
Gutenberg · ebook 1572
Timaeus
by Plato · English · public domain in the US
Timaeus by Plato is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #1572). Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Section 1.
Socrates begins the Timaeus with a summary of the Republic. He
lightly touches upon a few points,—the division of labour and
distribution of the citizens into classes, the double nature and
training of the guardians, the community of property and of women
and children. But he makes no mention of the second education, or
of the government of philosophers.
And now he desires to see the ideal State set in motion; he would
like to know how she behaved in some great struggle.
But he is
unable to invent such a narrative himself; and he is afraid that
the poets are equally incapable; for, although he pretends to
have nothing to say against them, he remarks that they are a
tribe of imitators, who can only describe what they have seen.
And he fears that the Sophists, who are plentifully supplied with
graces of speech, in their erratic way of life having never had a
city or house of their own, may through want of experience err in
their conception of philosophers and statesmen. ‘And therefore to
you I turn, Timaeus, citizen of Locris, who are at once a
philosopher and a statesman, and to you, Critias, whom all
Athenians know to be similarly accomplished, and to Hermocrates,
who is also fitted by nature and education to share in our
discourse.’
HERMOCRATES: ‘We will do our best, and have been already
preparing; for on our way home, Critias told us of an ancient
tradition, which I wish, Critias, that you would repeat to
Socrates.’ ‘I will, if Timaeus approves.’ ‘I approve.’ Listen
then, Socrates, to a tale of Solon’s, who, being the friend of
Dropidas my great-grandfather, told it to my grandfather Critias,
and he told me. The narrative related to ancient famous actions
of the Athenian people, and to one especially, which I will
rehearse in honour of you and of the goddess.
Critias when he
told this tale of the olden time, was ninety years old, I being
not more than ten. The occasion of the rehearsal was the day of
the Apaturia called the Registration of Youth, at which our
parents gave prizes for recitation. Some poems of Solon were
recited by the boys. They had not at that time gone out of
fashion, and the recital of them led some one to say, perhaps in
compliment to Critias, that Solon was not only the wisest of men
but also the best of poets.
The old man brightened up at hearing
this, and said: Had Solon only had the leisure which was required
to complete the famous legend which he brought with him from
Egypt he would have been as distinguished as Homer and Hesiod.
‘And what was the subject of the poem?’ said the person who made
the remark. The subject was a very noble one; he described the
most famous action in which the Athenian people were ever
engaged.
But the memory of their exploits has passed away owing
to the lapse of time and the extinction of the actors. ‘Tell us,’
said the other, ‘the whole story, and where Solon heard the
story.’ He replied—There is at the head of the Egyptian Delta,
where the river Nile divides, a city and district called Sais;
the city was the birthplace of King Amasis, and is under the
protection of the goddess Neith or Athene. The citizens have a
friendly feeling towards the Athenians, believing themselves to
be related to them.
Hither came Solon, and was received with
honour; and here he first learnt, by conversing with the Egyptian
priests, how ignorant he and his countrymen were of antiquity.
Perceiving this, and with the view of eliciting information from
them, he told them the tales of Phoroneus and Niobe, and also of
Deucalion and Pyrrha, and he endeavoured to count the generations
which had since passed.
Thereupon an aged priest said to him: ‘O
Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are ever young, and there is no old
man who is a Hellene.’ ‘What do you mean?’ he asked. ‘In mind,’
replied the priest, ‘I mean to say that you are children; there
is no opinion or tradition of knowledge among you which is white
with age; and I will tell you why. Like the rest of mankind you
have suffered from convulsions of nature, which are chiefly
brought about by the two great agencies of fire and water.
The
former is symbolized in the Hellenic tale of young Phaethon who
drove his father’s horses the wrong way, and having burnt up the
earth was himself burnt up by a thunderbolt. For there occurs at
long intervals a derangement of the heavenly bodies, and then the
earth is destroyed by fire. At such times, and when fire is the
agent, those who dwell by rivers or on the seashore are safer
than those who dwell upon high and dry places, who in their turn
are safer when the danger is from water.
Now the Nile is our
saviour from fire, and as there is little rain in Egypt, we are
not harmed by water; whereas in other countries, when a deluge
comes, the inhabitants are swept by the rivers into the sea. The
memorials which your own and other nations have once had of the
famous actions of mankind perish in the waters at certain
periods; and the rude survivors in the mountains begin again,
knowing nothing of the world before the flood. But in Egypt the
traditions of our own and other lands are by us registered for
ever in our temples.
The genealogies which you have recited to us
out of your own annals, Solon, are a mere children’s story. For
in the first place, you remember one deluge only, and there were
many of them, and you know nothing of that fairest and noblest
race of which you are a seed or remnant. The memory of them was
lost, because there was no written voice among you.
For in the
times before the great flood Athens was the greatest and best of
cities and did the noblest deeds and had the best constitution of
any under the face of heaven.’ Solon marvelled, and desired to be
informed of the particulars. ‘You are welcome to hear them,’ said
the priest, ‘both for your own sake and for that of the city, and
above all for the sake of the goddess who is the common foundress
of both our cities. Nine thousand years have elapsed since she
founded yours, and eight thousand since she founded ours, as our
annals record.
Many laws exist among us which are the counterpart
of yours as they were in the olden time. I will briefly describe
them to you, and you shall read the account of them at your
leisure in the sacred registers. In the first place, there was a
caste of priests among the ancient Athenians, and another of
artisans; also castes of shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen, and
lastly of warriors, who, like the warriors of Egypt, were
separated from the rest, and carried shields and spears, a custom
which the goddess first taught you, and then the Asiatics, and we
among Asiatics first received from her.
Observe again, what care
the law took in the pursuit of wisdom, searching out the deep
things of the world, and applying them to the use of man. The
spot of earth which the goddess chose had the best of climates,
and produced the wisest men; in no other was she herself, the
philosopher and warrior goddess, so likely to have votaries. And
there you dwelt as became the children of the gods, excelling all
men in virtue, and many famous actions are recorded of you. The
most famous of them all was the overthrow of the island of
Atlantis.
This great island lay over against the Pillars of
Heracles, in extent greater than Libya and Asia put together, and
was the passage to other islands and to a great ocean of which
the Mediterranean sea was only the harbour; and within the
Pillars the empire of Atlantis reached in Europe to Tyrrhenia and
in Libya to Egypt.
This mighty power was arrayed against Egypt
and Hellas and all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean.
Then your city did bravely, and won renown over the whole earth.
For at the peril of her own existence, and when the other
Hellenes had deserted her, she repelled the invader, and of her
own accord gave liberty to all the nations within the Pillars. A
little while afterwards there were great earthquakes and floods,
and your warrior race all sank into the earth; and the great
island of Atlantis also disappeared in the sea.
This is the
explanation of the shallows which are found in that part of the
Atlantic ocean.’
Such was the tale, Socrates, which Critias heard from Solon; and
I noticed when listening to you yesterday, how close the
resemblance was between your city and citizens and the ancient
Athenian State. But I would not speak at the time, because I
wanted to refresh my memory. I had heard the old man when I was a
child, and though I could not remember the whole of our
yesterday’s discourse, I was able to recall every word of this,
which is branded into my mind; and I am prepared, Socrates, to
rehearse to you the entire narrative.
The imaginary State which
you were describing may be identified with the reality of Solon,
and our antediluvian ancestors may be your citizens. ‘That is
excellent, Critias, and very appropriate to a Panathenaic
festival; the truth of the story is a great advantage.’ Then now
let me explain to you the order of our entertainment; first,
Timaeus, who is a natural philosopher, will speak of the origin
of the world, going down to the creation of man, and then I shall
receive the men whom he has created, and some of whom will have
been educated by you, and introduce them to you as the lost
Athenian citizens of whom the Egyptian record spoke.
As the law
of Solon prescribes, we will bring them into court and
acknowledge their claims to citizenship. ‘I see,’ replied
Socrates, ‘that I shall be well entertained; and do you, Timaeus,
offer up a prayer and begin.’
TIMAEUS: All men who have any right feeling, at the beginning of
any enterprise, call upon the Gods; and he who is about to speak
of the origin of the universe has a special need of their aid.
May my words be acceptable to them, and may I speak in the manner
which will be most intelligible to you and will best express my
own meaning!
First, I must distinguish between that which always is and never
becomes and which is apprehended by reason and reflection, and
that which always becomes and never is and is conceived by
opinion with the help of sense. All that becomes and is created
is the work of a cause, and that is fair which the artificer
makes after an eternal pattern, but whatever is fashioned after a
created pattern is not fair. Is the world created or
uncreated?—that is the first question.
Created, I reply, being
visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible;
and if sensible, then created; and if created, made by a cause,
and the cause is the ineffable father of all things, who had
before him an eternal archetype. For to imagine that the
archetype was created would be blasphemy, seeing that the world
is the noblest of creations, and God is the best of causes. And
the world being thus created according to the eternal pattern is
the copy of something; and we may assume that words are akin to
the matter of which they speak.
What is spoken of the unchanging
or intelligible must be certain and true; but what is spoken of
the created image can only be probable; being is to becoming what
truth is to belief. And amid the variety of opinions which have
arisen about God and the nature of the world we must be content
to take probability for our rule, considering that I, who am the
speaker, and you, who are the judges, are only men; to
probability we may attain but no further.
SOCRATES: Excellent, Timaeus, I like your manner of approaching
the subject—proceed.
TIMAEUS: Why did the Creator make the world?...He was good, and
therefore not jealous, and being free from jealousy he desired
that all things should be like himself. Wherefore he set in order
the visible world, which he found in disorder. Now he who is the
best could only create the fairest; and reflecting that of
visible things the intelligent is superior to the unintelligent,
he put intelligence in soul and soul in body, and framed the
universe to be the best and fairest work in the order of nature,
and the world became a living soul through the providence of God.
In the likeness of what animal was the world made?—that is the
third question...The form of the perfect animal was a whole, and
contained all intelligible beings, and the visible animal, made
after the pattern of this, included all visible creatures.
Are there many worlds or one only?—that is the fourth
question...One only. For if in the original there had been more
than one they would have been the parts of a third, which would
have been the true pattern of the world; and therefore there is,
and will ever be, but one created world. Now that which is
created is of necessity corporeal and visible and
tangible,—visible and therefore made of fire,—tangible and
therefore solid and made of earth.
But two terms must be united
by a third, which is a mean between them; and had the earth been
a surface only, one mean would have sufficed, but two means are
required to unite solid bodies. And as the world was composed of
solids, between the elements of fire and earth God placed two
other elements of air and water, and arranged them in a
continuous proportion—
fire:air::air:water, and air:water::water:earth,
and so put together a visible and palpable heaven, having harmony
and friendship in the union of the four elements; and being at
unity with itself it was indissoluble except by the hand of the
framer. Each of the elements was taken into the universe whole
and entire; for he considered that the animal should be perfect
and one, leaving no remnants out of which another animal could be
created, and should also be free from old age and disease, which
are produced by the action of external forces.
And as he was to
contain all things, he was made in the all-containing form of a
sphere, round as from a lathe and every way equidistant from the
centre, as was natural and suitable to him. He was finished and
smooth, having neither eyes nor ears, for there was nothing
without him which he could see or hear; and he had no need to
carry food to his mouth, nor was there air for him to breathe;
and he did not require hands, for there was nothing of which he
could take hold, nor feet, with which to walk.
All that he did
was done rationally in and by himself, and he moved in a circle
turning within himself, which is the most intellectual of
motions; but the other six motions were wanting to him; wherefore
the universe had no feet or legs.
And so the thought of God made a God in the image of a perfect
body, having intercourse with himself and needing no other, but
in every part harmonious and self-contained and truly blessed.
The soul was first made by him—the elder to rule the younger; not
in the order in which our wayward fancy has led us to describe
them, but the soul first and afterwards the body.
God took of the
unchangeable and indivisible and also of the divisible and
corporeal, and out of the two he made a third nature, essence,
which was in a mean between them, and partook of the same and the
other, the intractable nature of the other being compressed into
the same. Having made a compound of all the three, he proceeded
to divide the entire mass into portions related to one another in
the ratios of 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, and proceeded to fill up the
double and triple intervals thus—
- over 1, 4/3, 3/2, - over 2, 8/3, 3, - over 4, 16/3, 6, - over 8:
- over 1, 3/2, 2, - over 3, 9/2, 6, - over 9, 27/2, 18, - over 27;
in which double series of numbers are two kinds of means; the one
exceeds and is exceeded by equal parts of the extremes, e.g. 1,
4/3, 2; the other kind of mean is one which is equidistant from
the extremes—2, 4, 6. In this manner there were formed intervals
of thirds, 3:2, of fourths, 4:3, and of ninths, 9:8. And next he
filled up the intervals of a fourth with ninths, leaving a
remnant which is in the ratio of 256:243.
The entire compound was
divided by him lengthways into two parts, which he united at the
centre like the letter X, and bent into an inner and outer circle
or sphere, cutting one another again at a point over against the
point at which they cross. The outer circle or sphere was named
the sphere of the same—the inner, the sphere of the other or
diverse; and the one revolved horizontally to the right, the
other diagonally to the left.
To the sphere of the same which was
undivided he gave dominion, but the sphere of the other or
diverse was distributed into seven unequal orbits, having
intervals in ratios of twos and threes, three of either sort, and
he bade the orbits move in opposite directions to one
another—three of them, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, with equal
swiftness, and the remaining four—the Moon, Saturn, Mars,
Jupiter, with unequal swiftness to the three and to one another,
but all in due proportion.
When the Creator had made the soul he made the body within her;
and the soul interfused everywhere from the centre to the
circumference of heaven, herself turning in herself, began a
divine life of rational and everlasting motion. The body of
heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of
reason and harmony, and is the best of creations, being the work
of the best.
And being composed of the same, the other, and the
essence, these three, and also divided and bound in harmonical
proportion, and revolving within herself—the soul when touching
anything which has essence, whether divided or undivided, is
stirred to utter the sameness or diversity of that and some other
thing, and to tell how and when and where individuals are
affected or related, whether in the world of change or of
essence.
When reason is in the neighbourhood of sense, and the
circle of the other or diverse is moving truly, then arise true
opinions and beliefs; when reason is in the sphere of thought,
and the circle of the same runs smoothly, then intelligence is
perfected.
When the Father who begat the world saw the image which he had
made of the Eternal Gods moving and living, he rejoiced; and in
his joy resolved, since the archetype was eternal, to make the
creature eternal as far as this was possible. Wherefore he made
an image of eternity which is time, having an uniform motion
according to number, parted into months and days and years, and
also having greater divisions of past, present, and future.
These
all apply to becoming in time, and have no meaning in relation to
the eternal nature, which ever is and never was or will be; for
the unchangeable is never older or younger, and when we say that
he ‘was’ or ‘will be,’ we are mistaken, for these words are
applicable only to becoming, and not to true being; and equally
wrong are we in saying that what has become IS become and that
what becomes IS becoming, and that the non-existent IS
non-existent...These are the forms of time which imitate eternity
and move in a circle measured by number.
Thus was time made in the image of the eternal nature; and it was
created together with the heavens, in order that if they were
dissolved, it might perish with them. And God made the sun and
moon and five other wanderers, as they are called, seven in all,
and to each of them he gave a body moving in an orbit, being one
of the seven orbits into which the circle of the other was
divided.
He put the moon in the orbit which was nearest to the
earth, the sun in that next, the morning star and Mercury in the
orbits which move opposite to the sun but with equal
swiftness—this being the reason why they overtake and are
overtaken by one another. All these bodies became living
creatures, and learnt their appointed tasks, and began to move,
the nearer more swiftly, the remoter more slowly, according to
the diagonal movement of the other.
And since this was controlled
by the movement of the same, the seven planets in their courses
appeared to describe spirals; and that appeared fastest which was
slowest, and that which overtook others appeared to be overtaken
by them. And God lighted a fire in the second orbit from the
earth which is called the sun, to give light over the whole
heaven, and to teach intelligent beings that knowledge of number
which is derived from the revolution of the same.
Thus arose day
and night, which are the periods of the most intelligent nature;
a month is created by the revolution of the moon, a year by that
of the sun. Other periods of wonderful length and complexity are
not observed by men in general; there is moreover a cycle or
perfect year at the completion of which they all meet and
coincide...To this end the stars came into being, that the
created heaven might imitate the eternal nature.
Thus far the universal animal was made in the divine image, but
the other animals were not as yet included in him. And God
created them according to the patterns or species of them which
existed in the divine original. There are four of them: one of
gods, another of birds, a third of fishes, and a fourth of
animals. The gods were made in the form of a circle, which is the
most perfect figure and the figure of the universe. They were
created chiefly of fire, that they might be bright, and were made
to know and follow the best, and to be scattered over the
heavens, of which they were to be the glory.
Two kinds of motion
were assigned to them—first, the revolution in the same and
around the same, in peaceful unchanging thought of the same; and
to this was added a forward motion which was under the control of
the same. Thus then the fixed stars were created, being divine
and eternal animals, revolving on the same spot, and the
wandering stars, in their courses, were created in the manner
already described.
The earth, which is our nurse, clinging around
the pole extended through the universe, he made to be the
guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods
that are in the interior of heaven. Vain would be the labour of
telling all the figures of them, moving as in dance, and their
juxta-positions and approximations, and when and where and behind
what other stars they appear to disappear—to tell of all this
without looking at a plan of them would be labour in vain.
The knowledge of the other gods is beyond us, and we can only
accept the traditions of the ancients, who were the children of
the gods, as they said; for surely they must have known their own
ancestors. Although they give no proof, we must believe them as
is customary. They tell us that Oceanus and Tethys were the
children of Earth and Heaven; that Phoreys, Cronos, and Rhea came
in the next generation, and were followed by Zeus and Here, whose
brothers and children are known to everybody.
