Gutenberg · e01.org
Cover of Timaeus
Project Gutenberg cover, or a typographic cover where none is held.

Gutenberg · ebook 1572

Timaeus

by Plato · English · public domain in the US

  • Language English
  • PG edition 1998
  • Rights public domain (US)
  • Source Project Gutenberg
0%

Contents

    Timaeus by Plato is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #1572). Translated by Benjamin Jowett

    Section 1.

    Socrates begins the Timaeus with a summary of the Republic. He
    lightly touches upon a few points,—the division of labour and
    distribution of the citizens into classes, the double nature and
    training of the guardians, the community of property and of women
    and children. But he makes no mention of the second education, or
    of the government of philosophers.

    And now he desires to see the ideal State set in motion; he would
    like to know how she behaved in some great struggle.

    But he is
    unable to invent such a narrative himself; and he is afraid that
    the poets are equally incapable; for, although he pretends to
    have nothing to say against them, he remarks that they are a
    tribe of imitators, who can only describe what they have seen.
    And he fears that the Sophists, who are plentifully supplied with
    graces of speech, in their erratic way of life having never had a
    city or house of their own, may through want of experience err in
    their conception of philosophers and statesmen. ‘And therefore to
    you I turn, Timaeus, citizen of Locris, who are at once a
    philosopher and a statesman, and to you, Critias, whom all
    Athenians know to be similarly accomplished, and to Hermocrates,
    who is also fitted by nature and education to share in our
    discourse.’

    HERMOCRATES: ‘We will do our best, and have been already
    preparing; for on our way home, Critias told us of an ancient
    tradition, which I wish, Critias, that you would repeat to
    Socrates.’ ‘I will, if Timaeus approves.’ ‘I approve.’ Listen
    then, Socrates, to a tale of Solon’s, who, being the friend of
    Dropidas my great-grandfather, told it to my grandfather Critias,
    and he told me. The narrative related to ancient famous actions
    of the Athenian people, and to one especially, which I will
    rehearse in honour of you and of the goddess.

    Critias when he
    told this tale of the olden time, was ninety years old, I being
    not more than ten. The occasion of the rehearsal was the day of
    the Apaturia called the Registration of Youth, at which our
    parents gave prizes for recitation. Some poems of Solon were
    recited by the boys. They had not at that time gone out of
    fashion, and the recital of them led some one to say, perhaps in
    compliment to Critias, that Solon was not only the wisest of men
    but also the best of poets.

    The old man brightened up at hearing
    this, and said: Had Solon only had the leisure which was required
    to complete the famous legend which he brought with him from
    Egypt he would have been as distinguished as Homer and Hesiod.
    ‘And what was the subject of the poem?’ said the person who made
    the remark. The subject was a very noble one; he described the
    most famous action in which the Athenian people were ever
    engaged.

    But the memory of their exploits has passed away owing
    to the lapse of time and the extinction of the actors. ‘Tell us,’
    said the other, ‘the whole story, and where Solon heard the
    story.’ He replied—There is at the head of the Egyptian Delta,
    where the river Nile divides, a city and district called Sais;
    the city was the birthplace of King Amasis, and is under the
    protection of the goddess Neith or Athene. The citizens have a
    friendly feeling towards the Athenians, believing themselves to
    be related to them.

    Hither came Solon, and was received with
    honour; and here he first learnt, by conversing with the Egyptian
    priests, how ignorant he and his countrymen were of antiquity.
    Perceiving this, and with the view of eliciting information from
    them, he told them the tales of Phoroneus and Niobe, and also of
    Deucalion and Pyrrha, and he endeavoured to count the generations
    which had since passed.

    Thereupon an aged priest said to him: ‘O
    Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are ever young, and there is no old
    man who is a Hellene.’ ‘What do you mean?’ he asked. ‘In mind,’
    replied the priest, ‘I mean to say that you are children; there
    is no opinion or tradition of knowledge among you which is white
    with age; and I will tell you why. Like the rest of mankind you
    have suffered from convulsions of nature, which are chiefly
    brought about by the two great agencies of fire and water.

    The
    former is symbolized in the Hellenic tale of young Phaethon who
    drove his father’s horses the wrong way, and having burnt up the
    earth was himself burnt up by a thunderbolt. For there occurs at
    long intervals a derangement of the heavenly bodies, and then the
    earth is destroyed by fire. At such times, and when fire is the
    agent, those who dwell by rivers or on the seashore are safer
    than those who dwell upon high and dry places, who in their turn
    are safer when the danger is from water.

    Now the Nile is our
    saviour from fire, and as there is little rain in Egypt, we are
    not harmed by water; whereas in other countries, when a deluge
    comes, the inhabitants are swept by the rivers into the sea. The
    memorials which your own and other nations have once had of the
    famous actions of mankind perish in the waters at certain
    periods; and the rude survivors in the mountains begin again,
    knowing nothing of the world before the flood. But in Egypt the
    traditions of our own and other lands are by us registered for
    ever in our temples.

    The genealogies which you have recited to us
    out of your own annals, Solon, are a mere children’s story. For
    in the first place, you remember one deluge only, and there were
    many of them, and you know nothing of that fairest and noblest
    race of which you are a seed or remnant. The memory of them was
    lost, because there was no written voice among you.

    For in the
    times before the great flood Athens was the greatest and best of
    cities and did the noblest deeds and had the best constitution of
    any under the face of heaven.’ Solon marvelled, and desired to be
    informed of the particulars. ‘You are welcome to hear them,’ said
    the priest, ‘both for your own sake and for that of the city, and
    above all for the sake of the goddess who is the common foundress
    of both our cities. Nine thousand years have elapsed since she
    founded yours, and eight thousand since she founded ours, as our
    annals record.

    Many laws exist among us which are the counterpart
    of yours as they were in the olden time. I will briefly describe
    them to you, and you shall read the account of them at your
    leisure in the sacred registers. In the first place, there was a
    caste of priests among the ancient Athenians, and another of
    artisans; also castes of shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen, and
    lastly of warriors, who, like the warriors of Egypt, were
    separated from the rest, and carried shields and spears, a custom
    which the goddess first taught you, and then the Asiatics, and we
    among Asiatics first received from her.

    Observe again, what care
    the law took in the pursuit of wisdom, searching out the deep
    things of the world, and applying them to the use of man. The
    spot of earth which the goddess chose had the best of climates,
    and produced the wisest men; in no other was she herself, the
    philosopher and warrior goddess, so likely to have votaries. And
    there you dwelt as became the children of the gods, excelling all
    men in virtue, and many famous actions are recorded of you. The
    most famous of them all was the overthrow of the island of
    Atlantis.

    This great island lay over against the Pillars of
    Heracles, in extent greater than Libya and Asia put together, and
    was the passage to other islands and to a great ocean of which
    the Mediterranean sea was only the harbour; and within the
    Pillars the empire of Atlantis reached in Europe to Tyrrhenia and
    in Libya to Egypt.

    This mighty power was arrayed against Egypt
    and Hellas and all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean.
    Then your city did bravely, and won renown over the whole earth.
    For at the peril of her own existence, and when the other
    Hellenes had deserted her, she repelled the invader, and of her
    own accord gave liberty to all the nations within the Pillars. A
    little while afterwards there were great earthquakes and floods,
    and your warrior race all sank into the earth; and the great
    island of Atlantis also disappeared in the sea.

    This is the
    explanation of the shallows which are found in that part of the
    Atlantic ocean.’

    Such was the tale, Socrates, which Critias heard from Solon; and
    I noticed when listening to you yesterday, how close the
    resemblance was between your city and citizens and the ancient
    Athenian State. But I would not speak at the time, because I
    wanted to refresh my memory. I had heard the old man when I was a
    child, and though I could not remember the whole of our
    yesterday’s discourse, I was able to recall every word of this,
    which is branded into my mind; and I am prepared, Socrates, to
    rehearse to you the entire narrative.

    The imaginary State which
    you were describing may be identified with the reality of Solon,
    and our antediluvian ancestors may be your citizens. ‘That is
    excellent, Critias, and very appropriate to a Panathenaic
    festival; the truth of the story is a great advantage.’ Then now
    let me explain to you the order of our entertainment; first,
    Timaeus, who is a natural philosopher, will speak of the origin
    of the world, going down to the creation of man, and then I shall
    receive the men whom he has created, and some of whom will have
    been educated by you, and introduce them to you as the lost
    Athenian citizens of whom the Egyptian record spoke.

    As the law
    of Solon prescribes, we will bring them into court and
    acknowledge their claims to citizenship. ‘I see,’ replied
    Socrates, ‘that I shall be well entertained; and do you, Timaeus,
    offer up a prayer and begin.’

    TIMAEUS: All men who have any right feeling, at the beginning of
    any enterprise, call upon the Gods; and he who is about to speak
    of the origin of the universe has a special need of their aid.
    May my words be acceptable to them, and may I speak in the manner
    which will be most intelligible to you and will best express my
    own meaning!

    First, I must distinguish between that which always is and never
    becomes and which is apprehended by reason and reflection, and
    that which always becomes and never is and is conceived by
    opinion with the help of sense. All that becomes and is created
    is the work of a cause, and that is fair which the artificer
    makes after an eternal pattern, but whatever is fashioned after a
    created pattern is not fair. Is the world created or
    uncreated?—that is the first question.

    Created, I reply, being
    visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible;
    and if sensible, then created; and if created, made by a cause,
    and the cause is the ineffable father of all things, who had
    before him an eternal archetype. For to imagine that the
    archetype was created would be blasphemy, seeing that the world
    is the noblest of creations, and God is the best of causes. And
    the world being thus created according to the eternal pattern is
    the copy of something; and we may assume that words are akin to
    the matter of which they speak.

    What is spoken of the unchanging
    or intelligible must be certain and true; but what is spoken of
    the created image can only be probable; being is to becoming what
    truth is to belief. And amid the variety of opinions which have
    arisen about God and the nature of the world we must be content
    to take probability for our rule, considering that I, who am the
    speaker, and you, who are the judges, are only men; to
    probability we may attain but no further.

    SOCRATES: Excellent, Timaeus, I like your manner of approaching
    the subject—proceed.

    TIMAEUS: Why did the Creator make the world?...He was good, and
    therefore not jealous, and being free from jealousy he desired
    that all things should be like himself. Wherefore he set in order
    the visible world, which he found in disorder. Now he who is the
    best could only create the fairest; and reflecting that of
    visible things the intelligent is superior to the unintelligent,
    he put intelligence in soul and soul in body, and framed the
    universe to be the best and fairest work in the order of nature,
    and the world became a living soul through the providence of God.

    In the likeness of what animal was the world made?—that is the
    third question...The form of the perfect animal was a whole, and
    contained all intelligible beings, and the visible animal, made
    after the pattern of this, included all visible creatures.

    Are there many worlds or one only?—that is the fourth
    question...One only. For if in the original there had been more
    than one they would have been the parts of a third, which would
    have been the true pattern of the world; and therefore there is,
    and will ever be, but one created world. Now that which is
    created is of necessity corporeal and visible and
    tangible,—visible and therefore made of fire,—tangible and
    therefore solid and made of earth.

    But two terms must be united
    by a third, which is a mean between them; and had the earth been
    a surface only, one mean would have sufficed, but two means are
    required to unite solid bodies. And as the world was composed of
    solids, between the elements of fire and earth God placed two
    other elements of air and water, and arranged them in a
    continuous proportion—

    fire:air::air:water, and air:water::water:earth,

    and so put together a visible and palpable heaven, having harmony
    and friendship in the union of the four elements; and being at
    unity with itself it was indissoluble except by the hand of the
    framer. Each of the elements was taken into the universe whole
    and entire; for he considered that the animal should be perfect
    and one, leaving no remnants out of which another animal could be
    created, and should also be free from old age and disease, which
    are produced by the action of external forces.

    And as he was to
    contain all things, he was made in the all-containing form of a
    sphere, round as from a lathe and every way equidistant from the
    centre, as was natural and suitable to him. He was finished and
    smooth, having neither eyes nor ears, for there was nothing
    without him which he could see or hear; and he had no need to
    carry food to his mouth, nor was there air for him to breathe;
    and he did not require hands, for there was nothing of which he
    could take hold, nor feet, with which to walk.

    All that he did
    was done rationally in and by himself, and he moved in a circle
    turning within himself, which is the most intellectual of
    motions; but the other six motions were wanting to him; wherefore
    the universe had no feet or legs.

    And so the thought of God made a God in the image of a perfect
    body, having intercourse with himself and needing no other, but
    in every part harmonious and self-contained and truly blessed.
    The soul was first made by him—the elder to rule the younger; not
    in the order in which our wayward fancy has led us to describe
    them, but the soul first and afterwards the body.

    God took of the
    unchangeable and indivisible and also of the divisible and
    corporeal, and out of the two he made a third nature, essence,
    which was in a mean between them, and partook of the same and the
    other, the intractable nature of the other being compressed into
    the same. Having made a compound of all the three, he proceeded
    to divide the entire mass into portions related to one another in
    the ratios of 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, and proceeded to fill up the
    double and triple intervals thus—

    • over 1, 4/3, 3/2, - over 2, 8/3, 3, - over 4, 16/3, 6, - over 8:
    • over 1, 3/2, 2, - over 3, 9/2, 6, - over 9, 27/2, 18, - over 27;

    in which double series of numbers are two kinds of means; the one
    exceeds and is exceeded by equal parts of the extremes, e.g. 1,
    4/3, 2; the other kind of mean is one which is equidistant from
    the extremes—2, 4, 6. In this manner there were formed intervals
    of thirds, 3:2, of fourths, 4:3, and of ninths, 9:8. And next he
    filled up the intervals of a fourth with ninths, leaving a
    remnant which is in the ratio of 256:243.

    The entire compound was
    divided by him lengthways into two parts, which he united at the
    centre like the letter X, and bent into an inner and outer circle
    or sphere, cutting one another again at a point over against the
    point at which they cross. The outer circle or sphere was named
    the sphere of the same—the inner, the sphere of the other or
    diverse; and the one revolved horizontally to the right, the
    other diagonally to the left.

    To the sphere of the same which was
    undivided he gave dominion, but the sphere of the other or
    diverse was distributed into seven unequal orbits, having
    intervals in ratios of twos and threes, three of either sort, and
    he bade the orbits move in opposite directions to one
    another—three of them, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, with equal
    swiftness, and the remaining four—the Moon, Saturn, Mars,
    Jupiter, with unequal swiftness to the three and to one another,
    but all in due proportion.

    When the Creator had made the soul he made the body within her;
    and the soul interfused everywhere from the centre to the
    circumference of heaven, herself turning in herself, began a
    divine life of rational and everlasting motion. The body of
    heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of
    reason and harmony, and is the best of creations, being the work
    of the best.

    And being composed of the same, the other, and the
    essence, these three, and also divided and bound in harmonical
    proportion, and revolving within herself—the soul when touching
    anything which has essence, whether divided or undivided, is
    stirred to utter the sameness or diversity of that and some other
    thing, and to tell how and when and where individuals are
    affected or related, whether in the world of change or of
    essence.

    When reason is in the neighbourhood of sense, and the
    circle of the other or diverse is moving truly, then arise true
    opinions and beliefs; when reason is in the sphere of thought,
    and the circle of the same runs smoothly, then intelligence is
    perfected.

    When the Father who begat the world saw the image which he had
    made of the Eternal Gods moving and living, he rejoiced; and in
    his joy resolved, since the archetype was eternal, to make the
    creature eternal as far as this was possible. Wherefore he made
    an image of eternity which is time, having an uniform motion
    according to number, parted into months and days and years, and
    also having greater divisions of past, present, and future.

    These
    all apply to becoming in time, and have no meaning in relation to
    the eternal nature, which ever is and never was or will be; for
    the unchangeable is never older or younger, and when we say that
    he ‘was’ or ‘will be,’ we are mistaken, for these words are
    applicable only to becoming, and not to true being; and equally
    wrong are we in saying that what has become IS become and that
    what becomes IS becoming, and that the non-existent IS
    non-existent...These are the forms of time which imitate eternity
    and move in a circle measured by number.

    Thus was time made in the image of the eternal nature; and it was
    created together with the heavens, in order that if they were
    dissolved, it might perish with them. And God made the sun and
    moon and five other wanderers, as they are called, seven in all,
    and to each of them he gave a body moving in an orbit, being one
    of the seven orbits into which the circle of the other was
    divided.

    He put the moon in the orbit which was nearest to the
    earth, the sun in that next, the morning star and Mercury in the
    orbits which move opposite to the sun but with equal
    swiftness—this being the reason why they overtake and are
    overtaken by one another. All these bodies became living
    creatures, and learnt their appointed tasks, and began to move,
    the nearer more swiftly, the remoter more slowly, according to
    the diagonal movement of the other.

    And since this was controlled
    by the movement of the same, the seven planets in their courses
    appeared to describe spirals; and that appeared fastest which was
    slowest, and that which overtook others appeared to be overtaken
    by them. And God lighted a fire in the second orbit from the
    earth which is called the sun, to give light over the whole
    heaven, and to teach intelligent beings that knowledge of number
    which is derived from the revolution of the same.

    Thus arose day
    and night, which are the periods of the most intelligent nature;
    a month is created by the revolution of the moon, a year by that
    of the sun. Other periods of wonderful length and complexity are
    not observed by men in general; there is moreover a cycle or
    perfect year at the completion of which they all meet and
    coincide...To this end the stars came into being, that the
    created heaven might imitate the eternal nature.

    Thus far the universal animal was made in the divine image, but
    the other animals were not as yet included in him. And God
    created them according to the patterns or species of them which
    existed in the divine original. There are four of them: one of
    gods, another of birds, a third of fishes, and a fourth of
    animals. The gods were made in the form of a circle, which is the
    most perfect figure and the figure of the universe. They were
    created chiefly of fire, that they might be bright, and were made
    to know and follow the best, and to be scattered over the
    heavens, of which they were to be the glory.

    Two kinds of motion
    were assigned to them—first, the revolution in the same and
    around the same, in peaceful unchanging thought of the same; and
    to this was added a forward motion which was under the control of
    the same. Thus then the fixed stars were created, being divine
    and eternal animals, revolving on the same spot, and the
    wandering stars, in their courses, were created in the manner
    already described.

    The earth, which is our nurse, clinging around
    the pole extended through the universe, he made to be the
    guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods
    that are in the interior of heaven. Vain would be the labour of
    telling all the figures of them, moving as in dance, and their
    juxta-positions and approximations, and when and where and behind
    what other stars they appear to disappear—to tell of all this
    without looking at a plan of them would be labour in vain.

    The knowledge of the other gods is beyond us, and we can only
    accept the traditions of the ancients, who were the children of
    the gods, as they said; for surely they must have known their own
    ancestors. Although they give no proof, we must believe them as
    is customary. They tell us that Oceanus and Tethys were the
    children of Earth and Heaven; that Phoreys, Cronos, and Rhea came
    in the next generation, and were followed by Zeus and Here, whose
    brothers and children are known to everybody.

    When all of them, both those who show themselves in the sky, and
    those who retire from view, had come into being, the Creator
    addressed them thus:—‘Gods, sons of gods, my works, if I will,
    are indissoluble. That which is bound may be dissolved, but only
    an evil being would dissolve that which is harmonious and happy.
    And although you are not immortal you shall not die, for I will
    hold you together. Hear me, then:—Three tribes of mortal beings
    have still to be created, but if created by me they would be like
    gods.

