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Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil,

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Title: Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil,

Author: Earl of Thomas Cochrane Dundonald


        
Release date: February 5, 2005 [eBook #14914]
                Most recently updated: December 19, 2020

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NARRATIVE OF SERVICES IN THE LIBERATION OF CHILI, PERU AND BRAZIL, ***


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NARRATIVE OF SERVICES IN THE LIBERATION OF CHILI, PERU, AND BRAZIL,
FROM SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE DOMINATION

by

THOMAS, EARL OF DUNDONALD, G.C.B.
Admiral of the Red; Rear-Admiral of the Fleet, etc. etc.

VOL. I

London:
James Ridgway, No 169, Piccadilly

MDCCCLIX







TO THE MOST NOBLE THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE, K.G. ETC. ETC.


My Lord,

I am proud to have been honoured with your Lordship's permission to
dedicate to you the following narrative of historical events, respecting
which the public has not previously been placed in a position to form a
correct judgment. Your Lordship's generous acquiescence enables me to
discharge a double debt: First--of thanks to one whose high political
character this country will ever warmly cherish;--Secondly--of deep-felt
gratitude for the countenance and efficient aid experienced from your
Lordship at a period when party faction made me the object of bitter
resentment; the injustice of which could in no way be better
demonstrated, than by the fact that--in the midst of unmerited obloquy,
it was my high privilege to preserve your Lordship's friendship and
esteem.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's obliged and faithful Servant,

DUNDONALD.




CONTENTS.


PREFACE

CHAPTER I.

Invitation to take command of Chilian Navy--Arrival at Valparaiso--First
expedition to Peru--Attack on Spanish shipping at Callao--Departure for
Huacho--Capture of Spanish convoys of money--Paita taken--Return to
Valparaiso to reorganise the squadron--Offer to give up my share of
prize money to the Republic--This offer declined by the Supreme
Director--Popular congratulations--Attempt on Lady Cochrane's life.

CHAPTER II.

Second expedition to Peru--Disappointment at not being provided with
troops--Failure of rockets--Departure for Arica--Capture of
Pisco--Capture of Spanish ships at Puna--Determine to make an attempt on
Valdivia--Arrival off that port, and capture of Spanish brig of war
_Potrillo_--Troops obtained from Conception--Flag-ship nearly
wrecked--Attack on forts, and conquest of Valdivia.

CHAPTER III.

Departure for Chiloe--Preparations of the enemy--Capture of Fort
Corona--Failure at Fort Aguy, and subsequent retreat--Return to
Valdivia--Capture of Osorio--Return to Valparaiso--Enthusiastic
reception--Chagrin of the ministry--Importance of conquest of Valdivia
in a political point of view--Promotion of officers under
arrest--Employment of Indians by the Spaniards--Career of
Benavides--Mutinous spirit of the seamen in consequence of their
captures being appropriated by Government--Resignation of my
commission--Refusal thereof--Renewed offer of an estate--This again
declined--Seamen obtain their wages--Private purchase of an
estate--Government gives notice of taking it--Appointment of flag
captain against my wishes--Annoyance given to me by Minister of
Marine--Renewed resignation of the command--Officers of the squadron
resign in a body--Government begs of me to retain the command--My
consent--General San Martin--The Senate--Zenteno--Corruption of parties
in the Administration.

CHAPTER IV.

Obstacles to equipping the squadron--Sailing of the liberating
expedition--Debarcation at Pisco--Long inaction of the army--General San
Martin removes to Ancon--Capture of the Esmeralda--Exchange of
prisoners--Acknowledgment of the service by General San Martin--Lady
Cochrane's visit to Mendoza.

CHAPTER V.

San Martin's violation, of truth--Removal of blockade--Spanish
depression--Troops dying of fever--San Martin's designs on
Guayaquil--Mutinous conduct of officers--Refusal to obey
orders--Deposition of Viceroy--San Martin gives me troops--Jealousy of
San Martin--Attack on Arica--Capture of Tacna--Capture of
Moquega--Refusal of more men--an armistice ratified--Distress of
Lima--Dissatisfaction of the army--Lady Cochrane in action--Devotion of
seamen.

CHAPTER VI.

Return to Callao--Lima abandoned--Hesitation of General San Martin to
occupy the City--Loss of the _San Martin_--Excesses of the
Spaniards--Proclamation of independence--San Martin assumes autocratic
power under the title of Protector--My remonstrance--His reply--Mutinous
state of the squadron from neglect.

CHAPTER VII.

Tampering with Chilian officers--The Archbishop of Lima--His
expulsion--Negociation for surrender of the Forts--This
counteracted--San Martin's bombastic Proclamations--His refusal to
encounter the enemy--The Spaniards relieve Callao--Delusive
proclamation--The unblushing falsehood--Spaniards carry off the
treasure--Discontent of the squadron.

CHAPTER VIII.

Prolonged destitution of squadron--The men mutiny in a body--The
seamen's letters--San Martin sends away the public treasure--My seizure
of it--Private property restored--San Martin's accusations against
me--The squadron paid wages--Attempt on the officers' fidelity--I am
asked to desert from Chili--Ordered to quit on refusal--Monteagudo's
letter--My reply--Justification of seizing the treasure--- No other
course possible.

CHAPTER IX.

Arrival at Guayaquil--Address to Guayaquilenos--Injurious
monopolies--Ministerial folly--Departure from Guayaquil--Arrival in
Mexico--Anchor at Acapulco--Mock Ambassadors--Plot against me--Return to
Guayaquil--Venganza taken possession of--Agreement with Junta--General
La Mar--Orders to withhold supplies--Abominable cruelty--Courtly
splendour--Destruction of a division of the Army--Dissatisfaction of
officers--Renewed overtures from San Martin--Their refusal by
me--Warning to the Chilian Government.

CHAPTER X.

Return to Valparaiso--Thanks of the Government--Reasons for
satisfaction--Illegitimate trade--Turned to good account--Denunciation
of Officers deserted--Investigation of accounts--San Martin's charges
against me--My refutation--Government refuses its publication--Cruelty
to Spanish prisoners--Retirement to Quintero--Political fruits of our
success--Destitute condition of squadron--Infamous attempt to promote
dissatisfaction therein--Object of this course--Steps taken to defeat
it--Disavowed by the Minister--Sympathy of officers--Attempt to get rid
of Gen. Freire--Its eventual result--Letter of the Captains.

CHAPTER XI.

Negociations with Bolivar--Exile of Monteagudo--Complaints of the
Limeños--Extravagance of the Government--Exculpation of San
Martin--Effects of popular dissension--Disagreement of Bolivar and San
Martin--Vote of Peruvian Congress--Extraordinary neglect of the Chilian
Squadron--San Martin's arrival at Valparaiso--I demand his
trial--Countenance of the Supreme Director--Squadron at length paid
wages--Revolt of Conception--General Freire apprises me of it--Freire
asks for my support--His letter not replied to--San Martin's influence.

CHAPTER XII.

The squadron taken from me--I accept invitation from Brazil--Letter to
the Supreme Director--San Martin quits Chili--His prudence--Opinion of
his Aide-de Camp--Ministerial neglect--Permission to quit Chili--Letter
to General Freire--For the first time made public--Letter to the
Captains and Officers--To the Chilian people--To the foreign
merchants--To the President of Peru--San Martin actuated by
revenge--This shewn from his letters.

CHAPTER XIII.

Freire marches on Valparaiso--Elected Supreme Director--He begs of me to
return--My reply--Subsequent letter to General Freire.

CHAPTER XIV.

Injustice to the squadron--Inconsistency of this--Estate taken from
me--My losses by litigation--Endeavours to enforce my claims--Petty
excuses for evading them--I am charged with expenses of the Army--And
with costs for making legal captures--My conduct approved at the time---
Ministerial approbation--Paltry compensation at length given--Ministerial
corruption--Proved by San Martin--Cause of official animosity to
me--Conclusion.

APPENDIX.





PREFACE.


The first of these volumes forms a history of the consolidation of
Chilian independence, and of the subsequent liberation of Peru--through
the instrumentality of the Chilian squadron under my command; a service
which called forth from the Governments and people of the liberated
states the warmest expressions of gratitude to the naval service
collectively, and to myself personally, as having planned and conducted
the operations whereby these results were attained.

It records also the strangely inconsistent fact that--beyond these marks
of national approbation--neither Chili nor Peru ever awarded to the
squadron or myself any more substantial reward--though, in a pecuniary
sense, deeply indebted to us; for, during the greater portion of the war
of independence, the subsistence of the crews, and the repairs and
equipment of the Chilian squadron were solely provided for by our own
exertions, without cost to the Government; since, in addition to the
capture of Spanish ships-of-war and merchant vessels--money, provisions,
and stores to a great extent fell into our hands; all of which--though
our own stipulated right--were voluntarily devoted to state exigencies,
in the full conviction that, at the expiration of the war, the value of
our sacrifices would, as a point of national honour, be returned to us
by Chili. As regards Peru, our still unpaid for captures of ships-of-war
formed her first naval force, for which the only requital has been, a
vote of her first National Assembly--almost its inaugural act--ascribing
to me the double praise of her liberation from the Spanish yoke, and of
her subsequent deliverance from an intolerable military tyranny.

The volume contains another point, which forms a yet stranger sequel to
my services on the Western shores of South America. After the expiration
of thirty years, Chili granted me the absurdly inadequate sum of £.6,000
_in full of all my claims!_ And this, with the knowledge that, after my
return to England I was involved in litigation on account of the legal
seizure of vessels under the orders of her former Government--by which
I was subjected to a loss, directly and indirectly, of _more than three
times the amount_. The Chilian portion of this history, therefore,
resolves itself into the fact, that not only did I reap no reward
whatever, for the liberation of Chili and Peru, but that the
independence of both countries was achieved _at a heavy pecuniary
sacrifice to myself!_ in compensation for which, as well as for my
recognised services--Chili has thought its national honour sufficiently
vindicated by allotting me _one-third of my losses only_, without other
compensation of any kind! I regret to add, that my necessities at the
time, arising for the most part from the pecuniary difficulties to which
I had been subjected on Chilian account, compelled me to accept the
amount tendered.

The second volume is of a character somewhat similar. It narrates the
circumstances under which--by promises the most inviting, and
stipulations the most binding--I was induced to accept the command, or
rather organization of the first Brazilian navy. It details the complete
expulsion of all Portuguese armaments, naval and military, from the
Eastern shores of the South American Continent, by the squadron alone,
wholly unaided by military co-operation; in the course of which arduous
service, ships of war, merchant vessels, and valuable property to the
extent of several millions of dollars were captured under the Imperial
order, and their value--in spite of previous stipulations--_refused to
the captors_, on the falsely assumed ground that the provinces liberated
were Brazilian--though a Brazilian military force had been recently
beaten in an attempt to expel the Portuguese--and though these provinces
were, at the period of my assuming the command, in the uninterrupted
occupation of the very Portuguese fleets and armies afterwards expelled,
it was falsely pretended that the property captured was not enemy's
property--though expressly described as such in numerous Imperial
decrees--and more especially by the instructions given to me by His
Imperial Majesty to seize or destroy it wherever found.

It was, in short, subsequently decided by a Court of Admiralty--for the
most part composed of Portuguese members, acting under the influence of
a Portuguese faction in the Administration--that neither myself nor the
squadron were entitled to the prizes made--though most inconsistently,
the same tribunal condemned the ships of war taken--as "_droits_" to the
crown--for which, compensation was awarded to the squadron by His
Imperial Majesty, but never paid by the ministers to whom the order was
directed.

Not to anticipate the contents of the volume devoted to Brazilian
affairs. It being found after the expulsion of the enemy, that the
stipulations made with myself were too binding to be easily set aside,
several futile attempts were made to evade them, but this being found
impossible, the unworthy expedient was resorted to of summarily
dismissing me from the service, after the establishment of peace with
Portugal--an event entirely consequent on my individual services. By
this expedient--of the rectitude or otherwise of which the reader will
be able to judge from the documentary evidence laid before him--I was
got rid of without compensation for my claims, which for thirty years
were altogether repudiated; but, at the expiration of that period, fully
recognised as _having been due from the beginning!_ The Brazilian
Government, however, satisfied its own sense of justice by awarding me
less than _one-half the simple interest of the amount stipulated in my
patents_; thus retaining the whole of the principal admitted to be due.

The preceding remarks form a _synopsis_ of my career on both sides of
the continent of South America; the narrative, where dispute might
arise, being carefully founded on, and in all cases accompanied by
documentary evidence, which admits neither dispute nor contradiction.

The trifling amount awarded by Chili, would probably not have been
granted at all, but for the earnest remonstrance of Lord Palmerston,
warmly seconded by the efforts of the Hon. Mr. Jerningham, British
Minister to the Chilian Republic, by whose joint exertions the
Government was induced to admit--that national honour was involved in
fulfilling national obligations; though an infinitesimal view of either
the one or the other was certainly taken when awarding me the
insignificant sum previously mentioned.

In Brazil the case was somewhat different. It is to His present Imperial
Majesty, Don Pedro II. that I owe any investigation of my claims, by the
appointment of a Commission (_Secçoes_), which reported that they ought
never to have been withheld, as being my stipulated right. But even the
limited amount awarded in consequence of this decision, was on the point
of being further diminished one half by its projected payment in a
depreciated currency--and, had it not been for the intervention of Lord
Clarendon, and of the Hon. Mr. Scarlett, British Minister at Rio de
Janeiro, of whose zealous exertions in my favour I cannot speak too
warmly--this further injustice would have been perpetrated without the
knowledge or sanction of His present Imperial Majesty.

It may be asked, why--with the clear documentary evidence in my
possession--and now adduced--I have for so many years endured an amount
of obloquy and injustice, which might at any time have been set aside by
its publication? The reply is obvious. The withholding of my claims by
the Governments of both sides the South American Continent, and the
ruinous expense to which I was put on account of Chili, entailed upon me
many years of pecuniary difficulty. To have told even the
truth--unbacked as I then was, by the British Government--would have
been to have all my claims set at defiance, so that compulsory
discretion was a sufficient reason for my silence. It was long before I
could induce a British Minister to satisfy himself of the rectitude of
my conduct--the soundness of my claims--or the dishonesty of those who,
believing me to be powerless, laughed at reiterated demands for my
stipulated rights. Yet more I have never sought from those to whom I
gave liberty and dominion.

There is, however, a reason for the present publication, of which I have
never lost sight. Amidst all the injustice which it has been my lot to
sustain, I have ever determined--for the sake of my family--to whom my
character is an heir-loom--that no obloquy shall follow me to the grave,
for none have I merited. On the day these volumes see the light, this
resolution will be partially fulfilled. On that day I shall have
completed the eighty-third year of a career strangely chequered, yet not
undistinguished; and, therefore, the opinions of either Chilians or
Brazilians are now of small moment to me in comparison with a reputation
which has been demmed worthy of belonging to history. None of the
present ruling powers in either Chili or Brazil can possibly be offended
with me for giving a guardedly temperate documentary narrative of what
must hereafter form the basis of their national annals. I do not for a
moment contemplate that men of enlightened views such as now direct the
affairs of both countries have either part or sympathy with
self-interested adventurers who in popular revolutions too often rise to
the surface, and for a time make confusion worse confounded; till
replaced--as a matter of course, no less than by necessity--by men of
greater grasp of mind and more exalted aspirations.

But this is as it maybe--my reputation as a British seaman is to me of
the highest moment, and it shall not be sullied after my death by the
aspersions of those who wilfully revenged the thwarting of their
anti-Imperial designs, by imputations which can alone enter into the
minds of men devoid of generous impulses and therefore incapable of
appreciating higher motives. I have not followed their example, but
where it is necessary to bring forward such persons--they will be viewed
through the medium of their own documents, which are incontestible and
irresistible, and which would as easily convict me of untruth as they
convict my maligners of practices unworthy the honour of a nation.

To my own countrymen these volumes can scarcely be matter of
indifference; though, perhaps, few reflect that the numerous fleets of
British merchantmen which now frequent both shores of South America, are
the consequence of the deliverance of these vast territories from an
exclusive colonial yoke. It is true that England had previously formed a
treaty with Portugal, permitting English vessels to trade to her South
American Colonies, but such was the influence of Portuguese merchants
with the local governments, that it was nearly inoperative; so that,
practically, the Portuguese were in the exclusive possession of that
commerce which my expulsion of the fleet and army of the mother country
unreservedly threw open to British enterprise. The same, even in a
higher degree, may be said with regard to Chili and Peru.

Yet, scarcely had my mission to Chili become known, than the influence
of Spain induced the British Ministry to pass a "Foreign Enlistment
Act," the penal clauses of which were evidently aimed at me, for
having entered into the service of unacknowledged governments without
permission--though I had shortly before been most unjustly driven from
the service of my native country.

In blind animosity towards me, my former English persecutors failed to
perceive the advantage to British commerce, of freeing both sides of
South America from lingering war and internal dissension. An amusing
instance of this occurred on my return to England. Having occasion to
wait upon the then Attorney-General relative to a patent which I had in
hand, he brusquely inquired "_whether I was not afraid to appear before
him?_" On my replying that "I was not aware of having reason to fear
appearing in the presence of any man," he told me the question had been
officially put to him, whether I could be punished under the "Foreign
Enlistment Act," for the part I had taken in the liberation of Chili,
Peru, and Brazil? To this I replied, that "if Government was indiscreet
enough further to persecute me for having thrown open to British
commerce the largest field for enterprise of modern times, they could
take what steps they chose, for that I, having accepted service in South
America before the passing of the Act, was not afraid of the
consequences of having infringed its provisions." It is almost needless
to say that no such prosecution was instituted, though the will was
good, despite the national benefits conferred.

I will not enter farther into the subject in a preface to volumes which
themselves form only a summary of events in which I was a principal
actor, but at the same time, one, which I hope will prove satisfactory
and decisive. It would have been easy to have dilated the narrative, but
my object is solely to leave behind me a faithful record of events which
must one day become history, and there is no history like documentary
history.

To those high personages who have advocated my cause with other nations,
the present volume will give satisfaction, as affording additional proof
that their advocacy rested upon no visionary basis. To the members of
the press, who have adopted the same views, this exposition will be
equally satisfactory. To all these I owe the thanks of recognising in
me, a love for that service, from which--for a time I was unjustly
expelled. It is my intention, if God spare my life, to add to these
Memoirs a narrative of my former experience in the British navy, and,
what may be of greater utility, an exposition of that which, from
jealousy and other causes no less unworthy, _I was not permitted to
effect_. To these I shall add a few remarks upon my connexion with the
liberation of Greece, developing some remarkable facts, which have as
yet escaped the notice of historians. These reminiscences of the past
will, at least, be instructive to future generations and if any remarks
of mine will conduce to the permanent greatness and security of my
country, I shall deem the residue of my life well spent in recording
them.

At my advanced age, such a task as that now partially executed, would,
perhaps, have presented insuperable difficulties, but for the assistance
rendered me by Mr. Earp, who, with great perseverance, has
unravelled--what, in the lapse of time, had become the almost
inextricable confusion of my papers. That, however, has, with his
assistance, been accomplished in such a way as to base upon original
documents every incident contained in the work--the more important of
these documents being adduced, so as to admit of neither doubt nor
question. The same course will be pursued in the forthcoming English
portion of my career, with a result, I trust, equally clear and
convincing.

DUNDONALD.




CHAPTER I.

INVITATION TO TAKE COMMAND OF CHILIAN NAVY--ARRIVAL AT VALPARAISO--FIRST
EXPEDITION TO PERU--ATTACK ON SPANISH SHIPPING AT CALLAO--DEPARTURE FOR
HUACHO--CAPTURE OF SPANISH CONVOYS OF MONEY--PAITA TAKEN--RETURN TO
VALPARAISO TO REORGANIZE THE SQUADRON--OFFER TO GIVE UP MY SHARE OF
PRIZEMONEY TO THE REPUBLIC--THIS OFFER DECLINED BY THE SUPREME
DIRECTOR--POPULAR CONGRATULATIONS--ATTEMPT ON LADY COCHRANE'S LIFE.


In the year 1817, Don Jose Alvarez, accredited agent of the government
of Chili--as yet unacknowledged by European powers--applied to me to
undertake the organization of a naval force in that country, capable of
contending against the Spaniards; who, notwithstanding the successful
revolt of the Chilenos by land, still maintained their predominance on
the waters of the Pacific.

