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Academica

by Marcus Tullius Cicero · English, Latin · Gutenberg #14970 · 619,114 chars · public domain (US)

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Title: Academica

Author: Marcus Tullius Cicero

Editor: James S. Reid


        
Release date: February 8, 2005 [eBook #14970]
                Most recently updated: December 19, 2020

Language: English, Latin

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ACADEMICA ***




Produced by Ted Garvin, Keith Edkins and the PG Online Distributed
Proofreading Team





THE

ACADEMICA OF CICERO.

_THE TEXT REVISED AND EXPLAINED_

BY

JAMES S. REID,

M.L. CAMB. M.A. (LOND.)
ASSISTANT TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW, CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
ASSISTANT EXAMINER IN CLASSICS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

LONDON:
MACMILLAN AND CO.
1874

[_All Rights reserved_.]

       *       *       *       *       *

TO
THOSE OF HIS PUPILS
WHO HAVE READ WITH HIM
_THE ACADEMICA_,
THIS EDITION
IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED
BY
THE EDITOR.

       *       *       *       *       *

PREFACE.

Since the work of Davies appeared in 1725, no English scholar has edited
the _Academica_. In Germany the last edition with explanatory notes is that
of Goerenz, published in 1810. To the poverty and untrustworthiness of
Goerenz's learning Madvig's pages bear strong evidence; while the work of
Davies, though in every way far superior to that of Goerenz, is very
deficient when judged by the criticism of the present time.

This edition has grown out of a course of Intercollegiate lectures given by
me at Christ's College several years ago. I trust that the work in its
present shape will be of use to undergraduate students of the Universities,
and also to pupils and teachers alike in all schools where the
philosophical works of Cicero are studied, but especially in those where an
attempt is made to impart such instruction in the Ancient Philosophy as
will prepare the way for the completer knowledge now required in the final
Classical Examinations for Honours both at Oxford and Cambridge. My notes
have been written throughout with a practical reference to the needs of
junior students. During the last three or four years I have read the
_Academica_ with a large number of intelligent pupils, and there is
scarcely a note of mine which has not been suggested by some difficulty or
want of theirs. My plan has been, first, to embody in an Introduction such
information concerning Cicero's philosophical views and the literary
history of the _Academica_ as could not be readily got from existing books;
next, to provide a good text; then to aid the student in obtaining a higher
knowledge of Ciceronian Latinity, and lastly, to put it in his power to
learn thoroughly the philosophy with which Cicero deals.

My text may be said to be founded on that of Halm which appeared in the
edition of Cicero's philosophical works published in 1861 under the
editorship of Baiter and Halm as a continuation of Orelli's second edition
of Cicero's works, which was interrupted by the death of that editor. I
have never however allowed one of Halm's readings to pass without carefully
weighing the evidence he presents; and I have also studied all original
criticisms upon the text to which I could obtain access. The result is a
text which lies considerably nearer the MSS. than that of Halm. My
obligations other than those to Halm are sufficiently acknowledged in my
notes; the chief are to Madvig's little book entitled _Emendationes ad
Ciceronis libros Philosophicos_, published in 1825 at Copenhagen, but
never, I believe, reprinted, and to Baiter's text in the edition of
Cicero's works by himself and Kayser. In a very few passages I have
introduced emendations of my own, and that only where the conjecttires of
other Editors seemed to me to depart too widely from the MSS. If any
apology be needed for discussing, even sparingly, in the notes, questions
of textual criticism, I may say that I have done so from a conviction that
the very excellence of the texts now in use is depriving a Classical
training of a great deal of its old educational value. The judgment was
better cultivated when the student had to fight his way through bad texts
to the author's meaning and to a mastery of the Latin tongue. The
acceptance of results without a knowledge of the processes by which they
are obtained is worthless for the purposes of education, which is thus made
to rest on memory alone. I have therefore done my best to place before the
reader the arguments for and against different readings in the most
important places where the text is doubtful.

My experience as a teacher and examiner has proved to me that the students
for whom this edition is intended have a far smaller acquaintance than they
ought to have with the peculiarities and niceties of language which the
best Latin writers display. I have striven to guide them to the best
teaching of Madvig, on whose foundation every succeeding editor of Cicero
must build. His edition of the _De Finibus_ contains more valuable material
for illustrating, not merely the language, but also the subject-matter of
the _Academica_, than all the professed editions of the latter work in
existence. Yet, even after Madvig's labours, a great deal remains to be
done in pointing out what is, and what is not, Ciceronian Latin. I have
therefore added very many references from my own reading, and from other
sources. Wherever a quotation would not have been given but for its
appearance in some other work, I have pointed out the authority from whom
it was taken. I need hardly say that I do not expect or intend readers to
look out all the references given. It was necessary to provide material by
means of which the student might illustrate for himself a Latin usage, if
it were new to him, and might solve any linguistic difficulty that
occurred. Want of space has compelled me often to substitute a mere
reference for an actual quotation.

As there is no important doctrine of Ancient Philosophy which is not
touched upon somewhere in the _Academica_, it is evidently impossible for
an editor to give information which would be complete for a reader who is
studying that subject for the first time. I have therefore tried to enable
readers to find easily for themselves the information they require, and
have only dwelt in my own language upon such philosophical difficulties as
were in some special way bound up with the _Academica_. The two books
chiefly referred to in my notes are the English translation of Zeller's
_Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics_ (whenever Zeller is quoted without any
further description this book is meant), and the _Historia Philosophiae_ of
Ritter and Preller. The _pages_, not the _sections_, of the fourth edition
of this work are quoted. These books, with Madvig's _De Finibus_, all
teachers ought to place in the hands of pupils who are studying a
philosophical work of Cicero. Students at the Universities ought to have
constantly at hand Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and Sextus Empiricus, all
of which have been published in cheap and convenient forms.

Although this edition is primarily intended for junior students, it is
hoped that it may not be without interest for maturer scholars, as bringing
together much scattered information illustrative of the _Academica_, which
was before difficult of access. The present work will, I hope, prepare the
way for an exhaustive edition either from my own or some more competent
hand. It must be regarded as an experiment, for no English scholar of
recent times has treated any portion of Cicero's philosophical works with
quite the purpose which I have kept in view and have explained above.
Should this attempt meet with favour, I propose to edit after the same plan
some others of the less known and less edited portions of Cicero's
writings.

In dealing with a subject so unusually difficult and so rarely edited I
cannot hope to have escaped errors, but after submitting my views to
repeated revision during four years, it seems better to publish them than
to withhold from students help they so greatly need. Moreover, it is a
great gain, even at the cost of some errors, to throw off that intellectual
disease of over-fastidiousness which is so prevalent in this University,
and causes more than anything else the unproductiveness of English
scholarship as compared with that of Germany,

I have only to add that I shall be thankful for notices of errors and
omissions from any who are interested in the subject.

JAMES S. REID.

CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, _December, 1873._

       *       *       *       *       *

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.

Cic. = Cicero; Ac., Acad. = Academica; Ac., Acad. Post. = Academica
Posteriora; D.F. = De Finibus; T.D. = Tusculan Disputations; N.D. = De
Natura Deorum; De Div. = De Divinatione; Parad. = Paradoxa; Luc. =
Lucullus; Hortens. = Hortensius; De Off. = De Officiis; Tim. = Timaeus;
Cat. Mai. = Cato Maior; Lael. = Laelius; De Leg. = De Legibus; De Rep. = De
Republica; Somn. Scip. = Somnium Scipionis; De Or. = De Oratore; Orat. =
Orator; De Inv. = De Inventione; Brut. = Brutus; Ad Att. = Ad Atticum; Ad
Fam. = Ad Familiares; Ad Qu. Frat. = Ad Quintum Fratrem; In Verr., Verr. =
In Verrem; Div. in. Qu. Caec. = Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium; In Cat. =
In Catilinam.

Plat. = Plato: Rep. = Republic; Tim. = Timaeus; Apol. = Apologia Socratis;
Gorg. = Gorgias; Theaet. = Theaetetus.

Arist. = Aristotle; Nic. Eth. = Nicomachean Ethics; Mag. Mor. = Magna
Moralia; De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium; De Gen. et Corr. = De
Generatione et Corruptione; Anal. Post. = Analytica Posteriora; Met. =
Metaphysica; Phys. = Physica.

Plut. = Plutarch; De Plac. Phil. = De Placitis Philosophorum; Sto. Rep. =
De Stoicis Repugnantiis.

Sext. = Sextus; Sext. Emp. = Sextus Empiricus; Adv. Math. or A.M. =
Adversus Mathematicos; Pyrrh. Hypotyp. or Pyrrh. Hyp. or P.H. = Pyrrhoneôn
Hypotyposeôn Syntagmata.

Diog. or Diog. Laert. = Diogenes Laertius.

Stob. = Stobaeus; Phys. = Physica; Eth. = Ethica.

Galen; De Decr. Hipp. et Plat. = De Decretis Hippocratis et Platonis.

Euseb. = Eusebius; Pr. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelii.

Aug. or August. = Augustine; Contra Ac. or C. Ac. = Contra Academicos; De
Civ. Dei = De Civitate Dei.

Quintil. = Quintilian; Inst. Or. = Institutiones Oratoriae.

Seneca; Ep. = Epistles; Consol. ad Helv. = Consolatio ad Helvidium.

Epic. = Epicurus; Democr. = Democritus.

Madv. = Madvig; M.D.F. = Madvig's edition of the De Finibus; Opusc. =
Opuscula; Em. = Emendationes ad Ciceronis libros Philosophicos; Em. Liv. =
Emendationes Livianae; Gram. = Grammar.

Bentl. = Bentley; Bait. = Baiter; Dav. = Davies; Ern. = Ernesti; Forc. =
Forcellini; Goer. = Goerenz; Herm. = Hermann; Lamb. = Lambinus; Man. or
Manut. = Manutius; Turn. = Turnebus; Wes. or Wesenb. = Wesenberg.

Corss. = Corssen; Ausspr. = Aussprache, Vokalismus und Betonung.

Curt. = Curtius; Grundz. = Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie.

Corp. Inscr. = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum.

Dict. Biogr. = Dictionary of Classical Biography.

Cf. = compare; conj. = 'conjecture' or 'conjectures'; conjug. =
conjugation; constr. = construction; ed. = edition; edd. = editors; em. =
emendation; ex. = example; exx. = examples; exc. = except; esp. =
especially; fragm. = fragment or fragments; Gr. and Gk. = Greek; Introd. =
Introduction; Lat. = Latin; n. = note; nn. = notes; om. = omit, omits, or
omission; prep. = preposition; qu. = quotes or quoted by; subj. =
subjunctive.

R. and P. = Ritter and Preller's Historia Philosophiae ex fontium locis
contexta.

       *       *       *       *       *

THE ACADEMICA OF CICERO.

INTRODUCTION.

I. _Cicero as a Student of Philosophy and Man of
Letters:_ 90--45 B.C.

It would seem that Cicero's love for literature was inherited from his
father, who, being of infirm health, lived constantly at Arpinum, and spent
the greater part of his time in study.[1] From him was probably derived
that strong love for the old Latin dramatic and epic poetry which his son
throughout his writings displays. He too, we may conjecture, led the young
Cicero to feel the importance of a study of philosophy to serve as a
corrective for the somewhat narrow rhetorical discipline of the time.[2]

Cicero's first systematic lessons in philosophy were given him by the
Epicurean Phaedrus, then at Rome because of the unsettled state of Athens,
whose lectures he attended at a very early age, even before he had assumed
the toga virilis. The pupil seems to have been converted at once to the
tenets of the master.[3] Phaedrus remained to the end of his life a friend
of Cicero, who speaks warmly in praise of his teacher's amiable disposition
and refined style. He is the only Epicurean, with, perhaps, the exception
of Lucretius, whom the orator ever allows to possess any literary power.[4]
Cicero soon abandoned Epicureanism, but his schoolfellow, T. Pomponius
Atticus, received more lasting impressions from the teaching of Phaedrus.
It was probably at this period of their lives that Atticus and his friend
became acquainted with Patro, who succeeded Zeno of Sidon as head of the
Epicurean school.[5]

At this time (i.e. before 88 B.C.) Cicero also heard the lectures of
Diodotus the Stoic, with whom he studied chiefly, though not exclusively,
the art of dialectic.[6] This art, which Cicero deems so important to the
orator that he calls it "abbreviated eloquence," was then the monopoly of
the Stoic school. For some time Cicero spent all his days with Diodotus in
the severest study, but he seems never to have been much attracted by the
general Stoic teaching. Still, the friendship between the two lasted till
the death of Diodotus, who, according to a fashion set by the Roman Stoic
circle of the time of Scipio and Laelius, became an inmate of Cicero's
house, where he died in B.C. 59, leaving his pupil heir to a not
inconsiderable property.[7] He seems to have been one of the most
accomplished men of his time, and Cicero's feelings towards him were those
of gratitude, esteem, and admiration.[8]

In the year 88 B.C. the celebrated Philo of Larissa, then head of the
Academic school, came to Rome, one of a number of eminent Greeks who fled
from Athens on the approach of its siege during the Mithridatic war. Philo,
like Diodotus, was a man of versatile genius: unlike the Stoic philosopher,
he was a perfect master both of the theory and the practice of oratory.
Cicero had scarcely heard him before all inclination for Epicureanism was
swept from his mind, and he surrendered himself wholly, as he tells us, to
the brilliant Academic.[9] Smitten with a marvellous enthusiasm he
abandoned all other studies for philosophy. His zeal was quickened by the
conviction that the old judicial system of Rome was overthrown for ever,
and that the great career once open to an orator was now barred.[10]

We thus see that before Cicero was twenty years of age, he had been brought
into intimate connection with at least three of the most eminent
philosophers of the age, who represented the three most vigorous and
important Greek schools. It is fair to conclude that he must have become
thoroughly acquainted with their spirit, and with the main tenets of each.
His own statements, after every deduction necessitated by his egotism has
been made, leave no doubt about his diligence as a student. In his later
works he often dwells on his youthful devotion to philosophy.[11] It would
be unwise to lay too much stress on the intimate connection which subsisted
between the rhetorical and the ethical teaching of the Greeks; but there
can be little doubt that from the great rhetorician Molo, then Rhodian
ambassador at Rome, Cicero gained valuable information concerning the
ethical part of Greek philosophy.

During the years 88--81 B.C., Cicero employed himself incessantly with the
study of philosophy, law, rhetoric, and belles lettres. Many ambitious
works in the last two departments mentioned were written by him at this
period. On Sulla's return to the city after his conquest of the Marian
party in Italy, judicial affairs once more took their regular course, and
Cicero appeared as a pleader in the courts, the one philosophic orator of
Rome, as he not unjustly boasts[12]. For two years he was busily engaged,
and then suddenly left Rome for a tour in Eastern Hellas. It is usually
supposed that he came into collision with Sulla through the freedman
Chrysogonus, who was implicated in the case of Roscius. The silence of
Cicero is enough to condemn this theory, which rests on no better evidence
than that of Plutarch. Cicero himself, even when mentioning his speech in
defence of Roscius, never assigns any other cause for his departure than
his health, which was being undermined by his passionate style of
oratory[13].

The whole two years 79--77 B.C. were spent in the society of Greek
philosophers and rhetoricians. The first six months passed at Athens, and
were almost entirely devoted to philosophy, since, with the exception of
Demetrius Syrus, there were no eminent rhetorical teachers at that time
resident in the city[14]. By the advice of Philo himself[15], Cicero
attended the lectures of that clear thinker and writer, as Diogenes calls
him[16], Zeno of Sidon, now the head of the Epicurean school. In Cicero's
later works there are several references to his teaching. He was biting and
sarcastic in speech, and spiteful in spirit, hence in striking contrast to
Patro and Phaedrus[17]. It is curious to find that Zeno is numbered by
Cicero among those pupils and admirers of Carneades whom he had known[18].
Phaedrus was now at Athens, and along with Atticus who loved him beyond all
other philosophers[19], Cicero spent much time in listening to his
instruction, which was eagerly discussed by the two pupils[20]. Patro was
probably in Athens at the same time, but this is nowhere explicitly stated.
Cicero must at this time have attained an almost complete familiarity with
the Epicurean doctrines.

There seem to have been no eminent representatives of the Stoic school then
at Athens. Nor is any mention made of a Peripatetic teacher whose lectures
Cicero might have attended, though M. Pupius Piso, a professed Peripatetic,
was one of his companions in this sojourn at Athens[21]. Only three notable
Peripatetics were at this time living. Of these Staseas of Naples, who
lived some time in Piso's house, was not then at Athens[22]; it is
probable, however, from a mention of him in the De Oratore, that Cicero
knew himm through Piso. Diodorus, the pupil of Critolaus, is frequently
named by Cicero, but never as an acquaintance. Cratippus was at this time
unknown to him.

The philosopher from whose lessons Cicero certainly learned most at this
period was Antiochus of Ascalon, now the representative of a Stoicised
Academic school. Of this teacher, however, I shall have to treat later,
when I shall attempt to estimate the influence he exercised over our
author. It is sufficient here to say that on the main point which was in
controversy between Philo and Antiochus, Cicero still continued to think
with his earlier teacher. His later works, however, make it evident that he
set a high value on the abilities and the learning of Antiochus, especially
in dialectic, which was taught after Stoic principles. Cicero speaks of him
as eminent among the philosophers of the time, both for talent and
acquirement [23]; as a man of acute intellect[24]; as possessed of a
pointed style[25]; in fine, as the most cultivated and keenest of the
philosophers of the age[26]. A considerable friendship sprang up between
Antiochus and Cicero[27], which was strengthened by the fact that many
friends of the latter, such as Piso, Varro, Lucullus and Brutus, more or
less adhered to the views of Antiochus. It is improbable that Cicero at
this time became acquainted with Aristus the brother of Antiochus, since in
the Academica[28] he is mentioned in such a way as to show that he was
unknown to Cicero in B.C. 62.

The main purpose of Cicero while at Athens had been to learn philosophy; in
Asia and at Rhodes he devoted himself chiefly to rhetoric, under the
guidance of the most noted Greek teachers, chief of whom, was his old
friend Molo, the coryphaeus of the Rhodian school[29]. Cicero, however,
formed while at Rhodes one friendship which largely influenced his views of
philosophy, that with Posidonius the pupil of Panaetius, the most famous
Stoic of the age. To him Cicero makes reference in his works oftener than
to any other instructor. He speaks of him as the greatest of the
Stoics[30]; as a most notable philosopher, to visit whom Pompey, in the
midst of his eastern campaigns, put himself to much trouble[31]; as a
minute inquirer[32]. He is scarcely ever mentioned without some expression
of affection, and Cicero tells us that he read his works more than those of
any other author[33]. Posidonius was at a later time resident at Rome, and
stayed in Cicero's house. Hecato the Rhodian, another pupil of Panaetius,
may have been at Rhodes at this time. Mnesarchus and Dardanus, also hearers
of Panaetius, belonged to an earlier time, and although Cicero was well
acquainted with the works of the former, he does not seem to have known
either personally.

From the year 77 to the year 68 B.C., when the series of letters begins,
Cicero was doubtless too busily engaged with legal and political affairs to
spend much time in systematic study. That his oratory owed much to
philosophy from the first he repeatedly insists; and we know from his
letters that it was his later practice to refresh his style by much study
of the Greek writers, and especially the philosophers. During the period
then, about which we have little or no information, we may believe that he
kept up his old knowledge by converse with his many Roman friends who had a
bent towards philosophy, as well as with the Greeks who from time to time
came to Rome and frequented the houses of the Optimates; to this he added
such reading as his leisure would allow. The letters contained in the first
book of those addressed to Atticus, which range over the years 68--62 B.C.,
afford many proofs of the abiding strength of his passion for literary
employment. In the earlier part of this time we find him entreating Atticus
to let him have a library which was then for sale; expressing at the same
time in the strongest language his loathing for public affairs, and his
love for books, to which he looks as the support of his old age[34]. In the
midst of his busiest political occupations, when he was working his hardest
for the consulship, his heart was given to the adornment of his Tusculan
villa in a way suited to his literary and philosophic tastes. This may be
taken as a specimen of his spirit throughout his life. He was before all
things a man of letters; compared with literature, politics and oratory
held quite a secondary place in his affections. Public business employed
his intellect, but never his heart.

The year 62 released him from the consulship and enabled him to indulge his
literary tastes. To this year belong the publication of his speeches, which
were crowded, he says, with the maxims of philosophy[35]; the history of
his consulship, in Latin and Greek, the Greek version which he sent to
Posidonius being modelled on Isocrates and Aristotle; and the poem on his
consulship, of which some fragments remain. A year or two later we find him
reading with enthusiasm the works of Dicaearchus, and keeping up his
acquaintance with living Greek philosophers[36]. His long lack of leisure
seems to have caused an almost unquenchable thirst for reading at this
time. His friend Paetus had inherited a valuable library, which he
presented to Cicero. It was in Greece at the time, and Cicero thus writes
to Atticus: "If you love me and feel sure of my love for you, use all the
endeavours of your friends, clients, acquaintances, freedmen, and even
slaves to prevent a single leaf from being lost.... Every day I find
greater satisfaction in study, so far as my forensic labours permit[37]."
At this period of his life Cicero spent much time in study at his estates
near Tusculum, Antium, Formiae, and elsewhere. I dwell with greater
emphasis on these facts, because of the idea now spread abroad that Cicero
was a mere dabbler in literature, and that his works were extempore
paraphrases of Greek books half understood. In truth, his appetite for
every kind of literature was insatiable, and his attainments in each
department considerable. He was certainly the most learned Roman of his
age, with the single exception of Varro. One of his letters to Atticus[38]
will give a fair picture of his life at this time. He especially studied
the political writings of the Greeks, such as Theophrastus and
Dicaearchus[39]. He also wrote historical memoirs after the fashion, of
Theopompus[40].

