Elements of Military Art and Science
by H. W. Halleck · English · Gutenberg #16170 · 866,559 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: Elements of Military Art and Science
Author: H. W. Halleck
Release date: July 1, 2005 [eBook #16170]
Most recently updated: December 11, 2020
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE ***
Produced by Graeme Mackreth and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net.
ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE: OR, COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN
STRATEGY, FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF BATTLES, &c.
EMBRACING THE DUTIES OF STAFF, INFANTRY, CAVALRY, ARTILLERY, AND
ENGINEERS.
ADAPTED TO THE USE OF VOLUNTEERS AND MILITIA.
THIRD EDITION.
WITH CRITICAL NOTES ON THE MEXICAN AND CRIMEAN WARS.
BY
H. WAGER HALLECK, A.M., MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.A.
NEW YORK:
D. APPLETON & COMPANY,
443 & 445 BROADWAY.
LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN
1862.
Entered, according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1846, BY D.
APPLETON & COMPANY, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the
United States for the Southern District of New York.
CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE 5
I. INTRODUCTION.--Dr. Wayland's Arguments on the Justifiableness of War
briefly examined. 7
II. STRATEGY.--General Divisions of the Art.--Rules for planning a
Campaign.--Analysis of the Military Operations of Napoleon. 35
III. FORTIFICATIONS.--Their importance in the Defence of States proved
by numerous Historical Examples. 61
IV. LOGISTICS.--Subsistence.--Forage.--Marches.--Convoys.--
Castrametation. 88
V. TACTICS.--The Twelve Orders of Battle, with Examples of
each.--Different Formations of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and
Engineers on the Field of Battle, with the Modes of bringing Troops into
action. 114
VI. MILITARY POLITY.--The Means of National Defence best suited to the
character and condition of a Country, with a brief Account of those
adopted by the several European Powers. 135
VII. DEFENCE OF OUR SEA-COAST.--Brief Description of our Maritime
Fortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that have
taken place between Ships and Forts, including the Attack on San Juan
d'Ulloa, and on St. Jean d'Acre. 155
VIII. OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.--Brief Description of the
Fortifications on the Frontier, and an analysis of our Northern
Campaigns. 210
IX. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Staff and Administrative Corps.--Their History,
Duties, Numbers, and Organization. 235
X. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Infantry and Cavalry.--Their History, Duties,
Numbers, and Organization. 256
XI. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Artillery.--Its History and Organization, with a
Brief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, the Manufacture of
Projectiles, &c. 275
XII. ARMY ORGANIZATION.--Engineers.--Their History, Duties, and
Organization,--with a Brief Discussion, showing their importance as a
part of a modern Army Organization. 300
XIII. PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. Historical Notice of the progress of
this Art.--Description of the several parts of a Fortress, and the
various Methods of fortifying a Position. 327
XIV. FIELD ENGINEERING.--Field Fortifications.--Military
Communications.--Military Bridges.--Sapping, Mining, and the Attack and
Defence of a Fortified Place. 342
XV. MILITARY EDUCATION.--Military Schools of France, Prussia, Austria,
Russia, England, &c.--Washington's Reasons for establishing the West
Point Academy.--Rules of Appointment and Promotion in Foreign
Services.--Absurdity and Injustice of our own System. 378
EXPLANATION OF PLATES 409
PREFACE
The following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of
lectures, and delivered, during, the past winter, before the Lowell
Institute of Boston. They were written without the slightest intention
of ever publishing them; but several officers of militia, who heard them
delivered, or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their
publication, on the ground of their being useful to a class of officers
now likely to be called into military service. It is with this view
alone that they are placed in the hands of the printer. No pretension is
made to originality in any part of the work; the sole object having been
to embody, in a small compass, well established military principles, and
to illustrate these by reference to the events of past history, and the
opinions and practice of the best generals.
Small portions of two or three of the following chapters have already
appeared, in articles furnished by the author to the New York and
Democratic Reviews, and in a "Report on the Means of National Defence,"
published by order of Congress.
H.W.H.
MAY, 1846.
ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
Our distance from the old world, and the favorable circumstances in
which we have been placed with respect to the other nations of the new
world, have made it so easy for our government to adhere to a pacific
policy, that, in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since the
acknowledgment of our national independence, we have enjoyed more than
fifty-eight of general peace; our Indian border wars have been too
limited and local in their character to seriously affect the other parts
of the country, or to disturb the general conditions of peace. This
fortunate state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, promote
commerce, agriculture, and manufactures; in fine, to increase the
greatness of the nation and the happiness of the individual. Under these
circumstances our people have grown up with habits and dispositions
essentially pacific, and it is to be hoped that these feelings may not
soon be changed. But in all communities opinions sometimes run into
extremes; and there are not a few among us who, dazzled by the
beneficial results of a long peace, have adopted the opinion that war in
any case is not only useless, but actually immoral; nay, more, that to
engage in war is wicked in the highest degree, and even _brutish_.
All modern ethical writers regard _unjust_ war as not only immoral, but
as one of the greatest of crimes--murder on a large scale. Such are all
wars of mere ambition, engaged in for the purpose of extending regal
power or national sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on from
mercenary motives; wars of propagandism, undertaken for the unrighteous
end of compelling men to adopt certain religious or political opinions,
whether from the alleged motives of "introducing a more orthodox
religion," or of "extending the area of freedom." Such wars are held in
just abhorrence by all moral and religious people: and this is believed
to be the settled conviction of the great mass of our own citizens.
But in addition to that respectable denomination of Christians who deny
our right to use arms under any circumstances, there are many religious
enthusiasts in other communions who, from causes already noticed, have
adopted the same theory, and hold _all_ wars, even those in
self-defence, as unlawful and immoral. This opinion has been, within the
last few years, pressed on the public with great zeal and eloquence, and
many able pens have been enlisted in its cause. One of the most popular,
and by some regarded one of the most able writers on moral science, has
adopted this view as the only one consonant with the principles of
Christian morality.
It has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of lectures on war, to
make a few introductory remarks respecting this question of its
justifiableness. We know of no better way of doing this than to give on
the one side the objections to war as laid down in Dr. Wayland's Moral
Philosophy, and on the other side the arguments by which other ethical
writers have justified a resort to war. We do not select Dr. Wayland's
work for the purpose of criticizing so distinguished an author; but
because he is almost the only writer on ethics who advocates these
views, and because the main arguments against war are here given in
brief space, and in more moderate and temperate language than that used
by most of his followers. I shall give his arguments in his own
language.
"I. All wars are contrary to the revealed will of God."
It is said in reply, that if the Christian religion condemns all wars,
no matter how just the cause, or how necessary for self-defence, we must
expect to find in the Bible some direct prohibition of war, or at least
a prohibition fairly implied in other direct commandments. But the Bible
nowhere prohibits war: in the Old Testament we find war and even
conquest positively commanded, and although war was raging in the world
in the time of Christ and his apostles, still they said not a word of
its unlawfulness and immorality. Moreover, the fathers of the church
amply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, that when war
is justly declared, the Christian may engage in it either by stratagem
or open force. If it be of that highly wicked and immoral character
which some have recently attributed to it, most assuredly it would be
condemned in the Bible in terms the most positive and unequivocal.
But it has been said that the use of the sword is either directly or
typically forbidden to the Christian, by such passages as "Thou shalt
not kill," (Deut. v. 17,) "I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but
whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other
also," (Matt. v. 39,) &c. If these passages are to be taken as literal
commands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts would have us believe,
not only is war unlawful, but also all our penal statutes, the
magistracy, and all the institutions of the state for the defence of
individual rights, the protection of the innocent, and the punishment of
the guilty. But if taken in conjunction with the whole Bible, we must
infer that they are hyperbolical expressions, used to impress strongly
on our minds the general principle of love and forgiveness, and that, so
far as possible, we over come evil with good. Can any sober-minded man
suppose, for a moment, that we are commanded to encourage the attacks of
the wicked, by literally turning the left cheek when assaulted on the
right, and thus induce the assailant to commit more wrong? Shall we
invite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depredations, by
literally giving him a cloak when he takes our coat; and the insolent
and the oppressor to proceed in his path of crime, by going two miles
with him if he bid us to go one?
Again, if the command, "Thou shalt not kill," is to be taken literally,
it not only prohibits us from engaging in just war, and forbids the
taking of human life by the state, as a punishment for crime; it also
forbids, says Dr. Leiber, our taking the life of any animal, and even
extends to the vegetable kingdom,--for undoubtedly plants have life, and
are liable to violent death--to be _killed_. But Dr. Wayland concedes to
individuals the right to take vegetable and animal life, and to society
the right to punish murder by death. This passage undoubtedly means,
thou shalt not unjustly kill,--thou shalt do no murder; and so it is
rendered in our prayer-books. It cannot have reference to war, for on
almost the next page we find the Israelites commanded to go forth and
smite the heathen nations,--to cast them out of the land,--to utterly
destroy them,--to show them no mercy, &c. If these passages of the Bible
are to be taken literally, there is no book which contains so many
contradictions; but if taken in connection with the spirit of other
passages, we shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventing
or punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals; but that we
should combine love with justice, and free our hearts from all evil
motives.
II. All wars are unjustifiable, because "God commands us to love every
man, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, as ourselves; and the act
neither of society nor of government can render it our duty to violate
this command."
It is true that no act of society can make it our duty to violate any
command of God: but is the above command to be taken literally, and as
forbidding us to engage in just war? Is it not rather intended to
impress upon us, in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a great
virtue; that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an enemy,
but should treat all with justice, mercy, and loving-kindness? If the
meaning attempted to be given to this command in the above quotation be
the true one, it is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil
justice, to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections.
But are we bound to love all human beings alike; that is, to the same
degree? Does the Bible, as a whole, inculcate such doctrine? On the
contrary, Christ himself had his _beloved_ disciple,--one whom he loved
pre-eminently, and above all the others; though he loved the others none
the less on that account. We are bound to love our parents, our
brothers, our families first, and above all other human beings; but we
do not, for this reason, love others any the less. A man is not only
permitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, but
if he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. We are bound to
protect our families against the attacks of others; and, if necessary
for the defence of their lives, we are permitted to take the life of the
assailant; nay more, we are bound to do so. But it does not follow that
we _hate_ him whom we thus destroy. On the contrary, we may feel
compassion, and even love for him. The magistrate sentences the murderer
to suffer the penalty of the law; and the sheriff carries the sentence
into execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner:
nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindest
feelings towards him whom they thus deprive of life.
So it is in the external affairs of the state. Next to my kindred and my
neighbors do I love my countrymen. I love them more than I do
foreigners, because my interests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of
friendship and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to the
foreigner. I sympathize with the oppressed Greek, and the enslaved
African, and willingly contribute to their relief, although their
sufferings affect me very remotely; but if my own countrymen become
oppressed and enslaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, and
peculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which God has
formed. If my countrymen be oppressed, my neighbors and kindred will be
made unhappy and suffering; this I am bound to take all proper measures
in my power to prevent. If the assailant cannot be persuaded by argument
to desist from his wicked intentions, I unite with my fellow-citizens in
forcibly resisting his aggressions. In doing this I am actuated by no
feelings of hatred towards the hostile forces; I have in my heart no
malice, no spirit of revenge; I have no desire to harm individuals,
except so far as they are made the instruments of oppression. But as
instruments of evil, I am bound to destroy their power to do harm. I do
not shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge; I fight against
him because the paramount interests of my country cannot be secured
without destroying the instrument by which they are assailed. I am
prohibited from exercising any personal cruelty; and after the battle,
or as soon as the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated with
kindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wounded friend. All
conduct to the contrary is regarded by civilized nations with
disapprobation.
That war does not properly beget personal malignity but that, on the
contrary, the effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on the
battle-field, frequently have a beneficial influence in the political
events of after years, may be shown by innumerable examples in all
history. Soult and Wellington were opposing generals in numerous
battles; but when the former visited England in 1838, he was received by
Wellington and the whole British nation with the highest marks of
respect; and the mutual warmth of feeling between these two
distinguished men has contributed much to the continuance of friendly
relations between the two nations. And a few years ago, when we seemed
brought, by our civil authorities, almost to the brink of war by the
northeastern boundary difficulties, the pacific arrangements concluded,
through the intervention of General Scott, between the Governors of
Maine and New Brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendships
contracted by officers of the contending armies during our last war with
Great Britain.
III. "It is granted that it would be better for man in general, if wars
were abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned.
Now, this seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which God has
created man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be at an
end; for God never places man under circumstances in which it is either
wise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate his laws. Is it for the
advantage of him who lives among a community of thieves, to steal; or
for one who lives among a community of liars, to lie?"
The fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcely
necessary to point out its logical defects.
My living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing,
and certainly it would be no reason why I should neglect the security of
my property. My living among murderers would not justify me in
committing murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason why I
should not fight in the defence of my family, if the arm of the law were
unable to protect them. That other nations carry on unjust wars is no
reason why we should do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why we
should neglect the means of self-defence.
It may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we were placed in
a world where there were no wars, or murders, or thefts; but God has
seen fit to order it otherwise. Our duties and our relations to our
fellow-men are made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world as
we would make for ourselves.
We live among thieves: we must therefore resort to force to protect our
property--that is, to locks, and bars, and bolts; we build walls thick
and high between the robber and our merchandise. And more: we enact laws
for his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly seize the
guilty and inflict that degree of punishment necessary for the
prevention of other thefts and robberies.
We live among murderers: if neither the law nor the ordinary physical
protections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives of
our innocent friends, we forcibly resist the murderer, even to his
death, if need be. Moreover, to deter others from like crimes, we
inflict the punishment of death upon him who has already taken life.
These relations of individuals and of society are laid down by all
ethical writers as in accordance with the strictest rules of Christian
morality. Even Dr. Wayland considers it not only the right, but the duty
of individuals and of society to resort to these means, and to enact
these laws for self-protection. Let us extend the same course of
reasoning to the relations of different societies.
We live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregarding
the rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens,
in order to reach some unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fences
and walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, as
a nation, we build ships and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors,
and our cities. But the walls of our houses and stores are useless,
unless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through or
scale them without great effort and personal danger; so our national
ships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fully
armed and equipped.
Further: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for
the protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm them
with the physical means of executing the laws, even though the
employment of these means should cost human life. The prevention and
punishment of crime causes much human suffering; nevertheless the good
of community requires that crime should be prevented and punished. So,
as a nation, we employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to
protect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish those who
seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. National
aggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual
crime; so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more
stupendous, and the employment of these means causes a far greater
amount of human suffering. This may be a good reason for greater
_caution_ in resorting to such means, but assuredly it is no argument
against the _moral right_ to use them.
IV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary:
"1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its
measures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any
thing else to prevent the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of
every community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the
just the kind, and the merciful."
The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of
individuals. Active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so
far as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases
to be a virtue. If we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber,
and the murderer, think you that crime will be diminished? Reason and
experience prove the contrary. Active benevolence and kindness should
always attend just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit
it. The laws of God's universe are founded on justice as well as love.
"The moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injury
inflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;" but this fact does
not entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent
persons, and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall
be punished, in order that those who are dead to all moral restraints
may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment.
"2d. But suppose the [national] injury to be done. I reply, the proper
appeal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force,
but to the consciences of men. Let the wrong be set forth, but be set
forth in the spirit of love; and in this manner, if in any, will the
consciences of men be aroused to justice."
Argument, and "appeals to the consciences of men" should always be
resorted to in preference to "physical force;" but when they fail to
deter the wicked, force must be employed. I may reason with the robber
and the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob my
house, and murder my family; but if he refuse to listen to moral
appeals, I employ physical force,--I call in the strong arm of the law
to assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent life
that is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed.
"If," says Puffendorf, "some one treads the laws of peace under his
feet, forming projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without the
highest degree of impudence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this I
should consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be touched; in
other words, that I should betray myself, and abandon the care of my own
preservation, in order to give way to the malice of a criminal, that he
may act with impunity and with full liberty. On the contrary, since he
shows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself in
a position which does not permit me safely to practice towards him the
duties of peace, I have only to think of preventing the danger which
menaces me; so that if I cannot do this without hurting him, he has to
accuse himself only, since he has reduced me to this necessity." _De
Jure Nat. et Gent_, lib. ii., ch. v., §1. This same course of
reasoning is also applied to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in
respect to war.
"3d. But suppose this method fail. Why, then, let us suffer the evil."
This principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we believe, be
subversive of all right, and soon place all power in the hands of the
most evil and wicked men in the community. Reason with the nation that
invades our soil, and tramples under foot our rights and liberties, and
should it not desist, why, then, suffer the evil! Reason with the
murderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, suffer him to murder our
wives and our children! Reason with the robber and the defaulter, and if
they will not listen, why, then, let them take our property! We cannot
appeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not respected, they
employ _force_ to _compel_ obedience to their mandates. But Dr. Wayland
considers the law of benevolence to forbid the use of force between men.
He forgets this, it is true, in speaking of our duties towards our
fellow-men of the same _society_, and even allows us to punish the
murderer with death; but towards the foreigner he requires a greater
forbearance and benevolence than towards our neighbor; for if another
nation send its armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by the
thousand, we have no right to employ physical force either to prevent or
to punish them, though we may do so to prevent or punish a neighbor for
an individual act of the same character. The greater the scale of crime,
then, the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to prevent
it!