When all of them, both those who show themselves in the sky, and
those who retire from view, had come into being, the Creator
addressed them thus:—‘Gods, sons of gods, my works, if I will,
are indissoluble. That which is bound may be dissolved, but only
an evil being would dissolve that which is harmonious and happy.
And although you are not immortal you shall not die, for I will
hold you together. Hear me, then:—Three tribes of mortal beings
have still to be created, but if created by me they would be like
gods.
Do ye therefore make them; I will implant in them the seed
of immortality, and you shall weave together the mortal and
immortal, and provide food for them, and receive them again in
death.’ Thus he spake, and poured the remains of the elements
into the cup in which he had mingled the soul of the universe.
They were no longer pure as before, but diluted; and the mixture
he distributed into souls equal in number to the stars, and
assigned each to a star—then having mounted them, as in a
chariot, he showed them the nature of the universe, and told them
of their future birth and human lot.
They were to be sown in the
planets, and out of them was to come forth the most religious of
animals, which would hereafter be called man.
The souls were to
be implanted in bodies, which were in a perpetual flux, whence,
he said, would arise, first, sensation; secondly, love, which is
a mixture of pleasure and pain; thirdly, fear and anger, and the
opposite affections: and if they conquered these, they would live
righteously, but if they were conquered by them, unrighteously.
He who lived well would return to his native star, and would
there have a blessed existence; but, if he lived ill, he would
pass into the nature of a woman, and if he did not then alter his
evil ways, into the likeness of some animal, until the reason
which was in him reasserted her sway over the elements of fire,
air, earth, water, which had engrossed her, and he regained his
first and better nature.
Having given this law to his creatures,
that he might be guiltless of their future evil, he sowed them,
some in the earth, some in the moon, and some in the other
planets; and he ordered the younger gods to frame human bodies
for them and to make the necessary additions to them, and to
avert from them all but self-inflicted evil.
Having given these commands, the Creator remained in his own
nature. And his children, receiving from him the immortal
principle, borrowed from the world portions of earth, air, fire,
water, hereafter to be returned, which they fastened together,
not with the adamantine bonds which bound themselves, but by
little invisible pegs, making each separate body out of all the
elements, subject to influx and efflux, and containing the
courses of the soul. These swelling and surging as in a river
moved irregularly and irrationally in all the six possible ways,
forwards, backwards, right, left, up and down.
But violent as
were the internal and alimentary fluids, the tide became still
more violent when the body came into contact with flaming fire,
or the solid earth, or gliding waters, or the stormy wind; the
motions produced by these impulses pass through the body to the
soul and have the name of sensations.
Uniting with the
ever-flowing current, they shake the courses of the soul,
stopping the revolution of the same and twisting in all sorts of
ways the nature of the other, and the harmonical ratios of twos
and threes and the mean terms which connect them, until the
circles are bent and disordered and their motion becomes
irregular. You may imagine a position of the body in which the
head is resting upon the ground, and the legs are in the air, and
the top is bottom and the left right.
And something similar
happens when the disordered motions of the soul come into contact
with any external thing; they say the same or the other in a
manner which is the very opposite of the truth, and they are
false and foolish, and have no guiding principle in them. And
when external impressions enter in, they are really conquered,
though they seem to conquer.
By reason of these affections the soul is at first without
intelligence, but as time goes on the stream of nutriment abates,
and the courses of the soul regain their proper motion, and
apprehend the same and the other rightly, and become rational.
The soul of him who has education is whole and perfect and
escapes the worst disease, but, if a man’s education be
neglected, he walks lamely through life and returns good for
nothing to the world below. This, however, is an after-stage—at
present, we are only concerned with the creation of the body and
soul.
The two divine courses were encased by the gods in a sphere which
is called the head, and is the god and lord of us. And to this
they gave the body to be a vehicle, and the members to be
instruments, having the power of flexion and extension. Such was
the origin of legs and arms. In the next place, the gods gave a
forward motion to the human body, because the front part of man
was the more honourable and had authority. And they put in a face
in which they inserted organs to minister in all things to the
providence of the soul.
They first contrived the eyes, into which
they conveyed a light akin to the light of day, making it flow
through the pupils. When the light of the eye is surrounded by
the light of day, then like falls upon like, and they unite and
form one body which conveys to the soul the motions of visible
objects. But when the visual ray goes forth into the darkness,
then unlike falls upon unlike—the eye no longer sees, and we go
to sleep.
The fire or light, when kept in by the eyelids,
equalizes the inward motions, and there is rest accompanied by
few dreams; only when the greater motions remain they engender in
us corresponding visions of the night. And now we shall be able
to understand the nature of reflections in mirrors. The fires
from within and from without meet about the smooth and bright
surface of the mirror; and because they meet in a manner contrary
to the usual mode, the right and left sides of the object are
transposed. In a concave mirror the top and bottom are inverted,
but this is no transposition.
These are the second causes which God used as his ministers in
fashioning the world. They are thought by many to be the prime
causes, but they are not so; for they are destitute of mind and
reason, and the lover of mind will not allow that there are any
prime causes other than the rational and invisible ones—these he
investigates first, and afterwards the causes of things which are
moved by others, and which work by chance and without order. Of
the second or concurrent causes of sight I have already spoken,
and I will now speak of the higher purpose of God in giving us
eyes.
Sight is the source of the greatest benefits to us; for if
our eyes had never seen the sun, stars, and heavens, the words
which we have spoken would not have been uttered. The sight of
them and their revolutions has given us the knowledge of number
and time, the power of enquiry, and philosophy, which is the
great blessing of human life; not to speak of the lesser benefits
which even the vulgar can appreciate. God gave us the faculty of
sight that we might behold the order of the heavens and create a
corresponding order in our own erring minds.
To the like end the
gifts of speech and hearing were bestowed upon us; not for the
sake of irrational pleasure, but in order that we might harmonize
the courses of the soul by sympathy with the harmony of sound,
and cure ourselves of our irregular and graceless ways.
Thus far we have spoken of the works of mind; and there are other
works done from necessity, which we must now place beside them;
for the creation is made up of both, mind persuading necessity as
far as possible to work out good. Before the heavens there
existed fire, air, water, earth, which we suppose men to know,
though no one has explained their nature, and we erroneously
maintain them to be the letters or elements of the whole,
although they cannot reasonably be compared even to syllables or
first compounds.
I am not now speaking of the first principles of
things, because I cannot discover them by our present mode of
enquiry. But as I observed the rule of probability at first, I
will begin anew, seeking by the grace of God to observe it still.
In our former discussion I distinguished two kinds of being—the
unchanging or invisible, and the visible or changing. But now a
third kind is required, which I shall call the receptacle or
nurse of generation. There is a difficulty in arriving at an
exact notion of this third kind, because the four elements
themselves are of inexact natures and easily pass into one
another, and are too transient to be detained by any one name;
wherefore we are compelled to speak of water or fire, not as
substances, but as qualities. They may be compared to images made
of gold, which are continually assuming new forms.
Somebody asks
what they are; if you do not know, the safest answer is to reply
that they are gold. In like manner there is a universal nature
out of which all things are made, and which is like none of them;
but they enter into and pass out of her, and are made after
patterns of the true in a wonderful and inexplicable manner.
The
containing principle may be likened to a mother, the source or
spring to a father, the intermediate nature to a child; and we
may also remark that the matter which receives every variety of
form must be formless, like the inodorous liquids which are
prepared to receive scents, or the smooth and soft materials on
which figures are impressed. In the same way space or matter is
neither earth nor fire nor air nor water, but an invisible and
formless being which receives all things, and in an
incomprehensible manner partakes of the intelligible.
But we may
say, speaking generally, that fire is that part of this nature
which is inflamed, water that which is moistened, and the like.
Let me ask a question in which a great principle is involved: Is
there an essence of fire and the other elements, or are there
only fires visible to sense? I answer in a word: If mind is one
thing and true opinion another, then there are self-existent
essences; but if mind is the same with opinion, then the visible
and corporeal is most real. But they are not the same, and they
have a different origin and nature.
The one comes to us by
instruction, the other by persuasion, the one is rational, the
other is irrational; the one is movable by persuasion, the other
immovable; the one is possessed by every man, the other by the
gods and by very few men. And we must acknowledge that as there
are two kinds of knowledge, so there are two kinds of being
corresponding to them; the one uncreated, indestructible,
immovable, which is seen by intelligence only; the other created,
which is always becoming in place and vanishing out of place, and
is apprehended by opinion and sense.
There is also a third
nature—that of space, which is indestructible, and is perceived
by a kind of spurious reason without the help of sense. This is
presented to us in a dreamy manner, and yet is said to be
necessary, for we say that all things must be somewhere in space.
For they are the images of other things and must therefore have a
separate existence and exist in something (i.e. in space). But
true reason assures us that while two things (i.e. the idea and
the image) are different they cannot inhere in one another, so as
to be one and two at the same time.
To sum up: Being and generation and space, these three, existed
before the heavens, and the nurse or vessel of generation,
moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and taking the forms of
air and earth, assumed various shapes. By the motion of the
vessel, the elements were divided, and like grain winnowed by
fans, the close and heavy particles settled in one place, the
light and airy ones in another. At first they were without reason
and measure, and had only certain faint traces of themselves,
until God fashioned them by figure and number.
In this, as in
every other part of creation, I suppose God to have made things,
as far as was possible, fair and good, out of things not fair and
good.
And now I will explain to you the generation of the world by a
method with which your scientific training will have made you
familiar. Fire, air, earth, and water are bodies and therefore
solids, and solids are contained in planes, and plane rectilinear
figures are made up of triangles. Of triangles there are two
kinds; one having the opposite sides equal (isosceles), the other
with unequal sides (scalene). These we may fairly assume to be
the original elements of fire and the other bodies; what
principles are prior to these God only knows, and he of men whom
God loves.
Next, we must determine what are the four most
beautiful figures which are unlike one another and yet sometimes
capable of resolution into one another...Of the two kinds of
triangles the equal-sided has but one form, the unequal-sided has
an infinite variety of forms; and there is none more beautiful
than that which forms the half of an equilateral triangle.
Let us
then choose two triangles; one, the isosceles, the other, that
form of scalene which has the square of the longer side three
times as great as the square of the lesser side; and affirm that,
out of these, fire and the other elements have been constructed.
I was wrong in imagining that all the four elements could be
generated into and out of one another. For as they are formed,
three of them from the triangle which has the sides unequal, the
fourth from the triangle which has equal sides, three can be
resolved into one another, but the fourth cannot be resolved into
them nor they into it. So much for their passage into one
another: I must now speak of their construction.
From the
triangle of which the hypotenuse is twice the lesser side the
three first regular solids are formed—first, the equilateral
pyramid or tetrahedron; secondly, the octahedron; thirdly, the
icosahedron; and from the isosceles triangle is formed the cube.
And there is a fifth figure (which is made out of twelve
pentagons), the dodecahedron—this God used as a model for the
twelvefold division of the Zodiac.
Let us now assign the geometrical forms to their respective
elements. The cube is the most stable of them because resting on
a quadrangular plane surface, and composed of isosceles
triangles. To the earth then, which is the most stable of bodies
and the most easily modelled of them, may be assigned the form of
a cube; and the remaining forms to the other elements,—to fire
the pyramid, to air the octahedron, and to water the
icosahedron,—according to their degrees of lightness or heaviness
or power, or want of power, of penetration.
The single particles
of any of the elements are not seen by reason of their smallness;
they only become visible when collected. The ratios of their
motions, numbers, and other properties, are ordered by the God,
who harmonized them as far as necessity permitted.
The probable conclusion is as follows:—Earth, when dissolved by
the more penetrating element of fire, whether acting immediately
or through the medium of air or water, is decomposed but not
transformed. Water, when divided by fire or air, becomes one part
fire, and two parts air. A volume of air divided becomes two of
fire. On the other hand, when condensed, two volumes of fire make
a volume of air; and two and a half parts of air condense into
one of water.
Any element which is fastened upon by fire is cut
by the sharpness of the triangles, until at length, coalescing
with the fire, it is at rest; for similars are not affected by
similars. When two kinds of bodies quarrel with one another, then
the tendency to decomposition continues until the smaller either
escapes to its kindred element or becomes one with its conqueror.
And this tendency in bodies to condense or escape is a source of
motion...Where there is motion there must be a mover, and where
there is a mover there must be something to move.
These cannot
exist in what is uniform, and therefore motion is due to want of
uniformity. But then why, when things are divided after their
kinds, do they not cease from motion? The answer is, that the
circular motion of all things compresses them, and as ‘nature
abhors a vacuum,’ the finer and more subtle particles of the
lighter elements, such as fire and air, are thrust into the
interstices of the larger, each of them penetrating according to
their rarity, and thus all the elements are on their way up and
down everywhere and always into their own places.
Hence there is
a principle of inequality, and therefore of motion, in all time.
In the next place, we may observe that there are different kinds
of fire—(1) flame, (2) light that burns not, (3) the red heat of
the embers of fire. And there are varieties of air, as for
example, the pure aether, the opaque mist, and other nameless
forms. Water, again, is of two kinds, liquid and fusile.
The
liquid is composed of small and unequal particles, the fusile of
large and uniform particles and is more solid, but nevertheless
melts at the approach of fire, and then spreads upon the earth.
When the substance cools, the fire passes into the air, which is
displaced, and forces together and condenses the liquid mass.
This process is called cooling and congealment. Of the fusile
kinds the fairest and heaviest is gold; this is hardened by
filtration through rock, and is of a bright yellow colour. A
shoot of gold which is darker and denser than the rest is called
adamant.
Another kind is called copper, which is harder and yet
lighter because the interstices are larger than in gold. There is
mingled with it a fine and small portion of earth which comes out
in the form of rust. These are a few of the conjectures which
philosophy forms, when, leaving the eternal nature, she turns for
innocent recreation to consider the truths of generation.
Water which is mingled with fire is called liquid because it
rolls upon the earth, and soft because its bases give way. This
becomes more equable when separated from fire and air, and then
congeals into hail or ice, or the looser forms of hoar frost or
snow. There are other waters which are called juices and are
distilled through plants.
Of these we may mention, first, wine,
which warms the soul as well as the body; secondly, oily
substances, as for example, oil or pitch; thirdly, honey, which
relaxes the contracted parts of the mouth and so produces
sweetness; fourthly, vegetable acid, which is frothy and has a
burning quality and dissolves the flesh. Of the kinds of earth,
that which is filtered through water passes into stone; the water
is broken up by the earth and escapes in the form of air—this in
turn presses upon the mass of earth, and the earth, compressed
into an indissoluble union with the remaining water, becomes
rock.
Rock, when it is made up of equal particles, is fair and
transparent, but the reverse when of unequal. Earth is converted
into pottery when the watery part is suddenly drawn away; or if
moisture remains, the earth, when fused by fire, becomes, on
cooling, a stone of a black colour. When the earth is finer and
of a briny nature then two half-solid bodies are formed by
separating the water,—soda and salt. The strong compounds of
earth and water are not soluble by water, but only by fire. Earth
itself, when not consolidated, is dissolved by water; when
consolidated, by fire only.
The cohesion of water, when strong,
is dissolved by fire only; when weak, either by air or fire, the
former entering the interstices, the latter penetrating even the
triangles. Air when strongly condensed is indissoluble by any
power which does not reach the triangles, and even when not
strongly condensed is only resolved by fire. Compounds of earth
and water are unaffected by water while the water occupies the
interstices in them, but begin to liquefy when fire enters into
the interstices of the water.
They are of two kinds, some of
them, like glass, having more earth, others, like wax, having
more water in them.
Having considered objects of sense, we now pass on to sensation.
But we cannot explain sensation without explaining the nature of
flesh and of the mortal soul; and as we cannot treat of both
together, in order that we may proceed at once to the sensations
we must assume the existence of body and soul.
What makes fire burn? The fineness of the sides, the sharpness of
the angles, the smallness of the particles, the quickness of the
motion. Moreover, the pyramid, which is the figure of fire, is
more cutting than any other. The feeling of cold is produced by
the larger particles of moisture outside the body trying to eject
the smaller ones in the body which they compress. The struggle
which arises between elements thus unnaturally brought together
causes shivering. That is hard to which the flesh yields, and
soft which yields to the flesh, and these two terms are also
relative to one another.
The yielding matter is that which has
the slenderest base, whereas that which has a rectangular base is
compact and repellent. Light and heavy are wrongly explained with
reference to a lower and higher in place. For in the universe,
which is a sphere, there is no opposition of above or below, and
that which is to us above would be below to a man standing at the
antipodes. The greater or less difficulty in detaching any
element from its like is the real cause of heaviness or of
lightness.
If you draw the earth into the dissimilar air, the
particles of earth cling to their native element, and you more
easily detach a small portion than a large. There would be the
same difficulty in moving any of the upper elements towards the
lower. The smooth and the rough are severally produced by the
union of evenness with compactness, and of hardness with
inequality.
Pleasure and pain are the most important of the affections common
to the whole body. According to our general doctrine of
sensation, parts of the body which are easily moved readily
transmit the motion to the mind; but parts which are not easily
moved have no effect upon the patient. The bones and hair are of
the latter kind, sight and hearing of the former. Ordinary
affections are neither pleasant nor painful. The impressions of
sight afford an example of these, and are neither violent nor
sudden.
But sudden replenishments of the body cause pleasure, and
sudden disturbances, as for example cuttings and burnings, have
the opposite effect.
>From sensations common to the whole body, we proceed to those of
particular parts. The affections of the tongue appear to be
caused by contraction and dilation, but they have more of
roughness or smoothness than is found in other affections. Earthy
particles, entering into the small veins of the tongue which
reach to the heart, when they melt into and dry up the little
veins are astringent if they are rough; or if not so rough, they
are only harsh, and if excessively abstergent, like potash and
soda, bitter. Purgatives of a weaker sort are called salt and,
having no bitterness, are rather agreeable.
