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A History of Trade Unionism in the United States

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Title: A History of Trade Unionism in the United States

Author: Selig Perlman


        
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES ***

Social Science Text-Books

EDITED BY RICHARD T. ELY




A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES

BY

SELIG PERLMAN, PH.D.

Assistant Professor of Economics in the University of Wisconsin;
Co-author of the History of Labour in the United States

New York

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1922


PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1922

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

Set up and electrotyped. October, 1922.




AUTHOR'S PREFACE

The present _History of Trade Unionism in the United States_ is in part
a summary of work in labor history by Professor John R. Commons and
collaborators at the University of Wisconsin from 1904 to 1918, and in
part an attempt by the author to carry the work further. Part I of the
present book is based on the _History of Labour in the United States_ by
Commons and Associates (Introduction: John R. Commons; Colonial and
Federal Beginnings, to 1827: David J. Saposs; Citizenship, 1827-1833:
Helen L. Summer; Trade Unionism, 1833-1839: Edward B. Mittelman;
Humanitarianism, 1840-1860: Henry E. Hoagland; Nationalization,
1860-1877: John B. Andrews; and Upheaval and Reorganization, 1876-1896:
by the present author), published by the Macmillan Company in 1918 in
two volumes.

Part II, "The Larger Career of Unionism," brings the story from 1897
down to date; and Part III, "Conclusions and Inferences," is an attempt
to bring together several of the general ideas suggested by the History.
Chapter 12, entitled "An Economic Interpretation," follows the line of
analysis laid down by Professor Commons in his study of the American
shoemakers, 1648-1895.[1]

The author wishes to express his strong gratitude to Professors Richard
T. Ely and John R. Commons for their kind aid at every stage of this
work. He also wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Edwin E.
Witte, Director of the Wisconsin State Legislative Reference Library,
upon whose extensive and still unpublished researches he based his
summary of the history of the injunction; and to Professor Frederick L.
Paxson, who subjected the manuscript to criticism from the point of view
of General American History.

S.P.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] See his _Labor and Administration_, Chapter XIV (Macmillan, 1913).




CONTENTS

                                                  PAGE

PREFACE                                            v


PART I. THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

CHAPTER

1 LABOR MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

  (1) Early Beginnings, to 1827                    8
  (2) Equal Citizenship, 1827-1832                 9
  (3) The Period of the "Wild-Cat" Prosperity,
      1833-1837                                   18
  (4) The Long Depression, 1837-1862              29

2 THE "GREENBACK" PERIOD, 1862-1879               42

3 THE BEGINNING OF THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND OF
  THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR                68

4 REVIVAL AND UPHEAVAL, 1879-1887                 81

5 THE VICTORY OF CRAFT UNIONISM AND THE FINAL
  FAILURE OF PRODUCERS' COOPERATION              106

6 STABILIZATION, 1888-1897                       130

7 TRADE UNIONISM AND THE COURTS                  146


PART II. THE LARGER CAREER OF UNIONISM

8 PARTIAL RECOGNITION AND NEW DIFFICULTIES,
  1898-1914                                      163

  (1) The Miners                                 167
  (2) The Railway Men                            180
  (3) The Machinery and Metal Trades             186
  (4) The Employers' Reaction                    190
  (5) Legislation, Courts, and Politics          198

9 RADICAL UNIONISM AND A "COUNTER-REFORMATION"   208

10 THE WAR-TIME BALANCE SHEET                    226

11 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS                           245


PART III. CONCLUSIONS AND INFERENCES

12 AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION                    265

13 THE IDEALISTIC FACTOR                         279

14 WHY THERE IS NOT AN AMERICAN LABOR PARTY      285

15 THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND
  TRADE UNIONISM                                 295

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                     307




PART I

THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE U.S.




CHAPTER 1

LABOR MOVEMENTS BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR


(1) _Early Beginnings, to 1827_

The customary chronology records the first American labor strike in
1741. In that year the New York bakers went out on strike. A closer
analysis discloses, however, that this outbreak was a protest of master
bakers against a municipal regulation of the price of bread, not a wage
earners' strike against employers. The earliest genuine labor strike in
America occurred, as far as known, in 1786, when the Philadelphia
printers "turned out" for a minimum wage of six dollars a week. The
second strike on record was in 1791 by Philadelphia house carpenters for
the ten-hour day. The Baltimore sailors were successful in advancing
their wages through strikes in the years 1795, 1805, and 1807, but their
endeavors were recurrent, not permanent. Even more ephemeral were
several riotous sailors' strikes as well as a ship builders' strike in
1817 at Medford, Massachusetts. Doubtless many other such outbreaks
occurred during the period to 1820, but left no record of their
existence.