    Do ye therefore make them; I will implant in them the seed
    of immortality, and you shall weave together the mortal and
    immortal, and provide food for them, and receive them again in
    death.’ Thus he spake, and poured the remains of the elements
    into the cup in which he had mingled the soul of the universe.
    They were no longer pure as before, but diluted; and the mixture
    he distributed into souls equal in number to the stars, and
    assigned each to a star—then having mounted them, as in a
    chariot, he showed them the nature of the universe, and told them
    of their future birth and human lot.

    They were to be sown in the
    planets, and out of them was to come forth the most religious of
    animals, which would hereafter be called man.

    The souls were to
    be implanted in bodies, which were in a perpetual flux, whence,
    he said, would arise, first, sensation; secondly, love, which is
    a mixture of pleasure and pain; thirdly, fear and anger, and the
    opposite affections: and if they conquered these, they would live
    righteously, but if they were conquered by them, unrighteously.
    He who lived well would return to his native star, and would
    there have a blessed existence; but, if he lived ill, he would
    pass into the nature of a woman, and if he did not then alter his
    evil ways, into the likeness of some animal, until the reason
    which was in him reasserted her sway over the elements of fire,
    air, earth, water, which had engrossed her, and he regained his
    first and better nature.

    Having given this law to his creatures,
    that he might be guiltless of their future evil, he sowed them,
    some in the earth, some in the moon, and some in the other
    planets; and he ordered the younger gods to frame human bodies
    for them and to make the necessary additions to them, and to
    avert from them all but self-inflicted evil.

    Having given these commands, the Creator remained in his own
    nature. And his children, receiving from him the immortal
    principle, borrowed from the world portions of earth, air, fire,
    water, hereafter to be returned, which they fastened together,
    not with the adamantine bonds which bound themselves, but by
    little invisible pegs, making each separate body out of all the
    elements, subject to influx and efflux, and containing the
    courses of the soul. These swelling and surging as in a river
    moved irregularly and irrationally in all the six possible ways,
    forwards, backwards, right, left, up and down.

    But violent as
    were the internal and alimentary fluids, the tide became still
    more violent when the body came into contact with flaming fire,
    or the solid earth, or gliding waters, or the stormy wind; the
    motions produced by these impulses pass through the body to the
    soul and have the name of sensations.

    Uniting with the
    ever-flowing current, they shake the courses of the soul,
    stopping the revolution of the same and twisting in all sorts of
    ways the nature of the other, and the harmonical ratios of twos
    and threes and the mean terms which connect them, until the
    circles are bent and disordered and their motion becomes
    irregular. You may imagine a position of the body in which the
    head is resting upon the ground, and the legs are in the air, and
    the top is bottom and the left right.

    And something similar
    happens when the disordered motions of the soul come into contact
    with any external thing; they say the same or the other in a
    manner which is the very opposite of the truth, and they are
    false and foolish, and have no guiding principle in them. And
    when external impressions enter in, they are really conquered,
    though they seem to conquer.

    By reason of these affections the soul is at first without
    intelligence, but as time goes on the stream of nutriment abates,
    and the courses of the soul regain their proper motion, and
    apprehend the same and the other rightly, and become rational.
    The soul of him who has education is whole and perfect and
    escapes the worst disease, but, if a man’s education be
    neglected, he walks lamely through life and returns good for
    nothing to the world below. This, however, is an after-stage—at
    present, we are only concerned with the creation of the body and
    soul.

    The two divine courses were encased by the gods in a sphere which
    is called the head, and is the god and lord of us. And to this
    they gave the body to be a vehicle, and the members to be
    instruments, having the power of flexion and extension. Such was
    the origin of legs and arms. In the next place, the gods gave a
    forward motion to the human body, because the front part of man
    was the more honourable and had authority. And they put in a face
    in which they inserted organs to minister in all things to the
    providence of the soul.

    They first contrived the eyes, into which
    they conveyed a light akin to the light of day, making it flow
    through the pupils. When the light of the eye is surrounded by
    the light of day, then like falls upon like, and they unite and
    form one body which conveys to the soul the motions of visible
    objects. But when the visual ray goes forth into the darkness,
    then unlike falls upon unlike—the eye no longer sees, and we go
    to sleep.

    The fire or light, when kept in by the eyelids,
    equalizes the inward motions, and there is rest accompanied by
    few dreams; only when the greater motions remain they engender in
    us corresponding visions of the night. And now we shall be able
    to understand the nature of reflections in mirrors. The fires
    from within and from without meet about the smooth and bright
    surface of the mirror; and because they meet in a manner contrary
    to the usual mode, the right and left sides of the object are
    transposed. In a concave mirror the top and bottom are inverted,
    but this is no transposition.

    These are the second causes which God used as his ministers in
    fashioning the world. They are thought by many to be the prime
    causes, but they are not so; for they are destitute of mind and
    reason, and the lover of mind will not allow that there are any
    prime causes other than the rational and invisible ones—these he
    investigates first, and afterwards the causes of things which are
    moved by others, and which work by chance and without order. Of
    the second or concurrent causes of sight I have already spoken,
    and I will now speak of the higher purpose of God in giving us
    eyes.

    Sight is the source of the greatest benefits to us; for if
    our eyes had never seen the sun, stars, and heavens, the words
    which we have spoken would not have been uttered. The sight of
    them and their revolutions has given us the knowledge of number
    and time, the power of enquiry, and philosophy, which is the
    great blessing of human life; not to speak of the lesser benefits
    which even the vulgar can appreciate. God gave us the faculty of
    sight that we might behold the order of the heavens and create a
    corresponding order in our own erring minds.

    To the like end the
    gifts of speech and hearing were bestowed upon us; not for the
    sake of irrational pleasure, but in order that we might harmonize
    the courses of the soul by sympathy with the harmony of sound,
    and cure ourselves of our irregular and graceless ways.

    Thus far we have spoken of the works of mind; and there are other
    works done from necessity, which we must now place beside them;
    for the creation is made up of both, mind persuading necessity as
    far as possible to work out good. Before the heavens there
    existed fire, air, water, earth, which we suppose men to know,
    though no one has explained their nature, and we erroneously
    maintain them to be the letters or elements of the whole,
    although they cannot reasonably be compared even to syllables or
    first compounds.

    I am not now speaking of the first principles of
    things, because I cannot discover them by our present mode of
    enquiry. But as I observed the rule of probability at first, I
    will begin anew, seeking by the grace of God to observe it still.

    In our former discussion I distinguished two kinds of being—the
    unchanging or invisible, and the visible or changing. But now a
    third kind is required, which I shall call the receptacle or
    nurse of generation. There is a difficulty in arriving at an
    exact notion of this third kind, because the four elements
    themselves are of inexact natures and easily pass into one
    another, and are too transient to be detained by any one name;
    wherefore we are compelled to speak of water or fire, not as
    substances, but as qualities. They may be compared to images made
    of gold, which are continually assuming new forms.

    Somebody asks
    what they are; if you do not know, the safest answer is to reply
    that they are gold. In like manner there is a universal nature
    out of which all things are made, and which is like none of them;
    but they enter into and pass out of her, and are made after
    patterns of the true in a wonderful and inexplicable manner.

    The
    containing principle may be likened to a mother, the source or
    spring to a father, the intermediate nature to a child; and we
    may also remark that the matter which receives every variety of
    form must be formless, like the inodorous liquids which are
    prepared to receive scents, or the smooth and soft materials on
    which figures are impressed. In the same way space or matter is
    neither earth nor fire nor air nor water, but an invisible and
    formless being which receives all things, and in an
    incomprehensible manner partakes of the intelligible.

    But we may
    say, speaking generally, that fire is that part of this nature
    which is inflamed, water that which is moistened, and the like.

    Let me ask a question in which a great principle is involved: Is
    there an essence of fire and the other elements, or are there
    only fires visible to sense? I answer in a word: If mind is one
    thing and true opinion another, then there are self-existent
    essences; but if mind is the same with opinion, then the visible
    and corporeal is most real. But they are not the same, and they
    have a different origin and nature.

    The one comes to us by
    instruction, the other by persuasion, the one is rational, the
    other is irrational; the one is movable by persuasion, the other
    immovable; the one is possessed by every man, the other by the
    gods and by very few men. And we must acknowledge that as there
    are two kinds of knowledge, so there are two kinds of being
    corresponding to them; the one uncreated, indestructible,
    immovable, which is seen by intelligence only; the other created,
    which is always becoming in place and vanishing out of place, and
    is apprehended by opinion and sense.

    There is also a third
    nature—that of space, which is indestructible, and is perceived
    by a kind of spurious reason without the help of sense. This is
    presented to us in a dreamy manner, and yet is said to be
    necessary, for we say that all things must be somewhere in space.
    For they are the images of other things and must therefore have a
    separate existence and exist in something (i.e. in space). But
    true reason assures us that while two things (i.e. the idea and
    the image) are different they cannot inhere in one another, so as
    to be one and two at the same time.

    To sum up: Being and generation and space, these three, existed
    before the heavens, and the nurse or vessel of generation,
    moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and taking the forms of
    air and earth, assumed various shapes. By the motion of the
    vessel, the elements were divided, and like grain winnowed by
    fans, the close and heavy particles settled in one place, the
    light and airy ones in another. At first they were without reason
    and measure, and had only certain faint traces of themselves,
    until God fashioned them by figure and number.

    In this, as in
    every other part of creation, I suppose God to have made things,
    as far as was possible, fair and good, out of things not fair and
    good.

    And now I will explain to you the generation of the world by a
    method with which your scientific training will have made you
    familiar. Fire, air, earth, and water are bodies and therefore
    solids, and solids are contained in planes, and plane rectilinear
    figures are made up of triangles. Of triangles there are two
    kinds; one having the opposite sides equal (isosceles), the other
    with unequal sides (scalene). These we may fairly assume to be
    the original elements of fire and the other bodies; what
    principles are prior to these God only knows, and he of men whom
    God loves.

    Next, we must determine what are the four most
    beautiful figures which are unlike one another and yet sometimes
    capable of resolution into one another...Of the two kinds of
    triangles the equal-sided has but one form, the unequal-sided has
    an infinite variety of forms; and there is none more beautiful
    than that which forms the half of an equilateral triangle.

    Let us
    then choose two triangles; one, the isosceles, the other, that
    form of scalene which has the square of the longer side three
    times as great as the square of the lesser side; and affirm that,
    out of these, fire and the other elements have been constructed.

    I was wrong in imagining that all the four elements could be
    generated into and out of one another. For as they are formed,
    three of them from the triangle which has the sides unequal, the
    fourth from the triangle which has equal sides, three can be
    resolved into one another, but the fourth cannot be resolved into
    them nor they into it. So much for their passage into one
    another: I must now speak of their construction.

    From the
    triangle of which the hypotenuse is twice the lesser side the
    three first regular solids are formed—first, the equilateral
    pyramid or tetrahedron; secondly, the octahedron; thirdly, the
    icosahedron; and from the isosceles triangle is formed the cube.
    And there is a fifth figure (which is made out of twelve
    pentagons), the dodecahedron—this God used as a model for the
    twelvefold division of the Zodiac.

    Let us now assign the geometrical forms to their respective
    elements. The cube is the most stable of them because resting on
    a quadrangular plane surface, and composed of isosceles
    triangles. To the earth then, which is the most stable of bodies
    and the most easily modelled of them, may be assigned the form of
    a cube; and the remaining forms to the other elements,—to fire
    the pyramid, to air the octahedron, and to water the
    icosahedron,—according to their degrees of lightness or heaviness
    or power, or want of power, of penetration.

    The single particles
    of any of the elements are not seen by reason of their smallness;
    they only become visible when collected. The ratios of their
    motions, numbers, and other properties, are ordered by the God,
    who harmonized them as far as necessity permitted.

    The probable conclusion is as follows:—Earth, when dissolved by
    the more penetrating element of fire, whether acting immediately
    or through the medium of air or water, is decomposed but not
    transformed. Water, when divided by fire or air, becomes one part
    fire, and two parts air. A volume of air divided becomes two of
    fire. On the other hand, when condensed, two volumes of fire make
    a volume of air; and two and a half parts of air condense into
    one of water.

    Any element which is fastened upon by fire is cut
    by the sharpness of the triangles, until at length, coalescing
    with the fire, it is at rest; for similars are not affected by
    similars. When two kinds of bodies quarrel with one another, then
    the tendency to decomposition continues until the smaller either
    escapes to its kindred element or becomes one with its conqueror.
    And this tendency in bodies to condense or escape is a source of
    motion...Where there is motion there must be a mover, and where
    there is a mover there must be something to move.

    These cannot
    exist in what is uniform, and therefore motion is due to want of
    uniformity. But then why, when things are divided after their
    kinds, do they not cease from motion? The answer is, that the
    circular motion of all things compresses them, and as ‘nature
    abhors a vacuum,’ the finer and more subtle particles of the
    lighter elements, such as fire and air, are thrust into the
    interstices of the larger, each of them penetrating according to
    their rarity, and thus all the elements are on their way up and
    down everywhere and always into their own places.

    Hence there is
    a principle of inequality, and therefore of motion, in all time.

    In the next place, we may observe that there are different kinds
    of fire—(1) flame, (2) light that burns not, (3) the red heat of
    the embers of fire. And there are varieties of air, as for
    example, the pure aether, the opaque mist, and other nameless
    forms. Water, again, is of two kinds, liquid and fusile.

    The
    liquid is composed of small and unequal particles, the fusile of
    large and uniform particles and is more solid, but nevertheless
    melts at the approach of fire, and then spreads upon the earth.
    When the substance cools, the fire passes into the air, which is
    displaced, and forces together and condenses the liquid mass.
    This process is called cooling and congealment. Of the fusile
    kinds the fairest and heaviest is gold; this is hardened by
    filtration through rock, and is of a bright yellow colour. A
    shoot of gold which is darker and denser than the rest is called
    adamant.

    Another kind is called copper, which is harder and yet
    lighter because the interstices are larger than in gold. There is
    mingled with it a fine and small portion of earth which comes out
    in the form of rust. These are a few of the conjectures which
    philosophy forms, when, leaving the eternal nature, she turns for
    innocent recreation to consider the truths of generation.

    Water which is mingled with fire is called liquid because it
    rolls upon the earth, and soft because its bases give way. This
    becomes more equable when separated from fire and air, and then
    congeals into hail or ice, or the looser forms of hoar frost or
    snow. There are other waters which are called juices and are
    distilled through plants.

    Of these we may mention, first, wine,
    which warms the soul as well as the body; secondly, oily
    substances, as for example, oil or pitch; thirdly, honey, which
    relaxes the contracted parts of the mouth and so produces
    sweetness; fourthly, vegetable acid, which is frothy and has a
    burning quality and dissolves the flesh. Of the kinds of earth,
    that which is filtered through water passes into stone; the water
    is broken up by the earth and escapes in the form of air—this in
    turn presses upon the mass of earth, and the earth, compressed
    into an indissoluble union with the remaining water, becomes
    rock.

    Rock, when it is made up of equal particles, is fair and
    transparent, but the reverse when of unequal. Earth is converted
    into pottery when the watery part is suddenly drawn away; or if
    moisture remains, the earth, when fused by fire, becomes, on
    cooling, a stone of a black colour. When the earth is finer and
    of a briny nature then two half-solid bodies are formed by
    separating the water,—soda and salt. The strong compounds of
    earth and water are not soluble by water, but only by fire. Earth
    itself, when not consolidated, is dissolved by water; when
    consolidated, by fire only.

    The cohesion of water, when strong,
    is dissolved by fire only; when weak, either by air or fire, the
    former entering the interstices, the latter penetrating even the
    triangles. Air when strongly condensed is indissoluble by any
    power which does not reach the triangles, and even when not
    strongly condensed is only resolved by fire. Compounds of earth
    and water are unaffected by water while the water occupies the
    interstices in them, but begin to liquefy when fire enters into
    the interstices of the water.

    They are of two kinds, some of
    them, like glass, having more earth, others, like wax, having
    more water in them.

    Having considered objects of sense, we now pass on to sensation.
    But we cannot explain sensation without explaining the nature of
    flesh and of the mortal soul; and as we cannot treat of both
    together, in order that we may proceed at once to the sensations
    we must assume the existence of body and soul.

    What makes fire burn? The fineness of the sides, the sharpness of
    the angles, the smallness of the particles, the quickness of the
    motion. Moreover, the pyramid, which is the figure of fire, is
    more cutting than any other. The feeling of cold is produced by
    the larger particles of moisture outside the body trying to eject
    the smaller ones in the body which they compress. The struggle
    which arises between elements thus unnaturally brought together
    causes shivering. That is hard to which the flesh yields, and
    soft which yields to the flesh, and these two terms are also
    relative to one another.

    The yielding matter is that which has
    the slenderest base, whereas that which has a rectangular base is
    compact and repellent. Light and heavy are wrongly explained with
    reference to a lower and higher in place. For in the universe,
    which is a sphere, there is no opposition of above or below, and
    that which is to us above would be below to a man standing at the
    antipodes. The greater or less difficulty in detaching any
    element from its like is the real cause of heaviness or of
    lightness.

    If you draw the earth into the dissimilar air, the
    particles of earth cling to their native element, and you more
    easily detach a small portion than a large. There would be the
    same difficulty in moving any of the upper elements towards the
    lower. The smooth and the rough are severally produced by the
    union of evenness with compactness, and of hardness with
    inequality.

    Pleasure and pain are the most important of the affections common
    to the whole body. According to our general doctrine of
    sensation, parts of the body which are easily moved readily
    transmit the motion to the mind; but parts which are not easily
    moved have no effect upon the patient. The bones and hair are of
    the latter kind, sight and hearing of the former. Ordinary
    affections are neither pleasant nor painful. The impressions of
    sight afford an example of these, and are neither violent nor
    sudden.

    But sudden replenishments of the body cause pleasure, and
    sudden disturbances, as for example cuttings and burnings, have
    the opposite effect.

    >From sensations common to the whole body, we proceed to those of
    particular parts. The affections of the tongue appear to be
    caused by contraction and dilation, but they have more of
    roughness or smoothness than is found in other affections. Earthy
    particles, entering into the small veins of the tongue which
    reach to the heart, when they melt into and dry up the little
    veins are astringent if they are rough; or if not so rough, they
    are only harsh, and if excessively abstergent, like potash and
    soda, bitter. Purgatives of a weaker sort are called salt and,
    having no bitterness, are rather agreeable.

    Inflammatory bodies,
    which by their lightness are carried up into the head, cutting
    all that comes in their way, are termed pungent.

    But when these
    are refined by putrefaction, and enter the narrow veins of the
    tongue, and meet there particles of earth and air, two kinds of
    globules are formed—one of earthy and impure liquid, which boils
    and ferments, the other of pure and transparent water, which are
    called bubbles; of all these affections the cause is termed acid.
    When, on the other hand, the composition of the deliquescent
    particles is congenial to the tongue, and disposes the parts
    according to their nature, this remedial power in them is called
    sweet.

    Smells are not divided into kinds; all of them are transitional,
    and arise out of the decomposition of one element into another,
    for the simple air or water is without smell. They are vapours or
    mists, thinner than water and thicker than air: and hence in
    drawing in the breath, when there is an obstruction, the air
    passes, but there is no smell. They have no names, but are
    distinguished as pleasant and unpleasant, and their influence
    extends over the whole region from the head to the navel.

    Hearing is the effect of a stroke which is transmitted through
    the ears by means of the air, brain, and blood to the soul,
    beginning at the head and extending to the liver. The sound which
    moves swiftly is acute; that which moves slowly is grave; that
    which is uniform is smooth, and the opposite is harsh. Loudness
    depends on the quantity of the sound. Of the harmony of sounds I
    will hereafter speak.

