the following morning Lord Howe
appeared and anchored off Point Judith, seven miles from the entrance
to the Bay, and twelve from the position then occupied by the French
fleet. He brought a stronger force than he had been able to gather for
the defence of New York, having now one 74, seven 64's, and five 50's,
in all thirteen of the line, besides several smaller vessels; but he
still was greatly inferior to opponent, by any rational mode of naval
reckoning.
Howe's energies in New York had not been confined to preparations
for resisting the entrance of the enemy, nor did they cease with the
latter's departure. When he first arrived there from Philadelphia, he
had hastened to get his ships ready for sea, a pre-occupation which
somewhat, but not unduly, delayed their taking their positions at
Sandy Hook. Two, for instance, had been at the watering-place when the
approach of the French was signalled. Owing to this diligence, no time
was lost by his fault when the new destination of the enemy was made
known to him, on the 28th or 29th of July, by the arrival of the
_Raisonnable_, 64,[30] from Halifax. This ship narrowly escaped the
French fleet, having passed it on the evening of the 27th, steering
for Rhode Island. The _Renown_, 50, which on the 26th had reached New
York from the West Indies, had a similar close shave, having sailed
unnoticed through the rear of the enemy the night before. Besides
these two, Howe was joined also by the _Centurion_, 50, from Halifax,
and by the _Cornwall_, 74; the latter, which crossed the bar on the
30th, being the first of Byron's fleet to reach New York. The three
others belonged to Howe's own squadron. For the two Halifax ships
which helped to make this most welcome reinforcement, the Admiral was
indebted to the diligence of the officer there commanding, who hurried
them away as soon as he learned of d'Estaing's appearance on the
coast. The opportuneness of their arrival attracted notice. "Had
they appeared a few days sooner," says a contemporary narrative,
"either they must have been prevented from forming a junction with
our squadron, and forced again to sea, or we should have had the
mortification to see them increase the triumph of our enemy."
On the 1st of August, forty-eight hours after the _Cornwall_ had come
in from a stormy passage of fifty-two days, the squadron was ready for
sea, and Howe attempted to sail; but the wind hauled foul immediately
after the signal to weigh had been made. It did not become fair at the
hour of high water, when alone heavy ships could cross the bar, until
the morning of the 6th. "Rhode Island was of such importance," says
the narrator already quoted, "_and the fate of so large a portion
of the British army as formed the garrison was of such infinite
consequence to the general cause_, that it was imagined the Admiral
would not lose a moment in making some attempt for their relief."
He had learned of the detachments made from the French fleet, and
hoped that some advantage might be taken of this division. In
short, he went, as was proper and incumbent on him in such critical
circumstances, to take a great risk, in hope of a favourable chance
offering. On the 9th, as before stated, he anchored off Point Judith,
and opened communications with the garrison, from which he learned
the events that had so far occurred, and also that the enemy was well
provided with craft of all kinds to make a descent upon any part of
the Island.
As deGrasse at Yorktown, when rumour announced the approach of
a British fleet, was deterred only by the most urgent appeals of
Washington from abandoning his control of the Chesapeake, essential
to the capture of Cornwallis, so now d'Estaing, in Narragansett Bay,
was unwilling to keep his place, in face of Howe's greatly inferior
squadron.[31] The influence exerted upon these two admirals by the
mere approach of a hostile fleet, when decisive advantages depended
upon their holding their ground, may be cited plausibly in support
of the most extreme view of the effect of a "fleet in being;" but
the instances also, when the conditions are analysed, will suggest
the question: Is such effect always legitimate, inherent in the
existence of the fleet itself, or does it not depend often upon
the characteristics of the man affected? The contemporary British
narrative of these events in Narragansett Bay, after reciting the
various obstacles and the inferiority of the British squadron,
says: "The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion that
the Vice-Admiral could not risk an attack; and it appears by his
Lordship's public letter that this was also his own opinion: under
such circumstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford the
General any essential relief." In both these instances, the admirals
concerned were impelled to sacrifice the almost certain capture, not
of a mere position, but of a decisive part of the enemy's organised
forces, by the mere possibility of action; by the moral effect
produced by a fleet greatly inferior to their own, which in neither
case would have attacked, as things stood. What does this prove?
