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The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya

by unknown · English · public domain in the US

  • Language English
  • PG edition 2005
  • Rights public domain (US)
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Contents

    INTRODUCTION.

    To the sacred literature of the Brahmans, in the strict sense of the term, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of complementary works without whose assistance the student is, according to Hindu notions, unable to do more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be understood, be read together with running commentaries such as Sâya/n/a's commentaries on the Sa/m/hitâs and Brâhma/n/as, and the Bhâshyas ascribed to Sa@nkara on the chief Upanishads.

    But these commentaries do not by themselves conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts, since they confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached passage without investigating its relation to other passages, and the whole of which they form part; considerations of the latter kind are at any rate introduced occasionally only.

    The task of taking a comprehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a whole, of systematising what they present in an unsystematical form, of showing the mutual co-ordination or subordination of single passages and sections, and of reconciling contradictions--which, according to the view of the orthodox commentators, can be apparent only--is allotted to a separate sâstra or body of doctrine which is termed Mîmâ/m/sâ, i.e. the investigation or enquiry [Greek: kat ezochaen], viz. the enquiry into the connected meaning of the sacred texts.

    Of this Mîmâ/m/sâ two branches have to be distinguished, the so-called earlier (pûrva) Mîmâ/m/sâ, and the later (uttara) Mîmâ/m/sâ. The former undertakes to systematise the karmakâ/nd/a, i.e. that entire portion of the Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial action, and which comprises the Sa/m/hitâs and the Brâhma/n/as exclusive of the Âra/n/yaka portions; the latter performs the same service with regard to the so-called j/ñ/ânaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Vedic writings which includes the Âra/n/yaka portions of the Brâhma/n/as, and a number of detached treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not action but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.

    At what period these two /s/âstras first assumed a definite form, we are unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature of those which constitute the subject-matter of the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ must have arisen at a very early period, and the word Mîmâ/m/sâ itself together with its derivatives is already employed in the Brâhma/n/as to denote the doubts and discussions connected with certain contested points of ritual.

    The want of a body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i.e. how to perform the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of the Veda, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether practical want, continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in ritualistic duties.

    And the task of establishing such rules was moreover a comparatively limited and feasible one; for the members of a certain Vedic sâkhâ or school had to do no more than to digest thoroughly their own brâhma/n/a and sa/m/hitâ, without being under any obligation of reconciling with the teaching of their own books the occasionally conflicting rules implied in the texts of other sâkhâs.

    It was assumed that action, as being something which depends on the will and choice of man, admits of alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be performed in different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or even by the followers of one and the same sâkhâ.

    The Uttara Mîmâ/m/sâ-/s/âstra may be supposed to have originated considerably later than the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ. In the first place, the texts with which it is concerned doubtless constitute the latest branch of Vedic literature. And in the second place, the subject-matter of those texts did not call for a systematical treatment with equal urgency, as it was in no way connected with practice; the mental attitude of the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definiteness and coherence, may have perpetuated itself through many generations without any great inconvenience resulting therefrom.

    But in the long run two causes must have acted with ever-increasing force, to give an impulse to the systematic working up of the teaching of the Upanishads also.

    The followers of the different Vedic sâkhâs no doubt recognised already at an early period the truth that, while conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got over by the assumption of a vikalpa, i.e. an optional proceeding, it is not so with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation to it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the like.

    Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and it therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who look on the whole body of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate that their teaching forms a consistent whole free from all contradictions.

    In addition there supervened the external motive that, while the karmakâ/nd/a of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of brahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins certain sacrificial performances connected with certain rewards, the j/ñ/ânâkâ/nd/a, as propounding a certain theory of the world, towards which any reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox community could not but take up a definite position, must soon have become the object of criticism on the part of those who held different views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood in need of systematic defence.

    At present there exists a vast literature connected with the two branches of the Mîmâ/m/sâ. We have, on the one hand, all those works which constitute the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-/s/âstra--or as it is often, shortly but not accurately, termed, the Mîmâ/m/sâ-/s/âstra--and, on the other hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under the name Vedânta-/s/âstra.

    At the head of this extensive literature there stand two collections of Sûtras (i.e. short aphorisms constituting in their totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed authors are Jainini and Bâdarâya/n/a. There can, however, be no doubt that the composition of those two collections of Sûtras was preceded by a long series of preparatory literary efforts of which they merely represent the highly condensed outcome.

    This is rendered probable by the analogy of other /s/âstras, as well as by the exhaustive thoroughness with which the Sûtras perform their task of systematizing the teaching of the Veda, and is further proved by the frequent references which the Sûtras make to the views of earlier teachers.

    If we consider merely the preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sûtras (of the two Mîmâ/m/sâs as well as of other /s/âstras) mark the beginning; if we, however, take into account what once existed, although it is at present irretrievably lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central position, summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary essays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand, the head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days, and may yet have some future before itself.

    The general scope of the two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras and their relation to the Veda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some importance between the two has, however, to be noted in this connexion.

    The systematisation of the karmakâ/nd/a of the Veda led to the elaboration of two classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sûtras on the one hand, and the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras on the other hand. The former give nothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices enjoined in the Brâhma/n/as; while the latter discuss and establish the general principles which the author of a Kalpa-sûtra has to follow, if he wishes to render his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of the Veda.

    The j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda, on the other hand, is systematised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mîmâ/m/sâ or Vedânta-sûtras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing the special interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sûtras. This difference may be accounted for by two reasons.

    In the first place, the contents of the karmakâ/nd/a, as being of an entirely practical nature, called for summaries such as the Kalpa-sûtras, from which all burdensome discussions of method are excluded; while there was no similar reason for the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place, the Vedânta-sûtras throughout presuppose the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras, and may therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods already established in the latter.

    The time at which the two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras were composed we are at present unable to fix with any certainty; a few remarks on the subject will, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that common to all the so-called Sûtras which aims at condensing a given body of doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and often even mere detached words in lieu of sentences.

    Besides the Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras this literary form is common to the fundamental works on the other philosophic systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on sacred law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras occupy, however, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All Sûtras aim at conciseness; that is clearly the reason to which this whole species of literary composition owes its existence.

    This their aim they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repetitions, and, as in the case of the grammatical Sûtras, by the employment of an arbitrarily coined terminology which substitutes single syllables for entire words or combination of words. At the same time the manifest intention of the Sûtra writers is to express themselves with as much clearness as the conciseness affected by them admits of.

    The aphorisms are indeed often concise to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically obscure, the manifest care of the writers being to retain what is essential in a given phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied, although perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory and reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary Sûtras. Altogether different is the case of the two Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras.

    There scarcely one single Sûtra is intelligible without a commentary.

    The most essential words are habitually dispensed with; nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple ommission of the subject or predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sûtra occurs whose words construe without anything having to be supplied, the phraseology is so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a commentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sûtra refers. When undertaking to translate either of the Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras we therefore depend altogether on commentaries; and hence the question arises which of the numerous commentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to their right understanding.

    The commentary here selected for translation, together with Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras (to which we shall henceforth confine our attention to the exclusion of Jaimini's Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras), is the one composed by the celebrated theologian /S/a@nkara or, as he is commonly called, /S/a@nkarâ/k/ârya. There are obvious reasons for this selection.

    In the first place, the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya represents the so-called orthodox side of Brahminical theology which strictly upholds the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as something different from, and in fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as Vish/n/u or Siva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects of popular worship in India.

    In the second place, the doctrine advocated by /S/a@nkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedânta which diverge from the view represented by /S/a@nkara nor any of the non-Vedântic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedânta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation.

    In the third place, /S/a@nkara's bhâashya is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant commentaries, and relative antiquity is at any rate one of the circumstances which have to be taken into account, although, it must be admitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. The /S/a@nkara-bhâshya further is the authority most generally deferred to in India as to the right understanding of the Vedânta-sûtras, and ever since /S/a@nkara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging to his school.

    If in addition to all this we take into consideration the intrinsic merits of /S/a@nkara's work which, as a piece of philosophical argumentation and theological apologetics, undoubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will be easily understood.

    But to the European--or, generally, modern--translator of the Vedânta-sûtras with /S/a@nkara's commentary another question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not /S/a@nkara's explanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the Sûtras. To the Indian Pandit of /S/a@nkara's school this question has become an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects to it being raised, as he looks on /S/a@nkara's authority as standing above doubt and dispute.

    When pressed to make good his position he will, moreover, most probably not enter into any detailed comparison of /S/a@nkara's comments with the text of Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras, but will rather endeavour to show on speculative grounds that /S/a@nkara's philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course follows that it accurately represents the meaning of Bâdarâya/n/a, who himself must necessarily be assured to have taught the true doctrine.

    But on the modern investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the authority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative wants, it is clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the outset in the interpretations given of the Vedânta-sûtras--and the Upanishads--by /S/a@nkara and his school, but to submit them, as far as that can be done, to a critical investigation.

    This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if /S/a@nkara's views as to the true meaning of the Sûtras and Upanishads had never been called into doubt on Indian soil, although in that case it could perhaps hardly be entered upon with much hope of success; but it becomes much more urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet in India itself with systems claiming to be Vedântic and based on interpretations of the Sûtras and Upanishads more or less differing from those of /S/a@nkara.

    The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the right understanding of the fundamental authorities of the Vedânta must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to reject them.

    It appears that already at a very early period the Vedânta-sûtras had come to be looked upon as an authoritative work, not to be neglected by any who wished to affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present, at any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Bâdarâya/n/a's teaching.

    Owing to this the commentaries on the Sûtras have in the course of time become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing, much less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen commentaries, copies of which had been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for instance, Râmânuja's Vedânta-sâra, No.

    XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the strict sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sûtras; but, on the other hand, there are in existence several true commentaries which had not been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be practical--and certainly not feasible in this place--to submit all the existing bhâshyas to a critical enquiry at once.

    All we can do here is to single out one or a few of the more important ones, and to compare their interpretations with those given by /S/a@nkara, and with the text of the Sûtras themselves.

    The bhâshya, which in this connexion is the first to press itself upon our attention, is the one composed by the famous Vaish@nava theologian and philosopher Râmânuja, who is supposed to have lived in the twelfth century. The Râmânuja or, as it is often called, the /S/rî-bhâshya appears to be the oldest commentary extant next to /S/a@nkara's.

    It is further to be noted that the sect of the Râmânujas occupies a pre-eminent position among the Vaishnava, sects which themselves, in their totality, may claim to be considered the most important among all Hindu sects.

    The intrinsic value of the /S/rî-bhâshya moreover is--as every student acquainted with it will be ready to acknowledge--a very high one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a writer of extensive learning and great power of argumentation, and in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of /S/a@nkara, it not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of Râmânuja's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty tradition.

    This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance.

    If it could be demonstrated or even rendered probable only that the oldest bhâshya which we possess, i.e. the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya, represents an uninterrupted and uniform tradition bridging over the interval between Bâdarâya/n/a, the reputed author of the Sûtras, and /S/a@nkara; and if, on the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern bhâshyas are not supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts of clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised authority into the service of their individual tenets; there would certainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later bhâshyas can help us in making out the true meaning of the Sûtras.

    All we should have to do in that case would be to accept /S/a@nkara's interpretations as they stand, or at the utmost to attempt to make out, if at all possible, by a careful comparison of /S/a@nkara's bhâshya with the text of the Sûtras, whether the former in all cases faithfully represents the purport of the latter.

    In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the question as to how far we have to accept /S/a@nkara as a guide to the right understanding of the Sûtras (Mr. A. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp.

    239 ff.) that /S/a@nkara is the generally recognised expositor of true Vedânta doctrine, that that doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening between him and the Sûtrakâra, and that there existed from the beginning only one Vedânta doctrine, agreeing in all essential points with the doctrine known to us from /S/a@nkara's writings. Mr.

    Gough undertakes to prove this view, firstly, by a comparison of /S/a@nkara's system with the teaching of the Upanishads themselves; and, secondly, by a comparison of the purport of the Sûtras--as far as that can be made out independently of the commentaries--with the interpretations given of them by /S/a@nkara. To both these points we shall revert later on.

    Meanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even if we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being confronted by a considerable number of essentially differing theories, all of which claim to be founded on the Upanishads.