Having at that time no professional employment, in consequence of my
unjust expulsion from the British naval service, by the machinations of
the powerful political party which I had offended--and finding that
Chili was making great efforts to create a navy, in furtherance of which
object a war steamer had been placed on the stocks in London--I accepted
the invitation, engaging to superintend her building and equipment, and
to take her to Valparaiso when completed.

Meanwhile, Alvarez received orders from his Government, that, if his
proposals had been accepted, no time must be lost in my departure, as
the position of Chili was critical, the Spaniards threatening Valparaiso
by sea, and being still in possession of the continent from Conception
to Chiloe, where they were organizing the savage Indian tribes to carry
desolation into the newly emancipated provinces. Reliable information
had also been received, that the Court of Madrid was making strenuous
efforts to recover its lost possessions by a powerful reinforcement to
its Pacific squadron, against which the Chileno ships of war, in their
present state, were not in a condition to contend.

Alvarez therefore begged me not to wait for the steamer, the completion
and equipment of which he would hasten, but at once to sail for Chili in
the _Rose_ merchantman, then on the eve of departure. Knowing that the
whole of Peru was in the hands of the Spaniards, and that they were also
in possession of Valdivia, the strongest fortified harbour to the
southward--from both of which there would be considerable difficulty in
dislodging them after the arrival of the anticipated reinforcements--I
embarked without delay; and on the 28th of November, 1818, landed at
Valparaiso, accompanied by Lady Cochrane and our two children.

Our reception, both from the authorities and the people, was
enthusiastic, the Supreme Director, General O'Higgins, coming from the
seat of Government, Santiago, to welcome us. This excellent man was the
son of an Irish gentleman of distinction in the Spanish service, who had
occupied the important position of Viceroy of Peru. The son had,
however, joined the patriots, and whilst second in command had not long
before inflicted a signal defeat upon the Spaniards in the interior; in
reward for which service the gratitude of the nation had elevated him to
the Supreme Directorate.

A variety of _fêtes_ was given at Valparaiso in honour of our arrival,
these being prolonged for so many days as to amount to a waste of time.
The same scenes were, however, re-enacted at the distant capital,
whither the Supreme Director insisted on taking us, till I had to remind
His Excellency that our purpose was rather fighting than feasting.
Nevertheless, the reception we had met impressed me with so high a sense
of Chilian hospitality, that, heartbroken as I had been by the infamous
persecution which had driven me from the British navy, I decided upon
Chili as my future home; this decision, however, being only an
exemplification of the proverb _"L'homme propose--Dieu dispose."_

The Chilian squadron had just returned from a successful cruise, the
gallant Admiral Blanco Encalada, who commanded it, having captured a
noble Spanish 50-gun frigate, the _Maria Isabel_, in the bay of
Talcahuano.

The squadron consisted of the recently captured Spanish frigate, now
named the _O'Higgins_, in honour of the Supreme Director; the _San
Martin_, 56 guns, formerly the _Cumberland_ Indiaman, which had been
bought into the service; the _Lautaro_, 44 guns, also a purchased
Indiaman; the _Galvarino_, 18 guns, recently the British sloop of war
_Hecate_; the _Chacabuco_, 20 guns; and the _Aracauno_, 16 guns; a force
which, though deficient in organization and equipment, was very
creditable to the energy of a newly emancipated people.

A few days after my arrival a commission was issued, conferring upon me
the title of "Vice-Admiral of Chili, Admiral and Commander in Chief of
the Naval Forces of the Republic." Admiral Blanco, with patriotic
liberality, relinquishing his position in my favour, though, from his
recent achievement, justly entitled to retain it; paying me also the
additional compliment of personally announcing to the ships' companies
the change which had been effected.

My advent was regarded by the captains of the squadron with great
jealousy, the more so, as I had brought with me from England officers
upon whom I could place implicit reliance. It so happened that two of
the Chilian commanders, Captains Guise and Spry, had shortly before
arrived from England with the _Hecate_, which had been sold out of the
British navy, and bought by them on speculation. The Buenos Ayrean
Government having declined to purchase her, they had brought her on to
Chili, where the Government took her and received her former owners into
its service. These officers, together with Captain Worcester, a North
American, got up a cabal, the object of which was to bring about a
divided command between myself and Admiral Blanco, or, as they
expressed it--"two commodores and no Cochrane." Finding that Admiral
Blanco would not listen to this, they persuaded one or two of the
inferior ministers--whose jealousy it was not difficult to excite--that
it was dangerous and discreditable to a republican Government to allow a
nobleman and a foreigner to command its navy, and still more so, to
allow him to retain his title; the object being to place Admiral Blanco
in the chief command, with myself as his second--by which arrangement,
as he had not been accustomed to manage British seamen, they expected to
control him as they pleased. Admiral Blanco, however, insisted on
reversing our positions, offering his services as second in command, in
which arrangement I gladly acquiesced. This insignificant squabble would
not be worth narrating, but for its bearing on subsequent events; as
well as enabling me to confer a pleasing testimony to the patriotic
disinterestedness of Admiral Blanco, who is still one of the brightest
ornaments of the Republic which he so eminently aided to establish.

On the 22nd of December my flag was hoisted on board the _O'Higgins_,
after which the greatest despatch was used to get the squadron ready for
sea. Anxious to avoid delay, on the 16th of January I sailed with four
ships only, the _O'Higgins, San Martin, Lautaro,_ and _Chacabuco_;
leaving Admiral Blanco to follow with the _Gaharino, Aracauno,_ and
_Puyrredon_. A mutiny having broken out on board the _Chacabuco_, it
became necessary to enter Coquimbo, where the leading mutineers were
landed, tried, and punished.

I shall here narrate an incident which occurred on our departure. Lady
Cochrane, with her children, had returned from Santiago to Valparaiso,
to take leave of me on embarkation. She had just gone ashore, and the
last gun had been fired to summon all hands on board, when, hearing a
loud _hurrah_ near the house where she resided, she went to the window,
and saw our little boy--now Lord Cochrane, but then scarcely more than
five years old--mounted on the shoulders of my flag-lieutenant, waving
his tiny cap over the heads of the people, and crying out with all his
might, _"Viva la patria!"_ the mob being in a frenzied state of
excitement.

The child had slipped out of Lady Cochrane's house with the officer,
insisting on being carried to his father; with which request the
lieutenant, nothing loth, complied. To the horror of Lady Cochrane, she
saw her boy hurried down to the beach amidst the shouts of the
multitude, and, before she could interfere, placed in a boat and rowed
off to the flag-ship, which was at the time under weigh, so that he
could not be sent ashore again; there being no alternative but to take
him with us, though without clothes--which were afterwards made for him
by the sailors--and with no other attendance save that which their rough
but kindly natures could administer.

On our way along the coast we received information that the _Antonio_
was about to sail from Callao for Cadiz, with a considerable amount of
treasure, so that, in the hope of intercepting her, we cruized just out
of sight of the port till the 21st of February. As she did not make her
appearance, preparations were made to put in execution a plan which had
been formed to attack the Spanish shipping during the Carnival, when, in
the height of that festival, less vigilance than ordinary might
reasonably be expected. We had previously ascertained that the naval
force in the harbour consisted of the frigates _Esmeralda_ and
_Venganza_, a corvette, three brigs of war, a schooner, twenty-eight
gun-boats, and six heavily-armed merchantmen; the whole being moored
close in under the batteries, which mounted upwards of 160 guns, whilst
the aggregate force of the shipping was 350 guns, as appeared from an
official account of their armament.

A direct attack with our small force seemed, therefore, a thing not at
present to be attempted; but in its place I had formed the design to cut
out the frigates during the carnival, which terminated on the 23rd.
Knowing that two North American ships of war were daily expected at
Callao, it was arranged to take in the _O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_, under
American colours, leaving the _San Martin_ out of sight behind San
Lorenzo, and if the _ruse_ were successful, to make a feint of sending a
boat ashore with despatches, and in the meantime suddenly to dash at the
frigates, and cut them out. Unfortunately, one of those thick fogs, so
common on the Peruvian coast, arose, in which the _Lautaro_ parted
company, and did not rejoin the flag-ship for four days afterwards,
when the carnival being at an end, our plan was rendered abortive.

The fog, which in the climate of Peru often continues for a considerable
length of time, lasted till the 29th, when hearing heavy firing, and
imagining that one of the ships was engaged with the enemy, I stood with
the flag-ship into the bay; the other ships, imagining the same thing,
also steered in the direction of the firing, when the fog clearing for a
moment, we discovered each other, as well as a strange sail near us;
which, when taken possession of by the flag-ship, proved to be a Spanish
gun-boat, with a lieutenant and twenty men, who, on being made
prisoners, informed us that the firing was a salute in honour of the
Viceroy, who had that morning been on a visit of inspection to the
batteries and shipping, and was then on board the brig of war _Pezuela_,
which we saw crowding sail in the direction of the batteries.

The fog again coming on, suggested to me the possibility of a direct
attack, which, if not altogether successful, would give the Spaniards
such an idea of our determination of purpose, as would inspire them with
respect for the Chilian squadron, and might induce their ships to
refrain from the protection of their commerce; in which case a blockade
would prevent the necessity of separating our small force in chase of
them, should they evince a desire of getting to sea.

Accordingly, still maintaining our disguise under American colours, the
_O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_ stood towards the batteries, narrowly escaping
going ashore in the fog. The Viceroy having no doubt witnessed the
capture of the gun-boat, had, however, provided for our reception, the
garrison being at their guns, and the crews of the ships of war at their
quarters. Notwithstanding the great odds, I determined to persist in an
attack, as our withdrawing without firing a shot, would produce an
effect upon the minds of the Spaniards the reverse of that intended;
having sufficient experience in war to know that moral effect, even if
the result of a degree of temerity, will not unfrequently supply the
place of superior force.

The wind falling light, I did not venture on laying the flag-ship and
the _Lautaro_ alongside the Spanish frigates, as at first intended, but
anchored with springs on our cables, abreast of the shipping, which was
arranged in a half-moon of two lines, the rear rank being judiciously
disposed so as to cover the intervals of the ships in the front line. A
dead calm succeeding, we were for two hours exposed to a heavy fire from
the batteries, in addition to that from the two frigates, the brigs
_Pezuela_ and _Maypeu_, and seven or eight gun-boats; nevertheless, the
northern angle of one of the principal forts was silenced by our fire.

A breeze springing up, we weighed anchor, standing to and fro in front
of the batteries, and returning their fire; when Captain Guise, who
commanded the _Lautaro_, being severely wounded, that ship sheered off,
and never again came within range. As from want of wind, or doubt of the
result, neither the _San Martin_ nor _Chacabuco_ had ever got within
fire, the flag-ship was thus left alone to continue the action; but as
this, from want of co-operation on the part of the other ships, was
useless, I was reluctantly compelled to relinquish the attack, and
withdrew to the island of San Lorenzo, about three miles distant from
the forts; the Spaniards, though nearly quadruple our numbers, exclusive
of their gun-boats, not venturing to follow us.

The annexed was the Spanish naval force present: _Frigates_.--Esmeralda,
44 guns; Venganza, 42 guns; Sebastiana, 28 guns.

_Brigs_.--Maypeu, 18 guns; Pezuela, 22 guns; Potrilla, 18 guns; and one,
name unknown, 18 guns.

_Schooner_, name unknown, one long 24, and 20 culverins.

_Armed Merchantmen_.--Resolution, 36 guns; Cleopatra, 28 guns; La Focha,
20 guns; Guarmey, 18 guns; Fernando, 26 guns; San Antonio, 18 guns.

Total, fourteen vessels, of which ten were ready for sea; and
twenty-seven gun-boats.

In this action my little boy had a narrow escape. As the story has been
told by several Chilian writers somewhat incorrectly, I will
recapitulate the circumstances.

When the firing commenced, I had placed the boy in my after-cabin,
locking the door upon him; but not liking the restriction, he contrived
to get through the quarter gallery window, and joined me on deck,
refusing to go down again. As I could not attend to him, he was
permitted to remain, and, in a miniature midshipman's uniform, which the
seamen had made for him, was busying himself in handing powder to the
gunners.

Whilst thus employed, a round shot took off the head of a marine close
to him, scattering the unlucky man's brains in his face. Instantly
recovering his self-possession, to my great relief, for believing him
killed, I was spell-bound with agony, he ran up to me exclaiming, "I am
not hurt, papa: the shot did not touch me; Jack says, the ball is not
made that can kill mamma's boy." I ordered him to be carried below; but,
resisting with all his might, he was permitted to remain on deck during
the action.

Our loss in this affair was trifling, considering that we were under the
fire of more than two hundred guns; but the ships were so placed that
the enemy's frigates lay between us and the fortress, so that the shot
of the latter only told upon our rigging, which was considerably
damaged.

The action having been commenced in a fog, the Spaniards imagined that
all the Chilian vessels were engaged, and were not a little surprised,
as it again cleared, to find that their own frigate, the quondam _Maria
Isabella_, was their only opponent. So much were they dispirited by this
discovery, that as soon as possible after the close of the contest,
their ships of war were dismantled, the top masts and spars being formed
into a double boom across the anchorage so as to prevent approach. The
Spaniards were also previously unaware of my being in command of the
Chilian squadron, but on becoming acquainted with this fact, bestowed
upon me the not very complimentary title of "El Diablo," by which I was
afterwards known amongst them. The title might have been rendered more
appropriate, had my efforts been better seconded by the other vessels.

On the following day, having repaired damages, the flag-ship and
_Lautaro_ again went in and commenced a destructive fire upon the
Spanish gun-boats, the neutral vessels in the harbour removing out of
the line of shot. As the gun-boats withdrew to a position closer under
the batteries, where we could make little impression upon them without
getting severely punished by the fire of the fortress, we contented
ourselves with the demonstration made.

On the 2nd of March, I despatched Capt. Foster with the gun-boat
captured from the Spaniards, and the launches of the _O'Higgins_ and
_Lautaro_--to take possession of the island of San Lorenzo, when an
unworthy instance of Spanish cruelty presented itself in the spectacle
of thirty-seven Chilian soldiers taken prisoners eight years before. The
unhappy men had ever since been forced to work in chains under the
supervision of a military guard--now prisoners in turn; their sleeping
place during the whole of this period being a filthy shed, in which they
were every night chained by one leg to an iron bar. The joy of the poor
fellows at their deliverance, after all hope had fled, can scarcely be
conceived.

From the liberated patriots and the Spanish prisoners, I learned that in
Lima there were a number of Chilian officers and seamen taken on board
the _Maypeu_, whose condition was even more deplorable than their own,
the fetters on their legs having worn their ancles to the bone, whilst
their commander, by a refinement of cruelty, had for more than a year
been lying under sentence of death as a rebel. Upon this, I sent a flag
of truce to the viceroy, Don Joaquim de la Pezuela, requesting him to
permit the prisoners to return to their families, in exchange for the
Spanish prisoners on board the squadron, and others in Chili--where
there were great numbers, who were comparatively well treated. The
Viceroy denied the charge of ill-treatment--asserted his right, if he
thought proper, to regard his prisoners as pirates; retorting that after
the battle of Maypeu, General San Martin had treated the Spanish
Commissioner as a spy, and had repeatedly threatened him with death. The
exchange of prisoners was uncourteously refused, the Viceroy concluding
his reply with an expression of surprise that a British nobleman should
command the maritime forces of a Government "unacknowledged by all the
Powers of the globe." To this latter observation, I considered it
incumbent upon me to reply that "a British nobleman was a free man, and
therefore had a right to adopt any country which was endeavouring to
re-establish the rights of aggrieved humanity; and that I had hence
adopted the cause of Chili, with the same freedom of judgment that I had
previously exercised when refusing the offer of an Admiral's rank in
Spain, made to me not long before, by the Spanish Ambassador in London;"
this offer having been made by the Duke de San Carlos, in the name of
Ferdinand the Seventh.

Our means being clearly inadequate to any decisive attack on the Spanish
ships of war, I resolved to try the effect of an explosion vessel, and
accordingly established a laboratory on the island of San Lorenzo, under
the superintendence of Major Miller, the Commandant of Marines. Whilst
engaged in this duty, that able and gallant officer was so severely
burned by an accidental explosion, as to render his further services on
this occasion unavailable.

On the 22nd of March--our preparations being completed--we again stood
towards the batteries, the flag-ship going close in under the combined
fire of the forts and shipping, in order to divert the attention of the
enemy from the explosion vessel, which was set adrift in the direction
of the frigates, but, unfortunately, when within musket shot of them,
she was struck by a round shot and foundered, causing complete failure
in our object. The _San Martin_ and the _Lautaro_ keeping far astern,
there was no alternative but to withdraw from further attack, leaving
the explosion vessel to her fate.

As other attempts, with our want of means, would answer no better
purpose than useless demonstration, and as the ships were now destitute
of water and provisions, we were obliged to fall back upon Huacho,
leaving the _Chacabuco_ to watch the movements of the enemy.

The inhabitants of Huacho, who were well disposed to co-operate in any
effort for the emancipation of Peru, afforded us every assistance in
provisioning and watering the ships, for which the commandant, Cevallos,
shot two influential persons who had been foremost in aiding us, and
severely punished others; at the same time seizing our water casks, and
sending me an insolent letter of defiance, on which a party of seamen
and marines was landed and put the garrison to flight; the officer
commanding the party however withdrew from pursuit at hearing salutes
fired on the arrival of Admiral Blanco with the _Galvarino_ and
_Puyrredon_, mistaking this for an engagement with a newly-arrived
enemy. The whole of the Government property found in the Spanish
custom-house was captured.

The people of Huacho having volunteered information that a quantity of
specie belonging to the Philippine Company had been placed for safety on
board a vessel in the river Barrança, she was forthwith overhauled, and
the treasure transferred to the flag-ship.

Leaving Admiral Blanco at Huacho with the _San Martin_ and _Puyrredon_,
on the 4th of April we sailed for Supe, with the _O'Higgins_ and
_Galvarino_, having previously ascertained that a sum of money destined
for the payment of Spanish troops was on its way from Lima to Guambucho;
on the following day a party of marines being landed at Patavilca,
captured the treasure, amounting to 70,000 dollars, together with a
quantity of military stores. On the 7th, having received further
information that the Philippine Company had placed other treasure on
board the French brig, _Gazelle_, at Guambucho, we sailed for that
place, and, on the 10th, the seamen of the _O'Higgins_ examined her, and
brought off an additional sum of 60,000 dollars.

The secret of our obtaining possession of these and other convoys of
Spanish money along the coast, was, that I paid the inhabitants highly
for information relative to their transmission, and was thus enabled to
seize the treasure even in the interior of the country. As the Chilian
Ministry subsequently refused to allow me "secret service money," these,
disbursements were actually made at my own expense.

It was also my object to make friends of the Peruvian people, by
adopting towards them a conciliatory course, and by strict care that
none but Spanish property should be taken, whilst their own was in all
cases respected. Confidence was thus inspired, and the universal
dissatisfaction with Spanish colonial rule speedily became changed into
an earnest desire to be freed from it. Had it not been for this good
understanding with the inhabitants, I should scarcely have ventured to
detach marines and seamen for operations at a distance into the country,
as was subsequently the case; the people giving me the most reliable
information of every movement of the enemy.

On the 13th, we arrived at Paita, where the Spaniards had established a
garrison. A party of marines and seamen was again landed, on which the
enemy fled from the fort, and a quantity of brass ordnance, spirits, and
military stores, was captured.

Contrary to strict orders, some marines stole a number of valuable
church ornaments, but on the complaint of the authorities I caused them
to be restored, punishing the offenders, and at the same time presenting
the priests with a thousand dollars to repair the damage done in their
churches; this act, though far from conciliating the priests--who
dreaded Chilian success--adding greatly to our popularity amongst the
inhabitants, which was my object in bestowing the amount. Our thus
refraining from plunder was almost beyond the comprehension of a people
who had bitter experience of Spanish rapacity, whilst the undisciplined
Chilenos, who formed the greater portion of the squadron, as little
comprehended why their plundering propensities should be restrained.

On the 5th of May, I proceeded with the flag-ship alone to reconnoitre
Callao, having learned that the _Chacabuco_ and _Puyrredon_ had been
chased off the port by the Spanish frigates. Finding that these were
again moored under shelter of the batteries, we returned to Supe,
convinced that our previous visit to Callao had proved sufficient to
deter them from putting to sea for the protection of their own coasts;
this, indeed, forming my chief reason for having persisted in attacks
which, with our small force, could answer no other purpose; but this
alone was an advantage gained, as it enabled us to communicate freely
with the inhabitants on the coast, and to ascertain their sentiments,
which--from our forbearance, no less than command of the sea--were
almost uniformly in favour of co-operation with Chili for their
emancipation.