    Colours are flames which emanate from all bodies, having
    particles corresponding to the sense of sight. Some of the
    particles are less and some larger, and some are equal to the
    parts of the sight. The equal particles appear transparent; the
    larger contract, and the lesser dilate the sight. White is
    produced by the dilation, black by the contraction, of the
    particles of sight. There is also a swifter motion of another
    sort of fire which forces a way through the passages of the eyes,
    and elicits from them a union of fire and water which we call
    tears.

    The inner fire flashes forth, and the outer finds a way in
    and is extinguished in the moisture, and all sorts of colours are
    generated by the mixture. This affection is termed by us
    dazzling, and the object which produces it is called bright.
    There is yet another sort of fire which mingles with the moisture
    of the eye without flashing, and produces a colour like blood—to
    this we give the name of red. A bright element mingling with red
    and white produces a colour which we call auburn.

    The law of
    proportion, however, according to which compound colours are
    formed, cannot be determined scientifically or even probably.
    Red, when mingled with black and white, gives a purple hue, which
    becomes umber when the colours are burnt and there is a larger
    admixture of black. Flame-colour is a mixture of auburn and dun;
    dun of white and black; yellow of white and auburn. White and
    bright meeting, and falling upon a full black, become dark blue;
    dark blue mingling with white becomes a light blue; the union of
    flame-colour and black makes leek-green.

    There is no difficulty
    in seeing how other colours are probably composed. But he who
    should attempt to test the truth of this by experiment, would
    forget the difference of the human and divine nature. God only is
    able to compound and resolve substances; such experiments are
    impossible to man.

    These are the elements of necessity which the Creator received in
    the world of generation when he made the all-sufficient and
    perfect creature, using the secondary causes as his ministers,
    but himself fashioning the good in all things. For there are two
    sorts of causes, the one divine, the other necessary; and we
    should seek to discover the divine above all, and, for their
    sake, the necessary, because without them the higher cannot be
    attained by us.

    Having now before us the causes out of which the rest of our
    discourse is to be framed, let us go back to the point at which
    we began, and add a fair ending to our tale. As I said at first,
    all things were originally a chaos in which there was no order or
    proportion. The elements of this chaos were arranged by the
    Creator, and out of them he made the world. Of the divine he
    himself was the author, but he committed to his offspring the
    creation of the mortal.

    From him they received the immortal soul,
    but themselves made the body to be its vehicle, and constructed
    within another soul which was mortal, and subject to terrible
    affections—pleasure, the inciter of evil; pain, which deters from
    good; rashness and fear, foolish counsellors; anger hard to be
    appeased; hope easily led astray. These they mingled with
    irrational sense and all-daring love according to necessary laws
    and so framed man. And, fearing to pollute the divine element,
    they gave the mortal soul a separate habitation in the breast,
    parted off from the head by a narrow isthmus.

    And as in a house
    the women’s apartments are divided from the men’s, the cavity of
    the thorax was divided into two parts, a higher and a lower. The
    higher of the two, which is the seat of courage and anger, lies
    nearer to the head, between the midriff and the neck, and assists
    reason in restraining the desires. The heart is the house of
    guard in which all the veins meet, and through them reason sends
    her commands to the extremity of her kingdom.

    When the passions
    are in revolt, or danger approaches from without, then the heart
    beats and swells; and the creating powers, knowing this,
    implanted in the body the soft and bloodless substance of the
    lung, having a porous and springy nature like a sponge, and being
    kept cool by drink and air which enters through the trachea.

    The part of the soul which desires meat and drink was placed
    between the midriff and navel, where they made a sort of manger;
    and here they bound it down, like a wild animal, away from the
    council-chamber, and leaving the better principle undisturbed to
    advise quietly for the good of the whole. For the Creator knew
    that the belly would not listen to reason, and was under the
    power of idols and fancies.

    Wherefore he framed the liver to
    connect with the lower nature, contriving that it should be
    compact, and bright, and sweet, and also bitter and smooth, in
    order that the power of thought which originates in the mind
    might there be reflected, terrifying the belly with the elements
    of bitterness and gall, and a suffusion of bilious colours when
    the liver is contracted, and causing pain and misery by twisting
    out of its place the lobe and closing up the vessels and gates.
    And the converse happens when some gentle inspiration coming from
    intelligence mirrors the opposite fancies, giving rest and
    sweetness and freedom, and at night, moderation and peace
    accompanied with prophetic insight, when reason and sense are
    asleep.

    For the authors of our being, in obedience to their
    Father’s will and in order to make men as good as they could,
    gave to the liver the power of divination, which is never active
    when men are awake or in health; but when they are under the
    influence of some disorder or enthusiasm then they receive
    intimations, which have to be interpreted by others who are
    called prophets, but should rather be called interpreters of
    prophecy; after death these intimations become unintelligible.
    The spleen which is situated in the neighbourhood, on the left
    side, keeps the liver bright and clean, as a napkin does a
    mirror, and the evacuations of the liver are received into it;
    and being a hollow tissue it is for a time swollen with these
    impurities, but when the body is purged it returns to its natural
    size.

    The truth concerning the soul can only be established by the word
    of God. Still, we may venture to assert what is probable both
    concerning soul and body.

    The creative powers were aware of our tendency to excess. And so
    when they made the belly to be a receptacle for food, in order
    that men might not perish by insatiable gluttony, they formed the
    convolutions of the intestines, in this way retarding the passage
    of food through the body, lest mankind should be absorbed in
    eating and drinking, and the whole race become impervious to
    divine philosophy.

    The creation of bones and flesh was on this wise. The foundation
    of these is the marrow which binds together body and soul, and
    the marrow is made out of such of the primary triangles as are
    adapted by their perfection to produce all the four elements.
    These God took and mingled them in due proportion, making as many
    kinds of marrow as there were hereafter to be kinds of souls. The
    receptacle of the divine soul he made round, and called that
    portion of the marrow brain, intending that the vessel containing
    this substance should be the head.

    The remaining part he divided
    into long and round figures, and to these as to anchors,
    fastening the mortal soul, he proceeded to make the rest of the
    body, first forming for both parts a covering of bone. The bone
    was formed by sifting pure smooth earth and wetting it with
    marrow. It was then thrust alternately into fire and water, and
    thus rendered insoluble by either. Of bone he made a globe which
    he placed around the brain, leaving a narrow opening, and around
    the marrow of the neck and spine he formed the vertebrae, like
    hinges, which extended from the head through the whole of the
    trunk.

    And as the bone was brittle and liable to mortify and
    destroy the marrow by too great rigidity and susceptibility to
    heat and cold, he contrived sinews and flesh—the first to give
    flexibility, the second to guard against heat and cold, and to be
    a protection against falls, containing a warm moisture, which in
    summer exudes and cools the body, and in winter is a defence
    against cold. Having this in view, the Creator mingled earth with
    fire and water and mixed with them a ferment of acid and salt, so
    as to form pulpy flesh.

    But the sinews he made of a mixture of
    bone and unfermented flesh, giving them a mean nature between the
    two, and a yellow colour. Hence they were more glutinous than
    flesh, but softer than bone. The bones which have most of the
    living soul within them he covered with the thinnest film of
    flesh, those which have least of it, he lodged deeper. At the
    joints he diminished the flesh in order not to impede the flexure
    of the limbs, and also to avoid clogging the perceptions of the
    mind.

    About the thighs and arms, which have no sense because
    there is little soul in the marrow, and about the inner bones, he
    laid the flesh thicker. For where the flesh is thicker there is
    less feeling, except in certain parts which the Creator has made
    solely of flesh, as for example, the tongue. Had the combination
    of solid bone and thick flesh been consistent with acute
    perceptions, the Creator would have given man a sinewy and fleshy
    head, and then he would have lived twice as long.

    But our
    creators were of opinion that a shorter life which was better was
    preferable to a longer which was worse, and therefore they
    covered the head with thin bone, and placed the sinews at the
    extremity of the head round the neck, and fastened the jawbones
    to them below the face. And they framed the mouth, having teeth
    and tongue and lips, with a view to the necessary and the good;
    for food is a necessity, and the river of speech is the best of
    rivers.

    Still, the head could not be left a bare globe of bone on
    account of the extremes of heat and cold, nor be allowed to
    become dull and senseless by an overgrowth of flesh. Wherefore it
    was covered by a peel or skin which met and grew by the help of
    the cerebral humour. The diversity of the sutures was caused by
    the struggle of the food against the courses of the soul. The
    skin of the head was pierced by fire, and out of the punctures
    came forth a moisture, part liquid, and part of a skinny nature,
    which was hardened by the pressure of the external cold and
    became hair.

    And God gave hair to the head of man to be a light
    covering, so that it might not interfere with his perceptions.
    Nails were formed by combining sinew, skin, and bone, and were
    made by the creators with a view to the future when, as they
    knew, women and other animals who would require them would be
    framed out of man.

    The gods also mingled natures akin to that of man with other
    forms and perceptions. Thus trees and plants were created, which
    were originally wild and have been adapted by cultivation to our
    use. They partake of that third kind of life which is seated
    between the midriff and the navel, and is altogether passive and
    incapable of reflection.

    When the creators had furnished all these natures for our
    sustenance, they cut channels through our bodies as in a garden,
    watering them with a perennial stream. Two were cut down the
    back, along the back bone, where the skin and flesh meet, one on
    the right and the other on the left, having the marrow of
    generation between them. In the next place, they divided the
    veins about the head and interlaced them with each other in order
    that they might form an additional link between the head and the
    body, and that the sensations from both sides might be diffused
    throughout the body.

    In the third place, they contrived the
    passage of liquids, which may be explained in this way:—Finer
    bodies retain coarser, but not the coarser the finer, and the
    belly is capable of retaining food, but not fire and air. God
    therefore formed a network of fire and air to irrigate the veins,
    having within it two lesser nets, and stretched cords reaching
    from both the lesser nets to the extremity of the outer net. The
    inner parts of the net were made by him of fire, the lesser nets
    and their cavities of air.

    The two latter he made to pass into
    the mouth; the one ascending by the air-pipes from the lungs, the
    other by the side of the air-pipes from the belly. The entrance
    to the first he divided into two parts, both of which he made to
    meet at the channels of the nose, that when the mouth was closed
    the passage connected with it might still be fed with air.

    The
    cavity of the network he spread around the hollows of the body,
    making the entire receptacle to flow into and out of the lesser
    nets and the lesser nets into and out of it, while the outer net
    found a way into and out of the pores of the body, and the
    internal heat followed the air to and fro. These, as we affirm,
    are the phenomena of respiration. And all this process takes
    place in order that the body may be watered and cooled and
    nourished, and the meat and drink digested and liquefied and
    carried into the veins.

    The causes of respiration have now to be considered. The
    exhalation of the breath through the mouth and nostrils displaces
    the external air, and at the same time leaves a vacuum into which
    through the pores the air which is displaced enters. Also the
    vacuum which is made when the air is exhaled through the pores is
    filled up by the inhalation of breath through the mouth and
    nostrils. The explanation of this double phenomenon is as
    follows:—Elements move towards their natural places.

    Now as every
    animal has within him a fountain of fire, the air which is
    inhaled through the mouth and nostrils, on coming into contact
    with this, is heated; and when heated, in accordance with the law
    of attraction, it escapes by the way it entered toward the place
    of fire. On leaving the body it is cooled and drives round the
    air which it displaces through the pores into the empty lungs.
    This again is in turn heated by the internal fire and escapes, as
    it entered, through the pores.

    The phenomena of medical cupping-glasses, of swallowing, and of
    the hurling of bodies, are to be explained on a similar
    principle; as also sounds, which are sometimes discordant on
    account of the inequality of them, and again harmonious by reason
    of equality. The slower sounds reaching the swifter, when they
    begin to pause, by degrees assimilate with them: whence arises a
    pleasure which even the unwise feel, and which to the wise
    becomes a higher sense of delight, being an imitation of divine
    harmony in mortal motions.

    Streams flow, lightnings play, amber
    and the magnet attract, not by reason of attraction, but because
    ‘nature abhors a vacuum,’ and because things, when compounded or
    dissolved, move different ways, each to its own place.

    I will now return to the phenomena of respiration. The fire,
    entering the belly, minces the food, and as it escapes, fills the
    veins by drawing after it the divided portions, and thus the
    streams of nutriment are diffused through the body. The fruits or
    herbs which are our daily sustenance take all sorts of colours
    when intermixed, but the colour of red or fire predominates, and
    hence the liquid which we call blood is red, being the nurturing
    principle of the body, whence all parts are watered and empty
    places filled.

    The process of repletion and depletion is produced by the
    attraction of like to like, after the manner of the universal
    motion. The external elements by their attraction are always
    diminishing the substance of the body: the particles of blood,
    too, formed out of the newly digested food, are attracted towards
    kindred elements within the body and so fill up the void. When
    more is taken away than flows in, then we decay; and when less,
    we grow and increase.

    The young of every animal has the triangles new and closely
    locked together, and yet the entire frame is soft and delicate,
    being newly made of marrow and nurtured on milk. These triangles
    are sharper than those which enter the body from without in the
    shape of food, and therefore they cut them up. But as life
    advances, the triangles wear out and are no longer able to
    assimilate food; and at length, when the bonds which unite the
    triangles of the marrow become undone, they in turn unloose the
    bonds of the soul; and if the release be according to nature, she
    then flies away with joy.

    For the death which is natural is
    pleasant, but that which is caused by violence is painful.

    Every one may understand the origin of diseases. They may be
    occasioned by the disarrangement or disproportion of the elements
    out of which the body is framed. This is the origin of many of
    them, but the worst of all owe their severity to the following
    causes: There is a natural order in the human frame according to
    which the flesh and sinews are made of blood, the sinews out of
    the fibres, and the flesh out of the congealed substance which is
    formed by separation from the fibres.

    The glutinous matter which
    comes away from the sinews and the flesh, not only binds the
    flesh to the bones, but nourishes the bones and waters the
    marrow. When these processes take place in regular order the body
    is in health.

    But when the flesh wastes and returns into the veins there is
    discoloured blood as well as air in the veins, having acid and
    salt qualities, from which is generated every sort of phlegm and
    bile. All things go the wrong way and cease to give nourishment
    to the body, no longer preserving their natural courses, but at
    war with themselves and destructive to the constitution of the
    body. The oldest part of the flesh which is hard to decompose
    blackens from long burning, and from being corroded grows bitter,
    and as the bitter element refines away, becomes acid.

    When tinged
    with blood the bitter substance has a red colour, and this when
    mixed with black takes the hue of grass; or again, the bitter
    substance has an auburn colour, when new flesh is decomposed by
    the internal flame. To all which phenomena some physician or
    philosopher who was able to see the one in many has given the
    name of bile. The various kinds of bile have names answering to
    their colours.

    Lymph or serum is of two kinds: first, the whey of
    blood, which is gentle; secondly, the secretion of dark and
    bitter bile, which, when mingled under the influence of heat with
    salt, is malignant and is called acid phlegm. There is also white
    phlegm, formed by the decomposition of young and tender flesh,
    and covered with little bubbles, separately invisible, but
    becoming visible when collected. The water of tears and
    perspiration and similar substances is also the watery part of
    fresh phlegm.

    All these humours become sources of disease when
    the blood is replenished in irregular ways and not by food or
    drink. The danger, however, is not so great when the foundation
    remains, for then there is a possibility of recovery.

    But when
    the substance which unites the flesh and bones is diseased, and
    is no longer renewed from the muscles and sinews, and instead of
    being oily and smooth and glutinous becomes rough and salt and
    dry, then the fleshy parts fall away and leave the sinews bare
    and full of brine, and the flesh gets back again into the
    circulation of the blood, and makes the previously mentioned
    disorders still greater.

    There are other and worse diseases which
    are prior to these; as when the bone through the density of the
    flesh does not receive sufficient air, and becomes stagnant and
    gangrened, and crumbling away passes into the food, and the food
    into the flesh, and the flesh returns again into the blood. Worst
    of all and most fatal is the disease of the marrow, by which the
    whole course of the body is reversed. There is a third class of
    diseases which are produced, some by wind and some by phlegm and
    some by bile.

    When the lung, which is the steward of the air, is
    obstructed, by rheums, and in one part no air, and in another too
    much, enters in, then the parts which are unrefreshed by air
    corrode, and other parts are distorted by the excess of air; and
    in this manner painful diseases are produced. The most painful
    are caused by wind generated within the body, which gets about
    the great sinews of the shoulders—these are termed tetanus. The
    cure of them is difficult, and in most cases they are relieved
    only by fever.

    White phlegm, which is dangerous if kept in, by
    reason of the air bubbles, is not equally dangerous if able to
    escape through the pores, although it variegates the body,
    generating diverse kinds of leprosies. If, when mingled with
    black bile, it disturbs the courses of the head in sleep, there
    is not so much danger; but if it assails those who are awake,
    then the attack is far more dangerous, and is called epilepsy or
    the sacred disease. Acid and salt phlegm is the source of
    catarrh.

    Inflammations originate in bile, which is sometimes relieved by
    boils and swellings, but when detained, and above all when
    mingled with pure blood, generates many inflammatory disorders,
    disturbing the position of the fibres which are scattered about
    in the blood in order to maintain the balance of rare and dense
    which is necessary to its regular circulation. If the bile, which
    is only stale blood, or liquefied flesh, comes in little by
    little, it is congealed by the fibres and produces internal cold
    and shuddering.

    But when it enters with more of a flood it
    overcomes the fibres by its heat and reaches the spinal marrow,
    and burning up the cables of the soul sets her free from the
    body. When on the other hand the body, though wasted, still holds
    out, then the bile is expelled, like an exile from a factious
    state, causing associating diarrhoeas and dysenteries and similar
    disorders.

    The body which is diseased from the effects of fire is
    in a continual fever; when air is the agent, the fever is
    quotidian; when water, the fever intermits a day; when earth,
    which is the most sluggish element, the fever intermits three
    days and is with difficulty shaken off.

    Of mental disorders there are two sorts, one madness, the other
    ignorance, and they may be justly attributed to disease.
    Excessive pleasures or pains are among the greatest diseases, and
    deprive men of their senses. When the seed about the spinal
    marrow is too abundant, the body has too great pleasures and
    pains; and during a great part of his life he who is the subject
    of them is more or less mad. He is often thought bad, but this is
    a mistake; for the truth is that the intemperance of lust is due
    to the fluidity of the marrow produced by the loose consistency
    of the bones.

    And this is true of vice in general, which is
    commonly regarded as disgraceful, whereas it is really
    involuntary and arises from a bad habit of the body and evil
    education. In like manner the soul is often made vicious by the
    influence of bodily pain; the briny phlegm and other bitter and
    bilious humours wander over the body and find no exit, but are
    compressed within, and mingle their own vapours with the motions
    of the soul, and are carried to the three places of the soul,
    creating infinite varieties of trouble and melancholy, of
    rashness and cowardice, of forgetfulness and stupidity.

    When men
    are in this evil plight of body, and evil forms of government and
    evil discourses are superadded, and there is no education to save
    them, they are corrupted through two causes; but of neither of
    them are they really the authors. For the planters are to blame
    rather than the plants, the educators and not the educated.
    Still, we should endeavour to attain virtue and avoid vice; but
    this is part of another subject.

    Enough of disease—I have now to speak of the means by which the
    mind and body are to be preserved, a higher theme than the other.
    The good is the beautiful, and the beautiful is the symmetrical,
    and there is no greater or fairer symmetry than that of body and
    soul, as the contrary is the greatest of deformities. A leg or an
    arm too long or too short is at once ugly and unserviceable, and
    the same is true if body and soul are disproportionate. For a
    strong and impassioned soul may ‘fret the pigmy body to decay,’
    and so produce convulsions and other evils.