    And with regard to the latter point I have to say for the present that, as long as we have only /S/a@nkara's bhâshya before us, we are naturally inclined to find in the Sûtras--which, taken by themselves, are for the greater part unintelligible--the meaning which /S/a@nkara ascribes to them; while a reference to other bhâshyas may not impossibly change our views at once.--Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the unbroken uniformity of Vedântic tradition from another point or view, viz. by enquiring whether or not the Sûtras themselves, and the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya, furnish any indications of there having existed already at an early time essentially different Vedântic systems or lines of Vedântic speculation.

    Beginning with the Sûtras, we find that they supply ample evidence to the effect that already at a very early time, viz. the period antecedent to the final composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present shape, there had arisen among the chief doctors of the Vedânta differences of opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but affecting the most essential parts of the system.

    In addition to Bâdarâya/n/a himself, the reputed author of the Sûtras, the latter quote opinions ascribed to the following teachers: Âtreya, Â/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi, Kârsh/n/âgini, Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna, Jaimini, Bâdari. Among the passages where diverging views of those teachers are recorded and contrasted three are of particular importance.

    Firstly, a passage in the fourth pâda of the fourth adhyâya (Sûtras 5-7), where the opinions of various teachers concerning the characteristics of the released soul are given, and where the important discrepancy is noted that, according to Au/d/ulomi, its only characteristic is thought (/k/aitanya), while Jaimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and Bâdarâya/n/a declares himself in favour of a combination of those two views.--The second passage occurs in the third pâda of the fourth adhyâya (Sûtras 7-14), where Jaimini maintains that the soul of him who possesses the lower knowledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest Brahman, while Bâdari--whose opinion is endorsed by /S/a@nkara--teaches that it repairs to the lower Brahman only--Finally, the third and most important passage is met with in the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya (Sûtras 20-22), where the question is discussed why in a certain passage of the Brhadâra/n/yaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are strictly applicable to the individual soul only.

    In connexion therewith the Sûtras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relation in which the individual soul stands to Brahman. According to Â/s/marathya (if we accept the interpretation of his view given by /S/a@nkara and /S/a@nkara's commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in the bhedâbheda relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire.

    Audulomi, on the other hand, teaches that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time when obtaining final release it is merged in it, and Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is absolutely non-different from Brahman; which, in, some way or other presents itself as the individual soul.

    That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose speculations and discussions is embodied in the Vedânta-sûtras, disagreed among themselves on points of vital importance is sufficiently proved by the three passages quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as showing that recognised authorities--deemed worthy of being quoted in the Sûtras--denied that doctrine on which the whole system of /S/a@nkara hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman.

    Turning next to the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya itself, we there also meet with indications that the Vedântins were divided among themselves on important points of dogma. These indications are indeed not numerous: /S/a@nkara, does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not failed to remark and criticise.

    But yet more than once /S/a@nkara also refers to the opinion of 'another,' viz., commentator of the Sûtras, and in several places /S/a@nkara's commentators explain that the 'other' meant is the V/ri/ttikâra (about whom more will be said shortly). Those references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and hence throw little or no light on important differences of dogma; but there are two remarks of /S/a@nkara's at any rate which are of interest in this connexion.

    The one is made with reference to Sûtras 7-14 of the third pâda of the fourth adhyâya; 'some,' he says there, 'declare those Sûtras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhânta view, to state merely the pûrvapaksha;' a difference of opinion which, as we have seen above, affects the important question as to the ultimate fate of those who have not reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman.--And under I, 3, 19 /S/a@nkara, after having explained at length that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it is identical with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu vâdina/h/ pâramârthikam eva jaiva/m/ rûpam iti manyante asmadîyâ/s/ /k/a ke/k/it,' i.e. other theorisers again, and among them some of ours, are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real.' The term 'ours,' here made use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or Vedântins, and it thus appears that /S/a@nkara himself was willing to class under the same category himself and philosophers who--as in later times the Râmânujas and others--looked upon the individual soul as not due to the fictitious limitations of Mâyâ, but as real in itself; whatever may be the relation in which they considered it to stand to the highest Self.

    From what precedes it follows that the Vedântins of the school to which /S/a@nkara himself belonged acknowledged the existence of Vedântic teaching of a type essentially different from their own. We must now proceed to enquire whether the Râmânuja system, which likewise claims to be Vedânta, and to be founded on the Vedânta-sûtras, has any title to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition.

    It appears that Râmânuja claims--and by Hindu writers is generally admitted--to follow in his bhâshya the authority of Bodhâyana, who had composed a v/ri/tti on the Sûtras. Thus we read in the beginning of the /S/rî-bhâshya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p.

    163), 'Bhagavad-bodhâyanak/ri/tâ/m/ vistîrnâ/m/ brahmasûtra-v/ri/tti/m/ pûrvâ/k/âryâ/h/ sa/m/kikshipus tanmatânusâre/n/a sûtrâksharâ/n/i vyâkhyâsyante.' Whether the Bodhâyana to whom that v/ri/tti is ascribed is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sûtra, and other works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient v/ri/tti on the Sûtras connected with Bodhâyana's name actually existed, there is not any reason to doubt.

    Short quotations from it are met with in a few places of the /S/rî-bhâshya, and, as we have seen above, /S/a@nkara's commentators state that their author's polemical remarks are directed against the V/ri/ttikâra. In addition to Bodhâyana, Râmânuja appeals to quite a series of ancient teachers--pûrvâ/k/âryâs--who carried on the true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedânta and the meaning of the Sûtras.

    In the Vedârthasa@ngraha--a work composed by Râmânuja himself--we meet in one place with the enumeration of the following authorities: Bodhâyana, /T/a@nka, Drami/d/a, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharu/k/i, and quotations from the writings of some of these are not unfrequent in the Vedârthasa@ngraha, as well as the /S/rî-bhâshya. The author most frequently quoted is Drami/d/a, who composed the Drami/d/a-bhâshya; he is sometimes referred to as the bhâshyakâra.

    Another writer repeatedly quoted as the vâkyakâra is, I am told, to be identified with the /T/a@nka mentioned above. I refrain from inserting in this place the information concerning the relative age of these writers which may be derived from the oral tradition of the Râmânuja sect. From another source, however, we receive an intimation that Drami/d/â/k/ârya or Dravi/d/â/k/ârya preceded /S/a@nkara in point of time.

    In his /t/îkâ on /S/a@nkara's bhâshya to the Chândogya Upanishad III, 10, 4, Ânandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of Sm/ri/ti on the same point is a reproduction of the analogous attempt made by the Dravi/d/â/k/ârya.

    It thus appears that that special interpretation of the Vedânta-sûtras with which the /S/rî-bhâshya makes us acquainted is not due to innovating views on the part of Râmânuja, but had authoritative representatives already at a period anterior to that of /S/a@nkara. This latter point, moreover, receives additional confirmation from the relation in which the so-called Râmânuja sect stands to earlier sects.

    What the exact position of Râmânuja was, and of what nature were the reforms that rendered him so prominent as to give his name to a new sect, is not exactly known at present; at the same time it is generally acknowledged that the Râmânujas are closely connected with the so-called Bhâgavatas or Pâ/ñk/arâtras, who are known to have existed already at a very early time.

    This latter point is proved by evidence of various kinds; for our present purpose it suffices to point to the fact that, according to the interpretation of the most authoritative commentators, the last Sûtras of the second pâda of the second adhyâya (Vedânta-sûtras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhâgavatas--which tenet forms part of the Râmânuja system also--viz. that the highest being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyûha) as Vâsudeva, Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those four forms being identical with the highest Self, the individual soul, the internal organ (manas), and the principle of egoity (aha@nkâra).

    Whether those Sûtras embody an approval of the tenet referred to, as Râmânuja maintains, or are meant to impugn it, as /S/a@nkara thinks; so much is certain that in the opinion of the best commentators the Bhâgavatas, the direct forerunners of the Râmânujas, are mentioned in the Sûtras themselves, and hence must not only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree of importance at the time when the Sûtras were composed.

    And considering the general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhâgavatas and the later Râmânujas, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were at one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedânta-sûtras.

    The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to show that it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how Râmânuja interprets the Sûtras, and wherein he differs from /S/a@nkara. This in fact seems clearly to be the first step we have to take, if we wish to make an attempt at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of scholiasts to the meaning of the Sûtras themselves.

    A full and exhaustive comparison of the views of the two commentators would indeed far exceed the limits of the space which can here he devoted to that task, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage when the complete Sanskrit text of the /S/rî-bhâshya has been printed, and thus made available for general reference.

    But meanwhile it is possible, and--as said before--even urged upon a translator of the Sûtras to compare the interpretations, given by the two bhâshyakâras, of those Sûtras, which, more than others, touch on the essential points of the Vedânta system. This will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara/n/as of the Vedânta-sûtras, according to /S/a@nkara; a review which--apart from the side-glances at Râmânuja's comments--will be useful as a guide through the Sûtras and the /S/a@nkara-bhâshya.

    Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of /S/a@nkara as well as of Râmânuja, which may be referred to when, later on discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted.

    In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details. Of /S/a@nkara's system we possess as it is more than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to Deussen's System of the Vedânta, in which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be learned from the Sûtra-bhâshya, are represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid sketch of the /S/a@nkara Vedânta, founded on the Sûtra-bhâshya, the Upanishad bhâshyas, and some later writers belonging to /S/a@nkara's school.

    With regard to Râmânuja's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Râmânuja chapter in the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the /S/rî-bhâshya itself.

    What in /S/a@nkara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as follows.--Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Paramâtman, the highest Self. This being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is pure 'Being,' or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (/k/aitanya, j/ñ/âna). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance, Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself.

    It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it.--But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, in which we ourselves exist as individual beings?--Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a certain power called Mâyâ or avidyâ to which the appearance of this entire world is due.

    This power cannot be called 'being' (sat), for 'being' is only Brahman; nor can it be called 'non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a principle of illusion; the undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences.

    Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of animate and inanimate beings. Mâyâ thus constitutes the upâdâna, the material cause of the world; or--if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that Mâyâ belongs to Brahman as a /s/akti--we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with Mâyâ.

    In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called Î/s/vara, the Lord.

    Mâyâ, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive evolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of which the world consists; from it there spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole bodily apparatus belonging to sentient Beings.

    In all those apparently, individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Mâyâ has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up--it is broken up, as it were--into a multiplicity, of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called jîvas (individual or personal souls).

    What is real in each jîva is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and distinguish one jîva from another, is the offspring of Mâyâ and as such unreal.

    The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahâra) thus consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for both are altogether due to Mâyâ.

    But at the same time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are.

    The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond Mâyâ, which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (upâdhi), the fictitious offspring of Mâyâ, and thus looks for its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ (manas), i.e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer.

    Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future embodied existences, the Lord--as a retributor and dispenser--allotting to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its previous actions.

    At the end of each of the great world periods called kalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Mâyâ, while the individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion with upâdhis, lie in deep slumber as it were.

    But as the consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted, they have again to enter on embodied existence as soon as the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old round of birth, action, death begins anew to last to all eternity as it has lasted from all eternity.

    The means of escaping from this endless sa/ms/ára, the way out of which can never be found by the non-enlightened soul, are furnished by the Veda. The karmaká/nd/a indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain actions, cannot lead to final release; for even the most meritorious works necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence.

    And in the j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda also two different parts have to be distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and passages which treat of Brahman in so far as related to the world, and hence characterised by various attributes, i.e. of Î/s/vara or the lower Brahman; and, secondly, those texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman transcending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the individual soul with that highest Brahman.

    Devout meditation on Brahman as suggested by passages of the former kind does not directly lead to final emancipation; the pious worshipper passes on his death into the world of the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as a distinct individual soul--although in the enjoyment of great power and knowledge--until at last he reaches the highest knowledge, and, through it, final release.--That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose soul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher knowledge of Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying, 'That art thou,' have taught that there is no difference between his true Self and the highest Self, obtains at the moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he withdraws altogether from the influence of Mâyâ, and asserts himself in his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman.

    Thus /S/a@nkara.--According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows.--There exists only one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self of the Lord.

    This being is not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 'intelligence,'--as /S/a@nkara maintains,--but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself whatever exists.

    While, according to /S/a@nkara, the only reality is to be found in the non-qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only be defined as pure 'Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a mere illusion; Brahman--according to Râmânuja's view--comprises within itself distinct elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute reality of one and the same kind.

    Whatever is presented to us by ordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications and the individual souls of different classes and degrees, are essential real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (a/k/it and /k/it) constitute, according to Râmânuja's terminology, the body of the Lord; they stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and subserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable body stands to its soul or animating principle.