A strike undoubtedly is a symptom of discontent. However, one can
hardly speak of a beginning of trade unionism until such discontent has
become expressed in an organization that keeps alive after a strike, or
between strikes. Such permanent organizations existed prior to the
twenties only in two trades, namely, shoemaking and printing.

The first continuous organization of wage earners was that of the
Philadelphia shoemakers, organized in 1792. This society, however,
existed for less than a year and did not even leave us its name. The
shoemakers of Philadelphia again organized in 1794 under the name of the
Federal Society of Journeymen Cordwainers and maintained their existence
as such at least until 1806. In 1799 the society conducted the first
organized strike, which lasted nine or ten weeks. Prior to 1799, the
only recorded strikes of any workmen were "unorganized" and, indeed,
such were the majority of the strikes that occurred prior to the decade
of the thirties in the nineteenth century.

The printers organized their first society in 1794 in New York under the
name of The Typographical Society and it continued in existence for ten
years and six months. The printers of Philadelphia, who had struck in
1786, neglected to keep up an organization after winning their demands.
Between the years 1800 and 1805, the shoemakers and the printers had
continuous organizations in Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore. In
1809 the shoemakers of Pittsburgh and the Boston printers were added to
the list, and somewhat later the Albany and Washington printers. In 1810
the printers organized in New Orleans.

The separation of the journeymen from the masters, first shown in the
formation of these organizations, was emphasized in the attitude toward
employer members. The question arose over the continuation in membership
of those who became employers. The shoemakers excluded such members from
the organization. The printers, on the other hand, were more liberal.
But in 1817 the New York society put them out on the ground that "the
interests of the journeymen are _separate_ and in some respects
_opposite_ to those of the employers."

The strike was the chief weapon of these early societies. Generally a
committee was chosen by the society to present a price list or scale of
wages to the masters individually. The first complete wage scale
presented in this country was drawn up by the organized printers of New
York in 1800. The strikes were mainly over wages and were generally
conducted in an orderly and comparatively peaceful manner. In only one
instance, that of the Philadelphia shoemakers of 1806, is there evidence
of violence and intimidation. In that case "scabs" were beaten and
employers intimidated by demonstrations in front of the shop or by
breaking shop windows. During a strike the duties of "picketing" were
discharged by tramping committees. The Philadelphia shoemakers, however,
as early as 1799, employed for this purpose a paid officer. This strike
was for higher wages for workers on boots. Although those who worked on
shoes made no demands of their own, they were obliged to strike, much
against their will. We thus meet with the first sympathetic strike on
record. In 1809 the New York shoemakers, starting with a strike against
one firm, ordered a general strike when they discovered that that firm
was getting its work done in other shops. The payment of strike benefits
dates from the first authenticated strike, namely in 1786. The method of
payment varied from society to society, but the constitution of the New
York shoemakers, as early as 1805, provided for a permanent strike fund.

The aggressive trade unionism of these early trade societies forced the
masters to combine against them. Associations of masters in their
capacity as merchants had usually preceded the journeymen's societies.
Their function was to counteract destructive competition from
"advertisers" and sellers in the "public market" at low prices. As soon,
however, as the wage question became serious, the masters' associations
proceeded to take on the function of dealing with labor--mostly aiming
to break up the trade societies. Generally they sought to create an
available force of non-union labor by means of advertising, but often
they turned to the courts and brought action against the journeymen's
societies on the ground of conspiracy.