Both at Lima and on the coast, the best effect was produced by the
circulation of the following proclamation:--

   "Compatriots! The repeated echoes of liberty in South America
   have been heard with pleasure in every part of enlightened Europe,
   more especially in Great Britain, where I, unable to resist the
   desire of joining in such a cause, determined to take part in it.
   The Republic of Chili has confided to me the command of her naval
   forces. To these must the dominion of the Pacific be consigned.
   By their co-operation must your chains be broken. Doubt not but
   that the day is at hand on which, with the annihilation of despotism
   and your now degraded condition, you will rise to the rank of a free
   nation, to which your geographical position and the course of events
   naturally call you."

   "But it is your duty to co-operate in preparing for this success,
   and to remove obstacles, under the assurance that you will receive
   the most efficacious assistance from the government of Chili, and
   your true friend,             COCHRANE."

This proclamation was accompanied by another from the Chilian
government, declaratory of the sincerity of its intentions, so that
these combined caused us to be everywhere received as liberators.

On the 8th, we returned to Supe, and having learned that a Spanish force
was in the vicinity, a detachment of marines and seamen was, after dark,
pushed through a heavy surf, and landed, in the hope of taking them by
surprise. But the enemy was on the alert, and on the following morning
our little party fell into an ambuscade, which would have proved
serious, had not Major Miller, who commanded the marines, promptly
formed his men, who, attacking in turn, soon put the enemy to flight at
the point of the bayonet, capturing their colours, and the greater
portion of their arms. On the 13th, a detachment of Spanish troops
arrived from Lima under Major Camba, who, notwithstanding his
superiority of numbers, did not venture to attack our small party, which
withdrew to the ships with a number of cattle taken from the Spaniards;
Camba writing to the Viceroy so effective a description of his having
"driven the enemy into the sea," that he was immediately promoted.

Not to enter into further details of our visits to other parts of the
coast, where similar captures of provisions and military stores, &c.
were effected--it being my practice to compel the Spaniards to supply
all the wants of the squadron, nothing being ever taken from the natives
without payment,--I resolved--as our means were clearly incommensurate
with our main object--to return to Valparaiso, for the purpose of
organizing a more effective force, and on the 16th of June reached that
port, where we found Admiral Blanco with the _San Martin_ and
_Chacabuco_, he having been obliged to raise the blockade of Callao for
want of provisions; a step with which the Government was highly
displeased, though with more reason to blame its own negligence or want
of foresight in not providing them. Admiral Blanco was nevertheless put
under arrest, but a court of inquiry being held, he was honourably
acquitted.

The objects of the first expedition had been fully accomplished, viz. to
reconnoitre, with a view to future operations, when the squadron should
be rendered efficient; but more especially to ascertain the
inclinations of the Peruvians with regard to their desire for
emancipation--a point of the first importance to Chili, as being obliged
to be constantly on the alert for her own newly-acquired liberties, so
long as the Spaniards were in undisturbed possession of Peru. To the
accomplishment of these objects had been superadded the restriction of
the Spanish naval force to the shelter of the forts, the defeat of their
military forces wherever encountered, and the capture of no
inconsiderable amount of treasure.

It had, however, become evident to me that the passive system of defence
which the Spaniards adopted in Callao, would render it a difficult
matter to get at them without more effective means than the guns of the
ships, which were greatly inferior in number to those of the enemy's
fortress and shipping combined, whilst their experience in the use of
artillery was greater than that of our crews. The Supreme Director
having paid a visit to the squadron--on the 21st of June I addressed to
him a letter, stating my apprehension that the finances of the
Government might be limited, and that I would gladly give up to the
exigencies of the Republic the whole of my share of prize-money taken
during our recent cruize, provided it were applied to the manufacture of
rockets. This offer was declined, with a compliment from the Supreme
Director, on the advantage already gained, by compelling the Spaniards
ignominiously to shut "themselves up in their port, in spite of their
numerical superiority."

Complimentary addresses from the Chilian people were also presented to
me in profusion, and a public panegyric was pronounced at the National
Institute of the capital, upon the service rendered; but as this was
only a recapitulation of what has been already narrated--conveyed in
flowery rhetorical phrases--in the use of which the Occidentals are
almost as expert, and often as exaggerated, as are the Orientals--I
shall refrain from giving it. Suffice it to say, that the people were
not a little delighted with the plain facts, that whereas only a few
months before theirs had been the blockaded port, they were now able to
beard the enemy in his stronghold, till then believed--both by
Spaniards and Chilians--to be inviolable; and that, with only four ships
on our part, the Spanish Viceroy had been shut up in his capital, and
his convoys, both by sea and land, intercepted, whilst his ships of war
did not venture to emerge from their shelter under the batteries of
Callao.

The manufacture of rockets was now carried on in earnest, under the
superintendence of Mr. Goldsack, an eminent engineer, who had been
engaged in England for the purpose. From a mistaken notion of parsimony,
the labour of constructing and filling them was allotted to a number of
Spanish prisoners, with what result will appear in the sequel.

In these and other preparations two months were consumed, in the course
of which another vessel--an American built corvette--was added to the
squadron, and named by the Supreme Director the _Independencia_.

During my absence Lady Cochrane chiefly resided at Valparaiso, where
she diligently employed herself in promoting objects essential to the
welfare of the squadron; after a time removing to a delightful country
house at Quillota, where her life was endangered by a ruffian in the
interest of the Spanish faction.

This man, having gained admission to her private apartment, threatened
her with instant death if she would not divulge the secret orders which
had been given to me. On her declaring firmly that she would not divulge
anything, a struggle took place for a paper which she picked off a
table; and before her attendants could come to her assistance she
received a severe cut from a stiletto. The assassin was seized,
condemned, and ordered for execution, without the last offices of the
Catholic religion.

In the dead of the night preceding the day fixed for his execution, Lady
Cochrane was awoke by loud lamentations beneath her window. On sending
to ascertain the cause, the wretched wife of the criminal was found
imploring her Ladyship's intercession that her husband should not be
deprived of the benefits of confession and absolution. Forgiving the
atrocity of the act, Lady Cochrane, on the following morning used all
her influence with the authorities, not for this alone, but to save the
man's life, and at length wrung from them a reluctant consent to commute
his punishment to banishment for life.




CHAPTER II.

SECOND EXPEDITION TO PERU--DISAPPOINTMENT AT NOT BEING PROVIDED WITH
TROOPS--FAILURE OF ROCKETS--DEPARTURE FOR ARICA--CAPTURE OF
PISCO--CAPTURE OF SPANISH SHIPS AT PUNA--DETERMINE TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT ON
VALDIVIA--ARRIVAL OFF THAT PORT, AND CAPTURE OF SPANISH BRIG OF WAR
POTRILLO--TROOPS OBTAINED FROM CONCEPTION--FLAG-SHIP NEARLY
WRECKED--ATTACK ON FORTS, AND CONQUEST OF VALDIVIA.


On the 12th of September, 1819, I again sailed for the Peruvian coast,
with Admiral Blanco as second in command. The squadron consisted of the
_O'Higgins, San Martin, Lautaro, Independencia_, and _Puyrredon_, the
_Galvarino_ and _Araucano_ not being in readiness. Two vessels
accompanied the squadron, to be afterwards fitted up as fire-ships.

The Government was exceedingly anxious that some decisive blow should be
at once struck. With the exception of the rockets, the squadron was in
little better condition than before, a loan having failed, whilst 4,000
dollars only were subscribed by the merchants. The crews for the most
part consisted of _cholos_, or native peasants, whom it was difficult to
shape into good seamen, though they fought gallantly when well led. The
officers were nearly all English or North American, this being a
redeeming feature, but very few of them possessed the tact to bring up
the men to anything like a seaman-like standard; a by no means easy
task however, as a considerable portion of those embarked did duty both
as marines and seamen.

I begged of the Government to supply me with 1,000 troops, asserting
that even with that number of men it would be possible to take the
castles of Callao, and destroy the whole of the Spanish shipping in the
harbour. I was assured that this force had been provided, and was in
readiness to embark at Coquimbo, where, on my arrival on the 16th, in
place of 1,000 troops I found only 90!--and these in so ragged a
condition, that a subscription of 400 dollars was raised by the
inhabitants, and given to Major Miller to buy clothing for them.

I was so much annoyed at this, as to be on the point of returning to
Valparaiso to throw up my commission; but, reflecting that the squadron
was in possession of rockets, and that the Government might even yet
forward a military force, I made up my mind to proceed, and on the 29th
the squadron again came to an anchor in Callao roads.

The two following days were occupied in making rocket rafts, and in
getting ready life-preservers for the men, in case of their falling from
the rafts. On the 1st of October the _Galvarino, Puyrredon_, and
_Araucano_, stood into the bay to reconnoitre, and sustained a heavy
fire from the shore, upon which I ordered the _Independencia_ to their
aid; but that vessel was brought to an anchor when at the distance of
several miles from them. On the same day Lieutenant-Colonel Charles, a
most able and gallant officer, reconnoitred in a boat, and made trial
of some rockets, upon which he reported unfavourably.

In this affair the mast of the _Araucano_ was struck by a round shot,
and severely damaged--the circumstance being merely mentioned to shew
the state in which the squadron was equipped; the only means of
repairing the damage being by fishing the mast with an anchor-stock
taken from the _Lautaro_, whilst an axe had to be borrowed for the
purpose from the flag-ship!

On the 2nd, the _Araucano_ again went in, accompanied by a squadron of
boats under the command of Captain Guise, and fired several rockets, but
with no perceptible effect--the Spaniards having unrigged their ships;
the brig sustained considerable damage from the firing of the forts and
shipping.

After dark, an attack by rockets and shells was arranged, the
_Galvarino_ taking in tow a mortar raft, under the command of Major
Miller, and placing it, under a heavy fire, within half a mile of the
enemy's batteries. The _Puyrredon_ followed with another raft, carrying
the shells and magazine; the _Araucano_ took charge of a rocket-raft,
under Captain Hind, whilst the _Independencia_ towed in a second
rocket-raft, under Lieut-Colonel Charles, the rest of the squadron
remaining at anchor.

Great expectations were formed, as well by myself as the whole squadron,
as to the effect to be produced by these destructive missiles, but they
were doomed to disappointment, the rockets turning out utterly useless.
Some, in consequence of the badness of the solder used, bursting from
the expansive force of the charge before they left the raft, and setting
fire to others--Captain Hind's raft being blown up from this cause, thus
rendering it useless, besides severely burning him and thirteen men:
others took a wrong direction in consequence of the sticks not having
been formed of proper wood, whilst the greater portion would not ignite
at all from a cause which was only discovered when too late. It has been
stated in the last chapter that the filling of the tubes was, from
motives of parsimony, entrusted to Spanish prisoners, who, as was found
on examination, had embraced every opportunity of inserting handfulls of
sand, sawdust, and even manure, at intervals in the tubes, thus impeding
the progress of combustion, whilst in the majority of instances they had
so thoroughly mixed the neutralizing matter with the ingredients
supplied, that the charge would not ignite at all, the result being
complete failure in the object of the expedition. It was impossible to
blame the Spanish prisoners in the Chilian arsenal for their loyalty,
but to me their ingenuity was a bitter ground for disappointment, as
with useless rockets we were no better off than in the first expedition;
nor indeed so well off, for in the interval the Spaniards had so
strengthened their booms at the anchorage, as to render it impossible
for the ships to get at them--whilst, by constant practice, their fire
had acquired a precision which our crews could not equal.

The only damage effected was by Major Miller's mortar, the shells
sinking a gun-boat, and doing some execution in the forts and amongst
the shipping. As daylight appeared, I ordered the whole of the rafts to
be towed off, there being no further use in their remaining exposed to
the heavy fire of the batteries. As it was, our loss was trifling, only
about twenty being killed and wounded; but amongst these I had to regret
the death of a promising young officer, Lieut. Bealey, who was cut in
two by a round shot.

The failure of the rockets was very unfairly attributed by the Chilian
Government to Mr. Goldsack, whereas the fault lay in itself for having
neither supplied him with proper workmen nor materials. From the
scarcity and high, price of spelter, he had also been compelled to make
use of an inferior solder for the tubes, and thus the saving of a few
hundred dollars frustrated the success of a great object. The
consequence to poor Goldsack was utter ruin, though of his capability
there could be no question, he having for many years been one of the
principal assistants of Sir W. Congreve at Woolwich.

By the 5th, one of the explosion vessels was completed, and I resolved
to try her effect on the booms and shipping, for which purpose she was
placed in charge of Lieut. Morgell, who carried her in gallant style
towards the enemy's shipping, but the wind falling calm, she became a
target for their really excellent practice, and was in a short time
riddled through and through. As the Spaniards began to fire red-hot
shot, Lieut. Morgell was compelled to abandon her, first setting fire
to the train, then turning her adrift, thus causing her to explode,
though at a distance which did no damage to the enemy.

Whilst this was going on, a strange sail was reported off the bay, and
the _Araucano_ went in chase, Captain Crosbie returning the next morning
with the intelligence that she was a frigate. Upon this, the squadron
got under weigh, in pursuit, when she made all sail, and as I did not
deem it expedient to quit the bay of Callao, the chase was given up, and
we returned in the evening to our former anchorage. It was afterwards
learned that she was the _Prueba_, of 50 guns, just arrived from Cadiz;
whence she had convoyed another ship, with a cargo valued at half a
million of dollars; this ship contriving to slip into Callao during the
short absence of the squadron in pursuit of the frigate, so that we lost
both prizes.

It was useless to remain any longer at Callao, as my instructions
peremptorily commanded me not to approach with the ships within range of
the enemy's batteries, nor to make any attempt on their squadron, except
with the rockets and fire-ships. I was moreover ordered to return within
a given time to Valparaiso, these restrictions being insisted on by the
Minister of Marine, ostensibly from what he considered my temerity in
having attacked the forts and shipping at Callao on the first
expedition--but really, from his own narrow-minded jealousy, that I, a
foreigner, should effect anything which might give me undue prominence
in the estimation of the Chilian people.

I had, however, other reasons for quitting Callao. The newly-arrived
Spanish frigate _Prueba_, was at large, and as I had reason to believe,
was sheltering at Guayaquil, from which port I made up my mind to
dislodge her. The Government had not sent any of the promised supplies
for the squadron, which was running short of provisions, so that it was
necessary to resort to my former practice of compelling the Spaniards to
furnish them; whilst as no troops had been supplied, it was clear that
there had never been an intention of sending any; the assurance of the
Minister of Marine that they were waiting for me at Coquimbo being only
a _ruse_ on his part to get me to sea without a military force.

We now received intelligence that the _Prueba_ had been accompanied from
Spain by two line of battle ships, and that these were daily expected at
Arica, whither I proceeded in quest of them, but was disappointed in not
finding them. It was subsequently learned, that although they had sailed
from Cadiz, in company with the _Prueba_, they never reached the
Pacific, one of them, the _Europe_, being pronounced unseaworthy on
crossing the line; and the other, the _Elmo_, foundering on the passage
round Cape Horn!

On the 5th of November, three hundred and fifty troops--now brought by
the experience and zeal of Lieut.-Col. Charles into a tolerably
soldier-like condition--were distributed on board the _Lautaro,
Galvarino_, and the remaining fire-ship, and were despatched to Pisco,
under the command of Captain Guise, for supplies to be taken from the
Spaniards, the troops being under the orders of Lieut.-Col. Charles, and
the marines under the direction of Major Miller.

As it was not improbable that the expected Spanish ships would make for
Callao, whilst it was more than probable that the _Prueha_ would again
attempt to run in, I therefore proceeded towards that port, and on the
8th anchored at San Lorenzo, the United States frigate _Macedonia_ being
also at anchor there. The presence of the latter put the Spaniards on
their mettle, for shortly after our arrival, they made a show of sending
twenty-seven gun-boats to attack us, not however, venturing to get their
frigates under weigh. Preparations being made on our part to cut off the
gun-boats, they quickly retreated, to the no small amusement of the
North Americans, for whose edification the spectacle had been exhibited.

I was not mistaken in the expectation that the _Prueba_ might again
attempt to take shelter under the forts of Callao. On her appearance, we
immediately gave chase, but she once more escaped in the night. On my
return, I fell in with, and captured her boat, which had been sent
ashore with despatches to the Viceroy, and from the information gained
from the crew, I now felt certain that she would take refuge in
Guayaquil, whither I determined to follow her.

Before doing so in the narrative, the success of the expedition
despatched to Pisco must be mentioned. It was the intention of the
officers commanding to land in the night, and thus take the garrison by
surprise; but this plan was frustrated by the wind dying away, so that
the landing could not be effected till broad daylight, when the
garrison, supported by field artillery and cavalry, were prepared to
receive them. Nothing daunted, the patriot troops landed without firing
a shot, through the fire of the guns, whilst the Spanish infantry from
house tops, and the church tower, thinned their ranks at every step. At
length it came to the bayonet, for which the Spaniards did not wait, but
rushed into the square of the town, after having mortally wounded the
brave Col. Charles. Major Miller instantly followed, when their last
volley in the square, before flying in all directions, brought down him
also, with three bullets in his body, so that his life was despaired of.
The ships remained for four days, during which they obtained all they
wanted; but 200,000 gallons of spirits, placed on the beach for
shipment, was destroyed by order of Captain Guise, in consequence of his
not being able to control the men, who, from the facility of obtaining
liquor, were becoming unmanageable.

On the 16th, the _Galvarino_ and _Lautaro_ rejoined me at Santa, which
place had previously been taken possession of by the marines left on
board the flag-ship. On the 21st, I despatched the _San Martin,
Independencia,_ and _Araucano_ to Valparaiso, together with a transport
filled with sick--an epidemic of a destructive nature having broken out
on board the squadron. This disease, which carried off many men, had
been introduced on board by the Minister of Marine's army of ninety men,
shipped at Coquimbo.

I now proceeded in search of the _Prueba_, with the flag-ship,
_Lautaro, Galvarino_, and _Puyrredon_. On the 27th, we entered the river
Guayaquil, and leaving the _Lautaro_ and the brigs outside, the
flag-ship crowded all sail during the night--though without a
pilot--arriving next morning at the island of Puna, under which two
large vessels were anchored, and instantly attacked, when, after a brisk
fire of twenty minutes, they struck, proving to be the _Aguila_, of 20
guns, and _Vigonia_, of 16 guns, both laden with timber, destined for
Lima. The village of Puna was also taken possession of. On rejoining the
other vessels with the prizes, they were found ready to sail, imagining
from the firing that I had fallen in with the _Prueba_, and might
possibly get the worst of the contest.

The _Prueba_ was at Guayaquil as had been anticipated, but having been
lightened of her guns and stores she had been towed up the river, where,
from the shallowness of the water, it was impossible to get at her;
whilst, as she lay under the protection of the batteries, I did not deem
it practicable to cut her out with the boats.

A circumstance here occurred which would not be worth mentioning, did it
not bear upon future matters. Captains Guise and Spry--imagining that I
should now return to Valparaiso, and that the comparative failure of the
expedition would be attributed to me, instead of to the worthless
rockets, and to my instructions not to attempt anything beyond their
use--endeavoured to get up a mutiny, by circulating a report that I did
not intend to permit the ships left outside to share in the prizes, and
had indeed left them behind for this purpose; having also permitted my
officers to plunder the prizes _ad libitum_, before leaving the
river--further declaring, that I intended to claim a double share, from
having acted in the capacity of admiral and captain.

As there was not the slightest doubt of their having sedulously
circulated these reports, with the object of entering the port of
Valparaiso with the squadron in a discontented condition, I determined
to take serious notice of their conduct. On the necessary steps being
taken, they both pledged their honour that they had not made or even
heard of such a report!

But I had no intention to return to Valparaiso, and still less to make
officers so inimical to me acquainted with my future plans.

On the 13th of December, Major Miller was so far recovered as to be
removed on board the flag-ship, after which I despatched the _Lautaro_
to Valparaiso with the two prizes, first transferring to her armament
the beautiful brass guns taken in the _Vigonia_; leaving the _Galvarino_
and _Puyrredon_ to watch the movements of the Spanish frigate.