    The Lord pervades and rules all things which exist--material or immaterial--as their antaryâmin; the fundamental text for this special Râmânuja tenet--which in the writings of the sect is quoted again and again--is the so-called antaryâmin brâhma/n/a. (B/ri/. Up.

    III, 7) which says, that within all elements, all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls, there abides an inward ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual souls constitute.--Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord are also called modes of him (prakâra). They are to be looked upon as his effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual existence which is theirs from all eternity, and will never be entirely resolved into Brahman. They, however, exist in two different, periodically alternating, conditions.

    At some times they exist in a subtle state in which they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily known, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form.

    Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta); the individual souls are not joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of contraction, non-manifestation (sa@nko/k/a). This is the pralaya state which recurs at the end of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in its causal condition (kâra/n/âvasthâ). To that state all those scriptural passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as being in the beginning one only, without a second.

    Brahman then is indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a germinal condition; but as in that condition they are so subtle as not to allow of individual distinctions being made, they are not counted as something second in addition to Brahman.--When the pralaya state comes to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of volition on the Lord's part.

    Primary unevolved matter then passes over into its other condition; it becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible attributes, visibility, tangibility, and so on, which are known from ordinary experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion with material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit acquired by them in previous forms of existence; their intelligence at the same time undergoes a certain expansion (vikâ/s/a).

    The Lord, together with matter in its gross state and the 'expanded' souls, is Brahman in the condition of an effect (káryâvasthâ). Cause and effect are thus at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but the cause which has undergone a certain change (pari/n/âma). Hence the cause being known, the effect is known likewise.

    Owing to the effects of their former actions the individual souls are implicated in the sa/m/sâra, the endless cycle of birth, action, and death, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study of the j/ñ/ânakâ/nd/a of the Veda.

    Compliance with the injunctions of the karmakâ/nd/a does not lead outside the sa/m/sâra; but he who, assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes--and meditates on--him in the way prescribed by the Upanishads reaches at his death final emancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the path of the gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an everlasting blissful existence from which there is no return into the sphere of transmigration.

    The characteristics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract the entire world.

    The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as follows.--Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the prak/r/iti and the purushas of the Sâ@nkhyas, but there exists only one all-embracing being.

    While, however, the advaita taught by /S/a@nkara is a rigorous, absolute one, Râmânuja's doctrine has to be characterised as visish/t/a advaita, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a difference. According to Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality must be illusory.

    According to Râmânuja also, whatever is, is Brahman; but Brahman is not of a homogeneous nature, but contains within itself elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a diversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal Mâyâ, but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self.

    The Brahman of /S/a@nkara is in itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless thought, transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only through its association with the unreal principle of Mâyâ, so that--strictly speaking--/S/a@nkara's personal God, his Î/s/vara, is himself something unreal. Râmânuja's Brahman, on the other hand, is essentially a personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world permeated and animated by his spirit.

    There is thus no room for the distinction between a param nirgu/n/am and an apara/m/ sagu/n/am brahma, between Brahman and Î/s/vara.--/S/a@nkara's individual soul is Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal upâdhis due to Mâyâ.

    The individual soul of Râmânuja, on the other hand, is really individual; it has indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brahman, but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal existence and will remain a personality for ever--The release from sa/m/sâra means, according to /S/a@nkara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the dismissal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from Brahman; according to Râmânuja it only means the soul's passing from the troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will remain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss.--As Râmânuja does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one result only [1].

    I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedânta-sûtras according to /S/a@nkara in which at the same time all the more important points concerning which Râmânuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of the different modes of interpretation which have been applied to the Sûtras.

    The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the present nothing can be taken for granted or known.--In stating the different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/n/as), each of which comprises one or more Sûtras, I shall follow the subdivision into adhikara/n/as adopted in the Vyâsâdhika-ra/n/amâlâ, the text of which is printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Sûtras.

    FIRST ADHYÂYA.

    PÂDA I.

    The first five adhikara/n/as lay down the fundamental positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik. I (1) [2] treats of what the study of the Vedânta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates, and so on. Adhik. III (3) declares that Brahman is the source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedânta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11) is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brahman, which the Vedânta-texts represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent pradhâna from which the world springs according to the Sâ@nkhyas.

    With the next adhikara/n/a there begins a series of discussions of essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first adhyâya.

    The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the jîva, the individual soul. /S/a@nkara remarks at the outset that, as the preceding ten Sûtras had settled the all-important point that all the Vedânta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry should be continued any further, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknowledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts of primâ facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brahman as the object of devout meditation, or the higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge.

    But that such an investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first adhyâya, appears neither from the wording of the Sûtras nor even from /S/a@nkara's own treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the Sûtras.

    In I, 1, 20, for instance, the question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured eyes--of whom the Chândogya Upanishad speaks in 1, 6, 6--is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord. /S/a@nkara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Mâyâ.

    So that according to /S/a@nkara himself the alternative lies between the sagu/n/a Brahman and some particular individual soul, not between the sagu/n/a Brahman and the nirgu/n/a Brahman.

    Adhik.

    VI (12-19) raises the question whether the ânandamaya, mentioned in Taittirîya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. /S/a@nkara begins by explaining the Sûtras on the latter supposition--and the text of the Sûtras is certainly in favour of that interpretation--gives, however, finally the preference to a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the Sûtras teach that the ânandamaya is not Brahman, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the ânandamaya[3].--Râmânuja's interpretation of Adhikara/n/a VI, although not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of /S/a@nkara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the ânandamaya is Brahman.

    It further deserves notice that, while /S/a@nkara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not, Râmânuja separates the adhikara/n/a from the subsequent part of the pâda and connects it with what had preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be identified with the pradhâna; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the system is thereby completed[4].--Adhik.

    VII (20, 21) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in Ch. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman.--Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to Ch. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest Brahman.--Adhik. IX (23). The prâ/n/a also mentioned in Ch. Up. I, ii, 5 denotes the highest Brahman[5]--Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Ch. Up.

    III, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman[6].--Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the prâ/n/a mentioned in Kau. Up. III, 2 is Brahman.

    PÂDA II.

    Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in Ch. Up. III, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman.

    The Sûtras of this adhikara/n/a emphatically dwell on the difference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence /S/a@nkara is obliged to add an explanation--in his comment on Sûtra 6--to the effect that that difference is to be understood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self.--The comment of Râmânuja throughout closely follows the words of the Sûtras; on Sûtra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul is [7].--Adhik.

    II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food (Ka/th/a. Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.--Adhik. III (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul[8].--Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman.--Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within (antarâymin) described in B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3 is Brahman.

    Sûtra 20 clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord; hence /S/a@nkara is obliged to remark that that difference is not real.--Adhik. VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c, mentioned in Mu/nd/aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.--Adhik. VII (24-32) shows that the âtman vai/s/vânara of Ch. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.

    PÂDA III.

    Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c. are woven (Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.--Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhûman referred to in Ch. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.--Adhik. III (10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to B/ri/. Up.

    III, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman.--Adhik. IV (13) decides that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om, according to Pra/s/na Up. V, 5, is not the lower but the higher Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahmâ (jîvasamash/t/irûpoz/nd/âdhipatis /k/aturmukha/h/).--Adhik. V and VI (comprising, according to /S/a@nkara, Sûtras l4-2l) discuss the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the individual soul or Brahman; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative the pûrvapakshin pleads the two passages Ch. Up.

    VIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasâda); for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to it the same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the heart.--But the reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true nature has become manifest, i.e. in which it is Brahman; so that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul but Brahman.

    And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests itself in its true nature.--What Râmânuja understands by the âvirbhâva of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4.

    The two next Sûtras (22, 23) constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (VII), proving that he 'after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted' (Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15) is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself.--According to Râmânuja the two Sûtras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sûtras.[9]

    Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

    The two next adhikara/n/as are of the nature of a digression.

    The passage about the a@ngush/th/amâtra was explained on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a question finally answered in the affirmative.--This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of beings stand to the words denoting them (Sûtra 28).

    In connexion herewith /S/a@nkara treats of the nature of words (/s/abda), opposing the opinion of the Mîmâ/m/saka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called 'spho/t/a,' which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX;

    Sûtras 26-33).

    Adhik. X (34-38) explains that /S/ûdras are altogether disqualified for Brahmavidyâ.

    Sûtra 39 constitutes, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (XI), proving that the prâ/n/a in which everything trembles, according to /K/a/th/a Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the Sûtra does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the decision arrived at under Sûtras 24, 25, viz. that the a@ngus/th/amâtra is Brahman.

    On this supposition, Sûtras 24-39 form one adhikara/n/a in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25.--The a@ngus/th/mâtra is referred to twice in the Ka/th/a Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4, 12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a thumb').

    To determine what is meant by the a@ngus/th/mâtra, Râmânuja says, we are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the two passages concerning the a@ngus/th/mâtra, and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in awe.

    The next Sûtra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion.

    According to /S/a@nkara it constitutes by itself a new adhikara/n/a (XII), proving that the 'light' (jyotis) mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the Sûtra continues the preceding adhikara/n/a, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a further argument, referring to Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15--a passage intermediate between the two passages about the a@ngush/th/amâtra--which speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman.

    The Sûtra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The a@ngush/th/amâtra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening between the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).'

    The three last Sûtras of the pâda are, according to /S/a@nkara, to be divided into two adhikara/n/as (XIII and XIV), Sûtra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms (Ch. Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vij/ñ/ânamaya, 'he who consists of knowledge,' of B/ri/. Up.

    IV, 3, 7 is not the individual soul but Brahman.--According to Râmânuja the three Sûtras make up one single adhikara/n/a discussing whether the Chandogya Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage immediately preceding ('Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes off his hair,' &c.).

    Sûtra 41 decides that 'the ether (is Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else,' &c.

    (i.e. of something other than the individual soul; other because to the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)--But, an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as Brahman?--(The two, Sûtra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as different' (from the soul)--which point is proved by the same scriptural passages which /S/a@nkara adduces;--and 'because such terms as Lord and the like' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43).

    Reference is made to IV, 4, 14, where all jagadvyâpâra is said to belong to the Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.

    PÂDA IV.

    The last pâda of the first adhyâya is specially directed against the Sâ@nkhyas.

    The first adhikara/n/a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/th/a Up. I, 3, 10; 11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped--both of them terms used with a special technical sense in the Sâ@nkhya-/s/âstra, avyakta being a synonym for pradhâna.--/S/a@nkara shows by an exhaustive review of the topics of the Ka/th/a Upanishad that the term avyakta has not the special meaning which the Sâ@nkhyas attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the subtle body (sûkshma /s/arîra), but at the same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the subtle one.

    Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to /S/a@nkara, that the tricoloured ajâ spoken of in /S/ve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhâna of the Sânkhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that power.--What Râmânuja in contradistinction from /S/a@nkara understands by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above of the two systems.

    Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the pa/ñk/a pa/ñk/ajanâ/h/ mentioned in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sâ@nkhyas.--Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world.

    Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to /S/a@nkara, meant to prove that 'he who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman.--The subject of the adhikara/n/a is essentially the same in Râmânuja's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara/n/a being polemical against the Sâ@nkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into an argument for the pradhâna doctrine.

    The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the next adhikara/n/a (VI; Sûtras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be seen, to be heard,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Râmânuja, made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sâ@nkhya who is anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sâ@nkhya purusha.

    Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well.

    The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (pari/n/âma; Sûtra 26).--Râmânuja views this adhikara/n/a as specially directed against the Se/s/vara-sâ@nkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord, but postulate in addition an independent pradhâna on which the Lord acts as an operative cause merely.

    Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sâ@nkhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms.

    After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyâya and the succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which is the principle on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sûtras have been selected and arranged; and, secondly, if, where /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja disagree as to the subdivision of the Sûtras into Adhikara/n/as, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in the Sûtras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general question as to how far the Sûtras favour either /S/a@nkara's or Râmânuja's general views cannot be considered at present.)

    The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by the consideration of a certain other one.

    Their explanations--which have occasionally been referred to in the notes to the translation--rest on the assumption that the Sûtrakâra in arranging the texts to be commented upon was guided by technicalities of the Mîmâ/m/sâ-system, especially by a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mîmâ/m/saka employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position of scriptural passages.

    But that this was the guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyâya, such as given by Deussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in which the Sûtras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the same time to exemplify the various pramâ/n/as of the Mîmâ/m/sâ in their due systematic succession.

    As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages discussed are taken from the Chândogya Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first adhyâya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those Chândogya passages of which it is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman or not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an opportunity offers.