The bitterness of the masters' associations against the the journeymen's
societies perhaps was caused not so much by their resistance to
reductions in wages as by their imposition of working rules, such as the
limitation of the number of apprentices, the minimum wage, and what we
would now call the "closed shop." The conspiracy trials largely turned
upon the "closed shop" and in these the shoemakers figured
exclusively.[2]

Altogether six criminal conspiracy cases are recorded against the
shoemakers from 1806 to 1815. One occurred in Philadelphia in 1806; one
in New York in 1809; two in Baltimore in 1809; and two in Pittsburgh,
the first in 1814 and the other in 1815. Each case was tried before a
jury which was judge both of law and fact. Four of the cases were
decided against the journeymen. In one of the Baltimore cases judgment
was rendered in favor of the journeymen. The Pittsburgh case of 1815 was
compromised, the shoemakers paying the costs and returning to work at
the old wages. The outcome in the other cases is not definitely known.
It was brought out in the testimony that the masters financed, in part
at least, the New York and Pittsburgh prosecutions.

Effective as the convictions in court for conspiracy may have been in
checking the early trade societies, of much greater consequence was the
industrial depression which set in after the conclusion of the
Napoleonic Wars. The lifting of the Embargo enabled the foreign traders
and manufacturers to dump their products upon the American market. The
incipient American industries were in no position to withstand this
destructive competition. Conditions were made worse by past over
investment and by the collapse of currency inflation.

Trade unionism for the time being had to come to an end. The effect on
the journeymen's societies was paralyzing. Only those survived which
turned to mutual insurance. Several of the printers' societies had
already instituted benefit features, and these now helped them
considerably to maintain their organization. The shoe-makers' societies
on the other hand had remained to the end purely trade-regulating
organizations and went to the wall.

Depression reached its ebb in 1820. Thereafter conditions improved,
giving rise to aggressive organizations of wage earners in several
industries. We find strikes and permanent organizations among hatters,
tailors, weavers, nailers, and cabinet makers. And for the first time we
meet with organizations of factory workers--female workers.

Beginning with 1824 and running through 1825, the year which saw the
culmination of a period of high prices, a number of strikes occurred in
the important industrial centers. The majority were called to enforce
higher wages. In Philadelphia, 2900 weavers out of about 4500 in the
city were on strike. But the strike that attracted the most public
attention was that of the Boston house carpenters for the ten-hour day
in 1825.

The Boston journeymen carpenters chose the most strategic time for their
strike. They called it in the spring of the year when there was a great
demand for carpenters owing to a recent fire. Close to six hundred
journeymen were involved in this struggle. The journeymen's demand for
the ten-hour day drew a characteristic reply from the "gentlemen engaged
in building," the customers of the master builders. They condemned the
journeymen on the moral ground that an agitation for a shorter day would
open "a wide door for idleness and vice"; hinted broadly at the foreign
origin of the agitation; declared that all combinations intending to
regulate the value of labor by abridging the working day were in a high
degree unjust and injurious to the other classes in the community;
announced their resolution to support the masters at the sacrifice of
suspending building altogether; and bound themselves not to employ any
journeyman or master who might enforce the ten-hour day. The strike
failed.

The renewed trade-union activities brought forth a fresh crop of trials
for conspiracy.[3] One case involved Philadelphia master shoemakers who
combined to reduce wages, two were against journeymen tailors in
Philadelphia and Buffalo and the fourth was a hatters' case in New
York. The masters were acquitted and the hatters were found guilty of
combining to deprive a non-union man of his livelihood. In the
Philadelphia tailors' case, the journeymen were convicted on the charge
of intimidation. Of the Buffalo tailors' case it is only known that it
ended in the conviction of the journeymen.


(2) _Equal Citizenship, 1827-1832_

So far we have dealt only with trade societies but not yet with a labor
movement. A labor movement presupposes a feeling of solidarity which
goes beyond the boundaries of a single trade and extends to other wage
earners. The American labor movement began in 1827, when the several
trades in Philadelphia organized the Mechanics' Union of Trade
Associations, which was, so far as now known, the first city central
organization of trades in the world. This Union, originally intended as
an economic organization, changed to a political one the following year
and initiated what was probably the most interesting and most typically
American labor movement--a struggle for "equality of citizenship." It
was brought to a head by the severe industrial depression of the time.
But the decisive impulse came from the nation-wide democratic upheaval
led by Andrew Jackson, for which the poorer classes in the cities
displayed no less enthusiasm than the agricultural West. To the wage
earner this outburst of democratic fervor offered an opportunity to try
out his recently acquired franchise. Of the then industrial States,
Massachusetts granted suffrage to the workingmen in 1820 and New York in
1822. In Pennsylvania the constitution of 1790 had extended the right of
suffrage to those who paid any kind of a state or county tax, however
small.