The years from 59--57 B.C. were years in which Cicero's private cares
overwhelmed all thought of other occupation. Soon after his return from
exile, in the year 56, he describes himself as "devouring literature" with
a marvellous man named Dionysius[41], and laughingly pronouncing that
nothing is sweeter than universal knowledge. He spent great part of the
year 55 at Cumae or Naples "feeding upon" the library of Faustus Sulla, the
son of the Dictator[42]. Literature formed then, he tells us, his solace
and support, and he would rather sit in a garden seat which Atticus had,
beneath a bust of Aristotle, than in the ivory chair of office. Towards the
end of the year, he was busily engaged on the _De Oratore_, a work which
clearly proves his continued familiarity with Greek philosophy[43]. In the
following year (54) he writes that politics must cease for him, and that he
therefore returns unreservedly to the life most in accordance with nature,
that of the student[44]. During this year he was again for the most part at
those of his country villas where his best collections of books were. At
this time was written the _De Republica_, a work to which I may appeal for
evidence that his old philosophical studies had by no means been allowed to
drop[45]. Aristotle is especially mentioned as one of the authors read at
this time[46]. In the year 52 B.C. came the _De Legibus_, written amid many
distracting occupations; a work professedly modelled on Plato and the older
philosophers of the Socratic schools.

In the year 51 Cicero, then on his way to Cilicia, revisited Athens, much
to his own pleasure and that of the Athenians. He stayed in the house of
Aristus, the brother of Antiochus and teacher of Brutus. His acquaintance
with this philosopher was lasting, if we may judge from the affectionate
mention in the _Brutus_[47]. Cicero also speaks in kindly terms of Xeno, an
Epicurean friend of Atticus, who was then with Patro at Athens. It was at
this time that Cicero interfered to prevent Memmius, the pupil of the great
Roman Epicurean Lucretius, from destroying the house in which Epicurus had
lived[48]. Cicero seems to have been somewhat disappointed with the state
of philosophy at Athens, Aristus being the only man of merit then resident
there[49]. On the journey from Athens to his province, he made the
acquaintance of Cratippus, who afterwards taught at Athens as head of the
Peripatetic school[50]. At this time he was resident at Mitylene, where
Cicero seems to have passed some time in his society[51]. He was by far the
greatest, Cicero said, of all the Peripatetics he had himself heard, and
indeed equal in merit to the most eminent of that school[52].

The care of that disordered province Cilicia enough to employ Cicero's
thoughts till the end of 50. Yet he yearned for Athens and philosophy. He
wished to leave some memorial of himself at the beautiful city, and
anxiously asked Atticus whether it would look foolish to build a προπυλον
at the Academia, as Appius, his predecessor, had done at Eleusis[53]. It
seems the Athenians of the time were in the habit of adapting their ancient
statues to suit the noble Romans of the day, and of placing on them fulsome
inscriptions. Of this practice Cicero speaks with loathing. In one letter
of this date he carefully discusses the errors Atticus had pointed out in
the books _De Republica_[54]. His wishes with regard to Athens still kept
their hold upon his mind, and on his way home from Cilicia he spoke of
conferring on the city some signal favour[55]. Cicero was anxious to show
Rhodes, with its school of eloquence, to the two boys Marcus and Quintus,
who accompanied him, and they probably touched there for a few days[56].
From thence they went to Athens, where Cicero again stayed with
Aristus[57], and renewed his friendship with other philosophers, among them
Xeno the friend of Atticus[58].

On Cicero's return to Italy public affairs were in a very critical
condition, and left little room for thoughts about literature. The letters
which belong to this time are very pathetic. Cicero several times contrasts
the statesmen of the time with the Scipio he had himself drawn in the _De
Republica_[59]; when he thinks of Caesar, Plato's description of the tyrant
is present to his mind[60]; when, he deliberates about the course he is
himself to take, he naturally recals the example of Socrates, who refused
to leave Athens amid the misrule of the thirty tyrants[61]. It is curious
to find Cicero, in the very midst of civil war, poring over the book of
Demetrius the Magnesian concerning concord[62]; or employing his days in
arguing with himself a string of abstract philosophical propositions about
tyranny[63]. Nothing could more clearly show that he was really a man of
books; by nothing but accident a politician. In these evil days, however,
nothing was long to his taste; books, letters, study, all in their turn
became unpleasant[64].

As soon as Cicero had become fully reconciled to Caesar in the year 46 he
returned with desperate energy to his old literary pursuits. In a letter
written to Varro in that year[65], he says "I assure you I had no sooner
returned to Rome than I renewed my intimacy with my old friends, my books."
These gave him real comfort, and his studies seemed to bear richer fruit
than in his days of prosperity[66]. The tenor of all his letters at this
time is the same: see especially the remaining letters to Varro and also to
Sulpicius[67]. The _Partitiones Oratoriae_, the _Paradoxa_, the _Orator_,
and the _Laudatio Catonis_, to which Caesar replied by his _Anticato_, were
all finished within the year. Before the end of the year the _Hortensius_
and the _De Finibus_ had probably both been planned and commenced. Early in
the following year the _Academica_, the history of which I shall trace
elsewhere, was written.

I have now finished the first portion of my task; I have shown Cicero as
the man of letters and the student of philosophy during that portion of his
life which preceded the writing of the _Academica_. Even the evidence I
have produced, which does not include such indirect indications of
philosophical study as might be obtained from the actual philosophical
works of Cicero, is sufficient to justify his boast that at no time had he
been divorced from philosophy[68]. He was entitled to repel the charge made
by some people on the publication of his first book of the later
period--the _Hortensius_--that he was a mere tiro in philosophy, by the
assertion that on the contrary nothing had more occupied his thoughts
throughout the whole of a wonderfully energetic life[69]. Did the scope of
this edition allow it, I should have little difficulty in showing from a
minute survey of his works, and a comparison of them with ancient
authorities, that his knowledge of Greek philosophy was nearly as accurate
as it was extensive. So far as the _Academica_ is concerned, I have had in
my notes an opportunity of defending Cicero's substantial accuracy; of the
success of the defence I must leave the reader to judge. During the
progress of this work I shall have to expose the groundlessness of many
feelings and judgments now current which have contributed to produce a low
estimate of Cicero's philosophical attainments, but there is one piece of
unfairness which I shall have no better opportunity of mentioning than the
present. It is this. Cicero, the philosopher, is made to suffer for the
shortcomings of Cicero the politician. Scholars who have learned to despise
his political weakness, vanity, and irresolution, make haste to depreciate
his achievements in philosophy, without troubling themselves to inquire too
closely into their intrinsic value. I am sorry to be obliged to instance
the illustrious Mommsen, who speaks of the _De Legibus_ as "an oasis in the
desert of this dreary and voluminous writer." From political partizanship,
and prejudices based on facts irrelevant to the matter in hand, I beg all
students to free themselves in reading the _Academica_.

II. _The Philosophical Opinions of Cicero_.

In order to define with clearness the position of Cicero as a student of
philosophy, it would be indispensable to enter into a detailed historical
examination of the later Greek schools--the Stoic, Peripatetic, Epicurean
and new Academic. These it would be necessary to know, not merely as they
came from the hands of their founders, but as they existed in Cicero's age;
Stoicism not as Zeno understood it, but as Posidonius and the other pupils
of Panaetius propounded it; not merely the Epicureanism of Epicurus, but
that of Zeno, Phaedrus, Patro, and Xeno; the doctrines taught in the Lyceum
by Cratippus; the new Academicism of Philo as well as that of Arcesilas and
Carneades; the medley of Academicism, Peripateticism, and Stoicism put
forward by Antiochus in the name of the Old Academy. A systematic attempt
to distinguish between the earlier and later forms of doctrine held by
these schools is still a great desideratum. Cicero's statements concerning
any particular school are generally tested by comparing them with the
assertions made by ancient authorities about the earlier representatives of
the school. Should any discrepancy appear, it is at once concluded that
Cicero is in gross error, whereas, in all probability, he is uttering
opinions which would have been recognised as genuine by those who were at
the head of the school in his day. The criticism of Madvig even is not free
from this error, as will be seen from my notes on several passages of the
_Academica_[70]. As my space forbids me to attempt the thorough inquiry I
have indicated as desirable, I can but describe in rough outline the
relation in which Cicero stands to the chief schools.

The two main tasks of the later Greek philosophy were, as Cicero often
insists, the establishment of a criterion such as would suffice to
distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of an ethical
standard[71]. We have in the _Academica_ Cicero's view of the first
problem: that the attainment of any infallible criterion was impossible. To
go more into detail here would be to anticipate the text of the _Lucullus_
as well as my notes. Without further refinements, I may say that Cicero in
this respect was in substantial agreement with the New Academic school, and
in opposition to all other schools. As he himself says, the doctrine that
absolute knowledge is impossible was the one Academic tenet against which
all the other schools were combined[72]. In that which was most
distinctively New Academic, Cicero followed the New Academy.

It is easy to see what there was in such a tenet to attract Cicero. Nothing
was more repulsive to his mind than dogmatism. As an orator, he was
accustomed to hear arguments put forward with equal persuasiveness on both
sides of a case. It seemed to him arrogant to make any proposition with a
conviction of its absolute, indestructible and irrefragable truth. One
requisite of a philosophy with him was that it should avoid this
arrogance[73]. Philosophers of the highest respectability had held the most
opposite opinions on the same subjects. To withhold absolute assent from
all doctrines, while giving a qualified assent to those which seemed most
probable, was the only prudent course[74]. Cicero's temperament also, apart
from his experience as an orator, inclined him to charity and toleration,
and repelled him from the fury of dogmatism. He repeatedly insists that the
diversities of opinion which the most famous intellects display, ought to
lead men to teach one another with all gentleness and meekness[75]. In
positiveness of assertion there seemed to be something reckless and
disgraceful, unworthy of a self-controlled character[76]. Here we have a
touch of feeling thoroughly Roman. Cicero further urges arguments similar
to some put forward by a long series of English thinkers from Milton to
Mill, to show that the free conflict of opinion is necessary to the
progress of philosophy, which was by that very freedom brought rapidly to
maturity in Greece[77]. Wherever authority has loudly raised its voice,
says Cicero, there philosophy has pined. Pythagoras[78] is quoted as a
warning example, and the baneful effects of authority are often
depicted[79]. The true philosophic spirit requires us to find out what can
be said for every view. It is a positive duty to discuss all aspects of
every question, after the example of the Old Academy and Aristotle[80].
Those who demand a dogmatic statement of belief are mere busybodies[81].
The Academics glory in their freedom of judgment. They are not compelled to
defend an opinion whether they will or no, merely because one of their
predecessors has laid it down[82]. So far does Cicero carry this freedom,
that in the fifth book of the _Tusculan Disputations_, he maintains a view
entirely at variance with the whole of the fourth book of the _De Finibus_,
and when the discrepancy is pointed out, refuses to be bound by his former
statements, on the score that he is an Academic and a freeman[83]. "Modo
hoc, modo illud probabilius videtur[84]." The Academic sips the best of
every school[85]. He roams in the wide field of philosophy, while the Stoic
dares not stir a foot's breadth away from Chrysippus[86]. The Academic is
only anxious that people should combat his opinions; for he makes it his
sole aim, with Socrates, to rid himself and others of the mists of
error[87]. This spirit is even found in Lucullus the Antiochean[88]. While
professing, however, this philosophic bohemianism, Cicero indignantly
repels the charge that the Academy, though claiming to seek for the truth,
has no truth to follow[89]. The probable is for it the true.

Another consideration which attracted Cicero to these tenets was their
evident adaptability to the purposes of oratory, and the fact that
eloquence was, as he puts it, the child of the Academy[90]. Orators,
politicians, and stylists had ever found their best nourishment in the
teaching of the Academic and Peripatetic masters[91]. The Stoics and
Epicureans cared nothing for power of expression. Again, the Academic
tenets were those with which the common sense of the world could have most
sympathy[92]. The Academy also was the school which had the most
respectable pedigree. Compared with its system, all other philosophies were
plebeian[93]. The philosopher who best preserved the Socratic tradition was
most estimable, _ceteris paribus_, and that man was Carneades[94].

In looking at the second great problem, that of the ethical standard, we
must never forget that it was considered by nearly all the later
philosophers as of overwhelming importance compared with the first.
Philosophy was emphatically defined as the art of conduct (_ars vivendi_).
All speculative and non-ethical doctrines were merely estimable as
supplying a basis on which this practical art could be reared. This is
equally true of the Pyrrhonian scepticism and of the dogmatism of Zeno and
Epicurus. Their logical and physical doctrines were mere outworks or
ramparts within which the ordinary life of the school was carried on. These
were useful chiefly in case of attack by the enemy; in time of peace ethics
held the supremacy. In this fact we shall find a key to unlock many
difficulties in Cicero's philosophical writings. I may instance one passage
in the beginning of the _Academica Posteriora_[95], which has given much
trouble to editors. Cicero is there charged by Varro with having deserted
the Old Academy for the New, and admits the charge. How is this to be
reconciled with his own oft-repeated statements that he never recanted the
doctrines Philo had taught him? Simply thus. Arcesilas, Carneades, and
Philo had been too busy with their polemic against Zeno and his followers,
maintained on logical grounds, to deal much with ethics. On the other hand,
in the works which Cicero had written and published before the _Academica_,
wherever he had touched philosophy, it had been on its ethical side. The
works themselves, moreover, were direct imitations of early Academic and
Peripatetic writers, who, in the rough popular view which regarded ethics
mainly or solely, really composed a single school, denoted by the phrase
"Vetus Academia." General readers, therefore, who considered ethical
resemblance as of far greater moment than dialectical difference, would
naturally look upon Cicero as a supporter of their "Vetus Academia," so
long as he kept clear of dialectic; when he brought dialectic to the front,
and pronounced boldly for Carneades, they would naturally regard him as a
deserter from the Old Academy to the New. This view is confirmed by the
fact that for many years before Cicero wrote, the Academic dialectic had
found no eminent expositor. So much was this the case, that when Cicero
wrote the _Academica_ he was charged with constituting himself the champion
of an exploded and discredited school[96].

Cicero's ethics, then, stand quite apart from his dialectic. In the sphere
of morals he felt the danger of the principle of doubt. Even in the _De
Legibus_ when the dialogue turns on a moral question, he begs the New
Academy, which has introduced confusion into these subjects, to be
silent[97]. Again, Antiochus, who in the dialectical dialogue is rejected,
is in the _De Legibus_ spoken of with considerable favour[98]. All ethical
systems which seemed to afford stability to moral principles had an
attraction for Cicero. He was fascinated by the Stoics almost beyond the
power of resistance. In respect of their ethical and religious ideas he
calls them "great and famous philosophers[99]," and he frequently speaks
with something like shame of the treatment they had received at the hands
of Arcesilas and Carneades. Once he gives expression to a fear lest they
should be the only true philosophers after all[100]. There was a kind of
magnificence about the Stoic utterances on morality, more suited to a
superhuman than a human world, which allured Cicero more than the
barrenness of the Stoic dialectic repelled him[101]. On moral questions,
therefore, we often find him going farther in the direction of Stoicism
than even his teacher Antiochus. One great question which divided the
philosophers of the time was, whether happiness was capable of degrees. The
Stoics maintained that it was not, and in a remarkable passage Cicero
agrees with them, explicitly rejecting the position of Antiochus, that a
life enriched by virtue, but unattended by other advantages, might be
happy, but could not be the happiest possible[102]. He begs the Academic
and Peripatetic schools to cease from giving an uncertain sound (balbutire)
and to allow that the happiness of the wise man would remain unimpaired
even if he were thrust into the bull of Phalaris[103]. In another place he
admits the purely Stoic doctrine that virtue is one and indivisible[104].
These opinions, however, he will not allow to be distinctively Stoic, but
appeals to Socrates as his authority for them[105]. Zeno, who is merely an
ignoble craftsman of words, stole them from the Old Academy. This is
Cicero's general feeling with regard to Zeno, and there can be no doubt
that he caught it from Antiochus who, in stealing the doctrines of Zeno,
ever stoutly maintained that Zeno had stolen them before. Cicero, however,
regarded chiefly the ethics of Zeno with this feeling, while Antiochus so
regarded chiefly the dialectic. It is just in this that the difference
between Antiochus and Cicero lies. To the former Zeno's dialectic was true
and Socratic, while the latter treated it as un-Socratic, looking upon
Socrates as the apostle of doubt[106]. On the whole Cicero was more in
accord with Stoic ethics than Antiochus. Not in all points, however: for
while Antiochus accepted without reserve the Stoic paradoxes, Cicero
hesitatingly followed them, although he conceded that they were
Socratic[107]. Again, Antiochus subscribed to the Stoic theory that all
emotion was sinful; Cicero, who was very human in his joys and sorrows,
refused it with horror[108]. It must be admitted that on some points Cicero
was inconsistent. In the _De Finibus_ he argued that the difference between
the Peripatetic and Stoic ethics was merely one of terms; in the _Tusculan
Disputations_ he held it to be real. The most Stoic in tone of all his
works are the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Officiis_.

With regard to physics, I may remark at the outset that a comparatively
small importance was in Cicero's time attached to this branch of
philosophy. Its chief importance lay in the fact that ancient theology was,
as all natural theology must be, an appendage of physical science. The
religious element in Cicero's nature inclined him very strongly to
sympathize with the Stoic views about the grand universal operation of
divine power. Piety, sanctity, and moral good, were impossible in any form,
he thought, if the divine government of the universe were denied[109]. It
went to Cicero's heart that Carneades should have found it necessary to
oppose the beautiful Stoic theology, and he defends the great sceptic by
the plea that his one aim was to arouse men to the investigation of the
truth[110]. At the same time, while really following the Stoics in physics,
Cicero often believed himself to be following Aristotle. This partly arose
from the actual adoption by the late Peripatetics of many Stoic doctrines,
which they gave out as Aristotelian. The discrepancy between the spurious
and the genuine Aristotelian views passed undetected, owing to the strange
oblivion into which the most important works of Aristotle had fallen[111].
Still, Cicero contrives to correct many of the extravagances of the Stoic
physics by a study of Aristotle and Plato. For a thorough understanding of
his notions about physics, the _Timaeus_ of Plato, which he knew well and
translated, is especially important. It must not be forgotten, also, that
the Stoic physics were in the main Aristotelian, and that Cicero was well
aware of the fact.

Very few words are necessary in order to characterize Cicero's estimate of
the Peripatetic and Epicurean schools. The former was not very powerfully
represented during his lifetime. The philosophical descendants of the
author of the _Organon_ were notorious for their ignorance of logic[112],
and in ethics had approximated considerably to the Stoic teaching. While
not much influenced by the school, Cicero generally treats it tenderly for
the sake of its great past, deeming it a worthy branch of the true Socratic
family. With the Epicureans the case was different. In physics they stood
absolutely alone, their system was grossly unintellectual, and they
discarded mathematics. Their ethical doctrines excited in Cicero nothing
but loathing, dialectic they did not use, and they crowned all their errors
by a sin which the orator could never pardon, for they were completely
indifferent to every adornment and beauty of language.

III. _The aim of Cicero in writing his philosophical works_.

It is usual to charge Cicero with a want of originality as a philosopher,
and on that score to depreciate his works. The charge is true, but still
absurd, for it rests on a misconception, not merely of Cicero's purpose in
writing, but of the whole spirit of the later Greek speculation. The
conclusion drawn from the charge is also quite unwarranted. If the later
philosophy of the Greeks is of any value, Cicero's works are of equal
value, for it is only from them that we get any full or clear view of it.
Any one who attempts to reconcile the contradictions of Stobaeus, Diogenes
Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch and other authorities, will perhaps
feel little inclination to cry out against the confusion of Ciceros ideas.
Such outcry, now so common, is due largely to the want, which I have
already noticed, of any clear exposition of the variations in doctrine
which the late Greek schools exhibited during the last two centuries before
the Christian era. But to return to the charge of want of originality. This
is a virtue which Cicero never claims. There is scarcely one of his works
(if we except the third book of the _De Officiis_), which he does not
freely confess to be taken wholly from Greek sources. Indeed at the time
when he wrote, originality would have been looked upon as a fault rather
than an excellence. For two centuries, if we omit Carneades, no one had
propounded anything substantially novel in philosophy: there had been
simply one eclectic combination after another of pre-existing tenets. It
would be hasty to conclude that the writers of these two centuries are
therefore undeserving of our study, for the spirit, if not the substance of
the doctrines had undergone a momentous change, which ultimately exercised
no unimportant influence on society and on the Christian religion itself.

When Cicero began to write, the Latin language may be said to have been
destitute of a philosophical literature. Philosophy was a sealed study to
those who did not know Greek. It was his aim, by putting the best Greek
speculation into the most elegant Latin form, to extend the education of
his countrymen, and to enrich their literature. He wished at the same time
to strike a blow at the ascendency of Epicureanism throughout Italy. The
doctrines of Epicurus had alone appeared in Latin in a shape suited to
catch the popular taste. There seems to have been a very large Epicurean
literature in Latin, of which all but a few scanty traces is now lost. C.
Amafinius, mentioned in the _Academica_[113], was the first to write, and
his books seem to have had an enormous circulation[114]. He had a large
number of imitators, who obtained such a favourable reception, that, in
Cicero's strong language, they took possession of the whole of Italy[115].
Rabirius and Catius the Insubrian, possibly the epicure and friend of
Horace, were two of the most noted of these writers. Cicero assigns various
reasons for their extreme popularity: the easy nature of the Epicurean
physics, the fact that there was no other philosophy for Latin readers, and
the voluptuous blandishments of pleasure. This last cause, as indeed he in
one passage seems to allow, must have been of little real importance. It is
exceedingly remarkable that the whole of the Roman Epicurean literature
dealt in an overwhelmingly greater degree with the physics than with the
ethics of Epicurus. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the
Italian races had as yet a strong practical basis for morality in the legal
and social constitution of the family, and did not much feel the need of
any speculative system; while the general decay among the educated classes
of a belief in the supernatural, accompanied as it was by an increase of
superstition among the masses, prepared the way for the acceptance of a
purely mechanical explanation of the universe. But of this subject,
interesting and important as it is in itself, and neglected though it has
been, I can treat no farther.