Immediately upon Howe's appearance, the French seamen who had landed
the day before on Conanicut were recalled to their ships. The next
morning, August 10, at 7 A.M., the wind came out strong at north-east,
which is exceptional at that season. D'Estaing at once put to sea,
cutting the cables in his haste. In two hours he was outside, steering
for the enemy. Howe, of course, retired at once; his inferiority[32]
did not permit an engagement except on his own terms. To insure these,
he needed the weather-gage, the offensive position of that day, which
by keeping south he expected to gain, when the usual wind from that
quarter should set in. The French Admiral had the same object, hoping
to crush his agile opponent; and, as the sea breeze from south-west
did not make that day, he succeeded in keeping the advantage with
which he had started, despite Howe's skill. At nightfall both fleets
were still steering to the southward, on the port tack, the French
five or six miles in the rear of the British, with the wind variable
at east. The same course was maintained throughout the night, the
French gradually overhauling the British, and becoming visible at 3
A.M. of the 11th. By Howe's dispatch, they bore in the morning, at an
hour not specified, east-north-east, which would be nearly abeam, but
somewhat more distant than the night before, having apparently kept
closer to the wind, which by this had steadied at east-north-east.
In the course of the day Howe shifted his flag from the _Eagle_, 64,
to the _Apollo_, 32, and placed himself between the two fleets, the
better to decide the movements of his own. Finding it impossible
to gain the weather-gage, and unwilling, probably, to be drawn too
far from Rhode Island, he now made a wide circle with the fleet
by a succession of changes of course: at 8 A.M. to south, then to
south-west and west, until finally, at 1.30 P.M., the ships were
steering north-west; always in line of battle. The French Admiral
seems to have followed this movement cautiously, on an outer circle
but with a higher speed, so that from east-north-east in the morning,
which, as the fleets were then heading, would be on the starboard side
of the British, abreast and to windward, at 4 P.M. the French bore
south-south-east, which would be somewhat on the port quarter, or
nearly astern but to leeward. At this time their van was estimated by
Howe to be two or three miles from the British rear, and, according
to his reading of their manoeuvres, d'Estaing was forming his line
for the same tack as the British, with a view of "engaging the British
squadron to leeward," whereby he would obtain over it the advantage
of using the lower-deck guns, the wind and sea having become much
heavier. As the French Admiral, in this new disposition, had put his
heaviest ships in the van, and his line was nearly in the wake of the
British, Howe inferred an attack upon his rear. He therefore ordered
his heaviest ship, the _Cornwall_, 74, to go there from the centre,
exchanging places with the _Centurion_, 50, and at the same time
signalled the fleet to close _to the centre_,--a detail worth
remembering in view of Rodney's frustrated manoeuvre of April 17th,
1780. It now remained simply to await firmly the moment when the
French should have covered the intervening ground, and brought
to action so much of his rear as d'Estaing saw fit to engage; the
conditions of the sea favoring the speed of the bulkier ships that
composed the hostile fleet. The latter, however, soon abandoned the
attempt, and "bore away to the southward, apparently from the state of
the weather, which, by the wind freshening much, with frequent rain,
was now rendered very unfavorable for engaging." It may be added that
the hour was very late for beginning an action. At sundown the British
were under close-reefed topsails, and the sea such that Howe was
unable to return to the _Eagle_.[33]
The wind now increased to great violence, and a severe storm raged on
the coast until the evening of the 13th, throwing the two fleets into
confusion, scattering the ships, and causing numerous disasters. The
_Apollo_ lost her foremast, and sprung the mainmast, on the night of
the 12th. The next day only two British ships of the line and three
smaller vessels were in sight of their Admiral. When the weather
moderated, Howe went on board the _Phoenix_, 44, and thence to the
_Centurion_, 50, with which he "proceeded to the southward, and on the
15th discovered ten sail of the French squadron, some at anchor in the
sea, about twenty-five leagues east from Cape May."[34] Leaving there
the _Centurion_, to direct to New York any of Byron's ships that
might come on the coast, he departed thither himself also, and on
the evening of the 17th rejoined the squadron off Sandy Hook, the
appointed rendezvous. Many injuries had been received by the various
ships, but they were mostly of a minor character; and on the 22d the
fleet again put to sea in search of the enemy.
The French had suffered much more severely. The flagship _Languedoc_,
90, had carried away her bowsprit, all her lower masts followed
it overboard, and her tiller also was broken, rendering the rudder
unserviceable. The _Marseillais_, 74, lost her foremast and bowsprit.