    The violence of
    controversy, or the earnestness of enquiry, will often generate
    inflammations and rheums which are not understood, or assigned to
    their true cause by the professors of medicine. And in like
    manner the body may be too much for the soul, darkening the
    reason, and quickening the animal desires. The only security is
    to preserve the balance of the two, and to this end the
    mathematician or philosopher must practise gymnastics, and the
    gymnast must cultivate music. The parts of the body too must be
    treated in the same way—they should receive their appropriate
    exercise.

    For the body is set in motion when it is heated and
    cooled by the elements which enter in, or is dried up and
    moistened by external things; and, if given up to these processes
    when at rest, it is liable to destruction. But the natural
    motion, as in the world, so also in the human frame, produces
    harmony and divides hostile powers.

    The best exercise is the
    spontaneous motion of the body, as in gymnastics, because most
    akin to the motion of mind; not so good is the motion of which
    the source is in another, as in sailing or riding; least good
    when the body is at rest and the motion is in parts only, which
    is a species of motion imparted by physic. This should only be
    resorted to by men of sense in extreme cases; lesser diseases are
    not to be irritated by medicine.

    For every disease is akin to the
    living being and has an appointed term, just as life has, which
    depends on the form of the triangles, and cannot be protracted
    when they are worn out. And he who, instead of accepting his
    destiny, endeavours to prolong his life by medicine, is likely to
    multiply and magnify his diseases. Regimen and not medicine is
    the true cure, when a man has time at his disposal.

    Enough of the nature of man and of the body, and of training and
    education. The subject is a great one and cannot be adequately
    treated as an appendage to another. To sum up all in a word:
    there are three kinds of soul located within us, and any one of
    them, if remaining inactive, becomes very weak; if exercised,
    very strong. Wherefore we should duly train and exercise all
    three kinds.

    The divine soul God lodged in the head, to raise us, like plants
    which are not of earthly origin, to our kindred; for the head is
    nearest to heaven. He who is intent upon the gratification of his
    desires and cherishes the mortal soul, has all his ideas mortal,
    and is himself mortal in the truest sense.

    But he who seeks after
    knowledge and exercises the divine part of himself in godly and
    immortal thoughts, attains to truth and immortality, as far as is
    possible to man, and also to happiness, while he is training up
    within him the divine principle and indwelling power of order.
    There is only one way in which one person can benefit another;
    and that is by assigning to him his proper nurture and motion. To
    the motions of the soul answer the motions of the universe, and
    by the study of these the individual is restored to his original
    nature.

    Thus we have finished the discussion of the universe, which,
    according to our original intention, has now been brought down to
    the creation of man. Completeness seems to require that something
    should be briefly said about other animals: first of women, who
    are probably degenerate and cowardly men.

    And when they
    degenerated, the gods implanted in men the desire of union with
    them, creating in man one animate substance and in woman another
    in the following manner:—The outlet for liquids they connected
    with the living principle of the spinal marrow, which the man has
    the desire to emit into the fruitful womb of the woman; this is
    like a fertile field in which the seed is quickened and matured,
    and at last brought to light.

    When this desire is unsatisfied the
    man is over-mastered by the power of the generative organs, and
    the woman is subjected to disorders from the obstruction of the
    passages of the breath, until the two meet and pluck the fruit of
    the tree.

    The race of birds was created out of innocent, light-minded men,
    who thought to pursue the study of the heavens by sight; these
    were transformed into birds, and grew feathers instead of hair.
    The race of wild animals were men who had no philosophy, and
    never looked up to heaven or used the courses of the head, but
    followed only the influences of passion. Naturally they turned to
    their kindred earth, and put their forelegs to the ground, and
    their heads were crushed into strange oblong forms.

    Some of them
    have four feet, and some of them more than four,—the latter, who
    are the more senseless, drawing closer to their native element;
    the most senseless of all have no limbs and trail their whole
    body on the ground. The fourth kind are the inhabitants of the
    waters; these are made out of the most senseless and ignorant and
    impure of men, whom God placed in the uttermost parts of the
    world in return for their utter ignorance, and caused them to
    respire water instead of the pure element of air. Such are the
    laws by which animals pass into one another.

    And so the world received animals, mortal and immortal, and was
    fulfilled with them, and became a visible God, comprehending the
    visible, made in the image of the Intellectual, being the one
    perfect only-begotten heaven.

    Section 2.

    Nature in the aspect which she presented to a Greek philosopher
    of the fourth century before Christ is not easily reproduced to
    modern eyes. The associations of mythology and poetry have to be
    added, and the unconscious influence of science has to be
    subtracted, before we can behold the heavens or the earth as they
    appeared to the Greek. The philosopher himself was a child and
    also a man—a child in the range of his attainments, but also a
    great intelligence having an insight into nature, and often
    anticipations of the truth.

    He was full of original thoughts, and
    yet liable to be imposed upon by the most obvious fallacies. He
    occasionally confused numbers with ideas, and atoms with numbers;
    his a priori notions were out of all proportion to his
    experience. He was ready to explain the phenomena of the heavens
    by the most trivial analogies of earth. The experiments which
    nature worked for him he sometimes accepted, but he never tried
    experiments for himself which would either prove or disprove his
    theories.

    His knowledge was unequal; while in some branches, such
    as medicine and astronomy, he had made considerable proficiency,
    there were others, such as chemistry, electricity, mechanics, of
    which the very names were unknown to him. He was the natural
    enemy of mythology, and yet mythological ideas still retained
    their hold over him.

    He was endeavouring to form a conception of
    principles, but these principles or ideas were regarded by him as
    real powers or entities, to which the world had been subjected.
    He was always tending to argue from what was near to what was
    remote, from what was known to what was unknown, from man to the
    universe, and back again from the universe to man. While he was
    arranging the world, he was arranging the forms of thought in his
    own mind; and the light from within and the light from without
    often crossed and helped to confuse one another.

    He might be
    compared to a builder engaged in some great design, who could
    only dig with his hands because he was unprovided with common
    tools; or to some poet or musician, like Tynnichus (Ion), obliged
    to accommodate his lyric raptures to the limits of the tetrachord
    or of the flute.

    The Hesiodic and Orphic cosmogonies were a phase of thought
    intermediate between mythology and philosophy and had a great
    influence on the beginnings of knowledge. There was nothing
    behind them; they were to physical science what the poems of
    Homer were to early Greek history. They made men think of the
    world as a whole; they carried the mind back into the infinity of
    past time; they suggested the first observation of the effects of
    fire and water on the earth’s surface. To the ancient physics
    they stood much in the same relation which geology does to modern
    science.

    But the Greek was not, like the enquirer of the last
    generation, confined to a period of six thousand years; he was
    able to speculate freely on the effects of infinite ages in the
    production of physical phenomena. He could imagine cities which
    had existed time out of mind (States.; Laws), laws or forms of
    art and music which had lasted, ‘not in word only, but in very
    truth, for ten thousand years’ (Laws); he was aware that natural
    phenomena like the Delta of the Nile might have slowly
    accumulated in long periods of time (Hdt.).

    But he seems to have
    supposed that the course of events was recurring rather than
    progressive. To this he was probably led by the fixedness of
    Egyptian customs and the general observation that there were
    other civilisations in the world more ancient than that of
    Hellas.

    The ancient philosophers found in mythology many ideas which, if
    not originally derived from nature, were easily transferred to
    her—such, for example, as love or hate, corresponding to
    attraction or repulsion; or the conception of necessity allied
    both to the regularity and irregularity of nature; or of chance,
    the nameless or unknown cause; or of justice, symbolizing the law
    of compensation; are of the Fates and Furies, typifying the fixed
    order or the extraordinary convulsions of nature. Their own
    interpretations of Homer and the poets were supposed by them to
    be the original meaning.

    Musing in themselves on the phenomena of
    nature, they were relieved at being able to utter the thoughts of
    their hearts in figures of speech which to them were not figures,
    and were already consecrated by tradition. Hesiod and the Orphic
    poets moved in a region of half-personification in which the
    meaning or principle appeared through the person. In their vaster
    conceptions of Chaos, Erebus, Aether, Night, and the like, the
    first rude attempts at generalization are dimly seen. The Gods
    themselves, especially the greater Gods, such as Zeus, Poseidon,
    Apollo, Athene, are universals as well as individuals.

    They were
    gradually becoming lost in a common conception of mind or God.
    They continued to exist for the purposes of ritual or of art; but
    from the sixth century onwards or even earlier there arose and
    gained strength in the minds of men the notion of ‘one God,
    greatest among Gods and men, who was all sight, all hearing, all
    knowing’ (Xenophanes).

    Under the influence of such ideas, perhaps also deriving from the
    traditions of their own or of other nations scraps of medicine
    and astronomy, men came to the observation of nature. The Greek
    philosopher looked at the blue circle of the heavens and it
    flashed upon him that all things were one; the tumult of sense
    abated, and the mind found repose in the thought which former
    generations had been striving to realize. The first expression of
    this was some element, rarefied by degrees into a pure
    abstraction, and purged from any tincture of sense.

    Soon an inner
    world of ideas began to be unfolded, more absorbing, more
    overpowering, more abiding than the brightest of visible objects,
    which to the eye of the philosopher looking inward, seemed to
    pale before them, retaining only a faint and precarious
    existence. At the same time, the minds of men parted into the two
    great divisions of those who saw only a principle of motion, and
    of those who saw only a principle of rest, in nature and in
    themselves; there were born Heracliteans or Eleatics, as there
    have been in later ages born Aristotelians or Platonists.

    Like
    some philosophers in modern times, who are accused of making a
    theory first and finding their facts afterwards, the advocates of
    either opinion never thought of applying either to themselves or
    to their adversaries the criterion of fact. They were mastered by
    their ideas and not masters of them. Like the Heraclitean
    fanatics whom Plato has ridiculed in the Theaetetus, they were
    incapable of giving a reason of the faith that was in them, and
    had all the animosities of a religious sect.

    Yet, doubtless,
    there was some first impression derived from external nature,
    which, as in mythology, so also in philosophy, worked upon the
    minds of the first thinkers. Though incapable of induction or
    generalization in the modern sense, they caught an inspiration
    from the external world.

    The most general facts or appearances of
    nature, the circle of the universe, the nutritive power of water,
    the air which is the breath of life, the destructive force of
    fire, the seeming regularity of the greater part of nature and
    the irregularity of a remnant, the recurrence of day and night
    and of the seasons, the solid earth and the impalpable aether,
    were always present to them.

    The great source of error and also the beginning of truth to them
    was reasoning from analogy; they could see resemblances, but not
    differences; and they were incapable of distinguishing
    illustration from argument. Analogy in modern times only points
    the way, and is immediately verified by experiment. The dreams
    and visions, which pass through the philosopher’s mind, of
    resemblances between different classes of substances, or between
    the animal and vegetable world, are put into the refiner’s fire,
    and the dross and other elements which adhere to them are purged
    away.

    But the contemporary of Plato and Socrates was incapable of
    resisting the power of any analogy which occurred to him, and was
    drawn into any consequences which seemed to follow. He had no
    methods of difference or of concomitant variations, by the use of
    which he could distinguish the accidental from the essential. He
    could not isolate phenomena, and he was helpless against the
    influence of any word which had an equivocal or double sense.

    Yet without this crude use of analogy the ancient physical
    philosopher would have stood still; he could not have made even
    ‘one guess among many’ without comparison. The course of natural
    phenomena would have passed unheeded before his eyes, like fair
    sights or musical sounds before the eyes and ears of an animal.
    Even the fetichism of the savage is the beginning of reasoning;
    the assumption of the most fanciful of causes indicates a higher
    mental state than the absence of all enquiry about them.

    The
    tendency to argue from the higher to the lower, from man to the
    world, has led to many errors, but has also had an elevating
    influence on philosophy. The conception of the world as a whole,
    a person, an animal, has been the source of hasty
    generalizations; yet this general grasp of nature led also to a
    spirit of comprehensiveness in early philosophy, which has not
    increased, but rather diminished, as the fields of knowledge have
    become more divided. The modern physicist confines himself to one
    or perhaps two branches of science.

    But he comparatively seldom
    rises above his own department, and often falls under the
    narrowing influence which any single branch, when pursued to the
    exclusion of every other, has over the mind.

    Language, two,
    exercised a spell over the beginnings of physical philosophy,
    leading to error and sometimes to truth; for many thoughts were
    suggested by the double meanings of words (Greek), and the
    accidental distinctions of words sometimes led the ancient
    philosopher to make corresponding differences in things (Greek).
    ‘If they are the same, why have they different names; or if they
    are different, why have they the same name?’—is an argument not
    easily answered in the infancy of knowledge.

    The modern
    philosopher has always been taught the lesson which he still
    imperfectly learns, that he must disengage himself from the
    influence of words. Nor are there wanting in Plato, who was
    himself too often the victim of them, impressive admonitions that
    we should regard not words but things (States.). But upon the
    whole, the ancients, though not entirely dominated by them, were
    much more subject to the influence of words than the moderns.
    They had no clear divisions of colours or substances; even the
    four elements were undefined; the fields of knowledge were not
    parted off.

    They were bringing order out of disorder, having a
    small grain of experience mingled in a confused heap of a priori
    notions. And yet, probably, their first impressions, the
    illusions and mirages of their fancy, created a greater
    intellectual activity and made a nearer approach to the truth
    than any patient investigation of isolated facts, for which the
    time had not yet come, could have accomplished.

    There was one more illusion to which the ancient philosophers
    were subject, and against which Plato in his later dialogues
    seems to be struggling—the tendency to mere abstractions; not
    perceiving that pure abstraction is only negation, they thought
    that the greater the abstraction the greater the truth. Behind
    any pair of ideas a new idea which comprehended them—the (Greek),
    as it was technically termed—began at once to appear. Two are
    truer than three, one than two. The words ‘being,’ or ‘unity,’ or
    essence,’ or ‘good,’ became sacred to them.

    They did not see that
    they had a word only, and in one sense the most unmeaning of
    words. They did not understand that the content of notions is in
    inverse proportion to their universality—the element which is the
    most widely diffused is also the thinnest; or, in the language of
    the common logic, the greater the extension the less the
    comprehension. But this vacant idea of a whole without parts, of
    a subject without predicates, a rest without motion, has been
    also the most fruitful of all ideas. It is the beginning of a
    priori thought, and indeed of thinking at all.

    Men were led to
    conceive it, not by a love of hasty generalization, but by a
    divine instinct, a dialectical enthusiasm, in which the human
    faculties seemed to yearn for enlargement. We know that ‘being’
    is only the verb of existence, the copula, the most general
    symbol of relation, the first and most meagre of abstractions;
    but to some of the ancient philosophers this little word appeared
    to attain divine proportions, and to comprehend all truth.

    Being
    or essence, and similar words, represented to them a supreme or
    divine being, in which they thought that they found the
    containing and continuing principle of the universe. In a few
    years the human mind was peopled with abstractions; a new world
    was called into existence to give law and order to the old. But
    between them there was still a gulf, and no one could pass from
    the one to the other.

    Number and figure were the greatest instruments of thought which
    were possessed by the Greek philosopher; having the same power
    over the mind which was exerted by abstract ideas, they were also
    capable of practical application. Many curious and, to the early
    thinker, mysterious properties of them came to light when they
    were compared with one another. They admitted of infinite
    multiplication and construction; in Pythagorean triangles or in
    proportions of 1:2:4:8 and 1:3:9:27, or compounds of them, the
    laws of the world seemed to be more than half revealed.

    They were
    also capable of infinite subdivision—a wonder and also a puzzle
    to the ancient thinker (Rep.). They were not, like being or
    essence, mere vacant abstractions, but admitted of progress and
    growth, while at the same time they confirmed a higher sentiment
    of the mind, that there was order in the universe. And so there
    began to be a real sympathy between the world within and the
    world without.

    The numbers and figures which were present to the
    mind’s eye became visible to the eye of sense; the truth of
    nature was mathematics; the other properties of objects seemed to
    reappear only in the light of number. Law and morality also found
    a natural expression in number and figure. Instruments of such
    power and elasticity could not fail to be ‘a most gracious
    assistance’ to the first efforts of human intelligence.

    There was another reason why numbers had so great an influence
    over the minds of early thinkers—they were verified by
    experience. Every use of them, even the most trivial, assured men
    of their truth; they were everywhere to be found, in the least
    things and the greatest alike. One, two, three, counted on the
    fingers was a ‘trivial matter (Rep.), a little instrument out of
    which to create a world; but from these and by the help of these
    all our knowledge of nature has been developed.

    They were the
    measure of all things, and seemed to give law to all things;
    nature was rescued from chaos and confusion by their power; the
    notes of music, the motions of the stars, the forms of atoms, the
    evolution and recurrence of days, months, years, the military
    divisions of an army, the civil divisions of a state, seemed to
    afford a ‘present witness’ of them—what would have become of man
    or of the world if deprived of number (Rep.)? The mystery of
    number and the mystery of music were akin.

    There was a music of
    rhythm and of harmonious motion everywhere; and to the real
    connexion which existed between music and number, a fanciful or
    imaginary relation was superadded. There was a music of the
    spheres as well as of the notes of the lyre. If in all things
    seen there was number and figure, why should they not also
    pervade the unseen world, with which by their wonderful and
    unchangeable nature they seemed to hold communion?

    Two other points strike us in the use which the ancient
    philosophers made of numbers. First, they applied to external
    nature the relations of them which they found in their own minds;
    and where nature seemed to be at variance with number, as for
    example in the case of fractions, they protested against her
    (Rep.; Arist. Metaph.). Having long meditated on the properties
    of 1:2:4:8, or 1:3:9:27, or of 3, 4, 5, they discovered in them
    many curious correspondences and were disposed to find in them
    the secret of the universe.

    Secondly, they applied number and
    figure equally to those parts of physics, such as astronomy or
    mechanics, in which the modern philosopher expects to find them,
    and to those in which he would never think of looking for them,
    such as physiology and psychology. For the sciences were not yet
    divided, and there was nothing really irrational in arguing that
    the same laws which regulated the heavenly bodies were partially
    applied to the erring limbs or brain of man. Astrology was the
    form which the lively fancy of ancient thinkers almost
    necessarily gave to astronomy.

    The observation that the lower
    principle, e.g. mechanics, is always seen in the higher, e.g. in
    the phenomena of life, further tended to perplex them. Plato’s
    doctrine of the same and the other ruling the courses of the
    heavens and of the human body is not a mere vagary, but is a
    natural result of the state of knowledge and thought at which he
    had arrived.

    When in modern times we contemplate the heavens, a certain amount
    of scientific truth imperceptibly blends, even with the cursory
    glance of an unscientific person. He knows that the earth is
    revolving round the sun, and not the sun around the earth. He
    does not imagine the earth to be the centre of the universe, and
    he has some conception of chemistry and the cognate sciences. A
    very different aspect of nature would have been present to the
    mind of the early Greek philosopher.

    He would have beheld the
    earth a surface only, not mirrored, however faintly, in the glass
    of science, but indissolubly connected with some theory of one,
    two, or more elements. He would have seen the world pervaded by
    number and figure, animated by a principle of motion, immanent in
    a principle of rest. He would have tried to construct the
    universe on a quantitative principle, seeming to find in endless
    combinations of geometrical figures or in the infinite variety of
    their sizes a sufficient account of the multiplicity of
    phenomena.

    To these a priori speculations he would add a rude
    conception of matter and his own immediate experience of health
    and disease. His cosmos would necessarily be imperfect and
    unequal, being the first attempt to impress form and order on the
    primaeval chaos of human knowledge. He would see all things as in
    a dream.