These Roman Epicureans are continually reproached by Cicero for their
uncouth style of writing[116]. He indeed confesses that he had not read
them, but his estimate of them was probably correct. A curious question
arises, which I cannot here discuss, as to the reasons Cicero had for
omitting all mention of Lucretius when speaking of these Roman Epicureans.
The most probable elucidation is, that he found it impossible to include
the great poet in his sweeping condemnation, and being unwilling to allow
that anything good could come from the school of Epicurus, preferred to
keep silence, which nothing compelled him to break, since Lucretius was an
obscure man and only slowly won his way to favour with the public.

In addition to his desire to undermine Epicureanism in Italy, Cicero had a
patriotic wish to remove from the literature of his country the reproach
that it was completely destitute where Greek was richest. He often tries by
the most far-fetched arguments to show that philosophy had left its mark on
the early Italian peoples[117]. To those who objected that philosophy was
best left to the Greek language, he replies with indignation, accusing them
of being untrue to their country[118]. It would be a glorious thing, he
thinks, if Romans were no longer absolutely compelled to resort to
Greeks[119]. He will not even concede that the Greek is a richer tongue
than the Latin[120]. As for the alleged incapacity of the Roman intellect
to deal with philosophical enquiries, he will not hear of it. It is only,
he says, because the energy of the nation has been diverted into other
channels that so little progress has been made. The history of Roman
oratory is referred to in support of this opinion[121]. If only an impulse
were given at Rome to the pursuit of philosophy, already on the wane in
Greece, Cicero thought it would flourish and take the place of oratory,
which he believed to be expiring amid the din of civil war[122].

There can be no doubt that Cicero was penetrated by the belief that he
could thus do his country a real service. In his enforced political
inaction, and amid the disorganisation of the law-courts, it was the one
service he could render[123]. He is within his right when he claims praise
for not abandoning himself to idleness or worse, as did so many of the most
prominent men of the time[124]. For Cicero idleness was misery, and in
those evil times he was spurred on to exertion by the deepest sorrow[125].
Philosophy took the place of forensic oratory, public harangues, and
politics[126]. It is strange to find Cicero making such elaborate apologies
as he does for devoting himself to philosophy, and a careless reader might
set them down to egotism. But it must never be forgotten that at Rome such
studies were merely the amusement of the wealthy; the total devotion of a
life to them seemed well enough for Greeks, but for Romans unmanly,
unpractical and unstatesmanlike[127]. There were plenty of Romans who were
ready to condemn such pursuits altogether, and to regard any fresh
importation from Greece much in the spirit with which things French were
received by English patriots immediately after the great war. Others, like
the Neoptolemus of Ennius, thought a little learning in philosophy was
good, but a great deal was a dangerous thing[128]. Some few preferred that
Cicero should write on other subjects[129]. To these he replies by urging
the pressing necessity there was for works on philosophy in Latin.

Still, amid much depreciation, sufficient interest and sympathy were roused
by his first philosophical works to encourage Cicero to proceed. The elder
generation, for whose approbation he most cared, praised the books, and
many were incited both to read and to write philosophy[130]. Cicero now
extended his design, which seems to have been at first indefinite, so as to
bring within its scope every topic which Greek philosophers were accustomed
to treat[131]. Individual questions in philosophy could not be thoroughly
understood till the whole subject had been mastered[132]. This design then,
which is not explicitly stated in the two earliest works which we possess,
the _Academica_ and the _De Finibus_, required the composition of a sort of
philosophical encyclopaedia. Cicero never claimed to be more than an
interpreter of Greek philosophy to the Romans. He never pretended to
present new views of philosophy, or even original criticisms on its
history. The only thing he proclaims to be his own is his style. Looked at
in this, the true light, his work cannot be judged a failure. Those who
contrive to pronounce this judgment must either insist upon trying the work
by a standard to which it does not appeal, or fail to understand the Greek
philosophy it copies, or perhaps make Cicero suffer for the supposed
worthlessness of the philosophy of his age.

In accordance with Greek precedent, Cicero claims to have his oratorical
and political writings, all or nearly all published before the
_Hortensius_, included in his philosophical encyclopaedia[133]. The only
two works strictly philosophical, even in the ancient view, which preceded
the _Academica_, were the _De Consolatione_, founded on Crantor's book,
περι πενθους, and the _Hortensius_, which was introductory to philosophy,
or, as it was then called, protreptic.

For a list of the philosophical works of Cicero, and the dates of their
composition, the student must be referred to the _Dict. of Biography_, Art.
Cicero.

IV. _History of the Academica_.

On the death of Tullia, which happened at Tusculum in February, 45 B.C.,
Cicero took refuge in the solitude of his villa at Astura, which was
pleasantly situated on the Latin coast between Antium and Circeii[134].
Here he sought to soften his deep grief by incessant toil. First the book
_De Consolatione_ was written. He found the mechanic exercise of
composition the best solace for his pain, and wrote for whole days
together[135]. At other times he would plunge at early morning into the
dense woods near his villa, and remain there absorbed in study till
nightfall[136]. Often exertion failed to bring relief; yet he repelled the
entreaties of Atticus that he would return to the forum and the senate. A
grief, which books and solitude could scarcely enable him to endure, would
crush him, he felt, in the busy city[137].

It was amid such surroundings that the _Academica_ was written. The first
trace of an intention to write the treatise is found in a letter of Cicero
to Atticus, which seems to belong to the first few weeks of his
bereavement[138]. It was his wont to depend on Atticus very much for
historical and biographical details, and in the letter in question he asks
for just the kind of information which would be needed in writing the
_Academica_. The words with which he introduces his request imply that he
had determined on some new work to which our _Academica_ would
correspond[139]. He asks what reason brought to Rome the embassy which
Carneades accompanied; who was at that time the leader of the Epicurean
school; who were then the most noted πολιτικοι at Athens. The meaning of
the last question is made clear by a passage in the _De Oratore_[140],
where Cicero speaks of the combined Academic and Peripatetic schools under
that name. It may be with reference to the progress of the _Academica_ that
in a later letter he expresses himself satisfied with the advance he has
made in his literary undertakings[141]. During the whole of the remainder
of his sojourn at Astura he continued to be actively employed; but although
he speaks of various other literary projects, we find no express mention in
his letters to Atticus of the _Academica_[142]. He declares that however
much his detractors at Rome may reproach him with inaction, they could not
read the numerous difficult works on which he has been engaged within the
same space of time that he has taken to write them[143].

In the beginning of June Cicero spent a few days at his villa near
Antium[144], where he wrote a treatise addressed to Caesar, which he
afterwards suppressed[145]. From the same place he wrote to Atticus of his
intention to proceed to Tusculum or Rome by way of Lanuvium about the
middle of June[146]. He had in the time immediately following Tullia's
death entertained an aversion for Tusculum, where she died. This he felt
now compelled to conquer, otherwise he must either abandon Tusculum
altogether, or, if he returned at all, a delay of even ten years would make
the effort no less painful[147]. Before setting out for Antium Cicero wrote
to Atticus that he had finished while at Astura _duo magna_ συνταγματα,
words which have given rise to much controversy[148]. Many scholars,
including Madvig, have understood that the first edition of the
_Academica_, along with the _De Finibus_, is intended. Against this view
the reasons adduced by Krische are convincing[149]. It is clear from the
letters to Atticus that the _De Finibus_ was being worked out book by book
long after the first edition of the _Academica_ had been placed in the
hands of Atticus. The _De Finibus_ was indeed begun at Astura[150], but it
was still in an unfinished state when Cicero began to revise the
_Academica_[151]. The final arrangement of the characters in the _De
Finibus_ is announced later still[152]; and even at a later date Cicero
complains that Balbus had managed to obtain surreptitiously a copy of the
fifth book before it was properly corrected, the irrepressible Caerellia
having copied the whole five books while in that state[153]. A passage in
the _De Divinatione_[154] affords almost direct evidence that the
_Academica_ was published before the _De Finibus_. On all these grounds I
hold that these two works cannot be those which Cicero describes as having
been finished simultaneously at Astura.

Another view of the συνταγματα in question is that they are simply the two
books, entitled _Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, of the _Priora Academica_. In my
opinion the word συνταγμα, the use of which to denote a portion of a work
Madvig suspects[155], thus obtains its natural meaning. Cicero uses the
word συνταξις of the whole work[156], while συνταγμα[157], and
συγγραμμα[158], designate definite portions or divisions of a work. I
should be quite content, then, to refer the words of Cicero to the
_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_. Krische, however, without giving reasons, decides
that this view is unsatisfactory, and prefers to hold that the _Hortensius_
(or _de Philosophia_) and the _Priora Academica_ are the compositions in
question. If this conjecture is correct, we have in the disputed passage
the only reference to the _Hortensius_ which is to be found in the letters
of Cicero. We are quite certain that the book was written at Astura, and
published before the _Academica_. This would be clear from the mention in
the _Academica Posteriora_ alone[159], but the words of Cicero in the _De
Finibus_[160] place it beyond all doubt, showing as they do that the
_Hortensius_ had been published a sufficiently long time before the _De
Finibus_, to have become known to a tolerably large circle of readers.
Further, in the _Tusculan Disputations_ and the _De Divinatione_[161] the
_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ are mentioned together in such a way as to
show that the former was finished and given to the world before the latter.
Nothing therefore stands in the way of Krische's conjecture, except the
doubt I have expressed as to the use of the word συνταγμα, which equally
affects the old view maintained by Madvig.

Whatever be the truth on this point, it cannot be disputed that the
_Hortensius_ and the _Academica_ must have been more closely connected, in
style and tone, than any two works of Cicero, excepting perhaps the
_Academica_ and the _De Finibus_. The interlocutors in the _Hortensius_
were exactly the same as in the _Academica Priora_, for the introduction of
Balbus into some editions of the fragments of the _Hortensius_ is an
error[162]. The discussion in the _Academica Priora_ is carried on at
Hortensius' villa near Bauli; in the _Hortensius_ at the villa of Lucullus
near Cumae. It is rather surprising that under these circumstances there
should be but one direct reference to the _Hortensius_ in the
_Lucullus_[163].

While at his Tusculan villa, soon after the middle of June, B.C. 45, Cicero
sent Atticus the _Torquatus_, as he calls the first book of the _De
Finibus_[164]. He had already sent the first edition of the _Academica_ to
Rome[165]. We have a mention that new prooemia had been added to the
_Catulus_ and _Lucullus_, in which the public characters from whom the
books took their names were extolled. In all probability the extant
prooemium of the _Lucullus_ is the one which was then affixed. Atticus, who
visited Cicero at Tusculum, had doubtless pointed out the incongruity
between the known attainments of Catulus and Lucullus, and the parts they
were made to take in difficult philosophical discussions. It is not
uncharacteristic of Cicero that his first plan for healing the incongruity
should be a deliberate attempt to impose upon his readers a set of
statements concerning the ability and culture of these two noble Romans
which he knew, and in his own letters to Atticus admitted, to be false. I
may note, as of some interest in connection with the _Academica_, the fact
that among the unpleasant visits received by Cicero at Tusculum was one
from Varro[166].

On the 23rd July, Cicero left Home for Arpinum, in order, as he says, to
arrange some business matters, and to avoid the embarrassing attentions of
Brutus[167]. Before leaving Astura, however, it had been his intention to
go on to Arpinum[168]. He seems to have been still unsatisfied with his
choice of interlocutors for the _Academica_, for the first thing he did on
his arrival was to transfer the parts of Catulus and Lucullus to Cato and
Brutus[169]. This plan was speedily cast aside on the receipt of a letter
from Atticus, strongly urging that the whole work should be dedicated to
Varro, or if not the _Academica_, the _De Finibus_[170]. Cicero had never
been very intimate with Varro: their acquaintance seems to have been
chiefly maintained through Atticus, who was at all times anxious to draw
them more closely together. Nine years before he had pressed Cicero to find
room in his works for some mention of Varro[171]. The nature of the works
on which our author was then engaged had made it difficult to comply with
the request[172]. Varro had promised on his side, full two years before the
_Academica_ was written, to dedicate to Cicero his great work _De Lingua
Latino_. In answer to the later entreaty of Atticus, Cicero declared
himself very much dissatisfied with Varro's failure to fulfil his promise.
From this it is evident that Cicero knew nothing of the scope or magnitude
of that work. His complaint that Varro had been writing for two years
without making any progress[173], shows that there could have been little
of anything like friendship between the two. Apart from these causes for
grumbling, Cicero thought the suggestion of Atticus a "godsend[174]." Since
the _De Finibus_ was already "betrothed" to Brutus, he promised to transfer
to Varro the _Academica_, allowing that Catulus and Lucullus, though of
noble birth, had no claim to learning[175]. So little of it did they
possess that they could never even have dreamed of the doctrines they had
been made in the first edition of the _Academica_ to maintain[176]. For
them another place was to be found, and the remark was made that the
_Academica_ would just suit Varro, who was a follower of Antiochus, and the
fittest person to expound the opinions of that philosopher[177]. It
happened that continual rain fell during the first few days of Cicero's
stay at Arpinum, so he employed his whole time in editing once more his
_Academica_, which he now divided into four books instead of two, making
the interlocutors himself, Varro and Atticus[178]. The position occupied by
Atticus in the dialogue was quite an inferior one, but he was so pleased
with it that Cicero determined to confer upon him often in the future such
minor parts[179]. A suggestion of Atticus that Cotta should also be
introduced was found impracticable[180].

Although the work of re-editing was vigorously pushed on, Cicero had
constant doubts about the expediency of dedicating the work to Varro. He
frequently throws the whole responsibility for the decision upon Atticus,
but for whose importunities he would probably again have changed his plans.
Nearly every letter written to Atticus during the progress of the work
contains entreaties that he would consider the matter over and over again
before he finally decided[181]. As no reasons had been given for these
solicitations, Atticus naturally grew impatient, and Cicero was obliged to
assure him that there were reasons, which he could not disclose in a
letter[182]. The true reasons, however, did appear in some later letters.
In one Cicero said: "I am in favour of Varro, and the more so because he
wishes it, but you know he is

  δεινος ανηρ, ταχα κεν και αναιτιον αιτιοωιτο.

So there often flits before me a vision of his face, as he grumbles, it may
be, that my part in the treatise is more liberally sustained than his; a
charge which you will perceive to be untrue[183]." Cicero, then, feared
Varro's temper, and perhaps his knowledge and real critical fastidiousness.
Before these explanations Atticus had concluded that Cicero was afraid of
the effect the work might produce on the public. This notion Cicero assured
him to be wrong; the only cause for his vacillation was his doubt as to how
Varro would receive the dedication[184]. Atticus would seem to have
repeatedly communicated with Varro, and to have assured Cicero that there
was no cause for fear; but the latter refused to take a general assurance,
and anxiously asked for a detailed account of the reasons from which it
proceeded[185]. In order to stimulate his friend, Atticus affirmed that
Varro was jealous of some to whom Cicero had shown more favour[186]. We
find Cicero eagerly asking for more information, on this point: was it
Brutus of whom Varro was jealous? It seems strange that Cicero should not
have entered into correspondence with Varro himself. Etiquette seems to
have required that the recipient of a dedication should be assumed ignorant
of the intentions of the donor till they were on the point of being
actually carried out. Thus although Cicero saw Brutus frequently while at
Tusculum, he apparently did not speak to him about the _De Finibus_, but
employed Atticus to ascertain his feeling about the dedication[187].

Cicero's own judgment about the completed second edition of the _Academica_
is often given in the letters. He tells us that it extended, on the whole,
to greater length than the first, though much had been omitted; he adds,
"Unless human self love deceives me, the books have been so finished that
the Greeks themselves have nothing in the same department of literature to
approach them.... This edition will be more brilliant, more terse, and
altogether better than the last[188]." Again: "The Antiochean portion has
all the point of Antiochus combined with any polish my style may
possess[189]." Also: "I have finished the book with I know not what
success, but with a care which nothing could surpass[190]." The binding and
adornment of the presentation copy for Varro received great attention, and
the letter accompanying it was carefully elaborated[191]. Yet after
everything had been done and the book had been sent to Atticus at Rome,
Cicero was still uneasy as to the reception it would meet with from Varro.
He wrote thus to Atticus: "I tell you again and again that the presentation
will be at your own risk. So if you begin to hesitate, let us desert to
Brutus, who is also a follower of Antiochus. 0 Academy, on the wing as thou
wert ever wont, flitting now hither, now thither!" Atticus on his part
"shuddered" at the idea of taking the responsibility[192]. After the work
had passed into his hands, Cicero begged him to take all precautions to
prevent it from getting into circulation until they could meet one another
in Rome[193]. This warning was necessary, because Balbus and Caerellia had
just managed to get access to the _De Finibus_[194]. In a letter, dated
apparently a day or two later, Cicero declared his intention to meet
Atticus at Rome and send the work to Varro, should it be judged advisable
to do so, after a consultation[195]. The meeting ultimately did not take
place, but Cicero left the four books in Atticus' power, promising to
approve any course that might be taken[196]. Atticus wrote to say that as
soon as Varro came to Rome the books would be sent to him. "By this time,
then," says Cicero, when he gets the letter, "you have taken the fatal
step; oh dear! if you only knew at what peril to yourself! Perhaps my
letter stopped you, although you had not read it when you wrote. I long to
hear how the matter stands[197]." Again, a little later: "You have been
bold enough, then, to give Varro the books? I await his judgment upon them,
but when will he read them?" Varro probably received the books in the first
fortnight of August, 45 B.C., when Cicero was hard at work on the _Tusculan
Disputations_[198]. A copy of the first edition had already got into
Varro's hands, as we learn from a letter, in which Cicero begs Atticus to
ask Varro to make some alterations in his copy of the _Academica_, at a
time when the fate of the second edition was still undecided[199]. From
this fact we may conclude that Cicero had given up all hope of suppressing
the first edition. If he consoles Atticus for the uselessness of his copies
of the first edition, it does not contradict my supposition, for Cicero of
course assumes that Atticus, whatever may be the feeling of other people,
wishes to have the "Splendidiora, breviora, meliora." Still, on every
occasion which offered, the author sought to point out as his authorised
edition the one in four books. He did so in a passage written immediately
after the _Academica Posteriora_ was completed[200], and often
subsequently, when he most markedly mentioned the number of the books as
four[201]. That he wished the work to bear the title _Academica_ is
clear[202]. The expressions _Academica quaestio_, Ακαδημικη συνταξις, and
_Academia_, are merely descriptive[203]; so also is the frequent
appellation _Academici libri_[204]. The title _Academicae Quaestiones_,
found in many editions, is merely an imitation of the _Tusculanae
Quaestiones_, which was supported by the false notion, found as early as
Pliny[205], that Cicero had a villa called Academia, at which the book was
written. He had indeed a Gymnasium at his Tusculan villa, which he called
his Academia, but we are certain from the letters to Atticus that the work
was written entirely at Astura, Antium, and Arpinum.

Quintilian seems to have known the first edition very well[206], but the
second edition is the one which is most frequently quoted. The four books
are expressly referred to by Nonius, Diomedes, and Lactantius, under the
title _Academica_. Augustine speaks of them only as _Academici libri_, and
his references show that he knew the second edition only. Lactantius also
uses this name occasionally, though he generally speaks of the _Academica_.
Plutarch shows only a knowledge of the first edition[207].

I have thought it advisable to set forth in plain terms the history of the
genesis of the book, as gathered from Cicero's letters to Atticus. That it
was not unnecessary to do so may be seen from the astounding theories which
old scholars of great repute put forward concerning the two editions. A
fair summary of them may be seen in the preface of Goerenz. I now proceed
to examine into the constitution and arrangement of the two editions.

a. _The lost dialogue "Catulus."_

The whole of the characters in this dialogue and the _Lucullus_ are among
those genuine Optimates and adherents of the senatorial party whom Cicero
so loves to honour. The Catulus from whom the lost dialogue was named was
son of the illustrious colleague of Marius. With the political career of
father and son we shall have little to do. I merely inquire what was their
position with respect to the philosophy of the time, and the nature of
their connection with Cicero.

Catulus the younger need not detain us long. It is clear from the
_Lucullus_[208] that he did little more than put forward opinions he had
received from his father. Cicero would, doubtless, have preferred to
introduce the elder man as speaking for himself, but in that case, as in
the _De Oratore_, the author would have been compelled to exclude himself
from the conversation[209]. The son, therefore, is merely the mouthpiece of
the father, just as Lucullus, in the dialogue which bears his name, does
nothing but render literally a speech of Antiochus, which he professes to
have heard[210]. For the arrangement in the case of both a reason is to be
found in their ατριψια with respect to philosophy[211]. This ατριψια did
not amount to απαιδευσια, or else Cicero could not have made Catulus the
younger the advocate of philosophy in the _Hortensius_[212]. Though Cicero
sometimes classes the father and son together as men of literary culture
and perfect masters of Latin style, it is very evident on a comparison of
all the passages where the two are mentioned, that no very high value was
placed on the learning of the son[213]. But however slight were the claims
of Catulus the younger to be considered a philosopher, he was closely
linked to Cicero by other ties. During all the most brilliant period of
Cicero's life, Catulus was one of the foremost Optimates of Rome, and his
character, life, and influence are often depicted in even extravagant
language by the orator[214]. He is one of the pillars of the state[215],
Cicero cries, and deserves to be classed with the ancient worthies of
Rome[216]. When he opposes the Manilian law, and asks the people on whom
they would rely if Pompey, with such gigantic power concentrated in his
hands, were to die, the people answer with one voice "On you[217]." He
alone was bold enough to rebuke the follies, on the one hand, of the mob,
on the other, of the senate[218]. In him no storm of danger, no favouring
breeze of fortune, could ever inspire either fear or hope, or cause to
swerve from his own course[219]. His influence, though he be dead, will
ever live among his countrymen[220]. He was not only glorious in his life,
but fortunate in his death[221].

Apart from Cicero's general agreement with Catulus in politics, there were
special causes for his enthusiasm. Catulus was one of the _viri consulares_
who had given their unreserved approval to the measures taken for the
suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, and was the first to confer on
Cicero the greatest glory of his life, the title "Father of his
country[222]." So closely did Cicero suppose himself to be allied to
Catulus, that a friend tried to console him for the death of Tullia, by
bidding him remember "Catulus and the olden times[223]." The statement of
Catulus, often referred to by Cicero, that Rome had never been so
unfortunate as to have two bad consuls in the same year, except when Cinna
held the office, may have been intended to point a contrast between the
zeal of Cicero and the lukewarmness of his colleague Antonius[224].
Archias, who wrote in honour of Cicero's consulship, lived in the house of
the two Catuli[225].