"4th. But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and continued
aggression? I answer, first, not instruments of destruction, but the
moral principle which God has placed in the bosom of every man. I think
that obedience to the law of God, on the part of the injured, is the
surest preventive against the repetition of injury. I answer, secondly,
suppose that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence will not
prevent the repetition of injury, will acting on the principle of
retaliation prevent it?" Again; "I believe aggression from a foreign
nation to be the intimation from God that we are disobeying the law of
benevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching nations their duty,
in this respect, to each other. So that aggression seems to me in no
manner to call for retaliation and injury, but rather to call for
special kindness and good-will."
This argument, if such it can be called, is equally applicable to
individual aggressions. We are bound to regard them as intimations of
our want of benevolence, and to reward the aggressors for the
intimations! Is it true, that in this world the wicked only are
oppressed, and that the good are always the prospered and happy? Even
suppose this true, and that I, as a sinful man, deserve God's anger, is
this any reason why I should not resist the assassin, and seek to bring
him to punishment? The whole of this argument of Dr. Wayland applies
with much greater force to municipal courts than to war.
V. "Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means both of offence and of
defence, to lay aside all power of inflicting injury, and to rely for
self-preservation solely upon the justice of its own conduct, and the
moral effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon the
consciences of men. * * * * How would such a nation be protected from
external attack, and entire subjugation? I answer, by adopting the law
of benevolence, a nation would render such an event in the highest
degree improbable. The causes of national war are, most commonly, the
love of plunder and the love of glory. The first of these is rarely, if
ever, sufficient to stimulate men to the _ferocity necessary to war_,
unless when assisted by the second. And by adopting as the rule of our
conduct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the second cause
is taken away. There is not a nation in Europe that could be led on to
war against a harmless, just, forgiving, and defenceless people."
History teaches us that societies as well as individuals have been
attacked again and again notwithstanding that they either would not or
could not defend themselves. Did Mr. White, of Salem, escape his
murderers any the more for being harmless and defenceless? Did the
Quakers escape being attacked and hung by the ancient New Englanders any
the more because of their non-resisting principles? Have the Jews
escaped persecutions throughout Christendom any the more because of
their imbecility and non-resistance for some centuries past? Poland was
comparatively harmless and defenceless when the three great European
powers combined to attack and destroy the entire nation, dividing
between themselves the Polish territory, and enslaving or driving into
exile the Polish people.
"Oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time,
Sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime!"
We need not multiply examples under this head; all history is filled
with them.
Let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, disband our army
and navy, and apply the lighted torch to our military munitions and to
our physical means of defence of every description; let it be proclaimed
to the world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of nations
for justice, and that we have no longer either the will or the ability
to defend ourselves against aggression. Think you that the African and
Asiatic pirates would refrain, any the more, from plundering our vessels
trading to China, because we had adopted "the law of benevolence?" Would
England be any the more likely to compromise her differences with us, or
be any the more disposed to refrain from impressing our seamen and from
searching our merchant-ships? Experience shows that an undefended state,
known to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey of all others, and
history most abundantly proves the wisdom and justice of the words of
Washington--"IF WE DESIRE TO SECURE PEACE, IT MUST BE KNOWN THAT WE ARE
AT ALL TIMES READY FOR WAR."
But let us bring this case still nearer home. Let it be known to-morrow
that the people of Boston or New York have adopted the strictly
non-resisting principle, and that hereafter they will rely solely on the
consciences of men for justice; let it be proclaimed throughout the
whole extent of our Union, and throughout the world, that you have
destroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished your police and
executive law officers, that courts may decide justice but will be
allowed no force to compel respect to their decisions, that you will no
longer employ walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property and
the virtue and lives of your children; but that you will trust solely
for protection to "the law of active benevolence." Think you that the
thieves, and robbers, and murderers of Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and
New Orleans, and the cities of the old world, will, on this account,
refrain from molesting the peace of New York and Boston, and that the
wicked and abandoned men now in these cities, will be the more likely to
turn from the evil of their ways?
Assuredly, if this "law of active benevolence," as Dr. Wayland
denominates the rule of non-resistance, will prevent nations from
attacking the harmless and defenceless, it will be still more likely to
prevent individuals from the like aggressions; for the moral sense is
less active in communities than where the responsibility is individual
and direct.
Throughout this argument Dr. Wayland assumes that all wars are wars of
aggression, waged for "plunder" or "glory," or through "hatred" or
"revenge," whereas such is far from being true. He indeed sometimes
speaks of war as being _generally_ of this character; at others he
speaks of it as being _always_ undertaken either from a spirit of
aggression or retaliation. Take either form of his argument, and the
veriest schoolboy would pronounce it unsound: viz.,
_All_ wars are undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;
Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws;--therefore,
_All_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable.
Or,
Wars are _generally_ undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;
Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws--therefore,
_All_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable.
VI. "Let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expenditure, and
the awful waste of human life, which the wars of the last hundred years
have occasioned, and then we will ask him whether it be not evident,
that the one-hundredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed
in the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, would, long
before this time, have banished wars from the earth, and rendered the
civilized world like the garden of Eden? If this be true, it will follow
that the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community,
inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the corrupt passions
of the human breast, by the very manner in which it attempts to correct
the evil itself."
Much has been said to show that war begets immorality, and that the
cultivation of the military spirit has a corrupting influence on
community. And members of the clergy and of the bar have not
unfrequently so far forgotten, if not truth and fact, at least the
common courtesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the military
profession an unequal share of immorality and crime. We are declared not
only parasites on the body politic, but professed violators of God's
laws--men so degraded, though unconsciously, that "in the pursuit of
justice we renounce the human character and assume that of the beasts;"
it is said that "murder, robbery, rape, arson, theft, if only plaited
with the soldier's garb, go unwhipped of justice."[1] It has never been
the habit of the military to retort these charges upon the other
professions. We prefer to leave them unanswered. If demagogues on the
"stump," or in the legislative halls, or in their Fourth of-July
addresses, can find no fitter subjects "to point a moral or adorn a
tale," we must be content to bear their misrepresentations and abuse.
[Footnote 1: Sumner's Oration.]
Unjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral in their effects
and also in their cause. But just wars and just litigation are not
demoralizing. Suppose all wars and all courts of justice to be
abolished, and the wicked nations as well as individuals to be suffered
to commit injuries without opposition and without punishment; would not
immorality and unrighteousness increase rather than diminish? Few events
rouse and elevate the patriotism and public spirit of a nation so much
as a just and patriotic war. It raises the tone of public morality, and
destroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness which so
often result from a long-protracted peace. Such was the Dutch war of
independence against the Spaniards; such the German war against the
aggressions of Louis XIV., and the French war against the coalition of
1792. But without looking abroad for illustration, we find ample proof
in our own history. Can it be said that the wars of the American
Revolution and of 1812, were demoralizing in their effects? "Whence do
Americans," says Dr. Lieber, "habitually take their best and purest
examples of all that is connected with patriotism, public spirit,
devotedness to common good, purity of motive and action, if not from the
daring band of their patriots of the Revolution?"
The principal actors in the military events of the Revolution and of
1812, held, while living, high political offices in the state, and the
moral tone which they derived from these wars may be judged of by the
character stamped on their administration of the government. These men
have passed away, and their places have, for some time, been filled by
men who take their moral tone from the relations of peace. To the true
believer in the efficacy of _non-resistance,_ and in the demoralizing
influence of all wars, how striking the contrast between these
different periods in our political history! How infinitely inferior to
the rulers in later times were those, who, in the blindness of their
infatuation, appealed to physical force, rather than surrender their
life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness! Let us trace out this
contrast:--
In the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule of those whose
moral character had been corrupted by war, party spirit ran higher and
was less pure than at later periods in our history. The object of the
principal leaders of the great political parties was then to render the
opinions of the opposite party odious: now, their only object is to
sustain their own opinions by argument. Then, each party claimed to
itself an exclusive love of country, and stigmatized the other as aliens
and the natural enemies of the state: now, they both practise great
forbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. Then, men
obtained place through intrigue and corruption, and a universal scramble
for the loaves and fishes of office on the one side, and a universal
political proscription on the other, were regarded as the natural
results of an election: now, this disgusting strife for office has
ceased; men no longer seek place, but wait, like Cincinnatus, to be
called from their ploughs; and none are proscribed for opinion's sake.
Then, in electing men to office the most important social and
constitutional principles were forgotten or violated: now, we have the
august spectacle of a nation-choosing its rulers under the guidance of
strict moral principle. Then, the halls of congress were frequently
filled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the _small men_ of community:
now, the ablest and best of the country are always sought for as
representatives. Then, the magnates of party were the mere timid,
temporizing slaves of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdom
of their measures, but to their probable popularity with then sneaking
train of followers: now, they rely for respect and support upon the
judgment of the honest and enlightened. Then, the rank and file of party
were mere political hirelings, who sold their manhood for place, who
reviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and whispered calumnies, just
as they were bidden; they could fawn upon those who dispensed political
patronage with a cringing servility that would shame the courtiers of
Louis XIV., or the parasites and hirelings of Walpole: now, all
political partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping times of
peace, are pure, disinterested patriots, who, like the Roman farmer,
take office with great reluctance, and resign it again as soon as the
state can spare their services. Then, prize-fighters, and blacklegs, and
gamblers, having formed themselves into political clubs, were courted by
men high in authority, and rewarded for their dirty and corrupting
partisan services by offices of trust and responsibility: now, no man
clothed with authority would dare to insult the moral sense of community
by receiving such characters in the national councils, or by bestowing
public offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of society.
Such, the advocates of non resistance would persuade us, are the
legitimate results in this country of war on the one hand and of a
long-protracted peace on the other. But there are men of less vivid
imaginations, and, perhaps, of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal,
who fail to perceive these results, and who even think they see the
reverse of all this. These men cannot perceive any thing in the lives of
Washington, Hamilton, and Knox, to show that they were the less virtuous
because they had borne arms in their country's service: they even fail
to perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a military
spirit on the military students of West Point, whose graduates, they
think, will compare favorably in moral character with the graduates of
Yale and Cambridge. Nay, more, some even go so far as to say that our
army, as a body, is no less moral than the corresponding classes in
civil life; that our common soldiers are as seldom guilty of riots,
thefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly educated men engaged in
other pursuits; that our military officers are not inferior in moral
character to our civil officers, and that, as a class, they will compare
favorably with any other class of professional men--with lawyers, for
example. In justification of these opinions--which may, perhaps, be
deemed singularly erroneous--they say, that in the many millions of
public money expended during the last forty years, by military officers,
for the army, for military defences, and for internal improvements, but
a single graduate of West Point has proved a defaulter, even to the
smallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see an officer of the
army brought into court for violating the laws.
But even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse immorality
through community, is it not equally true that habitual submission to
the injustice, plunder, and insult of foreign conquerors would tend
still more to degrade and demoralize any people?
With regard to "pecuniary expenditures" required in military defence,
many absurd as well as false statements have been put forth. With
respect to our own country, the entire amounts expended, under the head
of war department, whether for Indian pensions, for the purchase of
Indian lands, the construction of government roads, the improvement of
rivers and harbors, the building of breakwaters and sea-walls, for the
preservation of property, the surveying of public lands, &c., &c.; in
fine, every expenditure made by officers of the army, under the war
department, is put down as "expenses for military defence." Similar
misstatements are made with respect to foreign countries: for example,
the new fortifications of Paris are said to have already cost from fifty
to seventy-five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be
required to complete them. Indeed, we have seen the whole estimated cost
of those works stated at two hundred and forty millions of dollars, or
twelve hundred millions of francs! The facts are these: the works, when
done, will have cost about twenty-eight millions. We had the pleasure of
examining them not long since, in company with several of the engineer
officers employed on the works. They were then three-fourths done, and
had cost about twenty millions. We were assured by these officers that
the fortifications proper would be completed for somewhat less than the
original estimate of twenty-eight millions. Had we time to enter into
details, other examples of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be
given.
But it is not to be denied that wars and the means of military defence
have cost vast amounts of money. So also have litigation and the means
deemed requisite for maintaining justice between individuals. It has
been estimated that we have in this country, at the present time, thirty
thousand lawyers, without including pettifoggers. Allowing each of these
to cost the country the average sum of one thousand dollars, and we have
the annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty millions of dollars.
Add to this the cost of legislative halls and legislators for making
laws; of court-houses, jails, police offices, judges of the different
courts, marshals, sheriffs justices of the peace, constables, clerks,
witnesses, &c., employed to apply and enforce the laws when made; the
personal loss of time of the different plaintiffs and defendants, the
individual anxiety and suffering produced by litigation; add all these
together, and I doubt not the result for a single year will somewhat
astonish these modern economists. But if all the expenditures of this
nature that have been made for the last fifty years, in this individual
"war of hate," be added together, we have no doubt a very fruitful text
might be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers! But
could any sane man be found to say that, on account of the cost of
maintaining them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should be
abolished?
If, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to secure
justice between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that the
means of international justice can be maintained without expenditures
commensurate with the object in view? If we cannot rely exclusively upon
the "law of active benevolence" for maintaining justice between brothers
of the same country, can we hope that, in the present state of the
world, strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its
requisitions?
The length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity in
the further discussion of this subject.
It is objected to war, that men being rational beings, should contend
with one another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes.
To this it is answered, that force properly begins only where argument
ends. If he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution,
I apply to the court,--that is, to _legal_ force,--to compel him to do
me justice. So nations ought to resort to _military force_ only when all
other means fail to prevent aggression and injury.
But war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or to prevent
repeated and continued aggression.
So does a resort to civil force; but such a resort is none the less
proper and just on that account.
But in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, while the
guilty triumph.
So it often is in civil life: God, for some wise purpose, sometimes
permits the wicked to triumph for a season.
But in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the war
is unjust on both sides.
So in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently both
resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends.
But nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, to settle
their differences.
For the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character--a
congress of nations, as it has been called,--would be more productive
of evil than of good. By such an arrangement the old and powerful
European monarchies would acquire the authority to interfere in the
domestic affairs of the weaker powers. We see the effects of
establishing such a tribunal in the so-called Holy Alliance, whose
influence is regarded by the friends of liberty as little less dangerous
than the Holy Inquisition. Moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent
war, for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its
decisions. For these and other reasons, it is deemed better and safer to
rely on the present system of International Law. Under this system, and
in this country, a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of
impulse and passion,--a yielding to the mere "bestial propensities" of
our nature; it is a deliberate and solemn act of the legislative
power,--of the representatives of the national mind, convened as the
high council of the people. It is this power which must determine when
all just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain national
justice, and when a resort to military force is requisite and proper. If
this decision be necessarily unchristian and barbarous, such, also,
should we expect to be the character of other laws passed by the same
body, and under the same circumstances. A declaration of war, in this
country, is a law of the land, made by a deliberative body, under the
high sanction of the constitution. It is true that such a law may be
unjust and wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily be
so. The distinction between war, as thus duly declared, and
"international Lynch-law" is too evident to need comment.
But it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced by
the evils it entails, and that, "most commonly, the very means by which
we repel a despotism from abroad, only establishes over us a military
despotism at home."
Much has been said and written about _military_ despotism; but we think
he who studies history thoroughly, will not fail to prefer a military
despotism to a despotism of mere politicians. The governments of
Alexander and Charlemagne were infinitely preferable to those of the
petty civil tyrants who preceded and followed them; and there is no one
so blinded by prejudice as to say that the reign of Napoleon was no
better than that of Robespierre, Danton, and the other "lawyers" who
preceded him, or of the Bourbons, for whom he was dethroned.
"Cæsar," says a distinguished senator of our own country, "was
rightfully killed for conspiring against his country; but it was not he
that destroyed the liberties of Rome. That work was done by the
profligate politicians without him, and before his time; and his death
did not restore the republic. There were no more elections: rotten
politicians had destroyed them; and the nephew of Cæsar, as heir to his
uncle, succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditary
succession."
"And here History appears in her grand and instructive character, as
Philosophy teaching by example: and let us not be senseless to her
warning voice. Superficial readers believe it was the military men who
destroyed the Roman republic! No such thing! It was the politicians who
did it!--factious, corrupt, intriguing politicians--destroying public
virtue in their mad pursuit after office--destroying their rivals by
crime--deceiving and debauching the people for votes--and bringing
elections into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they were
conducted. From the time of the Gracchi there were no elections that
could bear the name. Confederate and rotten politicians bought and sold
the consulship. Intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. Fraud,
violence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public treasury
commanded votes. The people had no choice; and long before the time of
Cæsar, nothing remained of republican government but the name and the
abuse. Read Plutarch. In the 'Life of Cæsar,' and not three pages before
the crossing of the Rubicon, he paints the ruined state of the
elections,--shows that all elective government was gone,--that the
hereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of the
corrupt,--and that in choosing between Pompey and Cæsar, many preferred
Pompey, not because they thought him republican, but because they
thought he would make the milder king. Even arms were but a small part
of Cæsar's reliance, when he crossed the Rubicon. Gold, still more than
the sword, was his dependence; and he sent forward the accumulated
treasures of plundered Gaul, to be poured into the laps of rotten
politicians. There was no longer a popular government; and in taking all
power himself, he only took advantage of the state of things which
profligate politicians had produced. In this he was culpable, and paid
the forfeit with his life. But in contemplating his fate, let us never
forget that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic,
before he came to seize and to master it."