As the reader may suppose, I was greatly annoyed at having been foiled
at Callao, from causes altogether beyond my control, for the bad
rockets, and worse faith of the Minister of Marine in not supplying me
with the promised troops, were no faults of mine. My instructions, as
has been said, were carefully drawn up to prevent my doing anything
rash--as the first trip to Callao had been represented by certain
officers under my command, who had no great relish for fighting. At the
same time the Chilian people expected impossibilities; and I had, for
some time, been revolving in my mind a plan to achieve one which should
gratify them, and allay my own wounded feelings. I had now only one
ship, so that there were no other inclinations to consult; and felt
quite sure of Major Miller's concurrence where there was any fighting to
be done, though a ball in the arm, another through the chest, passing
out at his back, and a left hand shattered for life, were not very
promising fighting incentives as far as physical force was concerned,
yet the moral courage of my gallant guest was untouched, and his
capacity to carry out my plans was greater than before, as being more
matured by sharp experience.

My design was, with the flag-ship alone, to capture by a _coup de main_
the numerous forts and garrison of Valdivia, a fortress previously
deemed impregnable, and thus to counteract the disappointment which
would ensue in Chili from our want of success before Callao. The
enterprise was a desperate one; nevertheless, I was not about to do
anything desperate, having resolved that, unless fully satisfied as to
its practicability, I would not attempt it. Rashness, though often
imputed to me, forms no part of my composition. There is a rashness
without calculation of consequences; but with that calculation,
well-founded, it is no longer rashness. And thus, now that I was
unfettered by people who did not second my operations as they ought to
have done, I made up my mind to take Valdivia, if the attempt came
within the scope of my calculations.

The first step clearly was to reconnoitre the place, where the flag-ship
arrived on the 18th of January, 1820, under Spanish colours, and made a
signal for a pilot, who--as the Spaniards mistook the _O'Higgins_ for
the long-expected _Prueba_--promptly came off, together with a
complimentary retinue of an officer and four soldiers, all of whom were
made prisoners as soon as they came on board. The pilot was ordered to
take us into the channels leading to the forts, whilst the officer and
his men, knowing there was little chance of finding their way on shore
again, thought it most conducive to their interests to supply all the
information demanded, the result being increased confidence on my part
as to the possibility of a successful attack. Amongst other information
obtained was the expected arrival of the Spanish brig of war _Potrillo_,
with money on board for the payment of the garrison.

As we were busily employing ourselves in inspecting the channels, the
officer commanding the garrison began to suspect that our object might
not altogether be pacific, this suspicion being confirmed by the
detention of his officer. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon us from
the various forts, to which we did not reply, but, our reconnoissance
being now completed, withdrew beyond its reach. Having occupied two days
in reconnoitring--on the third the _Potrillo_ hove in sight; and being
also deceived by our Spanish colours was captured without a
shot--20,000 dollars and some important despatches being found on board.

As nothing could be done without troops, with which the Chilian
ministers had been careful not to supply me, I determined to sail to
Conception, where Governor Freire had a considerable force to keep in
check the savage tribes of Indians whom the Spaniards employed, under
the monster Benavides and his brother, to murder the defenceless
patriots. On the 22nd of January we anchored in Talcahuano bay, where we
found the Buenos Ayrean brig _Intrepido_ and the Chilian schooner
_Montezuma_.

Governor Freire received us with great hospitality; and after
explanation of my plans, placed two hundred and fifty men at my
disposal, under the command of a gallant Frenchman, Major Beauchef;
notwithstanding that Freire was on the eve of attacking Benavides, and
by thus weakening his division might incur the displeasure of the
Government. No time was lost in embarking the men in the three vessels,
the _Montezuma_ being taken into the service, and the Buenos Ayrean brig
volunteering to accompany us.

It was highly praiseworthy on the part of General Freire to place these
troops under my orders, inasmuch as they were destined for a service in
the praise of which, even if successful, he could not participate;
whilst, if unsuccessful, he would certainly have incurred great blame.
He knew, moreover, that the Ministry had refrained from supplying me
with regular troops; yet he not only generously contributed them, but
pledged himself not to communicate my plans to the Government; our
destination being even kept secret from the officers, who were told not
to encumber themselves with baggage, as we were only going to Tucapel,
in order to harass the enemy at Arauco, thus making it appear that we
were about to aid General Freire against Benavides, instead of his
aiding us to capture Valdivia.

But our difficulties, though we had obtained the troops, were not at an
end. The flag-ship had only two naval officers on board, one of these
being under arrest for disobedience of orders, whilst the other was
incapable of performing the duty of lieutenant; so that I had to act as
admiral, captain, and lieutenant, taking my turn in the watch--or rather
being constantly on the watch--as the only available officer was so
incompetent.

We sailed from Talcahuano on the 25th of January, when I communicated my
intentions to the military officers, who displayed great eagerness in
the cause--alone questioning their success from motives of prudence. On
explaining to them that if unexpected projects are energetically put in
execution they almost invariably succeed, in spite of odds, they
willingly entered into my plans; and Major Miller's health being now
sufficiently re-established, his value as a commander was as great as
ever.

On the night of the 29th, we were off the island of Quiriquina, in a
dead calm. From excessive fatigue in the execution of subordinate
duties, I had laid down to rest, leaving the ship in charge of the
lieutenant, who took advantage of my absence to retire also,
surrendering the watch to the care of a midshipman, who fell asleep.
Knowing our dangerous position, I had left strict orders to be called
the moment a breeze sprang up, but these orders were neglected, and a
sudden wind taking the ship unawares, the midshipman, in attempting to
bring her round, ran her upon the sharp edge of a rock, where she lay
beating, suspended, as it were, upon her keel, and had the swell
increased, she must inevitably have gone to pieces.

We were forty miles from the mainland, the brig and schooner being both
out of sight. The first impulse both of officers and crew was to abandon
the ship, but as we had six hundred men on board, whilst not more than a
hundred and fifty could have entered the boats, this would have been but
a scramble for life. Pointing out to the men that those who escaped
could only reach the coast of Arauco, where they would meet nothing but
torture and inevitable death at the hands of the Indians, I with some
difficulty got them to adopt the alternative of attempting to save the
ship.

The first sounding gave five feet water in the hold, and the pumps were
entirely out of order. Our carpenter, who was only one by name, was
incompetent to repair them; but having myself some skill in carpentry I
took off my coat, and by midnight got them into working order, the water
meanwhile gaining on us, though the whole crew were engaged in bailing
it out with buckets.

To our great delight the leak did not increase, upon which I got out
the stream anchor, and commenced heaving off the ship, the officers
clamouring first to ascertain the extent of the leak. This I expressly
forbade, as calculated to damp the energy of the men, whilst as we now
gained on the leak, there was no doubt the ship would swim as far as
Valdivia, which was the chief point to be regarded, the capture of the
fortress being my object, after which the ship might be repaired at
leisure. As there was no lack of physical force on board, she was at
length floated; but the powder magazine having been under water, the
ammunition of every kind--except a little upon deck and in the cartouch
boxes of the troops--was rendered unserviceable; though about this I
cared little, as it involved the necessity of using the bayonet in our
anticipated attack, and to facing this weapon the Spaniards had, in
every case, evinced a rooted aversion.

Before making the land to the southward of Punta Galera, the troops in
the _O'Higgins_ as well as the marines, were, in a high sea, removed
into the _Intrepido_ and _Montezuma_, to which I shifted my flag,
ordering the _O'Higgins_ to stand off and on out of sight of land, to
avoid creating suspicion. We then made for the harbour, intending to
land the same evening and take the Spaniards by surprise, but, as it
fell calm, this plan was frustrated.

The fortifications of Valdivia are placed on both sides of a channel
three quarters of a mile in width, and command the entrance, anchorage,
and river leading to the town, crossing their fire in all directions so
effectually, that with proper caution on the part of the garrison no
ship could enter without suffering severely, while she would be equally
exposed at anchor. The principal forts on the western shore are placed
in the following order:--El Ingles, San Carlos, Amargos, Chorocomayo
Alto, and Corral Castle. Those on the eastern side are Niebla, directly
opposite Amargos, and Piojo; whilst on the island of Manzanera is a
strong fort mounted with guns of large calibre, commanding the whole
range of the entrance channel. These forts, with a few others, amounted
in the whole to fifteen, and in the hands of a skilful garrison would
render the place almost impregnable, the shores on which they stand
being almost inaccesible by reason of the surf, with the exception of a
small landing place at the Aguada del Ingles.

It was to this landing-place that we first directed our attention,
anchoring the brig and schooner off the guns of Fort Ingles, on the
afternoon of Feb. 3rd, amidst a swell which rendered immediate
disembarkation impracticable. The troops were carefully kept below; and
to avert the suspicion of the Spaniards, we had trumped up a story of
our having just arrived from Cadiz, and being in want of a pilot: upon
which they told us to send a boat for one. To this we replied, that our
boats had been washed away in the passage round Cape Horn. Not being
quite satisfied, they began to assemble troops at the landing-place,
firing alarm guns, and rapidly bringing up the garrisons of the western
forts to Fort Ingles, but not molesting us.

Unfortunately for the credit of the story about the loss of the boats,
which were at the time carefully concealed under the lee of the vessels,
one drifted astern, so that our object became apparent, and the guns of
Fort Ingles, under which we lay, forthwith opened upon us, the first
shots passing through the sides of the _Intrepido_, and killing two men,
so that it became necessary to land in spite of the swell. We had only
two launches and a gig, into which I entered to direct the operation,
Major Miller, with forty-four marines, pushing off in the first launch,
under the fire of the party at the landing place, by which the coxswain
being wounded, the Major had to take the helm, and whilst doing this,
received a ball through his hat, grazing the crown of his head. Ordering
a few only of his party to fire, the whole leaped ashore at the landing
place, driving the Spaniards, before them at the point of the bayonet.
The second launch now pushed off from the Intrepido, and, in this way,
in less than an hour, three hundred men had made good their footing on
shore.

The most difficult task--the capture of the forts--was to come; the only
way in which the first, Fort Ingles, could be approached being by a
precipitous path, along which the men could only pass in single file;
the fort itself being inaccessible except by a ladder, which the enemy,
after being routed by Major Miller, had drawn up.

As soon as it was dark, a picked party, under the guidance of one of
the Spanish prisoners, silently advanced to the attack, expecting to
fall in with a body of the enemy outside the fort, but all having
re-entered, our men were unopposed.

This party having taken up its position, the main body moved forward,
cheering and firing in the air, to intimate to the Spaniards that their
chief reliance was on the bayonet. The enemy, meanwhile, kept up an
incessant fire of artillery and musketry in the direction of the shouts,
but without effect, as no aim could be taken in the dark. Whilst the
patriots were thus noisily advancing, a gallant young officer, Ensign
Vidal--who had previously distinguished himself at Santa--got under the
inland flank of the fort, and with a few men, contrived unperceived to
tear up some pallisades, by which a bridge was made across the ditch,
whereby he and his small party entered, and formed noiselessly under
cover of some branches of trees which overhung it, the garrison
directing their whole attention to the shouting patriots in an opposite
direction.

A volley from Vidal's party convinced the Spaniards that they had been
taken in flank. Without waiting to ascertain the number of those who had
outflanked them, they instantly took to flight, filling with a like
panic a column of three hundred men, drawn up behind the fort. The
Chilians, who were now well up, bayoneted them by dozens, in their
efforts to gain the other forts, which were opened to receive them; the
patriots thus entering at the same time, and driving them from fort to
fort into the Castle of Corral, together with two hundred more, who had
abandoned some guns advantageously placed on a height at Fort
Chorocomayo. The Corral was stormed with equal rapidity, a number of the
enemy escaping in boats to Valdivia, others plunging into the forest;
whilst upwards of a hundred, besides officers, fell into our hands, the
like number being found bayoneted on the following morning. Our loss was
seven men killed, and nineteen wounded.

The Spaniards had, no doubt, regarded their position as impregnable,
which, considering its difficulty of access and almost natural
impenetrability, it ought to have been, if properly defended. They had
only found out their error when too late, thus justifying my former
remark to the military officers, that an attack where least expected is
almost invariably crowned with success. Much less had the Spaniards
calculated on a night attack, the most favourable of all to the
attacking party, as necessitating unity of action--and the least
favourable of all to the party attacked, as inspiring doubt and panic,
almost certain to end in irresolution and defeat. The garrison consisted
of the Cantabria regiment of the line, numbering about eight hundred,
with whom was associated a militia of upwards of a thousand.

On the 5th, the _Intrepido_ and _Montezuma_, which had been left at the
Aguada Inglesa, entered the harbour, being fired at in their passage by
Fort Niebla on the eastern shore. On their coming to an anchor at the
Corral, two hundred men were again embarked to attack Forts Niebla,
Carbonero, and Piojo. The _O'Higgins_ now appearing in sight off the
mouth of the harbour, the Spaniards abandoned the forts on the eastern
side, no doubt judging that as the western forts had been captured
without the aid of the frigate, they had--now that she had arrived--no
chance of successfully defending them; the patriot troops were therefore
disembarked at Fort Niebla till the tide served to take them to the town
of Valdivia.

In crossing the harbour, the _Intrepido_, from want of precaution in
taking soundings, grounded on a bank in the channel, where, bilged by
the surf, she finally became a wreck. Nor was the _O'Higgins_ in a much
better condition, as, from the injury sustained at Quiriquina, it became
necessary to put her ashore on a mud bank, as the sole means of saving
her from going down in deep water, so that the only vessel left was the
little schooner _Montezuma_.

On the 6th, the troops were again embarked to pursue the flying garrison
up the river, when we received a flag of truce informing us that the
enemy had abandoned the town, after plundering the private houses and
magazines; and, together with the Governor, Colonel Montoya, had fled in
the direction of Chiloe. From the disorders which were committed by the
Spaniards, previous to their retreat, the town was in great
consternation, many of the inhabitants having also fled; a proclamation
issued by me, to the effect that no one should be molested in person or
property, had, however, the effect of inducing them to return; and an
additional order immediately to choose for themselves a Governor, at
once restored peace and tranquillity--the disposition of the people
being for the most part good, whilst any leaning which might have
existed in favour of Spanish rule was dissipated by the excesses which,
previous to their flight, the royalist troops had committed.

The fortifications were so numerous, that at first it was my intention
to destroy them and embark the artillery, as the Spaniards who had
escaped to Chiloe--where another Spanish regiment was stationed--might
return after my departure and recover them, the force which could be
spared to garrison them being insignificant when distributed amongst
fifteen forts. On further reflection, I could not make up my mind to
destroy fortresses, the erection of which had cost upwards of a million
of dollars, and which Chili would find it difficult to replace; and
therefore determined on leaving them intact, with their artillery and
ammunition, intending, before my return to Valparaiso, to render the
rout of the Spaniards who had escaped, yet more complete.

The booty which fell into our hands, exclusive of the value of the forts
and public buildings, was considerable, Valdivia being the chief
military depot in the southern part of the continent. Amongst the
military stores, were upwards of 1,000 cwt. of gunpowder, 10,000 cannon
shot, of which 2,500 were brass, 170,000 musket cartridges, a large
quantity of small arms, 128 guns, of which 53 were brass, and the
remainder iron; the ship _Dolores_, afterwards sold at Valparaiso for
20,000 dollars, with public stores, also sold for the like value; and
plate, of which General Sanchez had previously stripped the churches of
Conception, valued at 16,000 dollars.

From correspondence found in the archives of Valdivia, it was clear that
Quintanilla, the Governor of Chiloe, had serious apprehensions of a
revolt at San Carlos, so that, in place of returning to Valparaiso, I
resolved to see what could be effected there. The loss of the
_Intrepido_ was a serious drawback to our means of transporting troops,
and the flag-ship would no longer float; as, however, we had possession
of the _Dolores_, it was resolved to crowd into her and the _Montezuma_
all the troops that could be spared, leaving Major Beauchef the whole of
those brought from Conception.

Meanwhile, I despatched a _piragua_ to Valparaiso with the intelligence
of our success; the unexpected news, as was afterwards learned, creating
such an amount of popular enthusiasm as had never before been witnessed
in Chili. The most amusing part of the affair was, that by the time my
despatches announcing our victory reached Vaparaiso, the other ships of
the squadron had also arrived, when Captain Guise and his officers had
attributed our rocket failure at Callao to my want of skill in their
use; the inference desired, being my want of capability to command a
squadron. Not a word of blame was then attributed to poor Goldsack, who
had superintended their manufacture, as indeed none was deserved, though
the blame afterwards attributed to him ended as before stated in his
ruin.

To this alleged want of professional skill on my part, Zenteno had
drawn up an elaborate accusation against me of disobedience to orders,
in not having returned, according to my instructions; the whole _clique_
felicitating themselves on my dismissal with disgrace. Even the people
did not know what judgment to form, as all materials for forming an
opinion were kept from them, whilst every pretence tending to my
discredit was carefully made known. On news of the victory, all this was
immediately hushed up--the ministers, to retrieve their own credit,
joined in the popular enthusiasm, which it would have been unavailing to
thwart--and poor Goldsack was overwhelmed with reproach for the failure
of his rockets, though the whole blame rested with the Government in
having employed Spanish prisoners as his workmen.




CHAPTER III.

DEPARTURE FOR CHILOE--PREPARATIONS OF THE ENEMY--CAPTURE OF FORT
CORONA--FAILURE AT FORT AGUY, AND SUBSEQUENT RETREAT--RETURN TO
VALDIVIA--CAPTURE OF OSORIO--RETURN TO VALPARAISO--ENTHUSIASTIC
RECEPTION--CHAGRIN OF THE MINISTRY--IMPORTANCE OF CONQUEST OF VALDIVIA
IN A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW--PROMOTION OF OFFICERS UNDER
ARREST--EMPLOYMENT OF INDIANS BY THE SPANIARDS--CAREER OF
BENAVIDES--MUTINOUS SPIRIT OF THE SEAMEN IN CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR
CAPTURES BEING APPROPRIATED BY GOVERNMENT--RESIGNATION OF MY
COMMISSION--REFUSAL THEREOF--RENEWED OFFER OF AN ESTATE--THIS AGAIN
DECLINED--SEAMEN OBTAIN THEIR WAGES--PRIVATE PURCHASE OF AN
ESTATE--GOVERNMENT GIVES NOTICE OF TAKING IT--APPOINTMENT OF FLAG
CAPTAIN AGAINST MY WISHES--ANNOYANCE GIVEN TO ME BY MINISTER OF
MARINE--RENEWED RESIGNATION OF THE COMMAND--OFFICERS OF THE SQUADRON
RESIGN IN A BODY--GOVERNMENT BEGS OF ME TO RETAIN THE COMMAND--MY
CONSENT--GENERAL SAN MARTIN--THE SENATE--ZENTENO--CORRUPTION OF PARTIES
IN THE ADMINISTRATION.


Having provided for the safety of the city and province of Valdivia, by
establishing a provisional government, and left Major Beauchef with his
own troops to maintain order--on the 16th of February, I sailed with the
_Montezuma_ schooner, and our prize the _Dolores_, for the island of
Chiloe, taking with me two hundred men, under the command of Major
Miller, my object being to wrest Chiloe from Spain, as I had done
Valdivia. Unfortunately, the services of the flag-ship, the _O'Higgins_,
were not available, there being no way of rendering her seaworthy,
without tedious repairs, for which there was no time, as our success
depended on attacking Chiloe before the Governor had leisure to prepare
for defence. Neither of our vessels being armed for fighting, I
depended altogether upon Major Miller and our handful of soldiers to
oppose a thousand regular troops, besides a numerous militia; but having
been informed that the garrison was in a mutinous state, I calculated
that by judicious management, they might be induced to join the patriot
cause.

Unluckily, our design had got wind, and the Spanish Governor,
Quintanilla, a judicious officer, had managed to conciliate them. On
coming to an anchor on the 17th, at Huechucucay, we found a body of
infantry and cavalry, with a field-piece, ready to dispute our landing;
but drawing off their attention by a feigned attack upon a distant spot,
and thus dividing them into two parties, Major Miller got on shore, and
soon routed them, capturing their field-piece.

A night attack being decided upon, the troops, a hundred and seventy in
number, moved on under the direction of a guide, who, wilfully or
treacherously, misled them, the men thus wandering about in the dark
throughout the whole night. At dawn, they found their way to Fort
Corona, which, with a detached battery, was taken without loss. Halting
for a short time to refresh the men, Major Miller bravely, but too
precipitately, moved on Fort Aguy, in broad daylight; this fort being
the stronghold of the enemy, mounting twelve guns, with others flanking
the only accessible path by which entrance could be gained, and being
garrisoned by three companies of regulars, two companies of militia, and
a full proportion of artillerymen. The fort stood on a hill, washed on
one side by the sea, and having on the other an impenetrable forest, the
only access being by a narrow path, whilst the means of retreat for the
garrison was by the same path, so that the attack became for the latter
a matter of life and death, since, in case of defeat, there was no mode
of escape, as at Valdivia.