We have seen that when Cicero found it too late to withdraw the first
edition of the _Academica_ from circulation, he affixed a prooemium to each
book, Catulus being lauded in the first, Lucullus in the second. From the
passages above quoted, and from our knowledge of Cicero's habit in such
matters, we can have no difficulty in conjecturing at least a portion of
the contents of the lost prooemium to the _Catulus_. The achievements of
the elder Catulus were probably extolled, as well as those of his son. The
philosophical knowledge of the elder man was made to cast its lustre on the
younger. Cicero's glorious consulship was once more lauded, and great
stress was laid upon the patronage it received from so famous a man as the
younger Catulus, whose praises were sung in the fervid language which
Cicero lavishes on the same theme elsewhere. Some allusion most likely was
made to the connection of Archias with the Catuli, and to the poem he had
written in Cicero's honour. Then the occasion of the dialogue, its supposed
date, and the place where it was held, were indicated. The place was the
Cuman villa of Catulus[226]. The feigned date must fall between the year 60
B.C. in which Catulus died, and 63, the year of Cicero's consulship, which
is alluded to in the _Lucullus_[227]. It is well known that in the
arrangement of his dialogues Cicero took every precaution against
anachronisms.

The prooemium ended, the dialogue commenced. Allusion was undoubtedly made
to the _Hortensius_, in which the same speakers had been engaged; and after
more compliments had been bandied about, most of which would fall to
Cicero's share, a proposal was made to discuss the great difference between
the dogmatic and sceptic schools. Catulus offered to give his father's
views, at the same time commending his father's knowledge of philosophy.
Before we proceed to construct in outline the speech of Catulus from
indications offered by the _Lucullus_, it is necessary to speak of the
character and philosophical opinions of Catulus the elder.

In the many passages where Cicero speaks of him, he seldom omits to mention
his _sapientia_, which implies a certain knowledge of philosophy. He was,
says Cicero, the kindest, the most upright, the wisest, the holiest of
men[228]. He was a man of universal merit, of surpassing worth, a second
Laelius[229]. It is easy to gather from the _De Oratore_, in which he
appears as an interlocutor, a more detailed view of his accomplishments.
Throughout the second and third books he is treated as the lettered man,
par excellence, of the company[230]. Appeal is made to him when any
question is started which touches on Greek literature and philosophy. We
are especially told that even with Greeks his acquaintance with Greek, and
his style of speaking it, won admiration[231]. He defends the Greeks from
the attacks of Crassus[232]. He contemptuously contrasts the Latin
historians with the Greek[233]. He depreciates the later Greek rhetorical
teaching, while he bestows high commendation on the early sophists[234].
The systematic rhetoric of Aristotle and Theophrastus is most to his
mind[235]. An account is given by him of the history of Greek speculation
in Italy[236]. The undefiled purity of his Latin style made him seem to
many the only speaker of the language[237]. He had written a history of his
own deeds, in the style of Xenophon, which Cicero had imitated[238], and
was well known as a wit and writer of epigrams[239].

Although so much is said of his general culture, it is only from the
_Academica_ that we learn definitely his philosophical opinions. In the _De
Oratore_, when he speaks of the visit of Carneades to Rome[240], he does
not declare himself a follower of that philosopher, nor does Crassus, in
his long speech about Greek philosophy, connect Catulus with any particular
teacher. The only Greek especially mentioned as a friend of his, is the
poet Antipater of Sidon[241]. Still it might have been concluded that he
was an adherent either of the Academic or Peripatetic Schools. Cicero
repeatedly asserts that from no other schools can the orator spring, and
the whole tone of the _De Oratore_ shows that Catulus could have had no
leaning towards the Stoics or Epicureans[242]. The probability is that he
had never placed himself under the instruction of Greek teachers for any
length of time, but had rather gained his information from books and
especially from the writings of Clitomachus. If he had ever been in actual
communication with any of the prominent Academics, Cicero would not have
failed to tell us, as he does in the case of Antonius[243], and
Crassus[244]. It is scarcely possible that any direct intercourse between
Philo and Catulus can have taken place, although one passage in the
_Lucullus_ seems to imply it[245]. Still Philo had a brilliant reputation
during the later years of Catulus, and no one at all conversant with Greek
literature or society could fail to be well acquainted with his
opinions[246]. No follower of Carneades and Clitomachus, such as Catulus
undoubtedly was[247], could view with indifference the latest development
of Academic doctrine. The famous books of Philo were probably not known to
Catulus[248].

I now proceed to draw out from the references in the _Lucullus_ the chief
features of the speech of Catulus the younger. It was probably introduced
by a mention of Philo's books[249]. Some considerable portion of the speech
must have been directed against the innovations made by Philo upon the
genuine Carneadean doctrine. These the elder Catulus had repudiated with
great warmth, even charging Philo with wilful misrepresentation of the
older Academics[250]. The most important part of the speech, however, must
have consisted of a defence of Carneades and Arcesilas against the dogmatic
schools[251]. Catulus evidently concerned himself more with the system of
the later than with that of the earlier sceptic. It is also exceedingly
probable that he touched only very lightly on the negative Academic
arguments, while he developed fully that positive teaching about the
πιθανον which was so distinctive of Carneades. All the counter arguments of
Lucullus which concern the destructive side of Academic teaching appear to
be distinctly aimed at Cicero, who must have represented it in the
discourse of the day before[252]. On the other hand, those parts of
Lucullus' speech which deal with the constructive part of Academicism[253]
seem to be intended for Catulus, to whom the maintenance of the genuine
Carneadean distinction between αδηλα and ακαταληπτα would be a peculiarly
congenial task. Thus the commendation bestowed by Lucullus on the way in
which the _probabile_ had been handled appertains to Catulus. The
exposition of the sceptical criticism would naturally be reserved for the
most brilliant and incisive orator of the party--Cicero himself. These
conjectures have the advantage of establishing an intimate connection
between the prooemium, the speech of Catulus, and the succeeding one of
Hortensius. In the prooemium the innovations of Philo were mentioned;
Catulus then showed that the only object aimed at by them, a satisfactory
basis for επιστημη, was already attained by the Carneadean theory of the
πιθανον; whereupon Hortensius showed, after the principles of Antiochus,
that such a basis was provided by the older philosophy, which both
Carneades and Philo had wrongly abandoned. Thus Philo becomes the central
point or pivot of the discussion. With this arrangement none of the
indications in the _Lucullus_ clash. Even the demand made by Hortensius
upon Catulus[254] need only imply such a bare statement on the part of the
latter of the negative Arcesilaean doctrines as would clear the ground for
the Carneadean πιθανον. One important opinion maintained by Catulus after
Carneades, that the wise man would opine[255] (τον σοφον δοξασειν), seems
another indication of the generally constructive character of his
exposition. Everything points to the conclusion that this part of the
dialogue was mainly drawn by Cicero from the writings of Clitomachus.

Catulus was followed by Hortensius, who in some way spoke in favour of
Antiochean opinions, but to what extent is uncertain[256]. I think it
extremely probable that he gave a résumé of the history of philosophy,
corresponding to the speech of Varro in the beginning of the _Academica
Posteriora_. One main reason in favour of this view is the difficulty of
understanding to whom, if not to Hortensius, the substance of the speech
could have been assigned in the first edition. In the _Academica
Posteriora_ it was necessary to make Varro speak first and not second as
Hortensius did; this accounts for the disappearance in the second edition
of the polemical argument of Hortensius[257], which would be appropriate
only in the mouth of one who was answering a speech already made. On the
view I have taken, there would be little difficulty in the fact that
Hortensius now advocates a dogmatic philosophy, though in the lost dialogue
which bore his name he had argued against philosophy altogether[258], and
denied that philosophy and wisdom were at all the same thing[259]. Such a
historical résumé as I have supposed Hortensius to give would be within the
reach of any cultivated man of the time, and would only be put forward to
show that the New Academic revolt against the supposed old
Academico-Peripatetic school was unjustifiable. There is actual warrant for
stating that his exposition of Antiochus was merely superficial[260]. We
are thus relieved from the necessity of forcing the meaning of the word
_commoveris_[261], from which Krische infers that the dialogue, entitled
_Hortensius_, had ended in a conversion to philosophy of the orator from
whom it was named. To any such conversion we have nowhere else any
allusion.

The relation in which Hortensius stood to Cicero, also his character and
attainments, are too well known to need mention here. He seems to have been
as nearly innocent of any acquaintance with philosophy as it was possible
for an educated man to be. Cicero's materials for the speech of Hortensius
were, doubtless, drawn from the published works and oral teaching of
Antiochus.

The speech of Hortensius was answered by Cicero himself. If my view of the
preceding speech is correct, it follows that Cicero in his reply pursued
the same course which he takes in his answer to Varro, part of which is
preserved in the _Academica Posteriora_[262]. He justified the New Academy
by showing that it was in essential harmony with the Old, and also with
those ancient philosophers who preceded Plato. Lucullus, therefore,
reproves him as a rebel in philosophy, who appeals to great and ancient
names like a seditious tribune[263]. Unfair use had been made, according to
Lucullus, of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes,
Plato, and Socrates[264]. But Cicero did not merely give a historical
summary. He must have dealt with the theory of καταληπτικη φαντασια and
εννοιαι (which though really Stoic had been adopted by Antiochus), since he
found it necessary to "manufacture" (_fabricari_) Latin terms to represent
the Greek[265]. He probably also commented on the headlong rashness with
which the dogmatists gave their assent to the truth of phenomena. To this a
retort is made by Lucullus[266]. That Cicero's criticism of the dogmatic
schools was incomplete may be seen by the fact that he had not had occasion
to Latinize the terms καταληψις (i.e. in the abstract, as opposed to the
individual καταληπτικη φαντασια), εναργεια, ‛ορμη, αποδειξις, δογμα,
οικειον, αδηλα, εποχη, nearly all important terms in the Stoic, and to some
extent in the Antiochean system, all of which Lucullus is obliged to
translate for himself[267]. The more the matter is examined the more
clearly does it appear that the main purpose of Cicero in this speech was
to justify from the history of philosophy the position of the New Academy,
and not to advance sceptical arguments against experience, which were
reserved for his answer to Lucullus. In his later speech, he expressly
tells us that such sceptical paradoxes as were advanced by him in the first
day's discourse were really out of place, and were merely introduced in
order to disarm Lucullus, who was to speak next[268]. Yet these arguments
must have occupied some considerable space in Cicero's speech, although
foreign to its main intention[269]. He probably gave a summary
classification of the sensations, with the reasons for refusing to assent
to the truth of each class[270]. The whole constitution and tenor of the
elaborate speech of Cicero in the _Lucullus_ proves that no general or
minute demonstration of the impossibility of επιστημη in the dogmatic sense
had been attempted in his statement of the day before. Cicero's argument in
the _Catulus_ was allowed by Lucullus to have considerably damaged the
cause of Antiochus[271]. The three speeches of Catulus, Hortensius, and
Cicero had gone over nearly the whole ground marked out for the
discussion[272], but only cursorily, so that there was plenty of room for a
more minute examination in the _Lucullus_.

One question remains: how far did Cicero defend Philo against the attack of
Catulus? Krische believes that the argument of Catulus was answered point
by point. In this opinion I cannot concur. Cicero never appears elsewhere
as the defender of Philo's reactionary doctrines[273]. The expressions of
Lucullus seem to imply that this part of his teaching had been dismissed by
all the disputants[274]. It follows that when Cicero, in his letter of
dedication to Varro, describes his own part as that of Philo (_partes mihi
sumpsi Philonis_[275]), he merely attaches Philo's name to those general
New Academic doctrines which had been so brilliantly supported by the pupil
of Clitomachus in his earlier days. The two chief sources for Cicero's
speech in the _Catulus_ were, doubtless, Philo himself and Clitomachus.

In that intermediate form of the _Academica_, where Cato and Brutus
appeared in the place of Hortensius and Lucullus, there can be no doubt
that Brutus occupied a more prominent position than Cato. Consequently Cato
must have taken the comparatively inferior part of Hortensius, while Brutus
took that of Lucullus. It may perhaps seem strange that a Stoic of the
Stoics like Cato should be chosen to represent Antiochus, however much that
philosopher may have borrowed from Zeno. The rôle given to Hortensius,
however, was in my view such as any cultivated man might sustain who had
not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles. So eminent an
Antiochean as Brutus cannot have been reduced to the comparatively
secondary position assigned to Hortensius in the _Academica Priora_. He
would naturally occupy the place given to Varro in the second edition[276].
If this be true, Brutus would not speak at length in the first half of the
work. Cato is not closely enough connected with the _Academica_ to render
it necessary to treat of him farther.

b. _The "Lucullus."_

The day after the discussion narrated in the _Catulus_, during which
Lucullus had been merely a looker-on, the whole party left the Cuman villa
of Catulus early in the morning, and came to that of Hortensius at
Bauli[277]. In the evening, if the wind favoured, Lucullus was to leave for
his villa at Neapolis, Cicero for his at Pompeii[278]. Bauli was a little
place on the gulf of Baiae, close to Cimmerium, round which so many legends
lingered[279]. The scenery in view was magnificent[280]. As the party were
seated in the xystus with its polished floor and lines of statues, the
waves rippled at their feet, and the sea away to the horizon glistened and
quivered under the bright sun, and changed colour under the freshening
breeze. Within sight lay the Cuman shore and Puteoli, thirty stadia
distant[281].

Cicero strove to give vividness to the dialogue and to keep it perfectly
free from anachronisms. Diodotus is spoken of as still living, although
when the words were written he had been dead for many years[282]. The
surprise of Hortensius, who is but a learner in philosophy, at the wisdom
of Lucullus, is very dramatic[283]. The many political and private troubles
which were pressing upon Cicero when he wrote the work are kept carefully
out of sight. Still we can catch here and there traces of thoughts and
plans which were actively employing the author's mind at Astura. His
intention to visit Tusculum has left its mark on the last section of the
book, while in the last but one the _De Finibus_, the _De Natura Deorum_
and other works are shadowed forth[284]. In another passage the design of
the _Tusculan Disputations_, which was carried out immediately after the
publication of the _Academica_ and _De Finibus_, is clearly to be
seen[285].

Hortensius and Catulus now sink to a secondary position in the
conversation, which is resumed by Lucullus. His speech is especially
acknowledged by Cicero to be drawn from the works of Antiochus[286]. Nearly
all that is known of the learning of Lucullus is told in Cicero's dialogue,
and the passages already quoted from the letters. He seems at least to have
dallied with culture, although his chief energy, as a private citizen, was
directed to the care of his fish-ponds[287]. In his train when he went to
Sicily was the poet Archias, and during the whole of his residence in the
East he sought to attach learned men to his person. At Alexandria he was
found in the company of Antiochus, Aristus, Heraclitus Tyrius, Tetrilius
Rogus and the Selii, all men of philosophic tastes[288]. He is several
times mentioned by Pliny in the _Natural History_ as the patron of Greek
artists. Yet, as we have already seen, Cicero acknowledged in his letters
to Atticus that Lucullus was no philosopher. He has to be propped up, like
Catulus, by the authority of another person. All his arguments are
explicitly stated to be derived from a discussion in which he had heard
Antiochus engage. The speech of Lucullus was, as I have said, mainly a
reply to that of Cicero in the _Catulus_. Any closer examination of its
contents must be postponed till I come to annotate its actual text. The
same may be said of Cicero's answer.

In the intermediate form of the _Academica_, the speech of Lucullus was no
doubt transferred to Brutus, but as he has only such a slight connection
with the work, I do not think it necessary to do much more than call
attention to the fact. I may, however, notice the close relationship in
which Brutus stood to the other persons with whom we have had to deal. He
was nephew of Cato, whose half-sister Servilia was wife of Lucullus[289].
Cato was tutor to Lucullus' son, with Cicero for a sort of adviser: while
Hortensius had married a divorced wife of Cato. All of them were of the
Senatorial party, and Cato and Brutus lived to be present, with Cicero,
during the war between Pompey and Caesar. Brutus and Cicero were both
friends of Antiochus and Aristus, whose pupil Brutus was[290].

c. _The Second Edition._

When Cicero dedicated the _Academica_ to Varro, very slight alterations
were necessary in the scenery and other accessories of the piece. Cicero
had a villa close to the Cuman villa of Catulus and almost within sight of
Hortensius' villa at Bauli[291]. Varro's villa, at which the scene was now
laid, was close to the Lucrine lake[292]. With regard to the feigned date
of the discourse, we may observe that at the very outset of the work it is
shown to be not far distant from the actual time of composition[293]. Many
allusions are made to recent events, such as the utter overthrow of the
Pompeian party, the death of Tullia[294], and the publication of the
_Hortensius_[295]. Between the date of Tullia's death and the writing of
the _Academica_, it can be shown that Varro, Cicero and Atticus could not
have met together at Cumae. Cicero therefore for once admits into his works
an impossibility in fact. This impossibility would at once occur to Varro,
and Cicero anticipates his wonder in the letter of dedication[296].

For the main facts of Varro's life the student must be referred to the
ordinary sources of information. A short account of the points of contact
between his life and that of Cicero, with a few words about his
philosophical opinions, are alone needed here. The first mention we have of
Varro in any of Cicero's writings is in itself sufficient to show his
character and the impossibility of anything like friendship between the
two. Varro had done the orator some service in the trying time which came
before the exile. In writing to Atticus Cicero had eulogised Varro; and in
the letter to which I refer he begs Atticus to send Varro the eulogy to
read, adding "_Mirabiliter moratus est, sicut nosti,_ ελικτα και
ουδεν[297]." All the references to Varro in the letters to Atticus are in
the same strain. Cicero had to be pressed to write Varro a letter of thanks
for supposed exertions in his behalf, during his exile[298]. Several
passages show that Cicero refused to believe in Varro's zeal, as reported
by Atticus[299]. On Cicero's return from exile, he and Varro remained in
the same semi-friendly state. About the year 54 B.C., as we have already
seen, Atticus in vain urged his friend to dedicate some work to the great
polymath. After the fall of the Pompeian cause, Cicero and Varro do seem to
have been drawn a little closer together. Eight letters, written mostly in
the year before the _Academica_ was published, testify to this
approximation[300]. Still they are all cold, forced and artificial; very
different from the letters Cicero addressed to his real intimates, such for
instance as Sulpicius, Caelius, Paetus, Plancus, and Trebatius. They all
show a fear of giving offence to the harsh temper of Varro, and a humility
in presence of his vast learning which is by no means natural to Cicero.
The negotiations between Atticus and Cicero with respect to the dedication
of the second edition, as detailed already, show sufficiently that this
slight increase in cordiality did not lead to friendship[301].

The philosophical views of Varro can be gathered with tolerable accuracy
from Augustine, who quotes considerably from, the work of Varro _De
Philosophia_[302]. Beyond doubt he was a follower of Antiochus and the
so-called Old Academy. How he selected this school from, among the 288
philosophies which he considered possible, by an elaborate and pedantic
process of exhaustion, may be read by the curious in Augustine. My notes on
the _Academica Posteriora_ will show that there is no reason for accusing
Cicero of having mistaken Varro's philosophical views. This supposition
owes its currency to Müller, who, from Stoic phrases in the _De Lingua
Latina_, concluded that Varro had passed over to the Stoics before that
work was written. All that was Stoic in Varro came from Antiochus[303].

The exact specification of the changes in the arrangement of the
subject-matter, necessitated by the dedication to Varro, will be more
conveniently deferred till we come to the fragments of the second edition
preserved by Nonius and others. Roughly speaking, the following were the
contents of the four books. Book I.: the historico-philosophical exposition
of Antiochus' views, formerly given by Hortensius, now by Varro; then the
historical justification of the Philonian position, which Cicero had given
in the first edition as an answer to Hortensius[304]. Book II.: an
exposition by Cicero of Carneades' positive teaching, practically the same
as that given by Catulus in ed. I.; to this was appended, probably, that
foretaste of the negative arguments against dogmatism, which in ed. 1. had
formed part of the answer made by Cicero to Hortensius. Book III.: a speech
of Varro in reply to Cicero, closely corresponding to that of Lucullus in
ed. 1. Book IV.: Cicero's answer, substantially the same as in ed. 1.
Atticus must have been almost a κωφον προσωπον.

I may here notice a fact which might puzzle the student. In some old
editions the _Lucullus_ is marked throughout as _Academicorum liber IV_.
This is an entire mistake, which arose from a wrong view of Nonius'
quotations, which are always from the _second_ edition, and can tell us
nothing about the constitution of the _first_. One other thing is worth
remark. Halm (as many before him had done) places the _Academica Priora_
before the _Posteriora_. This seems to me an unnatural arrangement; the
subject-matter of the _Varro_ is certainly prior, logically, to that of the
_Lucullus_.

       *       *       *       *       *

M. TULLII CICERONIS

ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM

LIBER PRIMUS.

       *       *       *       *       *

I. 1. In Cumano nuper cum mecum Atticus noster esset, nuntiatum est nobis a
M. Varrone, venisse eum Roma pridie vesperi et, nisi de via fessus esset,
continuo ad nos venturum fuisse. Quod cum audissemus, nullam moram
interponendam putavimus quin videremus hominem nobiscum et studiis isdem et
vetustate amicitiae coniunctum. Itaque confestim ad eum ire perreximus,
paulumque cum _ab_ eius villa abessemus, ipsum ad nos venientem vidimus:
atque ilium complexi, ut mos amicorum est, satis eum longo intervallo ad
suam villam reduximus. 2. Hic pauca primo, atque ea percontantibus nobis,
ecquid forte Roma novi, Atticus: Omitte ista, quae nec percontari nec
audire sine molestia possumus, quaeso, inquit, et quaere potius ecquid ipse
novi. Silent enim diutius Musae Varronis quam solebant, nec tamen istum
cessare, sed celare quae scribat existimo. Minime vero, inquit ille:
intemperantis enim arbitror esse scribere quod occultari velit: sed habeo
opus magnum in manibus, idque iam pridem: ad hunc enim ipsum--me autem
dicebat--quaedam institui, quae et sunt magna sane et limantur a me
politius. 3. Et ego: Ista quidem, inquam, Varro, iam diu exspectans, non
audeo tamen flagitare: audivi enim e Libone nostro, cuius nosti
studium--nihil enim eius modi celare possumus--non te ea intermittere, sed
accuratius tractare nec de manibus umquam deponere. Illud autem mihi ante
hoc tempus numquam in mentem venit a te requirere: sed nunc, postea quam
sum ingressus res eas, quas tecum simul didici, mandare monumentis
philosophiamque veterem illam a Socrate ortam Latinis litteris illustrare,
quaero quid sit cur, cum multa scribas, genus hoc praetermittas, praesertim
cum et ipse in eo excellas et id studium totaque ea res longe ceteris et
studiis et artibus antecedat.