    Considering the prominent position assigned to the Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sûtrakâra meant to begin the series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the Chândogya, and that hence the sixth adhikara/n/a which treats of the anândamaya mentioned in the Taittirîya Upanishad has, in agreement with Râmânuja's views, to be separated from the subsequent adhikara/n/as, and to be combined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the fundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature.--The remaining adhikara/n/as of the first pâda follow the order of passages in the Chândogya Upanishad, and therefore call for no remark; with the exception of the last adhikara/n/a, which refers to a Kaushîtaki passage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to account.--The first adhikara/n/a of the second pâda returns to the Chândogya Upanishad.

    The second one treats of a passage in the Ka/th/a Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason why that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly assigned in the /S/rî-bhâshya, which remarks that, as in the preceding Sûtra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a doubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest Self can be meant[10]--The third adhikara/n/a again, whose topic is the 'two entered into the cave' (Ka/th/a Up.

    I, 3, 1), appears, as Râmânuja remarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding adhikara/n/a; for if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the 'eater' since the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under the same prakara/n/a, and must therefore be held to refer to the same matter.--The fourth adhikara/n/a is again occupied with a Chândogya passage.--The fifth adhikara/n/a, whose topic is the Ruler within (antaryâmin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Râmânuja also, to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the preceding adhikara/n/a (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the argument [11].--The sixth adhikara/n/a, again, which discusses 'that which is not seen' (adre/s/ya; Mu/nd/.

    Up. I, 1, 6), is clearly introduced in this place because in the preceding adhikara/n/a it had been said that ad/ri/sh/t/a, &c. denote the highest Self;--The reasons to which the last adhikara/n/a of the second pâda and the first and third adhikara/n/as of the third pâda owe their places are not apparent (the second adhikara/n/a of the third pâda treats of a Chândogya passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the Pra/s/na Upanishad treating of the akshara.

    O/m/kâra is clearly due to the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been discussed in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--The fifth and sixth adhikara/n/as investigate Chândogya passages.--The two next Sûtras (22,

    1. are, as remarked above, considered by /S/a@nkara to constitute a new

    adhikara/n/a treating of the 'being after which everything shines' (Mu/nd/. Up. II, 2, 10); while Râmânuja looks on them as continuing the sixth adhikara/n/a. There is one circumstance which renders it at any rate probable that Râmânuja, and not /S/a@nkara, here hits the intention of the author of the Sûtras.

    The general rule in the first three pâdas is that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the subject of the discussion, i.e. that being which in the end is declared to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a nominative form [12]. From this rule there is in the preceding part of the adhyâya only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may be due to the fact that there a new pâda begins, and it therefore was considered superfluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a special word.

    The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent one; for, as remarked above, Sûtra 19 does not in reality begin a new adhikara/n/a.

    A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in their places.--Now neither Sûtra 22 nor Sûtra 23 contains any word intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration, and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Râmânuja, as continuing the topic of the preceding adhikara/n/a.--This conclusion receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next adhikara/n/a, which treats of the being 'a span long' mentioned in Ka/th/a Up.

    II, 4, 12; for the reason of this latter passage being considered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpa/s/ruti in Sûtra 21, and, if so, the a@ngush/th/amátra properly constitutes the subject of the adhikara/n/a immediately following on Adhik.

    V, VI; which, in its turn, implies that Sûtras 22, 23 do not form an independent adhikara/n/a.--The two next adhikara/n/as are digressions, and do not refer to special Vedic passages.--Sûtra 39 forms a new adhikara/n/a, according to /S/a@nkara, but not according to Râmânuja, whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sûtra does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic.

    The same difference of opinion prevails with regard to Sûtra 40, and it appears from the translation of the Sûtra given above, according to Râmânuja's view, that 'jyoti/h/' need not be taken as a nominative.--The last two adhikara/n/as finally refer, according to Râmânuja, to one Chândogya passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sûtra 42 does not comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be discussed.

    From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three first pâdas of the Vedánta-sûtras comprise all the doubtful--or at any rate all the more important doubtful--passages from the Chândogya Upanishad. These passages are arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them.

    Passages from other Upanishads are discussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain Chândogya passage is followed by a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a number of cases although not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily accounted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sûtras into adhikara/n/as adopted by Râmânuja, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sûtras.

    The fourth pâda of the first adhyâya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sâ@nkhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also--as is brought out much more clearly in the /S/rî-bhâshya than by /S/a@nkara--in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world.

    Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sûtrakâra of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the passages referred to in the first adhyâya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld.

    The Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras are throughout Mîmâ/m/sâ i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a primâ facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their meaning. Here and there we meet with Sutrâs which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point.

    But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutrâs to assume that a whole adhyâya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is sufficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara/n/as; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not.

    With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/n/as of the first adhyâya are occupied. That the Vedânta-sûtras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sâ@nkhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 23). The fifth adhikara/n/a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhâna, and the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya returns to an express polemic against Sâ@nkhya interpretations of certain Vedic statements.

    It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhyâya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sûtrakâra, to guard his own doctrine against Sâ@nkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sâ@nkhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious--and actually attempted--to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural passages.

    The Sâ@nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedântin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhâna or some product of the pradhâna, or else to the purusha in the Sânkhya sense, i.e. the individual soul.

    It consequently became the task of the Vedântin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyâya of the Vedânta-sûtras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length.

    But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sûtrakára; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is--or can possibly be--sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sûtras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the intricacies of the Mîmâ/m/sâ, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.

    Notes:

    [Footnote 1: The only 'sectarian' feature of the Srî-bhâshya is, that identifies Brahman with Vish/n/u or Nârâya/n/a; but this in no way affects the interpretations put on the Sûtras and Upanishads. Nârâya/n/a is in fact nothing but another name of Brahman.]

    [Footnote 2: The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikara/n/a; the figures in parentheses state the Sûtras comprised in each adhikara/n/a.]

    [Footnote 3: Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage conveying the second interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two objections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and explained by all commentators; in the second place, /S/a@nkara in the passage immediately preceding Sûtra 12 quotes the adhikara/n/a 'ânandamayo s bhyâsàt' as giving rise to a discussion whether the param or the aparam brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in that part of the bhâshya which sets forth the former explanation, but only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates the latter interpretation.]

    [Footnote 4: Eva/m/ jij/ñ/anasya brahma/nas/ /ko/tanabhogvabhutaga/d/arupsattvara, istamomayapradhânâd vyâv/ri/ttir uktâ, idânî/m/ karmava/s/vat trigu/n/atmakaprik/ri/u sa/m/sangammittanâmâvidhân intadukhasagaranimajjaonî/s/addhâ/h/. /k/i pratya gaumano nyan nikhilaheyapratauîka/m/ miatimyanandam brahmeti pratipadyate, anandamayo bhyásât.]

    [Footnote 5: There is no reason to consider the passage 'atra ke/k/it' in /S/a@nkara's bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p. 30). It simply contains a criticism passed by /S/a@nkara on other commentators.]

    [Footnote 6: To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text, which Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the remark made in the preceding note.]

    [Footnote 7: Gîvaysa iva parasyâpi brahma/n/a/h/ /s/arîrantarvaititvam abhyupagata/m/ /k/et tadvad eva /s/arîrasainbandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir hi /k/en na, hetuvai/s/eshyat, na hi /s/arîrântarvartitvam eva sukhadukhopabhogahetu/h/ api tu pu/n/yapàparnpakarmaparavasatva/m/ ta/k/ /K/àpahatapâpmana/h/ parahâtmano na sambhavati.]

    [Footnote 8: The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 of the Sanskrit text (beginning with apara âha) Deussen considers to be an interpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi upanishad in /S/a@nkara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason whatsoever for such an assumption. The passage on p.

    232 shows that /S/a@nkara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only in case of its having been quoted before by /S/a@nkara himself.--That the 'apara' quotes the B/ri/hadára/n/yaka not according to the Ka/n/va text--to quote from which is /S/a@nkara's habit--but from the Madhyandina text, is due just to the circumstance of his being an 'apara,' i.e. not /S/a@nkara.]

    [Footnote 9: Ita/s/ /k/aitad evam. Anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/a. Tasya daharâkâsasya parabrahma/n/o snukârâd ayam apahatapâpmatvâdigu/n/ako vimuktabandha/h/ pratyagâtmâ na daharakâ/s/a/h/ tadanukâras tatsâmya/m/ tathâ hi pratyagâlmanozpi vimuktasya parabrahmânukâra/h/ srûyate yadâ pa/s/ya/h/ pa/s/yate rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartâram î/s/a/m/ purusha/m/ brahmayoni/m/ tadâ vidvân pu/n/yapâpe vidhûya nira/ñg/ana/h/ parama/m/ sâmyam upaitîty atos'nukartâ prajâpativâkyanirdish/t/a/h/ anukârya/m/ para/m/ brahma na daharâkâ/s/a/h/. Api /k/a smaryate.

    Sa/m/sâri/n/oszpi muktâvasthâyâ/m/ paramasâmyâpattilaksha/n/a/h/ parabrahmânukâra/h/ smaryate ida/m/ j/ñ/ânam upâsritya, &c.--Ke/k/id anuk/ri/tes tasya /k/âpi smaryate iti /k/a sûtradvayam adhikara/n/ântara/m/ tam eva bhântam anubhâti sarva/m/ tasya bhâsâ sarvam ida/m/ vibhâtîty asyâ/h/ /s/rute/h/ parabrahmaparatvanir/n/ayâya prav/ri/tta/m/ vadanti.

    Tat tv ad/ris/yatvâdigu/n/ako dharmokte/h/ dyubhvâdyâyatana/m/ sva/s/abdâd ity adhi kara/n/advayena tasya prakara/n/asya brahmavishayatvapratipâdanât jyoti/sk/ara/n/âbhidhânât ity âdishu parasya brahma/n/o bhârûpatvâvagates /k/a pûrvapakshânutthânâd ayukta/m/ sûtrâksharavairûpya/k/ /k/a.]

    [Footnote 10: Yadi paramâtmâ na bhoktâ eva/m/ taihi bhokt /i/tayâ pratîyamâno jîva eva syâd ity âsankyâha attâ.]

    [Footnote 11: Sthânâdivyapade/s/â/k/ /k/a ity atra ya/h/ /k/akshushi tish/th/ann ity âdinâ pratipâdyamâna/m/ /k/akshushi sthitiniyamanâdika/m/ paramâtmana eveti siddha/m/ k/ri/tvâ akshipurushasya paramâtmatva/m/ sâdhitam idâni/m/ tad eva samarthayate antaryâû.]

    [Footnote 12: Ânandamaya/h/ I, 1, 12; anta/h/ I, i, 20; âkâ/s/a/h/ I, 1, 22; prâna/h/ I, 1, 23; jyoti/h/ I, 1, 24; prâna/h/ I, 1, 28; attâ I, 2, 9; guhâ/m/ pravish/t/au I, 2, 11; antara I, 2,13; antaryâmî I, 2, 18; ad/ris/yatvâdigu/n/aka/h/ I, 2, 21; vai/s/vânara/h/ I, 2, 24; dyubhvâdyâyatanam I, 3, 1; bhûmâ I, 3, 8; aksheram I, 3, 10; sa/h/ I, 3, 13; dahara/h/ I, 3, 14; pramita/h/ I, 3, 24; (jyoti/h/ 40;) âkâ/s/a/h/ I, 3,41.]

    SECOND ADHYÂYA.

    The first adhyâya has proved that all the Vedânta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedânta, more especially the Sâ@nkhya system. The task of the two first pâdas of the second adhyâya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedânta doctrine on purely speculative grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the systems irreconcilable with the Vedânta can be satisfactorily established.

    PÂDA I.

    Adhikara/n/a I refutes the Sâ@nkhya objection that the acceptation of the Vedânta system involves the rejection of the Sâ@nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Sm/ri/ti, and as such has claims on consideration.--To accept the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, the Vedântin replies, would compel us to reject other Sm/ri/tis, such as the Manu-sm/ri/ti, which are opposed to the Sâ@nkhya doctrine. The conflicting claims of Sm/ri/tis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sâ@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, but rather those Sm/ri/tis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause.

    Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-sm/ri/ti.

    Adhik. III (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman.

    For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes--as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted and thereby become simple gold again--do not continue to exist in those causes.--Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal substance participating in the same characteristics.

    Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning followed in the preceding adhikara/n/a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.

    The one Sûtra (13) constituting Adhik.