The wage earners' Jacksonianism struck a note all its own. If the
farmer and country merchant, who had passed through the abstract stage
of political aspiration with the Jeffersonian democratic movement, were
now, with Jackson, reaching out for the material advantages which
political power might yield, the wage earners, being as yet novices in
politics, naturally were more strongly impressed with that aspect of the
democratic upheaval which emphasized the rights of man in general and
social equality in particular. If the middle class Jacksonian was
probably thinking first of reducing the debt on his farm or perchance of
getting a political office, and only as an after-thought proceeding to
look for a justification in the Declaration of Independence, as yet the
wage earner was starting with the abstract notion of equal citizenship
as contained in the Declaration, and only then proceeding to search for
the remedies which would square reality with the idea. Hence it was that
the aspiration toward equal citizenship became the keynote of labor's
earliest political movement. The issue was drawn primarily between the
rich and the poor, not between the functional classes, employers and
employes. While the workmen took good care to exclude from their ranks
"persons not living by some useful occupation, such as bankers, brokers,
rich men, etc.," they did not draw the line on employers as such, master
workmen and independent "producers."

The workingmen's bill of complaints, as set forth in the Philadelphia
_Mechanic's Free Press_ and other labor papers, clearly marks off the
movement as a rebellion by the class of newly enfranchised wage earners
against conditions which made them feel degraded in their own eyes as
full fledged citizens of the commonwealth.

The complaints were of different sorts but revolved around the charge
of the usurpation of government by an "aristocracy." Incontrovertible
proof of this charge was found in special legislation chartering banks
and other corporations. The banks were indicted upon two counts. First,
the unstable bank paper money defrauded the wage earner of a
considerable portion of the purchasing power of his wages. Second, banks
restricted competition and shut off avenues for the "man on the make."
The latter accusation may be understood only if we keep in mind that
this was a period when bank credits began to play an essential part in
the conduct of industry; that with the extension of the market into the
States and territories South and West, with the resulting delay in
collections, business could be carried on only by those who enjoyed
credit facilities at the banks. Now, as credit generally follows access
to the market, it was inevitable that the beneficiary of the banking
system should not be the master or journeyman but the merchant for whom
both worked.[4] To the uninitiated, however, this arrangement could only
appear in the light of a huge conspiracy entered into by the chartered
monopolies, the banks, and the unchartered monopolist, the merchant, to
shut out the possible competition by the master and journeyman. The
grievance appeared all the more serious since all banks were chartered
by special enactments of the legislature, which thus appeared as an
accomplice in the conspiracy.

In addition to giving active help to the rich, the workingmen argued,
the government was too callous to the suffering of the poor and pointed
to the practice of imprisonment for debt. The Boston Prison Discipline
Society, a philanthropic organization, estimated in 1829 that about
75,000 persons were annually imprisoned for debt in the United States.
Many of these were imprisoned for very small debts. In one Massachusetts
prison, for example, out of 37 cases, 20 were for less than $20. The
Philadelphia printer and philanthropist, Mathew Carey, father of the
economist Henry C. Carey, cited a contemporary Boston case of a blind
man with a family dependent on him imprisoned for a debt of six dollars.
A labor paper reported an astounding case of a widow in Providence,
Rhode Island, whose husband had lost his life in a fire while attempting
to save the property of the man who later caused her imprisonment for a
debt of 68 cents. The physical conditions in debtors' jails were
appalling, according to unimpeachable contemporary reports. Little did
such treatment of the poor accord with their newly acquired dignity as
citizens.

Another grievance, particularly exasperating because the government was
responsible, grew in Pennsylvania out of the administration of the
compulsory militia system. Service was obligatory upon all male citizens
and non-attendance was punished by fine or imprisonment. The rich
delinquent did not mind, but the poor delinquent when unable to pay was
given a jail sentence.

Other complaints by workingmen went back to the failure of government to
protect the poorer citizen's right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness." The lack of a mechanic's lien law, which would protect his
wages in the case of his employer's bankruptcy, was keenly felt by the
workingmen. A labor paper estimated in 1829 that, owing to the lack of a
lien law on buildings, not less than three or four hundred thousand
dollars in wages were annually lost.