In the dispersal of the two fleets that followed the gale, each of
these crippled vessels, on the evening of the 13th, encountered singly
a British 50-gun ship; the _Languedoc_ being attacked by the _Renown_,
and the _Marseillais_ by the _Preston_. The conditions in each
instance were distinctly favourable to the smaller combatant; but both
unfortunately withdrew at nightfall, making the mistake of postponing
to to-morrow a chance which they had no certainty would exist after
to-day. When morning dawned, other French ships appeared, and the
opportunity passed away. The British _Isis_, 50, also was chased and
overtaken by the _César_, 74. In the action which ensued, the French
ship's wheel was shot away, and she retired;--two other British
vessels, one of the line, being in sight. The latter are not mentioned
in the British accounts, and both sides claimed the advantage in this
drawn action. The French captain lost an arm.
After making temporary repairs, at the anchorage where Howe saw them
on the 15th of August, the French fleet had proceeded again towards
Newport. It was in the course of this passage that they were seen by
Byron's flagship[35] on the 18th, to the southward of Long Island. The
_Experiment_, 50, which Howe had sent to reconnoitre Narragansett Bay,
was chased by them into Long Island Sound, and only reached New York
by the East River; being the first ship of the line or 50-gun ship
that ever passed through Hell Gate. On the 20th d'Estaing communicated
with General Sullivan, the commander of the American land forces on
Rhode Island; but it was only to tell him that in his own opinion,
and in that of a council of war, the condition of the squadron
necessitated going to Boston to refit. Whatever may be thought of the
propriety of this decision, its seriousness can be best understood
from the report sent by Pigot to Howe. "The rebels had advanced their
batteries within fifteen hundred yards of the British works. He was
under no apprehensions from any of their attempts in front; but,
should the French fleet come in, it would make an alarming change.
Troops might be landed and advanced in his rear; and in that case
he could not answer for the consequences." Disregarding Sullivan's
entreaties that he would remain, d'Estaing sailed next day for Boston,
which he reached on August 28th. On the 31st the indefatigable Howe
came in sight; but the French had worked actively in the three days.
Forty-nine guns, 18 and 24-pounders, with six mortars, were already
in position covering the anchorage; and "the French squadron, far
from fearing an attack, desired it eagerly."[36] The withdrawal of the
French fleet from Rhode Island was followed by that of the American
troops from before Newport.
Howe had quitted New York the instant he heard of d'Estaing's
reappearance off Rhode Island. He took with him the same number of
vessels as before,--thirteen of the line,--the _Monmouth_, 64, of
Byron's squadron, having arrived and taken the place of the _Isis_,
crippled in her late action. Before reaching Newport, he learned
that the French had started for Boston. He hoped that they would
find it necessary to go outside George's Bank, and that he might
intercept them by following the shorter road inside. In this he was
disappointed, as has been seen, and the enemy's position was now
too strong for attack. The French retreat to Boston closed the naval
campaign of 1778 in North American waters.
[Illustration]
The inability or unwillingness of d'Estaing to renew the enterprise
against Rhode Island accords the indisputable triumph in this campaign
to Howe,--an honour he must share, and doubtless would have shared
gladly, with his supporters in general. That his fleet, for the most
part two years from home, in a country without dockyards, should have
been able to take the sea within ten days after the gale, while their
opponents, just from France, yet with three months' sea practice, were
so damaged that they had to abandon the field and all the splendid
prospects of Rhode Island,--as they already had allowed to slip the
chance at New York,--shows a decisive superiority in the British
officers and crews. The incontestable merits of the rank and file,
however, must not be permitted to divert attention from the great
qualities of the leader, but for which the best material would have
been unavailing. The conditions were such as to elicit to the utmost
Howe's strongest qualities,--firmness, endurance, uninterrupted
persistence rather than celerity, great professional skill, ripened by
constant reflection and ready at an instant's call. Not brilliant in
intellect, perhaps, but absolutely clear, and replete with expedients
to meet every probable contingency, Howe exhibited an equable,
unflagging energy, which was his greatest characteristic, and which
eminently fitted him for the task of checkmating an enemy's every
move--for a purely defensive campaign. He was always on hand and
always ready; for he never wearied, and he knew his business. To
great combinations he was perhaps unequal. At all events, such are not
associated with his name. The distant scene he did not see; but step
by step he saw his way with absolute precision, and followed it with
unhesitating resolution. With a force inferior throughout, to have
saved, in one campaign, the British fleet, New York, and Rhode Island,
with the entire British army, which was divided between those two
stations and dependent upon the sea, is an achievement unsurpassed
in the annals of naval defensive warfare. It may be added that his
accomplishment is the measure of his adversary's deficiencies.