    V teaches, according to /S/a@nkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water.--The /S/rî-bhâshya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sûtra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed.

    Translated according to Râmânuja's view, the Sûtra runs as follows: 'If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circumstance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day experience.' That is to say: If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essentially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Râmânuja puts on the Sûtra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sûtra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears from a quotation made by Râmànuja from the Drami/d/abhâshyakâra[13].

    Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedânta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the Vai/s/eshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause.--The divergent views of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.

    Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected.

    For, the Sûtrakîra remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sûtras constituting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Râmânuja on the other is characteristic.

    Râmânuja throughout simply follows the words of the Sûtras, of which Sûtra 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sûtra 22 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sûtra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts.

    Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.

    Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to /S/a@nkara, because the world is unreal; according to Râmânuja, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.

    Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.

    Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

    Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.

    Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.

    PÂDA II.

    The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta view.--The first adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers.

    Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvâstitvavâdins, or bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vij/ñ/ânavâdins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.--The last Sûtra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Râmânuja as a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik.

    VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

    The last adhikara/n/a of the pâda (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas or Pâ/ñk/arâtras. But /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja totally disagree as to the drift of the Sûtrakâra's opinion regarding that system.

    According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.--Sûtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sûtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vâsudeva, there is originated Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and Sûtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarsha/n/a there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.--The Sûtra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44.

    Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'--This means, according to /S/a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sa@nkarsha/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sûtra 42 against the Bhâgavata doctrine).'--According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the Sûtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/ñk/arâtra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarsha/n/a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pâ/ñk/arâtra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.--The form of the Sûtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'vâ' and of the 'tat,' implied in Râmânuja's comment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/a@nkara's interpretation.

    Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pâda with a defence of that doctrine which--in spite of objections--has to be viewed as the true one.

    PÂDA III.

    The third pâda discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

    The first seven adhikara/n/as treat of the five elementary substances.--Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.--Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.--Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.

    Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.

    Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

    Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist.

    The remainder of the pâda is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the jîva.--Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

    Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.--This Sûtra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Râmânuja on the other.

    According to the former, the jîva is in reality identical--and as such co-eternal--with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.--According to Râmânuja, the jîva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakâra) of Brahman.

    So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate.

    The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikâsa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya.

    But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarûpânyathâbhâva) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.

    Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sûtra declares that the soul is 'j/ñ/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul.

    The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Râmânuja, on the other hand, explains 'j/ñ/a' by 'j/ñ/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sûtra to be directed not only against the Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the Sâ@nkhyas and the Vedântins of /S/a@nkara's school--maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the Sûtra certainly seems to favour Râmânuja's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term j/ñ/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/ñ/ât/ri/, not j/ñ/ânam.

    Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyâpin).

    Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.--In /S/a@nkara's opinion the Sûtras 19-38 represent the pûrvapaksha view, according to which the jîva is a/n/u, while Sûtra 29 formulates the siddhânta, viz. that the jîva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is a/n/u--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sa/m/sâra.--According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the first Sûtra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the siddhânta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sûtras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the Sûtras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sûtra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/ñ/ât/ri/) stands to knowledge (j/ñ/âna).--In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.--/S/a@nkara maintains that Sûtras 19-28 state and enforce a pûrvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29.

    What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere primâ facie view is carried; in no other place the Sûtras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bonâ fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system.

    Still it is not altogether impossible that the pûrvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with /S/a@nkara, look upon Sûtra 29 as embodying a refutation of the pûrvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that /S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sûtra is exceedingly forced.

    Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word 'prâj/ñ/avat') the Sûtra runs as follows: 'But on account of that quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality--or qualities--of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or "the designation of that").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sâra state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first 'tat' by buddhi.

    And--which is more important--in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.--can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the sa/m/sâra state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to /S/a@nkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.

    There are no similar difficulties in the way of Râmânuja's interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/a@nkara in the explanation of Sûtras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the pûrvapaksha, but the siddhânta. Sûtras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/a@nkara's, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge.

    This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vij/ñ/âna when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sûtra 29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever.

    It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sûtra which, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the pûrvapaksha, serves on Râmânuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate assumption.

    Of the three remaining Sûtras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains, according to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as long as it exists in the sa/m/sâra condition, it is connected with the buddhi.

    According to Râmânuja the Sûtra teaches that the soul may be called vij/ñ/âna because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists.--Sûtra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest.

    The same Sûtra, according to Râmânuja, teaches that j/ñ/ât/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only.--In Sûtra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while, according to Râmânuja, the Sûtra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jñ/ât/ri/ and a/n/u, as it is in reality).--The three Sûtras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

    Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jîva, i.e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sûtras 33-39 clearly say that it is such.

    But as, according to /S/a@nkara's system, this cannot be the final view,--the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of upâdhis,--he looks upon the next following Sûtra (40) as constituting an adhikara/n/a by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.--Râmânuja, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sûtra 40 from the preceding Sûtras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases.

    Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.

    Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Sûtra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and the following Sûtras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman.

    According to Râmânuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman[14]; according to Sa@nkara the 'a/ms/a' of the Sûtra must be understood to mean 'a/ms/a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.--One Sûtra (50) in this adhikara/n/a calls for special notice.

    According to Sa@nkara the words 'âbhâsa eva /k/a' mean '(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called pratibimbavâda, i.e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while Sûtra 43 had propounded the so-called ava/kkh/edavâda, i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.--According to Râmânuja the âbhâsa of the Sûtra has to be taken in the sense of hetvâbhâsa, a fallacious argument, and the Sûtra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Vedântins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts[15].

    PÂDA IV.

    Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the prâ/n/as (by which generic name are denoted the buddhîndriyas, karmen-driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size (a/n/u).

    Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya prâ/n/a, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the prâ/n/as discussed above; and that it is minute (a/n/u).

    Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the prâ/n/as are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya prâ/n/a.

    Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the nâmarûpavyâkara/n/a) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord.

    Notes:

    [Footnote 13: Lokavat, Yathâ loke râja/s/âsanânuvartinâ/m/ /k/a râjânugrahanigrahak/ri/takhadukhayoges'pi na sa/s/arîraîvamâtre/n/a sâsake râjany api /s/âsanânuv/ri/ttyauv/ri/ttinimittasukhadukhayor bhokt/ri/vaprasa@nga/h/. Yathâha Drami/d/abhâshyakâra/h/ yathâ loke râjâ pra/k/uradanda/s/ûke ghores'narthasa/m/ka/t/es'pi prade/s/e vartamânoszpi vyajanâdyavadhûtadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipretâ/ms/ /k/a lokân paripipâlayishati bhogâ/ms/ /k/a gandhâdîn avi/s/vajanopabhogyân dhârayati tathâsau loke/s/varo bhramatsvasâmait/h/ya/k/amato doshair na sp/ris/yate rakshati /k/a lokân brahmalokâdi/ms/ /k/âvi/s/vajanopabhogyân dhârayatîti.]

    [Footnote 14: Gîvasya kart/ri/tva/m/ paramapurushâyattam ity uktam.

    Idânîm kim aya/m/ gîva/h/ parasmâd atyantabhinna/h/ uta param eva brahma bhrântam uta brahmaivopâdhyava/kkh/innam atha brahmâ/ms/a iti sa/m/sayyate /s/rutivipraticpatte/h/ sa/m/saya/h/. Nanu tadananyam ârambha/n/a/s/abdâdibhya/h/ adhika/m/ tu bhedanirdesâd ity atraivâyam aitho nir/n/îta/h/ Satya/m/ sa eva nânâtvaikatva/s/rutivipratipattyâ skshipya jîvasya brahmâ/ms/atvopapâdanena vi/s/eshato nir/n/îyate. Yâvad dhi jîvasya brahmâ/m/satva/m/ na nir/n/îtam tâvaj jîvasya brahmanosnanyatva/m/ brahma/n/as tasmâd adhikatvâ/m/ /k/a na pratitish/th/ati. Ki/m/ tâvat prâptam. Atyanta/m/ bhinna iti. Kuta/h/.

    J/ñ/âj/ñ/nau dvâv ityâdibhedanirde/s/ât. J/ñ/âj/ñ/ayor abheda/s/rutayas tv agninâ si/ñk/ed itivad viruddhârthapratipâdanâd aupa/k/ârikya/h/, Brahma/n/os/ms/o jîva ity api na sâdhîya/h/, ekavastvekade/s/avâ/k/î hy a/ms/a/s/sabda/h/, jîvasya brahmaikade/s/atve tadgatâ doshâ brahma/n/i bhaveyu/h/. Na /k/a brahmakha/nd/o jîva ity a/ms/atvopapatti/h/ kha/nd/anânarhatvâd brahma/n/a/h/ prâguktadoshaprasa@ngâ/k/ /k/a, tasmâd atyantabhinnasya tada/ms/atva/m/ durupapâdam. Yadvâ bhrânta/m/ brahmaiva jîva/h/. Kuta/h/.

    Tat tvam asi ayam âtmâ brahmetyâdibrahmâtmabhâvopade/s/ât, nânâtmatvavâdinyas tu pratyakshâdisiddhârthânuvâditvâd ananyathâsiddhâdvaitopade/s/aparâbhi/h/ /s/rutibhi/h/ pratyakshâdaya/s/ /k/a avidyântargata/h/ khyâpyante.--Athavâ brahmaivânâdyupâdhyava/kkh/inna/m/ jîva/h/. Kuta/h/.

    Tata eva brahmâtmabhâvopade/s/at. Na /k/âyam upâdhir bhrântiparikalpita ita vaktu/m/ sakya/m/ bandhamokshâdivyavasthânupapatter. Ity eva/m/ prâtptesbhidhîyate. Brahmâ/ms/a iti. Kuta/h/. Nânâvyapade/s/âd anyathâ /k/aikatvena vyapade/s/âd ubhayathâ hi vyapade/s/o d/ris/yate.

    Nâvâvyapade/s/as tâvat srash/tri/tva/rig/yatva--niyant/ri/tvaniyâmyatva--sarvaj/ñ/atvâj/ñ/atva-- svâdhînatvaparâdhînatva--/s/uddhatvâ/s/uddhatva-- kalyâ/n/agu/n/âkaratvaviparîtatva--patitva/s/eshatvâdibhir d/ris/yate.

    Anyathâ /k/âbhedena vyapade/s/os pi tat tvam asi ayam âtmâ brahmetyâdibhir d/ris/yate. Api dâ/s/akitavâditvam apy adhîyate eke, brahma dâsâ brahma dâsâ brahmeme kitavâ ity âtharva/n/ikâ brahma/n/o dâ/s/akitavâditvam apy adhîyate, tata/s/ /k/a sarvajîvavyâpitvena abhedo vyapadi/s/yata it artha/h/. Evam ubhayavyapade/s/amukhyatvasiddhaye jîvosya/m/ brahma/n/os/ms/a ity abhyupagantavya/h/.]

    [Footnote 15: Nanu bhrântabrahmajîvavâdeszpy avidyâk/ri/topâdhibhedâd bhogavyavasthâdaya upapadyanta ata âha, âbhâsa eva /k/a.

    Akha/nd/aikarasaprakâ/s/amâtratvarûpasya svarûpatirodhânapûrvakopâdhibhedopapâdanahetur âbhâsa eva.

    Prakâ/s/aikasvarûpasya prakâ/s/atirodhâna/m/ prakâ/s/anâ/s/a eveti prâg evopapâditam. Âbhâsâ eveti vâ pâ/th/a/h/, tathâ sati hetava âbhâsâ/h/.]

    THIRD ADHYÂYA.

    PÂDA I.

    Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements (bhûtasûkshma) which serve as an abode to the prâ/n/as attached to the soul.

    Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anu/s/aya) of their former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.

    Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.

    Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.

    PÂDA II.

    Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to /S/a@nkara the three first Sûtras discuss the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sûtra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere 'Mâyâ,' since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Sûtra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Mâyâ, yet have a prophetic quality.

    Sûtras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.

    The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by Râmânuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sûtras with each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sûtras 1 and 2 set forth the pûrvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of some /s/âkâs declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c.

    The third Sûtra states the siddhânta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Mâyâ, i.e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'mâyâ,' Râmânuja remarks, 'mâyâ/s/abdo hy â/sk/aryavâ/k/î janaka/s/ya kule jâtâ devamâyeva nirmitâ ityâdishu tathâ dar/s/anât.' The three remaining Sûtras are exhibited in the /S/rî-bhâshya in a different order, the fourth Sûtra, according to /S/a@nkara, being the sixth according to Râmânuja.