Inflammatory bodies,
which by their lightness are carried up into the head, cutting
all that comes in their way, are termed pungent.
But when these
are refined by putrefaction, and enter the narrow veins of the
tongue, and meet there particles of earth and air, two kinds of
globules are formed—one of earthy and impure liquid, which boils
and ferments, the other of pure and transparent water, which are
called bubbles; of all these affections the cause is termed acid.
When, on the other hand, the composition of the deliquescent
particles is congenial to the tongue, and disposes the parts
according to their nature, this remedial power in them is called
sweet.
Smells are not divided into kinds; all of them are transitional,
and arise out of the decomposition of one element into another,
for the simple air or water is without smell. They are vapours or
mists, thinner than water and thicker than air: and hence in
drawing in the breath, when there is an obstruction, the air
passes, but there is no smell. They have no names, but are
distinguished as pleasant and unpleasant, and their influence
extends over the whole region from the head to the navel.
Hearing is the effect of a stroke which is transmitted through
the ears by means of the air, brain, and blood to the soul,
beginning at the head and extending to the liver. The sound which
moves swiftly is acute; that which moves slowly is grave; that
which is uniform is smooth, and the opposite is harsh. Loudness
depends on the quantity of the sound. Of the harmony of sounds I
will hereafter speak.
Colours are flames which emanate from all bodies, having
particles corresponding to the sense of sight. Some of the
particles are less and some larger, and some are equal to the
parts of the sight. The equal particles appear transparent; the
larger contract, and the lesser dilate the sight. White is
produced by the dilation, black by the contraction, of the
particles of sight. There is also a swifter motion of another
sort of fire which forces a way through the passages of the eyes,
and elicits from them a union of fire and water which we call
tears.
The inner fire flashes forth, and the outer finds a way in
and is extinguished in the moisture, and all sorts of colours are
generated by the mixture. This affection is termed by us
dazzling, and the object which produces it is called bright.
There is yet another sort of fire which mingles with the moisture
of the eye without flashing, and produces a colour like blood—to
this we give the name of red. A bright element mingling with red
and white produces a colour which we call auburn.
The law of
proportion, however, according to which compound colours are
formed, cannot be determined scientifically or even probably.
Red, when mingled with black and white, gives a purple hue, which
becomes umber when the colours are burnt and there is a larger
admixture of black. Flame-colour is a mixture of auburn and dun;
dun of white and black; yellow of white and auburn. White and
bright meeting, and falling upon a full black, become dark blue;
dark blue mingling with white becomes a light blue; the union of
flame-colour and black makes leek-green.
There is no difficulty
in seeing how other colours are probably composed. But he who
should attempt to test the truth of this by experiment, would
forget the difference of the human and divine nature. God only is
able to compound and resolve substances; such experiments are
impossible to man.
These are the elements of necessity which the Creator received in
the world of generation when he made the all-sufficient and
perfect creature, using the secondary causes as his ministers,
but himself fashioning the good in all things. For there are two
sorts of causes, the one divine, the other necessary; and we
should seek to discover the divine above all, and, for their
sake, the necessary, because without them the higher cannot be
attained by us.
Having now before us the causes out of which the rest of our
discourse is to be framed, let us go back to the point at which
we began, and add a fair ending to our tale. As I said at first,
all things were originally a chaos in which there was no order or
proportion. The elements of this chaos were arranged by the
Creator, and out of them he made the world. Of the divine he
himself was the author, but he committed to his offspring the
creation of the mortal.
From him they received the immortal soul,
but themselves made the body to be its vehicle, and constructed
within another soul which was mortal, and subject to terrible
affections—pleasure, the inciter of evil; pain, which deters from
good; rashness and fear, foolish counsellors; anger hard to be
appeased; hope easily led astray. These they mingled with
irrational sense and all-daring love according to necessary laws
and so framed man. And, fearing to pollute the divine element,
they gave the mortal soul a separate habitation in the breast,
parted off from the head by a narrow isthmus.
And as in a house
the women’s apartments are divided from the men’s, the cavity of
the thorax was divided into two parts, a higher and a lower. The
higher of the two, which is the seat of courage and anger, lies
nearer to the head, between the midriff and the neck, and assists
reason in restraining the desires. The heart is the house of
guard in which all the veins meet, and through them reason sends
her commands to the extremity of her kingdom.
When the passions
are in revolt, or danger approaches from without, then the heart
beats and swells; and the creating powers, knowing this,
implanted in the body the soft and bloodless substance of the
lung, having a porous and springy nature like a sponge, and being
kept cool by drink and air which enters through the trachea.
The part of the soul which desires meat and drink was placed
between the midriff and navel, where they made a sort of manger;
and here they bound it down, like a wild animal, away from the
council-chamber, and leaving the better principle undisturbed to
advise quietly for the good of the whole. For the Creator knew
that the belly would not listen to reason, and was under the
power of idols and fancies.
Wherefore he framed the liver to
connect with the lower nature, contriving that it should be
compact, and bright, and sweet, and also bitter and smooth, in
order that the power of thought which originates in the mind
might there be reflected, terrifying the belly with the elements
of bitterness and gall, and a suffusion of bilious colours when
the liver is contracted, and causing pain and misery by twisting
out of its place the lobe and closing up the vessels and gates.
And the converse happens when some gentle inspiration coming from
intelligence mirrors the opposite fancies, giving rest and
sweetness and freedom, and at night, moderation and peace
accompanied with prophetic insight, when reason and sense are
asleep.
For the authors of our being, in obedience to their
Father’s will and in order to make men as good as they could,
gave to the liver the power of divination, which is never active
when men are awake or in health; but when they are under the
influence of some disorder or enthusiasm then they receive
intimations, which have to be interpreted by others who are
called prophets, but should rather be called interpreters of
prophecy; after death these intimations become unintelligible.
The spleen which is situated in the neighbourhood, on the left
side, keeps the liver bright and clean, as a napkin does a
mirror, and the evacuations of the liver are received into it;
and being a hollow tissue it is for a time swollen with these
impurities, but when the body is purged it returns to its natural
size.
The truth concerning the soul can only be established by the word
of God. Still, we may venture to assert what is probable both
concerning soul and body.
The creative powers were aware of our tendency to excess. And so
when they made the belly to be a receptacle for food, in order
that men might not perish by insatiable gluttony, they formed the
convolutions of the intestines, in this way retarding the passage
of food through the body, lest mankind should be absorbed in
eating and drinking, and the whole race become impervious to
divine philosophy.
The creation of bones and flesh was on this wise. The foundation
of these is the marrow which binds together body and soul, and
the marrow is made out of such of the primary triangles as are
adapted by their perfection to produce all the four elements.
These God took and mingled them in due proportion, making as many
kinds of marrow as there were hereafter to be kinds of souls. The
receptacle of the divine soul he made round, and called that
portion of the marrow brain, intending that the vessel containing
this substance should be the head.
The remaining part he divided
into long and round figures, and to these as to anchors,
fastening the mortal soul, he proceeded to make the rest of the
body, first forming for both parts a covering of bone. The bone
was formed by sifting pure smooth earth and wetting it with
marrow. It was then thrust alternately into fire and water, and
thus rendered insoluble by either. Of bone he made a globe which
he placed around the brain, leaving a narrow opening, and around
the marrow of the neck and spine he formed the vertebrae, like
hinges, which extended from the head through the whole of the
trunk.
And as the bone was brittle and liable to mortify and
destroy the marrow by too great rigidity and susceptibility to
heat and cold, he contrived sinews and flesh—the first to give
flexibility, the second to guard against heat and cold, and to be
a protection against falls, containing a warm moisture, which in
summer exudes and cools the body, and in winter is a defence
against cold. Having this in view, the Creator mingled earth with
fire and water and mixed with them a ferment of acid and salt, so
as to form pulpy flesh.
But the sinews he made of a mixture of
bone and unfermented flesh, giving them a mean nature between the
two, and a yellow colour. Hence they were more glutinous than
flesh, but softer than bone. The bones which have most of the
living soul within them he covered with the thinnest film of
flesh, those which have least of it, he lodged deeper. At the
joints he diminished the flesh in order not to impede the flexure
of the limbs, and also to avoid clogging the perceptions of the
mind.
About the thighs and arms, which have no sense because
there is little soul in the marrow, and about the inner bones, he
laid the flesh thicker. For where the flesh is thicker there is
less feeling, except in certain parts which the Creator has made
solely of flesh, as for example, the tongue. Had the combination
of solid bone and thick flesh been consistent with acute
perceptions, the Creator would have given man a sinewy and fleshy
head, and then he would have lived twice as long.
But our
creators were of opinion that a shorter life which was better was
preferable to a longer which was worse, and therefore they
covered the head with thin bone, and placed the sinews at the
extremity of the head round the neck, and fastened the jawbones
to them below the face. And they framed the mouth, having teeth
and tongue and lips, with a view to the necessary and the good;
for food is a necessity, and the river of speech is the best of
rivers.
Still, the head could not be left a bare globe of bone on
account of the extremes of heat and cold, nor be allowed to
become dull and senseless by an overgrowth of flesh. Wherefore it
was covered by a peel or skin which met and grew by the help of
the cerebral humour. The diversity of the sutures was caused by
the struggle of the food against the courses of the soul. The
skin of the head was pierced by fire, and out of the punctures
came forth a moisture, part liquid, and part of a skinny nature,
which was hardened by the pressure of the external cold and
became hair.
And God gave hair to the head of man to be a light
covering, so that it might not interfere with his perceptions.
Nails were formed by combining sinew, skin, and bone, and were
made by the creators with a view to the future when, as they
knew, women and other animals who would require them would be
framed out of man.
The gods also mingled natures akin to that of man with other
forms and perceptions. Thus trees and plants were created, which
were originally wild and have been adapted by cultivation to our
use. They partake of that third kind of life which is seated
between the midriff and the navel, and is altogether passive and
incapable of reflection.
When the creators had furnished all these natures for our
sustenance, they cut channels through our bodies as in a garden,
watering them with a perennial stream. Two were cut down the
back, along the back bone, where the skin and flesh meet, one on
the right and the other on the left, having the marrow of
generation between them. In the next place, they divided the
veins about the head and interlaced them with each other in order
that they might form an additional link between the head and the
body, and that the sensations from both sides might be diffused
throughout the body.
In the third place, they contrived the
passage of liquids, which may be explained in this way:—Finer
bodies retain coarser, but not the coarser the finer, and the
belly is capable of retaining food, but not fire and air. God
therefore formed a network of fire and air to irrigate the veins,
having within it two lesser nets, and stretched cords reaching
from both the lesser nets to the extremity of the outer net. The
inner parts of the net were made by him of fire, the lesser nets
and their cavities of air.
The two latter he made to pass into
the mouth; the one ascending by the air-pipes from the lungs, the
other by the side of the air-pipes from the belly. The entrance
to the first he divided into two parts, both of which he made to
meet at the channels of the nose, that when the mouth was closed
the passage connected with it might still be fed with air.
The
cavity of the network he spread around the hollows of the body,
making the entire receptacle to flow into and out of the lesser
nets and the lesser nets into and out of it, while the outer net
found a way into and out of the pores of the body, and the
internal heat followed the air to and fro. These, as we affirm,
are the phenomena of respiration. And all this process takes
place in order that the body may be watered and cooled and
nourished, and the meat and drink digested and liquefied and
carried into the veins.
The causes of respiration have now to be considered. The
exhalation of the breath through the mouth and nostrils displaces
the external air, and at the same time leaves a vacuum into which
through the pores the air which is displaced enters. Also the
vacuum which is made when the air is exhaled through the pores is
filled up by the inhalation of breath through the mouth and
nostrils. The explanation of this double phenomenon is as
follows:—Elements move towards their natural places.
Now as every
animal has within him a fountain of fire, the air which is
inhaled through the mouth and nostrils, on coming into contact
with this, is heated; and when heated, in accordance with the law
of attraction, it escapes by the way it entered toward the place
of fire. On leaving the body it is cooled and drives round the
air which it displaces through the pores into the empty lungs.
This again is in turn heated by the internal fire and escapes, as
it entered, through the pores.
The phenomena of medical cupping-glasses, of swallowing, and of
the hurling of bodies, are to be explained on a similar
principle; as also sounds, which are sometimes discordant on
account of the inequality of them, and again harmonious by reason
of equality. The slower sounds reaching the swifter, when they
begin to pause, by degrees assimilate with them: whence arises a
pleasure which even the unwise feel, and which to the wise
becomes a higher sense of delight, being an imitation of divine
harmony in mortal motions.
Streams flow, lightnings play, amber
and the magnet attract, not by reason of attraction, but because
‘nature abhors a vacuum,’ and because things, when compounded or
dissolved, move different ways, each to its own place.
I will now return to the phenomena of respiration. The fire,
entering the belly, minces the food, and as it escapes, fills the
veins by drawing after it the divided portions, and thus the
streams of nutriment are diffused through the body. The fruits or
herbs which are our daily sustenance take all sorts of colours
when intermixed, but the colour of red or fire predominates, and
hence the liquid which we call blood is red, being the nurturing
principle of the body, whence all parts are watered and empty
places filled.
The process of repletion and depletion is produced by the
attraction of like to like, after the manner of the universal
motion. The external elements by their attraction are always
diminishing the substance of the body: the particles of blood,
too, formed out of the newly digested food, are attracted towards
kindred elements within the body and so fill up the void. When
more is taken away than flows in, then we decay; and when less,
we grow and increase.
The young of every animal has the triangles new and closely
locked together, and yet the entire frame is soft and delicate,
being newly made of marrow and nurtured on milk. These triangles
are sharper than those which enter the body from without in the
shape of food, and therefore they cut them up. But as life
advances, the triangles wear out and are no longer able to
assimilate food; and at length, when the bonds which unite the
triangles of the marrow become undone, they in turn unloose the
bonds of the soul; and if the release be according to nature, she
then flies away with joy.
For the death which is natural is
pleasant, but that which is caused by violence is painful.
Every one may understand the origin of diseases. They may be
occasioned by the disarrangement or disproportion of the elements
out of which the body is framed. This is the origin of many of
them, but the worst of all owe their severity to the following
causes: There is a natural order in the human frame according to
which the flesh and sinews are made of blood, the sinews out of
the fibres, and the flesh out of the congealed substance which is
formed by separation from the fibres.
The glutinous matter which
comes away from the sinews and the flesh, not only binds the
flesh to the bones, but nourishes the bones and waters the
marrow. When these processes take place in regular order the body
is in health.
But when the flesh wastes and returns into the veins there is
discoloured blood as well as air in the veins, having acid and
salt qualities, from which is generated every sort of phlegm and
bile. All things go the wrong way and cease to give nourishment
to the body, no longer preserving their natural courses, but at
war with themselves and destructive to the constitution of the
body. The oldest part of the flesh which is hard to decompose
blackens from long burning, and from being corroded grows bitter,
and as the bitter element refines away, becomes acid.
When tinged
with blood the bitter substance has a red colour, and this when
mixed with black takes the hue of grass; or again, the bitter
substance has an auburn colour, when new flesh is decomposed by
the internal flame. To all which phenomena some physician or
philosopher who was able to see the one in many has given the
name of bile. The various kinds of bile have names answering to
their colours.
Lymph or serum is of two kinds: first, the whey of
blood, which is gentle; secondly, the secretion of dark and
bitter bile, which, when mingled under the influence of heat with
salt, is malignant and is called acid phlegm. There is also white
phlegm, formed by the decomposition of young and tender flesh,
and covered with little bubbles, separately invisible, but
becoming visible when collected. The water of tears and
perspiration and similar substances is also the watery part of
fresh phlegm.
All these humours become sources of disease when
the blood is replenished in irregular ways and not by food or
drink. The danger, however, is not so great when the foundation
remains, for then there is a possibility of recovery.
But when
the substance which unites the flesh and bones is diseased, and
is no longer renewed from the muscles and sinews, and instead of
being oily and smooth and glutinous becomes rough and salt and
dry, then the fleshy parts fall away and leave the sinews bare
and full of brine, and the flesh gets back again into the
circulation of the blood, and makes the previously mentioned
disorders still greater.
There are other and worse diseases which
are prior to these; as when the bone through the density of the
flesh does not receive sufficient air, and becomes stagnant and
gangrened, and crumbling away passes into the food, and the food
into the flesh, and the flesh returns again into the blood. Worst
of all and most fatal is the disease of the marrow, by which the
whole course of the body is reversed. There is a third class of
diseases which are produced, some by wind and some by phlegm and
some by bile.
When the lung, which is the steward of the air, is
obstructed, by rheums, and in one part no air, and in another too
much, enters in, then the parts which are unrefreshed by air
corrode, and other parts are distorted by the excess of air; and
in this manner painful diseases are produced. The most painful
are caused by wind generated within the body, which gets about
the great sinews of the shoulders—these are termed tetanus. The
cure of them is difficult, and in most cases they are relieved
only by fever.
White phlegm, which is dangerous if kept in, by
reason of the air bubbles, is not equally dangerous if able to
escape through the pores, although it variegates the body,
generating diverse kinds of leprosies. If, when mingled with
black bile, it disturbs the courses of the head in sleep, there
is not so much danger; but if it assails those who are awake,
then the attack is far more dangerous, and is called epilepsy or
the sacred disease. Acid and salt phlegm is the source of
catarrh.
Inflammations originate in bile, which is sometimes relieved by
boils and swellings, but when detained, and above all when
mingled with pure blood, generates many inflammatory disorders,
disturbing the position of the fibres which are scattered about
in the blood in order to maintain the balance of rare and dense
which is necessary to its regular circulation. If the bile, which
is only stale blood, or liquefied flesh, comes in little by
little, it is congealed by the fibres and produces internal cold
and shuddering.