We could point to numerous instances, where the benefits of war have
more than compensated for the evils which attended it; benefits not only
to the generations who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for
long ages. Had Rome adopted the non-resistance principle when Hannibal
was at her gates, we should now be in the night of African ignorance and
barbarism, instead of enjoying the benefits of Roman learning and Roman
civilization. Had France adopted this principle when the allied armies
invaded her territories in 1792, her fate had followed that of Poland.
Had our ancestors adopted this principle in 1776, what now had been,
think you, the character and condition of our country?
Dr. Lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just and apposite.
"The continued efforts," says he, "requisite for a nation to protect
themselves against the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be
infinitely greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic
war, which forever secures peace from that side. Nor will it be denied,
I suppose, that Niebuhr is right when he observes, that the advantage to
Rome of having conquered Sicily, as to power and national vigor, was
undeniable. But even if it were not so, are there no other advantages to
be secured? No human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance,
nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the
immeasurable blessings and the unspeakable good which have resolved to
mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece over the
rolling masses of servile Asia, which were nigh sweeping over Europe
like the high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand over all
the germs of civilization, liberty, and taste, and nearly all that is
good and noble. Think what we should have been had Europe become an
Asiatic province, and the Eastern principles of power and stagnation
should have become deeply infused into her population, so that no
process ever after could have thrown it out again! Has no advantage
resulted from the Hebrews declining any longer to be ground in the dust,
and ultimately annihilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude,
and the wars which followed their resolution? The Netherlands war of
independence has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modern
history, and, in the eye of all who value the most substantial parts and
elementary ideas of modern and civil liberty, a highly advantageous one,
both directly and through Great Britain. Wars have frequently been, in
the hands of Providence, the means of disseminating civilization, if
carried on by a civilized people--as in the case of Alexander, whose
wars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men and extension
of civilization--or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen into
lethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous hordes. Frequently
we find in history that the ruder and victorious tribe is made to
recover as it were civilization, already on the wane with a refined
nation. Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless,
amply proved by history, that the closest contact and consequent
exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of knowledge, between
two otherwise severed nations, is frequently produced by war. War is a
struggle, a state of suffering; but as such, at times, only that
struggling process without which--in proportion to the good to be
obtained, or, as would be a better expression for many cases, to the
good that is to be borne--no great and essential good falls ever to the
share of man. Suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. Our
religion, philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. No maternal
rejoicing brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of labor."
One word more, and we must leave this subject. It has been said by some
that the duties of patriotism are less binding upon us than upon our
ancestors; that, whatever may have been the practice in years that are
past the present generation can in no manner bear arms in their
country's cause, such a course being not only _dishonorable_, but in the
eye of the Christian, _wicked_, and even _infamous_! It is believed,
however, that such are not the general opinions and sentiments of the
religious people of this country. Our forefathers lighted the fires of
Religion and Patriotism at the same altar; it is believed that their
descendants have not allowed either to be extinguished, but that both
still burn, and will continue to burn, with a purer and brighter flame.
Our forefathers were not the less mindful of their duty to their God,
because they also faithfully served their country. If we are called upon
to excel them in works of charity, of benevolence, and of Christian
virtue, let it not be said of us that we have forgotten the virtue of
patriotism.[2]
[Footnote 2: For further discussion of this subject the reader is
referred to Lieber's Political Ethics, Part II., book vii. chap. 3;
Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy; Legare's Report of June 13,
1838, in the House of Representatives; Mackintosh's History of the
Revolution of 1688, chap. x.; Bynkershock; Vatel; Puffendorf;
Clausewitz; and most other writers on international law and the laws of
war.
Dr. Wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by Dymond
in his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Principles of
Christianity; Jay's Peace and War; Judd's Sermon on Peace and War;
Peabody's Address, &c.; Coue's Tract on What is the Use of the Navy?
Sumner's True Grandeur of Nations.]
CHAPTER II.
STRATEGY
War has been defined, "A contest between nations and states carried on
by force." But this definition is by some considered defective, inasmuch
as it would exclude all civil wars.
When war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, it is called
_offensive_, and when undertaken to repel invasion, or the attacks of an
enemy, it is called _defensive_. A war may be essentially defensive even
where we begin it, if intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is
under preparation. Besides this general division of war, military
writers have made numerous others, such as--
_Wars of intervention_, in which one state interferes in favor of
another. This intervention may either have respect to the _internal_ or
to the _external_ affairs of a nation. The interference of Russia in the
affairs of Poland, of England in the government of India, Austria and
the allied powers in the affairs of France during the Revolution and
under the empire, are examples under the first head. The intervention of
the Elector Maurice of Saxony against Charles V., of King William
against Louis XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years'
war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and between
France and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head. Most
liberal-publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of
nations as indefensible; but the principle is supported by the advocates
of the old monarchies of Europe.
_Wars of insurrection_ to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case
with the Americans in 1776, and the modern Greeks in 1821.
_Wars of independence_ from foreign dictation and control as the wars of
Poland against Russia, of the Netherlands against Spain, of France
against the several coalitions of the allied powers, of the Spanish
Peninsula against France and of China and India against England. The
American war of 1812 partook largely of this character, and some
judicious historians have denominated it the war of Independence, as
distinguished from the war of the Revolution.
_Wars of opinion_, like those which the Vendeans have sustained in
support of the Bourbons, and those France has sustained against the
allies, as also those of propagandism, waged against the smaller
European states by the republican hordes of the French Revolution. To
this class also belong--
_Religious wars_, like those of Islamism, of the crusades, and of the
Reformation.
_Wars of conquest_, like those of the Romans in Gaul, of the English in
India, of the French in Egypt and Africa, and of the Russians in
Circassia.
_National wars_, in which the great body of the people of a state
engage, like those of the Swiss against Austria and the Duke of
Burgundy, of the Catalans in 1712, of the Americans against England, of
the Dutch against Phillip II., and of the Poles and Circassians against
Russia.
_Civil wars_, where one portion of the state fights against the other,
as the war of the Roses in England, of the league in France, of the
Guelphs and Ghibelines in Italy, and of the factions in Mexico and South
America.
It is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of these
different kinds of war, but rather to consider the general subject, and
to discuss such general principles and rules as may be applicable to all
wars.
War in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a _science_ and
an _art_. It is a science so far as it investigates general principles
and institutes an analysis of military operations; and an art when
considered with reference to the practical rules for conducting
campaigns, sieges, battles, &c. So is engineering a science so far as it
investigates the general principles of fortification, and also
artillery, in analyzing the principles of gunnery; but both are arts
when considered with reference to the practical rules for the
construction, attack, and defence of forts, or for the use of cannon.
This distinction has not always been observed by writers on this
subject, and some have asserted that strategy is the _science_, and
tactics the _art_ of war. This is evidently mistaking the general
distinction between science, which investigates principles, and art,
which forms practical rules.
In popular language, however, it is usual to speak of _the military art_
when we refer to the general subject of war, and of _the military
sciences_ when we wish to call attention more particularly to the
scientific principles upon which the art is founded. We shall here
consider the military art in this general sense, as including the entire
subject of war.
As thus defined, the military art may be divided into four distinct
branches, viz.: 1st. _Strategy_; 2d. Fortification, or _Engineering_;
3d. _Logistics_; 4th. _Tactics_. Several general treatises on this art
add another branch, called _The Policy of War_, or the relations of war
with the affairs of state.
_Strategy_ is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive
points, or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each
other's cannon. _Engineering_ embraces all dispositions made to enable
troops to resist a superior force the longest time possible; and also
the means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome these material
obstacles. _Logistics_ embraces the practical details of moving and
supplying armies. _Tactics_ is the art of bringing troops into action,
or of moving them in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view,
and within the reach of his artillery. All these are most intimately
connected. A fault in tactics may occasion the loss of strategic lines;
the best combined manoeuvres on the field of battle may lead to no
decisive results, when the position, or the direction of the operation
is not strategic; sometimes not only battles, but entire campaigns, are
lost through neglect of the engineer's art, or faults in his
dispositions; again, armies would be of little use without the requisite
means of locomotion and of subsistence.
1. _Strategy_ regards the theatre of war, rather than the field of
battle. It selects the important points in this theatre, and the lines
of communication by which they may be reached; it forms the plan and
arranges the general operations of a campaign; but it leaves it to the
engineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect new ones; it
leaves to logistics the means of supporting armies and of moving them on
the chosen lines; and to tactics, the particular dispositions for
battle, when the armies have reached the destined points. It is well to
keep in mind these distinctions, which may be rendered still more
obvious by a few illustrations. The point where several lines of
communications either intersect or meet, and the centre of an arc which
is occupied by the enemy, are strategic points; but tactics would reject
a position equally accessible on all sides, especially with its flanks
exposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and Varro at Cannae, so placed
their armies that the Carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, in
front, on the flanks, and in rear; the Roman consuls were defeated: but
the central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli was eminently
successful. At the battle of Austerlitz the allies had projected a
_strategic_ movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's right
from Vienna; Weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed a
corresponding _tactical_ movement. By the former there had been some
chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction.
The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more
useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The
little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the
operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army;
whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706,
caused an army of 78,000 French to be defeated by only 40,000 men under
Prince Eugene of Savoy.
War, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. If
the attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war
of _invasion_. If only a province, or a military position, or an army,
be attacked, it is simply regarded as taking the _initiative_ in
offensive movements.
_Offensive_ war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and
political influence. It is waged on a foreign soil, and therefore spares
the country of the attacking force; it augments its own resources at the
same time that it diminishes those of the enemy; it adds to the moral
courage of its own army, while it disheartens its opponents. A war of
invasion may, however, have also its disadvantages. Its lines of
operation may become too _deep_, which is always hazardous in an enemy's
country. All the natural and artificial obstacles, such as mountains,
rivers, defiles, fortifications, &c., are favorable for defence, but
difficult to be overcome by the invader. The local authorities and
inhabitants oppose, instead of facilitating his operations; and if
patriotism animate the defensive army to fight for the independence of
its threatened country, the war may become long and bloody. But if a
political diversion be made in favor of the invading force, and its
operations be attended with success, it strikes the enemy at the heart,
paralyzes all his military energies, and deprives him of his military
resources, thus promptly terminating the contest. Regarded simply as the
initiative of movements, the offensive is almost always the preferable
one, as it enables the general to choose his lines for moving and
concentrating his masses on the decisive point.
The first and most important rule in offensive war is, to keep your
forces as much concentrated as possible. This will not only prevent
misfortune, but secure victory,--since, by its necessary operation, you
possess the power of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point of
your enemy's position.
To this general rule some writers have laid down the following
exceptions:--
1st. When the food and forage of the neighborhood in which you act have
been exhausted and destroyed, and your magazines are, from any cause,
unable to supply the deficiency, one of two things must be done; either
you must go to places where these articles abound, or you must draw from
them your supplies by _detachments_. The former is rarely compatible
with your plan, and necessarily retards its execution; and hence the
preference which is generally given to the latter.
2d. When reinforcements are about to join you, and this can only be
effected by a march through a country actually occupied by hostile
corps, or liable to be so occupied, you must again waive the general
rule, and risk one party for the security of the other; or, (which may
be better,) make such movements with your main body as shall accomplish
your object.
3d. When you have complete evidence of the actual, or probable
insurrection in your favor, of a town or province of your enemy, or of a
division of his army, you must support this inclination by strong
_detachments_, or by movements of your main body. Napoleon's operations
in Italy, in 1796-7, furnish examples of what is here meant.
4th. When, by dispatching a _detachment_, you may be able to intercept a
convoy, or reinforcement, coming to the aid of your enemy.
These are apparent rather than real exceptions to the rule of
concentration. This rule does not require that _all the army should
occupy the same position_. Far from it. Concentration requires the main
body to be in immediate and supporting reach: small detachments, for
temporary and important objects, like those mentioned, are perfectly
legitimate, and in accordance with correct principles. Napoleon's
position in Spain will serve as an illustration. A hand, placed on the
map of that country, will represent the position of the invading forces.
When opened, the fingers will represent the several detachments, thrown
out on important strategic lines, and which could readily be drawn in,
as in closing the hand, upon the principal and central mass, preparatory
to striking some important blow.
"If, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an army acting on
the offensive principle, to keep its forces _concentrated_, it is, no
doubt, the second, _to keep them fully employed._ Is it your intention
to seize a particular province of your enemy? to penetrate to his
capital? or to cut him off from his supplies? Whatever measure be
necessary to open your route to these objects must be _promptly_ taken;
and if you mean to subsist yourself at his expense, your movements must
be more rapid than his. Give him time to _breathe_,--and above all, give
him time to _rest_, and your project is blasted; his forages will be
completed, and his magazines filled and secured. The roads of approach
will be obstructed, bridges destroyed, and strong points everywhere
taken and defended. You will, in fact, like Burgoyne, in 1777, reduce
yourself to the necessity of bleeding at every step, without equivalent
or use."
"Such cannot be the fate of a commander who, knowing all the value of
acting on the offensive, shakes, by the vigor and address of his first
movements, the moral as well as physical force of his enemy,--who,
selecting his own time, and place, and mode of attack, confounds his
antagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unexpected,--and who at last
leaves to him only the alternative of resistance without hope, or of
flying without resistance."
The British army, in the war of the American Revolution, must have been
most wretchedly ignorant of these leading maxims for conducting
offensive war. Instead of concentrating their forces on some decisive
point, and then destroying the main body of our army by repeated and
well-directed blows, they scattered their forces over an immense extent
of country, and became too weak to act with decision and effect on any
one point. On the other hand, this policy enabled us to call out and
discipline our scattered and ill-provided forces.
The main object in _defensive_ war is, to protect the menaced territory,
to retard the enemy's progress, to multiply obstacles in his way, to
guard the vital points of the country, and--at the favorable moment,
when the enemy becomes enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, and
fatigue--to assume the offensive, and drive him from the country. This
combination of the defensive and offensive has many advantages. The
enemy, being forced to take the defensive in his turn, loses much of the
moral superiority due to successful offensive operations. There are
numerous instances of this kind of war, "the defensive-offensive," as it
is sometimes called, to be found in history. The last four campaigns of
Frederick the Great of Prussia, are examples which may serve as models.
Wellington played a similar part in the Spanish peninsula.
To merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to the
advances of the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions or
provinces as may have fallen into his power, or to inflict on him some
fatal and decisive blow on the first favorable opportunity; such a
system is always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, and
cowardice; but such is far from being the true Fabian system of
defensive war.
"Instead of finding security only in flight; instead of habitually
refusing to look the enemy in the face; instead of leaving his march
undisturbed; instead of abandoning, without contest, points strong by
nature or by art;--instead of all this, the true war of defence seeks
every occasion to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoy
or defeat him; it is always awake; it is constantly in motion, and never
unprepared for either attack or defence. When not employed in efforts of
courage or address, it incessantly yields itself to those of labor and
science. In its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges; while
it erects or repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, raises
batteries, fortifies passes, or intrenches encampments; and to the
system of deprivation adds all the activity, stratagem, and boldness of
_la petite guerre_. Dividing itself into detachments, it multiplies its
own attacks and the alarms of the enemy. Collecting itself at a single
point, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes for weeks
together. Does it even abandon the avenues it is destined to defend? It
is but for the purpose of shielding them more securely, by the attack of
his hospitals, magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. In a word, by
adopting the maxim, that the _enemy must be made to pay for whatever he
gains_, it disputes with him every inch of ground, and if at last it
yields to him a victory, it is of that kind which calls forth only his
sighs."
In discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical terms are
employed, such as _theatre of war; theatre of operations; base of
operations_, or the line from which operations start; _objective
points_, or points to which the operations are directed; _line of
operations_, or the line along which an army moves; _key points_, or
points which it is important for the defensive army to secure; _line of
defence,_ or the line which it is important to defend at all hazards:
and in general, _strategic points, strategic lines, strategic positions,
&c._ As these terms are very generally used in military books, it may be
well to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with their import. After
defining these terms and explaining their meaning and application, it is
deemed best to illustrate their use by reference to well-known and
striking historical examples.
_The theatre of a war_ embraces not only the territory of the two
belligerent powers, but also that of their allies, and of such secondary
powers as, through fear or interest, may be drawn into the contest. With
maritime nations it also embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses to
another continent. Some of the wars between France and England embraced
the two hemispheres.
_The theatre of operations_, however, is of a more limited character,
and should not be confounded with the theatre of war. In general, it
includes only the territory which an army seeks, on the one hand, to
defend, and on the other, to invade. If two or more armies be directed
towards the same object, though by different lines, their combined
operations are included in the same theatre but if each acts
independently of the others, and seeks distinct and separate objects,
each must have its own independent theatre of operations.
A war between France and Austria may embrace all Italy and Germany, but
the theatre of operations may be limited to only a portion of these
countries. Should the Oregon question lead to hostilities between the
United States and England, the theatre of war would embrace the greater
part of North America and the two oceans, but the theatre of operations
would probably be limited to Canada and our northern frontier, with
naval descents upon our maritime cities.