Howe's squadron had been constituted in 1776 with reference to the
colonial struggle only, and to shallow water, and therefore was
composed, very properly, of cruisers, and of ships of the line of the
smaller classes; there being several fifties, and nothing larger than
a sixty-four. When war with France threatened, the Ministry, having
long warning, committed an unpardonable fault in allowing such a force
to be confronted by one so superior as that which sailed from Toulon,
in April, 1778. This should have been stopped on its way, or, failing
that, its arrival in America should have been preceded by a British
reinforcement. As it was, the government was saved from a tremendous
disaster only by the efficiency of its Admiral and the inefficiency of
his antagonist. As is not too uncommon, gratitude was swamped by the
instinct of self-preservation from the national wrath, excited by
this, and by other simultaneous evidences of neglect. An attempt was
made to disparage Howe's conduct, and to prove that his force was even
superior to that of the French, by adding together the guns in all his
ships, disregarding their classes, or by combining groups of his small
vessels against d'Estaing's larger units. The instrument of the attack
was a naval officer, of some rank but slender professional credit, who
at this most opportune moment underwent a political conversion, which
earned him employment on the one hand, and the charge of apostasy on
the other. For this kind of professional arithmetic, Howe felt and
expressed just and utter contempt. Two and two make four in a primer,
but in the field they may make three, or they may make five. Not
to speak of the greater defensive power of heavy ships, nor of the
concentration of their fire, the unity of direction under one captain
possesses here also that importance which has caused unity of command
and of effort to be recognised as the prime element in military
efficiency, from the greatest things to the smallest. Taken together,
the three elements--greater defensive power, concentration of fire,
and unity of direction--constitute a decisive and permanent argument
in favor of big ships, in Howe's days as in our own. Doubtless,
now, as then, there is a limit; most arguments can be pushed to an
_absurdum_, intellectual or practical. To draw a line is always hard;
but, if we cannot tell just where the line has been passed we can
recognise that one ship is much too big, while another certainly is
not. Between the two an approximation to an exact result can be made.
On his return to New York on September 11th, Howe found there
Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker[37] with six ships of the line of Byron's
squadron. Considering his task now accomplished, Howe decided to
return to England, in virtue of a permission granted some time
before at his own request. The duty against the Americans, lately his
fellow-countrymen, had been always distasteful to him, although he
did not absolutely refuse to undertake it, as did Admiral Keppel.
The entrance of France into the quarrel, and the coming of d'Estaing,
refreshed the spirits of the veteran, who moreover scorned to abandon
his command in the face of such odds. Now, with the British positions
secure, and superiority of force insured for the time being, he
gladly turned over his charge and sailed for home; burning against the
Admiralty with a wrath common to most of the distinguished seamen of
that war. He was not employed afloat again until a change of Ministry
took place, in 1782.
[Footnote 19: Charles H., Comte d'Estaing. Born, 1729. Served in
India under Lally Tollendal, 1758. After having been taken prisoner at
Madras in 1759, exchanged into the navy. Commanded in North America,
1778-80. Guillotined, 1794. W.L.C.]
[Footnote 20: Grandfather of the poet.]
[Footnote 21: The Secretary of Lloyd's, for the purposes of this work,
has been so good as to cause to be specially compiled a summary of the
losses and captures during the period 1775-1783. This, so far as it
deals with merchantmen and privateers, gives the following results.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| BRITISH VESSELS | ENEMY'S VESSELS
|---------------------------------+----------------------------------
| Merchantmen | Privateers | Merchantmen | Privateers
|----------------+----------------+----------------+-----------------
| |Re-taken| |Re-taken| |Re-taken| |Re-taken
| Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran-
| [22] | somed | [22] | somed | [22] | somed | [22] | somed
-----+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------
1775 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1776 | 229 | 51 | --- | --- | 19 | --- | 6 | ---
1777 | 331 | 52 | --- | --- | 51 | 1 | 18 | ---
1778 | 359 | 87 | 5 | --- | 232 | 5 | 16 | ---
1779 | 487 | 106 | 29 | 5 | 238 | 5 | 31 | ---
1780 | 581 | 260 | 15 | 2 | 203 | 3 | 34 | 1
1781 | 587 | 211 | 38 | 6 | 277 | 10 | 40 | ---
1782 | 415 | 99 | 1 | --- | 104 | 1 | 68 | ---
1783 | 98 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3 | ---
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Footnote 22: Including those re-taken or ransomed. W.L.C.]