    Sûtras 4 and 5 (according to Râmânuja's numeration) are explained by Râmânuja very much in the same way as by /S/a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement of the subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves more intimately with the preceding Sûtras than is possible on /S/a@nkara's interpretation. In Sûtra 6 (sû/k/aka/s/ /k/â hi) Râmânuja sees a deduction from the siddhânta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have prophetic significance.'

    Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart.

    Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of a swoon.

    Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/a@nkara, taken up with the question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is merged in the state of deep sleep.

    Sûtra 11 declares that twofold characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes, nirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be destitute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact, Sûtra 12 continues, that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially stated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sûtra 13 adds--in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected to.--That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sûtra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all Vedânta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.--That Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature of the things he illuminates (15).--The B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka expressly declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the same is taught in other scriptural passages and in Sm/ri/ti (l7).--At the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the surface of the water are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material like the sun, and there are no real upâdhis separate from it as the water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that, as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase, decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes of the upâdhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is affected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the upâdhis, Scripture declares (21).

    From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given in the Srî-bhâshya differs totally. According to Râmânuja the adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the soul as antaryâmin.

    'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections) because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil, apahatapâpman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious qualities, satyakâma, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.) (11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially free from evil--according to the Prajâpativâkya in the Chândogya--yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies, so the antaryâmin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryâmin (in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the jiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (dvâ supar/n/â sayujâ sakhâyâ) (13).--Should it be said that, according to the Chândogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sára; we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent; pradhâna) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to 'âkâ/s/o ha vai nâmarûpayor nirvahitâ') (14).--But does not the passage 'satya/m/ j/ñ/ânam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage 'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittirîya of their purport, we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover the Taittirîya passage only asserts so much, viz. the prakâ/s/arûpatâ of Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).--And the passage 'neti neti' will be discussed later on.--The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the sense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti (17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryâmin really abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes.

    On this view both similes are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).

    Sûtras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti neti; B/ri/hadâr) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sûtras 23-26 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are altogether due to the upâdhis.

    The last four Sûtras return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.

    According to Rámânuja, Sûtras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in Sûtra 11.

    How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (prakâra), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmâtra)?--The reply given in Sûtra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them again[16]), but merely denies the prâk/ri/taitâvattva, the previously stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses only the previously mentioned qualifications.

    With this agrees, that subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further qualifications of Brahman.

    That Brahman as stated above is not the object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sûtra 23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the intuition (sákshâtkkâra) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/râdhana, i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti' is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as prakâ/s/a, luminousness, j/ñ/âna, intelligence, &c., so also the quality of being differentiated by the world (prapa/ñk/avsish/t/atâ) is intuited as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that prakâ/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vâmadeva) in the work of sa/m/râdhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious qualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as special arrangements (sa/m/sthanaviseshâ/h/) of Brahman, as the coils are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both being fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29, 30).

    Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be truly understood.

    Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called apûrva, but is allotted by the Lord.

    PÂDA III.

    With the third pâda of the second adhyâya a new section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations.

    The reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different /s/âkhâs contain many chapters of similar, often nearly identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the same /s/âkhâ exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms.

    The reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress.

    Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/âkhâ were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other /s/âkhâs also.

    But already at a very early period, at any rate long before the composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one /s/âkhâ may indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/âkhâs; that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic schools.

    For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation.

    The latter is the special task of the present pâda.

    Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyâs, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyâs, or one vidyâ only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those vidyâs whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is set forth.

    But things lie differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/â/nd/ilyavidyâ which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the /S/atapathabráhma/n/a (X, 6, 3).

    The three passages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bhârûpatva), while others are peculiar to each separate passage (prâ/n/a/s/arîratva and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chândogya Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brâhma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to in the two other texts).

    Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedântin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on the other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative.

    A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts.

    Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgîthavidyâs of the Chândogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgîtha being in both identified with prâ/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the Chândogya vidyâ is not the whole udgîtha but only the sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad represents the whole udgîtha as the object of meditation.

    Sûtra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the O/m/kâra and the udgîtha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kâra which,' &c.--According to Râmânuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik.

    V (10) determines the unity of the so-called prâ/n/a-vidyâs and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the prâ/n/a, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.

    Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sûtras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidyâ. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.--Adhik.

    VII (14, 15), according to /S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidyâ only.--Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in Ait. Âr.

    II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called sûtrâtman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.

    According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a whose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a.

    Sûtras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sûtra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sûtras 14-17 continue the discussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.--If priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sûtra 14 replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self?

    (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sûtra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (âtmâ ânandamaya) is applied to it.'--But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in âtma pra/n/amaya, &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in âtmâ ânandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sûtra 16 replies, 'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages (âtmaâ vâ idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding clauses about the prâ/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in ânandamaya âtman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage?--To this question asked in the former half of 17 (anvayâd iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz.

    II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'

    Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the prâ/n/asa/m/vâda.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyâs.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Râ/n/âyanîya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding Chândogya vidyâ, because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidyâ.--Adhik.

    XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

    Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brâhma/n/a passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance, a brâhma/n/a about the mahâvrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-âra/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidyâ, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

    Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

    Sûtras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken literally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not.

    The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any other place.

    The /S/rî-bhâshya treats the four Sûtras as one adhikara/n/a whose two first Sûtras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sûtra 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death, partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the gods).

    To this Sûtra 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir upasampadya svena rûpe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti krî/d/an ramamâna/h/ sa svarâ/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kâma/k/âro bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's vidyâmâhâtmya.--That the explanation of the /S/rî-bhâshya agrees with the text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show; especially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam ubhayathâ,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva in the other case.

    The next Sûtra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyâs which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyâs of Brahman.--The explanation given in the /S/rî-bhâshya (in which Sûtras 31 and 32 have exchanged places) is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on Brahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and sagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The /S/rî-bhâshya reads 'sarveshâm,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvâsâm,' all sagu/n/a-vidyâs.)

    Adhik.

    XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.--In the /S/rî-bhâshya, where the Sûtra follows immediately on Sûtra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully performed certain duties.

    Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in some vidyâs--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Kâ/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidyâ only, because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to Râmânuja the Sûtra contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sûtra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up.

    III, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidyâ only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the contrary decides that the passage Ait. Âr. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the vidyâ of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only--According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara.

    Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up.

    IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidyâ, since the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with Brahman as destitute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.--According to the /S/rî-bhâshya, Sûtras 39-41 form one adhikara/n/a whose first Sûtra reaches essentially the same conclusion as /S/a@nkara under 39. Sûtras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general question concerning the meditations on Brahman.

    The qualities, an opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are predicated of Brahman--such as va/s/itva, satyakâmatva, &c.--cannot be considered real (pâramârthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities.

    Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final release.--To this objection Sûtra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with emphasis[17].'--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he who meditates on Brahman as satyakâma, &c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in Ch. Up.

    VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection Sûtra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom (i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous of release, may include satyakâmatva, &c. in his meditations.)

    Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions, are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the latter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. passage and a similar Ch. Up. passage, Vâyu and Prâ/n/a are not to be identified, but to be held apart.--Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but merely subjects of meditations.

    Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, in the way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists maintain).--According to the /S/rî-bhâshya the adhikara/n/a does not refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the meditating devotee has to be viewed.

    The two Sûtras then have to be translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which belong to it in its embodied state, such as j/ñ/at/ri/tva and the like), because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The next Sûtra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e. the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in the condition of final release).'

    Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that /s/âkhâ in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all /s/âkhâs.--Adhik. XXXII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vânara Agni of Ch.

    Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.--Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidyâ, /S/a/nd/ilyavidyâ, &c. remain separate.

    Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being cumulated.--Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with constituent elements of action, such as the udgîtha.

    PÂDA IV.

    Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha, i.e. subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrâjins is enjoined by the sacred law, and that for them vidyâ only is prescribed, not action.--Adhik.

    III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part of vidyâs are not mere stutis (arthavâdas), but themselves enjoin the meditation.--The legends recorded in the Vedânta-texts are not to be used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying--as arthavâdas--the injunctions with which they are connected (Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the ûrdhvaretasa/h/ require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik.

    V, 25).--Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, &c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidyâ in the mind (Adhik.

    VI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII, 28-3l).--The â/s/ramakarmâ/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who, owing to poverty and so on, are anâ/s/rama have claims to vidyâ (Adhik. IX, 36-39).--An ûrdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation of the fall of an ûrdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the fallen ûrdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamâna (Adhik.

    XIII, 44-46).--B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to bâlya and pâ/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By bâlya is to be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

    Sûtras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Râmânuja, the question when the vidyâ, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises.

    Sûtra 51 treats of that vidyâ whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmântara (in which latter case the vidyâ arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in various passages).'--Sûtra 52, 'Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an obstacle, sometimes not).'--/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sûtras as two adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyâs.

    Notes:

    [Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them 'anuvâdena,' and finally negative them.]

    [Footnote 17: Râmânuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a mâtâpit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sâstra/m/ pratârakavad apâramârthikau nirasanîyau gu/n/au pramâ/n/ântarâpratipannau âdare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sâra/k/akraparivartanena pûrvam eva bambhramyamânân mumukshûn bhûyo-pi bhramayitum alam.']

    [Footnote 18: The /S/rî-bh­âshya as well as several other commentaries reads tadbhâvabhâvitvât for /S/an@kara's tadbhâvâbhâvitvât.]

    FOURTH ADHYÂYA.

    PÂDA I.

    Adhikara/n/a I (1, 2).--The meditation on the Âtman enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be repeated again and again.

    Adhik. II (3).--The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self.

    Adhik. III (4).--To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the so-called pratîkopâsanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano brahmety upâsîta) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to consider the pratîka as constituting his own Self.

    Adhik. IV (5).--In the pratîkopâsanas the pratîka is to be meditatively viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the pratîka.--Râmânuja takes Sûtra 5 as simply giving a reason for the decision arrived at under Sûtra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new adhikara/n/a.

    Adhik. V (6).--In meditations connected with constitutives of sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evâsau tapati tam udgîtham upâsîta) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance, the udgîtha is to be viewed as Âditya, not Âditya as the udgîtha.

    Adhik. VI (7-10).--The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a sitting posture.--/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sûtra gives no hint to that effect.

    Adhik. VII (11).--The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.

    Adhik. VIII (12).--The meditations are to be continued until death.--/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to sa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted.

    Adhik. IX (13).--When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the vidvân is no longer affected by the consequences of either past or future evil deeds.

    Adhik.

    X (14).--Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.--The literal translation of the Sûtra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the vidvân) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes place).' The last words of the Sûtra, 'but on the fall,' are separated by /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sûtra and interpreted to mean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvân, who through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of works).'--According to Râmânuja the whole Sûtra simply means, 'There is likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is reached), but on the death of the vidvân[19].'

    Adhik. XI (15).--The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding adhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anârabdhakârya works, i.e. those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend to the ârabdhakârya works on which the present existence of the devotee depends.

    Adhik. XII (16, 17).--From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so, for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of knowledge.

    Adhik. XIII (18).--The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the upâsanas referring to the different members of those works.

    Adhik. XIV (19).--The ârabdhakârya works have to be worked out fully by the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvân becomes united with Brahman.--The 'bhoga' of the Sûtra is, according to /S/a@nkara, restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would lead to future embodiments. According to Râmânuja a number of embodied existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the ârabdhakârya works are exhausted.

    PÂDA II.

    This and the two remaining pâdas of the fourth adhyâya describe the fate of the vidvân after death. According to /S/a@nkara we have to distinguish the vidvân who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest Brahman, and the vidvân who knows only the lower Brahman, and have to refer certain Sûtras to the former and others to the latter. According to Râmânuja the vidvân is one only.

    Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).--On the death of the vidvân (i.e. of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to /S/a@nkara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (prâ/n/a), the vital air in the individual soul (jîva), the soul in the subtle elements.--According to Râmânuja the combination (sampatti) of the senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not a merging (laya).

    Adhik. IV (7).--The vidvân (i.e. according to /S/a@nkara, he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvân, i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e. those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle elements, and so on into the nâ/d/îs.--The vidvân also remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet completely destroyed avidyâ, so that the immortality which Scripture ascribes to him (am/ri/tatva/m/ hi vidvân abhya/s/nute) is only a relative one.--Râmânuja quotes the following text regarding the immortality of the vidvân:

    'Yadâ sarve pramu/k/yante kâmâ yessya h/ri/di sthitâ/h/ atha
    martyosm/ri/to bhavaty atra brahma sama/s/nute,'

    and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvân as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the destruction--mentioned in the preceding pâda--of all the effects of good and evil works, while the 'reaching of Brahman' can only refer to the intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.