In spite of these odds, and the spectacle of two fanatical friars on the
ramparts, with lance in one hand, and crucifix in the other, urging on
the garrison to resist to the death the handful of aggressors--the
indomitable courage of Miller did not allow him to remain in the forts
he had already taken till nightfall, when he would have been
comparatively safe by attacking in the dark. Choosing out of his small
band a forlorn hope of sixty men, he perilled his own safety, upon which
so much depended, by leading them in person; every gun and musket of the
enemy being concentrated on a particular angle of the path which he must
needs pass. As the detachment reached the spot, a shower of grape and
musketry mowed down the whole, twenty out of the sixty being killed
outright, whilst nearly all the rest were mortally wounded. Seeing their
gallant Commander fall, the marines, who were waiting to follow, dashed
through the fire, and brought him off, with a grape-shot through his
thigh, and the bones of his right foot crushed by a round shot. Another
dash by the force which remained brought off the whole of the wounded,
though adding fearfully to their numbers. This having been accomplished,
Captain Erescano, who succeeded to the command, ordered a retreat; the
Spaniards, animated by success, and urged on by the friars, following
just within musket-shot, and making three separate attacks, which were
on each occasion repelled, though from the killed and wounded, the
pursuers were now fully six times their number. Nevertheless one-half of
the diminished band kept the enemy at bay, whilst the other half spiked
the guns, broke up the gun-carriages, and destroyed the military stores
in the forts captured in the morning, when they resumed their march to
the beach, followed by the Spaniards as before.

The marines who, with affectionate fidelity, had borne off Major Miller,
had been careful to protect him from fire, though two out of the three
who carried him were wounded in the act; and when, on arriving at the
beach, they were invited by him to enter the boat, one of them, a
gallant fellow named Roxas, of whom I had spoken highly in my despatches
from Valdivia, on account of his distinguished bravery, refused, saying,
"No, Sir, I was the first to land, and I mean to be the last to go on
board." He kept his word; for on his Commander being placed in safety,
he hastened back to the little band, now nearly cut up, and took his
share in the retreat, being the last to get into the boats. Such were
the Chilenos, of whom the mean jealousy of the Minister of Marine,
Zenteno, refused to allow me a thousand for operations at Callao--which
could have been conducted with ease, as Valdivia had been captured with
less than a third of that number.

Our force being now seriously diminished, and feeling convinced that
the fanatics of Chiloe were devoted to the cause of Spain, there was
nothing left but to return to Valdivia, where, finding that the
Spaniards who had been dispersed in the neighbourhood were committing
excesses, I despatched Major Beauchef with 100 men to Osorio to secure
that town, the relief being accepted with great joy even by the Indians,
of whom, wrote Major Beauchef to me, "I have embraced more than a
thousand Caciques and their followers. They have all offered their
services to fight in the patriotic cause; but as circumstances do not
require this, I have invited them to return to their own lands, and have
received their promises to be ready if the country should call for their
services." The Spaniards being driven from Osorio, the flag of Chili
was, on the 26th of February, hoisted on the castle by Major Beauchef,
who returned to Valdivia.

There being nothing further to require my presence, I placed the
_O'Higgins_ under the orders of my secretary, Mr. Bennet, to superintend
her repairs, and embarked in the _Montezuma_, for Valparaiso, taking
with me five Spanish officers who had been made prisoners, amongst whom
was Colonel Fausto De Hoyos, the Commandant of the Cantabria regiment.

On my departure, the Spaniards, elated by their success at Chiloe,
combined with those who had been driven from Valdivia, in an attempt to
recover their lost possessions, but Major Beauchef, having timely
intelligence of their intention, set out to meet them. A number of
volunteers having joined the patriot force, Major Beauchef on the 6th of
March encountered the enemy on the river Toro, and instantly attacked
them, when, in about an hour, the Spanish officers mounted their horses
and fled in a body, leaving the men to their fate. Nearly three hundred
of these immediately surrendered, and Major Beauchef--having captured
the whole of the arms and baggage--returned in triumph to Valdivia.

On the 27th of February, I arrived at Valparaiso, in the _Montezuma_,
amidst the most lively demonstrations of enthusiasm on the part of the
populace, and warm expressions of gratitude from the Supreme Director.
But my reception by his ministers was wholly different. Zenteno, through
whose orders I had broken, declared, that the conquest of Valdivia "was
the act of a madman! that I deserved to have lost my life in the
attempt; and even now ought to lose my head for daring to attack such a
place without instructions, and for exposing the patriot troops to such
hazard;" afterwards setting on foot a series of intrigues, having for
their object the depreciation of the service which had been rendered, so
that I found myself exposed to the greatest possible vexation and
annoyance, with not the slightest indication of national acknowledgment
or reward to myself, officers, or men.

The chagrin of Zenteno and the bad passions of his adherents were
further enhanced by the congratulatory addresses which poured in on both
the Supreme Director and myself from all parts, the people declaring,
contrary to the assertions of Zenteno, that I had acted, not from any
feeling of personal vanity, but from a conviction of the national
utility of the act; and that by its accomplishment the valour of the
Chilenos had been so displayed as to shew that they had the utmost
confidence in their officers, and hence possessed the moral as well as
physical courage necessary for further achievements.

Notwithstanding the envious dissatisfaction of Zenteno, the government
was compelled, in deference to the popular voice, to award medals to the
captors, the decree for this stating that "the capture of Valdivia was
the happy result of the devising of an admirably arranged plan, and of
the most daring and valorous execution." The decree further conferred on
me an estate of 4,000 quadras from the confiscated lands of Conception,
which I refused, as no vote of thanks was given by the legislature; this
vote I finally obtained as an indemnification to myself for having
exceeded my orders; such being necessary after Zenteno's expressions of
ill-will towards me on account of breaking through instructions.

Situated as Chili then was, it is impossible to over-rate the importance
of this acquisition--the capture of a noble harbour protected by fifteen
forts, and the magazines with their vast amount of military stores,
being even secondary to the political advantages gained by the Republic.

The annexation of this province, at one blow conferred on Chili
complete independence, averting the contemplated necessity for fitting
out a powerful military expedition for the attainment of that object,
vitally essential to her very existence as an independent state;
because, so long as Valdivia remained in the hands of the Spaniards,
Chili was, in her moments of unguardedness or disunion, in constant
danger of losing the liberties she had, as yet, but partially acquired.

The resources of the province of Valdivia, together with those of
Conception, had contributed the means whereby the Spaniards maintained
their hold upon the Chilian territory. Not only were they deprived of
these resources--now added to those of Chili--but a great saving was
effected by exonerating the Republic from the necessity of maintaining a
military force in the southern provinces, as a check upon both Spaniards
and Indians, who, at the moment of our conquest of Valdivia, were being
let loose in all directions against the Chilian patriots.

Setting aside, therefore, the removal of danger, and the complete
establishment of independence, the money value alone of the conquest
was, to a Government of very limited means, of the first importance, as
doing away with the necessity of military expenditure, estimated by
competent judges at a million of dollars, merely to attempt the
accomplishment of an object, which, without any additional cost, I had
effected with a single ship, so unseaworthy that she had to be left
behind.

But the advantage of the conquest did not end here. Had it not been for
this capture, the Spanish power in Chili, aided by the Indians, would
have found it easy to maintain itself in such a country for a protracted
period, despite any military force Chili was in a condition to bring
against it; so that no effective co-operation with the people of Peru
could have been undertaken--as common prudence would have deterred them
from entering into distant revolutionary projects, so long as the
Spaniards were in possession of any part of the Chilian territory;
whilst the necessity of defending herself through a protracted civil
war, would have prevented Chili from aiding in the liberation of Peru,
which would thus have remained a permanent base of operations for the
Spaniards to annoy, if not again to recover, the Chilian provinces.

A further advantage was the successful negociation of a loan of one
million sterling in England, which was accomplished solely on account of
what had been achieved, every attempt at this having failed so long as
the Spaniards were in possession of the most important harbour and
fortress in the country, from which, as a basis, they might organize
future attempts to recover the revolted provinces.

Notwithstanding these advantages, not a penny in the shape of reward,
either for this or any previous service, was paid to myself, the
officers, or seamen, nevertheless the Government appropriated the money
arising from the sale of the _Dolores_, and the stores with which she
was loaded; neither was there any account taken of the value of the guns
and the enormous amount of ammunition left in the forts at Valdivia.
The men who performed this achievement were literally in rags, and
destitute of everything, no attempt being made by the department of
Marine to lessen their sufferings--for to this extent was their
condition reduced.

In place of reward, every encouragement was offered to the officers to
disobey my orders. Two of these I had marked for punishment, for
deliberate murder. Ensign Vidal having captured two Spanish officers in
Fort Ingles, they surrendered their swords, receiving the gallant
youth's pledge of safety; but Captain Erescano coming up, immediately
butchered them. Another case was even worse: Ensign Latapia, who had
been left in command of the castle of Corral, after my departure to
Chiloe, ordered two of his prisoners to be shot; and four officers would
have met the same fate, had not my secretary, Mr. Bennet, taken them on
board the _O'Higgins_. For this I placed Latapia under arrest, making
the necessary declarations for a court-martial, and conveyed him as a
prisoner to Valparaiso, where, in place of being punished, both he and
Erescano were promoted, and taken into the liberating army of General
San Martin.

I have spoken of the aid afforded to the Spaniards by the Indians. On
the 10th of March General Freire, afterwards Supreme Director, wrote me
a letter congratulatory of my success against Valdivia, which he
concluded by informing me that its capture had already caused the
Indians of Angol, and their Cacique, Benavente, to declare in favour of
Chili, and that he did not doubt but that this would shortly be followed
by a similar declaration on the part of the Indians throughout the
province; General Freire not being aware that I had already produced
this effect by distributing amongst them an immense quantity of trumpery
stores and gewgaws, accumulated by the Spaniards in the magazines at
Valdivia, for the purpose of rewarding murderous inroads into the
Chilian territory.

It will be interesting briefly to note the employment of Indians by the
Spaniards. Their agent, or leader, in this horrible warfare, was a
wretch named Benavides, who may fairly lay claim to the distinction of
being the most perfect monster who ever disgraced humanity. He had
originally been a common soldier in the Buenos Ayrean army, and,
together with his brother, had _carte blanche_ from the Spaniards to
commit the most fearful atrocities on the Chilian patriots, who could
not defend themselves against the stealthy cowardice of Indian warfare.
His invariable practice was, whenever a village or estate could be
surprised, to sew up the leading inhabitants as tightly as possible in
raw ox-hides stripped from their own cattle, when, being laid in the
burning sun, the contraction of the hides as they dried caused a slow
and lingering death of perfect agony, which it was the amusement of
himself and the savages whom he led to enjoy whilst smoking their
cigars. When any persons of influence fell into his hands, he cut out
their tongues, and otherwise horribly mutilated them--a bishop and
several other gentlemen surviving as witnesses of his atrocities.

Valdivia was this man's _point d'appui_, whence he drew his supplies,
and when we took the place a small vessel fell into our hands, laden
with arms and ammunition for his disposal amongst the Indians. She was
destined for Arauco, and had on board two Spanish officers and four
non-commissioned officers, sent for the purpose of rendering the Indians
still more formidable by indoctrinating them into European modes of
warfare.

The wretch Benavides was afterwards bought over by General San Martin,
and sent to Conception for the orders of General Freire, who told him to
his face that he would have nothing to do with such a monster; whereupon
Benavides left Conception, and commenced a desolating warfare upon the
inhabitants of the coast, even refining upon his former barbarities. The
country getting too hot for him, he again offered his services to the
Spaniards, and was on his way to Peru in a small vessel, when, being
compelled to go ashore for water, in the vicinity of Valparaiso, one of
his men betrayed him, and he was sent to Santiago, where he was hung.

The seamen were becoming mutinous, in consequence of neither receiving
pay nor prize-money, every promise given being broken, as well to them
as to myself. As they looked to me for the vindication of their rights,
and, indeed, had only been kept from open outbreak by my assurance that
they should be paid, I addressed a letter of expostulation to the
Supreme Director, recounting their services and the ill-merited
harshness to which they were exposed at the hands of his Ministers,
notwithstanding that since their return they had aided the Government in
the construction of wharves and other conveniences necessary for the
embarkation of troops and stores to Peru--a military expedition to that
country being now decided on.

The fact was, that the proceeds of the captures were appropriated by the
Government, which, to avoid repayment, declared that the conquest of
Valdivia was a _restoration!_ though the place had never been in
possession of Chili. On my refusing to allow the stores I had brought
from thence to be disembarked, unless as a compensation to the seamen,
it was alleged as a reason for the course pursued that even if Valdivia
had not belonged to the Republic, Chili did not make war on every
section of America. It was therefore put to my liberality and honourable
character whether I would not give up to the Government all that the
squadron had acquired?

These views were written by Monteagudo, afterwards the willing
instrument of General San Martin in Peru. I asked him, "Whether he
considered that which had been advanced as just, or according to law?"
The reply was, "_Certainly not, but I was ordered to write so!_" Finding
that I would surrender nothing, it was next debated in the Council
whether I ought not to be brought to a court martial for having delayed
and diverted the naval forces of Chili to the reduction of Valdivia,
without the orders of Government!

No doubt this course would have been decided on but from the unsettled
condition of the Republic and fear of the populace, who denounced the
views of the Ministry as heartily as they advocated my proceedings.

As nothing in the shape of justice could be obtained for the squadron,
on the 14th of May, I begged His Excellency the Supreme Director to
accept the resignation of my Commission, as, by retaining it, I should
only be instrumental in promoting the ruin which must follow the conduct
of his advisers; at the same time telling him I had not accepted it to
have my motives misconstrued, and my services degraded as they had been
on account of objects which I was unable to divine, unless, indeed, a
narrow-minded jealousy, such as that which designated the capture of
Valdivia, its "_restoration_," though it had never before passed from
under the dominion of the Spaniards.

This course had not been anticipated, though it was not adopted in any
spirit of intimidation, but from repugnance to the heartless ingratitude
with which important national services had been met. The Ministers were,
however, thus brought for a time to their senses, the justice of my
complaints being acknowledged, and every assurance given that for the
future the Government would observe good faith towards the squadron. An
estate, as has been said, had been offered to me as a reward for my
services, which was declined for reasons already adduced. The offer was
now renewed, but again declined, as nothing but promises were as yet
forthcoming to the service, and the only hold upon the seamen was my
personal influence with them, in consequence of my unyielding advocacy
of their rights--a hold which I was not likely to forego for a grant to
myself. In place, therefore, of accepting the estate, I returned the
document conveying the grant, with a request that it might be sold, and
the proceeds applied to the payment of the squadron; but the requisition
was not complied with.

Seeing that I was determined not to be trifled with, and shamed by my
offer of applying the estate to the payment of the men, General San
Martin, who was appointed to command the military portion of the
expedition to Peru, came to Valparaiso in June, and on the 13th of July,
the squadron was paid wages in part only, but as I insisted on the whole
being liquidated, this was done on the 16th; but without any portion of
their prize-money. My share alone of the value of captures made at and
previous to the capture of Valdivia was 67,000 dollars, and for this I
received the assurance of the Supreme Director that it should be paid to
me at the earliest possible moment; upon which I accepted the estate
which continued to be pressed upon me, the grant expressing the purpose
for which it was given, adding as a reason that "my name should never
cease from the land." This estate, situated at Rio Clara, was, after my
departure from Chili, forcibly resumed by the succeeding Government;
and the bailiff, whom I had placed upon it for the purpose of seeing how
it could be improved by culture and the introduction of valuable
European seeds, was forcibly expelled from its supervision.

On my first refusal to accept the estate--for the reason before
assigned--in order to convince the Chilians how great was my desire to
be enrolled amongst the number of their citizens, I purchased a hacienda
at Herradura, about eight miles from Valparaiso. The effect produced by
this upon the Ministry was almost ludicrous. It was gravely argued
amongst them as to what I, a foreigner, could intend by purchasing an
estate in Chili? The conclusion to which they came being, as I was
credibly informed, that as the whole population was with me, I must
intend, when opportunity served, to set myself up as the ruler of the
Republic, relying upon the people for support! Such was statesmanship at
that day in Chili.

It so happened, that soon after purchasing this property I pointed out
to the Government how much better the Bay of Herradura was calculated
for a naval arsenal, than the ill-protected Bay of Valparaiso; offering
at the same time to make them a gratuitous present of all the land
required for the establishment of a naval arsenal and marine depot. This
offer was, no doubt, construed into an act, on my part, to gain
additional popularity--though this, perhaps, would have been no easy
matter; and a notice was served upon me not to make any improvements, as
the Government intended to appropriate the estate--but would not
reimburse any outlay, though they would repay me the purchase money, and
also for any improvements that had already have been effected!

I instantly solicited an explanation of the Supreme Director, and
received an apology, attributing the whole affair to the officiousness
of the Attorney-General, who had founded his proceeding on an old
Spanish law; and there, for a time, the matter dropped, but for a time
only--viz. so long as the necessities of the state required my services.

A new source of annoyance now arose, in all kinds of attempts to lessen
my authority in the navy, but as I was always on the alert to maintain
my position, these resulted in nothing but defeat to their concoctors.
At length an overt act was committed in the appointment of Captain Spry
as my flag captain on board the _O'Higgins_, which had been repaired at
Valdivia, and was now come down to Valparaiso. An order to this effect
was sent to me, which I promptly refused to obey, adding that Captain
Spry should never tread my quarter-deck as flag captain, and that if my
privilege as an admiral were not admitted, the Government might consider
my command as at an end, for so long as I continued in command of the
squadron, I would not permit an executor of my orders to be forced upon
me. The point was immediately conceded, and Captain Crosbie was
appointed flag captain.

The nomination of Spry was, no doubt, meant to control my efforts in the
future expedition to Peru, the credit of which, if any, was to be
reserved for the army. As far as I knew anything of Captain Spry, I had
no personal objections to him, but, restricted as I had been by the
Minister of Marine Zenteno, I had great doubts as to the motives for
appointments of his making, being convinced that his principal aim was
to prevent me from doing anything beyond keeping the Spaniards in check,
an operation to which I was by no means inclined to accede, as had been
evinced by the recent conquest of Valdivia, in excess of his
instructions.

Encouraged by the annoyance given to me by the Minister of Marine and
his party, one or two of my captains thought themselves at liberty to
manifest a disregard to my authority, which, as their admiral, I did not
choose to tolerate. The most influential of these was Captain Guise,
who, having been guilty of several acts of direct disobedience and
neglect of duty, was, by my orders, put in arrest, pending a demand made
by me that the Government should institute a court martial for the
investigation of his conduct. This act greatly irritated Zenteno, who
desired to support him, and refused consent to the inquiry; thus
establishing a precedent for the captain of any ship to consider himself
independent of the admiral.

Such an act of folly in violation of the discipline of the navy, no less
than of personal insult to myself, determined me to have nothing more to
do with the Chilian administration, and on July 16th, I once more
transmitted to the Government my resignation, at the same time demanding
my passport to quit the country, notifying to the officers of the
squadron that on the receipt of the same I should cease to command. A
meeting was immediately held amongst them, and on the same day, I
received--not a valedictory address, as might have been expected--but
two letters, one signed by five captains, and the other by twenty-three
commissioned officers, containing resolutions of abandoning the service
also, at the same time handing in their commissions. To this proof of
attachment, I replied, by requesting that they would not sacrifice their
own positions on my account, and recommended them not to make their
resolutions public till they had further considered the matter, as it
might be seriously detrimental to the interests of the country.

The following letter was addressed to me on this occasion by the
officers of the squadron:--

   "On board the _Independencia_, July 18, 1820."

   My Lord,

   The general discontent and anxiety which your Lordship's
   resignation has occasioned amongst the officers and others of
   the squadron, afford a strong proof how much the ungrateful conduct
   of the Government is felt by those serving under your command.

   "The officers whose names are subscribed to the enclosed resolutions,
   disdaining longer to serve under a Government which can
   so soon have forgotten the important services rendered to the State,
   beg leave to put in your hands their commissions, and to request
   you will be kind enough to forward them to the Minister of Marine.
   At the same time that we are thus forced to withdraw ourselves from
   the service, our warmest wishes will be offered up for the prosperity
   and liberty of the country."

   "Signed by 23 Commissioned Officers."

The following resolutions accompanied this letter:--

"Resolved--1. That the honour, safety, and interest of the Chilian
navy entirely rest on the abilities and experience of the present
Commander-in-Chief."