But when it enters with more of a flood it
overcomes the fibres by its heat and reaches the spinal marrow,
and burning up the cables of the soul sets her free from the
body. When on the other hand the body, though wasted, still holds
out, then the bile is expelled, like an exile from a factious
state, causing associating diarrhoeas and dysenteries and similar
disorders.
The body which is diseased from the effects of fire is
in a continual fever; when air is the agent, the fever is
quotidian; when water, the fever intermits a day; when earth,
which is the most sluggish element, the fever intermits three
days and is with difficulty shaken off.
Of mental disorders there are two sorts, one madness, the other
ignorance, and they may be justly attributed to disease.
Excessive pleasures or pains are among the greatest diseases, and
deprive men of their senses. When the seed about the spinal
marrow is too abundant, the body has too great pleasures and
pains; and during a great part of his life he who is the subject
of them is more or less mad. He is often thought bad, but this is
a mistake; for the truth is that the intemperance of lust is due
to the fluidity of the marrow produced by the loose consistency
of the bones.
And this is true of vice in general, which is
commonly regarded as disgraceful, whereas it is really
involuntary and arises from a bad habit of the body and evil
education. In like manner the soul is often made vicious by the
influence of bodily pain; the briny phlegm and other bitter and
bilious humours wander over the body and find no exit, but are
compressed within, and mingle their own vapours with the motions
of the soul, and are carried to the three places of the soul,
creating infinite varieties of trouble and melancholy, of
rashness and cowardice, of forgetfulness and stupidity.
When men
are in this evil plight of body, and evil forms of government and
evil discourses are superadded, and there is no education to save
them, they are corrupted through two causes; but of neither of
them are they really the authors. For the planters are to blame
rather than the plants, the educators and not the educated.
Still, we should endeavour to attain virtue and avoid vice; but
this is part of another subject.
Enough of disease—I have now to speak of the means by which the
mind and body are to be preserved, a higher theme than the other.
The good is the beautiful, and the beautiful is the symmetrical,
and there is no greater or fairer symmetry than that of body and
soul, as the contrary is the greatest of deformities. A leg or an
arm too long or too short is at once ugly and unserviceable, and
the same is true if body and soul are disproportionate. For a
strong and impassioned soul may ‘fret the pigmy body to decay,’
and so produce convulsions and other evils.
The violence of
controversy, or the earnestness of enquiry, will often generate
inflammations and rheums which are not understood, or assigned to
their true cause by the professors of medicine. And in like
manner the body may be too much for the soul, darkening the
reason, and quickening the animal desires. The only security is
to preserve the balance of the two, and to this end the
mathematician or philosopher must practise gymnastics, and the
gymnast must cultivate music. The parts of the body too must be
treated in the same way—they should receive their appropriate
exercise.
For the body is set in motion when it is heated and
cooled by the elements which enter in, or is dried up and
moistened by external things; and, if given up to these processes
when at rest, it is liable to destruction. But the natural
motion, as in the world, so also in the human frame, produces
harmony and divides hostile powers.
The best exercise is the
spontaneous motion of the body, as in gymnastics, because most
akin to the motion of mind; not so good is the motion of which
the source is in another, as in sailing or riding; least good
when the body is at rest and the motion is in parts only, which
is a species of motion imparted by physic. This should only be
resorted to by men of sense in extreme cases; lesser diseases are
not to be irritated by medicine.
For every disease is akin to the
living being and has an appointed term, just as life has, which
depends on the form of the triangles, and cannot be protracted
when they are worn out. And he who, instead of accepting his
destiny, endeavours to prolong his life by medicine, is likely to
multiply and magnify his diseases. Regimen and not medicine is
the true cure, when a man has time at his disposal.
Enough of the nature of man and of the body, and of training and
education. The subject is a great one and cannot be adequately
treated as an appendage to another. To sum up all in a word:
there are three kinds of soul located within us, and any one of
them, if remaining inactive, becomes very weak; if exercised,
very strong. Wherefore we should duly train and exercise all
three kinds.
The divine soul God lodged in the head, to raise us, like plants
which are not of earthly origin, to our kindred; for the head is
nearest to heaven. He who is intent upon the gratification of his
desires and cherishes the mortal soul, has all his ideas mortal,
and is himself mortal in the truest sense.
But he who seeks after
knowledge and exercises the divine part of himself in godly and
immortal thoughts, attains to truth and immortality, as far as is
possible to man, and also to happiness, while he is training up
within him the divine principle and indwelling power of order.
There is only one way in which one person can benefit another;
and that is by assigning to him his proper nurture and motion. To
the motions of the soul answer the motions of the universe, and
by the study of these the individual is restored to his original
nature.
Thus we have finished the discussion of the universe, which,
according to our original intention, has now been brought down to
the creation of man. Completeness seems to require that something
should be briefly said about other animals: first of women, who
are probably degenerate and cowardly men.
And when they
degenerated, the gods implanted in men the desire of union with
them, creating in man one animate substance and in woman another
in the following manner:—The outlet for liquids they connected
with the living principle of the spinal marrow, which the man has
the desire to emit into the fruitful womb of the woman; this is
like a fertile field in which the seed is quickened and matured,
and at last brought to light.
When this desire is unsatisfied the
man is over-mastered by the power of the generative organs, and
the woman is subjected to disorders from the obstruction of the
passages of the breath, until the two meet and pluck the fruit of
the tree.
The race of birds was created out of innocent, light-minded men,
who thought to pursue the study of the heavens by sight; these
were transformed into birds, and grew feathers instead of hair.
The race of wild animals were men who had no philosophy, and
never looked up to heaven or used the courses of the head, but
followed only the influences of passion. Naturally they turned to
their kindred earth, and put their forelegs to the ground, and
their heads were crushed into strange oblong forms.
Some of them
have four feet, and some of them more than four,—the latter, who
are the more senseless, drawing closer to their native element;
the most senseless of all have no limbs and trail their whole
body on the ground. The fourth kind are the inhabitants of the
waters; these are made out of the most senseless and ignorant and
impure of men, whom God placed in the uttermost parts of the
world in return for their utter ignorance, and caused them to
respire water instead of the pure element of air. Such are the
laws by which animals pass into one another.
And so the world received animals, mortal and immortal, and was
fulfilled with them, and became a visible God, comprehending the
visible, made in the image of the Intellectual, being the one
perfect only-begotten heaven.
Section 2.
Nature in the aspect which she presented to a Greek philosopher
of the fourth century before Christ is not easily reproduced to
modern eyes. The associations of mythology and poetry have to be
added, and the unconscious influence of science has to be
subtracted, before we can behold the heavens or the earth as they
appeared to the Greek. The philosopher himself was a child and
also a man—a child in the range of his attainments, but also a
great intelligence having an insight into nature, and often
anticipations of the truth.
He was full of original thoughts, and
yet liable to be imposed upon by the most obvious fallacies. He
occasionally confused numbers with ideas, and atoms with numbers;
his a priori notions were out of all proportion to his
experience. He was ready to explain the phenomena of the heavens
by the most trivial analogies of earth. The experiments which
nature worked for him he sometimes accepted, but he never tried
experiments for himself which would either prove or disprove his
theories.
His knowledge was unequal; while in some branches, such
as medicine and astronomy, he had made considerable proficiency,
there were others, such as chemistry, electricity, mechanics, of
which the very names were unknown to him. He was the natural
enemy of mythology, and yet mythological ideas still retained
their hold over him.
He was endeavouring to form a conception of
principles, but these principles or ideas were regarded by him as
real powers or entities, to which the world had been subjected.
He was always tending to argue from what was near to what was
remote, from what was known to what was unknown, from man to the
universe, and back again from the universe to man. While he was
arranging the world, he was arranging the forms of thought in his
own mind; and the light from within and the light from without
often crossed and helped to confuse one another.
He might be
compared to a builder engaged in some great design, who could
only dig with his hands because he was unprovided with common
tools; or to some poet or musician, like Tynnichus (Ion), obliged
to accommodate his lyric raptures to the limits of the tetrachord
or of the flute.
The Hesiodic and Orphic cosmogonies were a phase of thought
intermediate between mythology and philosophy and had a great
influence on the beginnings of knowledge. There was nothing
behind them; they were to physical science what the poems of
Homer were to early Greek history. They made men think of the
world as a whole; they carried the mind back into the infinity of
past time; they suggested the first observation of the effects of
fire and water on the earth’s surface. To the ancient physics
they stood much in the same relation which geology does to modern
science.
But the Greek was not, like the enquirer of the last
generation, confined to a period of six thousand years; he was
able to speculate freely on the effects of infinite ages in the
production of physical phenomena. He could imagine cities which
had existed time out of mind (States.; Laws), laws or forms of
art and music which had lasted, ‘not in word only, but in very
truth, for ten thousand years’ (Laws); he was aware that natural
phenomena like the Delta of the Nile might have slowly
accumulated in long periods of time (Hdt.).
But he seems to have
supposed that the course of events was recurring rather than
progressive. To this he was probably led by the fixedness of
Egyptian customs and the general observation that there were
other civilisations in the world more ancient than that of
Hellas.
The ancient philosophers found in mythology many ideas which, if
not originally derived from nature, were easily transferred to
her—such, for example, as love or hate, corresponding to
attraction or repulsion; or the conception of necessity allied
both to the regularity and irregularity of nature; or of chance,
the nameless or unknown cause; or of justice, symbolizing the law
of compensation; are of the Fates and Furies, typifying the fixed
order or the extraordinary convulsions of nature. Their own
interpretations of Homer and the poets were supposed by them to
be the original meaning.
Musing in themselves on the phenomena of
nature, they were relieved at being able to utter the thoughts of
their hearts in figures of speech which to them were not figures,
and were already consecrated by tradition. Hesiod and the Orphic
poets moved in a region of half-personification in which the
meaning or principle appeared through the person. In their vaster
conceptions of Chaos, Erebus, Aether, Night, and the like, the
first rude attempts at generalization are dimly seen. The Gods
themselves, especially the greater Gods, such as Zeus, Poseidon,
Apollo, Athene, are universals as well as individuals.
They were
gradually becoming lost in a common conception of mind or God.
They continued to exist for the purposes of ritual or of art; but
from the sixth century onwards or even earlier there arose and
gained strength in the minds of men the notion of ‘one God,
greatest among Gods and men, who was all sight, all hearing, all
knowing’ (Xenophanes).
Under the influence of such ideas, perhaps also deriving from the
traditions of their own or of other nations scraps of medicine
and astronomy, men came to the observation of nature. The Greek
philosopher looked at the blue circle of the heavens and it
flashed upon him that all things were one; the tumult of sense
abated, and the mind found repose in the thought which former
generations had been striving to realize. The first expression of
this was some element, rarefied by degrees into a pure
abstraction, and purged from any tincture of sense.
Soon an inner
world of ideas began to be unfolded, more absorbing, more
overpowering, more abiding than the brightest of visible objects,
which to the eye of the philosopher looking inward, seemed to
pale before them, retaining only a faint and precarious
existence. At the same time, the minds of men parted into the two
great divisions of those who saw only a principle of motion, and
of those who saw only a principle of rest, in nature and in
themselves; there were born Heracliteans or Eleatics, as there
have been in later ages born Aristotelians or Platonists.
Like
some philosophers in modern times, who are accused of making a
theory first and finding their facts afterwards, the advocates of
either opinion never thought of applying either to themselves or
to their adversaries the criterion of fact. They were mastered by
their ideas and not masters of them. Like the Heraclitean
fanatics whom Plato has ridiculed in the Theaetetus, they were
incapable of giving a reason of the faith that was in them, and
had all the animosities of a religious sect.
Yet, doubtless,
there was some first impression derived from external nature,
which, as in mythology, so also in philosophy, worked upon the
minds of the first thinkers. Though incapable of induction or
generalization in the modern sense, they caught an inspiration
from the external world.
The most general facts or appearances of
nature, the circle of the universe, the nutritive power of water,
the air which is the breath of life, the destructive force of
fire, the seeming regularity of the greater part of nature and
the irregularity of a remnant, the recurrence of day and night
and of the seasons, the solid earth and the impalpable aether,
were always present to them.
The great source of error and also the beginning of truth to them
was reasoning from analogy; they could see resemblances, but not
differences; and they were incapable of distinguishing
illustration from argument. Analogy in modern times only points
the way, and is immediately verified by experiment. The dreams
and visions, which pass through the philosopher’s mind, of
resemblances between different classes of substances, or between
the animal and vegetable world, are put into the refiner’s fire,
and the dross and other elements which adhere to them are purged
away.
But the contemporary of Plato and Socrates was incapable of
resisting the power of any analogy which occurred to him, and was
drawn into any consequences which seemed to follow. He had no
methods of difference or of concomitant variations, by the use of
which he could distinguish the accidental from the essential. He
could not isolate phenomena, and he was helpless against the
influence of any word which had an equivocal or double sense.
Yet without this crude use of analogy the ancient physical
philosopher would have stood still; he could not have made even
‘one guess among many’ without comparison. The course of natural
phenomena would have passed unheeded before his eyes, like fair
sights or musical sounds before the eyes and ears of an animal.
Even the fetichism of the savage is the beginning of reasoning;
the assumption of the most fanciful of causes indicates a higher
mental state than the absence of all enquiry about them.
The
tendency to argue from the higher to the lower, from man to the
world, has led to many errors, but has also had an elevating
influence on philosophy. The conception of the world as a whole,
a person, an animal, has been the source of hasty
generalizations; yet this general grasp of nature led also to a
spirit of comprehensiveness in early philosophy, which has not
increased, but rather diminished, as the fields of knowledge have
become more divided. The modern physicist confines himself to one
or perhaps two branches of science.
But he comparatively seldom
rises above his own department, and often falls under the
narrowing influence which any single branch, when pursued to the
exclusion of every other, has over the mind.
Language, two,
exercised a spell over the beginnings of physical philosophy,
leading to error and sometimes to truth; for many thoughts were
suggested by the double meanings of words (Greek), and the
accidental distinctions of words sometimes led the ancient
philosopher to make corresponding differences in things (Greek).
‘If they are the same, why have they different names; or if they
are different, why have they the same name?’—is an argument not
easily answered in the infancy of knowledge.
The modern
philosopher has always been taught the lesson which he still
imperfectly learns, that he must disengage himself from the
influence of words. Nor are there wanting in Plato, who was
himself too often the victim of them, impressive admonitions that
we should regard not words but things (States.). But upon the
whole, the ancients, though not entirely dominated by them, were
much more subject to the influence of words than the moderns.
They had no clear divisions of colours or substances; even the
four elements were undefined; the fields of knowledge were not
parted off.
They were bringing order out of disorder, having a
small grain of experience mingled in a confused heap of a priori
notions. And yet, probably, their first impressions, the
illusions and mirages of their fancy, created a greater
intellectual activity and made a nearer approach to the truth
than any patient investigation of isolated facts, for which the
time had not yet come, could have accomplished.
There was one more illusion to which the ancient philosophers
were subject, and against which Plato in his later dialogues
seems to be struggling—the tendency to mere abstractions; not
perceiving that pure abstraction is only negation, they thought
that the greater the abstraction the greater the truth. Behind
any pair of ideas a new idea which comprehended them—the (Greek),
as it was technically termed—began at once to appear. Two are
truer than three, one than two. The words ‘being,’ or ‘unity,’ or
essence,’ or ‘good,’ became sacred to them.
They did not see that
they had a word only, and in one sense the most unmeaning of
words. They did not understand that the content of notions is in
inverse proportion to their universality—the element which is the
most widely diffused is also the thinnest; or, in the language of
the common logic, the greater the extension the less the
comprehension. But this vacant idea of a whole without parts, of
a subject without predicates, a rest without motion, has been
also the most fruitful of all ideas. It is the beginning of a
priori thought, and indeed of thinking at all.
Men were led to
conceive it, not by a love of hasty generalization, but by a
divine instinct, a dialectical enthusiasm, in which the human
faculties seemed to yearn for enlargement. We know that ‘being’
is only the verb of existence, the copula, the most general
symbol of relation, the first and most meagre of abstractions;
but to some of the ancient philosophers this little word appeared
to attain divine proportions, and to comprehend all truth.
Being
or essence, and similar words, represented to them a supreme or
divine being, in which they thought that they found the
containing and continuing principle of the universe. In a few
years the human mind was peopled with abstractions; a new world
was called into existence to give law and order to the old. But
between them there was still a gulf, and no one could pass from
the one to the other.
Number and figure were the greatest instruments of thought which
were possessed by the Greek philosopher; having the same power
over the mind which was exerted by abstract ideas, they were also
capable of practical application. Many curious and, to the early
thinker, mysterious properties of them came to light when they
were compared with one another. They admitted of infinite
multiplication and construction; in Pythagorean triangles or in
proportions of 1:2:4:8 and 1:3:9:27, or compounds of them, the
laws of the world seemed to be more than half revealed.
They were
also capable of infinite subdivision—a wonder and also a puzzle
to the ancient thinker (Rep.). They were not, like being or
essence, mere vacant abstractions, but admitted of progress and
growth, while at the same time they confirmed a higher sentiment
of the mind, that there was order in the universe. And so there
began to be a real sympathy between the world within and the
world without.
The numbers and figures which were present to the
mind’s eye became visible to the eye of sense; the truth of
nature was mathematics; the other properties of objects seemed to
reappear only in the light of number. Law and morality also found
a natural expression in number and figure. Instruments of such
power and elasticity could not fail to be ‘a most gracious
assistance’ to the first efforts of human intelligence.
There was another reason why numbers had so great an influence
over the minds of early thinkers—they were verified by
experience. Every use of them, even the most trivial, assured men
of their truth; they were everywhere to be found, in the least
things and the greatest alike. One, two, three, counted on the
fingers was a ‘trivial matter (Rep.), a little instrument out of
which to create a world; but from these and by the help of these
all our knowledge of nature has been developed.