II. 4. Tum ille: Rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam requiris.
Itaque non haesitans respondebo, sed ea dicam, quae mihi sunt in promptu,
quod ista ipsa de re multum, ut dixi, et diu cogitavi. Nam cum philosophiam
viderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimavi, si qui de
nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca
potius quam nostra lecturos: sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis
abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca
intellegi non possunt: itaque ea nolui scribere, quae nec indocti
intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. 5. Vides autem--eadem enim
ipse didicisti--non posse nos Amafinii aut Rabirii similis esse, qui nulla
arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis volgari sermone disputant, nihil
definiunt, nihil partiuntur, nihil apta interrogatione concludunt, nullam
denique artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant. Nos autem praeceptis
dialecticorum et oratorum etiam, quoniam utramque vim virtutem esse nostri
putant, sic parentes, ut legibus, verbis quoque novis cogimur uti, quae
docti, ut dixi, a Graecis petere malent, indocti ne a nobis quidem
accipient, ut frustra omnis suscipiatur _labor_. 6. Iam vero physica, si
Epicurum, id est, si Democritum probarem, possem scribere ita plane, ut
Amafinius. Quid est enim magnum, cum causas rerum efficientium sustuleris,
de corpusculorum--ita enim appellat atomos--concursione fortuita loqui?
Nostra tu physica nosti, quae cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia
ea, quam fingit et format effectio, adhibenda etiam geometria est, quam
quibusnam quisquam enuntiare verbis aut quem ad intellegendum poterit
adducere? _Quid_, haec ipsa de vita et moribus, et de expetendis
fugiendisque rebus? Illi enim simpliciter pecudis et hominis idem bonum
esse censent: apud nostros autem non ignoras quae sit et quanta subtilitas.
7. Sive enim Zenonem sequare, magnum est efficere ut quis intelligat quid
sit illud verum et simplex bonum, quod non possit ab honestate seiungi:
quod bonum quale sit negat omnino Epicurus sine voluptatibus sensum
moventibus ne suspicari _quidem_. Si vero Academiam veterem persequamur,
quam nos, ut scis, probamus, quam erit illa acute explicanda nobis! quam
argute, quam obscure etiam contra Stoicos disserendum! Totum igitur illud
philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum
possum et ad delectationem animi, nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est,
maius aut melius a dis datum munus homini. 8. Sed meos amicos, in quibus
est studium, in Graeciam mitto, id est, ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ea a
fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consectentur. Quae autem nemo adhuc
docuerat nec erat unde studiosi scire possent, ea, quantum potui--nihil
enim magno opere meorum miror--feci ut essent nota nostris. A Graecis enim
peti non poterant ac post L. Aelii nostri occasum ne a Latinis quidem. Et
tamen in illis veteribus nostris, quae Menippum imitati, non interpretati,
quadam hilaritate conspersimus, multa admixta ex intima philosophia, multa
dicta dialectice †quae quo facilius minus docti intelligerent, iucunditate
quadam ad legendum invitati, in laudationibus, in his ipsis antiquitatum
prooemiis †philosophe scribere voluimus, si modo consecuti sumus.

III. 9. Tum, ego. Sunt, inquam, ista, Varro. Nam nos in nostra urbe
peregrinantis errantisque tamquam hospites tui libri quasi domum
deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui et ubi essemus agnoscere. Tu aetatem
patriae, tu descriptiones temporum, tu sacrorum iura, tu sacerdotum, tu
domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu sedem regionum locorum, tu omnium
divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti,
plurimumque poetis nostris omninoque Latinis et litteris luminis et verbis
attulisti, atque ipse varium et elegans omni fere numero poema fecisti
philosophiamque multis locis incohasti, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum
parum. 10. Causam autem probabilem tu quidem adfers; aut enim Graeca legere
malent qui erunt eruditi aut ne haec quidem qui illa nesciunt. Sed da mihi
nunc: satisne probas? Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca
poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim causae est cur poetas Latinos
Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? an quia delectat
Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba, sed vim Graecorum
expresserunt poetarum? Quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si, ut illi
Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem,
Theophrastum? Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem
sint aut Demosthenem imitati. 11. Ego autem--dicam enim, ut res est--dum me
ambitio, dum honores, dum causae, dum rei publicae non solum cura, sed
quaedam etiam procuratio multis officiis implicatum et constrictum tenebat,
haec inclusa habebam et, ne obsolescerent, renovabam, cum licebat, legendo.
Nunc vero et fortunae gravissimo percussus volnere et administratione rei
publicae liberatus, doloris medicinam a philosophia peto et otii
oblectationem hanc honestissimam iudico. Aut enim huic aetati hoc maxime
aptum est aut iis rebus, si quas dignas laude gessimus, hoc in primis
consentaneum aut etiam ad nostros civis erudiendos nihil utilius aut, si
haec ita non sunt, nihil aliud video quod agere possimus. 12. Brutus quidem
noster, excellens omni genere laudis, sic philosophiam Latinis litteris
persequitur, nihil ut iisdem de rebus Graecia desideret, et eandem quidem
sententiam sequitur quam tu. Nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquam diu, cuius
tu fratrem Antiochum. Quam ob rem da, quaeso, te huic etiam generi
litterarum.

IV. 13. Tum, ille. Istuc quidem considerabo, nec vero sine te. Sed de te
ipso quid est, inquit, quod audio? Quanam, inquam, de re? Relictam a te
veterem illam, inquit, tractari autem novam. Quid? ergo, inquam, Antiocho
id magis licuerit, nostro familiari, remigrare in domum veterem e nova quam
nobis in novam e vetere? certe enim recentissima quaeque sunt correcta et
emendata maxime. Quamquam Antiochi magister Philo, magnus vir, ut tu
existimas ipse, negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas
Academias esse erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt, coarguit. Est, inquit,
ut dicis: sed ignorare te non arbitror, quae contra _ea_ Philonis Antiochus
scripserit. 14. Immo vero et ista et totam veterem Academiam, a qua absum
iam diu, renovari a te, nisi molestum est, velim, et simul, adsidamus,
inquam, si videtur. Sane istud quidem, inquit: sum enim admodum infirmus.
Sed videamus idemne Attico placeat fieri a me, quod te velle video. Mihi
vero, ille: quid est enim quod malim quam ex Antiocho iam pridem audita
recordari? et simul videre satisne ea commode dici possit Latine? Quae cum
essent dicta, in conspectu consedimus [omnes].

15. Tum Varro ita exorsus est: Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter
omnis, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes
ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam
communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et
malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione
censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum
_valere_. 16. Hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab iis qui illum
audierunt perscripti varie _et_ copiose sunt, ita disputat ut nihil
adfirmet ipse, refellat alios: nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque
praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil
scire, id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium
sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una omnis sapientia non
arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Quae cum diceret constanter et in ea
sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tamen in virtute laudanda et in
hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum
libris, maximeque Platonis, intellegi potest. 17. Platonis autem
auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit, una et consentiens
duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et
Peripateticorum: qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant. Nam cum
Speusippum, sororis filium, Plato philosophiae quasi heredem reliquisset,
duos autem praestantissimo studio atque doctrina, Xenocratem Chalcedonium
et Aristotelem Stagiritem, qui erant cum Aristotele, Peripatetici dicti
sunt, quia disputabant inambulantes in Lycio, illi autem, qui Platonis
instituto in Academia, quod est alterum gymnasium, coetus erant et sermones
habere soliti, e loci vocabulo nomen habuerunt. Sed utrique Platonis
ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam
quidem plenam ac refertam, illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus
rebus et nulla adfirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt.
Ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et
rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae. 18. Quae quidem erat primo duobus, ut
dixi, nominibus una: nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem
Academiam differebat. Abundantia quadam ingeni praestabat, ut mihi quidem
videtur, Aristoteles, sed idem fons erat utrisque et eadem rerum
expetendarum fugiendarumque partitio.

V. Sed quid ago? inquit, aut sumne sanus, qui haec vos doceo? nam etsi non
sus Minervam, ut aiunt, tamen inepte quisquis Minervam docet. Tum Atticus:
Tu vero, inquit, perge, Varro: valde enim amo nostra atque nostros, meque
ista delectant, cum Latine dicuntur, et isto modo. Quid me, inquam, putas,
qui philosophiam iam professus sim populo nostro exhibiturum? Pergamus
igitur, inquit, quoniam placet. 19. Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone
philosophandi ratio triplex: una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et
rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid
rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans iudicando. Ac
primum partem illam bene vivendi a natura petebant eique parendum esse
dicebant, neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura quaerendum esse illud summum
bonum quo omnia referrentur, constituebantque extremum esse rerum
expetendarum et finem bonorum adeptum esse omnia e natura et animo et
corpore et vita. Corporis autem alia ponebant esse in toto, alia in
partibus: valetudinem, viris pulchritudinem in toto, in partibus autem
sensus integros et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus
celeritatem, vim in manibus, claritatem in voce, in lingua etiam explanatam
vocum impressionem: 20. animi autem, quae essent ad comprehendendam
ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab iis in naturam et mores dividebantur.
Naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant: quorum utrumque mentis
esset proprium et ingeni. Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi
consuetudinem: quam partim exercitationis adsiduitate, partim ratione
formabant, in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod incohatum est neque
absolutum, progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum,
id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum, quas in animis
ponunt, una res optima. Ergo haec animorum. 21. Vitae autem--id enim erat
tertium--adiuncta esse dicebant, quae ad virtutis usum valerent. Nam virtus
animi bonis et corporis cernitur, et _in_ quibusdam quae non tam naturae
quam beatae vitae adiuncta sunt. Hominem esse censebant quasi partem
quandam civitatis et universi generis humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum
hominibus humana quadam societate. Ac de summo quidem atque naturali bono
sic agunt: cetera autem pertinere ad id putant aut adaugendum aut tuendum,
ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam. Ita tripartita ab iis
inducitur ratio bonorum.

VI. 22. Atque haec illa sunt tria genera, quae putant plerique
Peripateticos dicere. Id quidem non falso: est enim haec partitio illorum:
illud imprudenter, si alios esse Academicos, qui tum appellarentur, alios
Peripateticos arbitrantur. Communis haec ratio et utrisque hic bonorum
finis videbatur, adipisci quae essent prima natura quaeque ipsa per sese
expetenda, aut omnia aut maxima. Ea sunt autem maxima, quae in ipso animo
atque in ipsa virtute versantur. Itaque omnis illa antiqua philosophia
sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam,
nisi adiungerentur et corporis et cetera, quae supra dicta sunt, ad
virtutis usum idonea. 23. Ex hac descriptione agendi quoque aliquid in vita
et officii ipsius initium reperiebatur: quod erat in conservatione earum
rerum, quas natura praescriberet. Hinc gignebatur fuga desidiae
voluptatumque contemptio: ex quo laborum dolorumque susceptio multorum
magnorumque recti honestique causa et earum rerum, quae erant congruentes
cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque
aequitas: eaeque voluptatibus et multis vitae commodis anteponebantur. Haec
quidem fuit apud eos morum institutio et eius partis, quam primam posui,
forma atque descriptio.

24. De natura autem--id enim sequebatur--ita dicebant, ut eam dividerent in
res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se praebens,
ea quae efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant, in
eo autem, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam: in utroque tamen utrumque:
neque enim materiam ipsam cohaerere potuisse, si nulla vi contineretur,
neque vim sine aliqua materia. Nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse
cogatur. Sed quod ex utroque, id iam corpus et quasi qualitatem quandam
nominabant: dabitis enim profecto, ut in rebus inusitatis, quod Graeci ipsi
faciunt, a quibus haec iam diu tractantur, utamur verbis interdum
inauditis.

VII. 25. Nos vero, inquit Atticus: quin etiam Graecis licebit utare, cum
voles, si te Latina forte deficient. Bene sane facis: sed enitar ut Latine
loquar, nisi in huiusce modi verbis, ut philosophiam aut rhetoricam aut
physicam aut dialecticam appellem, quibus, ut aliis multis, consuetudo iam
utitur pro Latinis. Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas ποιοτητας Graeci
vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed philosophorum,
atque id in multis. Dialecticorum vero verba nulla sunt publica: suis
utuntur. Et id quidem commune omnium fere est artium. Aut enim nova sunt
rerum novarum facienda nomina aut ex aliis transferenda. Quod si Graeci
faciunt, qui in his rebus tot iam saecula versantur, quanto id magis nobis
concedendum est, qui haec nunc primum tractare conamur? 26. Tu vero,
inquam, Varro, bene etiam meriturus mihi videris de tuis civibus, si eos
non modo copia rerum auxeris, uti fecisti, sed etiam verborum. Audebimus
ergo, inquit, novis verbis uti te auctore, si necesse erit. Earum igitur
qualitatum sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius
modi et simplices: ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multiformes.
Itaque aër--utimur enim pro Latino--et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt:
ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum, quae gignuntur e
terra. Ergo illa initia et, ut e Graeco vertam, elementa dicuntur: e quibus
aër et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi
et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram. Quintum genus, e quo essent astra
mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor, quae supra dixi, dissimile
Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur. 27. Sed subiectam putant omnibus sine
ulla specie atque carentem omni illa qualitate--faciamus enim tractando
usitatius hoc verbum et tritius--materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa
atque efficta sint: quae tota omnia accipere possit omnibusque modis mutari
atque ex omni parte, eoque etiam interire non in nihilum, sed in suas
partis, quae infinite secari ac dividi possint, cum sit nihil omnino in
rerum natura minimum quod dividi nequeat: quae autem moveantur, omnia
intervallis moveri, quae intervalla item infinite dividi possint. 28. Et
cum ita moveatur illa vis, quam qualitatem esse diximus, et cum sic ultro
citroque versetur, materiam ipsam totam penitus commutari putant et illa
effici, quae appellant qualia, e quibus in omni natura cohaerente et
continuata cum omnibus suis partibus effectum esse mundum, extra quem nulla
pars materiae sit nullumque corpus, partis autem esse mundi omnia, quae
insint in eo, quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit,
quae sit eadem sempiterna: nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat: 29.
quam vim animum esse dicunt mundi eandemque esse mentem sapientiamque
perfectam, quem deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subiectae,
quasi prudentiam quandam, procurantem caelestia maxime, deinde in terris
ea, quae pertinent ad homines: quam interdum eandem necessitatem appellant,
quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem
et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni: non numquam eandem
fortunam, quod efficiat multa improvisa ac necopinata nobis propter
obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.

VIII. 30. Tertia deinde philosophiae pars, quae erat in ratione et in
disserendo, sic tractabatur ab utrisque. Quamquam oriretur a sensibus,
tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse
iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id,
quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. Hanc illi
ιδεαν appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus
dicere. 31. Sensus autem omnis hebetes et tardos esse arbitrabantur, nec
percipere ullo modo res eas, quae subiectae sensibus viderentur, quae
essent aut ita parvae, ut sub sensum cadere non possent, aut ita mobiles et
concitatae, ut nihil umquam unum esset constans, ne idem quidem, quia
continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia. Itaque hanc omnem partem rerum
opinabilem appellabant. 32. Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in
animi notionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa definitiones rerum
probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant. Verborum
etiam explicatio probabatur, id est, qua de causa quaeque essent ita
nominata, quam ετυμολογιαν appellabant: post argumentis et quasi rerum
notis ducibus utebantur ad probandum et ad concludendum id, quod explanari
volebant: itaque tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis
ratione conclusae. Huic quasi ex altera parte oratoria vis dicendi
adhibebatur, explicatrix orationis perpetuae ad persuadendum accommodatae.
33. Haec erat illis disciplina a Platone tradita: cuius quas acceperim
mutationes, si voltis, exponam. Nos vero volumus, inquam, ut pro Attico
etiam respondeam.

IX. Et recte, inquit, respondes: praeclare enim explicatur Peripateticorum
et Academiae veteris auctoritas. Aristoteles primus species, quas paulo
ante dixi, labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis
quiddam divinum esse diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et
ita moratus, ut prae se probitatem quandam et ingenuitatem ferat,
vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae:
spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore imbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in
ea sola positum esse beate vivere. 34. Nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam
fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum
maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et
moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in
ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis. Speusippus autem et Xenocrates, qui primi
Platonis rationem auctoritatemque susceperant, et post eos Polemo et Crates
unaque Crantor, in Academia congregati, diligenter ea, quae a superioribus
acceperant, tuebantur. Iam Polemonem audiverant adsidue Zeno et Arcesilas.
35. Sed Zeno cum Arcesilam anteiret aetate valdeque subtiliter dissereret
et peracute moveretur, corrigere conatus est disciplinam. Eam quoque, si
videtur, correctionem explicabo, sicut solebat Antiochus. Mihi vero,
inquam, videtur, quod vides idem significare Pomponium.

X. Zeno igitur nullo modo is erat, qui, ut Theophrastus, nervos virtutis
inciderit, sed contra, qui omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertinerent in una
virtute poneret nec quicquam aliud numeraret in bonis, idque appellaret
honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum. 36. Cetera
autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat,
alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat.
Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione
dignanda docebat, contraque contraria: neutra autem in mediis relinquebat,
in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti. 37. Sed quae essent sumenda,
ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris. Quae pluris, ea
praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. Atque ut haec non tam
rebus quam vocabulis commutaverat, sic inter recte factum atque peccatum,
officium et contra officium media locabat quaedam: recte facta sola in
bonis actionibus ponens, prave, id est peccata, in malis: officia autem
servata praetermissaque media putabat, ut dixi. 38. Cumque superiores non
omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut
more perfectas, hic omnis in ratione ponebat, cumque illi ea genera
virtutum, quae supra dixi, seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hic nec id ullo
modo fieri posse disserebat nec virtutis usum modo, ut superiores, sed
ipsum habitum per se esse praeclarum, nec tamen virtutem cuiquam adesse
quin ea semper uteretur. Cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non
tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et
efferri laetitia dicerent, sed eas contraherent in angustumque deducerent,
hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. 39. Cumque eas
perturbationes antiqui naturalis esse dicerent et rationis expertis aliaque
in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem
adsentiebatur. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque
iudicio suscipi et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse
immoderatam quamdam intemperantiam. Haec fere de moribus.

XI. De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum, ut quattuor initiis rerum illis
quintam hanc naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur,
non adhiberet. Statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quae quidque
gigneret, et mentem atque sensus. Discrepabat etiam ab isdem quod nullo
modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea, quae expers esset corporis,
cuius generis Xenocrates et superiores etiam animum esse dixerant, nec vero
aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus. 40.
Plurima autem in illa tertia philosophiae parte mutavit. In qua primum de
sensibus ipsis quaedam dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi
impulsione oblata extrinsecus, quam ille φαντασιαν, nos visum appellemus
licet, et teneamus hoc verbum quidem: erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone
saepius. Sed ad haec, quae visa sunt et quasi accepta sensibus, adsensionem
adiungit animorum, quam esse volt in nobis positam et voluntariam. 41.
Visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem, sed iis solum, quae propriam quandam
haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur: id autem visum, cum
ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile--feretis hoc? Nos vero, inquit.
Quonam enim modo καταληπτον diceres?--Sed, cum acceptum iam et approbatum
esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem iis rebus, quae manu
prehenderentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat, cum eo verbo antea nemo
tali in re usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis--nova enim
dicebat--usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum
appellabat, et si ita erat comprehensum, ut convelli ratione non posset,
scientiam: sin aliter, inscientiam nominabat: ex qua exsisteret etiam
opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis. 42. Sed
inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam, quam dixi,
collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli
credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod, ut
supra dixi, comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis
videbatur, non quod omnia, quae essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia
nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret quodque natura quasi normam
scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis
imprimerentur, e quibus non principia solum, sed latiores quaedam ad
rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. Errorem autem et temeritatem et
ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia, quae essent
aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis, a virtute sapientiaque removebat.
Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a
superioribus.

XII. 43. Quae cum dixisset: Breviter sane minimeque obscure exposita est,
inquam, a te, Varro, et veteris Academiae ratio et Stoicorum: verum esse
[autem] arbitror, ut Antiocho, nostro familiari, placebat, correctionem
veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. Tunc
Varro: Tuae sunt nunc partes, inquit, qui ab antiquorum ratione desciscis
et ea, quae ab Arcesila novata sunt, probas, docere quod et qua de causa
discidium factum sit, ut videamus satisne ista sit iusta defectio. 44. Tum
ego: Cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen
instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi, ut mihi quidem videtur, sed
earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant
Socratem et iam ante Socratem Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnis
paene veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse
dixerunt: angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia curricula vitae et, ut
Democritus, in profundo veritatem esse demersam, opinionibus et institutis
omnia teneri, nihil veritati relinqui, deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa
esse dixerunt. 45. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri
posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia
latere censebat in occulto: neque esse quicquam quod cerni aut intellegi
posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare
quemquam neque adsensione approbare, cohibereque semper et ab omni lapsu
continere temeritatem, quae tum esset insignis, cum aut falsa aut incognita
res approbaretur, neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et
perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere. Huic rationi quod
erat consentaneum faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dicens in eam
plerosque deduceret, ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus
momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte adsensio
sustineretur. 46. Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur,
si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil
adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur,
nihil certi dicitur: sed tamen illa, quam exposui_sti_, vetus, haec nova
nominetur: quae usque ad Carneadem perducta, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit,
in eadem Arcesilae ratione permansit. Carneades autem nullius philosophiae
partis ignarus et, ut cognovi ex iis, qui illum audierant, maximeque ex
Epicureo Zenone, qui cum ab eo plurimum dissentiret, unum tamen praeter
ceteros mirabatur, incredibili quadam fuit facultate....