    The ancient physical philosophers have been charged by Dr.
    Whewell and others with wasting their fine intelligences in wrong
    methods of enquiry; and their progress in moral and political
    philosophy has been sometimes contrasted with their supposed
    failure in physical investigations. ‘They had plenty of ideas,’
    says Dr. Whewell, ‘and plenty of facts; but their ideas did not
    accurately represent the facts with which they were acquainted.’
    This is a very crude and misleading way of describing ancient
    science.

    It is the mistake of an uneducated person—uneducated,
    that is, in the higher sense of the word—who imagines every one
    else to be like himself and explains every other age by his own.
    No doubt the ancients often fell into strange and fanciful
    errors: the time had not yet arrived for the slower and surer
    path of the modern inductive philosophy. But it remains to be
    shown that they could have done more in their age and country; or
    that the contributions which they made to the sciences with which
    they were acquainted are not as great upon the whole as those
    made by their successors.

    There is no single step in astronomy as
    great as that of the nameless Pythagorean who first conceived the
    world to be a body moving round the sun in space: there is no
    truer or more comprehensive principle than the application of
    mathematics alike to the heavenly bodies, and to the particles of
    matter. The ancients had not the instruments which would have
    enabled them to correct or verify their anticipations, and their
    opportunities of observation were limited.

    Plato probably did
    more for physical science by asserting the supremacy of
    mathematics than Aristotle or his disciples by their collections
    of facts. When the thinkers of modern times, following Bacon,
    undervalue or disparage the speculations of ancient philosophers,
    they seem wholly to forget the conditions of the world and of the
    human mind, under which they carried on their investigations.
    When we accuse them of being under the influence of words, do we
    suppose that we are altogether free from this illusion?

    When we
    remark that Greek physics soon became stationary or extinct, may
    we not observe also that there have been and may be again periods
    in the history of modern philosophy which have been barren and
    unproductive? We might as well maintain that Greek art was not
    real or great, because it had nihil simile aut secundum, as say
    that Greek physics were a failure because they admire no
    subsequent progress.

    The charge of premature generalization which is often urged
    against ancient philosophers is really an anachronism. For they
    can hardly be said to have generalized at all. They may be said
    more truly to have cleared up and defined by the help of
    experience ideas which they already possessed. The beginnings of
    thought about nature must always have this character. A true
    method is the result of many ages of experiment and observation,
    and is ever going on and enlarging with the progress of science
    and knowledge.

    At first men personify nature, then they form
    impressions of nature, at last they conceive ‘measure’ or laws of
    nature. They pass out of mythology into philosophy. Early science
    is not a process of discovery in the modern sense; but rather a
    process of correcting by observation, and to a certain extent
    only, the first impressions of nature, which mankind, when they
    began to think, had received from poetry or language or
    unintelligent sense.

    Of all scientific truths the greatest and
    simplest is the uniformity of nature; this was expressed by the
    ancients in many ways, as fate, or necessity, or measure, or
    limit. Unexpected events, of which the cause was unknown to them,
    they attributed to chance (Thucyd.). But their conception of
    nature was never that of law interrupted by exceptions,—a
    somewhat unfortunate metaphysical invention of modern times,
    which is at variance with facts and has failed to satisfy the
    requirements of thought.

    Section 3.

    Plato’s account of the soul is partly mythical or figurative, and
    partly literal. Not that either he or we can draw a line between
    them, or say, ‘This is poetry, this is philosophy’; for the
    transition from the one to the other is imperceptible. Neither
    must we expect to find in him absolute consistency. He is apt to
    pass from one level or stage of thought to another without always
    making it apparent that he is changing his ground. In such
    passages we have to interpret his meaning by the general spirit
    of his writings.

    To reconcile his inconsistencies would be
    contrary to the first principles of criticism and fatal to any
    true understanding of him.

    There is a further difficulty in explaining this part of the
    Timaeus—the natural order of thought is inverted. We begin with
    the most abstract, and proceed from the abstract to the concrete.
    We are searching into things which are upon the utmost limit of
    human intelligence, and then of a sudden we fall rather heavily
    to the earth. There are no intermediate steps which lead from one
    to the other. But the abstract is a vacant form to us until
    brought into relation with man and nature. God and the world are
    mere names, like the Being of the Eleatics, unless some human
    qualities are added on to them.

    Yet the negation has a kind of
    unknown meaning to us. The priority of God and of the world,
    which he is imagined to have created, to all other existences,
    gives a solemn awe to them. And as in other systems of theology
    and philosophy, that of which we know least has the greatest
    interest to us.

    There is no use in attempting to define or explain the first God
    in the Platonic system, who has sometimes been thought to answer
    to God the Father; or the world, in whom the Fathers of the
    Church seemed to recognize ‘the firstborn of every creature.’ Nor
    need we discuss at length how far Plato agrees in the later
    Jewish idea of creation, according to which God made the world
    out of nothing. For his original conception of matter as
    something which has no qualities is really a negation.

    Moreover
    in the Hebrew Scriptures the creation of the world is described,
    even more explicitly than in the Timaeus, not as a single act,
    but as a work or process which occupied six days. There is a
    chaos in both, and it would be untrue to say that the Greek, any
    more than the Hebrew, had any definite belief in the eternal
    existence of matter. The beginning of things vanished into the
    distance. The real creation began, not with matter, but with
    ideas.

    According to Plato in the Timaeus, God took of the same
    and the other, of the divided and undivided, of the finite and
    infinite, and made essence, and out of the three combined created
    the soul of the world. To the soul he added a body formed out of
    the four elements. The general meaning of these words is that God
    imparted determinations of thought, or, as we might say, gave law
    and variety to the material universe.

    The elements are moving in
    a disorderly manner before the work of creation begins; and there
    is an eternal pattern of the world, which, like the ‘idea of
    good,’ is not the Creator himself, but not separable from him.
    The pattern too, though eternal, is a creation, a world of
    thought prior to the world of sense, which may be compared to the
    wisdom of God in the book of Ecclesiasticus, or to the ‘God in
    the form of a globe’ of the old Eleatic philosophers. The
    visible, which already exists, is fashioned in the likeness of
    this eternal pattern.

    On the other hand, there is no truth of
    which Plato is more firmly convinced than of the priority of the
    soul to the body, both in the universe and in man. So
    inconsistent are the forms in which he describes the works which
    no tongue can utter—his language, as he himself says, partaking
    of his own uncertainty about the things of which he is speaking.

    We may remark in passing, that the Platonic compared with the
    Jewish description of the process of creation has less of freedom
    or spontaneity. The Creator in Plato is still subject to a
    remnant of necessity which he cannot wholly overcome. When his
    work is accomplished he remains in his own nature. Plato is more
    sensible than the Hebrew prophet of the existence of evil, which
    he seeks to put as far as possible out of the way of God.

    And he
    can only suppose this to be accomplished by God retiring into
    himself and committing the lesser works of creation to inferior
    powers. (Compare, however, Laws for another solution of the
    difficulty.)

    Nor can we attach any intelligible meaning to his words when he
    speaks of the visible being in the image of the invisible. For
    how can that which is divided be like that which is undivided? Or
    that which is changing be the copy of that which is unchanging?
    All the old difficulties about the ideas come back upon us in an
    altered form.

    We can imagine two worlds, one of which is the mere
    double of the other, or one of which is an imperfect copy of the
    other, or one of which is the vanishing ideal of the other; but
    we cannot imagine an intellectual world which has no qualities—‘a
    thing in itself’—a point which has no parts or magnitude, which
    is nowhere, and nothing. This cannot be the archetype according
    to which God made the world, and is in reality, whether in Plato
    or in Kant, a mere negative residuum of human thought.

    There is another aspect of the same difficulty which appears to
    have no satisfactory solution. In what relation does the
    archetype stand to the Creator himself? For the idea or pattern
    of the world is not the thought of God, but a separate,
    self-existent nature, of which creation is the copy. We can only
    reply, (1) that to the mind of Plato subject and object were not
    yet distinguished; (2) that he supposes the process of creation
    to take place in accordance with his own theory of ideas; and as
    we cannot give a consistent account of the one, neither can we of
    the other.

    He means (3) to say that the creation of the world is
    not a material process of working with legs and arms, but ideal
    and intellectual; according to his own fine expression, ‘the
    thought of God made the God that was to be.’ He means (4) to draw
    an absolute distinction between the invisible or unchangeable
    which is or is the place of mind or being, and the world of sense
    or becoming which is visible and changing.

    He means (5) that the
    idea of the world is prior to the world, just as the other ideas
    are prior to sensible objects; and like them may be regarded as
    eternal and self-existent, and also, like the IDEA of good, may
    be viewed apart from the divine mind.

    There are several other questions which we might ask and which
    can receive no answer, or at least only an answer of the same
    kind as the preceding. How can matter be conceived to exist
    without form? Or, how can the essences or forms of things be
    distinguished from the eternal ideas, or essence itself from the
    soul? Or, how could there have been motion in the chaos when as
    yet time was not? Or, how did chaos come into existence, if not
    by the will of the Creator? Or, how could there have been a time
    when the world was not, if time was not? Or, how could the
    Creator have taken portions of an indivisible same?

    Or, how could
    space or anything else have been eternal when time is only
    created? Or, how could the surfaces of geometrical figures have
    formed solids? We must reply again that we cannot follow Plato in
    all his inconsistencies, but that the gaps of thought are
    probably more apparent to us than to him. He would, perhaps, have
    said that ‘the first things are known only to God and to him of
    men whom God loves.’ How often have the gaps in Theology been
    concealed from the eye of faith!

    And we may say that only by an
    effort of metaphysical imagination can we hope to understand
    Plato from his own point of view; we must not ask for
    consistency. Everywhere we find traces of the Platonic theory of
    knowledge expressed in an objective form, which by us has to be
    translated into the subjective, before we can attach any meaning
    to it. And this theory is exhibited in so many different points
    of view, that we cannot with any certainty interpret one dialogue
    by another; e.g. the Timaeus by the Parmenides or Phaedrus or
    Philebus.

    The soul of the world may also be conceived as the
    personification of the numbers and figures in which the heavenly
    bodies move. Imagine these as in a Pythagorean dream, stripped of
    qualitative difference and reduced to mathematical abstractions.
    They too conform to the principle of the same, and may be
    compared with the modern conception of laws of nature. They are
    in space, but not in time, and they are the makers of time.

    They
    are represented as constantly thinking of the same; for thought
    in the view of Plato is equivalent to truth or law, and need not
    imply a human consciousness, a conception which is familiar
    enough to us, but has no place, hardly even a name, in ancient
    Greek philosophy.

    To this principle of the same is opposed the
    principle of the other—the principle of irregularity and
    disorder, of necessity and chance, which is only partially
    impressed by mathematical laws and figures. (We may observe by
    the way, that the principle of the other, which is the principle
    of plurality and variation in the Timaeus, has nothing in common
    with the ‘other’ of the Sophist, which is the principle of
    determination.) The element of the same dominates to a certain
    extent over the other—the fixed stars keep the ‘wanderers’ of the
    inner circle in their courses, and a similar principle of
    fixedness or order appears to regulate the bodily constitution of
    man.

    But there still remains a rebellious seed of evil derived
    from the original chaos, which is the source of disorder in the
    world, and of vice and disease in man.

    But what did Plato mean by essence, (Greek), which is the
    intermediate nature compounded of the Same and the Other, and out
    of which, together with these two, the soul of the world is
    created? It is difficult to explain a process of thought so
    strange and unaccustomed to us, in which modern distinctions run
    into one another and are lost sight of. First, let us consider
    once more the meaning of the Same and the Other.

    The Same is the
    unchanging and indivisible, the heaven of the fixed stars,
    partaking of the divine nature, which, having law in itself,
    gives law to all besides and is the element of order and
    permanence in man and on the earth. It is the rational principle,
    mind regarded as a work, as creation—not as the creator. The old
    tradition of Parmenides and of the Eleatic Being, the foundation
    of so much in the philosophy of Greece and of the world, was
    lingering in Plato’s mind.

    The Other is the variable or changing
    element, the residuum of disorder or chaos, which cannot be
    reduced to order, nor altogether banished, the source of evil,
    seen in the errors of man and also in the wanderings of the
    planets, a necessity which protrudes through nature. Of this too
    there was a shadow in the Eleatic philosophy in the realm of
    opinion, which, like a mist, seemed to darken the purity of truth
    in itself.—So far the words of Plato may perhaps find an
    intelligible meaning.

    But when he goes on to speak of the Essence
    which is compounded out of both, the track becomes fainter and we
    can only follow him with hesitating steps. But still we find a
    trace reappearing of the teaching of Anaxagoras: ‘All was
    confusion, and then mind came and arranged things.’ We have
    already remarked that Plato was not acquainted with the modern
    distinction of subject and object, and therefore he sometimes
    confuses mind and the things of mind—(Greek) and (Greek). By
    (Greek) he clearly means some conception of the intelligible and
    the intelligent; it belongs to the class of (Greek).

    Matter,
    being, the Same, the eternal,—for any of these terms, being
    almost vacant of meaning, is equally suitable to express
    indefinite existence,—are compared or united with the Other or
    Diverse, and out of the union or comparison is elicited the idea
    of intelligence, the ‘One in many,’ brighter than any Promethean
    fire (Phil.), which co-existing with them and so forming a new
    existence, is or becomes the intelligible world...So we may
    perhaps venture to paraphrase or interpret or put into other
    words the parable in which Plato has wrapped up his conception of
    the creation of the world.

    The explanation may help to fill up
    with figures of speech the void of knowledge.

    The entire compound was divided by the Creator in certain
    proportions and reunited; it was then cut into two strips, which
    were bent into an inner circle and an outer, both moving with an
    uniform motion around a centre, the outer circle containing the
    fixed, the inner the wandering stars. The soul of the world was
    diffused everywhere from the centre to the circumference. To this
    God gave a body, consisting at first of fire and earth, and
    afterwards receiving an addition of air and water; because solid
    bodies, like the world, are always connected by two middle terms
    and not by one.

    The world was made in the form of a globe, and
    all the material elements were exhausted in the work of creation.

    The proportions in which the soul of the world as well as the
    human soul is divided answer to a series of numbers 1, 2, 3, 4,
    9, 8, 27, composed of the two Pythagorean progressions 1, 2, 4, 8
    and 1, 3, 9, 27, of which the number 1 represents a point, 2 and
    3 lines, 4 and 8, 9 and 27 the squares and cubes respectively of
    2 and 3.

    This series, of which the intervals are afterwards
    filled up, probably represents (1) the diatonic scale according
    to the Pythagoreans and Plato; (2) the order and distances of the
    heavenly bodies; and (3) may possibly contain an allusion to the
    music of the spheres, which is referred to in the myth at the end
    of the Republic. The meaning of the words that ‘solid bodies are
    always connected by two middle terms’ or mean proportionals has
    been much disputed.

    The most received explanation is that of
    Martin, who supposes that Plato is only speaking of surfaces and
    solids compounded of prime numbers (i.e. of numbers not made up
    of two factors, or, in other words, only measurable by unity).
    The square of any such number represents a surface, the cube a
    solid. The squares of any two such numbers (e.g. 2 squared, 3
    squared = 4, 9), have always a single mean proportional (e.g. 4
    and 9 have the single mean 6), whereas the cubes of primes (e.g.
    3 cubed and 5 cubed) have always two mean proportionals (e.g.
    27:45:75:125).

    But to this explanation of Martin’s it may be
    objected, (1) that Plato nowhere says that his proportion is to
    be limited to prime numbers; (2) that the limitation of surfaces
    to squares is also not to be found in his words; nor (3) is there
    any evidence to show that the distinction of prime from other
    numbers was known to him. What Plato chiefly intends to express
    is that a solid requires a stronger bond than a surface; and that
    the double bond which is given by two means is stronger than the
    single bond given by one.

    Having reflected on the singular
    numerical phenomena of the existence of one mean proportional
    between two square numbers are rather perhaps only between the
    two lowest squares; and of two mean proportionals between two
    cubes, perhaps again confining his attention to the two lowest
    cubes, he finds in the latter symbol an expression of the
    relation of the elements, as in the former an image of the
    combination of two surfaces.

    Between fire and earth, the two
    extremes, he remarks that there are introduced, not one, but two
    elements, air and water, which are compared to the two mean
    proportionals between two cube numbers. The vagueness of his
    language does not allow us to determine whether anything more
    than this was intended by him.

    Leaving the further explanation of details, which the reader will
    find discussed at length in Boeckh and Martin, we may now return
    to the main argument: Why did God make the world? Like man, he
    must have a purpose; and his purpose is the diffusion of that
    goodness or good which he himself is. The term ‘goodness’ is not
    to be understood in this passage as meaning benevolence or love,
    in the Christian sense of the term, but rather law, order,
    harmony, like the idea of good in the Republic.

    The ancient
    mythologers, and even the Hebrew prophets, had spoken of the
    jealousy of God; and the Greek had imagined that there was a
    Nemesis always attending the prosperity of mortals. But Plato
    delights to think of God as the author of order in his works,
    who, like a father, lives over again in his children, and can
    never have too much of good or friendship among his creatures.
    Only, as there is a certain remnant of evil inherent in matter
    which he cannot get rid of, he detaches himself from them and
    leaves them to themselves, that he may be guiltless of their
    faults and sufferings.

    Between the ideal and the sensible Plato interposes the two
    natures of time and space.

    Time is conceived by him to be only
    the shadow or image of eternity which ever is and never has been
    or will be, but is described in a figure only as past or future.
    This is one of the great thoughts of early philosophy, which are
    still as difficult to our minds as they were to the early
    thinkers; or perhaps more difficult, because we more distinctly
    see the consequences which are involved in such an hypothesis.
    All the objections which may be urged against Kant’s doctrine of
    the ideality of space and time at once press upon us.

    If time is
    unreal, then all which is contained in time is unreal—the
    succession of human thoughts as well as the flux of sensations;
    there is no connecting link between (Greek) and (Greek). Yet, on
    the other hand, we are conscious that knowledge is independent of
    time, that truth is not a thing of yesterday or tomorrow, but an
    ‘eternal now.’ To the ‘spectator of all time and all existence’
    the universe remains at rest. The truths of geometry and
    arithmetic in all their combinations are always the same.

    The
    generations of men, like the leaves of the forest, come and go,
    but the mathematical laws by which the world is governed remain,
    and seem as if they could never change. The ever-present image of
    space is transferred to time—succession is conceived as
    extension. (We remark that Plato does away with the above and
    below in space, as he has done away with the absolute existence
    of past and future.) The course of time, unless regularly marked
    by divisions of number, partakes of the indefiniteness of the
    Heraclitean flux.

    By such reflections we may conceive the Greek
    to have attained the metaphysical conception of eternity, which
    to the Hebrew was gained by meditation on the Divine Being. No
    one saw that this objective was really a subjective, and involved
    the subjectivity of all knowledge. ‘Non in tempore sed cum
    tempore finxit Deus mundum,’ says St. Augustine, repeating a
    thought derived from the Timaeus, but apparently unconscious of
    the results to which his doctrine would have led.

    The contradictions involved in the conception of time or motion,
    like the infinitesimal in space, were a source of perplexity to
    the mind of the Greek, who was driven to find a point of view
    above or beyond them. They had sprung up in the decline of the
    Eleatic philosophy and were very familiar to Plato, as we gather
    from the Parmenides. The consciousness of them had led the great
    Eleatic philosopher to describe the nature of God or Being under
    negatives.