[Footnote 23: A spring is a rope taken usually from the quarter (one
side of the stern) of a ship, to the anchor. By hauling upon it the
battery is turned in the direction desired.]
[Footnote 24: The leader, the _Leviathan_, was excepted, evidently
because she lay under the Hook, and her guns could not bear down
channel. She was not a fighting ship of the squadron, but an armed
storeship, although originally a ship of war, and therefore by her
thickness of side better fitted for defence than an ordinary merchant
vessel. Placing her seems to have been an afterthought, to close the
gap in the line, and prevent even the possibility of the enemy's ships
turning in there and doubling on the van. Thus Howe avoided the fatal
oversight made by Brueys twenty years later, in Aboukir Bay.]
[Footnote 25: It may be recalled that a similar disposition was made
by the Confederates at Mobile against Farragut's attack in 1864, and
that it was from these small vessels that his flagship _Hartford_
underwent her severest loss. To sailing ships the odds were
greater, as injury to spars might involve stoppage. Moreover, Howe's
arrangements brought into such fire all his heavier ships.]
[Footnote 26: A letter to the Admiralty, dated October 8th, 1779, from
Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, then commander-in-chief at New York,
states that "at spring tides there is generally thirty feet of water
on the bar at high water."]
[Footnote 27: These four ships were among the smallest of the fleet,
being one 74, two 64's, and a 50. D'Estaing very properly reserved his
heaviest ships to force the main channel.]
[Footnote 28: _Flora_, 32; _Juno_, 32; Lark, 32; _Orpheus_, 32;
_Falcon_, 16.]
[Footnote 29: I have not been able to find an exact statement of the
number; Beatson gives eight regiments, with a reinforcement of five
battalions.]
[Footnote 30: It may be interesting to recall that this was the ship
on the books of which Nelson's name was first borne in the navy, in
1771.]
[Footnote 31: Troude attributes d'Estaing's sortie to a sense of
the insecurity of his position; Lapeyrouse Bonfils, to a desire for
contest. Chevalier dwells upon the exposure of the situation.]
[Footnote 32: For the respective force of the two fleets see pp. 66,
67, 71.]
[Footnote 33: This account of the manoeuvres of the two fleets is
based upon Lord Howe's dispatch, and amplified from the journal of
Captain Henry Duncan of the flagship _Eagle_ which has been published
(1902) since the first publication of this work. See "Navy Records
Society, Naval Miscellany." Vol. i, p. 161.]
[Footnote 34: At the mouth of Delaware Bay.]
[Footnote 35: _Ante_, p. 62.]
[Footnote 36: Chevalier: "Marine Française," 1778.]
[Footnote 37: Later Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, Bart., who perished
in the _Cato_ in 1783. He was father of that Admiral Sir Hyde Parker,
who in 1801 was Nelson's commander-in-chief at Copenhagen, and who in
1778 commanded the _Phoenix_, 44, in Howe's fleet. (_Ante_, pp. 39,
46.)]
CHAPTER V
THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT
1778
During the same two months that saw the contest between d'Estaing and
Howe in America the only encounter between nearly equal fleets in
1778 took place in European waters. Admiral Keppel, having returned
to Spithead after the affair between the _Belle Poule_ and the
_Arethusa_,[38] again put to sea on the 9th of July, with a force
increased to thirty ships of the line. He had been mortified by the
necessity of avoiding action, and of even retiring into port, with the
inadequate numbers before under his command, and his mind was fixed
now to compel an engagement, if he met the French.
The Brest fleet also put to sea, the day before Keppel, under the
command of Admiral the Comte d'Orvilliers. It contained thirty-two
ships of the line. Of these, three--64, a 60, and a 50--were not
considered fit for the line of battle, which was thus reduced to
twenty-nine sail, carrying 2098 guns. To these the British opposed an
aggregate of 2278; but comparison by this means only is very rough.