       *       *       *       *       *

ACADEMICORUM POSTERIORUM FRAGMENTA.

EX LIBRO I.

1. Nonius p. 65 Merc. _Digladiari dictum est dissentire et dissidere,
dictum a gladiis. Cicero Academicorum lib. I._: quid autem stomachatur
Menesarchus? quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?

2. Nonius s.v. _concinnare_ p. 43. _Idem in Academicis lib. I._: qui cum
similitudine verbi concinere maxime sibi videretur.

EX LIBRO II.

3. Nonius p. 65. _Aequor ab aequo et plano Cicero Academicorum lib. II.
vocabulum accepisse confirmat_: quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo
etiam aequor illud poetae vocant.

4. Nonius p. 69. _Adamare Cicero Academicorum lib. II._: qui enim serius
honores adamaverunt vix admittuntur ad eos nec satis commendati multitudini
possunt esse.

5. Nonius p. 104. _Exponere pro exempla boni ostentare. Cicero Academicis
lib. II._: frangere avaritiam, scelera ponere, vitam suam exponere ad
imitandum iuventuti.

6. Nonius p. 121. _Hebes positum pro obscuro aut obtuso. Cicero
Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? lunae quae liniamenta sint potesne dicere?
cuius et nascentis et senescentis alias hebetiora, alias acutiora videntur
cornua.

7. Nonius p. 162. _Purpurascit. Cicero Academicorum lib. II.:_ quid? mare
nonne caeruleum? at eius unda, cum est pulsa remis, purpurascit: et quidem
aquae tinctum quodam modo et infectum....

8. Nonius p. 162. _Perpendiculi et normae. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_
atqui si id crederemus, non egeremus perpendiculis, non normis, non
regulis.

9. Nonius p. 394. _Siccum dicitur aridum et sine humore ... Siccum dicitur
et sobrium, non madidum ... Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ alius (_color_)
adultis, alius adulescentibus, alius aegris, _alius sanis_, alius siccis,
alius vinulentis ...

10. Nonius p. 474. _Urinantur. Cic. in Academicis lib. II.:_ si quando enim
nos demersimus, ut qui urinantur, aut nihil superum aut obscure admodum
cernimus.

11. Nonius p. 545. _Alabaster. Cic. Academicorum lib. II.:_ quibus etiam
alabaster plenus unguenti puter esse videtur.

EX LIBRO III.

Cicero ad Att. XVI. 6. §4. _De gloria librum ad te misi: at in eo_
prooemium _id est, quod in Academico tertio._

12. Nonius p. 65. _Digladiari ... idem tertio:_ digladiari autem semper,
depugnare cum facinorosis et audacibus, quis non cum miserrimum, tum etiam
stultissimum dixerit?

13. Nonius p. 65. _Exultare dictum est exilire. Cic. Academicorum lib.
III._: et ut nos nunc sedemus ad Lucrinum pisciculosque exultantes videmus
...

14. Nonius p. 123. _Ingeneraretur ut innasceretur. Cic. Academicorum lib.
III._: in tanta animantium varietate, homini ut soli cupiditas
ingeneraretur cognitionis et scientiae.

15. Nonius p. 419. _Vindicare, trahere, liberare ... Cicero Academicorum
lib. III._: aliqua potestas sit, vindicet se in libertatem.

16. Lactantius Inst. div. VI. 24. _Cicero ... cuius haec in Academico
tertio verba sunt:_ quod si liceret, ut iis qui in itinere deerravissent,
sic vitam deviam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset
emendatio temeritatis.

17. Diomedes p. 373, ed. Putsch.: p. 377, ed. Keil. _Varro ad Ciceronem
tertio_ fixum _et Cicero Academicorum tertio_ (= _Lucullus_ §27): †malcho
in opera adfixa.

18. Nonius p. 139. _Mordicibus et mordicus pro morsu, pro morsibus ... Cic.
Academicorum lib. III._: perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus,
abesse dicemus. = _Lucullus_ §51.

19. Nonius p. 117. _Gallinas. Cic. Academicorum lib. III._: qui gallinas
alere permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae
gallina peperisset dicere solebant. = _Lucullus_ §57.

EX LIBRO IIII.

20. Nonius p. 69, _Adstipulari positum est adsentiri. Cic. in Academicis
lib. IIII._: falsum esse.... Antiochus. = _Lucullus_ §67.

21. Nonius p. 65. _Maeniana ab inventore eorum Maenio dicta sunt; unde et
columna Maenia. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: item ille cum aestuaret,
veterum ut Maenianorum, sic Academicorum viam secutus est. = _Lucullus_
§70.

22. Nonius p. 99. _Dolitum, quod dolatum usu dicitur, quod est percaesum
vel abrasum vel effossum ... Cicero dolatum Academicorum lib. IIII._: non
enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. = _Lucullus_ §100.

23. Nonius p. 164. _Ravum fulvum. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: quia
nobismet ipsis tum caeruleum, tum ravum videtur, quodque nunc a sole
conlucet.... = _Lucullus_ §105.

24. Nonius p. 107. _Exanclare est perpeti vel superare. Cic. Academicorum
lib. IIII._: credoque Clitomacho ita scribenti ut Herculi quendam laborem
exanclatum. = _Lucullus_ §108.

25. Nonius p. 163. _Pingue positum pro impedito et inepto. Cic.
Academicorum lib. IIII._: quod ipsi ... contrarium. = _Lucullus_ §109.

26. Nonius p. 122. _Infinitatem. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: at hoc
Anaximandro infinitatem. = _Lucullus_ §118.

27. Nonius p. 65. _Natrices dicuntur angues natantes Cic. Academicorum lib.
IIII._: sic enim voltis ... fecerit. = _Lucullus_ §120.

28. Nonius p. 189. _Uncinatum ab unco. Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: nec
ut ille qui asperis et hamatis uncinatisque corpusculis concreta haec esse
dicat. = _Lucullus_ §121.

29. Martianus Capella V. §517, p. 444, ed. Kopp. _Cicero ... in
Academicis_: latent ista omnia, Varro, magnis obscurata et circumfusa
tenebris. = _Lucullus_ §122.

30. Nonius p. 102. _E regione positum est ex adverso. Cic. Academicorum
lib. IIII._: nec ego non ita ... vos etiam dicitis e regione nobis in
contraria parte terrae qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia.
= _Lucullus_ §123.

31. Nonius p. 80. _Balbuttire est cum quadam linguae haesitatione et
confusione trepidare, Cic. Academicorum lib. IIII._: plane, ut supra
dictus, Stoicus perpauca balbuttiens. = _Lucullus_ §135.

Ex LIBRIS INCERTIS.

32. Lactantius Inst. div. III. 14. _Haec tua verba sunt_ (_sc. Cicero!_):
mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua
ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi.

33. August. contra Academicos II. §26.: _id probabile vel veri simile
Academici vacant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potent invitare_. ...
Talia, _inquit Academicus_, mihi videntur omnia quae probabilia vel veri
similia putavi nominanda: quae tu si alio nomine vis vocare, nihil repugno.
Satis enim mihi est te iam bene accepisse quid dicam, id est, quibus rebus
haec nomina imponam; non enim vocabulorum opificem, sed rerum inquisitorem
decet esse sapientem. [_Proximis post hunc locum verbis perspicue asseverat
Augustinus haec ipsius esse Ciceronis verba_.]

34. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §15. _Est in libris Ciceronis quae in huius
causae (i.e. Academicorum) patrocinium scripsit, locus quidam.... _
Academico sapienti ab omnibus ceterarum sectarum, qui sibi sapientes
videntur, secundas partes dari; cum primas sibi quemque vindicare necesse
sit; ex quo posse probabiliter confici eum recte primum esse iudicio suo,
qui omnium ceterorum judicio sit secundus.

35. Augustin. c. Acad. III. §43. _Ait enim Cicero_ illis (_i.e.
Academicis_) morem fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam, nisi
qui secum ad senectutem usque vixissent, aperire consuesse.

36. Augustin. De Civit. Dei VI. 2. _Denique et ipse Tullius huic (i.e. M.T.
Varroni) tale testimonium perhibet, ut in libris Academicis eam quae ibi
versatur disputationem se habuisse cum M. Varrone_, homine, _inquit_,
omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo.

       *       *       *       *       *

ACADEMICORUM PRIORUM

LIBER II.

I. 1. Magnum ingenium Luci Luculli magnumque optimarum artium studium, tum
omnis liberalis et digna homine nobili ab eo percepta doctrina, quibus
temporibus florere in foro maxime potuit, caruit omnino rebus urbanis. Ut
enim admodum adolescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito
paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus, in Asiam quaestor
profectus, ibi permultos annos admirabili quadam laude provinciae praefuit;
deinde absens factus aedilis, continuo praetor--licebat enim celerius legis
praemio--, post in Africam, inde ad consulatum, quem ita gessit ut
diligentiam admirarentur omnes, ingenium cognoscerent. Post ad
Mithridaticum bellum missus a senatu non modo opinionem vicit omnium, quae
de virtute eius erat, sed etiam gloriam superiorum. 2. Idque eo fuit
mirabilius, quod ab eo laus imperatoria non admodum exspectabatur, qui
adolescentiam in forensi opera, quaesturae diuturnum tempus Murena bellum
in Ponto gerente in Asia pace consumpserat. Sed incredibilis quaedam ingeni
magnitudo non desideravit indocilem usus disciplinam. Itaque cum totum iter
et navigationem consumpsisset partim in percontando a peritis, partim in
rebus gestis legendis, in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma
profectus rei militaris rudis. Habuit enim divinam quandam memoriam rerum,
verborum maiorem Hortensius, sed quo plus in negotiis gerendis res quam
verba prosunt, hoc erat memoria illa praestantior, quam fuisse in
Themistocle, quem facile Graeciae principem ponimus, singularem ferunt: qui
quidem etiam pollicenti cuidam se artem ei memoriae, quae tum primum
proferebatur, traditurum respondisse dicitur oblivisci se malle discere,
credo, quod haerebant in memoria quaecumque audierat et viderat. Tali
ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam, quam Themistocles
spreverat, disciplinam. Itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monumentis
mandare volumus, sic ille in animo res insculptas habebat. 3. Tantus ergo
imperator in omni genere belli fuit, proeliis, oppugnationibus, navalibus
pugnis totiusque belli instrumento et apparatu, ut ille rex post Alexandrum
maximus hunc a se maiorem ducem cognitum quam quemquam eorum, quos
legisset, fateretur. In eodem tanta prudentia fuit in constituendis
temperandisque civitatibus, tanta aequitas, ut hodie stet Asia Luculli
institutis servandis et quasi vestigiis persequendis. Sed etsi magna cum
utilitate rei publicae, tamen diutius quam vellem tanta vis virtutis atque
ingeni peregrinata afuit ab oculis et fori et curiae. Quin etiam, cum
victor a Mithridatico bello revertisset, inimicorum calumnia triennio
tardius quam debuerat triumphavit. Nos enim consules introduximus paene in
urbem currum clarissimi viri: cuius mihi consilium et auctoritas quid tum
in maximis rebus profuisset dicerem, nisi de me ipso dicendum esset: quod
hoc tempore non est necesse. Itaque privabo illum potius debito testimonio
quam id cum mea laude communicem.

II. 4. Sed quae populari gloria decorari in Lucullo debuerunt, ea fere sunt
et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis. Nos autem illa externa cum
multis, haec interiora cum paucis ex ipso saepe cognovimus. Maiore enim
studio Lucullus cum omni litterarum generi tum philosophiae deditus fuit
quam qui illum ignorabant arbitrabantur, nec vero ineunte aetate solum, sed
et pro quaestore aliquot annos et in ipso bello, in quo ita magna rei
militaris esse occupatio solet, ut non multum imperatori sub ipsis pellibus
otii relinquatur. Cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur
Antiochus, Philonis auditor, excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit et
post aliquot annos imperator, cumque esset ea memoria, quam ante dixi, ea
saepe audiendo facile cognovit, quae vel semel audita meminisse potuisset.
Delectabatur autem mirifice lectione librorum, de quibus audiebat.

5. Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim, minuam
etiam gloriam. Sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras,
plures qui philosophiam, reliqui, etiam si haec non improbent, tamen earum
rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putant. Ego
autem, cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P.
autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante
censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum
Graecarum nec philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. 6. Restat ut iis
respondeam, qui sermonibus eius modi nolint personas tam gravis illigari.
Quasi vero clarorum virorum aut tacitos congressus esse oporteat aut
ludicros sermones aut rerum colloquia leviorum! Etenim, si quodam in libro
vere est a nobis philosophia laudata, profecto eius tractatio optimo atque
amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nec quicquam aliud videndum est nobis,
quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu collocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis
de opera publica detrahamus. Quod si, cum fungi munere debebamus, non modo
operam nostram numquam a populari coetu removimus, sed ne litteram quidem
ullam fecimus nisi forensem, quis reprehendet nostrum otium, qui in eo non
modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus, sed etiam ut plurimis
prosimus enitimur? Gloriam vero non modo non minui, sed etiam augeri
arbitramur eorum, quorum ad popularis illustrisque laudes has etiam minus
notas minusque pervolgatas adiungimus. 7. Sunt etiam qui negent in iis, qui
in nostris libris disputent, fuisse earum rerum, de quibus disputatur,
scientiam: qui mihi videntur non solum vivis, sed etiam mortuis invidere.

III. Restat unum genus reprehensorum, quibus Academiae ratio non probatur.
Quod gravius ferremus, si quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret
praeter eam, quam ipse sequeretur. Nos autem, quoniam contra omnis dicere
quae videntur solemus, non possumus quin alii a nobis dissentiant recusare:
quamquam nostra quidem causa facilis est, qui verum invenire sine ulla
contentione volumus, idque summa cura studioque conquirimus. Etsi enim
omnis cognitio multis est obstructa difficultatibus eaque est et in ipsis
rebus obscuritas et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas, ut non sine causa
antiquissimi et doctissimi invenire se posse quod cuperent diffisi sint,
tamen nec illi defecerunt neque nos studium exquirendi defetigati
relinquemus, neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliud agunt nisi ut in
utramque partem dicendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid, quod aut
verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat. 8. Neque inter nos et eos, qui se
scire arbitrantur, quicquam interest, nisi quod illi non dubitant quin ea
vera sint, quae defendunt: nos probabilia multa habemus, quae sequi facile,
adfirmare vix possumus. Hoc autem liberiores et solutiores sumus, quod
integra nobis est iudicandi potestas, nec ut omnia, quae praescripta et
quasi imperata sint, defendamus necessitate ulla cogimur. Nam ceteri primum
ante tenentur adstricti quam quid esset optimum iudicare potuerunt: deinde
infirmissimo tempore aetatis aut obsecuti amico cuidam aut una alicuius,
quem primum audierunt, oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant et, ad
quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tamquam ad
saxum adhaerescunt. 9. Nam, quod dicunt omnino se credere ei, quem iudicent
fuisse sapientem, probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti iudicare
potuissent--statuere enim qui sit sapiens vel maxime videtur esse
sapientis--, sed ut potuerint, potuerunt omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis
etiam reliquorum sententiis, iudicaverunt autem re semel audita atque ad
unius se auctoritatem contulerunt. Sed nescio quo modo plerique errare
malunt eamque sententiam, quam adamaverunt, pugnacissime defendere quam
sine pertinacia quid constantissime dicatur exquirere. Quibus de rebus et
alias saepe multa quaesita et disputata sunt et quondam in Hortensii villa,
quae est ad Baulos, cum eo Catulus et Lucullus nosque ipsi postridie
venissemus, quam apud Catulum fuissemus. Quo quidem etiam maturius venimus,
quod erat constitutum, si ventus esset, Lucullo in Neapolitanum, mihi in
Pompeianum navigare. Cum igitur pauca in xysto locuti essemus, tum eodem in
spatio consedimus.

IV. 10. Hic Catulus: Etsi heri, inquit, id, quod quaerebatur, paene
explicatum est, ut tota fere quaestio tractata videatur, tamen exspecto ea,
quae te pollicitus es, Luculle, ab Antiocho audita dicturum. Equidem,
inquit Hortensius, feci plus quam vellem: totam enim rem Lucullo integram
servatam oportuit. Et tamen fortasse servata est: a me enim ea, quae in
promptu erant, dicta sunt, a Lucullo autem reconditiora desidero. Tum ille:
Non sane, inquit, Hortensi, conturbat me exspectatio tua, etsi nihil est
iis, qui placere volunt, tam adversarium, sed quia non laboro quam valde
ea, quae dico, probaturus sim, eo minus conturbor. Dicam enim nec mea nec
ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, _non_ vinci me malim quam vincere. Sed
mehercule, ut quidem nunc se causa habet, etsi hesterno sermone labefactata
est, mihi tamen videtur esse verissima. Agam igitur, sicut Antiochus
agebat: nota enim mihi res est. Nam et vacuo animo illum audiebam et magno
studio, eadem de re etiam saepius, ut etiam maiorem exspectationem mei
faciam quam modo fecit Hortensius. Cum ita esset exorsus, ad audiendum
animos ereximus. 11. At ille: Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit, essem,
fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi
Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat,
homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus
et nobilis: cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque
leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo
est, tum erant adlati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus venerant:
et homo natura lenissimus--nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius--stomachari
tamen coepit. Mirabar: nec enim umquam ante videram. At ille, Heracliti
memoriam implorans, quaerere ex eo viderenturne illa Philonis aut ea num
vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando? Negabat. Philonis
tamen scriptum agnoscebat: nec id quidem dubitari poterat: nam aderant mei
familiares, docti homines, P. et C. Selii et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa
audivisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso illos duos libros dicerent
descripsisse. 12. Tum et illa dixit Antiochus, quae heri Catulus
commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni, et alia plura, nec se tenuit quin
contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. Tum igitur
et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item
Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex
eo totam cognoscerem. Itaque compluris dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque
compluribus et in iis Antiochi fratre, Aristo, et praeterea Aristone et
Dione, quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat, multum temporis in
ista una disputatione consumpsimus. Sed ea pars, quae contra Philonem erat,
praetermittenda est: minus enim acer est adversarius is, qui ista, quae
sunt heri defensa, negat Academicos omnino dicere. Etsi enim mentitur,
tamen est adversarius lenior. Ad Arcesilam Carneademque veniamus.

V. 13. Quae cum dixisset, sic rursus exorsus est: Primum mihi videmini--me
autem nomine appellabat, cum veteres physicos nominatis, facere idem, quod
seditiosi cives solent, cum aliquos ex antiquis claros viros proferunt,
quos dicant fuisse popularis, ut eorum ipsi similes esse videantur.
Repetunt ii a P. Valerio, qui exactis regibus primo anno consul fuit,
commemorant reliquos, qui leges popularis de provocationibus tulerint, cum
consules essent; tum ad hos notiores, C. Flaminium, qui legem agrariam
aliquot annis ante secundum Punicum bellum tribunus plebis tulerit invito
senatu et postea bis consul factus sit, L. Cassium, Q. Pompeium: illi
quidem etiam P. Africanum referre in eundem numerum solent. Duos vero
sapientissimos et clarissimos fratres, P. Crassum et P. Scaevolam, aiunt
Ti. Graccho auctores legum fuisse, alterum quidem, ut videmus, palam,
alterum, ut suspicantur, obscurius. Addunt etiam C. Marium. Et de hoc
quidem nihil mentiuntur. Horum nominibus tot virorum atque tantorum
expositis eorum se institutum sequi dicunt. 14. Similiter vos, cum
perturbare, ut illi rem publicam, sic vos philosophiam bene iam constitutam
velitis, Empedoclem, Anaxagoram, Democritum, Parmenidem, Xenophanem,
Platonem etiam et Socratem profertis. Sed neque Saturninus, ut nostrum
inimicum potissimum nominem, simile quicquam habuit veterum illorum nec
Arcesilae calumnia conferenda est cum Democriti verecundia. Et tamen isti
physici raro admodum, cum haerent aliquo loco, exclamant quasi mente
incitati, Empedocles quidem, ut interdum mihi furere videatur, abstrusa
esse omnia, nihil nos sentire, nihil cernere, nihil omnino quale sit posse
reperire: maiorem autem partem mihi quidem omnes isti videntur nimis etiam
quaedam adfirmare plusque profiteri se scire quam sciant. 15. Quod si illi
tum in novis rebus quasi modo nascentes haesitaverunt, nihilne tot
saeculis, summis ingeniis, maximis studiis explicatum putamus? nonne, cum
iam philosophorum disciplinae gravissimae constitissent, tum exortus est ut
in optima re publica Ti. Gracchus qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas qui
constitutam philosophiam everteret et in eorum auctoritate delitisceret,
qui negavissent quicquam sciri aut percipi posse? quorum e numero tollendus
est et Plato et Socrates: alter, quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam,
Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentis, re congruentis, a
quibus Stoici ipsi verbis magis quam sententiis dissenserunt. Socrates
autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat
refellere. Ita, cum aliud agnosceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus
est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci ειρωνειαν vocant: quam ait etiam in
Africano fuisse Fannius, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non putandum,
quod idem fuerit in Socrate.