    He sings of ‘Being unbegotten and imperishable,
    unmoved and never-ending, which never was nor will be, but always
    is, one and continuous, which cannot spring from any other; for
    it cannot be said or imagined not to be.’ The idea of eternity
    was for a great part a negation. There are regions of speculation
    in which the negative is hardly separable from the positive, and
    even seems to pass into it. Not only Buddhism, but Greek as well
    as Christian philosophy, show that it is quite possible that the
    human mind should retain an enthusiasm for mere negations.

    In
    different ages and countries there have been forms of light in
    which nothing could be discerned and which have nevertheless
    exercised a life-giving and illumining power.

    For the higher
    intelligence of man seems to require, not only something above
    sense, but above knowledge, which can only be described as Mind
    or Being or Truth or God or the unchangeable and eternal element,
    in the expression of which all predicates fail and fall short.
    Eternity or the eternal is not merely the unlimited in time but
    the truest of all Being, the most real of all realities, the most
    certain of all knowledge, which we nevertheless only see through
    a glass darkly. The passionate earnestness of Parmenides
    contrasts with the vacuity of the thought which he is revolving
    in his mind.

    Space is said by Plato to be the ‘containing vessel or nurse of
    generation.’ Reflecting on the simplest kinds of external
    objects, which to the ancients were the four elements, he was led
    to a more general notion of a substance, more or less like
    themselves, out of which they were fashioned. He would not have
    them too precisely distinguished. Thus seems to have arisen the
    first dim perception of (Greek) or matter, which has played so
    great a part in the metaphysical philosophy of Aristotle and his
    followers.

    But besides the material out of which the elements are
    made, there is also a space in which they are contained. There
    arises thus a second nature which the senses are incapable of
    discerning and which can hardly be referred to the intelligible
    class. For it is and it is not, it is nowhere when filled, it is
    nothing when empty. Hence it is said to be discerned by a kind of
    spurious or analogous reason, partaking so feebly of existence as
    to be hardly perceivable, yet always reappearing as the
    containing mother or nurse of all things.

    It had not that sort of
    consistency to Plato which has been given to it in modern times
    by geometry and metaphysics. Neither of the Greek words by which
    it is described are so purely abstract as the English word
    ‘space’ or the Latin ‘spatium.’ Neither Plato nor any other Greek
    would have spoken of (Greek) or (Greek) in the same manner as we
    speak of ‘time’ and ‘space.’

    Yet space is also of a very permanent or even eternal nature; and
    Plato seems more willing to admit of the unreality of time than
    of the unreality of space; because, as he says, all things must
    necessarily exist in space. We, on the other hand, are disposed
    to fancy that even if space were annihilated time might still
    survive. He admits indeed that our knowledge of space is of a
    dreamy kind, and is given by a spurious reason without the help
    of sense. (Compare the hypotheses and images of Rep.) It is true
    that it does not attain to the clearness of ideas.

    But like them
    it seems to remain, even if all the objects contained in it are
    supposed to have vanished away. Hence it was natural for Plato to
    conceive of it as eternal. We must remember further that in his
    attempt to realize either space or matter the two abstract ideas
    of weight and extension, which are familiar to us, had never
    passed before his mind.

    Thus far God, working according to an eternal pattern, out of his
    goodness has created the same, the other, and the essence
    (compare the three principles of the Philebus—the finite, the
    infinite, and the union of the two), and out of them has formed
    the outer circle of the fixed stars and the inner circle of the
    planets, divided according to certain musical intervals; he has
    also created time, the moving image of eternity, and space,
    existing by a sort of necessity and hardly distinguishable from
    matter.

    The matter out of which the world is formed is not
    absolutely void, but retains in the chaos certain germs or traces
    of the elements. These Plato, like Empedocles, supposed to be
    four in number—fire, air, earth, and water. They were at first
    mixed together; but already in the chaos, before God fashioned
    them by form and number, the greater masses of the elements had
    an appointed place. Into the confusion (Greek) which preceded
    Plato does not attempt further to penetrate.

    They are called
    elements, but they are so far from being elements (Greek) or
    letters in the higher sense that they are not even syllables or
    first compounds. The real elements are two triangles, the
    rectangular isosceles which has but one form, and the most
    beautiful of the many forms of scalene, which is half of an
    equilateral triangle. By the combination of these triangles which
    exist in an infinite variety of sizes, the surfaces of the four
    elements are constructed.

    That there were only five regular solids was already known to the
    ancients, and out of the surfaces which he has formed Plato
    proceeds to generate the four first of the five. He perhaps
    forgets that he is only putting together surfaces and has not
    provided for their transformation into solids. The first solid is
    a regular pyramid, of which the base and sides are formed by four
    equilateral or twenty-four scalene triangles. Each of the four
    solid angles in this figure is a little larger than the largest
    of obtuse angles.

    The second solid is composed of the same
    triangles, which unite as eight equilateral triangles, and make
    one solid angle out of four plane angles—six of these angles form
    a regular octahedron. The third solid is a regular icosahedron,
    having twenty triangular equilateral bases, and therefore 120
    rectangular scalene triangles. The fourth regular solid, or cube,
    is formed by the combination of four isosceles triangles into one
    square and of six squares into a cube.

    The fifth regular solid,
    or dodecahedron, cannot be formed by a combination of either of
    these triangles, but each of its faces may be regarded as
    composed of thirty triangles of another kind. Probably Plato
    notices this as the only remaining regular polyhedron, which from
    its approximation to a globe, and possibly because, as Plutarch
    remarks, it is composed of 12 x 30 = 360 scalene triangles
    (Platon.

    Quaest.), representing thus the signs and degrees of the
    Zodiac, as well as the months and days of the year, God may be
    said to have ‘used in the delineation of the universe.’ According
    to Plato earth was composed of cubes, fire of regular pyramids,
    air of regular octahedrons, water of regular icosahedrons. The
    stability of the last three increases with the number of their
    sides.

    The elements are supposed to pass into one another, but we must
    remember that these transformations are not the transformations
    of real solids, but of imaginary geometrical figures; in other
    words, we are composing and decomposing the faces of substances
    and not the substances themselves—it is a house of cards which we
    are pulling to pieces and putting together again (compare however
    Laws). Yet perhaps Plato may regard these sides or faces as only
    the forms which are impressed on pre-existent matter.

    It is
    remarkable that he should speak of each of these solids as a
    possible world in itself, though upon the whole he inclines to
    the opinion that they form one world and not five. To suppose
    that there is an infinite number of worlds, as Democritus
    (Hippolyt. Ref. Haer. I.) had said, would be, as he satirically
    observes, ‘the characteristic of a very indefinite and ignorant
    mind.’

    The twenty triangular faces of an icosahedron form the faces or
    sides of two regular octahedrons and of a regular pyramid (20 = 8
    x 2 + 4); and therefore, according to Plato, a particle of water
    when decomposed is supposed to give two particles of air and one
    of fire. So because an octahedron gives the sides of two pyramids
    (8 = 4 x 2), a particle of air is resolved into two particles of
    fire.

    The transformation is effected by the superior power or number of
    the conquering elements. The manner of the change is (1) a
    separation of portions of the elements from the masses in which
    they are collected; (2) a resolution of them into their original
    triangles; and (3) a reunion of them in new forms. Plato himself
    proposes the question, Why does motion continue at all when the
    elements are settled in their places?

    He answers that although
    the force of attraction is continually drawing similar elements
    to the same spot, still the revolution of the universe exercises
    a condensing power, and thrusts them again out of their natural
    places. Thus want of uniformity, the condition of motion, is
    produced. In all such disturbances of matter there is an
    alternative for the weaker element: it may escape to its kindred,
    or take the form of the stronger—becoming denser, if it be
    denser, or rarer if rarer.

    This is true of fire, air, and water,
    which, being composed of similar triangles, are interchangeable;
    earth, however, which has triangles peculiar to itself, is
    capable of dissolution, but not of change. Of the interchangeable
    elements, fire, the rarest, can only become a denser, and water,
    the densest, only a rarer: but air may become a denser or a
    rarer. No single particle of the elements is visible, but only
    the aggregates of them are seen. The subordinate species depend,
    not upon differences of form in the original triangles, but upon
    differences of size.

    The obvious physical phenomena from which
    Plato has gathered his views of the relations of the elements
    seem to be the effect of fire upon air, water, and earth, and the
    effect of water upon earth. The particles are supposed by him to
    be in a perpetual process of circulation caused by inequality.
    This process of circulation does not admit of a vacuum, as he
    tells us in his strange account of respiration.

    Of the phenomena of light and heavy he speaks afterwards, when
    treating of sensation, but they may be more conveniently
    considered by us in this place. They are not, he says, to be
    explained by ‘above’ and ‘below,’ which in the universal globe
    have no existence, but by the attraction of similars towards the
    great masses of similar substances; fire to fire, air to air,
    water to water, earth to earth. Plato’s doctrine of attraction
    implies not only (1) the attraction of similar elements to one
    another, but also (2) of smaller bodies to larger ones.

    Had he
    confined himself to the latter he would have arrived, though,
    perhaps, without any further result or any sense of the greatness
    of the discovery, at the modern doctrine of gravitation. He does
    not observe that water has an equal tendency towards both water
    and earth. So easily did the most obvious facts which were
    inconsistent with his theories escape him.

    The general physical doctrines of the Timaeus may be summed up as
    follows: (1) Plato supposes the greater masses of the elements to
    have been already settled in their places at the creation: (2)
    they are four in number, and are formed of rectangular triangles
    variously combined into regular solid figures: (3) three of them,
    fire, air, and water, admit of transformation into one another;
    the fourth, earth, cannot be similarly transformed: (4) different
    sizes of the same triangles form the lesser species of each
    element: (5) there is an attraction of like to like—smaller
    masses of the same kind being drawn towards greater: (6) there is
    no void, but the particles of matter are ever pushing one another
    round and round (Greek).

    Like the atomists, Plato attributes the
    differences between the elements to differences in geometrical
    figures. But he does not explain the process by which surfaces
    become solids; and he characteristically ridicules Democritus for
    not seeing that the worlds are finite and not infinite.

    Section 4.

    The astronomy of Plato is based on the two principles of the same
    and the other, which God combined in the creation of the world.
    The soul, which is compounded of the same, the other, and the
    essence, is diffused from the centre to the circumference of the
    heavens. We speak of a soul of the universe; but more truly
    regarded, the universe of the Timaeus is a soul, governed by
    mind, and holding in solution a residuum of matter or evil, which
    the author of the world is unable to expel, and of which Plato
    cannot tell us the origin.

    The creation, in Plato’s sense, is
    really the creation of order; and the first step in giving order
    is the division of the heavens into an inner and outer circle of
    the other and the same, of the divisible and the indivisible,
    answering to the two spheres, of the planets and of the world
    beyond them, all together moving around the earth, which is their
    centre. To us there is a difficulty in apprehending how that
    which is at rest can also be in motion, or that which is
    indivisible exist in space.

    But the whole description is so ideal
    and imaginative, that we can hardly venture to attribute to many
    of Plato’s words in the Timaeus any more meaning than to his
    mythical account of the heavens in the Republic and in the
    Phaedrus. (Compare his denial of the ‘blasphemous opinion’ that
    there are planets or wandering stars; all alike move in
    circles—Laws.) The stars are the habitations of the souls of men,
    from which they come and to which they return.

    In attributing to
    the fixed stars only the most perfect motion—that which is on the
    same spot or circulating around the same—he might perhaps have
    said that to ‘the spectator of all time and all existence,’ to
    borrow once more his own grand expression, or viewed, in the
    language of Spinoza, ‘sub specie aeternitatis,’ they were still
    at rest, but appeared to move in order to teach men the periods
    of time. Although absolutely in motion, they are relatively at
    rest; or we may conceive of them as resting, while the space in
    which they are contained, or the whole anima mundi, revolves.

    The universe revolves around a centre once in twenty-four hours,
    but the orbits of the fixed stars take a different direction from
    those of the planets. The outer and the inner sphere cross one
    another and meet again at a point opposite to that of their first
    contact; the first moving in a circle from left to right along
    the side of a parallelogram which is supposed to be inscribed in
    it, the second also moving in a circle along the diagonal of the
    same parallelogram from right to left; or, in other words, the
    first describing the path of the equator, the second, the path of
    the ecliptic.

    The motion of the second is controlled by the
    first, and hence the oblique line in which the planets are
    supposed to move becomes a spiral. The motion of the same is said
    to be undivided, whereas the inner motion is split into seven
    unequal orbits—the intervals between them being in the ratio of
    two and three, three of either:—the Sun, moving in the opposite
    direction to Mercury and Venus, but with equal swiftness; the
    remaining four, Moon, Saturn, Mars, Jupiter, with unequal
    swiftness to the former three and to one another.

    Thus arises the
    following progression:—Moon 1, Sun 2, Venus 3, Mercury 4, Mars 8,
    Jupiter 9, Saturn 27. This series of numbers is the compound of
    the two Pythagorean ratios, having the same intervals, though not
    in the same order, as the mixture which was originally divided in
    forming the soul of the world.

    Plato was struck by the phenomenon of Mercury, Venus, and the Sun
    appearing to overtake and be overtaken by one another. The true
    reason of this, namely, that they lie within the circle of the
    earth’s orbit, was unknown to him, and the reason which he
    gives—that the two former move in an opposite direction to the
    latter—is far from explaining the appearance of them in the
    heavens.

    All the planets, including the sun, are carried round in
    the daily motion of the circle of the fixed stars, and they have
    a second or oblique motion which gives the explanation of the
    different lengths of the sun’s course in different parts of the
    earth. The fixed stars have also two movements—a forward movement
    in their orbit which is common to the whole circle; and a
    movement on the same spot around an axis, which Plato calls the
    movement of thought about the same.

    In this latter respect they
    are more perfect than the wandering stars, as Plato himself terms
    them in the Timaeus, although in the Laws he condemns the
    appellation as blasphemous.

    The revolution of the world around earth, which is accomplished
    in a single day and night, is described as being the most perfect
    or intelligent. Yet Plato also speaks of an ‘annus magnus’ or
    cyclical year, in which periods wonderful for their complexity
    are found to coincide in a perfect number, i.e. a number which
    equals the sum of its factors, as 6 = 1 + 2 + 3. This, although
    not literally contradictory, is in spirit irreconcilable with the
    perfect revolution of twenty-four hours.

    The same remark may be
    applied to the complexity of the appearances and occultations of
    the stars, which, if the outer heaven is supposed to be moving
    around the centre once in twenty-four hours, must be confined to
    the effects produced by the seven planets. Plato seems to confuse
    the actual observation of the heavens with his desire to find in
    them mathematical perfection. The same spirit is carried yet
    further by him in the passage already quoted from the Laws, in
    which he affirms their wanderings to be an appearance only, which
    a little knowledge of mathematics would enable men to correct.

    We have now to consider the much discussed question of the
    rotation or immobility of the earth. Plato’s doctrine on this
    subject is contained in the following words:—‘The earth, which is
    our nurse, compacted (OR revolving) around the pole which is
    extended through the universe, he made to be the guardian and
    artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods that are in
    the interior of heaven’. There is an unfortunate doubt in this
    passage (1) about the meaning of the word (Greek), which is
    translated either ‘compacted’ or ‘revolving,’ and is equally
    capable of both explanations.

    A doubt (2) may also be raised as
    to whether the words ‘artificer of day and night’ are consistent
    with the mere passive causation of them, produced by the
    immobility of the earth in the midst of the circling universe. We
    must admit, further, (3) that Aristotle attributed to Plato the
    doctrine of the rotation of the earth on its axis.

    On the other
    hand it has been urged that if the earth goes round with the
    outer heaven and sun in twenty-four hours, there is no way of
    accounting for the alternation of day and night; since the equal
    motion of the earth and sun would have the effect of absolute
    immobility. To which it may be replied that Plato never says that
    the earth goes round with the outer heaven and sun; although the
    whole question depends on the relation of earth and sun, their
    movements are nowhere precisely described. But if we suppose,
    with Mr.

    Grote, that the diurnal rotation of the earth on its
    axis and the revolution of the sun and outer heaven precisely
    coincide, it would be difficult to imagine that Plato was unaware
    of the consequence. For though he was ignorant of many things
    which are familiar to us, and often confused in his ideas where
    we have become clear, we have no right to attribute to him a
    childish want of reasoning about very simple facts, or an
    inability to understand the necessary and obvious deductions from
    geometrical figures or movements.

    Of the causes of day and night
    the pre-Socratic philosophers, and especially the Pythagoreans,
    gave various accounts, and therefore the question can hardly be
    imagined to have escaped him. On the other hand it may be urged
    that the further step, however simple and obvious, is just what
    Plato often seems to be ignorant of, and that as there is no
    limit to his insight, there is also no limit to the blindness
    which sometimes obscures his intelligence (compare the
    construction of solids out of surfaces in his account of the
    creation of the world, or the attraction of similars to
    similars). Further, Mr.

    Grote supposes, not that (Greek) means
    ‘revolving,’ or that this is the sense in which Aristotle
    understood the word, but that the rotation of the earth is
    necessarily implied in its adherence to the cosmical axis. But
    (a) if, as Mr Grote assumes, Plato did not see that the rotation
    of the earth on its axis and of the sun and outer heavens around
    the earth in equal times was inconsistent with the alternation of
    day and night, neither need we suppose that he would have seen
    the immobility of the earth to be inconsistent with the rotation
    of the axis.

    And (b) what proof is there that the axis of the
    world revolves at all? (c) The comparison of the two passages
    quoted by Mr Grote (see his pamphlet on ‘The Rotation of the
    Earth’) from Aristotle De Coelo, Book II (Greek) clearly shows,
    although this is a matter of minor importance, that Aristotle, as
    Proclus and Simplicius supposed, understood (Greek) in the
    Timaeus to mean ‘revolving.’ For the second passage, in which
    motion on an axis is expressly mentioned, refers to the first,
    but this would be unmeaning unless (Greek) in the first passage
    meant rotation on an axis. (4) The immobility of the earth is
    more in accordance with Plato’s other writings than the opposite
    hypothesis.

    For in the Phaedo the earth is described as the
    centre of the world, and is not said to be in motion. In the
    Republic the pilgrims appear to be looking out from the earth
    upon the motions of the heavenly bodies; in the Phaedrus, Hestia,
    who remains immovable in the house of Zeus while the other gods
    go in procession, is called the first and eldest of the gods, and
    is probably the symbol of the earth.

    The silence of Plato in
    these and in some other passages (Laws) in which he might be
    expected to speak of the rotation of the earth, is more
    favourable to the doctrine of its immobility than to the
    opposite. If he had meant to say that the earth revolves on its
    axis, he would have said so in distinct words, and have explained
    the relation of its movements to those of the other heavenly
    bodies. (5) The meaning of the words ‘artificer of day and night’
    is literally true according to Plato’s view.

    For the alternation
    of day and night is not produced by the motion of the heavens
    alone, or by the immobility of the earth alone, but by both
    together; and that which has the inherent force or energy to
    remain at rest when all other bodies are moving, may be truly
    said to act, equally with them. (6) We should not lay too much
    stress on Aristotle or the writer De Caelo having adopted the
    other interpretation of the words, although Alexander of
    Aphrodisias thinks that he could not have been ignorant either of
    the doctrine of Plato or of the sense which he intended to give
    to the word (Greek).

    For the citations of Plato in Aristotle are
    frequently misinterpreted by him; and he seems hardly ever to
    have had in his mind the connection in which they occur. In this
    instance the allusion is very slight, and there is no reason to
    suppose that the diurnal revolution of the heavens was present to
    his mind. Hence we need not attribute to him the error from which
    we are defending Plato.