The first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is to
select a good _base_. Many circumstances influence this selection, such
as mountains, rivers, roads, forests, cities, fortifications, military
dépôts, means of subsistence, &c. If the frontier of a state contain
strong natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not only as a good
base for offensive operations, but also as an excellent line of defence
against invasion. A single frontier line may, however, be penetrated by
the enemy, and in that case a second or third base further in the
interior becomes indispensable for a good defence.
A French army carrying on military operations against Germany would make
the Rhine its first base; but if driven from this it would form a second
base on the Meuse or Moselle, a third on the Seine, and a fourth on the
Loire; or, when driven from the first base, it would take others
perpendicular to the front of defence, either to the right, on Béfort
and Besançon, or to the left, on Mézières and Sedan. If acting
offensively against Prussia and Russia, the Rhine and the Main would
form the first base the Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the
third, the Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the fifth.
A French army operating against Spain would have the Pyrenees for its
first base; the line of the Ebro for a second, resting its wings on the
gulf of Gascony and the Mediterranean. If from this position it advance
its left, possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the
Sierra d'Estellas becomes its third base of operations against the
centre of Spain.
A base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line of
operations, or to the enemy's line of defence. Some prefer one plan and
some another; the best authorities, however, think the oblique or
perpendicular more advantageous than the parallel; but we are not often
at liberty to choose between these, for other considerations usually
determine the selection.
In 1806, the French forces first moved perpendicular to their base on
the Main, but afterwards effected a change of front, and moved on a line
oblique or nearly parallel to this base. They had pursued the same plan
of operations in the Seven Years' War. The Russians, in 1812, based
perpendicularly on the Oka and the Kalouga, and extended their flank
march on Wiozma and Krasnoi; in 1813, the allies, based perpendicularly
on Bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing Napoleon's army on the Elbe.
An American army moving by Lake Champlain, would be based perpendicular
on the great line of communication between Boston and Buffalo; if moving
from the New England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of
operations would be oblique; and if moving from the Niagara frontier by
Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel
both to our base and to the enemy's line of defence--an operation, under
the circumstances, exceedingly objectionable.
Any point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor an
advantage over his opponent, is regarded as _strategic_. Their
geographical position and political and military character, give them a
greater or less influence in directing the campaign. These points are
occupied by the defensive army, and attacked by the offensive; if on or
near the base, they become the _key_ points for the former, and the
_objective_ points for the latter.[3] There are also between these two a
greater or less number of strategic points, which have an important
though inferior influence upon the result of the war.
[Footnote 3: It may be well to remark that a strategic point is not
necessarily a geometrical point; an entire province, or a considerable
portion of a geographical frontier, is, in military language, sometimes
denominated a _point_. In the same way, strategic lines, instead of
being mathematical lines, are frequently many miles in width.]
The first object of the French in attacking Belgium, is to gain
possession of the Meuse, as this position would give them a decided
advantage in any ulterior operations. In attacking southern Germany, the
course of the Danube offers a series of points which exercise an
important influence on the war. For northern Germany, Leipsic and the
country bordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are objects often fiercely
contested by the French and other belligerent powers. In a war between
this country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence
between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest
importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of
the war.
The capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its
military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its
capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. The
possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from
their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon
the results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice,
Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809,
Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If
Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of
Cannae;, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of
Washington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the
place was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal
capital. It, however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and
required many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national
escutcheon.
_Lines of defence_ in strategy are either permanent or temporary. The
great military frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened by
natural and artificial obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers,
lines of fortresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence.
The Alpine range between France and Piedmont, with its fortified passes;
the Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with their strongly-fortified places;
the Pyrenees, with Bayonne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other;
the triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier--are all
permanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is a permanent line
of defence for Canada; and the line of lake Champlain, the upper St.
Lawrence, and the lakes, for the United States.
Temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the
campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of the allies
in Belgium, in 1815; the line of the Marne, in 1814, are examples of
temporary lines of defence.
It will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are not
necessarily bases of operation.
_Strategic positions_ are such as are taken up during the operations of
a war, either by a _corps d'armée_ or grand detachment, for the purpose
of checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus to
distinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. The
positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797,
to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in
Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and
Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799,
are examples under this head.
Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic
relations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams.
(Fig. 1.) The army at A covers the whole of the ground in rear of the
line DC perpendicular to the line AB, the position of the enemy being at
B.
(Fig. 2.) AJ being equal to BJ, A will still cover every thing in rear
of DC.
(Fig. 3.) If the army A is obliged to cover the point _a_, the army B
will cover all the space without the circle whose radius is _a_ B; and of
course A continues to cover the point _a_ so long as it remains within
this circle _a_ B.
_A line of operations_ embraces that portion of the theatre of war which
an army or _corps d'armée_ passes over in attaining its object; _the
front of operations_ is the front formed by the army as it advances on
this line.
When an army acts as a single mass, without forming independent corps,
the line it follows is denominated a _simple line of operations_.
If two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but against the same
opposing force, they are said to follow _double_ or _multiple lines_.
The lines by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany in 1796, were
double lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806,
although moving in seven distinct _corps d'armée,_ formed but a single
line of operations.
_Interior lines of operations_ are those followed by an army which
operates between the enemy's lines in such a way as to be able to
concentrate his forces on one of these lines before the other can be
brought to its assistance. For example, Napoleon's line of operations
in 1814, between the Marne and the Seine, where he manoeuvred with so
much skill and success against the immensely superior forces of the
allies.
_Exterior lines_ present the opposite results; they are those which an
army will form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses. For
example, the lines of the Marne and the Seine, followed by the army of
Silesia and the grand Austro-Russian army, in the campaign of 1814.
Burgoyne's line of operations, in 1777, was double and exterior.
_Concentric lines_ are such as start from distant points, and are
directed towards the same object, either in the rear or in advance of
their base.
If a mass leaves a single point and separates into several distinct
corps, taking divergent directions, it is said to pursue _eccentric
lines_.
Lines are said to be _deep_, when the end to be attained is very distant
from the base.
The lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force are denominated
_secondary lines_.
The lines pursued by the army of the Sombre-et-Meuse in 1796, and by
Bagration in 1812, were _secondary lines_, as the former were merely
secondary to the army of the Rhine, and the latter to that of Barclay.
_Accidental lines_ are those which result from a change in the primitive
plan of campaign, which give a new direction to the operations. These
are of rare occurrence, but they sometimes lead to important results.
The direction given to a line of operations depends not only on the
geographical situation of the country, but also on the positions
occupied by the enemy. The general plan of campaign is frequently
determined on previous to beginning operations, but the choice of lines
and positions must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of the
war, and be made by the general as these events occur.
As a general rule, _a line of operations should be directed upon the
centre_, or _one of the extremities of the enemy's line of defence_;
unless our forces be infinitely superior in number, it would be absurd
to act against the front and extremities at the same time.
If the configuration of the theatre of operations be favorable to a
movement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, this
direction maybe best calculated to lead to important results. (Fig. 4.)
In 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against the extreme left of
the line of the Black Forest; the army of reserve was directed by the
St. Bernard and Milan on the extreme right and rear of Melas's line of
defence: both operations were most eminently successful. (Fig. 5.)
It may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain the
extremity and rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for
him to throw himself on our communications and place us in the very
dilemma in which we had hoped to involve him. To avoid this danger it is
necessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our
army shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base.
Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, had marched by
Turin on Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having first
secured Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own line of retreat would
have been completely cut off by Melas; whereas, by the direction which
he gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, every
means for reaching either the Var or the Valois. (Fig. 6.) Again, in
1806, if he had marched directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would have
been cut off from his base on the Rhine; whereas, by turning from Gera
towards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians from the Elbe, but at
the same time secured to himself the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, and
Hoff, thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear.
(Fig. 7.)
We have said that the configuration of the ground and the position of
the hostile forces may _sometimes_ render it advisable to direct our
line of operations against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence;
but, _as a general rule_ a central direction will lead to more important
results. This severs the enemy's means of resistance, and enables the
assailant to strike, with the mass of his force, upon the dissevered and
partially paralyzed members of the hostile body. (Fig. 8.)
Such a plan of operations enabled Napoleon, in the Italian campaigns of
1796 and 1797, to pierce and destroy, with a small force, the large and
successive armies which Austria sent against him. In 1805 his operations
were both interior and central: in 1808 they were most eminently
central: in 1809, by the central operations in the vicinity of
Ratisbonne, he defeated the large and almost victorious army of the
Archduke Charles: in 1814, from his central position between the Marne
and Seine, with only seventy thousand men against a force of more than
two hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and barely failed of
complete success. Again in 1815, with an army of only one hundred and
twenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty
thousand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he gained a
most decided advantage over the enemy--an advantage lost by the
eccentric movement of Grouchy: and even in 1813, his central position at
Dresden would have secured him most decisive advantages, had not the
faults of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of Kulm
and the Katzbach.
For the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army;
grand detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used with
advantage, but double or multiple lines of operation are far less
favorable than one simple line. It may however sometimes occur that the
position of the enemy's forces will be such as to make this operation
the preferable one. In that case, interior lines should always be
adopted, unless we have a vast superiority in number. Double exterior
lines, with corps several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if the
enemy, whether acting on single or double interior lines, take advantage
of his position to concentrate his masses successively against our
isolated forces. The Roman armies under the consuls Flaminius and
Servilius opposed Hannibal on exterior lines, the one by Florence and
Arrezzio, and the other by Modena and Ariminum. Hannibal turned the
position of Flaminius and attacked the Roman armies separately, gaining
a complete and decisive victory. Such also was the character of the
operations of the French in 1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan; they met
with a bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French armies
under Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines; the Archduke Charles,
from his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposing
generals, and forcing them to retreat. If the two armies united had
pursued a single line, the republican flag had been carried in triumph
to Vienna.
_Converging_ lines of operation are preferable, under most
circumstances, to diverging lines. Care should be taken, however, that
the point of meeting be such that it may not be taken as a strategic
position by the enemy, and our own forces be destroyed in detail, before
they can effect a junction. In 1797 the main body of the Austrians,
under Alvinzi, advanced against Napoleon, on three separate lines,
intending to concentrate at Rivoli, and then attack the French in mass;
but Napoleon took his strategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew the
enemy's corps as they successively appeared. In the same way the
Archduke Charles took an interior position, between Moreau and Jourdan,
in 1796, and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a single
point. Wurmser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on
the Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of Lake Garda; but Napoleon
took an interior position and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and
Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of
Napoleon and Grouchy.
_Diverging_ lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy
immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by
this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if
occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by
converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in
1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was
the manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at
Ratisbon in 1809.
_Interior_ lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost
invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be
clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other
extraneous circumstances of the campaign. There may, however, be cases
where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank;
the geographical character of the theatre of war, the position of other
collateral forces, &c., rendering such a direction necessary. But as a
general rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate
forces, will lead to decisive results.
Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the
Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against
Austria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in
Spain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Brienne and that
of Paris, and his operations previous to the Battle of Ligny in 1815,
are all brilliant examples under this head.
To change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, and
follow _accidental lines_, is always a delicate affair, and can only be
resorted to by a general of great skill, and with disciplined troops. In
such a case it may be attended with important results. It was one of
Napoleon's maxims, that "a line of operations, when once chosen, should
never be abandoned." This maxim, however, must sometimes be disregarded
by an army of undisciplined troops, in order to avoid entire
destruction; but the total abandonment of a line of operations is always
attended with great loss, and should be regarded as a mere choice of
evils. A regular army can always avoid this result, by changing the
direction of its line; thus frequently gaining superior advantages in
the new theatre of action. If the plan of this change be the result of a
good _coup d'oeil_, and it be skilfully executed, the rear of the
operating army will be secure from the enemy; and moreover, he will be
left in doubt respecting its weak points. But such is the uncertainty of
this manoeuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best troops, unless
actually forced upon them. If the army be of incongruous materials,
generally a change of direction will be less advantageous than to
entirely abandon the line, and save as many as possible of the troops
for some new plan of operations. (Maxim 20.) If, however, the
undisciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take up the
_accidental line of operations_ in the same manner, and with the same
probability of success, as is done by a regular force.
We have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of
Prussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, and of Washington, in
New-Jersey, after the action of Princeton. This is one of the finest in
military history. Napoleon had projected a change in his line of
operations, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz; but victory
rendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he had planned an
entire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forces
under Mortier and Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if
properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronounced
it one of the most brilliant of his military career.
Having explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace out
the successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations.
We will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just entering
upon a campaign. The political and military authorities of the state
determine upon the nature of the war, and select the theatre of its
enterprises. The chief selects certain points, on or near the borders of
the seat of war, where his troops are to be assembled, and his
_materiel_ collected. These points, together, form his base of
operations. He now selects some point, within the theatre of the war, as
the first object of his enterprises, and chooses the line of operations
most advantageous for reaching this objective point. The temporary
positions taken on this line become strategic positions, and the line in
his rear, a line of defence. When he arrives in the vicinity of his
first object, and the enemy begins to oppose his enterprises, he must
force this enemy to retreat, either by an attack or by manoeuvres. For
this purpose he temporarily adopts certain lines of manoeuvre, which may
deviate from his general line of operations. The ulterior events of the
campaign may possibly cause him to make these new, or accidental lines,
his lines of operations. The approach of hostile forces may cause him to
detach secondary corps on secondary lines; or to divide his army, and
pursue double or multiple lines. The primitive object may also be
relinquished, and new ones proposed, with new lines and new plans of
operations. As he advances far from his primitive base, he forms new
depots and lines of magazines. He may encounter natural and artificial
obstacles. To cross large rivers in the face of an enemy is a hazardous
operation; and he requires all the art of the engineer in constructing
bridges, and securing a safe passage for his army. If a fortified place
is to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and either continue his
march with the main army, or take a strategic position to cover this
siege. Thus Napoleon, in 1796, with an army of only 50,000 combatants,
could not venture to penetrate into Austria, with Mantua and its
garrison of 25,000 men in his rear, and an Austrian force of 40,000
before him. But in 1806 the great superiority of his army enabled him to
detach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of Silesia, and still
to continue his operations with his principal forces. The chief of the
army may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compel
him to give battle. If he should be victorious, the enemy must be
pursued and harassed to the uttermost. If he should be defeated, he must
form the best plan, and provide the best means of retreat. If possible,
he must take shelter in some line of fortifications, and prepare to
resume the offensive. Lines of intrenchment and temporary works may
sometimes serve him as a sufficient protection. Finally, when the
unfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations, he will go
into winter cantonments, and prepare for a new campaign.
Such are the ordinary operations of war: its relations to strategy must
be evident, even to the most superficial reader.
Not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon the
strategic operations of an army, than upon its victories gained in
actual combat. Tactics, or movements within the range of the enemy's
cannon, is therefore subordinate to the _choice of positions_: if the
field of battle be properly chosen, success will be decisive, and the
loss of the battle not disastrous; whereas, if selected without
reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained,
might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thus
demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due
to the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war,
than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18.)
We have a striking illustration of this in the French army of the
Danube, which, from the left wing of General Kray, marched rapidly
through Switzerland to the right extremity of the Austrian line, "and by
this movement alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and
Danube without pulling a trigger."
Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main
body forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In
1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of
Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid,
in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the
French in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, against
vastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the
maxim.
Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though least
understood, of all the branches of the military art.[4]
[Footnote 4: Strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general
military histories. There are very few good elementary works on this
branch of the military art. The general treatises of the Archduke
Charles, and of General Wagner, in German, (the former has been
translated into French,) are considered as the best. The discussions of
Jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are
exceedingly valuable; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot de
Presle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated into
English, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The military
histories of Lloyd, Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard,
Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, Wagner,
Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathieu Dumas, Ségur, Pelet, Koch,
Clausewitz, and Thiers, may be read with great advantage. Napier's
History of the Peninsular War is the only English History that is of any
value as a _military_ work: it is a most excellent book. Alison's great
History of Europe is utterly worthless to the military man; the author
is ignorant of the first principles of the military art, and nearly
every page is filled with the grossest blunders.
We subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy,
either directly or in connection with military history.
_Principes de la Stratégie, &c._, par le Prince Charles, traduit de
l'Allemand, 3 vols. in 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The technical
terms, however, are very loosely employed.
_Précis de l'Art de la Guerre_, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter on
strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art.
_Grundsätze der Strategic_, Von Wagner.
_Cours Elémentaire d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire_, par Rocquancourt.
This work contains much valuable information connected with the history
of the art of war; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an
elementary book.
_Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire_, par Jacquinot de Presle. This
work is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches
of military service are but very briefly discussed.
De Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification contains
much valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the same
objections as that of Rocquancourt.
_History of the Seven Years' War_, by Lloyd and Templehoff. The military
writings of Lloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected with the
history of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by these
writers are now regarded as erroneous.
_Mémoires de Napoléon_. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by himself
to Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into English. It is
hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles
of military art and science. No military man should fail to study them
thoroughly. The matter is so condensed, and important principles are
embodied in so few words, that they are not easily understood by the
ordinary reader, and probably will never be popular with the multitude.
_Essai général de Tactique_, par Guibert. A work very popular in its
day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned.
_Ausführliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens_, von Gravert.
Regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment.
_Mémoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne_. Souchet.
_Mémoires de Gouvion St. Cyr._
_Statistique de la Guerre_, par Reveroni St. Cyr.
_Première Campagnes de la Revolution_, par Grimoard.
_Victoires et Conquêtes_. Beauvais.
_Campagnes de Suwarrow_. Laverne.
_Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule_. Foy.
_Précis des Evénements Militaires_. Mathieu Dumas.
_Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande Armée en 1812_. Ségur
_Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809_. Pelet.
_La Campagne de 1814_. Koch.
_Vom Kriege--Die Feldzügge, &c._ Clausewitz.
_La Révolution, le Consulat et l'Empire._ Thiers.
_Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1812--sur la Campagne du Vice roi en Italie,
en 1813 et 1814; Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814; Histoire
des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France_. Vaudoncourt.
_Essai sur l'Art Militaire, &c._ Carion-Nisas.
_Histoire de l'Expédition en Russie en 1812_. Chambray.
_War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France_. John Jones.
_Peninsular War_. Napier.
_Notices of the War of 1812_. Armstrong
All the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the
military man than the military histories of Jomini and Kausler, with
their splendid diagrams and maps.]
CHAPTER III.
FORTIFICATIONS.
_Fortifications, or engineering_, may be considered with reference to
the defence of states and the grand operation of armies; or with
reference to the details of the construction, and attack, and defence of
forts, and the influence of field-works on the tactical manoeuvres of
armies. It is proposed to speak here only of its general character, as a
branch of the military art, without entering into any professional
discussion of details.
The connection of fortification and strategy may be considered under two
distinct heads: 1st, the choice of sites for constructing fortresses for
defence; 2d, their influence in offensive operations, and the
determination of the question whether they can be passed with safety, or
whether the attacking force will be under the necessity of besieging
them.
The centre and extremities of _a base of operations_ should always be
secured either by natural or artificial obstacles. This base is
generally chosen so that fortifications will be necessary for
strengthening only a part of the line. But if a frontier, like the side
of France towards Belgium, be destitute of natural obstacles, the
artificial means of defence must be proportionally increased. Great care
should be taken that permanent fortifications be made only on such
places as may favor military operations. If otherwise, the troops
detached from the active army for garrisoning them, will only tend to
weaken this force without any corresponding advantages. In this way,
fortifications may become actually injurious to defence. A number of the
European fortresses which were built before the subject of strategy was
properly understood, are now regarded as utterly useless, from their
ill-advised positions.
Whether a fortress may be safely passed with merely blockading or
observing it, depends very much upon the nature of the war, and the
numbers and position of the defensive army. The allies, in 1814,
invading France with a million of soldiers, assisted by the political
diversion of factions and Bourbonists within the kingdom, and treason in
the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of Napoleon's army, could
conduct their military operations on a very different plan from that
which would be adopted by either Austria, Prussia, Russia, England,
Spain, Portugal, Holland, Italy, and the German powers, if singly waging
war with the French. Napoleon sometimes detached a corps to observe a
fortress which threatened his line of operations or of manoeuvre; at
others, he delayed his advance till the place could be reduced.
"An army," says Jomini, "may sometimes penetrate between places on an
open frontier, to attack the enemy's forces in the field, taking care at
the same time to _observe_ these places; but no invading army can cross
a great river, like the Danube, the Rhine, or the Elbe, without reducing
at least one of the fortresses on that river, so as to secure a line of
retreat; but being in possession of such a place, it can continue the
offensive, while its _matériel de siège_ successively reduces the other
places."
In case the main army is obliged to remain and cover the besieging
corps, it should take some central position, where it can command all
the avenues of approach, and fall with vigor on the enemy, should he
attempt to raise the siege. Napoleon's operations before Mantua, in
1796, offer the finest model for imitation.
The old system of intrenched camps and lines of contravallation is
unsuited to the spirit of modern warfare. In ancient times, and more
particularly in the middle ages, too much importance was attached to
tactical positions, and not enough to strategic points and lines. This
gave to fortifications a character that never properly belonged to them.
From the middle ages down to the period of the French Revolution, wars
were carried on mainly by the system of positions--one party confining
their operations to the security of certain important places, while the
other directed their whole attention to the siege and capture of these
places. But Carnot and Napoleon changed this system, at the same time
with the system of tactics, or rather, returned from it to the old and
true system of strategic operations. Some men, looking merely at the
fact that a _change_ was made, but without examining the _character_ of
that change, have rushed headlong to the conclusion that fortified
places are now utterly useless in war, military success depending
entirely upon a good system of marches.
On this subject, General Jomini, the great military historian of the
wars of the French Revolution, remarks that "we should depend entirely
upon neither organized masses, nor upon material obstacles, whether
natural or artificial. To follow exclusively either of these systems
would be equally absurd. The true science of war consists in choosing a
just medium between the two extremes. The wars of Napoleon demonstrated
the great truth, that distance can protect no country from invasion, but
that a state, to be secure, must have a good system of fortresses, and a
good system of military reserves and military institutions."
In all military operations _time_ is of vast importance. If a single
division of an army can be retarded for a few hours only, it not
unfrequently decides the fate of the campaign. Had the approach of
Blucher been delayed for a few hours, Napoleon must have been victorious
at the battle of Waterloo. An equilibrium can seldom be sustained for
more than six or seven hours between forces on the field of battle; but
in this instance, the state of the ground rendered the movements so
slow as to prolong the battle for about twelve hours; thus enabling the
allies to effect a concentration in time to save Wellington.
Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing
troops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7,
Marengo in 1800, Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in
1814, and Ligny in 1815, are familiar examples. But this concentration
of forces, even with a regular army, cannot be calculated on by the
general with any degree of certainty, unless his communications are
perfectly secure. And this difficulty is very much increased where the
troops are new and undisciplined. When a country like ours is invaded,
large numbers of such troops must suddenly be called into the field. Not
knowing the designs of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches
and countermarches; and if there be no safe places of resort the
operations must be indecisive and insecure.
To a defensive army fortifications are valuable as points of repose,
upon which the troops, if beaten, may fall back, and shelter their sick
and wounded, collect their scattered forces, repair their materials, and
draw together a new supply of stores and provisions; and as rallying
points, where new troops may be assembled with safety, and the army, in
a few days, be prepared to again meet the enemy in the open field.
Without these defences, undisciplined and inexperienced armies, when
once routed, can seldom be rallied again, except with great losses. But
when supported by forts, they can select their opportunity for fighting,
and offer or refuse battle according to the probability of success; and,
having a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by fear in
the actual conflict.
The enemy, on the other hand, being compelled either to besiege or
_observe_ these works, his army will be separated from its magazines,
its strength and efficiency diminished by detachments, and his whole
force exposed to the horrors of partisan warfare. It has therefore been
estimated by the best military writers, that an army supported by a
judicious system of fortifications, can repel a land force _six_ times
as large as itself.
Every government should prepare, in time of peace, its most prominent
and durable means of defence. By securing in a permanent manner its
important points, it will enable a small force to retain possession of
these places against a greatly superior army, for a considerable length
of time. This serves the same purpose as a battle gained; for, in the
beginning of a war of invasion, the economy of time is of the utmost
importance to the defensive party, enabling it to organize and prepare
the great military resources of the state.
In all mountainous frontiers, or sides of states bordering on large
rivers, or chains of lakes, there will necessarily be but few points by
which an invader can penetrate into the interior of the country. Let us
suppose that, for a frontier of moderate extent, there are _five_
passes, or avenues through which the enemy may approach the interior. To
effectually defend these approaches against the invading army will
require, for each, an army of ten thousand men. Not being able to decide
positively on the plans of the enemy, all these communications must be
defended at the same time. This requires a defending army of fifty
thousand men. Let us now suppose each of these passes to be fortified in
such a way, that one thousand men will be able to hold the enemy in
check, and force him to resort to the operations of a siege; or, at
least, to retard his advance till an active army can be organized in the
interior, and prepared to meet him in the field. We here see that five
thousand men, by means of fortifications, can accomplish the same
defensive object as fifty thousand men without these artificial means of
security.
But let us enter a little more into the details of frontier defences,
and examine the character of the several systems which have been
successively proposed or adopted. Frontiers are divided into four
distinct classes, according as the state may be open on one or more
sides, or bounded by mountains, large rivers and lakes, or by the sea.
An open frontier is the most difficult of defence; and while there
exists a perfect uniformity among military men upon the vast importance
of fortifying such a frontier, there is an equal diversity of opinion
respecting the best manner of arranging these works. We shall here
mention three general systems of arranging forts for the defence of an
open country, each of which has been advocated at different times, and
afterwards received various modifications and additions. These three
systems comprise the main features of all others worthy of much
consideration. They are:--
1st. The system of continuous lines, proposed by Montalembert.
2d. A system of three lines of detached works, strongly recommended by
D'Arçon and others.
3d. A system proposed by Vauban, and advocated by Rogniat, consisting of
lines of very strong works, placed at considerable distances from each
other and covering large _intrenched camps_.
The first of these systems was proposed in 1790, and for a time
attracted considerable notice in France, but has long since been
discarded, as being utterly incompatible with the principles of the
military art. A writer, however, of some pretensions in this country,
recommends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the shores of
the Chesapeake. The same author would dispense entirely with our
present system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute in
their place wooden Martello towers! This would be very much like
building 120 gun ships at Pittsburg and Memphis, for the defence of the
Ohio and the Mississippi rivers, and sending out duck-boats to meet the
enemy on the Atlantic!
In the second system, the works on the extreme frontier are to be placed
about thirty or forty miles apart, and those of the second and third
lines respectively thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and second
lines, and opposite the intervals.
In the third system, first recommended by Vauban and more recently by
Rogniat, the works are to be arranged in the same manner as in that of
D'Arçon, but the distance between them is to be from seventy to one
hundred miles, and each fort arranged for covering a large intrenched
camp.
Either of these last two systems is well suited to the defence of an
open frontier. The former is applied to the side of France towards
Belgium, and the latter, with certain modifications, to the defence of
Western Germany. The first line of fortifications on the northern
frontier of France consists of Dunkirk, Lille, Valenciennes, Condé,
Quesnoy, Rocroi, Charlemont, Mézières, and Sedan; the second line, of
Calais, Andres, St. Omer, Béthune, Arras, Douai, Chambrai, Landrecies,
and Avesnes; the third line, of Boulogne, Montreuil, Hesdin, Abbeville,
Amiens, Bapaume, Peronne, Ham, and Laon.
For mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to secure all the
important passes with small redoubts or military works, and to defend
with strong forts the grand interior strategic points on which these
communications are directed. For a frontier of moderate extent there may
be some six or eight gorges in the mountains by which an army might
penetrate; but it will always be found that these roads concentrate on
two or three points in the great valleys below. Take, for example, the
frontier of France towards Switzerland and Italy. The passes of the
mountains are secured by the little works of Fort L'Ecluse, Fort
Pierre-châtel, Fort Barraux, Briançon, Mont Dauphin, Colmars, Entrevaux,
and Antibes; while Besançon, Grenoble, and Toulon, form a second line;
and Lyons a grand central dépôt.
Where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boundary of a state, the
system of defence will be much the same as that of an open land
frontier, the works of the first line being made to secure the great
bridges or ferries by which the enemy might effect a passage; those of
the second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that generally
approach more or less near the great watercourse; and those of the third
line, far enough in rear to protect the great internal communications of
the country. Let us take, for example, the side of France bordering on
the Rhine. Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, Haguenau,
Strasbourg, Schelstadt, Neuf-Brisach, and Huneguen, cover the several
passages of the river; while Bitche, Phalsbourg, and Béfort form a
second line; Thionville, Metz, and Toul, a third line; and Verdun a
grand central dépôt.
The following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished by
fortifications on a sea-coast.
1st. To close all important harbors to an enemy, and secure them to the
navy of the country.
2d. To prevent the enemy from forming an establishment on our shores,
from which, by his naval superiority, he might destroy our commerce and
keep the whole frontier in continual alarm.
3d. To cover our great cities against a maritime attack and bombardment.
4th. To cover our ship-yards and great naval depots.
5th. To prevent, as much as possible, the great avenues of interior
navigation from being blockaded by naval means at their entrance into
the ocean.
6th. To give to our navy facilities for protecting our coast trade from
the enemy's ships of war, and our internal communications, which lie
near the coast, from maritime descents.
Let us notice how France has attempted to accomplish this object. The
Mediterranean frontier has Fort Quarré, Fort St. Marguérite, St. Tropez,
Brigançon, the forts of Point Man, of l'Ertissac, and of Langoustier,
Toulon, St. Nicholas, Castle of If, Marseilles, Tour de Boue,
Aigues-Montes, Fort St. Louis, Fort Brescou, Narbonne, Château de
Salces, Perpignan, Collioure, Fort St. Elme, and Port Vendre. Toulon is
the great naval dépôt for this frontier, and Marseilles the great
commercial port. Both are well secured by strong fortifications. The
Atlantic frontier has Bayonne; the forts of Royan, Grave, Medoc, Paté,
&c., on the Gironde; Rochefort, with the forts of Chapus, Lapin, Aix,
Oleron, &c., to cover the roadstead; La Rochelle, with the forts of the
Isle of Ré; Sables, with the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines,
Isle Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier, Mindin, Ville Martin; Quiberon,
with Fort Penthièvre; L'Orient, with its harbor defences; Fort Cigogne;
Brest, with its harbor defences; St. Malo, with Forts Cézembre, La
Canchée, L'Anse du Verger, and Des Rimains; Cherbourg, with its
defensive forts and batteries; Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and
Dunkirk. Cherbourg, Brest, and Rochefort, are great naval dépôts; and
Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, the principal commercial ports. Many of the
works above enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their
construction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated nevertheless,
they have heretofore been found sufficient for the defence of the naval
depots and commercial seaports of France against the superior naval
forces of her neighbor.
Omitting for the present all discussion of sea-coast defences, let us
examine more particularly the character and influence of fortifications
on land frontiers.
All military writers agree that fortifications have heretofore exerted a
great, and frequently a decisive, influence on the operations of a war.
Those of France are frequently referred to as proofs of this influence.
But, while all are disposed to allow that these works contributed much
in former times to the defence of states, yet some have said that modern
improvements in the mode of attack have rendered forts far less valuable
than formerly.
Such, however, is not the case. Improvements in the mode of attack have
not kept pace with the facilities of locomotion; and, although
fortifications do not now usually sustain a siege of as _many days_ as
in former times, still, as compared with the relative lengths of
campaigns in ancient and modern wars, the _proportional_ length of
sieges is now even _greater_ than formerly. When the same is
accomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was formerly done in a war
of seven years, it is not necessary that fortified places should hold
out a very long time. A place that can sustain a siege of a month is now
deemed sufficiently strong for ordinary campaigns; for by the end of
that time the defensive army will either be destroyed, or be able to
come to its succor. In either case a longer defence would not be
required.
A reference to the most important sieges of the last century or two will
show that forts are, on an average, capable of sustaining a siege for
more than that length of time. Lille, in 1708, held the allies in check
for a whole year; and again, in 1792, compelled the Austrians to raise
the siege after an unsuccessful attack of fifteen days.
Antwerp, in 1585, sustained a siege of fourteen months against greatly
superior forces; in 1814 Carnot defended the citadel of this place for
four months, and until an armistice had been concluded between the
contending parties; in 1832, it sustained, with a garrison of only 4,500
men and 145 pieces of ordnance, a siege of twenty-five days, against a
force of 55,000 men and 223 cannon.
Namur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sustained a siege of ten
weeks.
Ismaïl, in 1790, sustained a siege of more than two months against the
Russians.
Maestricht, in 1793, sustained a siege of nearly two weeks; and again,
in 1794, sustained a blockade and siege of nearly two months.
Magdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army of Wallenstein
for seven months; and in 1813-14, although garrisoned by only 4,000 men,
it for a long time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies.
Dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against superior forces for
more than nine months.
Landau, in 1793, sustained a siege of nine months.
Valenciennes and Mayence, in 1793, each sustained a siege of about three
months.
Charleroi, Fort Vauban, and L'Ecluse, in 1794, each sustained a siege of
about thirty days.
Quesnoy, in 1794, sustained a siege of about three weeks.
Rosas, in 1795, sustained a siege of some seventy days.
Mantua, in 1796-7, protected from invasion, for eight months, the Tyrol
and the heart of the Austrian monarchy.
Kehl and Huninguen, in 1796, sheltered Moreau for three months against
all the efforts of the Archduke Charles.
St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, sustained a siege of sixty days of open
trench.
Ulm, in 1800, held Moreau in check for more than a month.
Genoa, in 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days.
Saragossa in 1808 sustained a close siege of near two months; and in
1809 it was again besieged for two months.
Rosas in 1808 sustained a siege of thirty days.
Gerona in 1809 sustained a siege and blockade of seven months, nearly
four of them being of open trench.
Mequinenza (a very small work) in 1810 sustained a siege of more than
two weeks.
Astorga in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days; twenty-four being of
open trench.
Lerida in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days, two weeks being of open
trench.
Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810 sustained a siege of two months.
Almeida in 1810 sustained a siege of more than a month.
Tortosa in 1810 sustained a siege of six months.
Tarragona in 1811 sustained a siege of nearly two months.