But the most distinctive demands of the workingmen went much further.
This was an age of egalitarianism. The Western frontiersmen demanded
equality with the wealthy Eastern merchant and banker, and found in
Andrew Jackson an ideal spokesman. For a brief moment it seemed that by
equality the workingmen meant an equal division of all property. That
was the program which received temporary endorsement at the first
workingmen's meeting in New York in April 1829. "Equal division" was
advocated by a self-taught mechanic by the name of Thomas Skidmore, who
elaborated his ideas in a book bearing the self-revealing title of "_The
Rights of Man to Property: being a Proposition to make it Equal among
the Adults of the Present Generation: and to Provide for its Equal
Transmission to Every Individual of Each Succeeding Generation, on
Arriving at the Age of Maturity_," published in 1829. This Skidmorian
program was better known as "agrarianism," probably from the title of a
book by Thomas Paine, _Agrarian Justice, as Opposed to Agrarian Law and
to Agrarian Monopoly_, published in 1797 in London, which advocated
equal division by means of an inheritance tax. Its adoption by the New
York workingmen was little more than a stratagem, for their intention
was to forestall any attempts by employers to lengthen the working day
to eleven hours by raising the question of "the nature of the tenure by
which all men hold title to their property." Apparently the stratagem
worked, for the employers immediately dropped the eleven-hour issue.
But, although the workingmen quickly thereafter repudiated agrarianism,
they succeeded only too well in affixing to their movement the mark of
the beast in the eyes of their opponents and the general public.

Except during the brief but damaging "agrarian" episode, the demand for
free public education or "Republican" education occupied the foreground.
We, who live in an age when free education at the expense of the
community is considered practically an inalienable right of every child,
find it extremely difficult to understand the vehemence of the
opposition which the demand aroused on the part of the press and the
"conservative" classes, when first brought up by the workingmen. The
explanation lies partly in the political situation, partly in the moral
character of the "intellectual" spokesmen for the workingmen, and partly
in the inborn conservatism of the tax-paying classes upon whom the
financial burden would fall. That the educational situation was
deplorable much proof is unnecessary. Pennsylvania had some public
schools, but parents had to declare themselves too poor to send their
children to a private school before they were allowed the privilege of
sending them there. In fact so much odium attached to these schools that
they were practically useless and the State became distinguished for the
number of children not attending school. As late as 1837 a labor paper
estimated that 250,000 out of 400,000 children in Pennsylvania of school
age were not in any school. The Public School Society of New York
estimated in a report for 1829 that in New York City alone there were
24,200 children between the ages of five and fifteen years not attending
any school whatever.

To meet these conditions the workingmen outlined a comprehensive
educational program. It was not merely a literary education that the
workingmen desired. The idea of industrial education, or training for a
vocation, which is even now young in this country, was undoubtedly first
introduced by the leaders of this early labor movement. They demanded a
system of public education which would "combine a knowledge of the
practical arts with that of the useful sciences." The idea of industrial
education appears to have originated in a group of which two
"intellectuals," Robert Dale Owen and Frances Wright, were the leading
spirits.

Robert Dale Owen was the eldest son of Robert Owen, the famous English
manufacturer-philanthropist, who originated the system of socialism
known as "Owenism." Born in Scotland, he was educated at Hofwyl,
Switzerland, in a school conducted by Emmanuel von Fellenberg, the
associate of the famous Pestalozzi, as a self-governing children's
republic on the manner of the present "Julior Republics." Owen himself
said that he owed his abiding faith in human virtue and social progress
to his years at Hofwyl. In 1825 Robert Dale left England to join his
father in a communistic experiment at New Harmony, Indiana, and together
they lived through the vicissitudes which attended that experiment.
There he met Frances Wright, America's first suffragist, with whom he
formed an intimate friendship lasting through many years. The failure at
New Harmony convinced him that his father had overlooked the importance
of the anti-social habits which the members had formed before they
joined; and he concluded that those could be prevented only by applying
a rational system of education to the young. These conclusions, together
with the recollections of his experience at Hofwyl, led him to advocate
a new system of education, which came to be called "state guardianship."