They were the
measure of all things, and seemed to give law to all things;
nature was rescued from chaos and confusion by their power; the
notes of music, the motions of the stars, the forms of atoms, the
evolution and recurrence of days, months, years, the military
divisions of an army, the civil divisions of a state, seemed to
afford a ‘present witness’ of them—what would have become of man
or of the world if deprived of number (Rep.)? The mystery of
number and the mystery of music were akin.
There was a music of
rhythm and of harmonious motion everywhere; and to the real
connexion which existed between music and number, a fanciful or
imaginary relation was superadded. There was a music of the
spheres as well as of the notes of the lyre. If in all things
seen there was number and figure, why should they not also
pervade the unseen world, with which by their wonderful and
unchangeable nature they seemed to hold communion?
Two other points strike us in the use which the ancient
philosophers made of numbers. First, they applied to external
nature the relations of them which they found in their own minds;
and where nature seemed to be at variance with number, as for
example in the case of fractions, they protested against her
(Rep.; Arist. Metaph.). Having long meditated on the properties
of 1:2:4:8, or 1:3:9:27, or of 3, 4, 5, they discovered in them
many curious correspondences and were disposed to find in them
the secret of the universe.
Secondly, they applied number and
figure equally to those parts of physics, such as astronomy or
mechanics, in which the modern philosopher expects to find them,
and to those in which he would never think of looking for them,
such as physiology and psychology. For the sciences were not yet
divided, and there was nothing really irrational in arguing that
the same laws which regulated the heavenly bodies were partially
applied to the erring limbs or brain of man. Astrology was the
form which the lively fancy of ancient thinkers almost
necessarily gave to astronomy.
The observation that the lower
principle, e.g. mechanics, is always seen in the higher, e.g. in
the phenomena of life, further tended to perplex them. Plato’s
doctrine of the same and the other ruling the courses of the
heavens and of the human body is not a mere vagary, but is a
natural result of the state of knowledge and thought at which he
had arrived.
When in modern times we contemplate the heavens, a certain amount
of scientific truth imperceptibly blends, even with the cursory
glance of an unscientific person. He knows that the earth is
revolving round the sun, and not the sun around the earth. He
does not imagine the earth to be the centre of the universe, and
he has some conception of chemistry and the cognate sciences. A
very different aspect of nature would have been present to the
mind of the early Greek philosopher.
He would have beheld the
earth a surface only, not mirrored, however faintly, in the glass
of science, but indissolubly connected with some theory of one,
two, or more elements. He would have seen the world pervaded by
number and figure, animated by a principle of motion, immanent in
a principle of rest. He would have tried to construct the
universe on a quantitative principle, seeming to find in endless
combinations of geometrical figures or in the infinite variety of
their sizes a sufficient account of the multiplicity of
phenomena.
To these a priori speculations he would add a rude
conception of matter and his own immediate experience of health
and disease. His cosmos would necessarily be imperfect and
unequal, being the first attempt to impress form and order on the
primaeval chaos of human knowledge. He would see all things as in
a dream.
The ancient physical philosophers have been charged by Dr.
Whewell and others with wasting their fine intelligences in wrong
methods of enquiry; and their progress in moral and political
philosophy has been sometimes contrasted with their supposed
failure in physical investigations. ‘They had plenty of ideas,’
says Dr. Whewell, ‘and plenty of facts; but their ideas did not
accurately represent the facts with which they were acquainted.’
This is a very crude and misleading way of describing ancient
science.
It is the mistake of an uneducated person—uneducated,
that is, in the higher sense of the word—who imagines every one
else to be like himself and explains every other age by his own.
No doubt the ancients often fell into strange and fanciful
errors: the time had not yet arrived for the slower and surer
path of the modern inductive philosophy. But it remains to be
shown that they could have done more in their age and country; or
that the contributions which they made to the sciences with which
they were acquainted are not as great upon the whole as those
made by their successors.
There is no single step in astronomy as
great as that of the nameless Pythagorean who first conceived the
world to be a body moving round the sun in space: there is no
truer or more comprehensive principle than the application of
mathematics alike to the heavenly bodies, and to the particles of
matter. The ancients had not the instruments which would have
enabled them to correct or verify their anticipations, and their
opportunities of observation were limited.
Plato probably did
more for physical science by asserting the supremacy of
mathematics than Aristotle or his disciples by their collections
of facts. When the thinkers of modern times, following Bacon,
undervalue or disparage the speculations of ancient philosophers,
they seem wholly to forget the conditions of the world and of the
human mind, under which they carried on their investigations.
When we accuse them of being under the influence of words, do we
suppose that we are altogether free from this illusion?
When we
remark that Greek physics soon became stationary or extinct, may
we not observe also that there have been and may be again periods
in the history of modern philosophy which have been barren and
unproductive? We might as well maintain that Greek art was not
real or great, because it had nihil simile aut secundum, as say
that Greek physics were a failure because they admire no
subsequent progress.
The charge of premature generalization which is often urged
against ancient philosophers is really an anachronism. For they
can hardly be said to have generalized at all. They may be said
more truly to have cleared up and defined by the help of
experience ideas which they already possessed. The beginnings of
thought about nature must always have this character. A true
method is the result of many ages of experiment and observation,
and is ever going on and enlarging with the progress of science
and knowledge.
At first men personify nature, then they form
impressions of nature, at last they conceive ‘measure’ or laws of
nature. They pass out of mythology into philosophy. Early science
is not a process of discovery in the modern sense; but rather a
process of correcting by observation, and to a certain extent
only, the first impressions of nature, which mankind, when they
began to think, had received from poetry or language or
unintelligent sense.
Of all scientific truths the greatest and
simplest is the uniformity of nature; this was expressed by the
ancients in many ways, as fate, or necessity, or measure, or
limit. Unexpected events, of which the cause was unknown to them,
they attributed to chance (Thucyd.). But their conception of
nature was never that of law interrupted by exceptions,—a
somewhat unfortunate metaphysical invention of modern times,
which is at variance with facts and has failed to satisfy the
requirements of thought.
Section 3.
Plato’s account of the soul is partly mythical or figurative, and
partly literal. Not that either he or we can draw a line between
them, or say, ‘This is poetry, this is philosophy’; for the
transition from the one to the other is imperceptible. Neither
must we expect to find in him absolute consistency. He is apt to
pass from one level or stage of thought to another without always
making it apparent that he is changing his ground. In such
passages we have to interpret his meaning by the general spirit
of his writings.
To reconcile his inconsistencies would be
contrary to the first principles of criticism and fatal to any
true understanding of him.
There is a further difficulty in explaining this part of the
Timaeus—the natural order of thought is inverted. We begin with
the most abstract, and proceed from the abstract to the concrete.
We are searching into things which are upon the utmost limit of
human intelligence, and then of a sudden we fall rather heavily
to the earth. There are no intermediate steps which lead from one
to the other. But the abstract is a vacant form to us until
brought into relation with man and nature. God and the world are
mere names, like the Being of the Eleatics, unless some human
qualities are added on to them.
Yet the negation has a kind of
unknown meaning to us. The priority of God and of the world,
which he is imagined to have created, to all other existences,
gives a solemn awe to them. And as in other systems of theology
and philosophy, that of which we know least has the greatest
interest to us.
There is no use in attempting to define or explain the first God
in the Platonic system, who has sometimes been thought to answer
to God the Father; or the world, in whom the Fathers of the
Church seemed to recognize ‘the firstborn of every creature.’ Nor
need we discuss at length how far Plato agrees in the later
Jewish idea of creation, according to which God made the world
out of nothing. For his original conception of matter as
something which has no qualities is really a negation.
Moreover
in the Hebrew Scriptures the creation of the world is described,
even more explicitly than in the Timaeus, not as a single act,
but as a work or process which occupied six days. There is a
chaos in both, and it would be untrue to say that the Greek, any
more than the Hebrew, had any definite belief in the eternal
existence of matter. The beginning of things vanished into the
distance. The real creation began, not with matter, but with
ideas.
According to Plato in the Timaeus, God took of the same
and the other, of the divided and undivided, of the finite and
infinite, and made essence, and out of the three combined created
the soul of the world. To the soul he added a body formed out of
the four elements. The general meaning of these words is that God
imparted determinations of thought, or, as we might say, gave law
and variety to the material universe.
The elements are moving in
a disorderly manner before the work of creation begins; and there
is an eternal pattern of the world, which, like the ‘idea of
good,’ is not the Creator himself, but not separable from him.
The pattern too, though eternal, is a creation, a world of
thought prior to the world of sense, which may be compared to the
wisdom of God in the book of Ecclesiasticus, or to the ‘God in
the form of a globe’ of the old Eleatic philosophers. The
visible, which already exists, is fashioned in the likeness of
this eternal pattern.
On the other hand, there is no truth of
which Plato is more firmly convinced than of the priority of the
soul to the body, both in the universe and in man. So
inconsistent are the forms in which he describes the works which
no tongue can utter—his language, as he himself says, partaking
of his own uncertainty about the things of which he is speaking.
We may remark in passing, that the Platonic compared with the
Jewish description of the process of creation has less of freedom
or spontaneity. The Creator in Plato is still subject to a
remnant of necessity which he cannot wholly overcome. When his
work is accomplished he remains in his own nature. Plato is more
sensible than the Hebrew prophet of the existence of evil, which
he seeks to put as far as possible out of the way of God.
And he
can only suppose this to be accomplished by God retiring into
himself and committing the lesser works of creation to inferior
powers. (Compare, however, Laws for another solution of the
difficulty.)
Nor can we attach any intelligible meaning to his words when he
speaks of the visible being in the image of the invisible. For
how can that which is divided be like that which is undivided? Or
that which is changing be the copy of that which is unchanging?
All the old difficulties about the ideas come back upon us in an
altered form.
We can imagine two worlds, one of which is the mere
double of the other, or one of which is an imperfect copy of the
other, or one of which is the vanishing ideal of the other; but
we cannot imagine an intellectual world which has no qualities—‘a
thing in itself’—a point which has no parts or magnitude, which
is nowhere, and nothing. This cannot be the archetype according
to which God made the world, and is in reality, whether in Plato
or in Kant, a mere negative residuum of human thought.
There is another aspect of the same difficulty which appears to
have no satisfactory solution. In what relation does the
archetype stand to the Creator himself? For the idea or pattern
of the world is not the thought of God, but a separate,
self-existent nature, of which creation is the copy. We can only
reply, (1) that to the mind of Plato subject and object were not
yet distinguished; (2) that he supposes the process of creation
to take place in accordance with his own theory of ideas; and as
we cannot give a consistent account of the one, neither can we of
the other.
He means (3) to say that the creation of the world is
not a material process of working with legs and arms, but ideal
and intellectual; according to his own fine expression, ‘the
thought of God made the God that was to be.’ He means (4) to draw
an absolute distinction between the invisible or unchangeable
which is or is the place of mind or being, and the world of sense
or becoming which is visible and changing.
He means (5) that the
idea of the world is prior to the world, just as the other ideas
are prior to sensible objects; and like them may be regarded as
eternal and self-existent, and also, like the IDEA of good, may
be viewed apart from the divine mind.
There are several other questions which we might ask and which
can receive no answer, or at least only an answer of the same
kind as the preceding. How can matter be conceived to exist
without form? Or, how can the essences or forms of things be
distinguished from the eternal ideas, or essence itself from the
soul? Or, how could there have been motion in the chaos when as
yet time was not? Or, how did chaos come into existence, if not
by the will of the Creator? Or, how could there have been a time
when the world was not, if time was not? Or, how could the
Creator have taken portions of an indivisible same?
Or, how could
space or anything else have been eternal when time is only
created? Or, how could the surfaces of geometrical figures have
formed solids? We must reply again that we cannot follow Plato in
all his inconsistencies, but that the gaps of thought are
probably more apparent to us than to him. He would, perhaps, have
said that ‘the first things are known only to God and to him of
men whom God loves.’ How often have the gaps in Theology been
concealed from the eye of faith!
And we may say that only by an
effort of metaphysical imagination can we hope to understand
Plato from his own point of view; we must not ask for
consistency. Everywhere we find traces of the Platonic theory of
knowledge expressed in an objective form, which by us has to be
translated into the subjective, before we can attach any meaning
to it. And this theory is exhibited in so many different points
of view, that we cannot with any certainty interpret one dialogue
by another; e.g. the Timaeus by the Parmenides or Phaedrus or
Philebus.
The soul of the world may also be conceived as the
personification of the numbers and figures in which the heavenly
bodies move. Imagine these as in a Pythagorean dream, stripped of
qualitative difference and reduced to mathematical abstractions.
They too conform to the principle of the same, and may be
compared with the modern conception of laws of nature. They are
in space, but not in time, and they are the makers of time.
They
are represented as constantly thinking of the same; for thought
in the view of Plato is equivalent to truth or law, and need not
imply a human consciousness, a conception which is familiar
enough to us, but has no place, hardly even a name, in ancient
Greek philosophy.
To this principle of the same is opposed the
principle of the other—the principle of irregularity and
disorder, of necessity and chance, which is only partially
impressed by mathematical laws and figures. (We may observe by
the way, that the principle of the other, which is the principle
of plurality and variation in the Timaeus, has nothing in common
with the ‘other’ of the Sophist, which is the principle of
determination.) The element of the same dominates to a certain
extent over the other—the fixed stars keep the ‘wanderers’ of the
inner circle in their courses, and a similar principle of
fixedness or order appears to regulate the bodily constitution of
man.
But there still remains a rebellious seed of evil derived
from the original chaos, which is the source of disorder in the
world, and of vice and disease in man.
But what did Plato mean by essence, (Greek), which is the
intermediate nature compounded of the Same and the Other, and out
of which, together with these two, the soul of the world is
created? It is difficult to explain a process of thought so
strange and unaccustomed to us, in which modern distinctions run
into one another and are lost sight of. First, let us consider
once more the meaning of the Same and the Other.
The Same is the
unchanging and indivisible, the heaven of the fixed stars,
partaking of the divine nature, which, having law in itself,
gives law to all besides and is the element of order and
permanence in man and on the earth. It is the rational principle,
mind regarded as a work, as creation—not as the creator. The old
tradition of Parmenides and of the Eleatic Being, the foundation
of so much in the philosophy of Greece and of the world, was
lingering in Plato’s mind.
The Other is the variable or changing
element, the residuum of disorder or chaos, which cannot be
reduced to order, nor altogether banished, the source of evil,
seen in the errors of man and also in the wanderings of the
planets, a necessity which protrudes through nature. Of this too
there was a shadow in the Eleatic philosophy in the realm of
opinion, which, like a mist, seemed to darken the purity of truth
in itself.—So far the words of Plato may perhaps find an
intelligible meaning.
But when he goes on to speak of the Essence
which is compounded out of both, the track becomes fainter and we
can only follow him with hesitating steps. But still we find a
trace reappearing of the teaching of Anaxagoras: ‘All was
confusion, and then mind came and arranged things.’ We have
already remarked that Plato was not acquainted with the modern
distinction of subject and object, and therefore he sometimes
confuses mind and the things of mind—(Greek) and (Greek). By
(Greek) he clearly means some conception of the intelligible and
the intelligent; it belongs to the class of (Greek).
Matter,
being, the Same, the eternal,—for any of these terms, being
almost vacant of meaning, is equally suitable to express
indefinite existence,—are compared or united with the Other or
Diverse, and out of the union or comparison is elicited the idea
of intelligence, the ‘One in many,’ brighter than any Promethean
fire (Phil.), which co-existing with them and so forming a new
existence, is or becomes the intelligible world...So we may
perhaps venture to paraphrase or interpret or put into other
words the parable in which Plato has wrapped up his conception of
the creation of the world.
The explanation may help to fill up
with figures of speech the void of knowledge.
The entire compound was divided by the Creator in certain
proportions and reunited; it was then cut into two strips, which
were bent into an inner circle and an outer, both moving with an
uniform motion around a centre, the outer circle containing the
fixed, the inner the wandering stars. The soul of the world was
diffused everywhere from the centre to the circumference. To this
God gave a body, consisting at first of fire and earth, and
afterwards receiving an addition of air and water; because solid
bodies, like the world, are always connected by two middle terms
and not by one.
The world was made in the form of a globe, and
all the material elements were exhausted in the work of creation.
The proportions in which the soul of the world as well as the
human soul is divided answer to a series of numbers 1, 2, 3, 4,
9, 8, 27, composed of the two Pythagorean progressions 1, 2, 4, 8
and 1, 3, 9, 27, of which the number 1 represents a point, 2 and
3 lines, 4 and 8, 9 and 27 the squares and cubes respectively of
2 and 3.
This series, of which the intervals are afterwards
filled up, probably represents (1) the diatonic scale according
to the Pythagoreans and Plato; (2) the order and distances of the
heavenly bodies; and (3) may possibly contain an allusion to the
music of the spheres, which is referred to in the myth at the end
of the Republic. The meaning of the words that ‘solid bodies are
always connected by two middle terms’ or mean proportionals has
been much disputed.
The most received explanation is that of
Martin, who supposes that Plato is only speaking of surfaces and
solids compounded of prime numbers (i.e. of numbers not made up
of two factors, or, in other words, only measurable by unity).
The square of any such number represents a surface, the cube a
solid. The squares of any two such numbers (e.g. 2 squared, 3
squared = 4, 9), have always a single mean proportional (e.g. 4
and 9 have the single mean 6), whereas the cubes of primes (e.g.
3 cubed and 5 cubed) have always two mean proportionals (e.g.
27:45:75:125).
But to this explanation of Martin’s it may be
objected, (1) that Plato nowhere says that his proportion is to
be limited to prime numbers; (2) that the limitation of surfaces
to squares is also not to be found in his words; nor (3) is there
any evidence to show that the distinction of prime from other
numbers was known to him. What Plato chiefly intends to express
is that a solid requires a stronger bond than a surface; and that
the double bond which is given by two means is stronger than the
single bond given by one.