    After weighing one against the other all these complicated
    probabilities, the final conclusion at which we arrive is that
    there is nearly as much to be said on the one side of the
    question as on the other, and that we are not perfectly certain,
    whether, as Bockh and the majority of commentators, ancient as
    well as modern, are inclined to believe, Plato thought that the
    earth was at rest in the centre of the universe, or, as Aristotle
    and Mr. Grote suppose, that it revolved on its axis.

    Whether we
    assume the earth to be stationary in the centre of the universe,
    or to revolve with the heavens, no explanation is given of the
    variation in the length of days and nights at different times of
    the year. The relations of the earth and heavens are so
    indistinct in the Timaeus and so figurative in the Phaedo,
    Phaedrus and Republic, that we must give up the hope of
    ascertaining how they were imagined by Plato, if he had any fixed
    or scientific conception of them at all.

    Section 5.

    The soul of the world is framed on the analogy of the soul of
    man, and many traces of anthropomorphism blend with Plato’s
    highest flights of idealism. The heavenly bodies are endowed with
    thought; the principles of the same and other exist in the
    universe as well as in the human mind. The soul of man is made
    out of the remains of the elements which had been used in
    creating the soul of the world; these remains, however, are
    diluted to the third degree; by this Plato expresses the measure
    of the difference between the soul human and divine.

    The human
    soul, like the cosmical, is framed before the body, as the mind
    is before the soul of either—this is the order of the divine
    work—and the finer parts of the body, which are more akin to the
    soul, such as the spinal marrow, are prior to the bones and
    flesh. The brain, the containing vessel of the divine part of the
    soul, is (nearly) in the form of a globe, which is the image of
    the gods, who are the stars, and of the universe.

    There is, however, an inconsistency in Plato’s manner of
    conceiving the soul of man; he cannot get rid of the element of
    necessity which is allowed to enter. He does not, like Kant,
    attempt to vindicate for men a freedom out of space and time; but
    he acknowledges him to be subject to the influence of external
    causes, and leaves hardly any place for freedom of the will. The
    lusts of men are caused by their bodily constitution, though they
    may be increased by bad education and bad laws, which implies
    that they may be decreased by good education and good laws.

    He
    appears to have an inkling of the truth that to the higher nature
    of man evil is involuntary. This is mixed up with the view which,
    while apparently agreeing with it, is in reality the opposite of
    it, that vice is due to physical causes. In the Timaeus, as well
    as in the Laws, he also regards vices and crimes as simply
    involuntary; they are diseases analogous to the diseases of the
    body, and arising out of the same causes. If we draw together the
    opposite poles of Plato’s system, we find that, like Spinoza, he
    combines idealism with fatalism.

    The soul of man is divided by him into three parts, answering
    roughly to the charioteer and steeds of the Phaedrus, and to the
    (Greek) of the Republic and Nicomachean Ethics. First, there is
    the immortal nature of which the brain is the seat, and which is
    akin to the soul of the universe. This alone thinks and knows and
    is the ruler of the whole. Secondly, there is the higher mortal
    soul which, though liable to perturbations of her own, takes the
    side of reason against the lower appetites. The seat of this is
    the heart, in which courage, anger, and all the nobler affections
    are supposed to reside.

    There the veins all meet; it is their
    centre or house of guard whence they carry the orders of the
    thinking being to the extremities of his kingdom. There is also a
    third or appetitive soul, which receives the commands of the
    immortal part, not immediately but mediately, through the liver,
    which reflects on its surface the admonitions and threats of the
    reason.

    The liver is imagined by Plato to be a smooth and bright
    substance, having a store of sweetness and also of bitterness,
    which reason freely uses in the execution of her mandates. In
    this region, as ancient superstition told, were to be found
    intimations of the future. But Plato is careful to observe that
    although such knowledge is given to the inferior parts of man, it
    requires to be interpreted by the superior. Reason, and not
    enthusiasm, is the true guide of man; he is only inspired when he
    is demented by some distemper or possession.

    The ancient saying,
    that ‘only a man in his senses can judge of his own actions,’ is
    approved by modern philosophy too. The same irony which appears
    in Plato’s remark, that ‘the men of old time must surely have
    known the gods who were their ancestors, and we should believe
    them as custom requires,’ is also manifest in his account of
    divination.

    The appetitive soul is seated in the belly, and there imprisoned
    like a wild beast, far away from the council chamber, as Plato
    graphically calls the head, in order that the animal passions may
    not interfere with the deliberations of reason. Though the soul
    is said by him to be prior to the body, yet we cannot help seeing
    that it is constructed on the model of the body—the threefold
    division into the rational, passionate, and appetitive
    corresponding to the head, heart and belly.

    The human soul
    differs from the soul of the world in this respect, that it is
    enveloped and finds its expression in matter, whereas the soul of
    the world is not only enveloped or diffused in matter, but is the
    element in which matter moves. The breath of man is within him,
    but the air or aether of heaven is the element which surrounds
    him and all things.

    Pleasure and pain are attributed in the Timaeus to the suddenness
    of our sensations—the first being a sudden restoration, the
    second a sudden violation, of nature (Phileb.). The sensations
    become conscious to us when they are exceptional. Sight is not
    attended either by pleasure or pain, but hunger and the appeasing
    of hunger are pleasant and painful because they are
    extraordinary.

    Section 6.

    I shall not attempt to connect the physiological speculations of
    Plato either with ancient or modern medicine. What light I can
    throw upon them will be derived from the comparison of them with
    his general system.

    There is no principle so apparent in the physics of the Timaeus,
    or in ancient physics generally, as that of continuity. The world
    is conceived of as a whole, and the elements are formed into and
    out of one another; the varieties of substances and processes are
    hardly known or noticed.

    And in a similar manner the human body
    is conceived of as a whole, and the different substances of
    which, to a superficial observer, it appears to be composed—the
    blood, flesh, sinews—like the elements out of which they are
    formed, are supposed to pass into one another in regular order,
    while the infinite complexity of the human frame remains
    unobserved. And diseases arise from the opposite process—when the
    natural proportions of the four elements are disturbed, and the
    secondary substances which are formed out of them, namely, blood,
    flesh, sinews, are generated in an inverse order.

    Plato found heat and air within the human frame, and the blood
    circulating in every part. He assumes in language almost
    unintelligible to us that a network of fire and air envelopes the
    greater part of the body. This outer net contains two lesser
    nets, one corresponding to the stomach, the other to the lungs;
    and the entrance to the latter is forked or divided into two
    passages which lead to the nostrils and to the mouth. In the
    process of respiration the external net is said to find a way in
    and out of the pores of the skin: while the interior of it and
    the lesser nets move alternately into each other.

    The whole
    description is figurative, as Plato himself implies when he
    speaks of a ‘fountain of fire which we compare to the network of
    a creel.’ He really means by this what we should describe as a
    state of heat or temperature in the interior of the body. The
    ‘fountain of fire’ or heat is also in a figure the circulation of
    the blood. The passage is partly imagination, partly fact.

    He has a singular theory of respiration for which he accounts
    solely by the movement of the air in and out of the body; he does
    not attribute any part of the process to the action of the body
    itself. The air has a double ingress and a double exit, through
    the mouth or nostrils, and through the skin. When exhaled through
    the mouth or nostrils, it leaves a vacuum which is filled up by
    other air finding a way in through the pores, this air being
    thrust out of its place by the exhalation from the mouth and
    nostrils.

    There is also a corresponding process of inhalation
    through the mouth or nostrils, and of exhalation through the
    pores. The inhalation through the pores appears to take place
    nearly at the same time as the exhalation through the mouth; and
    conversely. The internal fire is in either case the propelling
    cause outwards—the inhaled air, when heated by it, having a
    natural tendency to move out of the body to the place of fire;
    while the impossibility of a vacuum is the propelling cause
    inwards.

    Thus we see that this singular theory is dependent on two
    principles largely employed by Plato in explaining the operations
    of nature, the impossibility of a vacuum and the attraction of
    like to like. To these there has to be added a third principle,
    which is the condition of the action of the other two,—the
    interpenetration of particles in proportion to their density or
    rarity. It is this which enables fire and air to permeate the
    flesh.

    Plato’s account of digestion and the circulation of the blood is
    closely connected with his theory of respiration. Digestion is
    supposed to be effected by the action of the internal fire, which
    in the process of respiration moves into the stomach and minces
    the food. As the fire returns to its place, it takes with it the
    minced food or blood; and in this way the veins are replenished.
    Plato does not enquire how the blood is separated from the
    faeces.

    Of the anatomy and functions of the body he knew very
    little,—e.g. of the uses of the nerves in conveying motion and
    sensation, which he supposed to be communicated by the bones and
    veins; he was also ignorant of the distinction between veins and
    arteries;—the latter term he applies to the vessels which conduct
    air from the mouth to the lungs;—he supposes the lung to be
    hollow and bloodless; the spinal marrow he conceives to be the
    seed of generation; he confuses the parts of the body with the
    states of the body—the network of fire and air is spoken of as a
    bodily organ; he has absolutely no idea of the phenomena of
    respiration, which he attributes to a law of equalization in
    nature, the air which is breathed out displacing other air which
    finds a way in; he is wholly unacquainted with the process of
    digestion.

    Except the general divisions into the spleen, the
    liver, the belly, and the lungs, and the obvious distinctions of
    flesh, bones, and the limbs of the body, we find nothing that
    reminds us of anatomical facts. But we find much which is derived
    from his theory of the universe, and transferred to man, as there
    is much also in his theory of the universe which is suggested by
    man. The microcosm of the human body is the lesser image of the
    macrocosm. The courses of the same and the other affect both;
    they are made of the same elements and therefore in the same
    proportions.

    Both are intelligent natures endued with the power
    of self-motion, and the same equipoise is maintained in both. The
    animal is a sort of ‘world’ to the particles of the blood which
    circulate in it. All the four elements entered into the original
    composition of the human frame; the bone was formed out of smooth
    earth; liquids of various kinds pass to and fro; the network of
    fire and air irrigates the veins.

    Infancy and childhood is the
    chaos or first turbid flux of sense prior to the establishment of
    order; the intervals of time which may be observed in some
    intermittent fevers correspond to the density of the elements.
    The spinal marrow, including the brain, is formed out of the
    finest sorts of triangles, and is the connecting link between
    body and mind. Health is only to be preserved by imitating the
    motions of the world in space, which is the mother and nurse of
    generation.

    The work of digestion is carried on by the superior
    sharpness of the triangles forming the substances of the human
    body to those which are introduced into it in the shape of food.
    The freshest and acutest forms of triangles are those that are
    found in children, but they become more obtuse with advancing
    years; and when they finally wear out and fall to pieces, old age
    and death supervene.

    As in the Republic, Plato is still the enemy of the purgative
    treatment of physicians, which, except in extreme cases, no man
    of sense will ever adopt. For, as he adds, with an insight into
    the truth, ‘every disease is akin to the nature of the living
    being and is only irritated by stimulants.’ He is of opinion that
    nature should be left to herself, and is inclined to think that
    physicians are in vain (Laws—where he says that warm baths would
    be more beneficial to the limbs of the aged rustic than the
    prescriptions of a not over-wise doctor).

    If he seems to be
    extreme in his condemnation of medicine and to rely too much on
    diet and exercise, he might appeal to nearly all the best
    physicians of our own age in support of his opinions, who often
    speak to their patients of the worthlessness of drugs. For we
    ourselves are sceptical about medicine, and very unwilling to
    submit to the purgative treatment of physicians. May we not claim
    for Plato an anticipation of modern ideas as about some questions
    of astronomy and physics, so also about medicine?

    As in the
    Charmides he tells us that the body cannot be cured without the
    soul, so in the Timaeus he strongly asserts the sympathy of soul
    and body; any defect of either is the occasion of the greatest
    discord and disproportion in the other. Here too may be a
    presentiment that in the medicine of the future the
    interdependence of mind and body will be more fully recognized,
    and that the influence of the one over the other may be exerted
    in a manner which is not now thought possible.

    Section 7.

    In Plato’s explanation of sensation we are struck by the fact
    that he has not the same distinct conception of organs of sense
    which is familiar to ourselves. The senses are not instruments,
    but rather passages, through which external objects strike upon
    the mind. The eye is the aperture through which the stream of
    vision passes, the ear is the aperture through which the
    vibrations of sound pass. But that the complex structure of the
    eye or the ear is in any sense the cause of sight and hearing he
    seems hardly to be aware.

    The process of sight is the most complicated (Rep.), and consists
    of three elements—the light which is supposed to reside within
    the eye, the light of the sun, and the light emitted from
    external objects. When the light of the eye meets the light of
    the sun, and both together meet the light issuing from an
    external object, this is the simple act of sight. When the
    particles of light which proceed from the object are exactly
    equal to the particles of the visual ray which meet them from
    within, then the body is transparent.

    If they are larger and
    contract the visual ray, a black colour is produced; if they are
    smaller and dilate it, a white. Other phenomena are produced by
    the variety and motion of light. A sudden flash of fire at once
    elicits light and moisture from the eye, and causes a bright
    colour. A more subdued light, on mingling with the moisture of
    the eye, produces a red colour. Out of these elements all other
    colours are derived. All of them are combinations of bright and
    red with white and black.

    Plato himself tells us that he does not
    know in what proportions they combine, and he is of opinion that
    such knowledge is granted to the gods only. To have seen the
    affinity of them to each other and their connection with light,
    is not a bad basis for a theory of colours. We must remember that
    they were not distinctly defined to his, as they are to our eyes;
    he saw them, not as they are divided in the prism, or
    artificially manufactured for the painter’s use, but as they
    exist in nature, blended and confused with one another.

    We can hardly agree with him when he tells us that smells do not
    admit of kinds. He seems to think that no definite qualities can
    attach to bodies which are in a state of transition or
    evaporation; he also makes the subtle observation that smells
    must be denser than air, though thinner than water, because when
    there is an obstruction to the breathing, air can penetrate, but
    not smell.

    The affections peculiar to the tongue are of various kinds, and,
    like many other affections, are caused by contraction and
    dilation. Some of them are produced by rough, others by
    abstergent, others by inflammatory substances,—these act upon the
    testing instruments of the tongue, and produce a more or less
    disagreeable sensation, while other particles congenial to the
    tongue soften and harmonize them. The instruments of taste reach
    from the tongue to the heart.

    Plato has a lively sense of the
    manner in which sensation and motion are communicated from one
    part of the body to the other, though he confuses the affections
    with the organs. Hearing is a blow which passes through the ear
    and ends in the region of the liver, being transmitted by means
    of the air, the brain, and the blood to the soul. The swifter
    sound is acute, the sound which moves slowly is grave. A great
    body of sound is loud, the opposite is low.

    Discord is produced
    by the swifter and slower motions of two sounds, and is converted
    into harmony when the swifter motions begin to pause and are
    overtaken by the slower.

    The general phenomena of sensation are partly internal, but the
    more violent are caused by conflict with external objects.
    Proceeding by a method of superficial observation, Plato remarks
    that the more sensitive parts of the human frame are those which
    are least covered by flesh, as is the case with the head and the
    elbows. Man, if his head had been covered with a thicker pulp of
    flesh, might have been a longer-lived animal than he is, but
    could not have had as quick perceptions.

    On the other hand, the
    tongue is one of the most sensitive of organs; but then this is
    made, not to be a covering to the bones which contain the marrow
    or source of life, but with an express purpose, and in a separate
    mass.

    Section 8.

    We have now to consider how far in any of these speculations
    Plato approximated to the discoveries of modern science. The
    modern physical philosopher is apt to dwell exclusively on the
    absurdities of ancient ideas about science, on the haphazard
    fancies and a priori assumptions of ancient teachers, on their
    confusion of facts and ideas, on their inconsistency and
    blindness to the most obvious phenomena. He measures them not by
    what preceded them, but by what has followed them.

    He does not
    consider that ancient physical philosophy was not a free enquiry,
    but a growth, in which the mind was passive rather than active,
    and was incapable of resisting the impressions which flowed in
    upon it. He hardly allows to the notions of the ancients the
    merit of being the stepping-stones by which he has himself risen
    to a higher knowledge. He never reflects, how great a thing it
    was to have formed a conception, however imperfect, either of the
    human frame as a whole, or of the world as a whole.

    According to
    the view taken in these volumes the errors of ancient physicists
    were not separable from the intellectual conditions under which
    they lived. Their genius was their own; and they were not the
    rash and hasty generalizers which, since the days of Bacon, we
    have been apt to suppose them. The thoughts of men widened to
    receive experience; at first they seemed to know all things as in
    a dream: after a while they look at them closely and hold them in
    their hands. They begin to arrange them in classes and to connect
    causes with effects.

    General notions are necessary to the
    apprehension of particular facts, the metaphysical to the
    physical. Before men can observe the world, they must be able to
    conceive it.

    To do justice to the subject, we should consider the physical
    philosophy of the ancients as a whole; we should remember, (1)
    that the nebular theory was the received belief of several of the
    early physicists; (2) that the development of animals out of
    fishes who came to land, and of man out of the animals, was held
    by Anaximander in the sixth century before Christ (Plut. Symp.
    Quaest; Plac.

    Phil.); (3) that even by Philolaus and the early
    Pythagoreans, the earth was held to be a body like the other
    stars revolving in space around the sun or a central fire; (4)
    that the beginnings of chemistry are discernible in the ‘similar
    particles’ of Anaxagoras.

    Also they knew or thought (5) that
    there was a sex in plants as well as in animals; (6) they were
    aware that musical notes depended on the relative length or
    tension of the strings from which they were emitted, and were
    measured by ratios of number; (7) that mathematical laws pervaded
    the world; and even qualitative differences were supposed to have
    their origin in number and figure; (8) the annihilation of matter
    was denied by several of them, and the seeming disappearance of
    it held to be a transformation only.

    For, although one of these
    discoveries might have been supposed to be a happy guess, taken
    together they seem to imply a great advance and almost maturity
    of natural knowledge.

    We should also remember, when we attribute to the ancients hasty
    generalizations and delusions of language, that physical
    philosophy and metaphysical too have been guilty of similar
    fallacies in quite recent times. We by no means distinguish
    clearly between mind and body, between ideas and facts. Have not
    many discussions arisen about the Atomic theory in which a point
    has been confused with a material atom? Have not the natures of
    things been explained by imaginary entities, such as life or
    phlogiston, which exist in the mind only?

    Has not disease been
    regarded, like sin, sometimes as a negative and necessary,
    sometimes as a positive or malignant principle? The ‘idols’ of
    Bacon are nearly as common now as ever; they are inherent in the
    human mind, and when they have the most complete dominion over
    us, we are least able to perceive them. We recognize them in the
    ancients, but we fail to see them in ourselves.

    Such reflections, although this is not the place in which to
    dwell upon them at length, lead us to take a favourable view of

    Edition notice Project Gutenberg source, credits & licence

    The reading text above is the public-domain work. The Project Gutenberg header, production credits and licence are kept here as provenance rather than shown before the book.

    Title
    Timaeus
    Author
    Plato
    Release date
    December 1, 1998 [eBook #1572]
    Language
    English
    Credits
    Sue Asscher and David Widger
    Most recently updated
    April 25, 2021
    Front matter as received (title page, contents)
          TIMAEUS
    
          by Plato
    
          Translated by Benjamin Jowett
    
    
          Contents
    
     INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
     Section 1.
     Section 2.
     Section 3.
     Section 4.
     Section 5.
     Section 6.
     Section 7.
     Section 8.
    