Not only the sizes of the guns, but the classes and weight of the
vessels need to be considered. In the particular instance the matter
is of little importance; the action being indecisive, and credit
depending upon manoeuvres rather than upon fighting.
The French admiral was hampered by vacillating instructions,
reflections of the unstable impulses which swayed the Ministry.
Whatever his personal wishes, he felt that he was expected to avoid
action, unless under very favourable circumstances. At the moment of
sailing he wrote: "Since you leave me free to continue my cruise, I
will not bring the fleet back to Brest, unless by positive orders,
until I have fulfilled the month at sea mentioned in my instructions,
and known to all the captains. Till then I will not fly before Admiral
Keppel, whatever his strength; only, if I know him to be too superior,
I will avoid a disproportionate action as well as I can; but if the
enemy really seeks to force it, it will be very hard to shun." These
words explain his conduct through the next few days.
On the afternoon of July 23d the two fleets sighted each other, about
a hundred miles west of Ushant, the French being then to leeward.
Towards sunset, they were standing south-west, with the wind at
west-north-west, and bore north-east from the enemy, who were
lying-to, heads to the northward. The British remaining nearly
motionless throughout the night, and the wind shifting, d'Orvilliers
availed himself of the conditions to press to windward, and in the
morning was found to bear north-west from his opponent.[39] Their
relative positions satisfied both admirals for the moment; for
Keppel found himself interposed between Brest and the French, while
d'Orvilliers, though surrendering the advantage of open retreat to his
port, had made it possible, by getting the weather-gage, to fulfil
his promise to keep the sea and yet to avoid action. Two of his ships,
however, the _Duc de Bourgogne_, 80, and a 74, were still to leeward,
not only of their own main body, but also of the British. Keppel
sent chasers after them, for the expressed purpose of compelling
d'Orvilliers to action in their support,[40] and it was believed by
the British that they were forced to return to Brest, to avoid being
cut off. They certainly quitted their fleet, which was thus reduced to
twenty-seven effective sail. From this time until July 27th the wind
continued to the westward, and the wariness of the French admiral
baffled all his antagonist's efforts to get within range. Keppel,
having no doubts as to what was expected of him, pursued vigorously,
watching his chance. On the morning of July 27th the two fleets [Fig
1, AA, AA], were from six to ten miles apart, wind south-west, both on
the port tack,[41] steering north-west; the French dead to windward,
in line ahead. The British were in bow-and-quarter line. In this
formation, when exact, the ships of a fleet were nearly abreast each
other; so ranged, however, that if they tacked all at the same time
they would be at once in line of battle ahead close to the wind,--the
fighting order.[42] Both fleets were irregularly formed, the British
especially so; for Keppel rightly considered that he would not
accomplish his purpose, if he were pedantic concerning the order of
his going. He had therefore signalled a "General Chase," which,
by permitting much individual freedom of movement, facilitated the
progress of the whole body. At daylight, the division commanded by
Sir Hugh Palliser--the right wing, as then heading--had dropped astern
[R]; and at 5.30 A.M. the signal was made to seven of its fastest
sailers to chase to windward, to get farther to windward by pressing
sail, the object being so to place them relatively to the main body,
as to support the latter, if an opportunity for action should offer.
At 9 A.M. the French admiral, wishing to approach the enemy and to
see more clearly, ordered his fleet to wear in succession,--to
countermarch. As the van ships went round (b) under this signal, they
had to steer off the wind (be), parallel to their former line, on
which those following them still were, until they reached the point to
which the rear ship meantime had advanced (c), when they could again
haul to the wind. This caused a loss of ground to leeward, but not
more than d'Orvilliers could afford, as things stood. Just after he
had fairly committed himself to the manoeuvre, the wind hauled to the
southward two points,[43] from south-west to south-south-west, which
favoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards the
enemy (BB). The shift also threw the bows of the French off the line
they were following, deranging their order. Keppel therefore continued
on the port tack, until all the French (BB), were on the starboard,
and at 10.15, being nearly in their wake, he ordered his own ships to
tack together (dd), which would bring them into line ahead on the same
tack as the French; that is, having the wind on the same side. This
put the British in column,[44] still to leeward, but nearly astern of
the enemy and following (CC). At this moment a thick rain-squall came
up, concealing the fleets one from another for three quarters of an
hour. With the squall the wind shifted back to southwest, favouring
the British on this tack, as it had on the other, and enabling them to
lay up for the enemy's rear after which (French BB) they were standing
and could now bring to action. When the weather cleared, at 11, the
French were seen to have gone about again, all the ships together,
and were still in the confusion of a partly executed manoeuvre (CC).