Having reflected on the singular
numerical phenomena of the existence of one mean proportional
between two square numbers are rather perhaps only between the
two lowest squares; and of two mean proportionals between two
cubes, perhaps again confining his attention to the two lowest
cubes, he finds in the latter symbol an expression of the
relation of the elements, as in the former an image of the
combination of two surfaces.
Between fire and earth, the two
extremes, he remarks that there are introduced, not one, but two
elements, air and water, which are compared to the two mean
proportionals between two cube numbers. The vagueness of his
language does not allow us to determine whether anything more
than this was intended by him.
Leaving the further explanation of details, which the reader will
find discussed at length in Boeckh and Martin, we may now return
to the main argument: Why did God make the world? Like man, he
must have a purpose; and his purpose is the diffusion of that
goodness or good which he himself is. The term ‘goodness’ is not
to be understood in this passage as meaning benevolence or love,
in the Christian sense of the term, but rather law, order,
harmony, like the idea of good in the Republic.
The ancient
mythologers, and even the Hebrew prophets, had spoken of the
jealousy of God; and the Greek had imagined that there was a
Nemesis always attending the prosperity of mortals. But Plato
delights to think of God as the author of order in his works,
who, like a father, lives over again in his children, and can
never have too much of good or friendship among his creatures.
Only, as there is a certain remnant of evil inherent in matter
which he cannot get rid of, he detaches himself from them and
leaves them to themselves, that he may be guiltless of their
faults and sufferings.
Between the ideal and the sensible Plato interposes the two
natures of time and space.
Time is conceived by him to be only
the shadow or image of eternity which ever is and never has been
or will be, but is described in a figure only as past or future.
This is one of the great thoughts of early philosophy, which are
still as difficult to our minds as they were to the early
thinkers; or perhaps more difficult, because we more distinctly
see the consequences which are involved in such an hypothesis.
All the objections which may be urged against Kant’s doctrine of
the ideality of space and time at once press upon us.
If time is
unreal, then all which is contained in time is unreal—the
succession of human thoughts as well as the flux of sensations;
there is no connecting link between (Greek) and (Greek). Yet, on
the other hand, we are conscious that knowledge is independent of
time, that truth is not a thing of yesterday or tomorrow, but an
‘eternal now.’ To the ‘spectator of all time and all existence’
the universe remains at rest. The truths of geometry and
arithmetic in all their combinations are always the same.
The
generations of men, like the leaves of the forest, come and go,
but the mathematical laws by which the world is governed remain,
and seem as if they could never change. The ever-present image of
space is transferred to time—succession is conceived as
extension. (We remark that Plato does away with the above and
below in space, as he has done away with the absolute existence
of past and future.) The course of time, unless regularly marked
by divisions of number, partakes of the indefiniteness of the
Heraclitean flux.
By such reflections we may conceive the Greek
to have attained the metaphysical conception of eternity, which
to the Hebrew was gained by meditation on the Divine Being. No
one saw that this objective was really a subjective, and involved
the subjectivity of all knowledge. ‘Non in tempore sed cum
tempore finxit Deus mundum,’ says St. Augustine, repeating a
thought derived from the Timaeus, but apparently unconscious of
the results to which his doctrine would have led.
The contradictions involved in the conception of time or motion,
like the infinitesimal in space, were a source of perplexity to
the mind of the Greek, who was driven to find a point of view
above or beyond them. They had sprung up in the decline of the
Eleatic philosophy and were very familiar to Plato, as we gather
from the Parmenides. The consciousness of them had led the great
Eleatic philosopher to describe the nature of God or Being under
negatives.
He sings of ‘Being unbegotten and imperishable,
unmoved and never-ending, which never was nor will be, but always
is, one and continuous, which cannot spring from any other; for
it cannot be said or imagined not to be.’ The idea of eternity
was for a great part a negation. There are regions of speculation
in which the negative is hardly separable from the positive, and
even seems to pass into it. Not only Buddhism, but Greek as well
as Christian philosophy, show that it is quite possible that the
human mind should retain an enthusiasm for mere negations.
In
different ages and countries there have been forms of light in
which nothing could be discerned and which have nevertheless
exercised a life-giving and illumining power.
For the higher
intelligence of man seems to require, not only something above
sense, but above knowledge, which can only be described as Mind
or Being or Truth or God or the unchangeable and eternal element,
in the expression of which all predicates fail and fall short.
Eternity or the eternal is not merely the unlimited in time but
the truest of all Being, the most real of all realities, the most
certain of all knowledge, which we nevertheless only see through
a glass darkly. The passionate earnestness of Parmenides
contrasts with the vacuity of the thought which he is revolving
in his mind.
Space is said by Plato to be the ‘containing vessel or nurse of
generation.’ Reflecting on the simplest kinds of external
objects, which to the ancients were the four elements, he was led
to a more general notion of a substance, more or less like
themselves, out of which they were fashioned. He would not have
them too precisely distinguished. Thus seems to have arisen the
first dim perception of (Greek) or matter, which has played so
great a part in the metaphysical philosophy of Aristotle and his
followers.
But besides the material out of which the elements are
made, there is also a space in which they are contained. There
arises thus a second nature which the senses are incapable of
discerning and which can hardly be referred to the intelligible
class. For it is and it is not, it is nowhere when filled, it is
nothing when empty. Hence it is said to be discerned by a kind of
spurious or analogous reason, partaking so feebly of existence as
to be hardly perceivable, yet always reappearing as the
containing mother or nurse of all things.
It had not that sort of
consistency to Plato which has been given to it in modern times
by geometry and metaphysics. Neither of the Greek words by which
it is described are so purely abstract as the English word
‘space’ or the Latin ‘spatium.’ Neither Plato nor any other Greek
would have spoken of (Greek) or (Greek) in the same manner as we
speak of ‘time’ and ‘space.’
Yet space is also of a very permanent or even eternal nature; and
Plato seems more willing to admit of the unreality of time than
of the unreality of space; because, as he says, all things must
necessarily exist in space. We, on the other hand, are disposed
to fancy that even if space were annihilated time might still
survive. He admits indeed that our knowledge of space is of a
dreamy kind, and is given by a spurious reason without the help
of sense. (Compare the hypotheses and images of Rep.) It is true
that it does not attain to the clearness of ideas.
But like them
it seems to remain, even if all the objects contained in it are
supposed to have vanished away. Hence it was natural for Plato to
conceive of it as eternal. We must remember further that in his
attempt to realize either space or matter the two abstract ideas
of weight and extension, which are familiar to us, had never
passed before his mind.
Thus far God, working according to an eternal pattern, out of his
goodness has created the same, the other, and the essence
(compare the three principles of the Philebus—the finite, the
infinite, and the union of the two), and out of them has formed
the outer circle of the fixed stars and the inner circle of the
planets, divided according to certain musical intervals; he has
also created time, the moving image of eternity, and space,
existing by a sort of necessity and hardly distinguishable from
matter.
The matter out of which the world is formed is not
absolutely void, but retains in the chaos certain germs or traces
of the elements. These Plato, like Empedocles, supposed to be
four in number—fire, air, earth, and water. They were at first
mixed together; but already in the chaos, before God fashioned
them by form and number, the greater masses of the elements had
an appointed place. Into the confusion (Greek) which preceded
Plato does not attempt further to penetrate.
They are called
elements, but they are so far from being elements (Greek) or
letters in the higher sense that they are not even syllables or
first compounds. The real elements are two triangles, the
rectangular isosceles which has but one form, and the most
beautiful of the many forms of scalene, which is half of an
equilateral triangle. By the combination of these triangles which
exist in an infinite variety of sizes, the surfaces of the four
elements are constructed.
That there were only five regular solids was already known to the
ancients, and out of the surfaces which he has formed Plato
proceeds to generate the four first of the five. He perhaps
forgets that he is only putting together surfaces and has not
provided for their transformation into solids. The first solid is
a regular pyramid, of which the base and sides are formed by four
equilateral or twenty-four scalene triangles. Each of the four
solid angles in this figure is a little larger than the largest
of obtuse angles.
The second solid is composed of the same
triangles, which unite as eight equilateral triangles, and make
one solid angle out of four plane angles—six of these angles form
a regular octahedron. The third solid is a regular icosahedron,
having twenty triangular equilateral bases, and therefore 120
rectangular scalene triangles. The fourth regular solid, or cube,
is formed by the combination of four isosceles triangles into one
square and of six squares into a cube.
The fifth regular solid,
or dodecahedron, cannot be formed by a combination of either of
these triangles, but each of its faces may be regarded as
composed of thirty triangles of another kind. Probably Plato
notices this as the only remaining regular polyhedron, which from
its approximation to a globe, and possibly because, as Plutarch
remarks, it is composed of 12 x 30 = 360 scalene triangles
(Platon.
Quaest.), representing thus the signs and degrees of the
Zodiac, as well as the months and days of the year, God may be
said to have ‘used in the delineation of the universe.’ According
to Plato earth was composed of cubes, fire of regular pyramids,
air of regular octahedrons, water of regular icosahedrons. The
stability of the last three increases with the number of their
sides.
The elements are supposed to pass into one another, but we must
remember that these transformations are not the transformations
of real solids, but of imaginary geometrical figures; in other
words, we are composing and decomposing the faces of substances
and not the substances themselves—it is a house of cards which we
are pulling to pieces and putting together again (compare however
Laws). Yet perhaps Plato may regard these sides or faces as only
the forms which are impressed on pre-existent matter.
It is
remarkable that he should speak of each of these solids as a
possible world in itself, though upon the whole he inclines to
the opinion that they form one world and not five. To suppose
that there is an infinite number of worlds, as Democritus
(Hippolyt. Ref. Haer. I.) had said, would be, as he satirically
observes, ‘the characteristic of a very indefinite and ignorant
mind.’
The twenty triangular faces of an icosahedron form the faces or
sides of two regular octahedrons and of a regular pyramid (20 = 8
x 2 + 4); and therefore, according to Plato, a particle of water
when decomposed is supposed to give two particles of air and one
of fire. So because an octahedron gives the sides of two pyramids
(8 = 4 x 2), a particle of air is resolved into two particles of
fire.
The transformation is effected by the superior power or number of
the conquering elements. The manner of the change is (1) a
separation of portions of the elements from the masses in which
they are collected; (2) a resolution of them into their original
triangles; and (3) a reunion of them in new forms. Plato himself
proposes the question, Why does motion continue at all when the
elements are settled in their places?
He answers that although
the force of attraction is continually drawing similar elements
to the same spot, still the revolution of the universe exercises
a condensing power, and thrusts them again out of their natural
places. Thus want of uniformity, the condition of motion, is
produced. In all such disturbances of matter there is an
alternative for the weaker element: it may escape to its kindred,
or take the form of the stronger—becoming denser, if it be
denser, or rarer if rarer.
This is true of fire, air, and water,
which, being composed of similar triangles, are interchangeable;
earth, however, which has triangles peculiar to itself, is
capable of dissolution, but not of change. Of the interchangeable
elements, fire, the rarest, can only become a denser, and water,
the densest, only a rarer: but air may become a denser or a
rarer. No single particle of the elements is visible, but only
the aggregates of them are seen. The subordinate species depend,
not upon differences of form in the original triangles, but upon
differences of size.
The obvious physical phenomena from which
Plato has gathered his views of the relations of the elements
seem to be the effect of fire upon air, water, and earth, and the
effect of water upon earth. The particles are supposed by him to
be in a perpetual process of circulation caused by inequality.
This process of circulation does not admit of a vacuum, as he
tells us in his strange account of respiration.
Of the phenomena of light and heavy he speaks afterwards, when
treating of sensation, but they may be more conveniently
considered by us in this place. They are not, he says, to be
explained by ‘above’ and ‘below,’ which in the universal globe
have no existence, but by the attraction of similars towards the
great masses of similar substances; fire to fire, air to air,
water to water, earth to earth. Plato’s doctrine of attraction
implies not only (1) the attraction of similar elements to one
another, but also (2) of smaller bodies to larger ones.
Had he
confined himself to the latter he would have arrived, though,
perhaps, without any further result or any sense of the greatness
of the discovery, at the modern doctrine of gravitation. He does
not observe that water has an equal tendency towards both water
and earth. So easily did the most obvious facts which were
inconsistent with his theories escape him.
The general physical doctrines of the Timaeus may be summed up as
follows: (1) Plato supposes the greater masses of the elements to
have been already settled in their places at the creation: (2)
they are four in number, and are formed of rectangular triangles
variously combined into regular solid figures: (3) three of them,
fire, air, and water, admit of transformation into one another;
the fourth, earth, cannot be similarly transformed: (4) different
sizes of the same triangles form the lesser species of each
element: (5) there is an attraction of like to like—smaller
masses of the same kind being drawn towards greater: (6) there is
no void, but the particles of matter are ever pushing one another
round and round (Greek).
Like the atomists, Plato attributes the
differences between the elements to differences in geometrical
figures. But he does not explain the process by which surfaces
become solids; and he characteristically ridicules Democritus for
not seeing that the worlds are finite and not infinite.
Section 4.
The astronomy of Plato is based on the two principles of the same
and the other, which God combined in the creation of the world.
The soul, which is compounded of the same, the other, and the
essence, is diffused from the centre to the circumference of the
heavens. We speak of a soul of the universe; but more truly
regarded, the universe of the Timaeus is a soul, governed by
mind, and holding in solution a residuum of matter or evil, which
the author of the world is unable to expel, and of which Plato
cannot tell us the origin.
The creation, in Plato’s sense, is
really the creation of order; and the first step in giving order
is the division of the heavens into an inner and outer circle of
the other and the same, of the divisible and the indivisible,
answering to the two spheres, of the planets and of the world
beyond them, all together moving around the earth, which is their
centre. To us there is a difficulty in apprehending how that
which is at rest can also be in motion, or that which is
indivisible exist in space.
But the whole description is so ideal
and imaginative, that we can hardly venture to attribute to many
of Plato’s words in the Timaeus any more meaning than to his
mythical account of the heavens in the Republic and in the
Phaedrus. (Compare his denial of the ‘blasphemous opinion’ that
there are planets or wandering stars; all alike move in
circles—Laws.) The stars are the habitations of the souls of men,
from which they come and to which they return.
In attributing to
the fixed stars only the most perfect motion—that which is on the
same spot or circulating around the same—he might perhaps have
said that to ‘the spectator of all time and all existence,’ to
borrow once more his own grand expression, or viewed, in the
language of Spinoza, ‘sub specie aeternitatis,’ they were still
at rest, but appeared to move in order to teach men the periods
of time. Although absolutely in motion, they are relatively at
rest; or we may conceive of them as resting, while the space in
which they are contained, or the whole anima mundi, revolves.
The universe revolves around a centre once in twenty-four hours,
but the orbits of the fixed stars take a different direction from
those of the planets. The outer and the inner sphere cross one
another and meet again at a point opposite to that of their first
contact; the first moving in a circle from left to right along
the side of a parallelogram which is supposed to be inscribed in
it, the second also moving in a circle along the diagonal of the
same parallelogram from right to left; or, in other words, the
first describing the path of the equator, the second, the path of
the ecliptic.
The motion of the second is controlled by the
first, and hence the oblique line in which the planets are
supposed to move becomes a spiral. The motion of the same is said
to be undivided, whereas the inner motion is split into seven
unequal orbits—the intervals between them being in the ratio of
two and three, three of either:—the Sun, moving in the opposite
direction to Mercury and Venus, but with equal swiftness; the
remaining four, Moon, Saturn, Mars, Jupiter, with unequal
swiftness to the former three and to one another.
Thus arises the
following progression:—Moon 1, Sun 2, Venus 3, Mercury 4, Mars 8,
Jupiter 9, Saturn 27. This series of numbers is the compound of
the two Pythagorean ratios, having the same intervals, though not
in the same order, as the mixture which was originally divided in
forming the soul of the world.
Plato was struck by the phenomenon of Mercury, Venus, and the Sun
appearing to overtake and be overtaken by one another. The true
reason of this, namely, that they lie within the circle of the
earth’s orbit, was unknown to him, and the reason which he
gives—that the two former move in an opposite direction to the
latter—is far from explaining the appearance of them in the
heavens.
All the planets, including the sun, are carried round in
the daily motion of the circle of the fixed stars, and they have
a second or oblique motion which gives the explanation of the
different lengths of the sun’s course in different parts of the
earth. The fixed stars have also two movements—a forward movement
in their orbit which is common to the whole circle; and a
movement on the same spot around an axis, which Plato calls the
movement of thought about the same.
In this latter respect they
are more perfect than the wandering stars, as Plato himself terms
them in the Timaeus, although in the Laws he condemns the
appellation as blasphemous.
The revolution of the world around earth, which is accomplished
in a single day and night, is described as being the most perfect
or intelligent. Yet Plato also speaks of an ‘annus magnus’ or
cyclical year, in which periods wonderful for their complexity
are found to coincide in a perfect number, i.e. a number which
equals the sum of its factors, as 6 = 1 + 2 + 3. This, although
not literally contradictory, is in spirit irreconcilable with the
perfect revolution of twenty-four hours.
The same remark may be
applied to the complexity of the appearances and occultations of
the stars, which, if the outer heaven is supposed to be moving
around the centre once in twenty-four hours, must be confined to
the effects produced by the seven planets. Plato seems to confuse
the actual observation of the heavens with his desire to find in
them mathematical perfection. The same spirit is carried yet
further by him in the passage already quoted from the Laws, in
which he affirms their wanderings to be an appearance only, which
a little knowledge of mathematics would enable men to correct.
We have now to consider the much discussed question of the
rotation or immobility of the earth. Plato’s doctrine on this
subject is contained in the following words:—‘The earth, which is
our nurse, compacted (OR revolving) around the pole which is
extended through the universe, he made to be the guardian and
artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods that are in
the interior of heaven’. There is an unfortunate doubt in this
passage (1) about the meaning of the word (Greek), which is
translated either ‘compacted’ or ‘revolving,’ and is equally
capable of both explanations.