Badajos in 1811 sustained a siege of more than forty days open trench.
Lerida in 1811 sustained a siege of two weeks open trench.
Saguntum in 1811 sustained a siege of a month.
Valencia in 1811-12 sustained a siege of two months
Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812 sustained a blockade of several months, and a
close siege of two weeks.
Badajos in 1812 sustained twenty-one days of open trenches.
Burgos in 1812 sustained thirty-three days of open trenches.
St. Sebastian in 1813 sustained a siege and blockade of nearly three
months, with fifty-nine days of open trenches.
Pampeluna in 1813 sustained a siege of more than four months.
Monzon in 1813-14 also sustained a siege of more than four months.
This list might be increased with numerous other examples, to show that
even poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves, on an
average, for more than a month. These examples, be it remembered, are
nearly all taken from a period of history since any material
improvements have been made in the art of attack. Since the time of
Vauban the improvements in attack have not kept pace with the increased
means of defence. Moreover, these examples are taken from the sieges of
towns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and entirely
incapable of offering the same resistance as detached fortifications,
with all the modern improvements.
The value of fortifications, as land defences, is sufficiently proved by
showing their general capability of resisting an invader, even for a
limited period; thus affording us time and opportunity to provide other
means of security. But it must not be inferred that forts besieged _en
règle_ will necessarily fall after so many days. Such is far from being
the case. The besieged have usually great advantages over the besiegers;
and unless the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of a
very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisite
means and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken.
Mezieres was not taken in 1520; nor Marseilles in 1524; nor Peronne in
1536; nor Landrecies in 1543; nor Metz in 1552; nor Montauban in 1621;
nor Lerida in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, and
again in 1683; nor Turin in 1706; nor Conde in 1744; nor Lille in 1792;
nor Landau in 1793; nor Ulm in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos
in 1812. This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names
of places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation.
But, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortifications
have become of little comparative importance, under the new system of
warfare introduced during the wars of the French Revolution. On this
subject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges of the
present century.
Napoleon says of fortifications, "they are an excellent means of
retarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting a conquering foe."
"The possession of strategic points," says the Archduke Charles, "is
decisive in military operations; and the most efficacious means should,
therefore, be employed to defend points whose preservation is the
country's safeguard. This object is accomplished by fortifications,
inasmuch as they can resist, for a given time, with a small number of
troops, every effort of a much larger force; fortifications should,
therefore, be regarded as the basis of a good system of defence." "It
should be a maxim of state policy in every country, to fortify, in time
of peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great care, so that
they can be defended by a small number of troops. For the enemy, knowing
the difficulty of getting possession of these works, will look twice
before he involves himself in a war." "Establishments which can secure
strategic advantages are not the works of a moment; they require time
and labor. He who has the direction of the military forces of a state,
should, in time of peace, prepare for war." "The proper application or
neglect of these principles will decide the safety or the ruin of the
state." "Fortifications arrest the enemy in the pursuit of his object,
and direct his movements on less important points;--he must either force
these fortified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which offer
only disadvantages. In fine, a country secured by a system of defences
truly strategic, has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke of
the enemy; for he can advance to the interior of the country only
through great trouble and ruinous efforts. Of course, lines of
fortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all reverses;
but these reverses will not, in this case, be attended by total ruin;
for they cannot take from the state the means nor the time for
collecting new forces; nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel
alternative of submission or destruction."
"Fortifications," says Jomini, "fulfil two objects of capital
importance,--1st. The protection of the frontiers; and 2d. Assisting the
operations of the army in the field." "Every part of the frontiers of a
state should be secured by one or two great places of refuge, secondary
places, and even small posts for facilitating the active operations of
the armies. Cities girt with walls and slight ditches may often be of
great utility in the interior of a country, as places of deposit, where
stores, magazines, hospitals, &c., may be sheltered from the incursions
of the enemy's light troops. These works are more especially valuable
where such stores, in order not to weaken the regular army by
detachments, are intrusted to the care of raw and militia forces." It is
not supposed that any system of fortifications can hermetically close a
frontier; "but, although they of themselves can rarely present an
absolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it is
indisputable that they straiten its movements, change the direction of
its marches, and force it into detachments; while, on the contrary, they
afford all the opposite advantages to the defensive army; they protect
its marches, favor its debouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, and
its movements, and finally furnish it with a place of refuge in time of
need."
These opinions were uttered, be it remembered, long since the period at
which modern military quacks date the downfall of fortifications as
inland defences, by men, too, who were not engineers, and consequently
had no professional predilections in favor of fortifications. The
Archduke Charles, as a general, knew no rival but Napoleon, and General
Jomini is universally regarded as the first military historian of the
age. The truth of their remarks on fortifications is most fully
confirmed by the military histories of Germany and France.
For a long period previous to the Thirty Years' War, its strong castles
and fortified cities secured the German empire from attacks from abroad,
except on its extensive frontier, which was frequently assailed, but no
enemy was able to penetrate to the interior till a want of union among
its own princes opened its strongholds to the Swedish conqueror; nor
then, did the cautious Gustavus Adolphus venture far into its
territories till he had obtained possession of all the military works
that might endanger his retreat.
Again, in the Seven Years' War, when the French neglected to secure
their foothold in Germany, by placing in a state of defence the
fortifications that fell into their power, the first defeat rendered
their ground untenable, and threw them from the Elbe back upon the Rhine
and the Mayne. They afterwards took the precaution to fortify their
positions, and to secure their magazines under shelter of strong places,
and, consequently, were enabled to maintain themselves in the hostile
country till the end of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency of
their generals, the great reverses they sustained in the field, the
skill and perseverance of the enemy they were contending with, and the
weak and vacillating character of the cabinet that directed them.
But this system of defence was not so carefully maintained in the latter
part of the eighteenth century, for at the beginning of the French
Revolution, says Jomini, "Germany had too few fortifications; they were
generally of a poor character, and improperly located." France, on the
contrary, was well fortified: and although without armies, and torn in
pieces by domestic factions, (we here use the language of the Archduke,)
"she sustained herself against all Europe; _and this was because her
government, since the reign of Louis XIII_., _had continually labored to
put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principles
of strategy_; starting from such a system for a basis, she subdued every
country on the continent that was not thus fortified; and this reason
alone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an
army, and even an entire state, merely by a strategic success."
This may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns. In 1792,
when the Duke of Brunswick invaded France, she had no armies competent
to her defence. Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it is
true, but the license of the Revolution had so loosened the bonds of
discipline as to effect an almost complete disorganization. "It seemed,
at this period," says the historian, "as if the operations of the French
generals were dependent upon the absence of their enemies: the moment
they appeared, the operations were precipitately abandoned." But France
had on her eastern frontier a triple line of good fortresses, although
her miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending them. The
several works of the first and second lines fell, one after another,
before the slow operations of a Prussian siege, and the Duke of
Brunswick was already advancing upon the third, when Dumourier, with
only twenty-five thousand men, threw himself into this line, and by a
well-conducted war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces
behind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a disciplined
army nearly four times as numerous as his own. Had no other obstacle
than the French troops been interposed between Paris and the Prussians,
all agree that France must have fallen.
In the campaign, of 1793, the French army in Flanders were beaten in
almost every engagement, and their forces reduced to less than one half
the number of the allies. The French general turned traitor to his
country, and the National Guards deserted their colors and returned to
France. The only hope of the Republicans, at this crisis, was Vauban's
line of Flemish fortresses. These alone saved France. The strongholds of
Lille, Condé, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, Landrecies, &c., held the Austrians
in check till the French could raise new forces and reorganize their
army. "The important breathing-time which the sieges of these
fortresses," says an English historian, "afforded to the French, and the
immense advantage which they derived from the new levies which they
received, and fresh organization which they acquired during that
important period, is a signal proof of the vital importance of
fortresses in contributing to national defence. Napoleon has not
hesitated to ascribe to the three months thus gained the salvation of
France. It is to be constantly recollected that the Republican armies
were then totally unable to keep the field; that behind the frontier
fortresses there was neither a defensive position, nor a corps to
reinforce them; and that if driven from their vicinity, the capital was
taken and the war concluded."
In the following year, 1794, when France had completed her vast
armaments, and, in her turn, had become the invading power, the enemy
had no fortified towns to check the progress of the Republican armies;
which, based on strong works of defence, in a few weeks overran
Flanders, and drove the allies beyond the Rhine.
In the campaign of 1796, when the army of Moreau had been forced into a
precipitate retreat by the admirable strategic operations of the
Archduke Charles, the French forces owed their safety to the
fortifications on the Rhine. These works arrested the enemy's pursuit
and obliged him to resort to the tedious operations of sieges; and the
reduction of the French advanced posts alone, Kehl and Huninguen, poorly
as they were defended, employed all the resources of the Austrian army,
and the skill of their engineers, from early in October till late in
February. Kehl was at first assaulted by a force _four_ times as
numerous as the garrison; if the enemy had succeeded, he would have cut
off Moreau's retreat, and destroyed his army. Fortunately the place was
strong enough to resist all assaults; and Moreau, basing himself on the
fortresses of Alsace, his right covered by Huninguen, Neuf-Brisach, and
Béfort, and his left by the iron barrier of the Netherlands, effectually
checked the waves of Austrian success.
Let us now turn to the campaigns of Napoleon. In his first campaign in
Italy, 1796, the general was directed "to seize the forts of Savona,
compel the senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies, and to
surrender the keys of Gavi, a fortress perched on the rocky height
commanding the pass of the Bocchetta." Setting out from Savona, he
crossed the mountains at a weak point between the Alps and the
Apennines, and succeeded in piercing the enemy's line of defence. The
king of Sardinia, jealous of Austrian influence, had refused to permit
the Austrian army to garrison his line of fortifications. Napoleon,
profiting by his victorious attitude, the mutual jealousy of Austria
and Sardinia, and the intrigues of his diplomatists, soon gained
possession of these important works. "_These Sardinian fortresses_," he
wrote to the Directory, "_at once put the Republicans in possession of
the keys of the Peninsula_." Basing himself on Coni, Mondovi, Ceva,
Gavi, and Alessandria, with Tortosa as his dépôt of magazines, he
advanced against Lombardy. Now basing himself on the Adda and Po, with
the fortress of Pizzighettone as the dépôt of his magazines, he advanced
upon the line of the Adige. Pechiera became his next dépôt, and he now
had four fortresses in echelon between him and his first dépôt of
magazines; and, after the fall of Mantua, basing himself on the Po, he
advanced against the States of the Church, making Ferrara and then
Ancona, his places of dépôt.
From the solid basis of the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, "he was
enabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the
Austrians, and thus commence, with some security, that great career of
conquest which he already meditated in the imperial dominions." In this
campaign of 1797, after scouring his base, he fortified Palma-Nuova,
Osapo, &c., repaired the old fortifications of Klagenfurth, and, as he
advanced, established, to use his own words, "a good _point d'appui_ at
every five or six marches."
Afterwards, when the Austrians had nearly wrested Italy from the weak
grasp of Napoleon's successors, the French saved their army in the
fortress of Genoa and behind the line of the Var, which had been
fortified with care in 1794-5. Numerous attempts were made to force this
line, the advanced post of Fort Montauban being several times assaulted
by numerous forces. But the Austrian columns recoiled from its murderous
fire of grape and musketry, which swept off great numbers at every
discharge. Again the assault was renewed with a vast superiority of
numbers, and again "the brave men who headed the column almost perished
at the foot of the intrenchment; and, after sustaining a heavy loss,
they were compelled to abandon the enterprise."
While the forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of Austrian success,
Massena, in the fortifications of Genoa, sustained a blockade of sixty,
and a siege of forty days, against an army five times as large as his
own; and when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine, he almost
dictated to the enemy the terms of the treaty. These two defences held
in check the _élite_ of the Austrian forces, while the French reserve
crossed the Alps, seized the important points of the country, and cut
off the Austrian line of retreat. "But even after the victory of
Marengo," says Napoleon, "I did not consider the whole of Italy
reconquered, until all the fortified places between me and the Mincio
should be occupied by my troops. I gave Melas permission to return to
Mantua, on condition of his surrendering all these fortresses."
He now directed Chasseloup de Laubat and his engineers to repair and
remodel the fortifications of Verona, Legnano, Pechiera, Mantua, the
line of the Adda, Milan, Alessandria,[5] Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, and several
smaller works; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against Austrian
aggression in Italy. These works were of great service to the French in
1805, enabling Massena with fifty thousand men to hold in check the
Archduke Charles with more than ninety thousand, while Napoleon's grand
army, starting from the solid base of the Rhine, traversed Germany and
seized upon the capital of Austria.
[Footnote 5: More than twenty millions of money were appropriated for
this place alone.]
The neglect of the Prussians to place their country in a state of
military defence, previous to declaring war against Napoleon in 1806,
had a most disastrous influence upon the campaign. Napoleon, on the
other hand, occupied and secured all the important military positions
which he had captured in the preceding campaign. "The Prussians," said
he, "made no preparations for putting into a state of defence the
fortifications on their first line, not even those within a few marches
of our cantonments. While I was piling up bastion upon bastion at Kehl,
Cassel, and Wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at Magdeburg,
nor put in battery a single cannon at Spandau." The works on the three
great lines of the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser, had they been properly
repaired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufficient to have held in
check the French, even after the great victory of Jena, till the
newly-organized forces, acting in concert with the Russian army, could
re-establish the Prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness. Profiting
by the neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the great
defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readily
surrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who
commanded them; and French garrisons were almost immediately established
in the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau,
Hameln, Nieubourg, &c. "Spandau," said he in the 19th Bulletin, "is an
inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of
operations. But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had
not even armed its batteries." The possession of these fortifications
inclined the scale at Eylau. All the historians of the war notice their
influence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit.
These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty of
Tilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as they
effectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the
flames of war. And again in 1813, these works might have produced a
decided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of
Austria, and the treason of the French generals, prevented Napoleon from
profiting by the advantages of his position.
The influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the Peninsular
campaigns has often been alluded to by historians. Those works which had
been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities,
contributed very much to the success of his arms; while those which had
been retained by Spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree to
fetter and embarrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa,
Tarragona, Gerona, Tortosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and
defective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, by
compelling the French to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, did
much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.
The influence of the fortifications of the French frontiers in
furnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of Napoleon into
the enemy's territory, has already been noticed. If these fortresses of
France, after the disasters of 1812 and '13, failed to save the nation,
the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion
itself, rather than any lack of military influence in the French
defences. As has been already remarked, a million of disciplined men,
under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single state,
impoverished by the fatal war in Russia,--torn in pieces by political
factions,--deserted by its sworn allies,--its fortresses basely betrayed
into the enemy's hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treason
of generals with their entire armies. Its only hope was in the
fortresses which had remained faithful; and Napoleon said at St. Helena,
that if he had collected together the garrisons of these few fortresses
and retired to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after
their entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented the
operation.
Again in 1815, Napoleon, even after the defeat of Waterloo, possessed
lines of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion.
But again the want of co-operation on the part of the government at
Paris, and the treason of his own generals, forced his second
abdication. If he had retained the command of the army, and the nation
had seconded his efforts, the allies would never have reached Paris. But
the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the
way for the enemies of their country. "France," said Napoleon, "will
eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people to
pass under the Caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army that
had for twenty-five years been its country's glory, _and by giving up to
our astonished enemies our still invincible fortresses_."
History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger of
penetrating far into a hostile country to attack the capital, even when
that capital is without fortifications. The fatal effects of such an
advance, without properly securing the means of retreat, is exemplified
by his own campaign of 1812, in Russia. If, after the fall of Smolensk,
he had fortified that place and Vitepsk, which by their position closed
the narrow passage comprised between the Dnieper and the Dwina, he might
in all probability, on the following spring, have been able to seize
upon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hostile army of
Tschkokoff in his rear, he pushed on to Moscow, and when the
conflagration of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there,
and the premature rigor of the season destroyed the horses of his
artillery and provision-trains, retreat became impossible, and the awful
fate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror to which there
is scarcely a parallel in history. This point might be still further
illustrated by the Russian campaign of Charles XII., in 1708-9, the
fatal advance of the French army on Lisbon, in the Peninsular war, and
other examples of the same character.
Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of
fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus,
Lille suspended for a whole year the operations of Prince Eugene and
Marlborough; the siege of Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of
changing the fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost France her
monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian conquests; Metz, in
1552, arrested the entire power of Charles V., and saved France from
destruction; Prague, in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to
the brink of ruin; St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, stopped the successful
career of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the beaten army of Portugal,
enabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain the
ascendancy; Strasburg has often been, the bulwark of the French against
Germany, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjugation.
In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) If Vienna had
been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the
fate of the war. Again, in 1809, if this capital had been fortified, it
would have enabled the Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmuhl,
by a forced retreat on the left of the Danube, to form a junction with
the forces of General Hiller and the Archduke John.
If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at Jena would have
rallied there and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had been
strongly fortified in 1808, the French army, after the victories of
Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would not have marched
towards that capital, leaving in rear of Salamanca and Valladolid, both
the English army of General Moore and the Spanish army of Romana. If
Moscow had been fortified in 1812, its conflagration would have been
avoided, for, with strong defensive works, and the army of Kutusoff
encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been impossible.