    Adhik. V (8-11) raises; according to /S/a@nkara, the question whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with the highest deity (teja/h/ parasyâ/m/ devatâyâm) are completely merged in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on the other hand, as long as the sa/m/sâra state lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new bodies for the soul.

    According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 8-11 do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7.

    The immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul from the body, 'because Scripture declares sa/m/sâra, i.e. embodiedness up to the reaching of Brahman' (tasya tâvad eva /k/ira/m/ yâvan na vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).--That the soul after having departed from the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from authority[20] (9).--Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the body (10).

    Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.--According to /S/a@nkara the Sûtras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes of him who has reached the higher knowledge.

    So far it has been taught that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidyâ) the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the body of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one with Brahman.--Against this latter implied doctrine Sûtra 12 is supposed to formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the prâ/n/as from the body of the dying sage is denied (viz. in B/ri/. Up.

    IV, 4, 5, na tasya prâ/n/a utkrâmanti, of him the prâ/n/as do not pass out); we reply that in that passage the genitive "tasya" has the sense of the ablative "tasmât," so that the sense of the passage is, "from him, i.e. from the jîva of the dying sage, the prâ/n/as do not depart, but remain with it."'--This objection /S/a@nkara supposes to be disposed of in Sûtra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure of the prâ/n/as in the case of the dying sage,' viz. in the passage B/ri/. Up.

    III, 2, 11, where Yâj/ñ/avalkya instructs Ârtabhâga that, when this man dies, the prâ/n/as do not depart from it (asmât; the context showing that asmât means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not 'from him,' viz. the jîva).--The same view is, moreover, confirmed by Sm/ri/ti passages.

    According to Râmânuja the three Sûtras forming /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikara/n/a do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a at all, and, moreover, have to be combined into two Sûtras. The topic continuing to be discussed is the utkrânti of the vidvân. If, Sûtra 12 says, the utkrânti of the prâ/n/as is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to be contained in B/ri/. Up.

    IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the tasya there is '/s/ârîrât' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e. the jîva, the prâ/n/as do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the reading of some, viz. the Mâdhyandinas, who, in their text of the passage, do not read 'tasya' but 'tasmât.'--With reference to the instruction given by Yâj/ñ/avalkya to Ârtabhâga, it is to be remarked that nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows Brahman.--And, finally, there are Sm/ri/ti passages declaring that the sage also when dying departs from the body.

    Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to /S/a@nkara, that, on the death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his prâ/n/as, elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from it in any way.

    According to Râmânuja the two Sûtras continue the teaching about the prâ/n/as, bhûtas, &c. of the vidvân in general, and declare that they are finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction (sa/m/yoga), but completely.[21]

    Adhik. IX (17).--/S/a@nkara here returns to the owner of the aparâ vidyâ, while Râmânuja continues the description of the utkrânti of his vidvân.--The jîva of the dying man passes into the heart, and thence departs out of the body by means of the ná/d/is; the vidvân by means of the nâ/d/i called sushum/n/â, the avidvân by means of some other nâ/d/î.

    Adhik. X (18, 19).--The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of a ray of light which exists at night as well as during day.

    Adhik. XI (20, 21).--Also that vidvân who dies during the dakshi/n/âyana reaches Brahman.

    PÂDA III.

    Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the vidvân up to Brahman.

    Adhik. IV (4-6)--By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead the soul on.

    The remaining part of the pâda is by /S/a@nkara divided into two adhikara/n/as. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman to which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the gods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (kârya) or qualified (/s/agu/n/a) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sûtras 7-11 by Bâdari, and, finally, accepted by /S/a@nkara in his commentary on Sûtra

    1. In Sûtras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view, according to

    which the soul of the vidvân goes to the highest Brahman, not to the kâryam brahma. But Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part of the adhikara/n/a, is, according to /S/a@nkara, a mere pûrvapaksha, while Bâdari's opinion represents the siddhânta.--The latter of the two adhikara/n/as (VI of the whole pâda; 15, 16) records the opinion of Bâdarâya/n/a on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those who worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that those only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a pratîka form.

    According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 7-16 form one adhikara/n/a only, in which the views of Bâdari and of Jaimini represent two pûrvapakshas, while Bâdarâya/n/a's opinion is adopted as the siddhânta. The question is whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship the effected Brahman, i.e.

    Hira/n/yagarbha, or those who worship the highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from Prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye pratyagâtmâna/m/ prak/ri/tiviyukta/m/ brahmâtmakam upâsate).--The first view is maintained by Bâdari in Sûtra 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those who worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the latter only;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as such omnipresent Brahman.--The explanation of Sûtra 9 is similar to that of /S/a@nkara; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if Hira/n/yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho /s/a mânava/h/ sa etân brahma gamayati,' the text would read 'sa etân brahmâ/n/am gamayati') that Hira/n/yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.--The explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in /S/a@nkara; so also of l2-l4.--The siddhânta view is established in Sûtra 13, 'It is the opinion of Bâdarâya/n/a that it, i.e. the ga/n/a of the guardians, leads to Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is pratîka, i.e. those who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the individual Self as dissociated from prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under pratîkas.

    For both views--that of Jaimini as well as that of Bâdari--are faulty.' The kârya view contradicts such passages as 'asmâ/k/ charîrât samutthâya para/m/ jyotir upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, which declares that ya ittha/m/ vidu/h/, i.e. those who know the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, are also led up to Brahman.

    PÂDA IV.

    Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the parâ vidyâ, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely manifests itself in its true nature.--The explanation given by Râmânuja is essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvân whose going to Brahman had been described in the preceding pâda.

    Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul stands to Brahman is that of avibhâga, non-separation. This, on /S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.--According to Râmânuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul views itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhûta) from Brahman, or as non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is favoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat tvam asi and the like.[22]

    Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other places are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapâpmatva, satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.--According to Au/d/ulomi the only characteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.--According to Bâdarâyana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul vyavahârâpekshayâ).

    Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the aparâ vidyâ, and discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former alternative is accepted--According to Râmânuja the adhikara/n/a simply continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the preceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on.

    The question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa (it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released soul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive him.'

    Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied according to their wish and will.

    Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate several bodies at the same time.--Sûtra 12 gives, according to /S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the state of deep sleep (svâpyaya = sushupti), or to the fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).--Râmânuja explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti = mata/n/am according to 'vân manasi sampadyate,' &c.).

    Adhik. VII (17-21).--The released jîvas participate in all the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of embodied existence.

    After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the contents of the Brahma-sûtras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as well as Râmânuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two modes of interpretation represents--or at any rate more closely approximates to the true meaning of the Sûtras. That few of the Sûtras are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above; but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.

    We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous discrepancies,--of which only the more important ones have been singled out in the conspectus of contents,--the two commentators are at one as to the general drift of the Sûtras and the arrangement of topics. As a rule, the adhikara/n/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sûtras.

    This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the meaning of the Sûtras on which the bulk of the interpretations of /S/a@nkara as well as of Râmânuja are based.

    But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, the interpretations of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja diverge more or less widely, and that the Sûtras affected thereby are, most of them, especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the Vedânta system. The question then remains which of the two interpretations is entitled to preference.

    Regarding a small number of Sûtras I have already (in the conspectus of contents) given it as my opinion that Râmânuja's explanation appears to be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal meaning of a Sûtra, but where /S/a@nkara sees himself reduced to the necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it stands.

    To exemplify this remark, I again direct attention to all those Sûtras which in clear terms represent the individual soul as something different from the highest soul, and concerning which /S/a@nkara is each time obliged to have recourse to the plea of the Sûtra referring, not to what is true in the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked upon as true.

    It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that /S/a@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the Sûtras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr.

    Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while present.

    This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires convincing proofs before it can be allowed.--We have had, in the second place, to note a certain number of adhikara/n/as and Sûtras concerning whose interpretation /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja disagree altogether; and we have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with the words of the text.

    The most striking instance of this is afforded by the 13th adhikara/n/a of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jîva, and where Râmânuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to /S/a@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole adhikara/n/a and to the wording of the single Sûtras. The adhikara/n/a is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the question what kind of Vedânta is embodied in Bâdarâya/n/a's work.

    But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a few detached Sûtras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some opinion as to the relation of the Vedânta-sûtras as a whole to the chief distinguishing doctrines of /S/a@nkara as well as Râmânuja. Such an attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the conclusion that the Sûtras do not teach particular doctrines found in them by certain commentators, will not be without its value.

    The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the Sûtras in any way favour /S/a@nkara's doctrine that we have to distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an exalted form of individual existence. The adhyâya first to be considered in this connexion is the fourth one.

    According to /S/a@nkara the three latter pâdas of that adhyâya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who, before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman.

    According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the three pâdas, referring throughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the successive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it had tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever without returning into the sa/m/sâra.

    On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat strange that the concluding section of the Sûtras should be almost entirely taken up with describing the fate of him who has after all acquired an altogether inferior knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the true sanctuary of Vedântic knowledge, while the fate of the fully initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sûtras.

    It is, I think, not too much to say that no unbiassed student of the Sûtras would--before having allowed himself to be influenced by /S/a@nkara's interpretations--imagine for a moment that the solemn words, 'From thence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which the Sûtras conclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but merely a stage on the way of that soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual release, a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of existence, but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious sa/m/sâra, and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti.

    And this à priori impression--which, although no doubt significant, could hardly be appealed to as decisive--is confirmed by a detailed consideration of the two sets of Sûtras which /S/a@nkara connects with the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sûtras are interpreted by /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja has been stated above in the conspectus of contents; the points which render the interpretation given by Râmânuja more probable are as follows.

    With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to note, in the first place, the circumstance--relevant although not decisive in itself--that Sûtra 12 does not contain any indication of a new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be doubted that the text of Sûtra 13, 'spash/t/o hy ekeshâm,' is more appropriately understood, with Râmânuja, as furnishing a reason for the opinion advanced in the preceding Sûtra, than--with /S/a@nkara--as embodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case we should expect not 'hi' but 'tu').

    And, in the third place, the 'eke,' i.e. 'some,' referred to in Sûtra 13 would, on /S/a@nkara's interpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sûtra had referred, viz. the followers of the Kâ/n/va-/s/âkhâ (the two Vedic passages referred to in 12 and 13 being B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2, 11, according to the Kâ/n/va recension); while it is the standing practice of the Sûtras to introduce, by means of the designation 'eke,' members of Vedic /s/âkhâs, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in the preceding Sûtras.

    With this practice Râmânuja's interpretation, on the other hand, fully agrees; for, according to him, the 'eke' are the Mâdhyandinas, whose reading in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. 'tasmât,' clearly indicates that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the Kâ/n/vas denotes the /s/ârira, i.e. the jîva.

    I think it is not saying too much that /S/a@nkara's explanation, according to which the 'eke' would denote the very same Kâ/n/vas to whom the preceding Sûtra had referred--so that the Kâ/n/vas would be distinguished from themselves as it were--is altogether impossible.

    The result of this closer consideration of the first set of Sûtras, alleged by /S/a@nkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of Brahman, entitles us to view with some distrust /S/a@nkara's assertion that another set also--IV, 4, 1-7--has to be detached from the general topic of the fourth adhyâya, and to be understood as depicting the condition of those who have obtained final absolute release. And the Sûtras themselves do not tend to weaken this preliminary want of confidence.

    In the first place their wording also gives no indication whatever of their having to be separated from what precedes as well as what follows.

    And, in the second place, the last Sûtra of the set (7) obliges /S/a@nkara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities which clearly cannot belong to them; so that he finally is obliged to make the extraordinary statement that those qualities belong to them 'vyavahârâpekshayâ,' while yet the purport of the whole adhikara/n/a is said to be the description of the truly released soul for which no vyavahâra exists!

    Very truly /S/a@nkara's commentator here remarks, 'atra ke/k/in muhyanti akha/n/da/k/inmâtrajânân muktasyâjñânâbhâvât kuta âj/ñ/ânika-dharmayoga/h/,' and the way in which thereupon he himself attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters.

    In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth adhyâya with another passage, which indeed has no direct bearing on the distinction of aparâ and parâ vidyâ, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of /S/a@nkara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the Sûtras.

    The Sûtras 7-16 of the third pâda state the opinions of three different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the vidvân repairs on death, or--according to Râmânuja--the worshippers of which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman.