A doubt (2) may also be raised as
to whether the words ‘artificer of day and night’ are consistent
with the mere passive causation of them, produced by the
immobility of the earth in the midst of the circling universe. We
must admit, further, (3) that Aristotle attributed to Plato the
doctrine of the rotation of the earth on its axis.
On the other
hand it has been urged that if the earth goes round with the
outer heaven and sun in twenty-four hours, there is no way of
accounting for the alternation of day and night; since the equal
motion of the earth and sun would have the effect of absolute
immobility. To which it may be replied that Plato never says that
the earth goes round with the outer heaven and sun; although the
whole question depends on the relation of earth and sun, their
movements are nowhere precisely described. But if we suppose,
with Mr.
Grote, that the diurnal rotation of the earth on its
axis and the revolution of the sun and outer heaven precisely
coincide, it would be difficult to imagine that Plato was unaware
of the consequence. For though he was ignorant of many things
which are familiar to us, and often confused in his ideas where
we have become clear, we have no right to attribute to him a
childish want of reasoning about very simple facts, or an
inability to understand the necessary and obvious deductions from
geometrical figures or movements.
Of the causes of day and night
the pre-Socratic philosophers, and especially the Pythagoreans,
gave various accounts, and therefore the question can hardly be
imagined to have escaped him. On the other hand it may be urged
that the further step, however simple and obvious, is just what
Plato often seems to be ignorant of, and that as there is no
limit to his insight, there is also no limit to the blindness
which sometimes obscures his intelligence (compare the
construction of solids out of surfaces in his account of the
creation of the world, or the attraction of similars to
similars). Further, Mr.
Grote supposes, not that (Greek) means
‘revolving,’ or that this is the sense in which Aristotle
understood the word, but that the rotation of the earth is
necessarily implied in its adherence to the cosmical axis. But
(a) if, as Mr Grote assumes, Plato did not see that the rotation
of the earth on its axis and of the sun and outer heavens around
the earth in equal times was inconsistent with the alternation of
day and night, neither need we suppose that he would have seen
the immobility of the earth to be inconsistent with the rotation
of the axis.
And (b) what proof is there that the axis of the
world revolves at all? (c) The comparison of the two passages
quoted by Mr Grote (see his pamphlet on ‘The Rotation of the
Earth’) from Aristotle De Coelo, Book II (Greek) clearly shows,
although this is a matter of minor importance, that Aristotle, as
Proclus and Simplicius supposed, understood (Greek) in the
Timaeus to mean ‘revolving.’ For the second passage, in which
motion on an axis is expressly mentioned, refers to the first,
but this would be unmeaning unless (Greek) in the first passage
meant rotation on an axis. (4) The immobility of the earth is
more in accordance with Plato’s other writings than the opposite
hypothesis.
For in the Phaedo the earth is described as the
centre of the world, and is not said to be in motion. In the
Republic the pilgrims appear to be looking out from the earth
upon the motions of the heavenly bodies; in the Phaedrus, Hestia,
who remains immovable in the house of Zeus while the other gods
go in procession, is called the first and eldest of the gods, and
is probably the symbol of the earth.
The silence of Plato in
these and in some other passages (Laws) in which he might be
expected to speak of the rotation of the earth, is more
favourable to the doctrine of its immobility than to the
opposite. If he had meant to say that the earth revolves on its
axis, he would have said so in distinct words, and have explained
the relation of its movements to those of the other heavenly
bodies. (5) The meaning of the words ‘artificer of day and night’
is literally true according to Plato’s view.
For the alternation
of day and night is not produced by the motion of the heavens
alone, or by the immobility of the earth alone, but by both
together; and that which has the inherent force or energy to
remain at rest when all other bodies are moving, may be truly
said to act, equally with them. (6) We should not lay too much
stress on Aristotle or the writer De Caelo having adopted the
other interpretation of the words, although Alexander of
Aphrodisias thinks that he could not have been ignorant either of
the doctrine of Plato or of the sense which he intended to give
to the word (Greek).
For the citations of Plato in Aristotle are
frequently misinterpreted by him; and he seems hardly ever to
have had in his mind the connection in which they occur. In this
instance the allusion is very slight, and there is no reason to
suppose that the diurnal revolution of the heavens was present to
his mind. Hence we need not attribute to him the error from which
we are defending Plato.
After weighing one against the other all these complicated
probabilities, the final conclusion at which we arrive is that
there is nearly as much to be said on the one side of the
question as on the other, and that we are not perfectly certain,
whether, as Bockh and the majority of commentators, ancient as
well as modern, are inclined to believe, Plato thought that the
earth was at rest in the centre of the universe, or, as Aristotle
and Mr. Grote suppose, that it revolved on its axis.
Whether we
assume the earth to be stationary in the centre of the universe,
or to revolve with the heavens, no explanation is given of the
variation in the length of days and nights at different times of
the year. The relations of the earth and heavens are so
indistinct in the Timaeus and so figurative in the Phaedo,
Phaedrus and Republic, that we must give up the hope of
ascertaining how they were imagined by Plato, if he had any fixed
or scientific conception of them at all.
Section 5.
The soul of the world is framed on the analogy of the soul of
man, and many traces of anthropomorphism blend with Plato’s
highest flights of idealism. The heavenly bodies are endowed with
thought; the principles of the same and other exist in the
universe as well as in the human mind. The soul of man is made
out of the remains of the elements which had been used in
creating the soul of the world; these remains, however, are
diluted to the third degree; by this Plato expresses the measure
of the difference between the soul human and divine.
The human
soul, like the cosmical, is framed before the body, as the mind
is before the soul of either—this is the order of the divine
work—and the finer parts of the body, which are more akin to the
soul, such as the spinal marrow, are prior to the bones and
flesh. The brain, the containing vessel of the divine part of the
soul, is (nearly) in the form of a globe, which is the image of
the gods, who are the stars, and of the universe.
There is, however, an inconsistency in Plato’s manner of
conceiving the soul of man; he cannot get rid of the element of
necessity which is allowed to enter. He does not, like Kant,
attempt to vindicate for men a freedom out of space and time; but
he acknowledges him to be subject to the influence of external
causes, and leaves hardly any place for freedom of the will. The
lusts of men are caused by their bodily constitution, though they
may be increased by bad education and bad laws, which implies
that they may be decreased by good education and good laws.
He
appears to have an inkling of the truth that to the higher nature
of man evil is involuntary. This is mixed up with the view which,
while apparently agreeing with it, is in reality the opposite of
it, that vice is due to physical causes. In the Timaeus, as well
as in the Laws, he also regards vices and crimes as simply
involuntary; they are diseases analogous to the diseases of the
body, and arising out of the same causes. If we draw together the
opposite poles of Plato’s system, we find that, like Spinoza, he
combines idealism with fatalism.
The soul of man is divided by him into three parts, answering
roughly to the charioteer and steeds of the Phaedrus, and to the
(Greek) of the Republic and Nicomachean Ethics. First, there is
the immortal nature of which the brain is the seat, and which is
akin to the soul of the universe. This alone thinks and knows and
is the ruler of the whole. Secondly, there is the higher mortal
soul which, though liable to perturbations of her own, takes the
side of reason against the lower appetites. The seat of this is
the heart, in which courage, anger, and all the nobler affections
are supposed to reside.
There the veins all meet; it is their
centre or house of guard whence they carry the orders of the
thinking being to the extremities of his kingdom. There is also a
third or appetitive soul, which receives the commands of the
immortal part, not immediately but mediately, through the liver,
which reflects on its surface the admonitions and threats of the
reason.
The liver is imagined by Plato to be a smooth and bright
substance, having a store of sweetness and also of bitterness,
which reason freely uses in the execution of her mandates. In
this region, as ancient superstition told, were to be found
intimations of the future. But Plato is careful to observe that
although such knowledge is given to the inferior parts of man, it
requires to be interpreted by the superior. Reason, and not
enthusiasm, is the true guide of man; he is only inspired when he
is demented by some distemper or possession.
The ancient saying,
that ‘only a man in his senses can judge of his own actions,’ is
approved by modern philosophy too. The same irony which appears
in Plato’s remark, that ‘the men of old time must surely have
known the gods who were their ancestors, and we should believe
them as custom requires,’ is also manifest in his account of
divination.
The appetitive soul is seated in the belly, and there imprisoned
like a wild beast, far away from the council chamber, as Plato
graphically calls the head, in order that the animal passions may
not interfere with the deliberations of reason. Though the soul
is said by him to be prior to the body, yet we cannot help seeing
that it is constructed on the model of the body—the threefold
division into the rational, passionate, and appetitive
corresponding to the head, heart and belly.
The human soul
differs from the soul of the world in this respect, that it is
enveloped and finds its expression in matter, whereas the soul of
the world is not only enveloped or diffused in matter, but is the
element in which matter moves. The breath of man is within him,
but the air or aether of heaven is the element which surrounds
him and all things.
Pleasure and pain are attributed in the Timaeus to the suddenness
of our sensations—the first being a sudden restoration, the
second a sudden violation, of nature (Phileb.). The sensations
become conscious to us when they are exceptional. Sight is not
attended either by pleasure or pain, but hunger and the appeasing
of hunger are pleasant and painful because they are
extraordinary.
Section 6.
I shall not attempt to connect the physiological speculations of
Plato either with ancient or modern medicine. What light I can
throw upon them will be derived from the comparison of them with
his general system.
There is no principle so apparent in the physics of the Timaeus,
or in ancient physics generally, as that of continuity. The world
is conceived of as a whole, and the elements are formed into and
out of one another; the varieties of substances and processes are
hardly known or noticed.
And in a similar manner the human body
is conceived of as a whole, and the different substances of
which, to a superficial observer, it appears to be composed—the
blood, flesh, sinews—like the elements out of which they are
formed, are supposed to pass into one another in regular order,
while the infinite complexity of the human frame remains
unobserved. And diseases arise from the opposite process—when the
natural proportions of the four elements are disturbed, and the
secondary substances which are formed out of them, namely, blood,
flesh, sinews, are generated in an inverse order.
Plato found heat and air within the human frame, and the blood
circulating in every part. He assumes in language almost
unintelligible to us that a network of fire and air envelopes the
greater part of the body. This outer net contains two lesser
nets, one corresponding to the stomach, the other to the lungs;
and the entrance to the latter is forked or divided into two
passages which lead to the nostrils and to the mouth. In the
process of respiration the external net is said to find a way in
and out of the pores of the skin: while the interior of it and
the lesser nets move alternately into each other.
The whole
description is figurative, as Plato himself implies when he
speaks of a ‘fountain of fire which we compare to the network of
a creel.’ He really means by this what we should describe as a
state of heat or temperature in the interior of the body. The
‘fountain of fire’ or heat is also in a figure the circulation of
the blood. The passage is partly imagination, partly fact.
He has a singular theory of respiration for which he accounts
solely by the movement of the air in and out of the body; he does
not attribute any part of the process to the action of the body
itself. The air has a double ingress and a double exit, through
the mouth or nostrils, and through the skin. When exhaled through
the mouth or nostrils, it leaves a vacuum which is filled up by
other air finding a way in through the pores, this air being
thrust out of its place by the exhalation from the mouth and
nostrils.
There is also a corresponding process of inhalation
through the mouth or nostrils, and of exhalation through the
pores. The inhalation through the pores appears to take place
nearly at the same time as the exhalation through the mouth; and
conversely. The internal fire is in either case the propelling
cause outwards—the inhaled air, when heated by it, having a
natural tendency to move out of the body to the place of fire;
while the impossibility of a vacuum is the propelling cause
inwards.
Thus we see that this singular theory is dependent on two
principles largely employed by Plato in explaining the operations
of nature, the impossibility of a vacuum and the attraction of
like to like. To these there has to be added a third principle,
which is the condition of the action of the other two,—the
interpenetration of particles in proportion to their density or
rarity. It is this which enables fire and air to permeate the
flesh.
Plato’s account of digestion and the circulation of the blood is
closely connected with his theory of respiration. Digestion is
supposed to be effected by the action of the internal fire, which
in the process of respiration moves into the stomach and minces
the food. As the fire returns to its place, it takes with it the
minced food or blood; and in this way the veins are replenished.
Plato does not enquire how the blood is separated from the
faeces.
Of the anatomy and functions of the body he knew very
little,—e.g. of the uses of the nerves in conveying motion and
sensation, which he supposed to be communicated by the bones and
veins; he was also ignorant of the distinction between veins and
arteries;—the latter term he applies to the vessels which conduct
air from the mouth to the lungs;—he supposes the lung to be
hollow and bloodless; the spinal marrow he conceives to be the
seed of generation; he confuses the parts of the body with the
states of the body—the network of fire and air is spoken of as a
bodily organ; he has absolutely no idea of the phenomena of
respiration, which he attributes to a law of equalization in
nature, the air which is breathed out displacing other air which
finds a way in; he is wholly unacquainted with the process of
digestion.
Except the general divisions into the spleen, the
liver, the belly, and the lungs, and the obvious distinctions of
flesh, bones, and the limbs of the body, we find nothing that
reminds us of anatomical facts. But we find much which is derived
from his theory of the universe, and transferred to man, as there
is much also in his theory of the universe which is suggested by
man. The microcosm of the human body is the lesser image of the
macrocosm. The courses of the same and the other affect both;
they are made of the same elements and therefore in the same
proportions.
Both are intelligent natures endued with the power
of self-motion, and the same equipoise is maintained in both. The
animal is a sort of ‘world’ to the particles of the blood which
circulate in it. All the four elements entered into the original
composition of the human frame; the bone was formed out of smooth
earth; liquids of various kinds pass to and fro; the network of
fire and air irrigates the veins.
Infancy and childhood is the
chaos or first turbid flux of sense prior to the establishment of
order; the intervals of time which may be observed in some
intermittent fevers correspond to the density of the elements.
The spinal marrow, including the brain, is formed out of the
finest sorts of triangles, and is the connecting link between
body and mind. Health is only to be preserved by imitating the
motions of the world in space, which is the mother and nurse of
generation.
The work of digestion is carried on by the superior
sharpness of the triangles forming the substances of the human
body to those which are introduced into it in the shape of food.
The freshest and acutest forms of triangles are those that are
found in children, but they become more obtuse with advancing
years; and when they finally wear out and fall to pieces, old age
and death supervene.
As in the Republic, Plato is still the enemy of the purgative
treatment of physicians, which, except in extreme cases, no man
of sense will ever adopt. For, as he adds, with an insight into
the truth, ‘every disease is akin to the nature of the living
being and is only irritated by stimulants.’ He is of opinion that
nature should be left to herself, and is inclined to think that
physicians are in vain (Laws—where he says that warm baths would
be more beneficial to the limbs of the aged rustic than the
prescriptions of a not over-wise doctor).
If he seems to be
extreme in his condemnation of medicine and to rely too much on
diet and exercise, he might appeal to nearly all the best
physicians of our own age in support of his opinions, who often
speak to their patients of the worthlessness of drugs. For we
ourselves are sceptical about medicine, and very unwilling to
submit to the purgative treatment of physicians. May we not claim
for Plato an anticipation of modern ideas as about some questions
of astronomy and physics, so also about medicine?
As in the
Charmides he tells us that the body cannot be cured without the
soul, so in the Timaeus he strongly asserts the sympathy of soul
and body; any defect of either is the occasion of the greatest
discord and disproportion in the other. Here too may be a
presentiment that in the medicine of the future the
interdependence of mind and body will be more fully recognized,
and that the influence of the one over the other may be exerted
in a manner which is not now thought possible.
Section 7.
In Plato’s explanation of sensation we are struck by the fact
that he has not the same distinct conception of organs of sense
which is familiar to ourselves. The senses are not instruments,
but rather passages, through which external objects strike upon
the mind. The eye is the aperture through which the stream of
vision passes, the ear is the aperture through which the
vibrations of sound pass. But that the complex structure of the
eye or the ear is in any sense the cause of sight and hearing he
seems hardly to be aware.
The process of sight is the most complicated (Rep.), and consists
of three elements—the light which is supposed to reside within
the eye, the light of the sun, and the light emitted from
external objects. When the light of the eye meets the light of
the sun, and both together meet the light issuing from an
external object, this is the simple act of sight. When the
particles of light which proceed from the object are exactly
equal to the particles of the visual ray which meet them from
within, then the body is transparent.
If they are larger and
contract the visual ray, a black colour is produced; if they are
smaller and dilate it, a white. Other phenomena are produced by
the variety and motion of light. A sudden flash of fire at once
elicits light and moisture from the eye, and causes a bright
colour. A more subdued light, on mingling with the moisture of
the eye, produces a red colour. Out of these elements all other
colours are derived. All of them are combinations of bright and
red with white and black.
Plato himself tells us that he does not
know in what proportions they combine, and he is of opinion that
such knowledge is granted to the gods only. To have seen the
affinity of them to each other and their connection with light,
is not a bad basis for a theory of colours. We must remember that
they were not distinctly defined to his, as they are to our eyes;
he saw them, not as they are divided in the prism, or
artificially manufactured for the painter’s use, but as they
exist in nature, blended and confused with one another.
We can hardly agree with him when he tells us that smells do not
admit of kinds. He seems to think that no definite qualities can
attach to bodies which are in a state of transition or
evaporation; he also makes the subtle observation that smells
must be denser than air, though thinner than water, because when
there is an obstruction to the breathing, air can penetrate, but
not smell.
The affections peculiar to the tongue are of various kinds, and,
like many other affections, are caused by contraction and
dilation. Some of them are produced by rough, others by
abstergent, others by inflammatory substances,—these act upon the
testing instruments of the tongue, and produce a more or less
disagreeable sensation, while other particles congenial to the
tongue soften and harmonize them. The instruments of taste reach
from the tongue to the heart.