"2. That, as the feelings of unbounded confidence and respect which we
entertain for him cannot be transferred to another, we have come to the
resolution of resigning our commissions, and of transmitting them to
Government, through the hands of our admiral."

"3. That our commissions shall be accompanied by a letter expressive of
our sentiments, signed by all whose commissions are enclosed."

"Signed by 23 Officers."

Pending the acceptance of my resignation by the Government, the
equipment of the squadron was carried on with the greatest alacrity, so
that there might be no ground for complaint that the termination of my
command had caused any remissness in our duties. I, however, withheld
the commissions which had been enclosed to me by the officers of the
squadron, lest the measure should excite popular dissatisfaction, and
thus cause a danger for which the Government was unprepared.

The only captains who did not sign the resolutions were Guise and Spry,
the former being in arrest, and the latter being offended with me on
account of my refusal to accept him as flag captain. There is no doubt
but that he immediately communicated to Zenteno the resolutions of the
officers, for on the 20th I received from him the following letter:--

   "Valparaiso, July 20th, 1820."

   "My Lord,"

   "At a moment when the services of the naval forces of
   the State are of the highest importance, and the personal services
   of your Lordship indispensable, the Supremacy, with the most
   profound sentiments of regret, has received your resignation, which,
   should it be admitted, would involve the future operations of the
   arms of liberty in the New World in certain ruin; and ultimately
   replace in Chili, your adopted home, that tyranny which, your
   Lordship abhors, and to the annihilation of which your heroism has
   so greatly contributed."

   "His Excellency the Supreme Director commands me to
   inform your Lordship that should you persist in resigning the command
   of the squadron which has been honoured by bearing your
   flag--the cause of terror and dismay to our enemies, and of glory to
   all true Americans; or should the Government unwisely admit it,
   this would indeed be a day of universal mourning in the New
   World. The Government, therefore, in the name of the nation
   returns you your commission, soliciting your re-acceptance of it, for
   the furtherance of that sacred cause to which your whole soul is
   devoted."

   "The Supremacy is convinced of the necessity which obliges
   your Lordship to adopt the measures which placed Captain Guise, of
   the _Lantaro_, in arrest, and of the justice of the charges exhibited
   against this officer; but being desirous of preventing any delay in
   the important services in which the ships of war are about to
   proceed, it is the request of His Excellency the Supreme Director
   that his trial be postponed to the first opportunity which does not
   interfere with the service of the squadron, so important at the
   present epoch."

   "(Signed) JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO."

In addition to this communication from the Minister of Marine, I
received private letters from the Supreme Director and General San
Martin, begging me to continue in command of the naval forces, and
assuring me that there should be no further cause for complaint.

On receipt of these letters I withdrew my resignation, and returned to
the officers of the squadron their commissions, at the same time
setting Captain Guise at liberty, and reinstating him in the command of
his ship. I would not have done this but from a feeling of attachment to
the Supreme Director, General O'Higgins, whose amiable disposition--too
easy to contend with the machinations of those around him,--- was a
sufficient assurance that he was neither an actor in, nor even privy to
the system of annoyance pursued towards me by a clique of whom Zenteno
was the agent. Like many other good commanders, O'Higgins did not
display that tact in the cabinet which had so signally served his
country in the field, in which,--though General San Martin, by his
unquestionable powers of turning the achievements of others to his own
account, contrived to gain the credit--the praise was really due to
General O'Higgins. The same easy disposition, after the elevation of the
latter to the Supreme Directorate, induced him to consent to the
establishment of a senatorial court of consultation, conceding to it
privileges altogether incompatible with his own supremacy; and it was
with this body that all the vexations directed against me originated--as
has been asserted by writers on Chili, at the instigation of General San
Martin; but having no documentary evidence to prove this, I shall not
take upon myself to assert the fact, notwithstanding that the subsequent
conduct of the General gave more than probability to the generally
received opinion.

There was, however, no doubt but that General San Martin had been privy
to much of the annoyance given to the squadron and myself, as, upon my
accusing him of this, he replied that he only "wanted to see how far the
Supreme Director would allow a party spirit to oppose the welfare of the
expedition;" adding, "Never mind, my lord, I am general of the army, and
you shall be admiral of the squadron." _"Bien, milord, yo soy General
del exercito, y V. sara Almirante de la esquadra."_ His allusion to the
complicity of the Supreme Director I knew to be false, as His Excellency
was anxious to do all in his power both for the squadron and his
country; had not the Senate, on which he had conferred such
extraordinary powers, thwarted all his endeavours.

General San Martin was, however, much surprised when I shewed him the
letters and returned commissions of the officers, he having no
conception of their determination not to serve under any command but my
own; this step on their part being fraught with the greatest danger to
the equipment of the contemplated expedition.

The Senate just noticed was an anomaly in state government. It consisted
of five members, whose functions were to remain only during the first
struggles of the country for independence; but this body had now assumed
a permanent right to dictatorial control, whilst there was no appeal
from their arbitrary conduct, except to themselves. They arrogated the
title of "Most Excellent," whilst the Supreme Director was simply "His
Excellency;" his position, though nominally head of the executive,
being really that of mouth-piece to the Senate, which, assuming all
power, deprived the Executive Government of its legitimate influence, so
that no armament could be equipped, no public work undertaken, no troops
raised, and no taxes levied, except by the consent of this irresponsible
body. For such a clique, the plain, simple good sense, and thorough good
feeling of the Supreme Director was no match; as, being himself above
meanness, he was led to rely on the honesty of others from the
uprightness of his own motives. Though in every way disposed to believe,
with Burke, that "what is morally wrong can never be politically right,"
he was led to believe that a crooked policy was a necessary evil of
Government; and as such a policy was adverse to his own nature, he was
the more easily induced to surrender its administration to others who
were free from his conscientious principles.

Of these the most unscrupulous was Zenteno, who, previous to the
revolution, had been an attorney at Conception, and was a _protégé_ of
General San Martin--carrying with him into State Administration the
practical cunning of his profession, with more than its usual proportion
of chicanery. As he was my bitter opponent, obstructing my plans for the
interests of Chili in every possible way, it might ill become me to
speak of him as I then felt, and to this day feel. I will therefore
adduce the opinion of Mrs. Graham, the first historian of the Republic,
as to the estimation in which he was generally held:--"Zenteno has read
more than usual among his countrymen, and thinks that little much. Like
San Martin, he dignifies scepticism in religion, laxity of morals, and
coldness of heart, if not cruelty, with the name of philosophy; and
while he could shew creditable sensibility for the fate of a worm, would
think the death or torture of a political opponent matter for
congratulation." I was his political opponent, as wishing to uphold the
authority of the Supreme Director, and hence, no doubt, his enmity to
me; his influence even extending so far as to prevent the Supreme
Director from visiting me whilst in Santiago, on the ground that such a
course on his part would be undignified!

At this distance of time--now that Chili is in possession of a
Government acting on more enlightened principles--there is no necessity
for withholding these remarks, without which the subsequent acts of the
Chilian Government towards me might be liable to misconstruction as to
my representations of them. So long as Chili was in a transition state
from a corrupt and selfish Government to one acting in accordance with
the true interests of the country, I forbore to make known these and
other circumstances, which, having now become matters of history, need
not any longer be withheld.

Writing in this spirit, I may mention a reason, notorious enough at the
time, why the squadron was not paid even its wages. The Government _had_
provided the means, but those to whom the distribution was entrusted
retained the money during their pleasure, employing it for their own
advantage in trading speculations or in usury, only applying it to a
legitimate purpose when further delay became dangerous to themselves.
One great cause of the hatred displayed towards me by these people, was
my incessant demands that the claims of the squadron should be satisfied
as regarded wages. As to prize-money, not a dollar was ever conceded by
the Government either to myself, officers, or men, so long as I remained
in Chili; but I had the satisfaction to see that the constant watch
which I kept on those financial disorders, was the means of ameliorating
the system, though with the additional dislike to myself of those whose
short-sighted policy I was thwarting, and whose avaricious speculations
were thus curtailed.

In spite of his enmity, the Minister of Marine had been officially
compelled to write me the following letter:--

   "My Lord,"

   "If victories over an enemy are to be estimated
   according to the resistance offered, or the national advantages
   obtained, the conquest of Valdivia is, in both senses, inestimable;
   encountering, as you did, the natural and artificial strength of that
   impregnable fortress which, till now, had obstinately defended itself
   by means of those combined advantages. The memory of that
   glorious day will occupy the first pages of Chilian history, and the
   name of Your Excellency will be transmitted from generation to
   generation by the gratitude of our descendants."

   "His Excellency the Supreme Director, highly gratified by that
   noble conquest, orders me to inform you (as I have now the
   satisfaction of doing), that he experiences, in his own name, and in
   that of the nation, the most heartfelt gratification at that signal
   achievement. The meritorious officers, Beauchef, Miller, Erescano,
   Carter, and Vidal, and all the other officers and soldiers who, in
   imitation of your Excellency, encountered such vast dangers, will be
   brought to the notice of Government, in order to receive a decorative
   medal, in gratitude for their gallantry, and in proof that Chili rewards
   the heroes who advocate her cause."

   Our national flag has been displayed amidst the most festive public
   demonstrations, above those of Valdivia and Cantabria, in proof of the
   subjection of our enemies.

   "I beg, with the greatest gratification, the honour to announce to you
   your letter of the 3rd instant, transmitting those of Major Beauchef and
   Major Miller."

  "God preserve your Excellency many years."

  (Signed) JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO.
  "The Vice-Admiral commanding the Chilian
   Squadron."

It is difficult to see how a man who could have written the above
letter, even officially, could have become my worst enemy; the reasons
for which will, however, develop themselves as we proceed.

As the estate which was conferred upon me at Rio Clara was afterwards
taken from me, without reason assigned, I will here give the letter
conveying it, as this will again have to be alluded to. The
attorney-like cunning of Zenteno prevented its conveyance by any more
formal document than the decree conferring it.

   "My Lord,"

   "A Decree of this date has been issued by His
   Excellency the Supreme Director, of which the annexed is a
   copy:--"

   "Desirous to expedite, without loss of time, the gift of 4000
   _quadras_ of land, which, by decree of the Senate, was assigned to the
   Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron, Vice-Admiral Lord Cochrane,
   as a demonstration of public appreciation for his distinguished
   services in the '_Restoration,_' of the important fortress of Valdivia;
   the said 4000 _quadras_ are assigned on the lands of Rio Clara, in
   the province of Conception, being part of the confiscated estate of
   Pablo Furtado, a fugitive Spaniard."

   "'The present deed shall serve as a sufficient title to the property in
   favour of the Vice-Admiral, being communicated to the Minister of
   Finance, in order to the accustomed formalities, to receive possession
   and enjoy the benefits.'"

  "I have the honour to communicate the above, by Supreme orders, for your
   information."

  "God preserve your Excellency many years."

  "(Signed) JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO.
   Administration of Marine,
   Valparaiso, August SO, 1820.
   Published by order of His Excellency."

       *       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER IV.

OBSTACLES TO EQUIPPING THE SQUADRON--SAILING OF THE LIBERATING
EXPEDITION--DEBARCATION AT PISCO--LONG INACTION OF THE ARMY--GENERAL SAN
MARTIN REMOVES TO ANCON--CAPTURE OF THE ESMERALDA--EXCHANGE OF
PRISONERS--ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE SERVICE BY GENERAL SAN MARTIN--LADY
COCHRANE'S VISIT TO MENDOZA.


The difficulties which attended the equipment of the squadron and troops
destined for the liberation of Peru were very great, the Government
being without credit, whilst its treasury had been completely exhausted
by efforts to organise an army--a loan being impossible, and indeed
refused. By my influence with the British merchants, I managed to obtain
considerable quantities of naval and military stores, and in addition, a
contribution to a subscription which was set on foot, in place of a
forced loan, upon which the Government hesitated to venture.

The greatest difficulty was, however, with regard to the foreign seamen,
who, disgusted with the want of faith towards them, refused to re-enter
the service. The Government, upon this, requested me to resort to
impressment, which I declined, telling them, moreover, that the captain
of the British frigate then in port would not permit his countrymen to
be impressed. The alternative proposed was to use my influence with the
men, by issuing such a proclamation, dictated by myself, as would render
them dependent for their pay and prize-money upon General San Martin,
and on the success of the expedition; it being evident that they would
not place further confidence in the promises of the Government.

A joint proclamation was therefore issued by Gen. San Martin and myself,
my signature being added as a guarantee, whilst his bore the authority
of Commander-in-Chief. The following extract will shew the nature of
this proclamation:--

   "On my entry into Lima, I will punctually pay to all foreign
   seamen who shall voluntarily enlist into the Chilian service, the whole
   arrears of their pay, to which, I will also add to each individual,
   according to his rank, one year's pay over and above his arrears, as
   a premium or reward for his services, if he continue to fulfil his
   duty to the day of the surrender of that city, and its occupation by
   the liberating forces."

   (Signed) JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.
   "COCHRANE."

This proclamation had the desired effect, and the crews of the ships
were immediately completed.

The Chilian force amounted to 4200 men, General San Martin, to the great
disappointment of General Freire, being nominated Captain-General--the
force under his command was designated the "liberating army" _(Exercito
Libertador)_. Whilst the expedition was in process of formation, the
Supreme Director had apprised the Peruvian people of its object, and
lest they should entertain any jealousy of its presence uninvited, had
declared his views in a general proclamation, from which the following
is an extract:--

   "Peruvians--Do not think we shall pretend to treat you as a
   conquered people? such a desire could have entered into the heads
   of none but those who are inimical to our common happiness. We
   only aspire to see you free and happy; _yourselves will frame your
   own government_, choosing that form which is most consistent with
   your customs, your situation, and your wishes. Consequently, _you
   will constitute a nation as free and independent as ourselves_."

This, and subsequent proclamations, will require to be borne in mind, as
the result by no means corresponded with the intentions of the Supreme
Director, whose honesty of purpose was afterwards set at nought by those
in whose estimation Peru was only a field for the furtherance of their
own ambition. The Chileno officers, both native and foreign, certainly
believed in the sincerity of their leaders, but were subsequently doomed
to be miserably disappointed as regarded the chief of them.

On the 21st of August, 1820, the squadron sailed amidst the enthusiastic
plaudits of the people, who felt proud that in so short a time the power
of Spain had not only been humbled, but that they were enabled to
despatch an army to liberate her principal remaining State.

On the 25th, the squadron hove to off Coquimbo, taking on board another
battalion of troops. On the 26th we again sailed, when General San
Martin made known to me his intention of proceeding with the main body
of the army to Truxillo, a place four degrees to leeward of Lima, where
the army could have gained no advantage, nor, indeed, have found
anything to do, except to remain there safe from any attack by the
Spaniards, who could not approach it by land, whilst the squadron could
protect it by sea.

By representing to General San Martin that this course would cause great
dissatisfaction amongst the Chileno officers and men, who expected to be
landed and led at once against Lima, for the immediate conquest of which
they were amply sufficient, he consented to give up his plan of
proceeding to Truxillo, but firmly refused to disembark his men in the
vicinity of Lima; for what reason I could not then divine. My own plan
was to land the force at Chilca, the nearest point to Callao, and
forthwith to obtain possession of the capital; an object by no means
difficult of execution, and certain of success.

Finding all argument unavailing, we sailed for Pisco, where the
expedition arrived on the 7th of September, and on the 8th, to my great
chagrin, the troops were disembarked, and for fifty days remained in
total inaction! with the exception of despatching Colonel Arenales into
the interior with a detachment, which, after defeating a body of
Spaniards, took up a position to the eastward of Lima.

Even on arriving at Pisco, General San Martin declined to enter the
town, though the Spanish forces consisted of less than three hundred
men. Landing the troops under Major-General Las Heras, he went down the
coast in the schooner _Montezuma_ the inhabitants meanwhile retiring
into the interior, taking with them their cattle, slaves, and even the
furniture of their houses. This excess of caution excited great
discontent in the army and the squadron, as contrasting strangely with
the previous capture of the place, in the preceding year, by
Lieut.-Colonel Charles and Major Miller, with their handful of men.

On the return of General San Martin, he professed to be greatly
chagrined at the departure of the inhabitants, and the consequent loss
of supplies. Instead of attributing this to his own tardy movements, he
declared his disbelief in the accounts he had received from Peru as to
the friendly disposition of the inhabitants, even throwing out doubts as
to the success of the expedition in consequence. It was of the first
importance to have taken the place immediately, and to have conciliated
the inhabitants, as the ships were scantily provisioned, and all but
destitute of other necessary supplies. A detailed account, however, of
the capture of the place was transmitted to Santiago, where it was duly
recorded in the official organ as the first feat of the great
expedition.

During these fifty days the squadron was also necessarily kept in
inaction, having achieved nothing beyond the capture of a few
merchantmen along the coast, and a fruitless chase of two Spanish
frigates, the _Prueba_ and _Venganza_, which I did not follow up, as
involving risk to the transports during my absence.

This delay was productive of the worst disasters which could have
befallen the expedition. The people were eager to receive us, and not
calculating on such tardiness on the part of General Martin--were
everywhere declaring in our favour; but being unsupported, were fined,
imprisoned, and subjected to corporal punishment by the Viceroy.
Rendered cautious by this, they naturally distrusted the force idling
away its time at Pisco, manifesting reluctance to bring forward the
requisite supplies, upon which they were treated, by order of General
San Martin, with military rigour; being thus harassed, the Peruvians
began to look upon the Chilenos as oppressors in common with the
Spaniards, to the no small danger of losing every desire for national
independence.

Nevertheless, on reaching Pisco, Gen. San Martin had promulgated a
proclamation from the Supreme Director full of fervent appeals to God
and man as regarded the good intentions of the Chilian Government: the
following are extracts:--

   "Peruvians, here are the engagements under which Chili--before
   the Supreme Being--and calling all nations to witness as
   avengers of any violation of the compact, engages to aid you--setting
   death and toil at defiance. You shall be free and independent.
   You shall choose your own government and laws, by the
   spontaneous will of your representatives. No military or civil
   influence, direct or indirect, shall your brethren use to influence
   your social dispositions. You shall dismiss the armed force sent to
   your assistance the moment you judge proper, without regard to
   our opinion of your danger or security. Never shall any military
   division occupy the soil of a free people, unless called for by your
   lawful magistrate. Neither by ourselves, nor by our aid, shall
   party opinions which may have preceded your liberty be punished.
   Ready to overthrow any armed force which may resist your rights,
   we beseech you to forget all grievances antecedent to the day of
   your glory, so as to reserve the most severe justice to obstinacy
   and oppression."

Such, were the inducements held out to the Peruvian people, and such
was their first experience with regard to their liberators.

Yet even amidst inaction the fruits of demonstration early became
manifest, a vessel arriving on the 4th of October, from Guayaquil, with
the intelligence that on receiving news of the sailing of the
expedition, that province had declared itself independent. Upon the
arrival of this welcome news, I again begged of General San Martin to
reimbark the troops and move on Lima, and at length succeeded in
inducing him to make a move.

Previous to our departure, General San Martin issued the following
proclamation, here given to shew how promises solemnly entered into
could afterwards be broken.

   "Peruvians! I have paid the tribute which, as a public man, I
   owe to the opinion of others, and have shewn what is my object and
   mission towards you. I come to fulfil the expectations of all those
   who wish to belong to the country which gave them birth, and who
   desire to be governed by their own laws. On the day when Peru
   shall freely pronounce as to the form of her institutions, be they
   whatever they may, _my functions shall cease_, and I shall have the
   glory of announcing to the Government of Chili, of which I am a
   subject, that their heroic efforts have at last received the consolation
   of giving liberty to Peru, and peace to the neighbouring states."

The troops being reimbarked--on the 28th we sailed from Pisco, and on
the following day anchored before Callao. After having reconnoitred the
fortifications, I again urged on General San Martin an immediate
disembarcation of the force, but to this he once more strenuously
objected, to the great disappointment of the whole expedition;
insisting on going to Ancon, a place at some distance to the northward
of Callao. Having no control over the disposition of the troops, I was
obliged to submit; and on the 30th, detached the _San Martin,
Galvarino,_ and _Araucano_, to convoy the transports to Ancon, retaining
the _O'Higgins, Independencia_, and _Lautaro_, as if for the purpose of
blockade.