Their admiral had doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and
from the direction of the enemy when last visible, that an encounter
could not be avoided. If he continued on the starboard tack, the van
of the pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be
misunderstood, would overtake his rear ships, engaging as many of
them as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of the
columns would meet, and the fleets pass in opposite directions, on
equal terms as regarded position; because all the French would engage,
and not only a part of their rear. Therefore he had ordered his ships
to go about, all at the same time; thus forming column again rapidly,
but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.
[Illustration]
Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did he
now. Recognising from the four days' chase that his enemy was avoiding
action, he judged correctly that he should force it, even at some
risk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade. Besides,
thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to chase, these,
forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he was advancing,
were now well to windward, able therefore to support their comrades,
if needful, as well as to attack the enemy. In short, practically the
whole force was coming into action, although much less regularly than
might have been desired. What was to follow was a rough-and-ready
fight, but it was all that could be had, and better than nothing.
Keppel therefore simply made the signal for battle, and that just as
the firing began. The collision was so sudden that the ships at first
had not their colours flying.
The French also, although their manoeuvres had been more methodical,
were in some confusion. It is not given to a body of thirty ships, of
varying qualities, to attain perfection of movement in a fortnight of
sea practice. The change of wind had precipitated an action, which one
admiral had been seeking, and the other shunning; but each had to meet
it with such shift as he could. The British (CC) being close-hauled,
the French (CC), advancing on a parallel line, were four points[45]
off the wind. Most of their ships, therefore, could have gone clear
to windward of their opponents, but the fact that the latter could
reach some of the leaders compelled the others to support them. As
d'Orvilliers had said, it was hard to avoid an enemy resolute to
fight. The leading three French vessels[46] (e) hauled their wind, in
obedience to the admiral's signal to form the line of battle, which
means a close-hauled line. The effect of this was to draw them
gradually away from the hostile line, taking them out of range of the
British centre and rear. This, if imitated by their followers, would
render the affair even more partial and indecisive than such passing
by usually was. The fourth French ship began the action, opening fire
soon after eleven. The vessels of the opposing fleets surged by under
short canvas, (D), firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily much
handicapped by smoke, which prevented the clear sight of an enemy, and
caused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a broadside. "The
distance between the _Formidable_, 90, (Palliser's flagship) and the
_Egmont_, 74, was so short," testified Captain John Laforey, whose
three-decker, the _Ocean_, 90, was abreast and outside this interval,
"that it was with difficulty I could keep betwixt them to engage,
without firing upon them, and I was once very near on board the
_Egmont_,"--next ahead of the _Ocean_. The _Formidable_ kept her
mizzen topsail aback much of the time, to deaden her way, to make the
needed room ahead for the _Ocean_, and also to allow the rear ships
to close. "At a quarter past one," testified Captain Maitland of the
_Elizabeth_, 74, "we were very close behind the _Formidable_, and a
midshipman upon the poop called out that there was a ship coming on
board on the weatherbow. I put the helm up,... and found, when the
smoke cleared away, I was shot up under the _Formidable's_ lee. She
was then engaged with the two last ships in the French fleet, and, as
I could not fire at them without firing through the _Formidable_, I
was obliged to shoot on."[47] Captain Bazely, of the _Formidable_,
says of the same incident, "The _Formidable_ did at the time of action
bear up to one of the enemy's ships, to avoid being aboard of her,
whose jib boom nearly touched the main topsail weather leech of the
_Formidable_. I thought we could not avoid being on board."
Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in killed
and wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of the two
others.[48] This was due to the morning signal to chase to windward,
which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As soon as the
British van, ten ships, had passed the French rear, its commander,
Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, anticipating Keppel's wishes,
signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 2, V). As the
French column was running free, these ships, when about, fetched to
windward of its wake. When the _Victory_ drew out of the fire, at 1
P.M., Keppel also made a similar signal, and attempted to wear (c),
the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking; but caution was
needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and it
was not till 2 P.M., that the _Victory_ was about on the other tack
(Fig. 2, C), heading after the French. At this time, 2 P.M., just
before or just after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down,
and that for the line of battle was hoisted. The object of the latter
was to re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partly
because no longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradict
the urgent call for a re-formation.