Plato has a lively sense of the
manner in which sensation and motion are communicated from one
part of the body to the other, though he confuses the affections
with the organs. Hearing is a blow which passes through the ear
and ends in the region of the liver, being transmitted by means
of the air, the brain, and the blood to the soul. The swifter
sound is acute, the sound which moves slowly is grave. A great
body of sound is loud, the opposite is low.
Discord is produced
by the swifter and slower motions of two sounds, and is converted
into harmony when the swifter motions begin to pause and are
overtaken by the slower.
The general phenomena of sensation are partly internal, but the
more violent are caused by conflict with external objects.
Proceeding by a method of superficial observation, Plato remarks
that the more sensitive parts of the human frame are those which
are least covered by flesh, as is the case with the head and the
elbows. Man, if his head had been covered with a thicker pulp of
flesh, might have been a longer-lived animal than he is, but
could not have had as quick perceptions.
On the other hand, the
tongue is one of the most sensitive of organs; but then this is
made, not to be a covering to the bones which contain the marrow
or source of life, but with an express purpose, and in a separate
mass.
Section 8.
We have now to consider how far in any of these speculations
Plato approximated to the discoveries of modern science. The
modern physical philosopher is apt to dwell exclusively on the
absurdities of ancient ideas about science, on the haphazard
fancies and a priori assumptions of ancient teachers, on their
confusion of facts and ideas, on their inconsistency and
blindness to the most obvious phenomena. He measures them not by
what preceded them, but by what has followed them.
He does not
consider that ancient physical philosophy was not a free enquiry,
but a growth, in which the mind was passive rather than active,
and was incapable of resisting the impressions which flowed in
upon it. He hardly allows to the notions of the ancients the
merit of being the stepping-stones by which he has himself risen
to a higher knowledge. He never reflects, how great a thing it
was to have formed a conception, however imperfect, either of the
human frame as a whole, or of the world as a whole.
According to
the view taken in these volumes the errors of ancient physicists
were not separable from the intellectual conditions under which
they lived. Their genius was their own; and they were not the
rash and hasty generalizers which, since the days of Bacon, we
have been apt to suppose them. The thoughts of men widened to
receive experience; at first they seemed to know all things as in
a dream: after a while they look at them closely and hold them in
their hands. They begin to arrange them in classes and to connect
causes with effects.
General notions are necessary to the
apprehension of particular facts, the metaphysical to the
physical. Before men can observe the world, they must be able to
conceive it.
To do justice to the subject, we should consider the physical
philosophy of the ancients as a whole; we should remember, (1)
that the nebular theory was the received belief of several of the
early physicists; (2) that the development of animals out of
fishes who came to land, and of man out of the animals, was held
by Anaximander in the sixth century before Christ (Plut. Symp.
Quaest; Plac.
Phil.); (3) that even by Philolaus and the early
Pythagoreans, the earth was held to be a body like the other
stars revolving in space around the sun or a central fire; (4)
that the beginnings of chemistry are discernible in the ‘similar
particles’ of Anaxagoras.
Also they knew or thought (5) that
there was a sex in plants as well as in animals; (6) they were
aware that musical notes depended on the relative length or
tension of the strings from which they were emitted, and were
measured by ratios of number; (7) that mathematical laws pervaded
the world; and even qualitative differences were supposed to have
their origin in number and figure; (8) the annihilation of matter
was denied by several of them, and the seeming disappearance of
it held to be a transformation only.
For, although one of these
discoveries might have been supposed to be a happy guess, taken
together they seem to imply a great advance and almost maturity
of natural knowledge.
We should also remember, when we attribute to the ancients hasty
generalizations and delusions of language, that physical
philosophy and metaphysical too have been guilty of similar
fallacies in quite recent times. We by no means distinguish
clearly between mind and body, between ideas and facts. Have not
many discussions arisen about the Atomic theory in which a point
has been confused with a material atom? Have not the natures of
things been explained by imaginary entities, such as life or
phlogiston, which exist in the mind only?
Has not disease been
regarded, like sin, sometimes as a negative and necessary,
sometimes as a positive or malignant principle? The ‘idols’ of
Bacon are nearly as common now as ever; they are inherent in the
human mind, and when they have the most complete dominion over
us, we are least able to perceive them. We recognize them in the
ancients, but we fail to see them in ourselves.
Such reflections, although this is not the place in which to
dwell upon them at length, lead us to take a favourable view of
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TIMAEUS
by Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Contents
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.
Section 5.
Section 6.
Section 7.
Section 8.
TIMAEUS
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
Of all the writings of Plato the Timaeus is the most obscure and
repulsive to the modern reader, and has nevertheless had the
greatest influence over the ancient and mediaeval world. The
obscurity arises in the infancy of physical science, out of the
confusion of theological, mathematical, and physiological
notions, out of the desire to conceive the whole of nature
without any adequate knowledge of the parts, and from a greater
perception of similarities which lie on the surface than of
differences which are hidden from view. To bring sense under the
control of reason; to find some way through the mist or labyrinth
of appearances, either the highway of mathematics, or more
devious paths suggested by the analogy of man with the world, and
of the world with man; to see that all things have a cause and
are tending towards an end—this is the spirit of the ancient
physical philosopher. He has no notion of trying an experiment
and is hardly capable of observing the curiosities of nature
which are ‘tumbling out at his feet,’ or of interpreting even the
most obvious of them. He is driven back from the nearer to the
more distant, from particulars to generalities, from the earth to
the stars. He lifts up his eyes to the heavens and seeks to guide
by their motions his erring footsteps. But we neither appreciate
the conditions of knowledge to which he was subjected, nor have
the ideas which fastened upon his imagination the same hold upon
us. For he is hanging between matter and mind; he is under the
dominion at the same time both of sense and of abstractions; his
impressions are taken almost at random from the outside of
nature; he sees the light, but not the objects which are revealed
by the light; and he brings into juxtaposition things which to us
appear wide as the poles asunder, because he finds nothing
between them. He passes abruptly from persons to ideas and
numbers, and from ideas and numbers to persons,—from the heavens
to man, from astronomy to physiology; he confuses, or rather does
not distinguish, subject and object, first and final causes, and
is dreaming of geometrical figures lost in a flux of sense. He
contrasts the perfect movements of the heavenly bodies with the
imperfect representation of them (Rep.), and he does not always
require strict accuracy even in applications of number and figure
(Rep.). His mind lingers around the forms of mythology, which he
uses as symbols or translates into figures of speech. He has no
implements of observation, such as the telescope or microscope;
the great science of chemistry is a blank to him. It is only by
an effort that the modern thinker can breathe the atmosphere of
the ancient philosopher, or understand how, under such unequal
conditions, he seems in many instances, by a sort of inspiration,
to have anticipated the truth.
The influence with the Timaeus has exercised upon posterity is
due partly to a misunderstanding. In the supposed depths of this
dialogue the Neo-Platonists found hidden meanings and connections
with the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and out of them they
elicited doctrines quite at variance with the spirit of Plato.
Believing that he was inspired by the Holy Ghost, or had received
his wisdom from Moses, they seemed to find in his writings the
Christian Trinity, the Word, the Church, the creation of the
world in a Jewish sense, as they really found the personality of
God or of mind, and the immortality of the soul. All religions
and philosophies met and mingled in the schools of Alexandria,
and the Neo-Platonists had a method of interpretation which could
elicit any meaning out of any words. They were really incapable
of distinguishing between the opinions of one philosopher and
another— between Aristotle and Plato, or between the serious
thoughts of Plato and his passing fancies. They were absorbed in
his theology and were under the dominion of his name, while that
which was truly great and truly characteristic in him, his effort
to realize and connect abstractions, was not understood by them
at all. Yet the genius of Plato and Greek philosophy reacted upon
the East, and a Greek element of thought and language overlaid
and partly reduced to order the chaos of Orientalism. And kindred
spirits, like St. Augustine, even though they were acquainted
with his writings only through the medium of a Latin translation,
were profoundly affected by them, seeming to find ‘God and his
word everywhere insinuated’ in them (August. Confess.)
There is no danger of the modern commentators on the Timaeus
falling into the absurdities of the Neo-Platonists. In the
present day we are well aware that an ancient philosopher is to
be interpreted from himself and by the contemporary history of
thought. We know that mysticism is not criticism. The fancies of
the Neo-Platonists are only interesting to us because they
exhibit a phase of the human mind which prevailed widely in the
first centuries of the Christian era, and is not wholly extinct
in our own day. But they have nothing to do with the
interpretation of Plato, and in spirit they are opposed to him.
They are the feeble expression of an age which has lost the power
not only of creating great works, but of understanding them. They
are the spurious birth of a marriage between philosophy and
tradition, between Hellas and the East—(Greek) (Rep.). Whereas
the so-called mysticism of Plato is purely Greek, arising out of
his imperfect knowledge and high aspirations, and is the growth
of an age in which philosophy is not wholly separated from poetry
and mythology.
A greater danger with modern interpreters of Plato is the
tendency to regard the Timaeus as the centre of his system. We do
not know how Plato would have arranged his own dialogues, or
whether the thought of arranging any of them, besides the two
‘Trilogies’ which he has expressly connected; was ever present to
his mind. But, if he had arranged them, there are many
indications that this is not the place which he would have
assigned to the Timaeus. We observe, first of all, that the
dialogue is put into the mouth of a Pythagorean philosopher, and
not of Socrates. And this is required by dramatic propriety; for
the investigation of nature was expressly renounced by Socrates
in the Phaedo. Nor does Plato himself attribute any importance to
his guesses at science. He is not at all absorbed by them, as he
is by the IDEA of good. He is modest and hesitating, and
confesses that his words partake of the uncertainty of the
subject (Tim.). The dialogue is primarily concerned with the
animal creation, including under this term the heavenly bodies,
and with man only as one among the animals. But we can hardly
suppose that Plato would have preferred the study of nature to
man, or that he would have deemed the formation of the world and
the human frame to have the same interest which he ascribes to
the mystery of being and not-being, or to the great political
problems which he discusses in the Republic and the Laws. There
are no speculations on physics in the other dialogues of Plato,
and he himself regards the consideration of them as a rational
pastime only. He is beginning to feel the need of further
divisions of knowledge; and is becoming aware that besides
dialectic, mathematics, and the arts, there is another field
which has been hitherto unexplored by him. But he has not as yet
defined this intermediate territory which lies somewhere between
medicine and mathematics, and he would have felt that there was
as great an impiety in ranking theories of physics first in the
order of knowledge, as in placing the body before the soul.
It is true, however, that the Timaeus is by no means confined to
speculations on physics. The deeper foundations of the Platonic
philosophy, such as the nature of God, the distinction of the
sensible and intellectual, the great original conceptions of time
and space, also appear in it. They are found principally in the
first half of the dialogue. The construction of the heavens is
for the most part ideal; the cyclic year serves as the connection
between the world of absolute being and of generation, just as
the number of population in the Republic is the expression or
symbol of the transition from the ideal to the actual state. In
some passages we are uncertain whether we are reading a
description of astronomical facts or contemplating processes of
the human mind, or of that divine mind (Phil.) which in Plato is
hardly separable from it. The characteristics of man are
transferred to the world-animal, as for example when intelligence
and knowledge are said to be perfected by the circle of the Same,
and true opinion by the circle of the Other; and conversely the
motions of the world-animal reappear in man; its amorphous state
continues in the child, and in both disorder and chaos are
gradually succeeded by stability and order. It is not however to
passages like these that Plato is referring when he speaks of the
uncertainty of his subject, but rather to the composition of
bodies, to the relations of colours, the nature of diseases, and
the like, about which he truly feels the lamentable ignorance
prevailing in his own age.
We are led by Plato himself to regard the Timaeus, not as the
centre or inmost shrine of the edifice, but as a detached
building in a different style, framed, not after the Socratic,
but after some Pythagorean model. As in the Cratylus and
Parmenides, we are uncertain whether Plato is expressing his own
opinions, or appropriating and perhaps improving the
philosophical speculations of others. In all three dialogues he
is exerting his dramatic and imitative power; in the Cratylus
mingling a satirical and humorous purpose with true principles of
language; in the Parmenides overthrowing Megarianism by a sort of
ultra-Megarianism, which discovers contradictions in the one as
great as those which have been previously shown to exist in the
ideas. There is a similar uncertainty about the Timaeus; in the
first part he scales the heights of transcendentalism, in the
latter part he treats in a bald and superficial manner of the
functions and diseases of the human frame. He uses the thoughts
and almost the words of Parmenides when he discourses of being
and of essence, adopting from old religion into philosophy the
conception of God, and from the Megarians the IDEA of good. He
agrees with Empedocles and the Atomists in attributing the
greater differences of kinds to the figures of the elements and
their movements into and out of one another. With Heracleitus, he
acknowledges the perpetual flux; like Anaxagoras, he asserts the
predominance of mind, although admitting an element of necessity
which reason is incapable of subduing; like the Pythagoreans he
supposes the mystery of the world to be contained in number.
Many, if not all the elements of the Pre-Socratic philosophy are
included in the Timaeus. It is a composite or eclectic work of
imagination, in which Plato, without naming them, gathers up into
a kind of system the various elements of philosophy which
preceded him.
If we allow for the difference of subject, and for some growth in
Plato’s own mind, the discrepancy between the Timaeus and the
other dialogues will not appear to be great. It is probable that
the relation of the ideas to God or of God to the world was
differently conceived by him at different times of his life. In
all his later dialogues we observe a tendency in him to personify
mind or God, and he therefore naturally inclines to view creation
as the work of design. The creator is like a human artist who
frames in his mind a plan which he executes by the help of his
servants. Thus the language of philosophy which speaks of first
and second causes is crossed by another sort of phraseology: ‘God
made the world because he was good, and the demons ministered to
him.’ The Timaeus is cast in a more theological and less
philosophical mould than the other dialogues, but the same
general spirit is apparent; there is the same dualism or
opposition between the ideal and actual—the soul is prior to the
body, the intelligible and unseen to the visible and corporeal.
There is the same distinction between knowledge and opinion which
occurs in the Theaetetus and Republic, the same enmity to the
poets, the same combination of music and gymnastics. The doctrine
of transmigration is still held by him, as in the Phaedrus and
Republic; and the soul has a view of the heavens in a prior state
of being. The ideas also remain, but they have become types in
nature, forms of men, animals, birds, fishes. And the attribution
of evil to physical causes accords with the doctrine which he
maintains in the Laws respecting the involuntariness of vice.
The style and plan of the Timaeus differ greatly from that of any
other of the Platonic dialogues. The language is weighty, abrupt,
and in some passages sublime. But Plato has not the same mastery
over his instrument which he exhibits in the Phaedrus or
Symposium. Nothing can exceed the beauty or art of the
introduction, in which he is using words after his accustomed
manner. But in the rest of the work the power of language seems
to fail him, and the dramatic form is wholly given up. He could
write in one style, but not in another, and the Greek language
had not as yet been fashioned by any poet or philosopher to
describe physical phenomena. The early physiologists had
generally written in verse; the prose writers, like Democritus
and Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge from their fragments,
never attained to a periodic style. And hence we find the same
sort of clumsiness in the Timaeus of Plato which characterizes
the philosophical poem of Lucretius. There is a want of flow and
often a defect of rhythm; the meaning is sometimes obscure, and
there is a greater use of apposition and more of repetition than
occurs in Plato’s earlier writings. The sentences are less
closely connected and also more involved; the antecedents of
demonstrative and relative pronouns are in some cases remote and
perplexing. The greater frequency of participles and of absolute
constructions gives the effect of heaviness. The descriptive
portion of the Timaeus retains traces of the first Greek prose
composition; for the great master of language was speaking on a
theme with which he was imperfectly acquainted, and had no words
in which to express his meaning. The rugged grandeur of the
opening discourse of Timaeus may be compared with the more
harmonious beauty of a similar passage in the Phaedrus.
To the same cause we may attribute the want of plan. Plato had
not the command of his materials which would have enabled him to
produce a perfect work of art. Hence there are several new
beginnings and resumptions and formal or artificial connections;
we miss the ‘callida junctura’ of the earlier dialogues. His
speculations about the Eternal, his theories of creation, his
mathematical anticipations, are supplemented by desultory remarks
on the one immortal and the two mortal souls of man, on the
functions of the bodily organs in health and disease, on sight,
hearing, smell, taste, and touch. He soars into the heavens, and
then, as if his wings were suddenly clipped, he walks
ungracefully and with difficulty upon the earth. The greatest
things in the world, and the least things in man, are brought
within the compass of a short treatise. But the intermediate
links are missing, and we cannot be surprised that there should
be a want of unity in a work which embraces astronomy, theology,
physiology, and natural philosophy in a few pages.
It is not easy to determine how Plato’s cosmos may be presented
to the reader in a clearer and shorter form; or how we may supply
a thread of connexion to his ideas without giving greater
consistency to them than they possessed in his mind, or adding on
consequences which would never have occurred to him. For he has
glimpses of the truth, but no comprehensive or perfect vision.
There are isolated expressions about the nature of God which have
a wonderful depth and power; but we are not justified in assuming
that these had any greater significance to the mind of Plato than
language of a neutral and impersonal character... With a view to
the illustration of the Timaeus I propose to divide this
Introduction into sections, of which the first will contain an
outline of the dialogue: (2) I shall consider the aspects of
nature which presented themselves to Plato and his age, and the
elements of philosophy which entered into the conception of them:
(3) the theology and physics of the Timaeus, including the soul
of the world, the conception of time and space, and the
composition of the elements: (4) in the fourth section I shall
consider the Platonic astronomy, and the position of the earth.
There will remain, (5) the psychology, (6) the physiology of
Plato, and (7) his analysis of the senses to be briefly commented
upon: (8) lastly, we may examine in what points Plato approaches
or anticipates the discoveries of modern science.Header as received
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Title: Timaeus
Author: Plato
Translator: Benjamin Jowett
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