VI. 16. Sed fuerint illa veteribus, si voltis, incognita. Nihilne est
igitur actum, quod investigata sunt, postea quam Arcesilas Zenoni, ut
putatur, obtrectans nihil novi reperienti, sed emendanti superiores
immutatione verborum, dum huius definitiones labefactare volt, conatus est
clarissimis rebus tenebras obducere? Cuius primo non admodum probata ratio,
quamquam floruit cum acumine ingeni tum admirabili quodam lepore dicendi,
proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est: post autem confecta a Carneade, qui est
quartus ab Arcesila: audivit enim Hegesinum, qui Euandrum audierat, Lacydi
discipulum, cum Arcesilae Lacydes fuisset. Sed ipse Carneades diu tenuit:
nam nonaginta vixit annos, et qui illum audierant, admodum floruerunt: e
quibus industriae plurimum in Clitomacho fuit--declarat multitudo
librorum--ingeni non minus in [Aeschine], in Charmada eloquentiae, in
Melanthio Rhodio suavitatis. Bene autem nosse Carneadem Stratoniceus
Metrodorus putabatur. 17. Iam Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos
dedit. Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiae non defuit. Sed, quod nos
facere nunc ingredimur, ut contra Academicos disseramus, id quidam e
philosophis et ii quidem non mediocres faciendum omnino non putabant: nec
vero esse ullam rationem disputare cum iis, qui nihil probarent,
Antipatrumque Stoicum, qui multus in eo fuisset, reprehendebant, nec
definiri aiebant necesse esse quid esset cognitio aut perceptio aut, si
verbum e verbo volumus, comprehensio, quam καταληψιν illi vocant, eosque,
qui persuadere vellent, esse aliquid quod comprehendi et percipi posset,
inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius εναργειαι,
ut Graeci: perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus
fabricemurque, si opus erit, verba, ne hic sibi--me appellabat iocans--hoc
licere putet soli: sed tamen orationem nullam putabant illustriorem ipsa
evidentia reperiri posse nec ea, quae tam clara essent, definienda
censebant. Alii autem negabant se pro hac evidentia quicquam priores fuisse
dicturos, sed ad ea, quae contra dicerentur, dici oportere putabant, ne qui
fallerentur. 18. Plerique tamen et definitiones ipsarum etiam evidentium
rerum non improbant et rem idoneam, de qua quaeratur, et homines dignos,
quibuscum disseratur, putant. Philo autem, dum nova quaedam commovet, quod
ea sustinere vix poterat, quae contra Academicorum pertinaciam dicebantur,
et aperte mentitur, ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et, ut docuit
Antiochus, in id ipsum se induit, quod timebat. Cum enim ita negaret,
quicquam esse, quod comprehendi posset--id enim volumus esse ακαταληπτον--,
si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum--iam enim hoc pro
φαντασιαι verbum satis hesterno sermone trivimus--visum igitur impressum
effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset, ex eo, unde non
esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus: qui enim potest
quicquam comprehendi, ut plane confidas perceptum id cognitumque esse, quod
est tale, quale vel falsum esse possit? hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo,
iudicium tollit incogniti et cogniti: ex quo efficitur nihil posse
comprehendi. Ita imprudens eo, quo minime volt, revolvitur. Qua re omnis
oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem,
quam Philo voluit evertere. Quam nisi obtinemus, percipi nihil posse
concedimus.

VII. 19. Ordiamur igitur a sensibus: quorum ita clara iudicia et certa
sunt, ut, si optio naturae nostrae detur, et ab ea deus aliqui requirat
contentane sit suis integris incorruptisque sensibus an postulet melius
aliquid, non videam quid quaerat amplius. Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum
est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam: non enim is sum,
qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur. Epicurus hoc viderit
et alia multa. Meo autem iudicio ita est maxima in sensibus veritas, si et
sani sunt ac valentes et omnia removentur, quae obstant et impediunt.
Itaque et lumen mutari saepe volumus et situs earum rerum, quas intuemur,
et intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, multaque facimus usque eo, dum
adspectus ipse fidem faciat sui iudicii. Quod idem fit in vocibus, in
odore, in sapore, ut nemo sit nostrum qui in sensibus sui cuiusque generis
iudicium requirat acrius. 20. Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi
pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in
sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos
non videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere
exercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut
Andromacham, quum id nos ne suspicemur quidem. Nihil necesse est de gustatu
et odoratu loqui, in quibus intellegentia, etsi vitiosa, est quaedam tamen.
Quid de tactu, et eo quidem, quem philosophi interiorem vocant, aut doloris
aut voluptatis? in quo Cyrenaici solo putant veri esse iudicium, quia
sentiatur:--potestne igitur quisquam dicere inter eum, qui doleat, et inter
eum, qui in voluptate sit, nihil interesse? aut, ita qui sentiet non
apertissime insaniat? 21. Atqui qualia sunt haec, quae sensibus percipi
dicimus, talia secuntur ea, quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur, sed
quodam modo sensibus, ut haec: 'illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud,
hoc bene olens, hoc asperum.' Animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa, non
sensibus. 'Ille' deinceps 'equus est, ille canis.' Cetera series deinde
sequitur, maiora nectens, ut haec, quae quasi expletam rerum
comprehensionem amplectuntur: 'si homo est, animal est mortale, rationis
particeps.' Quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum imprimuntur, sine quibus nec
intellegi quicquam nec quaeri disputarive potest. 22. Quod si essent falsae
notitiae--εννοιας enim notitias appellare tu videbare--, si igitur essent
hae falsae aut eius modi visis impressae, qualia visa a falsis discerni non
possent, quo tandem his modo uteremur? quo modo autem quid cuique rei
consentaneum esset, quid repugnaret videremus? Memoriae quidem certe, quae
non modo philosophiam, sed omnis vitae usus omnisque artis una maxime
continet, nihil omnino loci relinquitur. Quae potest enim esse memoria
falsorum? aut quid quisquam meminit, quod non animo comprehendit et tenet?
Ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus, sed ex multis
animi perceptionibus constat? Quam si subtraxeris, qui distingues artificem
ab inscio? Non enim fortuito hunc artificem dicemus esse, illum negabimus,
sed cum alterum percepta et comprehensa tenere videmus, alterum non item.
Cumque artium aliud eius modi genus sit, ut tantum modo animo rem cernat,
aliud, ut moliatur aliquid et faciat, quo modo aut geometres cernere ea
potest, quae aut nulla sunt aut internosci a falsis non possunt, aut is,
qui fidibus utitur, explere numeros et conficere versus? Quod idem in
similibus quoque artibus continget, quarum omne opus est in faciendo atque
agendo. Quid enim est quod arte effici possit, nisi is, qui artem
tractabit, multa perceperit?

VIII. 23. Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendi
multa posse. In quibus solis inesse etiam scientiam dicimus, quam nos non
comprehensionem modo rerum, sed eam stabilem quoque et immutabilem esse
censemus, itemque sapientiam, artem vivendi, quae ipsa ex sese habeat
constantiam. Ea autem constantia si nihil habeat percepti et cogniti,
quaero unde nata sit aut quo modo? Quaero etiam, ille vir bonus, qui
statuit omnem cruciatum perferre, intolerabili dolore lacerari potius quam
aut officium prodat aut fidem, cur has igitur sibi tam gravis leges
imposuerit, cum quam ob rem ita oporteret nihil haberet comprehensi,
percepti, cogniti, constituti? Nullo igitur modo fieri potest ut quisquam
tanti aestimet aequitatem et fidem, ut eius conservandae causa nullum
supplicium recuset, nisi iis rebus adsensus sit, quae falsae esse non
possint. 24. Ipsa vero sapientia, si se ignorabit sapientia sit necne, quo
modo primum obtinebit nomen sapientiae? deinde quo modo suscipere aliquam
rem aut agere fidenter audebit, cum certi nihil erit quod sequatur? cum
vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, ignorans quo omnia
referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia? Atque etiam illud perspicuum est,
constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat,
sequatur, idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter
appetitio--eam enim volumus esse ‛ορμην--, qua ad agendum impellimur, et id
appetimus, quod est visum, moveri non potest. 25. Illud autem, quod movet,
prius oportet videri eique credi: quod fieri non potest, si id, quod visum
erit, discerni non poterit a falso. Quo modo autem moveri animus ad
appetendum potest, si id, quod videtur, non percipitur accommodatumne
naturae sit an alienum? Itemque, si quid offici sui sit non occurrit animo,
nihil umquam omnino aget, ad nullam rem umquam impelletur, numquam
movebitur. Quod si aliquid aliquando acturus est, necesse est id ei verum,
quod occurrit, videri. 26. Quid quod, si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis
tollitur, quasi quaedam lux lumenque vitae, tamenne in ista pravitate
perstabitis? Nam quaerendi initium ratio attulit, quae perfecit virtutem,
cum esset ipsa ratio confirmata quaerendo. Quaestio autem est appetitio
cognitionis quaestionisque finis inventio. At nemo invenit falsa, nec ea,
quae incerta permanent, inventa esse possunt, sed, cum ea, quae quasi
involuta fuerunt, aperta sunt, tum inventa dicuntur. Sic et initium
quaerendi et exitus percipiendi et comprehendendi tenet_ur_. Itaque
argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece αποδειξις, ita definitur: 'ratio, quae
ex rebus perceptis ad id, quod non percipiebatur, adducit.'

IX. 27. Quod si omnia visa eius modi essent, qualia isti dicunt, ut ea vel
falsa esse possent, neque ea posset ulla notio discernere, quo modo
quemquam aut conclusisse aliquid aut invenisse diceremus aut quae esset
conclusi argumenti fides? Ipsa autem philosophia, quae rationibus progredi
debet, quem habebit exitum? Sapientiae vero quid futurum est? quae neque de
se ipsa dubitare debet neque de suis decretis, quae philosophi vocant
δογματα, quorum nullum sine scelere prodi poterit. Cum enim decretum
proditur, lex veri rectique proditur, quo e vitio et amicitiarum
proditiones et rerum publicarum nasci solent. Non potest igitur dubitari
quin decretum nullum falsum possit esse sapientique satis non sit non esse
falsum, sed etiam stabile, fixum, ratum esse debeat, quod movere nulla
ratio queat. Talia autem neque esse neque videri possunt eorum ratione, qui
illa visa, e quibus omnia decreta sunt nata, negant quicquam a falsis
interesse. 28. Ex hoc illud est natum, quod postulabat Hortensius, ut id
ipsum saltem perceptum a sapiente diceretis, nihil posse percipi. Sed
Antipatro hoc idem postulanti, cum diceret ei, qui adfirmaret nihil posse
percipi, consentaneum esse unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse, ut alia
non possent, Carneades acutius resistebat. Nam tantum abesse dicebat, ut id
consentaneum esset, ut maxime etiam repugnaret. Qui enim negaret quicquam
esse quod perciperetur, eum nihil excipere: ita necesse esse, ne id ipsum
quidem, quod exceptum non esset, comprehendi et percipi ullo modo posse.
29. Antiochus ad istum locum pressius videbatur accedere. Quoniam enim id
haberent Academici decretum,--sentitis enim iam hoc me δογμα dicere--,
nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto, sicut in ceteris rebus,
fluctuare, praesertim cum in eo summa consisteret: hanc enim esse regulam
totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi, cogniti incogniti: quam
rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae vis_a_ accipi oporteret
et quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium
esset, percipere eos debuisse: etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia,
iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse, qui aut
cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde
proficiscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat: haec autem habere dubia
neque iis ita confidere, ut moveri non possint, abhorrere a sapientia
plurimum. Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum, ut hoc unum
saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent. Sed de inconstantia
totius illorum sententiae, si ulla sententia cuiusquam esse potest nihil
approbantis, sit, ut opinor, dictum satis.

X. 30. Sequitur disputatio copiosa illa quidem, sed paulo abstrusior--habet
enim aliquantum a physicis--, ut verear ne maiorem largiar ei, qui contra
dicturus est, libertatem et licentiam. Nam quid eum facturum putem de
abditis rebus et obscuris, qui lucem eripere conetur? Sed disputari poterat
subtiliter, quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset primum animal
omne, deinde hominem maxime, quae vis esset in sensibus, quem ad modum
primum visa nos pellerent, deinde appetitio ab his pulsa sequeretur, tum ut
sensus ad res percipiendas intenderemus. Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons
est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim habet, quam intendit ad ea,
quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic adripit, ut iis statim utatur, alia
quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur. Cetera autem similitudinibus
construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum εννοιας,
tum προληψεις vocant. Eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque
innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem
ratio perfecta his gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit. 31. Ad rerum igitur
scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit mens hominis, amplectitur
maxime cognitionem, et istam καταληψιν, quam, ut dixi, verbum e verbo
exprimentes comprehensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat--nihil est enim
ei veritatis luce dulcius--tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus
utitur et artis efficit, quasi sensus alteros, et usque eo philosophiam
ipsam corroborat, ut virtutem efficiat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit.
Ergo ii, qui negant quicquam posse comprehendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel
instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt
funditus ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut difficile sit de temeritate
eorum, perinde ut causa postulat, dicere.

32. Nec vero satis constituere possum quod sit eorum consilium aut quid
velint. Interdum enim cum adhibemus ad eos orationem eius modi: 'Si ea,
quae disputentur, vera sint, tum omnia fore incerta,' respondent: 'Quid
ergo istud ad nos? num nostra culpa est? naturam accusa, quae in profundo
veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit.' Alii autem elegantius,
qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque
intersit inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur
eaque distinguere. Cum his igitur agamus, qui haec distinguunt: illos, qui
omnia sic incerta dicunt, ut stellarum numerus par an impar sit, quasi
desperatos aliquos relinquamus. Volunt enim--et hoc quidem vel maxime vos
animadvertebam moveri--probabile aliquid esse et quasi veri simile, eaque
se uti regula et in agenda vita et in quaerendo ac disserendo.

XI. 33. Quae ista regula est veri et falsi, si notionem veri et falsi,
propterea quod ea non possunt internosci, nullam habemus? Nam si habemus,
interesse oportet ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Si
nihil interest, nulla regula est nec potest is, cui est visio veri falsique
communis, ullum habere iudicium aut ullam omnino veritatis notam. Nam cum
dicunt hoc se unum tollere, ut quicquam possit ita videri, ut non eodem
modo falsum etiam possit videri, cetera autem concedere, faciunt
pueriliter. Quo enim omnia iudicantur sublato reliqua se negant tollere: ut
si quis quem oculis privaverit, dicat ea, quae cerni possent, se ei non
ademisse. Ut enim illa oculis modo agnoscuntur, sic reliqua visis, sed
propria veri, non communi veri et falsi nota. Quam ob rem, sive tu
probabilem visionem sive probabilem et quae non impediatur, ut Carneades
volebat, sive aliud quid proferes quod sequare, ad visum illud, de quo
agimus, tibi erit revertendum. 34. In eo autem, si erit communitas cum
falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non
potest. Sin autem commune nihil erit, habeo quod volo: id enim quaero, quod
ita mihi videatur verum, ut non possit item falsum videri. Simili in errore
versantur, cum convicio veritatis coacti perspicua a perceptis volunt
distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud
quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi atque
comprehendi posse. Quo enim modo perspicue dixeris album esse aliquid, cum
possit accidere ut id, quod nigrum sit, album esse videatur? aut quo modo
ista aut perspicua dicemus aut impressa subtiliter, cum sit incertum vere
inaniterne moveatur? Ita neque color neque corpus nec veritas nec
argumentum nec sensus neque perspicuum ullum relinquitur. 35. Ex hoc illud
iis usu venire solet, ut, quidquid dixerint, a quibusdam interrogentur:
'Ergo istuc quidem percipis?' Sed qui ita interrogant, ab iis irridentur.
Non enim urguent, ut coarguant neminem ulla de re posse contendere neque
adseverare sine aliqua eius rei, quam sibi quisque placere dicit, certa et
propria nota. Quod est igitur istuc vestrum probabile? Nam si, quod cuique
occurrit et primo quasi adspectu probabile videtur, id confirmatur, quid eo
levius? 36. Sin ex circumspectione aliqua et accurata consideratione, quod
visum sit, id se dicent sequi, tamen exitum non habebunt: primum quia iis
visis, inter quae nihil interest, aequaliter omnibus abrogatur fides:
deinde, cum dicant posse accidere sapienti ut, cum omnia fecerit
diligentissimeque circumspexerit, exsistat aliquid quod et veri simile
videatur et absit longissime a vero, ne si magnam partem quidem, ut solent
dicere, ad verum ipsum aut quam proxime accedant, confidere sibi poterunt.
Ut enim confidant, notum iis esse debebit insigne veri, quo obscurato et
oppresso quod tandem verum sibi videbuntur attingere? Quid autem tam
absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'Est hoc quidem illius rei
signum aut argumentum et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id, quod
significatur, aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino.' Sed de perceptione
hactenus. Si quis enim ea, quae dicta sunt, labefactare volet, facile etiam
absentibus nobis veritas se ipsa defendet.

XII. 37. His satis cognitis, quae iam explicata sunt, nunc de adsensione
atque approbatione, quam Graeci συγκαταθεσιν vocant, pauca dicemus, non quo
non latus locus sit, sed paulo ante iacta sunt fundamenta. Nam cum vim,
quae esset in sensibus, explicabamus, simul illud aperiebatur, comprehendi
multa et percipi sensibus, quod fieri sine adsensione non potest. Deinde
cum inter inanimum et animal hoc maxime intersit, quod animal agit
aliquid--nihil enim agens ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit--, aut ei
sensus adimendus est aut ea, quae est in nostra potestate sita, reddenda
adsensio. 38. At vero animus quodam modo eripitur iis, quos neque sentire
neque adsentiri volunt. Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus
impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere. Nam quo modo non potest
animal ullum non appetere id, quod accommodatum ad naturam appareat--Graeci
id οικειον appellant--, sic non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non
approbare. Quamquam, si illa, de quibus disputatum est, vera sunt, nihil
attinet de adsensione omnino loqui. Qui enim quid percipit, adsentitur
statim. Sed haec etiam secuntur, nec memoriam sine adsensione posse
constare nec notitias rerum nec artis, idque, quod maximum est, ut sit
aliquid in nostra potestate, in eo, qui rei nulli adsentietur, non erit.
39. Ubi igitur virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis? Maxime autem
absurdum vitia in ipsorum esse potestate neque peccare quemquam nisi
adsensione: hoc idem in virtute non esse, cuius omnis constantia et
firmitas ex iis rebus constat, quibus adsensa est et quas approbavit,
omninoque ante videri aliquid quam agamus necesse est, eique, quod visum
sit, adsentiatur. Qua re qui aut visum aut adsensum tollit, is omnem
actionem tollit e vita.

XIII. 40. Nunc ea videamus, quae contra ab his disputari solent. Sed prius
potestis totius eorum rationis quasi fundamenta cognoscere. Componunt
igitur primum artem quandam de iis, quae visa dicimus, eorumque et vim et
genera definiunt, in his, quale sit id, quod percipi et comprehendi possit,
totidem verbis quot Stoici. Deinde illa exponunt duo, quae quasi contineant
omnem hanc quaestionem: quae ita videantur, ut etiam alia eodem modo videri
possint nec in iis quicquam intersit, non posse eorum alia percipi, alia
non percipi: nihil interesse autem, non modo si omni ex parte eiusdem modi
sint, sed etiam si discerni non possint. Quibus positis unius argumenti
conclusione tota ab his causa comprehenditur. Composita ea conclusio sic
est: 'Eorum, quae videntur, alia vera sunt, alia falsa, et quod falsum est,
id percipi non potest: quod autem verum visum est, id omne tale est, ut
eiusdem modi etiam falsum possit videri.' Et, 'quae visa sint eius modi, ut
in iis nihil intersit, non posse accidere ut eorum alia percipi possint,
alia non possint. 41. Nullum igitur est visum quod percipi possit.' Quae
autem sumunt, ut concludant id, quod volunt, ex his duo sibi putant
concedi: neque enim quisquam repugnat. Ea sunt haec: 'Quae visa falsa sint,
ea percipi non posse,' et alterum: 'Inter quae visa nihil intersit, ex iis
non posse alia talia esse, ut percipi possint, alia ut non possint:'
reliqua vero multa et varia oratione defendunt, quae sunt item duo, unum:
'quae videantur, eorum alia vera esse, alia falsa,' alterum: 'omne visum,
quod sit a vero, tale esse, quale etiam a falso possit esse.' 42. Haec duo
proposita non praetervolant, sed ita dilatant, ut non mediocrem curam
adhibeant et diligentiam. Dividunt enim in partis et eas quidem magnas:
primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quae ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni
consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt. Tum perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne
ratione quidem et coniectura ulla res percipi possit. Haec autem universa
concidunt etiam minutius. Ut enim de sensibus hesterno sermone vidistis,
item faciunt de reliquis, in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertiunt,
volunt efficere iis omnibus, quae visa sint, veris adiuncta esse falsa,
quae a veris nihil differant: ea cum talia sint, non posse comprehendi.

XIV. 43. Hanc ego subtilitatem philosophia quidem dignissimam iudico, sed
ab eorum causa, qui ita disserunt, remotissimam. Definitiones enim et
partitiones et horum luminibus utens oratio, tum similitudines
dissimilitudinesque et earum tenuis et acuta distinctio fidentium est
hominum illa vera et firma et certa esse quae tutentur, non eorum qui
clament nihilo magis vera illa esse quam falsa. Quid enim agant, si, cum
aliquid definierint, roget eos quispiam, num illa definitio possit in aliam
rem transferri quamlubet? Si posse dixerint, quid dicere habeant cur illa
vera definitio sit? si_n_ negaverint, fatendum sit, quoniam vel illa vera
definitio transferri non possit in falsum, quod ea definitione explicetur,
id percipi posse: quod minime illi volunt. Eadem dici poterunt in omnibus
partibus. 44. Si enim dicent ea, de quibus disserent, se dilucide
perspicere nec ulla communione visorum impediri, comprehendere ea se
fatebuntur. Sin autem negabunt vera visa a falsis posse distingui, qui
poterunt longius progredi? Occurretur enim, sicut occursum est. Nam
concludi argumentum non potest nisi iis, quae ad concludendum sumpta erunt,
ita probatis, ut falsa eiusdem modi nulla possint esse. Ergo si rebus
comprehensis et perceptis nisa et progressa ratio hoc efficiet, nihil posse
comprehendi, quid potest reperiri quod ipsum sibi repugnet magis? cumque
ipsa natura accuratae orationis hoc profiteatur, se aliquid patefacturam
quod non appareat et, quo id facilius adsequatur, adhibituram et sensus et
ea, quae perspicua sint, qualis est istorum oratio, qui omnia non tam esse
quam videri volunt? Maxime autem convincuntur, cum haec duo pro
congruentibus sumunt tam vehementer repugnantia: primum esse quaedam falsa
visa: quod cum volunt, declarant quaedam esse vera: deinde ibidem, inter
falsa visa et vera nihil interesse. At primum sumpseras, tamquam
interesset: ita priori posterius, posteriori superius non iungitur.