The fact was, that--annoyed in common with the whole expedition--at this
irresolution on the part of General San Martin, I determined that the
means of Chili, furnished with great difficulty, should not be wholly
wasted, without some attempt at accomplishing the objects of the
expedition; and accordingly formed a plan of attack with the three ships
which I had kept back--though being apprehensive that my design would be
opposed by General San Martin, I had not even mentioned to him my
intentions.

This design was to cut out the _Esmeralda_ frigate from under the
fortifications, and also to get possession of another ship, on board of
which we had learned that a million of dollars was embarked for flight,
if it became necessary; my opinion being that if such display of power
were manifested, the Spaniards would either surrender the capital or
abandon it.

The enterprise was hazardous, for since my former visit the enemy's
position had been much strengthened, no less than 300 pieces of
artillery being mounted on shore, whilst the _Esmeralda_ was crowded
with the best sailors and marines that could be procured, these sleeping
every night at quarters. She was, moreover, defended by a strong boom
with chain moorings, and by armed blockships; the whole being surrounded
by twenty-seven gun-boats; so that no ship could possibly get at her.

For three days we occupied ourselves in preparations, still keeping
secret the purpose for which they were intended. On the evening of 5th
of November, this was communicated to the ships by the following
proclamation:--

   "Marines and Seamen,"

   "This night we are going to give the enemy a mortal
   blow. Tomorrow you will present yourselves proudly before
   Callao, and all your comrades will envy your good fortune. One
   hour of courage and resolution is all that is required of you to
   triumph. Remember, that you have conquered in Valdivia, and be
   not afraid of those who have hitherto fled from you."

   "The value of all the vessels captured in Callao will be yours,
   and the same reward in money will be distributed amongst you as
   has been offered by the Spaniards in Lima to those who should
   capture any of the Chilian squadron. The moment of glory is
   approaching, and I hope that the Chilenos will fight as they have
   been accustomed to do, and that the English will act as they have
   ever done at home and abroad."

   "COCHRANE."

On issuing this proclamation, it was stated that I should lead the
attack in person, volunteers being requested to come forward, on which
the whole of the marines and seamen on board the three ships offered to
accompany me. As this could not be permitted, a hundred and sixty seamen
and eighty marines were selected, and after dark were placed in fourteen
boats alongside the flag-ship, each man armed with cutlass and pistol,
being, for distinction's sake, dressed in white, with a blue band on
the left arm. The Spaniards I expected would be off their guard, as, by
way of _ruse_, the other ships had been sent out of the bay under the
charge of Captain Foster, as though in pursuit of some vessels in the
offing--so that the Spaniards would consider themselves safe from attack
for that night.

At ten o'clock all was in readiness, the boats being formed in two
divisions, the first commanded by my flag-captain Crosbie, and the
second by Captain Guise,--my boat leading. The strictest silence, and
the exclusive use of cutlasses were enjoined; so that, as the oars were
muffled, and the night dark, the enemy had not the least suspicion of
the impending attack.

It was just upon midnight when we neared the small opening left in the
boom, our plan being well-nigh frustrated by the vigilance of a
guard-boat, upon which my launch had luckily stumbled. The challenge was
given, upon which, in an under-tone, I threatened the occupants of the
boat with instant death if they made the least alarm. No reply was made
to the threat, and in a few minutes our gallant fellows were alongside
the frigate in line, boarding at several points simultaneously.

The Spaniards were completely taken by surprise--the whole, with the
exception of the sentries, being asleep at their quarters--and great was
the havoc made amongst them by the Chileno cutlasses whilst they were
recovering themselves. Retreating to the forecastle, they there made a
gallant stand, and it was not until the third charge that the position
was carried. The fight was for a short time renewed on the
quarter-deck, where the Spanish marines fell to a man, the rest of the
enemy leaping overboard and into the hold to escape slaughter.

On boarding the ship by the main chains, I was knocked back by the butt
end of the sentry's musket, and falling on a thole pin of the boat, it
entered my back near the spine, inflicting a severe injury, which caused
me many years of subsequent suffering. Immediately regaining my footing,
I reascended the side, and when on deck, was shot through the thigh, but
binding a handkerchief tightly round the wound, managed, though with
great difficulty, to direct the contest to its close.

The whole affair, from beginning to end, occupied only a quarter of an
hour, our loss being eleven killed and thirty wounded, whilst that of
the Spaniards was a hundred and sixty, many of whom fell under the
cutlasses of the Chilenos before they could stand to their arms. Greater
bravery I never saw displayed than that of our gallant fellows. Before
boarding, the duties of all had been appointed, and a party was told off
to take possession of the tops. We had not been on deck a minute, when I
hailed the foretop, and was instantly answered by our own men, an
equally prompt answer being returned from the frigate's maintop. No
British man-of-war's crew could have excelled this minute attention to
orders.

The uproar speedily alarmed the garrison, who, hastening to their guns,
opened fire on their own frigate, thus paying us the compliment of
having taken it; though, even in this case, their own men must still
have been on board, so that firing on them was a wanton proceeding, as
several Spaniards were killed or wounded by the shot of the fortress,
and amongst the wounded was Captain Coig, the commander of the
_Esmeralda_--who, after he was made prisoner, received a severe
contusion by a shot from his own party.

The fire from the fortress was, however, neutralised by a successful
expedient. There were two foreign ships of war present during the
contest--the United States frigate _Macedonian_, and the British frigate
_Hyperion_; and these, as previously agreed on with the Spanish
authorities in case of a night attack--hoisted peculiar lights as
signals, to prevent being fired upon. This contingency being provided
for by us--as soon as the fortress commenced its fire on the
_Esmeralda_, we also ran up similar lights, so that the garrison became
puzzled which vessel to fire at; the intended mischief thus involving
the _Hyperion_ and _Macedonian_, which were several times struck, the
_Esmeralda_ being comparatively untouched. Upon this the neutral
frigates cut their cables and moved away; whilst Captain Guise, contrary
to my orders, cut the _Esmeralda_ cables also, so that there was nothing
to be done but to loose her top-sails and follow; the fortress then
ceasing its fire.

My orders were not to cut the cables of the, _Esmeralda_; but after
taking her to capture the _Maypu_, a brig of war previously taken from
Chili--and then to attack and cut adrift every ship near, there being
plenty of time before us; no doubt existing but that when the
_Esmeralda_ was taken, the Spaniards would desert the other ships as
fast as their boats would permit them, so that the whole might either
have been captured or burned. To this end all my previous plans had been
arranged; but on being placed _hors de combat_ by my wounds, Captain
Guise, on whom the command of the prize devolved, chose to interpose his
own judgment, and content himself with the _Esmeralda_ alone, cutting
her cables without my orders; the reason assigned being, that the
English had broken into her spirit-room and were getting drunk, whilst
the Chilenos were disorganized by plundering. It was a great mistake,
for if we could capture the _Esmeralda_, with her picked and
well-appointed crew, there would have been little or no difficulty in
cutting the other ships adrift in succession. It would only have been
the rout of Valdivia over again, chasing the enemy, without loss, from
ship after ship, instead of from fort to fort.

The following extract, from the order issued preparatory to the attack,
will clearly shew the plan frustrated by cutting the _Esmeralda_
adrift:--

   "On securing the frigate, the Chilian seamen and marines are
   not to give the Chilian cheer, but to deceive the enemy, and give
   time for completing the work: they are to cheer '_Viva el Rey_.'"

   "The two brigs of war are to be fired on by the musketry _from
   the Esmeralda_, and are to be taken possession of by Lieutenants
   Esmonde and Morgell, in the boats they command; which, being
   done, they are to cut adrift, run out, and anchor in the offing as
   quickly as possible. The boats of the _Independencia_ are to turn
   adrift all the outward Spanish merchant ships; and the boats of the
   _O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_, under Lieutenants Bell and Robertson, are to
   set fire to one or more of the headmost hulks; but these are not to be
   cut adrift, so as to fall down upon the rest."

  (Signed) "COCHRANE."

By the cutting of the _Esmeralda's_ cables, not one of these objects was
effected. The captured frigate was ready for sea, with three months'
provisions on board, and with stores sufficient for two years. She was,
no doubt, if opportunity offered, intended to convoy the treasure-ship,
which, by the precipitancy of Captain Guise, we had missed; indeed the
Spanish Admiral being on board at the time, with his flag flying, was a
pretty clear proof that she was on the point of departure; instead of
which, the Admiral, his officers, and 200 seamen were made prisoners,
the remainder of the crew, originally 370 in number, being killed,
wounded, or drowned.

An incident occurred during the contest which, at this distance of time,
I shall not refrain from mentioning. His Britannic Majesty's ship
_Hyperion_ was so close to the _Esmeralda_, as to be a witness of the
whole proceeding. A midshipman was standing at the gangway looking on,
amongst others, when his truly English nature, unable to restrain itself
as our gallant fellows cleared the forecastle of the enemy, gave vent to
its expression by clapping his hands in approbation. It was afterwards
reported that he was immediately ordered below by his commander, Captain
Searle, who threatened to put him under arrest. Such was the feeling of
an English commander towards me. I should not have condescended to
notice this occurrence but for the bravado shown by the same officer on
a previous occasion, by casting loose his guns, with their tompions out,
when my flag-ship entered the roads; thereby either intimating that he
considered me a pirate, or that he would so treat me, if he had an
opportunity.

When approaching the _Esmeralda_, the British frigate also hailed each
boat separately, with the evident intention of alarming the enemy; which
would no doubt have been the case, had not the Spaniards been thrown off
their guard by the before-mentioned ruse of sending the ships out of the
bay.

Far different was the conduct of the commander of the United States
frigate _Macedonian_--whose sentinels did not hail the boats--the
officers in an under-tone wishing us success; and still more honourable
was the subsequent testimony of that talented officer, Captain Basil
Hall, who commanded His Britannic Majesty's ship _Conway_, then in the
Pacific. This testimony, though in some degree a recapitulation of the
events already related, but slightly inaccurate as regards the number of
men employed, I feel proud to adduce:--

   "While the liberating army, under General San Martin, was
   removing to Ancon, Lord Cochrane, with part of his squadron,
   anchored in the outer roads of Callao. The inner harbour was
   guarded by an extensive system of batteries, admirably constructed,
   and bearing the general name of the 'Castles of Callao.' The
   merchant ships, as well as the men of war, consisting of the
   _Esmeralda_, a large 40-gun frigate, and two sloops of war, were
   moored under the guns of the castle, within a semicircle of fourteen
   gun-boats, and a boom made of spars chained together."

   "Lord Cochrane, having previously reconnoitred these formidable defences
   in person, undertook, on the 5th of November, 1820, the desperate
   enterprise of cutting out the Spanish frigate, although she was known to
   be fully prepared for an attack. His Lordship proceeded in fourteen
   boats, containing 240 men--all volunteers from the different ships of
   the squadron--in two divisions, one under the orders of Captain Crosby,
   and the other under Captain Guise, both officers commanding the Chileno
   squadron."

  "At midnight, the boats having forced their way across the boom, Lord
  Cochrane, who was leading, rowed alongside the first gun-boat, and
  taking the officer by surprise, proposed to him, with a pistol at his
  head, the alternative of silence or death. No reply being made, the
  boats pushed on unobserved, and Lord Cochrane, mounting the
  _Esmeralda's_ side, was the first to give the alarm. The sentinel on the
  gangway levelled his piece and fired, but was instantly cut down by the
  coxwain, and his Lordship, though wounded in the thigh, at the same
  moment stepped on the deck, the frigate being boarded with no less
  gallantry on the opposite side by Captain Guise, who met Lord Cochrane
  midway on the quarter-deck, as also Captain Crosby, and the afterpart of
  the ship was soon carried, sword in hand. The Spaniards rallied on the
  forecastle, where they made a desperate resistance, till overpowered by
  a fresh party of seamen and marines, headed by Lord Cochrane. A gallant
  stand was again made on the main deck, but before one o'clock the ship
  was captured, her cables cut, and she was steered triumphantly out of
  the harbour."

  "This loss was a death-blow to the Spanish naval force in that quarter
  of the world; for, although there were still two Spanish frigates and
  some smaller vessels in the Pacific, they never afterwards ventured to
  shew themselves, but left Lord Cochrane undisputed master of the coast."

On the morning of the 6th a horrible massacre was committed on shore.
The market-boat of the United States frigate was, as usual, sent for
provisions, when the mob took it into their heads that the _Esmeralda_
could not have been cut out without the assistance of the _Macedonian_,
and, falling upon the boat's crew, murdered the whole of them.

The wounded amongst the _Esmeralda's_ crew were sent on shore under a
flag of truce, a letter from me to the Viceroy proposing an exchange of
prisoners being at the same time transmitted. The proposal was this time
civilly acceded to, and the whole were sent on shore; the Chilian
prisoners, who had long languished in the dungeons of the fortress,
being returned, and ordered to join the army of General San Martin.

On transmitting the intelligence of our success to General San Martin, I
received from him the following acknowledgment of the achievement:--


   _10th November, 1820._
   "My Lord,"


   "The importance of the service you have rendered to the
   country by the capture of the frigate _Esmeralda_, and the brilliant
   manner in which you conducted the gallant officers and seamen
   under your orders to accomplish that noble enterprise, on the night
   of the memorable 5th of November, have augmented the gratitude
   due to your former services by the Government, as well as that of
   all interested in the public cause, and in your fame."

   "All those who participated in the risks and glory of the deed,
   also deserve well of their countrymen, and I have the satisfaction to
   be the medium of transmitting the sentiments of admiration which
   such transcendent success has excited in the chiefs of the army
   under my command. Permit me to express them to you, in order
   that they may be communicated to the meritorious officers, seamen,
   and marines of the squadron, to whom will be religiously fulfilled
   _the promises you made_."

   "It is grievous that, connected with the memory of so glorious
   a deed, regret for those who shed their blood in its achievement
   should enter; but let us hope that such thoughts will be dissipated,
   by your adding further deeds of glory to the country, and to your
   name."

   "God preserve you many years."

   "JOSE DE SAN MARTIN."


San Martin's expression of religiously fulfilling the "promises I
made," is in allusion to the promise, signed by himself, which had been
exacted previous to the departure of the squadron from Valparaiso, that
the men should have a year's pay given to them. With the preceding
letter General San Martin voluntarily sent another promise to the
captors, of 50,000 dollars, to be paid on gaining possession of Lima.
Neither the one promise nor the other were ever fulfilled, nor did they
ever obtain any prize-money.

To the Administration in Chili General San Martin wrote as follows:--


   "Head Quarters, Supe, Dec. 1, 1820.
    Senor Minister,"


   "I have the honour of forwarding to you the despatches
   of the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, Vice-Admiral of the squadron,
   relative to the heroic capture of the frigate _Esmeralda_, by boarding
   her under the batteries of Callao."

   "It is impossible for me to eulogise in proper language the daring
   enterprise of the 5th of November, by which Lord Cochrane
   has decided the superiority of our naval forces--augmented the
   splendour and power of Chili--and secured the success of this
   campaign."

   "I doubt not that His Excellency the Supreme Director will
   render the justice due to the worthy chief, his officers, and other
   individuals who have had a share in that successful action."

   "I beg you will honour me by congratulating His Excellency on
   this important success, and principally on account of the influence
   it will have on the great object which occupies his attention."

   "JOSE DE SAN MARTIN."

   "To Don Jose Ignacio Zenteno,
   Minister of Marine."

Soon after my departure for Peru, Lady Cochrane undertook a journey
across the _Cordillera_, to Mendoza, the passes being, at that season,
often blocked up with snow. Having been entrusted with some despatches
of importance, she pushed on rapidly, and on the 12th of October arrived
at the celebrated _Ponte del Inca_, 15,000 feet above the level of the
sea. Here the snow had increased to such an extent as to render farther
progress impossible, and her ladyship was obliged to remain at a
_Casucha_, or strong house, built above the snow for the safety of
travellers; the intense cold arising from the rarity of the atmosphere,
and the absence of all comfort--there being no better couch than a dried
bullock's hide--producing a degree of suffering which few ladies would
be willing to encounter.

Whilst proceeding on her mule up a precipitous path in the vicinity, a
Royalist, who had intruded himself on the party, rode up in an opposite
direction and disputed the path with her, at a place where the slightest
false step would have precipitated her into the abyss below. One of her
attendants, a tried and devoted soldier, named Pedro Flores, seeing the
movement, and guessing the man's intention, galloped up to him at a
critical moment, striking him a violent blow across the face, and thus
arresting his murderous design. The ruffian finding himself vigorously
attacked, made off, without resenting the blow, and so, no doubt,
another premeditated attempt on Lady Cochrane's life was averted.




CHAPTER V.

SAN MARTIN'S VIOLATION OF TRUTH--REMOVAL OF BLOCKADE--SPANISH
DEPRESSION--TROOPS DYING OF FEVER--SAN MARTIN'S DESIGNS ON
GUAYAQUIL--MUTINOUS CONDUCT OF OFFICERS--REFUSAL TO OBEY
ORDERS--DEPOSITION OF VICEROY--SAN MARTIN GIVES ME TROOPS--JEALOUSY OF
SAN MARTIN--ATTACK ON ARICA--CAPTURE OF TACNA--CAPTURE OF
MOQUEGA--REFUSAL OF MORE MEN--AN ARMISTICE RATIFIED--DISTRESS OF
LIMA--DISSATISFACTION OF THE ARMY--LADY COCHRANE--GOES INTO THE
INTERIOR--DANGEROUS POSITION--LADY COCHRANE IN ACTION--DEVOTION OF
SEAMEN.


On the 8th of November I went to Ancon with our prize, this being hailed
with great enthusiasm by the army, which--now that the Spanish naval
force had received, what even the Spaniards themselves considered its
death blow--made certain that it would be at once led against Lima,
before the authorities recovered from their consternation. To their
mortification--no less than my own--General San Martin, in defiance of
all argument to the contrary, ordered the troops on board the
transports, having decided on _retreating to Huacho!_ whither the
_O'Higgins_ and _Esmeralda_, abandoning the blockade, had to convoy
them. In place of prompt action--or rather demonstration, for the
occupation of the city would have amounted to little more--he issued a
proclamation, promising, as before, the most perfect freedom to the
Peruvian people if they would join him:--

  "Spaniards, your destiny is in your own hands. I come not to declare
  war against the fortunes and persons of individuals. The enemy of the
  liberty and independence of America alone is the object of the vengeance
  of the arms of the PATRIA. I promise you in the most positive manner,
  that your property and persons shall be inviolable, and that you shall
  be treated as respectable citizens, if you co-operate in the great
  cause," &c. &c.

By the 12th the army was again disembarked, amidst evident
manifestations of dissatisfaction on the part of the officers, who were
naturally jealous of the achievements of the squadron, from being
themselves restrained from enterprise of any kind. To allay this feeling
General San Martin had recourse to an almost incredible violation of
truth, intended to impress upon the Chilian people, that the army, and
not the squadron, had captured the _Esmeralda!_--indeed stating as much
in words, and declaring that the whole affair was the result of his own
plans, to which I had agreed! though the truth is, that doubting his
confidants, I had concealed from him my intentions of making the attack.
The following is an extract from the bulletin issued to the army:--

   "Before the General-in-Chief left the Vice-Admiral of the
   Squadron, _they agreed on the execution of a memorable project,
   sufficient to astound intrepidity itself!_ and to make the history of
   the liberating expedition of Peru eternal!"

   "Those valiant soldiers who for a length of time have suffered
   with the most heroic constancy the severest oppression, and the
   most inhuman treatment in the dungeons of Casas-matas, have just
   arrived at our head-quarters. Flattering promises of liberty, and
   the threats of death, were not sufficient to destroy their loyalty to
   their country; they have waited with firmness the day on which
   their companions in arms should rescue them from their misery, and
   revenge the insults which, humanity has received in their persons.
   This glory was reserved _to the liberating army, whose efforts have
   snatched from the hands of tyranny these respectable victims._ Let
   this be published for the satisfaction of these individuals, _and that
   of the army, to whose arms they owe their liberty_."

It thus went forth to the people of Chili, that the army captured the
frigate, and subsequently released the prisoners, though not a man in
the whole force had the most distant idea that an attack was even
contemplated, much less could it have co-operated, seeing that it was
far away in cantonments! This bulletin excited the astonishment of the
troops; but as it contributed to their _amour propre_, by representing
to the Chilian people that the achievement which had been effected was
due to them, they accepted it; whilst I thought it beneath me to refute
a falsehood palpable to the whole expedition. It had, however, as
General San Martin no doubt calculated, the effect of allaying, for the
moment, a dissatisfaction which foreboded serious consequences.