    Râmânuja treats the views of Bâdari and Jaimini as two pûrvapakshas, and the opinion of Bâdarâya/n/a--which is stated last--as the siddhânta. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, detaching the Sûtras in which Bâdarâya/n/a's view is set forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/n/a (a proceeding which, although not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether illegitimate), maintains that Bâdari's view, which is expounded first, represents the siddhânta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently, is to be considered a mere pûrvapaksha.

    This, of course, is altogether inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedânta-sûtras as well as the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ-sûtras to conclude the discussion of contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. This is so patent that /S/a@nkara feels himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but such as are valid only if /S/a@nkara's system itself is already accepted.

    The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice but to side with Râmânuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth adhyâya of the Sûtras. We need not accept him as our guide in all particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the Sûtras of the fourth adhyâya describe the ultimate fate of one and the same vidvân, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman in /S/a@nkara's sense.

    If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on the negative evidence of the fourth adhyâya, but regarding which the entire body of the Vedânta-sûtras has to be consulted.

    And intimately connected with this investigation--in fact, one with it from a certain point of view--is the question whether the Sûtras afford any evidence of their author having held the doctrine of Mâyâ, the principle of illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or Î/s/vara.

    That Râmânuja denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the doctrine of Mâyâ we have seen above; we shall, however, in the subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and interpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sûtras themselves.

    Placing myself at the point of view of a /S/a@nkara, I am startled at the outset by the second Sûtra of the first adhyâya, which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman.

    'Brahman is that whence the origination and so on (i.e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sûtra meant to define?--That Brahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sûtra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedânta; that Brahman whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact which /S/a@nkara calls the highest.--But, here we must object to ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the world originates.

    In later Vedântic writings, whose authors were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman and the lower Brahman related to Mâyâ or the world, we meet with definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type.

    I need only remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as sa/k/-/k/id-ânanda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the introductory /s/lokas of the Pa/ñk/ada/s/î dilating on the sa/m/vid svayam-prabhâ, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P.D. I, 7).

    'That from which the world proceeds' can by a /S/a@nkara be accepted only as a definition of Î/s/vara, of Brahman which by its association with Mâyâ is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and it certainly is as improbable that the Sûtras should open with a definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is unlikely that they should conclude with a description of the state of those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from obtaining true release.

    As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the all-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining one in all its various manifestations--a conception which need not by any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the Râmânujas--the definition of Brahman given in the second Sûtra becomes altogether unobjectionable.

    We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in which Bâdarâya/n/a defines Brahman, viz. that he does not distinguish between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Mâyâ, is confirmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sûtras being throughout far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines of reasoning.

    What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the Sûtrakâra against the Sâ@nkhya doctrine, which maintains that the world has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the non-intelligent pradhâna. The most important Sûtras relative to this point are to be met with in the first pâda of the second adhyâya.

    Those Sûtras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by themselves, but the unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investigation.

    The sixth Sûtra of the pâda mentioned replies to the Sâ@nkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that 'it is thus seen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence; hair and nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from dung.--Now, an argumentation of this kind is altogether out of place from the point of view of the true /S/â@nkara.

    According to the latter the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Mâyâ.

    Mâyâ is the upâdâna of the material world, and Mâyâ itself is of a non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedântic writers identified with the prak/ri/ti of the Sâ@nkhyas.

    Similarly the illustrative instances, adduced under Sûtra 9 for the purpose of showing that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal substances do not impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with the doctrine of Mâyâ, according to which the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its subsistence.

    According to /S/â@nkara the world is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms into which the upâdâna of the world, i.e.

    Mâyâ, had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Mâyâ, whose relation to Brahman is not changed thereby.--The illustration, again, given in Sûtra 24 of the mode in which Brahman, by means of its inherent power, transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous instruments of action, 'kshîravad dhi,' 'as milk (of its own accord turns into curds),' would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world; and also the analogous instance given in the Sûtra next following, 'as Gods and the like (create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will)'--which refers to the real creation of real things--would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world.

    The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous illustrative instances (kshîravad dhi; devâdivat), moreover, seems to show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent without having recourse to any extraneous means.[23]

    That the Mâyâ doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sûtrakâra, further appears from the latter part of the fourth pâda of the first adhyâya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is the material cause of the world through Mâyâ only, and that the world is unreal; but the Sûtras do not contain a single word to that effect.

    Sûtra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term 'pari/n/âmât;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of itself.

    It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the Vedânta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/n/âvada' was used to denote that very theory to which the followers of /S/a@nkara are most violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not a mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the effect of Brahman undergoing a real change, may that change be conceived to take place in the way taught by Râmânuja or in some other manner.--With regard to the last-quoted Sûtra, as well as to those touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of expression are apparently opposed to the vivartavâda are in reality reconcilable with it; to Sûtra 26, for instance, Govindânanda remarks that the term 'pari/n/âma' only denotes an effect in general (kâryamâtra), without implying that the effect is real.

    But in cases of this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as Râmânuja, are satisfied to take 'pari/n/âma' and similar terms in their generally received sense.

    A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III, 2, 11 ff. It is, according to /S/a@nkara's view, of special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that Brahman is in itself destitute of all qualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (upâdhis), the offspring of Mâyâ.

    I have above (in the conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole section as interpreted by /S/a@nkara on the one hand, and Râmânuja on the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to the purport of the group of Sûtras widely diverges from that of /S/a@nkara.

    The wording of the Sûtras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators--if indeed either--is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide; regarding the sense of some Sûtras /S/a@nkara's explanation seems to deserve preference, in the case of others Râmânuja seems to keep closer to the text.

    I decidedly prefer, for instance, Râmânuja's interpretation of Sûtra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sûtra is concerned, and more especially with regard to the term 'prak/ri/taitâvattvam,' whose proper force is brought out by Râmânuja's explanation only. So much is certain that none of the Sûtras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by /S/a@nkara.

    Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that the section is one of those--perhaps not few in number--in which both interpreters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing Bâdarâya/n/a's Sûtras to bear testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories.

    With special reference to the Mâyâ doctrine one important Sûtra has yet to be considered, the only one in which the term 'mâyâ' itself occurs, viz. III, 2, 3. According to /S/a@nkara the Sûtra signifies that the environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Mâyâ, i.e. unsubstantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Râmânuja (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a different explanation of the term 'mâyâ,' but in judging of /S/a@nkara's views we may for the time accept /S/a@nkara's own interpretation.

    Now, from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams are to be called Mâyâ, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the characteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking soul must not be called Mâyâ.

    But that the world perceived by waking men is Mâyâ, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming consciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the /S/â@nkara Vedânta; and the Sûtra therefore proves either that Bâdarâya/n/a did not hold the doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term 'mâyâ' in a sense altogether different from that in which /S/a@nkara employs it.--If, on the other hand, we, with Râmânuja, understand the word 'mâyâ' to denote a wonderful thing, the Sûtra of course has no bearing whatever on the doctrine of Mâyâ in its later technical sense.

    We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Do the Sûtras indicate anywhere that their author held /S/a@nkara's doctrine, according to which the jîva is in reality identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to avidyâ, or do they rather favour the view that the souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it?

    This question is in fact only another aspect of the Mâyâ question, but yet requires a short separate treatment.

    In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sûtras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in /S/a@nkara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Râmânuja, that the soul is of minute size.

    We have further seen that Sûtra 18 of the third pâda of the second adhyâya, which describes the soul as 'j/ñ/a,' is more appropriately understood in the sense assigned to it by Râmânuja; and, again, that the Sûtras which treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with /S/a@nkara's views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to authorise.--We next have the important Sûtra II, 3, 43 in which the soul is distinctly said to be a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and which, as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in with /S/a@nkara's views only if a/ms/a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by 'a/ms/a iva,' while Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it stands.--We also have already referred to Sûtra 50, 'âbhâsa eva /k/a,' which /S/a@nkara interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavâda according to which the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self.

    But almost every Sûtra--and Sûtra 50 forms no exception--being so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favourable to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sûtra 50, if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sûtra 43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman?

    For that 43 contains, as /S/a@nkara and his commentators aver, a statement of the ava/kkh/edavâda, can itself be accepted only if we interpret a/ms/a by a/ms/a iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever.

    I confess that Râmânuja's interpretation of the Sûtra (which however is accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me particularly convincing; and the Sûtras unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the term âbhâsa, which may mean 'reflection,' but may mean hetvâbhâsa, i.e. fallacious argument, as well.

    But as things stand, this one Sûtra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the pratibimbavâda which, in its turn, presupposes the mâyâvâda, is the teaching of the Sûtras.

    To the conclusion that the Sûtrakâra did not hold the doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of /S/a@nkara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with here and there in the Sûtras. In the conspectus of contents we have had occasion to direct attention to the important Sûtra II, 1, 22, which distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i.e. additional to, or different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to be different.

    Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the /s/ârîra is not the antaryâmin, because the Mâdhyandinas, as well as the Kâ/n/vas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam adhîyate), and in 22 the /s/ârîra and the pradhâna are referred to as the two 'others' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word 'itara' (the other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, 16; II, 1,

    1. as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in

    contradistinction from the Lord. The /S/â@nkaras indeed maintain that all those passages refer to an unreal distinction due to avidyâ. But this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands that the Sûtras should be thus understood.

    If we accept the interpretations of the school of /S/a@nkara, it remains altogether unintelligible why the Sûtrakâra should never hint even at what /S/a@nkara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only, ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its nature is.

    If other reasons should make it probable that the Sûtrakâra was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept /S/a@nkara's mode of interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming; nowhere among the avowed followers of the /S/a@nkara system is there any tendency to treat the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and hidden.

    On the contrary, they all, from Gau/d/apâda down to the most modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but this one knowledge is without true value.

    There remains one more important passage concerning the relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedânta. I mean I, 4, 20-22, which three Sûtras state the views of Â/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi, and Kâ/s/akr/ri/tsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed to the highest Self.

    The siddhânta view is enounced in Sûtra 22, 'avasthiter iti Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna/h/' i.e.

    Kâ/s/ak/ri/tsna (accounts for the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or abode.' By this 'permanent abiding' /S/a@nkara understands the Lord's abiding as, i.e. existing as--or in the condition of--the individual soul, and thus sees in the Sûtra an enunciation of his own view that the individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avik/ri/ta/h/ parame/s/varo jîvo nânya/h/.' Râmânuja on the other hand, likewise accepting Kâ/saak/ri/tsna's opinion as the siddhânta view, explains 'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul, as described in the antaryâmin-brâhma/n/a.--We can hardly maintain that the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by Sa@/n/kara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged in favour of Râmânuja's interpretation that in the five other places where avasthiti (or anavasthiti) is met with in the Sûtras (I, 2, 17;

    II, 2, 4; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent abiding or permanent abode within something.

    If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the preceding enquiry as to the teaching of the Sûtras, I must give it as my opinion that they do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Î/s/vara in /S/a@nkara's sense; that they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world; and that they do not, with /S/a@nkara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I do not wish to advance for the present beyond t

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    Title
    The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya
    Release date
    July 15, 2005 [eBook #16295]
    Language
    English
    Credits
    Produced by Srinivasan Sriram, David King, and the Online
    Most recently updated
    December 12, 2020
    Transcriber and production notes
    Produced by Srinivasan Sriram, David King, and the Online
    Distributed Proofreading Team
    Front matter as received (title page, contents)
    VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS
    
    _With the Commentary by_
    
    SA@NKARÂCHÂRYA
    
    _Translated by_
    GEORGE THIBAUT
    
    _Part I_
    
    
    
    
    CONTENTS.
    
    
    INTRODUCTION
    
    VEDÂNTA-SÛTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY BY SA@NKARÂCHÂRYA.
    
    ADHYÂYA I.
    
      Pâda I.
    
      Pâda II.
    
      Pâda III.
    
      Pâda IV.
    
    ADHYÂYA II.
    
      Pâda I.
    
      Pâda II.
    
           *       *       *       *       *
    
    Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of
    the Sacred Books of the East.
    
    [Transcriber's Note: This book contains many words with one or two
    letters in the word printed in italics; those letters are transcribed by
    enclosing them in slashes, e.g. "karmakâ/nd/a" has the letters "nd" in
    italics.  Also, the symbol "@" is used before the letter "n" to indicate
    a horizontal bar across the top.]
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    Title: The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya
    
    Translator: G. Thibaut
    
    Commentator: Sankaracarya
    
    
            
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