State guardianship was a demand for the establishment by the state of
boarding schools where children should receive, not only equal
instruction, general as well as industrial, but equal food and equal
clothing at the public expense. Under this system, it was asserted,
public schools would become "not schools of charity, but schools of the
nation, to the support of which all would contribute; and instead of
being almost a disgrace, it would become an honor to have been educated
there." It was urged as an especial advantage that, as children would be
clothed and cared for at all times, the fact that poor parents could not
afford to dress their children "as decently as their neighbors" would
not prevent their attendance.

State guardianship became the battle cry of an important faction in the
Workingmen's party in New York. Elsewhere a less radical program was
advocated. In Philadelphia the workingmen demanded only that high
schools be on the Hofwyl model, whereas in the smaller cities and towns
in both Pennsylvania and New York the demand was for "literary" day
schools. Yet the underlying principle was the same everywhere. A labor
candidate for Congress in the First Congressional District of
Philadelphia in 1830 expressed it succinctly during his campaign. He
made his plea on the ground that "he is the friend and indefatigable
defender of a system of general education, which will place the citizens
of this extensive Republic on an equality; a system that will fit the
children of the poor, as well as the rich, to become our future
legislators; a system that will bring the children of the poor and the
rich to mix together as a band of Republican brethren."

In New England the workingmen's movement for equal citizenship was
simultaneously a reaction against the factory system. To the cry for a
Republican system of education was added an anti-child labor crusade.
One who did more than any other to call attention to the evils of the
factory system of that day was a lawyer by the name of Seth Luther, who,
according to his own account, had "for years lived among cotton mills,
worked in them, travelled among them." His "_Address to the Working Men
of New England on the State of Education, and on the Condition of the
Producing Classes in Europe and America, with Particular Reference to
the Effect of Manufacturing (as now conducted) on the Health and
Happiness of the Poor, and on the Safety of our Republic_" was delivered
widely and undoubtedly had considerable influence over the labor
movement of the period. The average working day in the best factories at
that time was nearly thirteen hours. For the children who were sent into
the factories at an early age these hours precluded, of course, any
possibility of obtaining even the most rudimentary education.

The New England movement was an effort to unite producers of all kinds,
including not only farmers but factory workers with mechanics and city
workingmen. In many parts of the State of New York the workingmen's
parties included the three classes--"farmers, mechanics, and working
men,"--but New England added a fourth class, the factory operatives. It
was early found, however, that the movement could expect little or no
help from the factory operatives, who were for the most part women and
children.

The years 1828, 1829, and 1830 were years of political labor movements
and labor parties. Philadelphia originated the first workingmen's party,
then came New York and Boston, and finally state-wide movements and
political organizations in each of the three States. In New York the
workingmen scored their most striking single success, when in 1829 they
cast 6000 votes out of a total of 21,000. In Philadelphia the labor
ticket polled 2400 in 1828 and the labor party gained the balance of
power in the city. But the inexperience of the labor politicians coupled
with machinations on the part of "designing men" of both older parties
soon lost the labor parties their advantage. In New York Tammany made
the demand for a mechanics' lien law its own and later saw that it
became enacted into law. In New York, also, the situation became
complicated by factional strife between the Skidmorian "agrarians," the
Owenite state guardianship faction, and a third faction which eschewed
either "panacea." Then, too, the opposition parties and press seized
upon agrarianism and Owen's alleged atheism to brand the whole labor
movement. The labor party was decidedly unfortunate in its choice of
intellectuals and "ideologists."

It would be, however, a mistake to conclude that the Philadelphia, New
York, or New England political movements were totally without results.
Though unsuccessful in electing their candidates to office, they did
succeed in placing their demands to advantage before the public.
Humanitarians, like Horace Mann, took up independently the fight for
free public education and carried it to success. In Pennsylvania, public
schools, free from the taint of charity, date since 1836. In New York
City the public school system was established in 1832. The same is true
of the demand for a mechanics' lien law, of the abolition of
imprisonment for debt, and of others.