Had not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire of Constantine
must have terminated in the year 700, whereas the standard of the
Prophet was not planted there until 1440. This capital was therefore
indebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence. During this
period it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one of these sieges
was successful. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a very
severe contest.
Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normans
besieged it for two years without effect. In 1358 the Dauphin besieged
it in vain. In 1359 Edward, king of England, encamped at Montrouge,
devastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and
retired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the attack of Charles VII. In
1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful
in his attacks. In 1472 it repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone,
who had already ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by Charles
V., it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 and 1589 it repulsed
the armies of Henry III. and Henry IV. In 1636 and several succeeding
years the inhabitants of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this
capital had been strongly fortified in 1814 and 1815, the allied armies
would not have dared to attempt its investment.
But it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples; the whole
history of modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance of
fortifications as a means of national defence, and as an auxiliary in
offensive military operations. Our illustrations have been mostly drawn
from European wars, but our own brief history, as will be shown
hereafter, is not without its proofs.
The use and importance of field-fortifications, intrenched camps, &c.,
as well as the class of military works called coast-defences, will be
discussed hereafter.[6]
[Footnote 6: The use of fortifications in the defence of states is
discussed by Ternay, Vauban, Cormontaigne, Napoleon, the Archduke
Charles, Jomini, Fallot, and, incidentally, by most of the military
historians of the wars of the French Revolution. The names of such
standard works as give the detailed arrangements of fortifications will
be mentioned hereafter.]
CHAPTER IV.
LOGISTICS.
III. We have defined _logistics_ to be that branch of the military art
which embraces all the practical details of moving and supplying armies.
The term is derived from the title of a French general officer,
_(major-général des logis,)_ who was formerly charged with directing the
marches, encampments, and lodging of the troops. It has been still
further extended by recent military writers, and many of them now regard
logistics as a distinct and important branch of the art.
We shall here consider logistics as including the military duties
ordinarily attributed to the pay, subsistence, clothing, medical,
hospital, and transportation departments; in fine, of all the civil and
civico-military corps of the army. We shall therefore discuss under this
head, the preparation of all the necessary materials for fitting out
troops for a campaign and for putting them in motion; the regulating of
marches, convoys, the means of transport for provisions, hospitals,
munitions, and supplies of all kinds; the preparation and protection of
magazines; the laying out of camps and cantonments; in fine, every thing
connected with preparing, moving, and guarding the _impedimenta_ of an
army.
The officers connected with this branch of service must consult with the
engineers in every thing relating to the defence of their depots,
magazines, camps, cantonments, communications, and the passage of
rivers, and in all that relates to their connection with the attack and
defence of places: but in all that relates to strategy and tactics they
must receive instructions directly from the chief of the staff of the
army, who will have the general direction of every thing connected with
logistics. Before commencing the operations of the campaign, or
beginning the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters,
this officer should satisfy himself respecting the condition of the
various materials belonging to the different departments of the
army;--the horses and horse equipments, carriages, caissons, ponton and
artillery equipages, siege equipages, moveable hospitals, engineer and
artillery utensils, clothing, and munitions of all kinds; he must supply
whatever may be wanting, and provide means for the transportation of
every thing.
_Subsistence_.--The art of subsisting troops during active operations in
a hostile country, is one of the most difficult subjects connected with
war; and it is a question well worthy of study, both for the statesman
and the warrior, how Darius and Xerxes, Philip and Alexander, in ancient
times--and the Greek emperors and the barbarians--and, later still, the
crusaders of the middle ages, contrived to support the immense masses of
men which they led to war.
Cæsar has said that war should be made to support war; and some modern
generals have acted upon this principle to the extreme of supporting
their armies entirely at the expense of the country passed over. Others
have adopted either in part or entirely the principle of regular
magazines.
Louis XIV. and Frederick II. fought mostly on their own frontiers, and
followed the system of regular dépôts and supplies. But the
revolutionary armies of France made war without magazines, subsisting,
sometimes on the inhabitants, sometimes by requisitions levied on the
country passed over, and at others by pillage and marauding. Napoleon
found little difficulty in supporting an army of a hundred or a hundred
and twenty thousand men in Italy, Suabia, and on the rich borders of the
Rhine and the Danube; but in Spain, Poland, and Russia, the subject of
subsistence became one of extreme embarrassment.
All depots of provisions and other supplies for an army are denominated
_magazines_; these are divided into _principal, secondary,_ and
_provisional_. The first are usually on the base of operations; the
second, on the line of operations; and the last in the immediate
vicinity of the troops, and contain supplies for a few days only.
The system of _magazines_ is objected to by some, because it fetters the
movements of an army, and makes its military operations subordinate to
the means of supply. Moreover, as the movements of an army must be so
arranged as to cover these magazines, their establishment at given
points reveals to the enemy our plan of campaign.
On the other hand, the system of _requisitions_, either for immediate
supplies or for secondary magazines, gives far greater velocity and
impetuosity to an active army; and if it be so regulated as to repress
pillage, and be levied with uniformity and moderation, it may be relied
on with safety in well-cultivated countries; but in more barren and less
populous districts, an army without magazines, especially in case of a
prolonged stay or a forced retreat, will be exposed to great suffering
and loss, if not to total destruction.
Before commencing a campaign the general should make himself acquainted
with all the resources of the country to be passed over--determine the
amount of supplies which it may be necessary to take with him, and the
amount that can be obtained by requisitions; these requisitions being
levied in a uniform and legal manner, and through the existing local
authorities.
In great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, at least for a
time, to provide for the immense forces placed on foot, by any regular
system of magazines or of ordinary requisitions: in such cases their
subsistence is entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy
contributions wherever they pass. The inevitable consequences of this
system are universal pillage and a total relaxation of discipline; the
loss of private property and the violation of individual rights, are
followed by the massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinary
peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and
implacable enemies.
In this connection the war in the Spanish peninsula is well worthy of
study. At the beginning of this war Napoleon had to choose between
methodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army,
or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for; and irregular
warfare, with forced requisitions--war being made to support war. The
question was thoroughly discussed.
On the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions of francs from
the French treasury, he would have been able to support his troops
without requisitions, would have maintained good order and discipline in
his armies, and by the distribution of this money among a people poor
and interested, he would have made many partisans. He could then have
offered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. But
then the drafts upon the French treasury, had the war been a protracted
one, would have been enormous for the support of an army of 200,000 men
in Spain. Moreover, the hostile and insurrectionary state of the local
authorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible;
and the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport,
rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity
of stores in an insurrectionary country. Besides, no great detachments
could have been made to regulate the administration of the provinces, or
to pursue the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. In
fine, by this system, he would have effected a military occupation of
Spain without its subjugation.
On the other hand, by marching rapidly against all organized masses,
living from day to day upon the local resources of the country, as he
had done in Italy, sparing his reserves for the occupation and
pacification of the conquered provinces; this mode promised more prompt
and decisive results than the other. Napoleon, therefore, determined to
adopt it for his active masses, employing the system of magazines and
regular requisitions so far as practicable. In favorable parts of the
country, Soult and Souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in obtaining
in this way regular supplies for a considerable length of time, but the
others lived mainly by forced requisitions levied as necessity required.
This sometimes gave place to great excesses, but these were principally
the faults of subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than of
Napoleon, who punished such breaches of discipline, when they were known
to him, with great severity. He afterwards declared that, "had he
succeeded he would have indemnified the great mass of the Spanish people
for their losses, by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the clergy, which
would have rendered the church less powerful, and caused a more just
division of property; thus the evil of the war would have been forgotten
in the happy triumph of public and private interest over the interest of
an ambitious and exclusive clergy."
The following maxims on subsistence have the sanction of the best
military writers:
1st. Regular magazines should be formed, so far as practicable, for the
supplies of an army; the levying of requisitions being resorted to only
where the nature of the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches,
render these absolutely necessary to success.
2d. Dépôts should be formed in places strengthened by nature or art,
defended by small corps, or garrisons, and situated in positions least
liable to attack.
3d. All great dépôts should be placed on navigable rivers, canals,
railways, or practical roads, _communicating with the line of
operations_, so that they may be transported with ease and rapidity, as
the army advances on this line.
4th. An army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days,
otherwise the best chances of war may be lost, and the army exposed to
great inconveniences. Templehoff says that the great Frederick, in the
campaign of 1757, always carried in the Prussian provision-train _bread_
for _six_, and _flour_ for _nine days_, and was therefore never at a
loss for means to subsist his forces, in undertaking any sudden and
decisive operation. The Roman soldier usually carried with him
provisions for fifteen days. Napoleon says, "Experience has proved that
an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days' food
being carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty days
by the train of wagons; so that at least four hundred and eighty wagons
would be required for an army of forty thousand men; two hundred and
forty being regularly organized, and two hundred and forty being
obtained by requisition. For this purpose there would be a battalion of
three companies for the military stores of each division, each company
having its establishment for forty wagons, twenty being furnished by the
commissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition. This gives for each
division one hundred and twenty wagons, and for each army, four hundred
and eighty. Each battalion for a provision-train should have two hundred
and ten men."
5th. An army, while actually in motion, can find temporary resources,
unless in a sterile country, or one already ravaged by war, or at the
season of the year when the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new
ones not ready for harvest; but, even supposing the army may in this way
be partially or wholly supplied, while in motion, it nevertheless
frequently happens that it may remain for some days in position, (as the
French at Austerlitz and Ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some ten days
will therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular
commissariat can be established.
6th. "Supplies of bread and biscuit," says Napoleon, "are no more
essential to modern armies than to the Romans; flour, rice, and pulse,
may be substituted in marches without the troops suffering any harm. It
is an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great
attention to their magazines; it may be seen in Caesar's Commentaries,
how much he was occupied with this care in his several campaigns. The
ancients knew how to avoid being slaves to any system of supplies, or to
being obliged to depend on the purveyors; but all the great captains
well understood the art of subsistence."
_Forage_ is a military term applied to food of any kind for horses or
cattle,--as grass, hay, corn, oats, &c.; and also to the operation of
collecting such food. Forage is of two kinds, _green_ and _dry_; the
former being collected directly from the meadows and harvest-fields, and
the latter from the barns and granaries of the farmers, or the
storehouses of the dealers.
The animals connected with an army may be subsisted by regular
magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized _foraging_ [7] As
has already been remarked, it is not always politic, or even possible,
to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during
the active operations of a campaign. On account of the great expense and
difficulty of transporting forage, the general of an army is more
frequently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or forced
contributions as they are called, and to foraging, for the subsistence
of his animals, than to provide food for his men. Nor are requisitions
and foragings for this object so objectionable as in the other case,
being far less likely to produce general want and distress among the
non-combatant inhabitants.
[Footnote 7: This term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to the
operation of forcibly collecting food for the troops.]
The commanding officer of troops should always use his best endeavors to
obtain his forage by purchase of the inhabitants, or by requisitions on
the local authorities; and even where these means are impracticable, the
foraging parties should be strictly directed to make their levies with
uniformity and due moderation. Accurate accounts should be kept of the
kinds and quantities of all produce and other property taken, so that it
may be regularly distributed and accounted for. Under no circumstances
should individuals be permitted to appropriate to themselves more than
their _pro rata_ allowance. Foraging parties may sometimes attain their
object in a peaceful manner, by representing to the inhabitants the
nature of their instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediate
supplies. Even where no recompense is proposed, it may be well to offer
certificates to the effect that such articles have been taken for the
use of the army. These certificates, even when of no value in
themselves, frequently tend to appease excited passions and allay
insurrections. In defensive war, carried on in one's own country, it is
often necessary to seize upon private property and appropriate it to the
public service: in all such cases the certificates of the foraging
officers become proofs of individual claims against the government.
No foraging party should ever be sent out till after the country has
been properly reconnoitred. A good military escort and vanguard should
always accompany and precede the foragers, for protection against the
enemy's light cavalry and an insurgent militia. Trustworthy troops must
be placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be foraged, in
order to prevent the foragers from engaging in irregular and
unauthorized pillage. Officers of the staff and administrative corps
are sent with the party to see to the proper execution of the orders,
and to report any irregularities on the part of the troops. In case any
corps engage in unauthorized pillage, due restitution should be made to
the inhabitants, and the expense of such restitution deducted from the
pay and allowances of the corps by whom such excess is committed. A few
examples of this kind of justice will soon restore discipline to the
army, and pacify the inhabitants of the country occupied.
Experience is the best guide in estimating the amount of hay or grain
that may be taken from a given field: the produce of an acre is, of
course, very different for different soils and climates. In distributing
the burdens to the several pack-horses and wagons employed in conveying
the forage to the army, it is important for the foraging officers to
know the relative weight and bulk of each article.
Ordinary pressed hay in this country will average
about . 12 lbs. per cubic foot.
Wheat . . . weighs. . 60 lbs. per bushel.
Rye . . . . " . . . . 56 " "
Maize or Indian corn . 56 " "
Barley . . . " . . . . 50 " "
Oats . . . . " . . . . 35 " "
Meal, flour, and ground feed of all kinds, are purchased
by the pound.
As it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward the regular train
of the army for the conveyance of forage collected by these foraging
parties, the country wagons and pack-horses are usually pressed into
service for this purpose.
Troops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of meadows and
grain-fields for temporary subsistence: in such cases the horses and
cattle may be farmed in the neighborhood, and the grass and grain
issued in regular rations, immediately as taken from the field; but in
no case should the animals be turned out to pasture.
In a country like ours, where large bodies of new and irregular forces
are to be suddenly called into the field in case of war, it is important
to establish very rigid rules in relation to forage and subsistence;
otherwise the operations of such troops must be attended with great
waste of public and private property, the want of means of subsistence,
the consequent pillage of the inhabitants, and a general relaxation of
discipline. Regular troops are far less liable to such excesses than
inexperienced and undisciplined forces.
_Marches_.--Marches are of two kinds: 1st. Route marches,--2d. Marches
within reach of the enemy. The former belong to the domain of strategy;
the latter to that of tactics; both, however, are connected with
logistics in every thing that concerns the means of their execution.
When an army is moving on a line of operations, it should be in as many
columns as the facility of subsistence, celerity of movement, the nature
of the roads, &c., may require. Large columns cannot move with the same
rapidity as smaller ones, nor can they be so readily subsisted. But when
an army is within striking distance of the enemy, concentration becomes
more important than celerity, and the forces must be kept in mass, or at
least within supporting distances of each other. We find only two
instances in the Seven Years' War, in which Frederick attempted attacks
by several columns at considerable distances from each other; and in
both these instances (at Torgau and at Namiest, against Laudon, during
the siege of Olmutz) he was unsuccessful. His usual mode was to bring
his columns near together as he approached the enemy, and to form his
troops into line at the moment of attack. Such was his order of march at
Prague, Kollin, Rosbach, Leuthen, Zornsdorf, and Kunersdorf. The
following is one of Frederick's orders respecting marches, (October 2d,
1760.)
"The army will, as usual, march in three columns by lines. The first
column will consist of the first line; the second, of the second line;
and the third, of the reserve. The wagons, and hospital wagons, of
regiments, will follow their corps. The batteries of heavy calibre will
follow the infantry brigades to which they are assigned. On passing
woods, the regiments of cavalry will march between two infantry corps."
"Each column will have a vanguard of one light battalion and ten
squadrons of hussars or dragoons. They will be preceded by three wagons
carrying plank-bridges. The rear-guard is charged with taking up these
bridges after the army has defiled over them."
"The parks will be divided among the columns, to avoid the embarrassment
resulting from a great many wagons being together in a body."
"If any thing should happen to the second and third columns, the king
will be instantly apprized of it; he will be found at the head of the
first column. Should any thing occur to the rear-guard, the same will be
instantly communicated to Lieutenant-general Zeithen, who will be with
the rear-guard of the first column."
"The officers will take care that the soldiers march with equal step,
and that they do not stray to the right or left, and thus uselessly
fatigue themselves and lose their distances."
"When orders are given to form the line, the wagons will file out of the
columns to the left, and will march to be parked," &c.
The position of the baggage, when near the enemy, will depend on the
nature of the march. If the march be to the front, it will be in rear of
the column; if the march be by the flank, and the enemy be on the outer
flank, the baggage will be on the inner one, most remote from danger; if
the march be in retreat, the baggage will be in advance of the army. In
either case it should be strongly guarded.
It was in direct violation of this rule that General Hull, in the
campaign of 1812, on reaching the Miami of the Lake, (Maumee,) embarked
his baggage, stores, sick, convalescent, and "even the instructions of
his government and the returns of his army," on board the Cuyahoga
packet, and dispatched them for Detroit, while the army, with the same
destination, resumed its march by land. The result of thus sending his
baggage, stores, official papers, &c., _without a guard, and on the
flank nearest the enemy,_ was just what might have been anticipated:--in
attempting to pass the British post of Malden the whole detachment was
attacked and captured, "by a subaltern and six men, in a small and open
boat."
To prevent a surprise, detachments of light troops should be always
thrown out in front, on the flanks, and in rear of the column,
denominated from their position, _Advanced-Guard, Flankers,_ and
_Rear-Guard._ These scan the country which is to be passed over by the
column, watch the enemy's motions, and give notice of his approach in
time to allow the main force to choose a suitable field of battle, and
to pass from the order of march to that of combat. The strength and
composition of these detachments depend upon the nature of the ground,
and the character and position of the enemy. In case of an attack they
retire slowly, and on joining the main body, take their assigned
position in the line of battle.