45. Sed progrediamur longius et ita agamus, ut nihil nobis adsentati esse
videamur, quaeque ab iis dicuntur, sic persequamur, ut nihil in praeteritis
relinquamus. Primum igitur perspicuitas illa, quam diximus, satis magnam
habet vim, ut ipsa per sese ea, quae sint, nobis ita ut sint indicet. Sed
tamen, ut maneamus in perspicuis firmius et constantius, maiore quadam opus
est vel arte vel diligentia, ne ab iis, quae clara sint ipsa per sese,
quasi praestigiis quibusdam et captionibus depellamur. Nam qui voluit
subvenire erroribus Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem,
dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a perspicuitate seiungere, nihil
profecit: ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.

XV. 46. Quam ob rem cum duae causae perspicuis et evidentibus rebus
adversentur, auxilia totidem sunt contra comparanda. Adversatur enim
primum, quod parum defigunt animos et intendunt in ea, quae perspicua sunt,
ut quanta luce ea circumfusa sint possint agnoscere; alterum est, quod
fallacibus et captiosis interrogationibus circumscripti atque decepti
quidam, cum eas dissolvere non possunt, desciscunt a veritate. Oportet
igitur et ea, quae pro perspicuitate responderi possunt, in promptu habere,
de quibus iam diximus, et esse armatos, ut occurrere possimus
interrogationibus eorum captionesque discutere: quod deinceps facere
constitui. 47. Exponam igitur generatim argumenta eorum, quoniam ipsi etiam
illi solent non confuse loqui. Primum conantur ostendere multa posse videri
esse, quae omnino nulla sint, cum animi inaniter moveantur eodem modo rebus
iis, quae nullae sint, ut iis, quae sint. Nam cum dicatis, inquiunt, visa
quaedam mitti a deo, velut ea, quae in somnis videantur quaeque oraculis,
auspiciis, extis declarentur--haec enim aiunt probari Stoicis, quos contra
disputant--, quaerunt quonam modo, falsa visa quae sint, ea deus efficere
possit probabilia: quae autem plane proxime ad verum accedant, efficere non
possit? aut, si ea quoque possit, cur illa non possit, quae
perdifficiliter, internoscantur tamen? et, si haec, cur non inter quae
nihil sit omnino? 48. Deinde, cum mens moveatur ipsa per sese, ut et ea
declarant, quae cogitatione depingimus, et ea, quae vel dormientibus vel
furiosis videntur non numquam, veri simile est sic etiam mentem moveri, ut
non modo non internoscat vera visa illa sint anne falsa, sed ut in iis
nihil intersit omnino: ut si qui tremerent et exalbescerent vel ipsi per se
motu mentis aliquo vel obiecta terribili re extrinsecus, nihil ut esset,
qui distingueretur tremor ille et pallor, neque ut quicquam interesset
inter intestinum et oblatum. Postremo si nulla visa sunt probabilia, quae
falsa sint, alia ratio est. Sin autem sunt, cur non etiam quae non facile
internoscantur? cur non ut plane nihil intersit? praesertim cum ipsi
dicatis sapientem in furore sustinere se ab omni adsensu, quia nulla in
visis distinctio appareat.

XVI. 49. Ad has omnis visiones inanis Antiochus quidem et permulta dicebat
et erat de hac una re unius diei disputatio. Mihi autem non idem faciendum
puto, sed ipsa capita dicenda. Et primum quidem hoc reprehendendum, quod
captiosissimo genere interrogationis utuntur, quod genus minime in
philosophia probari solet, cum aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut
demitur. Soritas hoc vocant, quia acervum efficiunt uno addito grano.
Vitiosum sane et captiosum genus! Sic enim adscenditis: Si tale visum
obiectum est a deo dormienti, ut probabile sit, cur non etiam ut valde veri
simile? cur deinde non ut difficiliter a vero internoscatur? deinde ut ne
internoscatur quidem? postremo ut nihil inter hoc et illud intersit? Huc si
perveneris, me tibi primum quidque concedente, meum vitium fuerit: sin ipse
tua sponte processeris, tuum. 50. Quis enim tibi dederit aut omnia deum
posse aut ita facturum esse, si possit? quo modo autem sumis, ut, si quid
cui simile esse possit, sequatur ut etiam difficiliter internosci possit?
deinde ut ne internosci quidem? postremo ut eadem sint? ut, si lupi canibus
similes _sunt_, eosdem dices ad extremum. Et quidem honestis similia sunt
quaedam non honesta et bonis non bona et artificiosis minime artificiosa:
quid dubitamus igitur adfirmare nihil inter haec interesse? Ne repugnantia
quidem videmus? Nihil est enim quod de suo genere in aliud genus transferri
possit. At si efficeretur, ut inter visa differentium generum nihil
interesset, reperirentur quae et in suo genere essent et in alieno. 51.
Quod fieri qui potest? Omnium deinde inanium visorum una depulsio est, sive
illa cogitatione informantur, quod fieri solere concedimus, sive in quiete
sive per vinum sive per insaniam. Nam ab omnibus eiusdem modi visis
perspicuitatem, quam mordicus tenere debemus, abesse dicemus. Quis enim,
cum sibi fingit aliquid et cogitatione depingit, non simul ac se ipse
commovit atque ad se revocavit, sentit quid intersit inter perspicua et
inania? Eadem ratio est somniorum. Num censes Ennium, cum in hortis cum
Ser. Galba vicino suo ambulavisset, dixisse: 'Visus sum mihi cum Galba
ambulare?' At, cum somniavit, ita narravit:

  'visus Homerus adesse poeta.'

Idemque in Epicharmo:

  'Nam videbar somniare med ego esse mortuum.'

Itaque, simul ut experrecti sumus, visa illa contemnimus neque ita habemus,
ut ea, quae in foro gessimus.

XVII. 52. At enim dum videntur, eadem est in somnis species eorum_que_,
quae vigilantes videmus! Primum interest: sed id omittamus. Illud enim
dicimus, non eandem esse vim neque integritatem dormientium et vigilantium
nec mente nec sensu. Ne vinolenti quidem quae faciunt, eadem approbatione
faciunt qua sobrii: dubitant, haesitant, revocant se interdum iisque, quae
videntur, imbecillius adsentiuntur, cumque edormiverunt, illa visa quam
levia fuerint intellegunt. Quod idem contingit insanis, ut et incipientes
furere sentiant et dicant aliquid, quod non sit, id videri sibi, et, cum
relaxentur, sentiant atque illa dicant Alcmaeonis:

  'Sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum
  adspectu' ...

53. At enim ipse sapiens sustinet se in furore, ne approbet falsa pro
veris. Et alias quidem saepe, si aut in sensibus ipsius est aliqua forte
gravitas aut tarditas aut obscuriora sunt quae videntur aut a perspiciendo
temporis brevitate excluditur. Quamquam totum hoc, sapientem aliquando
sustinere adsensionem, contra vos est. Si enim inter visa nihil interesset,
aut semper sustineret aut numquam. Sed ex hoc genere toto perspici potest
levitas orationis eorum, qui omnia cupiunt confundere. Quaerimus
gravitatis, constantiae, firmitatis, sapientiae iudicium: utimur exemplis
somniantium, furiosorum, ebriosorum. Illud attendimus in hoc omni genere
quam inconstanter loquamur? Non enim proferremus vino aut somno oppressos
aut mente captos tam absurde, ut tum diceremus interesse inter vigilantium
visa et sobriorum et sanorum et eorum, qui essent aliter adfecti, tum nihil
interesse. 54. Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod
nolunt, ea dico incerta, quae αδηλα Graeci. Si enim res se ita habeant, ut
nihil intersit, utrum ita cui videatur, ut insano, an sano, cui possit
exploratum esse de sua sanitate? quod velle efficere non mediocris insaniae
est. Similitudines vero aut geminorum aut signorum anulis impressorum
pueriliter consectantur. Quis enim nostrum similitudines negat esse, cum
eae plurimis in rebus appareant? Sed, si satis est ad tollendam cognitionem
similia esse multa multorum, cur eo non estis contenti, praesertim
concedentibus nobis? et cur id potius contenditis, quod rerum natura non
patitur, ut non suo quidque genere sit tale, quale est, nec sit in duobus
aut pluribus nulla re differens ulla communitas? ut [sibi] sint et ova
ovorum et apes apium simillimae: quid pugnas igitur? aut quid tibi vis in
geminis? Conceditur enim similis esse, quo contentus esse potueras: tu
autem vis eosdem plane esse, non similis: quod fieri nullo modo potest. 55.
Dein confugis ad physicos eos, qui maxime in Academia irridentur, a quibus
ne tu quidem iam te abstinebis, et ais Democritum dicere innumerabilis esse
mundos et quidem sic quosdam inter sese non solum similis, sed undique
perfecte et absolute ita pares, ut inter eos nihil prorsus intersit [et eos
quidem innumerabiles], itemque homines. Deinde postulas, ut, si mundus ita
sit par alteri mundo, ut inter eos ne minimum quidem intersit, concedatur
tibi ut in hoc quoque nostro mundo aliquid alicui sic sit par, ut nihil
differat, nihil intersit. Cur enim, inquies, ex illis individuis, unde
omnia Democritus gigni adfirmat, in reliquis mundis et in iis quidem
innumerabilibus innumerabiles Q. Lutatii Catuli non modo possint esse, sed
etiam sint, in hoc tanto mundo Catulus alter non possit effici?

XVIII. 56. Primum quidem me ad Democritum vocas, cui non adsentior
potiusque refello propter id, quod dilucide docetur a politioribus physicis
singularum rerum singulas proprietates esse. Fac enim antiquos illos
Servilios, qui gemini fuerunt, tam similis quam dicuntur, num censes etiam
eosdem fuisse? Non cognoscebantur foris, at domi: non ab alienis, at a
suis. An non videmus hoc usu venire, ut, quos numquam putassemus a nobis
internosci posse, eos consuetudine adhibita tam facile internosceremus, uti
ne minimum quidem similes viderentur? 57. Hic, pugnes licet, non repugnabo:
quin etiam concedam illum ipsum sapientem, de quo omnis hic sermo est, cum
ei res similes occurrant, quas non habeat dinotatas, retenturum adsensum
nec umquam ulli viso adsensurum, nisi quod tale fuerit, quale falsum esse
non possit. Sed et ad ceteras res habet quandam artem, qua vera a falsis
possit distinguere, et ad similitudines istas usus adhibendus est. Ut mater
geminos internoscit consuetudine oculorum, sic tu internosces, si
adsueveris. Videsne ut in proverbio sit ovorum inter se similitudo? Tamen
hoc accepimus, Deli fuisse compluris salvis rebus illis, qui gallinas alere
permultas quaestus causa solerent: ii cum ovum inspexerant, quae id gallina
peperisset dicere solebant. 58. Neque id est contra nos: nam nobis satis
est ova illa non internoscere: nihil enim magis adsentiri par est, hoc
illud esse, quasi inter illa omnino nihil interesset: habeo enim regulam,
ut talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint: ab hac mihi non
licet transversum, ut aiunt, digitum discedere, ne confundam omnia. Veri
enim et falsi non modo cognitio, sed etiam natura tolletur, si nihil erit
quod intersit: ut etiam illud absurdum sit, quod interdum soletis dicere,
cum visa in animos imprimantur, non vos id dicere, inter ipsas impressiones
nihil interesse, sed inter species et quasdam formas eorum. Quasi vero non
specie visa iudicentur! quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi
nota. 59. Illud vero perabsurdum, quod dicitis, probabilia vos sequi, si re
nulla impediamini. Primum qui potestis non impediri, cum a veris falsa non
distent? deinde quod iudicium est veri, cum sit commune falsi? Ex his illa
necessario nata est εποχη, id est adsensionis retentio, in qua melius sibi
constitit Arcesilas, si vera sunt quae de Carneade non nulli existimant. Si
enim percipi nihil potest, quod utrique visum est, tollendus adsensus est.
Quid enim est tam futile quam quicquam approbare non cognitum? Carneadem
autem etiam heri audiebamus solitum esse _eo_ delabi interdum, ut diceret
opinaturum, id est peccaturum esse sapientem. Mihi porro non tam certum est
esse aliquid, quod comprehendi possit, de quo iam nimium etiam diu disputo,
quam sapientem nihil opinari, id est, numquam adsentiri rei vel falsae vel
incognitae. 60. Restat illud, quod dicunt, veri inveniendi causa contra
omnia dici oportere et pro omnibus. Volo igitur videre quid invenerint. Non
solemus, inquit, ostendere. Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? aut cur
celatis, quasi turpe aliquid, sententiam vestram? Ut, qui audient, inquit,
ratione potius quam auctoritate ducantur. Quid, si utroque? num peius est?
Unum tamen illud non celant, nihil esse quod percipi possit. An in eo
auctoritas nihil obest? Mihi quidem videtur vel plurimum. Quis enim ista
tam aperte perspicueque et perversa et falsa secutus esset, nisi tanta in
Arcesila, multo etiam maior in Carneade et copia rerum et dicendi vis
fuisset?

XIX. 61. Haec Antiochus fere et Alexandreae tum et multis annis post, multo
etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus.
Sed iam confirmata causa te, hominem amicissimum--me autem appellabat--et
aliquot annis minorem natu, non dubitabo monere: Tune, cum tantis laudibus
philosophiam extuleris Hortensiumque nostrum dissentientem commoveris, eam
philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos iudicio,
privat approbatione, omnibus orbat sensibus? Et Cimmeriis quidem, quibus
adspectum solis sive deus aliquis sive natura ademerat sive eius loci, quem
incolebant, situs, ignes tamen aderant, quorum illis uti lumine licebat,
isti autem, quos tu probas, tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillam quidem
ullam nobis ad dispiciendum reliquerunt: quos si sequamur, iis vinculis
simus adstricti, ut nos commovere nequeamus. 62. Sublata enim adsensione
omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt: quod non modo recte
fieri, sed omnino fieri non potest. Provide etiam ne uni tibi istam
sententiam minime liceat defendere. An tu, cum res occultissimas aperueris
in lucemque protuleris iuratusque dixeris ea te comperisse, quod mihi
quoque licebat, qui ex te illa cognoveram, negabis esse rem ullam quae
cognosci, comprehendi, percipi possit? Vide, quaeso, etiam atque etiam ne
illarum quoque rerum pulcherrimarum a te ipso minuatur auctoritas. Quae cum
dixisset ille, finem fecit. 63. Hortensius autem vehementer admirans, quod
quidem perpetuo Lucullo loquente fecerat, ut etiam manus saepe tolleret,
nec mirum: nam numquam arbitror contra Academiam dictum esse subtilius, me
quoque, iocansne an ita sentiens--non enim satis intellegebam--, coepit
hortari, ut sententia desisterem. Tum mihi Catulus: Si te, inquit, Luculli
oratio flexit, quae est habita memoriter, accurate, copiose, taceo neque te
quo minus, si tibi ita videatur, sententiam mutes deterrendum puto. Illud
vero non censuerim, ut eius auctoritate moveare. Tantum enim non te modo
monuit, inquit adridens, ut caveres ne quis improbus tribunus plebis,
quorum vides quanta copia semper futura sit, adriperet te et in contione
quaereret qui tibi constares, cum idem negares quicquam certi posse
reperiri, idem te comperisse dixisses. Hoc, quaeso, cave ne te terreat. De
causa autem ipsa malim quidem te ab hoc dissentire. Sin cesseris, non magno
opere mirabor. Memini enim Antiochum ipsum, cum annos multos alia
sensisset, simul ac visum sit, sententia destitisse. Haec cum dixisset
Catulus, me omnes intueri.

XX. 64. Tum ego non minus commotus quam soleo in causis maioribus, huius
modi quadam oratione sum exorsus: Me, Catule, oratio Luculli de ipsa re ita
movit, ut docti hominis et copiosi et parati et nihil praetereuntis eorum,
quae pro illa causa dici possent, non tamen ut ei respondere posse
diffiderem. Auctoritas autem tanta plane me movebat, nisi tu opposuisses
non minorem tuam. Adgrediar igitur, si pauca ante quasi de fama mea dixero.
65. Ego enim si aut ostentatione aliqua adductus aut studio certandi ad
hanc potissimum philosophiam me applicavi, non modo stultitiam meam, sed
etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto. Nam, si in minimis rebus
pertinacia reprehenditur, calumnia etiam coercetur, ego de omni statu
consilioque totius vitae aut certare cum aliis pugnaciter aut frustrari cum
alios tum etiam me ipsum velim? Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali
disputatione id facere, quod, cum de re publica disceptatur, fieri interdum
solet, iurarem per Iovem deosque penates me et ardere studio veri
reperiendi et ea sentire, quae dicerem. 66. Qui enim possum non cupere
verum invenire, cum gaudeam, si simile veri quid invenerim? Sed, ut hoc
pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa
turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum, qui nihil umquam falsi approbem, qui
numquam adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. Ego vero
ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator--non enim sum sapiens--et meas
cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,

  'Qua fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto,'

ut ait Aratus, eoque directius gubernant, quod eam tenent,

  'Quae cursu interiore, brevi convertitur orbe,'

sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est, rationes has latiore
specie, non ad tenue elimatas. Eo fit ut errem et vager latius. Sed non de
me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur. Visa enim ista cum acriter mentem
sensumve pepulerunt, accipio iisque interdum etiam adsentior, nec percipio
tamen; nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. Non sum sapiens; itaque visis
cedo nec possum resistere. Sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse
maximam, Zenoni adsentiens, cavere ne capiatur, ne fallatur videre. Nihil
est enim ab ea cogitatione, quam habemus de gravitate sapientis, errore,
levitate, temeritate diiunctius. Quid igitur loquar de firmitate sapientis?
quem quidem nihil opinari tu quoque, Luculle, concedis. Quod quoniam a te
probatur--ut praepostere tecum agam, mox referam me ad ordinem--haec primum
conclusio quam habeat vim considera.

XXI. 67. Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur umquam, aliquando etiam
opinabitur: numquam autem opinabitur: nulli igitur rei adsentietur. Hanc
conclusionem Arcesilas probabat: confirmabat enim et primum et secundum.
Carneades non numquam secundum illud dabat: adsentiri aliquando. Ita
sequebatur etiam opinari, quod tu non vis et recte, ut mihi videris. Sed
illud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse
et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum falsa a
veris et quae non possint percipi ab iis, quae possint, distinguere. 68.
Nobis autem primum, etiam si quid percipi possit, tamen ipsa consuetudo
adsentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica. Quam ob rem cum tam
vitiosum esse constet adsentiri quicquam aut falsum aut incognitum,
sustinenda est potius omnis adsensio, ne praecipitet, si temere
processerit. Ita enim finitima sunt falsa veris, eaque, quae percipi non
possunt, _iis quae possunt_--si modo ea sunt quaedam: iam enim videbimus--,
ut tam in praecipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere. Sin autem
omnino nihil esse quod percipi possit a me sumpsero et, quod tu mihi das,
accepero, sapientem nihil opinari, effectum illud erit, sapientem adsensus
omnes cohibiturum, ut videndum tibi sit, idne malis an aliquid opinaturum
esse sapientem. Neutrum, inquies, illorum. Nitamur igitur, nihil posse
percipi: etenim de eo omnis est controversia.

XXII. 69. Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa, quae a me
defenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius
didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime, et idem haec non
acrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat. Quamvis igitur
fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia levatur auctoritas. Quis enim
iste dies illuxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse
negitavisset, veri et falsi notam. Excogitavit aliquid? Eadem dicit quae
Stoici. Poenituit illa sensisse? Cur non se transtulit ad alios et maxime
ad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. Quid? eum Mnesarchi
poenitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum.
Numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent
habere. 70. Unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est? Nominis
dignitatem videtur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere voluisse, quod
erant qui illum gloriae causa facere dicerent, sperare etiam fore ut ii,
qui se sequerentur, Antiochii vocarentur. Mihi autem magis videtur non
potuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum. Etenim de ceteris sunt
inter illos non nulla communia: haec Academicorum est una sententia, quam
reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. Itaque cessit, et ut ii, qui sub
Novis solem non ferunt, item ille, cum aestuaret, veterum, ut Maenianorum,
sic Academicorum umbram secutus est. 71. Quoque solebat uti argumento tum,
cum ei placebat nihil posse percipi, cum quaereret, Dionysius ille
Heracleotes utrum comprehendisset certa illa nota, qua adsentiri dicitis
oportere, illudne, quod multos annos tenuisset Zenonique magistro
credidisset, honestum quod esset, id bonum solum esse, an quod postea
defensitavisset, honesti inane nomen esse, voluptatem esse summum bonum:
qui ex illius commutata sententia docere vellet nihil ita signari in animis
nostris a vero posse, quod non eodem modo possit a falso, is curavit _ut_
quod argumentum ex Dionysio ipse sumpsisset, ex eo ceteri sumerent. Sed cum
hoc alio loco plura, nunc ad ea, quae a te, Luculle, dicta sunt.

XXIII. 72. Et primum quod initio dixisti videamus quale sit: similiter a
nobis de antiquis philosophis commemorari atque seditiosi solerent claros
viros, sed tamen popularis aliquos nominare. Illi cum res _non_ bonas
tractent, similes bonorum videri volunt. Nos autem dicimus ea nobis videri,
quae vosmet ipsi nobilissimis philosophis placuisse conceditis. Anaxagoras
nivem nigram dixit esse. Ferres me, si ego idem dicerem? Tu, ne si
dubitarem quidem. At quis est? num hic sophistes?--sic enim appellabantur
ii, qui ostentationis aut quaestus causa philosophabantur--: maxima fuit et
gravitatis et ingeni gloria. 73. Quid loquar de Democrito? Quem cum eo
conferre possumus non modo ingeni magnitudine, sed etiam animi? qui ita sit
ausus ordiri: 'Haec loquor de universis.' Nihil excipit de quo non
profit

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