(3) _The Period of the "Wild-cat" Prosperity, 1833-1837_

With the break-up of the workingmen's parties, labor's newly acquired
sense of solidarity was temporarily lost, leaving only the restricted
solidarity of the isolated trade society. Within that limit, however,
important progress began to be made. In 1833, there were in New York
twenty-nine organized trades; in Philadelphia, twenty-one; and in
Baltimore, seventeen. Among those organized in Philadelphia were
hand-loom weavers, plasterers, bricklayers, black and white smiths,
cigar makers, plumbers, and women workers including tailoresses,
seamstresses, binders, folders, milliners, corset makers, and mantua
workers. Several trades, such as the printers and tailors in New York
and the Philadelphia carpenters, which formerly were organized upon the
benevolent basis, were now reorganized as trade societies. The
benevolent New York Typographical Society was reduced to secondary
importance by the appearance in 1831 of the New York Typographical
Association.

But the factor that compelled labor to organize on a much larger scale
was the remarkable rise in prices from 1835 to 1837. This rise in prices
was coincident with the "wild-cat" prosperity, which followed a rapid
multiplication of state banks with the right of issue of paper
currency--largely irredeemable "wild-cat" currency. Cost of living
having doubled, the subject of wages became a burning issue. At the same
time the general business prosperity rendered demands for higher wages
easily attainable. The outcome was a luxuriant growth of trade unionism.

In 1836 there were in Philadelphia fifty-eight trade unions; in Newark,
New Jersey, sixteen; in New York, fifty-two; in Pittsburgh, thirteen; in
Cincinnati, fourteen; and in Louisville, seven. In Buffalo the
journeymen builders' association included all the building trades. The
tailors of Louisville, Cincinnati, and St. Louis made a concentrated
effort against their employers in these three cities.

The wave of organization reached at last the women workers. In 1830 the
well-known Philadelphia philanthropist, Mathew Carey, asserted that
there were in the cities of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and
Baltimore about 20,000 women who could not by constant employment for
sixteen hours out of twenty-four earn more than $1.25 a week. These were
mostly seamstresses and tailoresses, umbrella makers, shoe binders,
cigar makers, and book binders. In New York there was in 1835 a Female
Union Association, in Baltimore a United Seamstresses' Society, and in
Philadelphia probably the first federation of women workers in this
country. In Lynn, Massachusetts, a "Female Society of Lynn and Vicinity
for the Protection and Promotion of Female Industry" operated during
1833 and 1834 among the shoe binders and had at one time 1000 members,
who, like the seamstresses, were home workers and earned scanty wages.

Where nearly every trade was in motion, it did not take long to discover
a common direction and a common purpose. This was expressed in city
"trades' unions," or federations of all organized trades in a city, and
in its ascendency over the individual trade societies.

The first trades' union was organized August 14, 1833, in New York.
Baltimore followed in September, Philadelphia in November, and Boston in
March 1834. New York after 1820 was the metropolis of the country and
also the largest industrial and commercial center. There the house
carpenters had struck for higher wages in the latter part of May 1833,
and fifteen other trades met and pledged their support. Out of this grew
the New York Trades' Union. It had an official organ in a weekly, the
_National Trades' Union_, published from 1834 to 1836, and a daily, _The
Union_, issued in 1836. Ely Moore, a printer, was made president. Moore
was elected a few months later as the first representative of labor in
Congress.

In addition, trades' unions were organized in Washington; in New
Brunswick and Newark, New Jersey; in Albany, Troy, and Schenectady, New
York; and in the "Far West"--Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Louisville.

Except in Boston, the trades' unions felt anxious to draw the line
between themselves and the political labor organizations of the
preceding years. In Philadelphia, where as we have seen, the formation
of an analogous organization, the Mechanics' Union of Trade Associations
of 1828, had served as a preliminary for a political movement, the
General Trades' Union took especial precaution and provided in the
constitution that "no party, political or religious questions shall at
any time be agitated in or acted upon in the Union." Its official organ,
the _National Laborer_, declared that "_the Trades' Union never will be
political_ because its members have learned from experience that the
introduction of politics into their societies has thwarted every effort
to ameliorate their conditions."

The repudiation of active politics did not carry with it a condemnation
of legislative action or "lobbying." On the contrary, these years
witnessed the first sustained legislative campaign that was ever
conducted by a labor organization, namely the campaign by the New York
Trades' Union for the suppression of the competition from prison-made
goods. Under the pressure of the New York Union the State Legislature
created in 1834 a special commission on prison labor with its president,
Ely Moore, as one of the three commissioners. On this question of
prison labor the trade unionists clashed with the humanitarian prison
reformers, who regarded productive labor by prisoners as a necessary
means of their reform to an honest mode of living; and the humanitarian
won. After several months' work the commission submitted what was to the
Union an entirely unsatisfactory report. It approved the prison-labor
system as a whole and recommended only minor changes. Ely Moore signed
the report, but a public meeting of workingmen condemned it.