At this time six or seven of Harland's division were on the weather
bow of the _Victory_, to windward (westward), but a little ahead, and
standing like her after the French; all on the port tack (Fig. 2).
None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flagship at once.
At 2.30 Palliser's ship, the _Formidable_ (R), on the starboard tack,
passed the _Victory_ to leeward, apparently the last of the fleet out
of action. A half-hour after this the _Victory_ had been joined by
three of the centre, which were following her in close order, the van
remaining in the same relative position. Astern of these two groups
from van and centre were a number of other ships in various degrees
of confusion,--some going about, some trying to come up, others
completely disabled. Especially, there was in the south-south-east,
therefore well to leeward, a cluster of four or five British vessels,
evidently temporarily incapable of manoeuvring.
This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral,
scanning the field as the smoke drove away. The disorder of the
British, which originated in the general chase, had increased through
the hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminated
in the conditions just described. It was an inevitable result of a
military exigency confronted by a fleet only recently equipped. The
French, starting from a better formation, had come out in better
shape. But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy the
disadvantage of a policy essentially defensive; and d'Orvilliers'
next order, though well conceived, was resultless. At 1 P.M.[49] he
signalled his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battle
on the starboard tack (Fig. 2, F). This signal was not seen by the
leading ship, which should have begun the movement. The junior French
admiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went about, and
spoke the flagship, to know what was the Commander-in-Chief's desire.
D'Orvilliers explained that he wished to pass along the enemy's fleet
from end to end, to _leeward_, because in its disordered state there
was a fair promise of advantage, and by going to leeward--presenting
his weather side to the enemy--he could use the weather lower-deck
guns, whereas, in the then state of the sea, the lee lower ports could
not be opened. Thus explained, the movement was executed, but the
favourable moment had passed. It was not till 2.30 that the manoeuvre
was evident to the British.
[Illustration]
As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent's intention, he wore the
_Victory_ again, (d), a few minutes after 3 P.M., and stood slowly
down, on the starboard tack _off the wind_, towards his crippled ships
in the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line of
battle, which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station
(Fig. 3, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy,
(F), Palliser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight,--a
preposterous extravagancy. Harland put his division about at once
and joined the Admiral. On this tack his station was ahead of the
_Victory_, but in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell in
behind her, to cover the rear until Palliser's division could repair
damage and take their places. At 4 P.M. Harland's division was in the
line. Palliser's ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselves
before or behind his flagship; their captains considering, as they
testified, that they took station from their divisional commander, and
not from the ship of the Commander-in-Chief. There was formed thus,
on the weather quarter of the _Victory_, and a mile or two distant, a
separate line of ships, constituting on this tack the proper rear of
the fleet, and dependent for initiative on Palliser's flagship (Fig.
3, R). At 5 P.M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasten
into the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, the
French now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not attacked, as
they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee of the British,
their van abreast the latter's centre. At the same time Harland was
directed to move to his proper position in the van, which he at
once did (Fig. 3, V). Palliser made no movement, and Keppel with
extraordinary--if not culpable--forbearance refrained from summoning
the rear ships into line by their individual pennants. This he at last
did about 7 P.M., signalling specifically to each of the vessels then
grouped with Palliser, (except his own flagship), to leave the latter
and take their posts in the line. This was accordingly done, but it
was thought then to be too late to renew the action. At daylight the
next morning, only three French ships were in sight from the decks;
but the main body could be seen in the south-east from some of the
mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to twenty miles distant.
Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish; the
British loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the French 161
killed and 513 wounded. The general result would appear to indicate
that the French, in accordance with their usual policy, had fired to
cripple their enemy's spars and rigging, the motive-power. This would
be consistent with d'Orvilliers' avowed purpose of avoiding action
except under favourable circumstances. As the smoke thickened and
confusion increased, the fleets had got closer together, and, whatever
the intention, many shot found their way to the British hulls.
Nevertheless, as the returns show, the number of men hit among the
French was to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand, it is
certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the action was
greater than that of the British.
Both sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point of honour,
or of credit, for material advantage accrued to neither. Keppel
had succeeded in forcing d'Orvilliers to action against his will;
d'Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superiority
of manoeuvring power after the engagement. Had his next signal been
promptly obeyed, he might have passed again by the British fleet, in
fairly good
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