On the 15th we again sailed from Huacho, to renew the blockade at
Callao, beyond which nothing could be done; though even this was of
importance, as cutting off supplies from the capital, the inhabitants of
which, in consequence of the privations they were subjected to, caused
great uneasiness to the Viceregal Government.

Several attempts were now made to entice the remaining Spanish naval
force from their shelter under the batteries, by placing the _Esmeralda_
apparently within reach, and the flag-ship herself in situations of some
danger. One day I carried her through an intricate strait called the
Boqueron, in which nothing beyond a fifty-ton schooner was ever seen.
The Spaniards, expecting every moment to see the ship strike, manned
their gun-boats, ready to attack as soon as she was aground, of which
there was little danger, for we had found, and buoyed off with small
bits of wood invisible to the enemy, a channel through which a vessel
could pass without much difficulty.

On the 2nd of December the _Esmeralda_, being in a more than usually
tempting position, the Spanish gun-boats ventured out in the hope of
recapturing her, and for an hour maintained a smart fire; but on seeing
the _O'Higgins_ manoeuvring to cut them off, they precipitately
retreated.

The preceeding successes caused great depression amongst the Spanish
troops, and on the following day the battalion of Numantia, numbering
650 disciplined men, deserted in a body, and joined the Chilian forces
at Chancay. On the 8th, forty Spanish officers followed their example;
and every day afterwards, officers, privates, and civilians of
respectability, joined the patriot army, which thus became considerably
reinforced; the defection of so large a portion of his troops being a
severe loss to the Viceroy.

On the 6th, Colonel Arenales, who, after his previous success, had
marched into the interior, defeated a division of the royalist army at
Pasco. On his proceeding to Huamanga, the authorities fled, and the
inhabitants declared themselves independent. Tarma was next abandoned,
and followed the same example, as did Huanuco, Cueñca, and Loxa;
whilst, on the news of the capture of the _Esmeralda_ arriving at
Truxillo, that important province also revolted, under the direction of
the Spanish governor, the Marquis of Torre Tagle.

Notwithstanding this succession of favourable events, General San Martin
still declined to march on Lima, remaining inactive at Haura, though the
unhealthy situation of the place was such, that nearly one-third of his
troops died of intermittent fever, during the many months they remained
there. In place of securing the capital, where the army would have now
been welcomed, he proposed to send half the army to Guayaquil, in order
to annex that province, this being the first manifestation on the part
of General San Martin to found a dominion of his own--for to nothing
less did he afterwards aspire, though the declared object of the
expedition was to enable the South Pacific provinces to emancipate
themselves from Spain, leaving them free to choose their own
governments, as had been repeatedly and solemnly declared, both by the
Chilian Government and himself.

Finding that I would not consent to avert the naval force from the
purposes to which it was destined, the project was abandoned; but the
troops which had advanced to Chancay were ordered to fall back on Haura,
this step being actually a further retreat as regarded the position of
the Spanish forces, which thus managed to check further desertion by
apprehending and shooting all who attempted it.

Still General San Martin was determined, if possible, to accomplish his
views on Guayaquil. Two deputies, Tomas Guido and Colonel Luzuriago,
were despatched with complimentary messages to Torre Tagle and others,
warning them against the designs of Bolivar, whose success in the north
led San Martin to fear that he might have designs on Peru. The deputies
were strictly enjoined to represent that if such were Bolivar's
intention, Guayaquil would only be regarded as a conquered province;
whilst, if the people of that place would adhere to him, he would, on
the fall of Lima, make it the _principal port of a great empire_, and
that the establishment of the docks and arsenals which _his navy_ would
require, would enrich the city beyond measure. They were at the same
time exhorted to form a militia, in order to keep out Bolivar.

By way of conciliating me, General San Martin proposed in a flattering
way to call the captured frigate the "_Cochrane_," as two vessels before
had been named the "_San Martin_," and "_O'Higgins_;" but to this I
demurred, as acquiescence in such a proceeding might in the estimation
of others have identified me with any course the general might be
inclined to pursue, and I had already formed my conjectures as to what
were evidently his future purposes. Finding me firm in declining the
proffered honour, he told me to give her what name I thought proper; but
this was also refused, when he said, "Let her be called the
'_Valdivia_,' in memory of your conquest of that place;" her name was
accordingly changed from the _Esmeralda_ to the _Valdivia_.

The command of the frigate had been given to Captain Guise; and after
her change of name, his officers wrote to him a letter deprecating the
name, and alleging, that as they had nothing to do with the conquest of
Valdivia, it ought to be withdrawn, and one more consonant with their
feelings substituted. This letter was followed by marked personal
disrespect towards myself, from the officers who had signed it, who made
it no secret that the name of Guise was the one sought to be
substituted.

As the conversations held by these officers with the rest of the
squadron were of such a derogatory nature as regarded my character and
authority, as might lead to serious disorganization, I brought the whole
of the officers who had signed the letter to a court-martial, two being
dismissed the service, the remainder being dismissed the ship, with a
recommendation to General San Martin for other appointments.

During the arrest of these officers, I had determined upon an attack
upon the fortifications of Callao, intending to carry them by a coup de
main, similar to that which had succeeded at Valdivia, and having, on
the 18th, taken soundings in the _Potrillo_, was convinced of the
feasibility of the plan.

On the 20th, this intention was notified by an order, stating that on
the following day I should make the attack with the boats of the
squadron and the _San_ _Martin_, the crew of which received the order
with loud cheers, volunteers for the boats eagerly pressing forward from
all quarters.

In place of preparing to second the operations, Captain Guise sent me a
note refusing to serve with any other but the officers under
arrest--stating that unless they were restored, he must resign his
command. My reply was that I would neither restore them nor accept his
resignation, without some better reason for it than the one alleged.
Captain Guise answered, that my refusal to restore his officers was a
sufficient reason for his resignation, whereupon I ordered him to weigh
anchor on a service of importance; the order being disobeyed on the
ground that he could no longer act, having given over the command of the
ship to Lieutenant Shepherd. Feeling that something like a mutiny was
being excited, and knowing that Guise and his colleague, Spry, were at
the bottom of the matter, I ordered the latter to proceed with the
_Galvarino_ to Chorillos, when he also requested leave to resign, as
"his friend Captain Guise had been compelled so to do, and he had
entered the Chilian navy conditionally to serve only with Captain Guise,
under whose patronage he had left England." Such was the state of mutiny
on board the _Galvarino_, that I deputed my flag-captain, Crosbie, to
restore order, when Spry affected to consider himself superseded, and
claimed exemption from martial law. I therefore tried him by
court-martial, and dismissed him from the ship.

The two officers now made their way to head-quarters, where General San
Martin immediately made Spry his naval _aide-de-camp_, thus promoting
him in the most public manner for disobedience to orders, and in
defiance of the sentence of the court-martial; this being pretty
conclusive proof that they had been acting under the instructions of
General San Martin himself, for what purpose will appear in the course
of the narrative. The course now pursued by General San Martin
sufficiently showed that the disturbance previously made at Valparaiso
emanated also from himself, and that in both cases the mutinous officers
felt quite secure in his protection; though I will do both the credit of
supposing them ignorant at the time of the treacherous purposes of which
they were afterwards the instruments.

Knowing that I should take their punishment into my own hands if they
returned to the squadron, General San Martin kept both about his own
person at head-quarters, where they remained.

So dissatisfied were the Spanish troops at Lima with the government of
their Viceroy, Pezuela, to whose want of military capacity they absurdly
attributed our successes, that they forcibly deposed him, after
compelling him to appoint General Lacerna as his successor. The deposed
Viceroy wishing to send his lady and family to Europe, applied to
General San Martin for a passport, to avoid capture by the Chilian
squadron. This was refused; but Lady Cochrane having arrived at Callao
in the British frigate _Andromache_, to take leave of me previous to
her departure for England, the Viceroy's lady, Donna Angela, begged of
her Ladyship to use her influence with the General to obtain leave for
her departure for Europe. Lady Cochrane immediately proceeded to Haura,
and effected the object; after which she remained for a month at
head-quarters, residing at the house of a Peruvian lady, Donna Josefa
Monteblanco.

A passage was also, by Lady Cochrane's influence, procured for the lady
in the _Andromache_, on board which ship Captain Sherriff politely
invited me to meet her. At this interview the ex-Vicequeen expressed her
surprise at finding me "a gentleman and _rational being_ and not the
_ferocious brute_ she had been taught to consider me!" A declaration,
which, from the unsophisticated manner in which it was made, caused no
small merriment in the party assembled.

As I was determined not to be idle, General San Martin was with some
difficulty prevailed upon to give me a division of 600 troops, under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miller. On the 13th of March we sailed for
Pisco, of which, on its previous abandonment by the army, after a
useless sojourn of fifty days, the enemy had again taken possession. On
the 20th it was retaken, when it was found that the Spaniards had
severely punished the alleged defection of the inhabitants for
contributing to the supplies of the patriot force during its stay. Not
imagining that we should return, the Spanish proprietors of estates had
brought back their cattle, of which we managed to seize some 500 head,
besides 300 horses for the use of the Chilian forces, the squadron thus
supplying their wants instead of remaining in total inaction.

Previous to going to Pisco, I had again urged on General San Martin to
advance on Lima, so convinced was I of the goodwill of the inhabitants.
On his refusal, I begged him to give me 2,000 men, with whom I offered
to take the capital, but this was also declined. I then offered to
undertake the capture of Lima with 1,000 men, but even this was refused,
and the detachment under Colonel Miller was only given to me to get rid
of my importunity. Of this detachment I however determined to make the
most before our return.

The only way of accounting for this indisposition on the part of General
San Martin to place an adequate military force at my disposal, was the
reason current amongst the officers of the army, who were all eager to
place themselves under my orders; viz. the violent jealousy which caused
him to look upon me as a rival, though without reason, as I should
certainly not have attempted to interfere with him in the government of
Peru when its reduction was complete. Suspicious himself he could not
trust me, employing every effort to lessen my reputation amongst his
officers, and endeavouring to the utmost to prevent the squadron from
gathering fresh laurels; even sacrificing his own reputation to this
insane jealousy, by preventing anything being done in which I could take
part.

On the 18th I shifted my flag into the _San Martin_, and leaving the
_O'Higgins_ and _Valdivia_ at Pisco to protect the troops, sailed for
Callao, where we arrived on the 2nd of April. On the 6th, we again
attacked the enemy's shipping under the batteries, and did them
considerable damage, but made no further attempt to gain possession of
them, as I had other aims in view. After this demonstration, the object
of which was to deter them from quitting their shelter, we returned to
Pisco.

General San Martin having now given me discretionary power to do what I
pleased with the few troops placed at my disposal, I determined on
attacking Arica, the southernmost port of Peru. Reimbarking the troops,
and abandoning Pisco, we sailed on the 21st, and on the 1st of May
arrived off Arica, to the Governor of which I sent a summons to
surrender, promising to respect persons and personal property. As this
was not complied with, an immediate bombardment took place, but without
any great effect, as, from the difficulties of the port, it was
impracticable to get sufficiently near to the fortifications.

After a careful survey, the _San Martin_ was on the 6th, hauled nearer
in shore, and some shells were thrown over the town by way of
intimidation. As this had not the desired effect, a portion of the
troops was landed at Sama, to the northward of the town, being followed
by Colonel Miller with the remainder, and Captain Wilkinson with the
marines of the _San Martin_; when the enemy fled, and the patriot flag
was hoisted on the batteries. We took here a considerable quantity of
stores, and four Spanish brigs, besides the guns of the fort and other
detached artillery. A quantity of European goods, belonging to the
Spaniards at Lima, was also seized and put on board the _San Martin_.

On the 14th Colonel Miller, with the troops and marines, advanced to
Tacna, and by my directions took possession of the town, which was
effected without opposition, two companies of infantry deserting the
royalist cause and joining his force. These I ordered to form the
nucleus of a new regiment, to be called the "Tacna Independents."

Learning that the Spanish General Ramirez had ordered three detachments
from Arequipa, Puno, and La Paz, to form a junction at Tacna, to execute
the usual Spanish order--to "drive the insurgents into the sea"--Miller
determined on attacking them separately. The Arequipa detachment, under
Colonel Hera, was fallen in with at Maribe, and immediately routed, the
result being that nearly the whole were killed or taken prisoners,
together with four hundred mules and their baggage. In this affair we
lost a valued officer, Mr. Welsh, an assistant surgeon, who had
volunteered to accompany the detachment. This gentleman was sincerely
mourned by all, and his early death was a great loss to the patriot
service.

This action was fought none too soon, for before it was over the other
detachments from Puno and La Plaz appeared in sight, so that the
patriots had to face a fresh enemy. With his usual promptness Miller
despatched Captain Hind, with a rocket party, to oppose their passage of
a river; when, finding that the Arequipa detachment had been cut up,
the royalists remounted their mules and decamped, in the direction of
Moquega.

On the 22nd Miller pursued the runaway royalists, and, on the 24th,
entered Moquega, by a forced march of nearly a hundred miles, where he
found the enemy, deserted by their colonel. Notwithstanding the fatigue
of the Chilenos, an instant attack was made, when the whole, with the
exception of about twenty killed, were made prisoners. The inhabitants
at once gave in their adherence to the cause of independence, their
Governor, Colonel Portocarrera, being the first to set the example.

On the 25th Colonel Miller learned that a Spanish force was passing
Torata, about fifteen miles distant, when, coming up with them on the
following day, they were all taken prisoners or dispersed, as were also
those who had fled from Arica, numbering four hundred men; so that in
less than a fortnight after landing at Arica, the patriot forces had
killed and made prisoners upwards of one thousand of the royalist army,
by a series of difficult forced marches, and amidst hunger and
privations of every kind, which were cheerfully borne by the Chilenos,
who were no less inspired by a love of country than with attachment to
their commander. The result was the complete submission of the Spaniards
from the sea to the Cordilleras, Arica forming the key to the whole
country.

Having ascertained that Colonel Miller was at Moquega, I took the _San
Martin_ to Ilo, from which anchorage the patriot force was supplied
with everything requisite. The sick were taken on board the brigs
captured at Arica, as were also the Spanish colonels, Sierra and Suares,
who had been taken prisoners, but whom I liberated on their _parole_,
not to serve again until regularly exchanged.

It has been said that, before sailing to Arica, I had procured from
General San Martin discretionary powers to do as I pleased with the
troops placed at my disposal. My object was believed to be to create a
diversion in favour of the general, but this was the least part of my
intention; for, as the army had remained inactive from its first landing
in Peru--with the exception of the detachment under Colonel
Arenales,--no diversion would have been of much use. I wrote to the
Government at Santiago for 1,000 men, or, if these could not be sent,
for 500, and also for 1,000 stand of arms, of which there was abundance
in the arsenal to equip recruits, who would have been forthcoming; and
with these we could, with the greatest ease, have secured the whole of
the southern provinces of Peru, the people being warmly disposed in our
favour. I therefore told the Government that with such a force, we could
hold the whole of Lower Peru, and gain eventual possession of Upper
Peru. My request was refused, on the false ground that the Government
had no means to equip such an expedition, and thus the good will
manifested by the natives was thrown away.

In spite of this neglect, I determined to persevere, relying upon
sacrifices made by the Peruvians themselves in our favour. General
Ramirez was actively engaged in drawing men from distant garrisons to
act against our small force, which was suffering severely from ague.
Nevertheless, every effort was made again to advance into the
interior--a number of recruits from the adjacent provinces having been
enrolled--and everything promised a general revolt in favour of
independence, when the Governor of Arequipa communicated to us
intelligence that an armistice had been agreed upon for twenty days,
between General San Martin and the Viceroy Lacerna. This happening just
at the moment when hostilities could have been carried on with the
greatest effect, and we were preparing to attack Arequipa itself--was
annoying in the extreme; the more so, as the application had come from
the Viceroy, who, being the first to receive intelligence of our
success, had, no doubt, deceived General San Martin into the
arrangement, in order to check our operations in the South.

This armistice was ratified on the 23rd of May, and sent by express to
the Governor of Arequipa, the unusual haste proving the object of the
Viceroy in persuading General San Martin to its ratification. To have
regarded the armistice as a preliminary to the independence of Peru was
a great mistake on the part of General San Martin, as the Viceroy
Lacerna had no more power to acknowledge the absolute independence of
the Colonists, than had his predecessor; and therefore the object of the
armistice could have been none other than to put a stop to our progress,
thereby giving the Spanish generals time to collect their scattered
forces, without any corresponding advantage to the patriot cause.

Being thus reluctantly reduced to inaction, I dropped down to Mollendo,
where we found a neutral vessel taking in corn for supplying the city of
Lima, which city, from the vigilance of the squadron, was reduced to
great straits, as shewn in an address from the _Cabildo_ to the
Viceroy:--"The richest and most opulent of our provinces has succumbed
to the unopposable force of the enemy, and the remaining provinces are
threatened with the same fate; whilst this suffering capital of Lima is
undergoing the horrible effects of a rigorous blockade, hunger,
robberies, and death. Our soldiers pay no respect to the last remains of
our property, even our oxen, indispensable for the cultivation of the
land, being slain. If this plague continues, what will be our lot--our
miserable condition?" From this extract it is plain that Lima was on the
point of being starved out by the squadron, whilst the inhabitants
foresaw that, although the army of General San Martin was inactive, our
little band in the south would speedily overrun the provinces, which
were willing to second our efforts in favour of independence.

To return to the shipment of wheat for the relief of Lima. On
ascertaining the fact, I wrote to the Governor of Arequipa, expressing
my surprise that neutrals should be allowed to embark provisions during
an armistice; the reply being that the most positive orders should be
given to put a stop to it, upon which I retired from Mollendo, but
leaving an officer to keep watch, and finding that the embarkation was
persisted in, I returned and shipped all the wheat found on shore. The
consequence of this was that Colonel La Hera, with 1,000 royalists, took
possession of Moquega, on pretence that I had broken the armistice.

My private advices from head quarters informed me that the
dissatisfaction of the Chilian army was daily increasing, on account of
their continued inaction, and from jealousy at our success; knowing
also, that the capital of Peru was, from the straits to which it was
reduced, as well as from inclination, eager to receive them. General San
Martin nevertheless declined to take advantage of the circumstances in
his favour, till dissension began to assume the character of
insubordination. A daily toast at the tables of the officers was, to
those who fight for the liberties of Peru, not those who write. "_A los
que pelean por la libertad del Peru, no los que escriven_." General San
Martin, aware of the state of feeling in the army, went on board the
schooner _Montezuma_, for the re-establishment of his health.

I was further informed that the Viceroy was negociating with General San
Martin for the prolongation of the armistice to _sixteen months_, in
order to give time for communication with the Court of Madrid, to
ascertain whether the parent state would consent to the independence of
Peru! At the same time official information was forwarded to me that a
further prolongation of twelve days had been conceded.

Feeling certain that there was something wrong at head-quarters, I
determined to proceed to Callao for the purpose of learning the true
state of affairs, leaving Colonel Miller to return to Arica, and in case
of emergency, victualling and equipping the prizes, so as to be in
readiness, if necessary, for the reception of his troops.

During my absence Lady Cochrane sailed for England, partly for the sake
of her health, but more for the purpose of obtaining justice for me, for
in addition to the persecution which I had undergone, a "Foreign
Enlistment Bill" had been passed, the enactments of which were
especially aimed at my having engaged in a service which had for its
object the expulsion of Spain, then in alliance with England, from her
Colonies in the Pacific.

As an incident relating to her Ladyship has been mentioned in the
"Memoirs of General Miller," I may be pardoned for giving it as narrated
in that work.

   "On the 25th, six hundred infantry and sixty Cavalry, all picked
   men, were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miller,
   who received directions to embark on a secret service under the
   orders of Lord Cochrane, and proceeded to Huacho. On the day
   after his arrival there, and whilst he was inspecting the detachments
   in the Plaza, Lady Cochrane galloped on to the parade to speak to
   him. The sudden appearance of youth and beauty on a fiery
   horse, managed with skill and elegance, absolutely electrified
   the men, who had never before seen an English lady. '_Que
   hermosa! Que graciosa! Que linda! Que airosa! Es un angel del
   cielo_!' were exclamations which escaped from one end of the line
   to the other. Colonel Miller, not displeased at this involuntary
   homage to the beauty of his countrywoman, said to the men, 'This
   is our _generala_;' on which her Ladyship, turning to the line,
   bowed to the troops, who no longer confining their expressions of
   admiration to suppressed interjections, loud _vivas_ burst from officers
   and men, to which Lady Cochrane, smiling her acknowledgments, cantered
   off

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