In an open country the order of march presents but little difficulty;
but in a broken country, and especially in the vicinity of the enemy, a
march cannot be conducted with too many precautions. Before engaging in
a _defile_ it should be thoroughly examined, and sufficient detachments
sent out to cover the main body from attack while effecting the
passage. A neglect of these precautions has sometimes led to the most
terrible disasters.
In military operations very much depends upon the rapidity of marches.
The Roman infantry, in Scipio's campaigns in Africa, frequently marched
a distance of twenty miles in five hours, each soldier carrying from
fifty to eighty pounds of baggage. Septimius Severus, Gibbon states,
marched from Vienna to Rome, a distance of eight hundred miles, in forty
days. Cæsar marched from Rome to the Sierra-Morena, in Spain, a distance
of four hundred and fifty leagues, in twenty-three days!
Napoleon excelled all modern generals in the celerity of his movements.
Others have made for a single day as extraordinary marches as the
French, but for general activity during a campaign they have no rivals
in modern history. A few examples of the rapidity of their movements may
not be without interest.
In 1797 a part of Napoleon's army left Verona after having fought the
battle of St. Michaels, on the 13th of January, then marched all night
upon Rivoli, fought in the mountains on the 14th, returned to Mantua on
the 15th, and defeated the army of Provera on the morning of the
16th,--thus, in less than four days, having marched near fifty leagues,
fought three battles, and captured more than twenty thousand prisoners!
Well might he write to the Directory that his soldiers had surpassed the
much vaunted rapidity of Cæsar's legions.
In the campaign of 1800, Macdonald, wishing to prevent the escape of
Loudon, in a single day marched forty miles, crossing rivers, and
climbing mountains and glaciers.
In 1805 the grand French army broke up their camp at Boulogne, in the
early part of September, and in two weeks reached their allotted posts
on the Rhine, averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles.
During the same campaign the French infantry, pursuing the Archduke
Ferdinand in his retreat from Ulm, marched thirty miles a day in
dreadful weather, and over roads almost impassable for artillery.
Again, in the campaign of 1806, the French infantry pursued the
Prussians at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day.
In 1808 the advanced posts of Napoleon's army pursued Sir John Moore's
army at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, in the midst of winter.
Napoleon transported an army of fifty thousand men from Madrid to
Astorga with nearly the same rapidity, marching through deep snows,
across high mountains, and rivers swollen by the winter rains. The
activity, perseverance, and endurance of his troops, during these ten
days' march, are scarcely equalled in history.
In 1812, the activity of the French forces under Clausel was truly
extraordinary. After almost unheard-of efforts at the battle of
Salamanca, he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours!
In 1814, Napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day,
besides fighting a battle every twenty-four hours. Wishing to form a
junction with other troops, for the succor of Paris, he marched his army
the distance of seventy-five miles in thirty-six hours; the cavalry
marching night and day, and the infantry travelling _en poste_.
On his return from Elba, in 1815, his guards marched fifty miles the
first day after landing; reached Grenoble through a rough and
mountainous country, a distance of two hundred miles, in six days, and
reached-Paris, a distance of six hundred miles, in less than twenty
days!
The marches of the allied powers, during the wars of the French
Revolution, were much less rapid than those of the armies of Napoleon.
Nevertheless, for a single day the English and Spaniards have made some
of the most extraordinary marches on record.
In 1809, on the day of the battle of Talavera, General Crawford, fearing
that Wellington was hard pressed, made a forced march with three
thousand men the distance of sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours!
The Spanish regiment of Romana, in their march from Jutland to Spain,
marched the extraordinary distance of fifty miles in twenty-one hours.
Cavalry, for a single day, will march a greater distance than infantry;
but for a campaign of several months the infantry will march over the
most ground. In the Russian campaign of Napoleon, his cavalry failed to
keep pace with the infantry in his forced march on Moskwa. But in the
short campaigns of 1805 and 1806, the cavalry of Murat displayed the
most wonderful activity, and effected more extraordinary results than
any mounted troops of modern ages.
The English cavalry, however, have made one or two short marches with a
rapidity truly extraordinary.
In 1803 Wellington's cavalry in India marched the distance of sixty
miles in thirty-two hours.
But the march of the English cavalry under Lord Lake, before the battle
of Furruckabad, is, if we can trust the English accounts, still more
extraordinary than any thing recorded of the Romans or the French--it is
said that he marched _seventy miles in twenty-four hours!!!_
As a general rule, troops marching for many days in succession will move
at the rate of from fifteen to twenty miles per day. In forced marches,
or in pursuit of a flying enemy, they will average from twenty to
twenty-five miles per day. And for only two or three days in succession,
with favorable roads, thirty miles per day may be calculated on. Marches
beyond this are unusual, and, when they do occur, are the result of
extraordinary circumstances.
_Convoy_.--A convoy consists of provisions, military munitions, &c.,
sent from one point to another, under the charge of a detachment of
troops, called an _escort_. When regular depots and magazines are
established, with proper relations to the line of operations, convoys
requiring particular escorts are seldom necessary, because the position
of the army will cover the space over which the magazines are to be
moved. But in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, or in a country whose
inhabitants are hostile or insurrectionary, precautions of this kind
should always be resorted to.
The size and composition of the escort must depend upon the nature of
the country and the imminence of the danger. The ground to be passed
over should be previously reconnoitred, and the line of march be taken
up only after the most satisfactory reports. When once put in motion,
the convoy should be thoroughly hemmed in by flankers, to give warning
to the escort of the approach of the enemy. Small parties of cavalry are
detached on all sides, but particularly in advance. The main body of the
escort is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy while the
other sides are guarded by subdivisions. In case of an attack by a large
party, the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of defensive
field-work, which, with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in
this way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the
convoy.
As a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an army by small
successive convoys than by periodical and large ones. Even should some
of the former be captured their loss would not be materially felt; but a
large periodical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise
of the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will venture much
to destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of an
important military operation. If the Prussian army, when besieging
Olmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not have
forced them to raise the siege and to retreat.
Napoleon estimates that an army of 100,000 men in position will require
the daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of
provisions.
The difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a retreat, is
always very great, and the very best generals have frequently failed on
this point. Indeed, the best concerted measures will sometimes fail,
amid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able
and active enemy in pursuit. In such a case, the loss of the
provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the most
terrible disasters. We will allude to two examples of this kind: the
retreat of the English from Spain in 1809, and that of the French from
Russia in 1812.
When Sir John Moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save his
army from entire destruction, he directed all the baggage and stores to
be taken to the rear, and every possible arrangement to be made for
their preservation and for the regular supplies of the army. But the
want of discipline in his troops, and more especially the want of a
proper engineer organization to prepare the requisite means for
facilitating his own marches, and impeding the enemy's pursuit,
prevented his plans from being fully carried into execution. Much
suffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops;
a large portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, and
even the treasure of his army, amounting to some 200,000 dollars, was
abandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escorting
officer.
In Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so admirably
combined, that from Mentz to Moscow not a single estafette or convoy, it
is said, was carried off in this campaign; nor was there a day passed
without his receiving intelligence from France. When the retreat was
begun, (after the burning of Moscow,) he had six lines of magazines in
his rear; the 1st, at Smolensk, ten days' march from Moscow; those of
the 2d line at Minsk and Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk; those of
the 3d line at Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok; those of the 4th line at
Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw; those of the 5th
line at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Posen; those of the 6th line at Stettin,
Custrin, and Glogau. When the army left Moscow it carried with it
provisions sufficient for twenty days, and an abundance of ammunition,
each piece of artillery being supplied with three hundred and fifty
rounds; but the premature cold weather destroyed thirty thousand horses
in less than three days, thus leaving the trains without the means of
transportation or suitable escorts for their protection: the horrible
sufferings of the returning army now surpassed all description.
The officer selected to escort convoys should be a man of great
prudence, activity, and energy, for frequently very much depends upon
the safe and timely arrival of the provisions and military stores which
he may have in charge.
_Castrametation_.--Castrametation is, strictly speaking, the art of
laying out and disposing to advantage the several parts of the camp of
an army. The term is sometimes more extensively used to include all the
means for lodging and sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and all
the arrangements for cooking, &c., either in the field or in winter
quarters. A camp, whether composed of tents or barracks, or merely
places assigned for bivouacking, must be divided and arranged in such a
way that the several divisions shall be disposed as they are intended to
be drawn up in order of battle; so that, on any sudden alarm, the troops
can pass from it promptly, and form their line of battle without
confusion. Suitable places must also be assigned for cooking, for
baggage, and for provisions, military stores, and ammunitions.
The extent of the color front of a camp depends much on the character of
the ground and the means of defence, but as a general rule, it should
never exceed the position which the army would occupy in the line of
battle. The different arms should be encamped in the same order as that
of battle; this order of course depending on the nature of the
battle-ground. A _corps d'armeé_ is composed of battalions of infantry,
squadrons of cavalry, batteries of artillery, and companies of engineer
troops, and the art of encampments consists in arranging each of these
elements so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions.
The choice of ground for a camp must be governed, 1st, by the general
rules respecting military positions, and, 2d, by other rules peculiar to
themselves, for they may be variously arranged in a manner more or less
suitable on the same position.
That the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and highest
consideration.
It should also be commodious and dry: moist ground in the vicinity of
swamps and stagnant waters, would endanger the health of the army: for
the same reason it should not be subject to overflow or to become marshy
by heavy rains, and the melting of snow.
The proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable streams, is important
for furnishing the soldiers with all the necessaries of life.
The proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing firewood,
materials for huts, for repairs of military equipments, for works of
defence, &c.
Good water within a convenient distance, is also an essential element in
the choice of ground for a camp; without this the soldiers' health is
soon undermined. The proximity of running streams is also important for
the purposes of washing and bathing, and for carrying off the filth of
the camp.
The camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or commanded by any
point within long cannon range; if bordering on a river or smaller
stream, there should be space enough between them to form in order of
battle; the communications in rear should offer the means of retreating
in case of necessity, but should not afford facilities to the enemy to
make his attack on that side.
If the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length of time, as for
_cantonments_ or _winter-quarters_, the greater must be the care in
selecting its position and in the arrangement for the health and comfort
of the soldiers. In the latter case, (of winter-quarters,) the
engineer's art should always be called in play to form intrenchments,
lines of abattis, inundations, &c., to render the position as difficult
of access to the enemy as possible.
A _bivouac_ is the most simple kind of camp. It consists merely of lines
of fires, and huts for the officers and soldiers. These huts may be made
of straw, of wood obtained from the forest, or by dismantling houses and
other buildings in the vicinity of the camp, and stripping them of their
timbers, doors, floors, &c. Troops may be kept in bivouac for a few
days, when in the vicinity of the enemy, but the exposure of the soldier
in ordinary bivouacs, especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorous
climate, is exceedingly destructive of human life, and moreover leads to
much distress to the inhabitants of the country occupied, in the
destruction of their dwellings and the most common necessaries of life.
If the position is to be occupied for any length of time, the huts
should be arranged like tents, according to a regular system, and made
comfortable for the troops. Such should always be the system adopted in
camps of practice or manoeuvre, in cantonments, winter-quarters, or in
intrenched positions.
We have adopted in our service the system of encamping in tents. These
may do very well under the ordinary circumstances; but in the active
operations of a campaign they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatly
encumbering the baggage-trains. It would seem preferable to resort to
bivouacs for the temporary camp of a single night, and to construct a
regular system of huts where a position is to be occupied for any length
of time. This may be regarded as a general rule, but in certain
countries and climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable.
Napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting, if not
decisive of the question: "Tents," says he, "are not wholesome. It is
better for the soldier to bivouac, because he can sleep with his feet
towards the fire; he may shelter himself from the wind with a few boards
or a little straw. The ground upon which he lies will be rapidly dried
in the vicinity of the fire. Tents are necessary for the superior
officers, who have occasion to read and consult maps, and who ought to
be ordered never to sleep in a house--a fatal abuse, which has given
rise to so many disasters. All the European nations have so far followed
the example of the French as to discard their tents; and if they be
still used in camps of mere parade, it is because they are economical,
sparing woods, thatched roofs, and villages. The shade of a tree,
against the heat of the sun, and any sorry shelter whatever, against the
rain, are preferable to tents. The carriage of the tents for each
battalion would load five horses, who would be much better employed in
carrying provisions. Tents are a subject of observation for the enemies'
spies and officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your
numbers, and the position that you occupy; and this inconvenience occurs
every day, and every instant in the day. An army ranged in two or three
lines of bivouac is only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke,
which the enemy may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere. It is
impossible to count the number of fires; it is easy, however, to count
the number of tents, and to trace out the position that they occupy."
The guarding of camps is a very important matter, and requires much
attention.
The _camp-guard_ consists of one or two rows of sentinels placed around
the camp, and relieved at regular intervals. The number of rows of
sentinels, and the distance between each man, will depend upon the
character of the ground and the degree of danger apprehended.
Detachments of infantry and cavalry, denominated picquets, are also
thrown out in front and on the flanks, which, in connection with the
camp-guards, serve to keep good order and discipline in and around the
camp, to prevent desertions, intercept reconnoitering parties, and to
give timely notice of the enemy's approach.
Still larger detachments, denominated _grand-guards_, are posted in the
surrounding villages, farm-houses, or small field-works, which they
occupy as outposts, and from which they can watch the movements of the
enemy, and prevent any attempts to surprise the camp. They detach
patrols, videttes, and sentries, to furnish timely notice of danger.
They should never be so far from the camp as to be beyond succor in case
of sudden attack. Outposts, when too far advanced, are sometimes
destroyed without being able to give notice of the enemy's approach.
In encamping troops in winter-quarters, it is sometimes necessary to
scatter them over a considerable extent of ground, in order to
facilitate their subsistence. In such a case, the arrangement of guards
requires the utmost care. A chain of advanced posts should be placed
several miles' distance from the line of camp; these posts should be
supported by other and larger detachments in their rear, and
concentrated on fewer points; and the whole country around should be
continually reconnoitered by patrols of cavalry.
The manner in which Napoleon quartered and wintered his army on the
Passarge, in 1806-7, furnishes a useful lesson to military men, both in
the matters of encampment and subsistence. An immense army of men were
here quartered and subsisted, in a most rigorous climate, with a not
over fertile soil, in the midst of hostile nations, and in the very face
of a most powerful enemy.
A Roman army invariably encamped in the same order, its troops being
always drawn up in the same battle array. A Roman staff-officer who
marked out an encampment, performed nothing more than a mechanical
operation; he had no occasion for much genius or experience. The form of
the camps was a square. In later times, they sometimes, in imitation of
the Greeks, made them circular, or adapted them to the ground. The camp
was always surrounded with a ditch and rampart, and divided into two
parts by a broad street, and into subdivisions by cross-streets and
alleys. Each tent was calculated to hold ten privates and a petty
officer.
In the middle ages, the form of the camp did not differ very essentially
from that of the Romans, the variation consisting principally in the
interior arrangements, these arrangements being made to correspond to
the existing mode of forming a line of battle. The details of this
system may be found in the military work of Machiavelli.
The art of fixing a camp in modern times is the same as taking up a line
of battle on the same position. Of all the projectile machines must be
in play and favorably placed. The position must neither be commanded,
out-fronted, nor surrounded; but on the contrary ought, as far as
possible, to command and out-front the enemy's position. But even in the
same position there are numerous modes of arranging an encampment, or of
forming a line of battle, and to select the best of these modes
requires great experience, _coup d'oeil_, and genius. In relation to
this point Napoleon makes the following remarks:--
"Ought an army to be confined to one single encampment, or ought it to
form as many as it has corps or divisions? At what distance ought the
vanguard and the flankers to be encamped? What frontage and what depth
ought to be given to the camp? Where should the cavalry, the artillery,
and the carriages be distributed? Should the army be ranged in battle
array, in several lines? And if it should, what space should there be
between those lines? Should the cavalry be in reserve behind the
infantry, or should it be placed upon the wings? As every piece has
sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours, should
all the artillery be brought into action at the beginning of the
engagement, or should half of it be kept in reserve?"
"The solution of these questions depends on the following
circumstances:--1st. On the number of troops, and the numbers of
infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which the army is composed. 2d. On
the relation subsisting between the two armies. 3d. On the quality of
the troops. 4th. On the end in view. 5th. On the nature of the field.
And 6th. On the position occupied by the enemy, and on the character of
the general who commands them. Nothing absolute either can or ought to
be prescribed on this head. In modern warfare there is no natural order
of battle."
"The duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficult
in modern armies, than it was in those of the ancients. It is also
certain that his influence is more efficacious in deciding battles. In
the ancient armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or a
hundred toises from the enemy, was in no danger; and yet he was
conveniently placed, so as to have an opportunity of directing to
advantage all the movements of his forces. In modern armies, a
general-in-chief, though removed four or five hundred toises, finds
himself in the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is very
much exposed; and still he is so distant that several movements of the
enemy escape him. In every engagement he is occasionally obliged to
approach within reach of small-arms. The effect of modern arms is much
influenced by the situation in which they are plac
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