     TIMAEUS
    
    
    
    
          INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
    
          Of all the writings of Plato the Timaeus is the most obscure and
          repulsive to the modern reader, and has nevertheless had the
          greatest influence over the ancient and mediaeval world. The
          obscurity arises in the infancy of physical science, out of the
          confusion of theological, mathematical, and physiological
          notions, out of the desire to conceive the whole of nature
          without any adequate knowledge of the parts, and from a greater
          perception of similarities which lie on the surface than of
          differences which are hidden from view. To bring sense under the
          control of reason; to find some way through the mist or labyrinth
          of appearances, either the highway of mathematics, or more
          devious paths suggested by the analogy of man with the world, and
          of the world with man; to see that all things have a cause and
          are tending towards an end—this is the spirit of the ancient
          physical philosopher. He has no notion of trying an experiment
          and is hardly capable of observing the curiosities of nature
          which are ‘tumbling out at his feet,’ or of interpreting even the
          most obvious of them. He is driven back from the nearer to the
          more distant, from particulars to generalities, from the earth to
          the stars. He lifts up his eyes to the heavens and seeks to guide
          by their motions his erring footsteps. But we neither appreciate
          the conditions of knowledge to which he was subjected, nor have
          the ideas which fastened upon his imagination the same hold upon
          us. For he is hanging between matter and mind; he is under the
          dominion at the same time both of sense and of abstractions; his
          impressions are taken almost at random from the outside of
          nature; he sees the light, but not the objects which are revealed
          by the light; and he brings into juxtaposition things which to us
          appear wide as the poles asunder, because he finds nothing
          between them. He passes abruptly from persons to ideas and
          numbers, and from ideas and numbers to persons,—from the heavens
          to man, from astronomy to physiology; he confuses, or rather does
          not distinguish, subject and object, first and final causes, and
          is dreaming of geometrical figures lost in a flux of sense. He
          contrasts the perfect movements of the heavenly bodies with the
          imperfect representation of them (Rep.), and he does not always
          require strict accuracy even in applications of number and figure
          (Rep.). His mind lingers around the forms of mythology, which he
          uses as symbols or translates into figures of speech. He has no
          implements of observation, such as the telescope or microscope;
          the great science of chemistry is a blank to him. It is only by
          an effort that the modern thinker can breathe the atmosphere of
          the ancient philosopher, or understand how, under such unequal
          conditions, he seems in many instances, by a sort of inspiration,
          to have anticipated the truth.
    
          The influence with the Timaeus has exercised upon posterity is
          due partly to a misunderstanding. In the supposed depths of this
          dialogue the Neo-Platonists found hidden meanings and connections
          with the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and out of them they
          elicited doctrines quite at variance with the spirit of Plato.
          Believing that he was inspired by the Holy Ghost, or had received
          his wisdom from Moses, they seemed to find in his writings the
          Christian Trinity, the Word, the Church, the creation of the
          world in a Jewish sense, as they really found the personality of
          God or of mind, and the immortality of the soul. All religions
          and philosophies met and mingled in the schools of Alexandria,
          and the Neo-Platonists had a method of interpretation which could
          elicit any meaning out of any words. They were really incapable
          of distinguishing between the opinions of one philosopher and
          another— between Aristotle and Plato, or between the serious
          thoughts of Plato and his passing fancies. They were absorbed in
          his theology and were under the dominion of his name, while that
          which was truly great and truly characteristic in him, his effort
          to realize and connect abstractions, was not understood by them
          at all. Yet the genius of Plato and Greek philosophy reacted upon
          the East, and a Greek element of thought and language overlaid
          and partly reduced to order the chaos of Orientalism. And kindred
          spirits, like St. Augustine, even though they were acquainted
          with his writings only through the medium of a Latin translation,
          were profoundly affected by them, seeming to find ‘God and his
          word everywhere insinuated’ in them (August. Confess.)
    
          There is no danger of the modern commentators on the Timaeus
          falling into the absurdities of the Neo-Platonists. In the
          present day we are well aware that an ancient philosopher is to
          be interpreted from himself and by the contemporary history of
          thought. We know that mysticism is not criticism. The fancies of
          the Neo-Platonists are only interesting to us because they
          exhibit a phase of the human mind which prevailed widely in the
          first centuries of the Christian era, and is not wholly extinct
          in our own day. But they have nothing to do with the
          interpretation of Plato, and in spirit they are opposed to him.
          They are the feeble expression of an age which has lost the power
          not only of creating great works, but of understanding them. They
          are the spurious birth of a marriage between philosophy and
          tradition, between Hellas and the East—(Greek) (Rep.). Whereas
          the so-called mysticism of Plato is purely Greek, arising out of
          his imperfect knowledge and high aspirations, and is the growth
          of an age in which philosophy is not wholly separated from poetry
          and mythology.
    
          A greater danger with modern interpreters of Plato is the
          tendency to regard the Timaeus as the centre of his system. We do
          not know how Plato would have arranged his own dialogues, or
          whether the thought of arranging any of them, besides the two
          ‘Trilogies’ which he has expressly connected; was ever present to
          his mind. But, if he had arranged them, there are many
          indications that this is not the place which he would have
          assigned to the Timaeus. We observe, first of all, that the
          dialogue is put into the mouth of a Pythagorean philosopher, and
          not of Socrates. And this is required by dramatic propriety; for
          the investigation of nature was expressly renounced by Socrates
          in the Phaedo. Nor does Plato himself attribute any importance to
          his guesses at science. He is not at all absorbed by them, as he
          is by the IDEA of good. He is modest and hesitating, and
          confesses that his words partake of the uncertainty of the
          subject (Tim.). The dialogue is primarily concerned with the
          animal creation, including under this term the heavenly bodies,
          and with man only as one among the animals. But we can hardly
          suppose that Plato would have preferred the study of nature to
          man, or that he would have deemed the formation of the world and
          the human frame to have the same interest which he ascribes to
          the mystery of being and not-being, or to the great political
          problems which he discusses in the Republic and the Laws. There
          are no speculations on physics in the other dialogues of Plato,
          and he himself regards the consideration of them as a rational
          pastime only. He is beginning to feel the need of further
          divisions of knowledge; and is becoming aware that besides
          dialectic, mathematics, and the arts, there is another field
          which has been hitherto unexplored by him. But he has not as yet
          defined this intermediate territory which lies somewhere between
          medicine and mathematics, and he would have felt that there was
          as great an impiety in ranking theories of physics first in the
          order of knowledge, as in placing the body before the soul.
    
          It is true, however, that the Timaeus is by no means confined to
          speculations on physics. The deeper foundations of the Platonic
          philosophy, such as the nature of God, the distinction of the
          sensible and intellectual, the great original conceptions of time
          and space, also appear in it. They are found principally in the
          first half of the dialogue. The construction of the heavens is
          for the most part ideal; the cyclic year serves as the connection
          between the world of absolute being and of generation, just as
          the number of population in the Republic is the expression or
          symbol of the transition from the ideal to the actual state. In
          some passages we are uncertain whether we are reading a
          description of astronomical facts or contemplating processes of
          the human mind, or of that divine mind (Phil.) which in Plato is
          hardly separable from it. The characteristics of man are
          transferred to the world-animal, as for example when intelligence
          and knowledge are said to be perfected by the circle of the Same,
          and true opinion by the circle of the Other; and conversely the
          motions of the world-animal reappear in man; its amorphous state
          continues in the child, and in both disorder and chaos are
          gradually succeeded by stability and order. It is not however to
          passages like these that Plato is referring when he speaks of the
          uncertainty of his subject, but rather to the composition of
          bodies, to the relations of colours, the nature of diseases, and
          the like, about which he truly feels the lamentable ignorance
          prevailing in his own age.
    
          We are led by Plato himself to regard the Timaeus, not as the
          centre or inmost shrine of the edifice, but as a detached
          building in a different style, framed, not after the Socratic,
          but after some Pythagorean model. As in the Cratylus and
          Parmenides, we are uncertain whether Plato is expressing his own
          opinions, or appropriating and perhaps improving the
          philosophical speculations of others. In all three dialogues he
          is exerting his dramatic and imitative power; in the Cratylus
          mingling a satirical and humorous purpose with true principles of
          language; in the Parmenides overthrowing Megarianism by a sort of
          ultra-Megarianism, which discovers contradictions in the one as
          great as those which have been previously shown to exist in the
          ideas. There is a similar uncertainty about the Timaeus; in the
          first part he scales the heights of transcendentalism, in the
          latter part he treats in a bald and superficial manner of the
          functions and diseases of the human frame. He uses the thoughts
          and almost the words of Parmenides when he discourses of being
          and of essence, adopting from old religion into philosophy the
          conception of God, and from the Megarians the IDEA of good. He
          agrees with Empedocles and the Atomists in attributing the
          greater differences of kinds to the figures of the elements and
          their movements into and out of one another. With Heracleitus, he
          acknowledges the perpetual flux; like Anaxagoras, he asserts the
          predominance of mind, although admitting an element of necessity
          which reason is incapable of subduing; like the Pythagoreans he
          supposes the mystery of the world to be contained in number.
          Many, if not all the elements of the Pre-Socratic philosophy are
          included in the Timaeus. It is a composite or eclectic work of
          imagination, in which Plato, without naming them, gathers up into
          a kind of system the various elements of philosophy which
          preceded him.
    
          If we allow for the difference of subject, and for some growth in
          Plato’s own mind, the discrepancy between the Timaeus and the
          other dialogues will not appear to be great. It is probable that
          the relation of the ideas to God or of God to the world was
          differently conceived by him at different times of his life. In
          all his later dialogues we observe a tendency in him to personify
          mind or God, and he therefore naturally inclines to view creation
          as the work of design. The creator is like a human artist who
          frames in his mind a plan which he executes by the help of his
          servants. Thus the language of philosophy which speaks of first
          and second causes is crossed by another sort of phraseology: ‘God
          made the world because he was good, and the demons ministered to
          him.’ The Timaeus is cast in a more theological and less
          philosophical mould than the other dialogues, but the same
          general spirit is apparent; there is the same dualism or
          opposition between the ideal and actual—the soul is prior to the
          body, the intelligible and unseen to the visible and corporeal.
          There is the same distinction between knowledge and opinion which
          occurs in the Theaetetus and Republic, the same enmity to the
          poets, the same combination of music and gymnastics. The doctrine
          of transmigration is still held by him, as in the Phaedrus and
          Republic; and the soul has a view of the heavens in a prior state
          of being. The ideas also remain, but they have become types in
          nature, forms of men, animals, birds, fishes. And the attribution
          of evil to physical causes accords with the doctrine which he
          maintains in the Laws respecting the involuntariness of vice.
    
          The style and plan of the Timaeus differ greatly from that of any
          other of the Platonic dialogues. The language is weighty, abrupt,
          and in some passages sublime. But Plato has not the same mastery
          over his instrument which he exhibits in the Phaedrus or
          Symposium. Nothing can exceed the beauty or art of the
          introduction, in which he is using words after his accustomed
          manner. But in the rest of the work the power of language seems
          to fail him, and the dramatic form is wholly given up. He could
          write in one style, but not in another, and the Greek language
          had not as yet been fashioned by any poet or philosopher to
          describe physical phenomena. The early physiologists had
          generally written in verse; the prose writers, like Democritus
          and Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge from their fragments,
          never attained to a periodic style. And hence we find the same
          sort of clumsiness in the Timaeus of Plato which characterizes
          the philosophical poem of Lucretius. There is a want of flow and
          often a defect of rhythm; the meaning is sometimes obscure, and
          there is a greater use of apposition and more of repetition than
          occurs in Plato’s earlier writings. The sentences are less
          closely connected and also more involved; the antecedents of
          demonstrative and relative pronouns are in some cases remote and
          perplexing. The greater frequency of participles and of absolute
          constructions gives the effect of heaviness. The descriptive
          portion of the Timaeus retains traces of the first Greek prose
          composition; for the great master of language was speaking on a
          theme with which he was imperfectly acquainted, and had no words
          in which to express his meaning. The rugged grandeur of the
          opening discourse of Timaeus may be compared with the more
          harmonious beauty of a similar passage in the Phaedrus.
    
          To the same cause we may attribute the want of plan. Plato had
          not the command of his materials which would have enabled him to
          produce a perfect work of art. Hence there are several new
          beginnings and resumptions and formal or artificial connections;
          we miss the ‘callida junctura’ of the earlier dialogues. His
          speculations about the Eternal, his theories of creation, his
          mathematical anticipations, are supplemented by desultory remarks
          on the one immortal and the two mortal souls of man, on the
          functions of the bodily organs in health and disease, on sight,
          hearing, smell, taste, and touch. He soars into the heavens, and
          then, as if his wings were suddenly clipped, he walks
          ungracefully and with difficulty upon the earth. The greatest
          things in the world, and the least things in man, are brought
          within the compass of a short treatise. But the intermediate
          links are missing, and we cannot be surprised that there should
          be a want of unity in a work which embraces astronomy, theology,
          physiology, and natural philosophy in a few pages.
    
          It is not easy to determine how Plato’s cosmos may be presented
          to the reader in a clearer and shorter form; or how we may supply
          a thread of connexion to his ideas without giving greater
          consistency to them than they possessed in his mind, or adding on
          consequences which would never have occurred to him. For he has
          glimpses of the truth, but no comprehensive or perfect vision.
          There are isolated expressions about the nature of God which have
          a wonderful depth and power; but we are not justified in assuming
          that these had any greater significance to the mind of Plato than
          language of a neutral and impersonal character... With a view to
          the illustration of the Timaeus I propose to divide this
          Introduction into sections, of which the first will contain an
          outline of the dialogue: (2) I shall consider the aspects of
          nature which presented themselves to Plato and his age, and the
          elements of philosophy which entered into the conception of them:
          (3) the theology and physics of the Timaeus, including the soul
          of the world, the conception of time and space, and the
          composition of the elements: (4) in the fourth section I shall
          consider the Platonic astronomy, and the position of the earth.
          There will remain, (5) the psychology, (6) the physiology of
          Plato, and (7) his analysis of the senses to be briefly commented
          upon: (8) lastly, we may examine in what points Plato approaches
          or anticipates the discoveries of modern science.
    Header as received
    The Project Gutenberg eBook of Timaeus
        
    This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
    most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
    whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
    of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
    at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
    you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
    before using this eBook.
    
    Title: Timaeus
    
    Author: Plato
    
    Translator: Benjamin Jowett
    
    
            
    Release date: December 1, 1998 [eBook #1572]
                    Most recently updated: April 25, 2021
    
    Language: English
    
    Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1572
    
    Credits: Sue Asscher and David Widger
    Full Project Gutenberg licence
        
    
    Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
    be renamed.
    
    Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
    law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
    so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
    States without permission and without paying copyright
    royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part
    of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project
    Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™
    concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark,
    and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following
    the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use
    of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
    copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
    easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
    of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project
    Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may
    do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected
    by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark
    license, especially commercial redistribution.
    
    
    START: FULL LICENSE
    
    THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG™ LICENSE
    
    PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
    
    To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
    distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
    (or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
    Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
    Project Gutenberg License available with this file or online at
    www.gutenberg.org/license.
    
    Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg
    electronic works
    
    1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg
    electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
    and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
    (trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
    the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
    destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg electronic works in your
    possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
    Project Gutenberg electronic work and you do not agree to be bound
    by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person
    or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
    
    1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
    used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
    agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
    things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg electronic works
    even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
    paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
    Gutenberg electronic works if you follow the terms of this
    agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg
    electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
    
    1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
    Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection
    of Project Gutenberg electronic works. Nearly all the individual
    works in the collection are in the public domain in the United
    States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the
    United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
    claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
    displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
    all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
    that you will support the Project Gutenberg mission of promoting
    free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg
    works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the
    Project Gutenberg name associated with the work. You can easily
    comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
    same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg License when
    you share it without charge with others.
    
    1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
    what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
    in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
    check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
    agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
    distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
    other Project Gutenberg work. The Foundation makes no
    representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
    country other than the United States.
    
    1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
    
    1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other
    immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg License must appear
    prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg work (any work
    on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the
    phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed,
    performed, viewed, copied or distributed:
    
        This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
        other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
        whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
        of the Project Gutenberg™ License included with this eBook or online
        at www.gutenberg.org. If you
        are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws
        of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
      
    1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is
    derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
    contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
    copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in
    the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
    redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
    Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply
    either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or
    obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg
    trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
    
    1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is posted
    with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
    must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
    additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
    will be linked to the Project Gutenberg License for all works
    posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the
    beginning of this work.
    
    1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg
    License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
    work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg.
    
    1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
    electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
    prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
    active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
    Gutenberg License.
    
    1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
    compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
    any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access
    to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg work in a format
    other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
    version posted on the official Project Gutenberg website
    (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
    to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
    of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
    Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
    full Project Gutenberg License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
    
    1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
    performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg works
    unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
    
    1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
    access to or distributing Project Gutenberg electronic works
    provided that:
    
        • You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
            the use of Project Gutenberg works calculated using the method
            you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed
            to the owner of the Project Gutenberg trademark, but he has
            agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project
            Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid
            within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are
            legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty
            payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project
            Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in
            Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg
            Literary Archive Foundation.”
        
        • You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
            you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
            does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
            License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
            copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue
            all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™
            works.
        
        • You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of
            any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
            electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
            receipt of the work.
        
        • You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
            distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
        
    
    1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project
    Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than
    are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing
    from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
    the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
    forth in Section 3 below.
    
    1.F.
    
    1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
    effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
    works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project
    Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™
    electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may
    contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate
    or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
    intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
    other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
    cannot be read by your equipment.
    
    1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right
    of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
    Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
    Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
    Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
    liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
    fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
    LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
    PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
    TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
    LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
    INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
    DAMAGE.
    
    1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
    defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
    receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
    written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
    received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium
    with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you
    with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in
    lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person
    or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
    opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If
    the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing
    without further opportunities to fix the problem.
    
    1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
    in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
    OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
    LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
    
    1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
    warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
    damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement
    violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the
    agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or
    limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or
    unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
    remaining provisions.
    
    1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
    trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
    providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in
    accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the
    production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™
    electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses,
    including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of
    the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this
    or any Project Gutenberg work, (b) alteration, modification, or
    additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg work, and (c) any
    Defect you cause.
    
    Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg
    
    Project Gutenberg is synonymous with the free distribution of
    electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
    computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
    exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
    from people in all walks of life.
    
    Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
    assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg’s
    goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg collection will
    remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
    Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
    and permanent future for Project Gutenberg and future
    generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
    Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see
    Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
    
    Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
    
    The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
    501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
    state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
    Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
    number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary
    Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by
    U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.
    
    The Foundation’s business office is located at 41 Watchung Plaza #516,
    Montclair NJ 07042, USA, +1 (862) 621-9288. Email contact links and up
    to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
    and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
    
    Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
    Literary Archive Foundation
    
    Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
    public support and donations to carry out its mission of
    increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
    freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
    array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations
    ($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
    status with the IRS.
    
    The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
    charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
    States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
    considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
    with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations
    where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
    DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state
    visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.
    
    While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
    have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
    against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
    approach us with offers to donate.
    
    International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
    any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
    outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
    
    Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
    methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
    ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
    donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.
    
    Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg electronic works
    
    Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
    Gutenberg concept of a library of electronic works that could be
    freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
    distributed Project Gutenberg eBooks with only a loose network of
    volunteer support.
    
    Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed
    editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
    the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
    necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
    edition.
    
    Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
    facility: www.gutenberg.org.
    
    This website includes information about Project Gutenberg,
    including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
    Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
    subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.

    Source: Project Gutenberg ebook #1572. Public-domain status is recorded per item; the licence text above is reproduced unchanged.

    Source
    Project Gutenberg
    Record
    ebook 1572
    Rights
    public domain (US)
    Rendered
    2026-11-22
    Completeness
    First 200,000 characters rendered.