The rediscovered solidarity between the several trades now embodied in
the city trades' unions found its first expression on a large scale in a
ten-hour movement.

The first concerted demand for the ten-hour day was made by the
workingmen of Baltimore in August 1833, and extended over seventeen
trades. But the mechanics' aspiration for a ten-hour day--perhaps the
strongest spiritual inheritance from the preceding movement for equal
citizenship,[5] had to await a change in the general condition of
industry to render trade union effort effective before it could turn
into a well sustained movement. That change finally came with the
prosperous year of 1835.

The movement was precipitated in Boston. There, as we saw, the
carpenters had been defeated in an effort to establish a ten-hour day in
1825,[6] but made another attempt in the spring of 1835. This time,
however, they did not stand alone but were joined by the masons and
stone-cutters. As before, the principal attack was directed against the
"capitalists," that is, the owners of the buildings and the real estate
speculators. The employer or small contractor was viewed
sympathetically. "We would not be too severe on our employers," said the
strikers' circular, which was sent out broadcast over the country, "they
are slaves to the capitalists, as we are to them."

The strike was protracted. The details of it are not known, but we know
that it won sympathy throughout the country. A committee visited in July
the different cities on the Atlantic coast to solicit aid for the
strikers. In Philadelphia, when the committee arrived in company with
delegates from New York, Newark, and Paterson, the Trades' Union held a
special meeting and resolved to stand by the "Boston House Wrights" who,
"in imitation of the noble and decided stand taken by their
Revolutionary Fathers, have determined to throw off the shackles of more
mercenary tyrants than theirs." Many societies voted varying sums of
money in aid of the strikers.

The Boston strike was lost, but the sympathy which it evoked among
mechanics in various cities was quickly turned to account. Wherever the
Boston circular reached, it acted like a spark upon powder. In
Philadelphia the ten-hour movement took on the aspect of a crusade. Not
only the building trades, as in Boston, but most of the mechanical
branches were involved. Street parades and mass meetings were held. The
public press, both friendly and hostile, discussed it at length. Work
was suspended and after but a brief "standout" the whole ended in a
complete victory for the workingmen. Unskilled laborers, too, struck for
the ten-hour day and, in the attempt to prevent others from taking their
jobs, riotous scenes occurred which attracted considerable attention.
The movement proved so irresistible that the Common Council announced a
ten-hour day for public servants. Lawyers, physicians, merchants, and
politicians took up the cause of the workingmen. On June 8 the master
carpenters granted the ten-hour day and by June 22 the victory was
complete.

The victory in Philadelphia was so overwhelming and was given so much
publicity that its influence extended to many smaller towns. In fact,
the ten-hour system, which remained in vogue in this country in the
skilled trades until the nineties, dates largely from this movement in
the middle of the thirties.

The great advance in the cost of living during 1835 and 1836 compelled
an extensive movement for higher wages. Prices had in some instances
more than doubled. Most of these strikes were hastily undertaken.
Prices, of course, were rising rapidly but the societies were new and
lacked balance. A strike in one trade was an example to others to
strike. In a few instances, however, there was considerable planning and
reserve.

The strike epidemic affected even the girls who worked in the textile
factories. The first strike of factory girls on record had occurred in
Dover, New Hampshire, in 1828. A factory strike in Paterson, New Jersey,
which occurred in the same year, occasioned the first recorded calling
out of militia to quell labor disturbances. There the strikers were,
however, for the most part men. But the factory strike which attracted
the greatest public attention was the Lowell strike in February, 1834,
against a 15 percent reduction in wages. The strike was short and
unsuccessful, notwithstanding that 800 striking girls at first exhibited
a determination to carry their struggle to the end. It appears that
public opinion in New England was disagreeably impressed by this early
manifestation of feminism. Another notable factory strike was one in
Paterson in July 1835. Unlike similar strikes, it had been preceded by
an organization. The chief demand was the eleven-hour day. The strike
involved twenty mills and 2000 persons. Two weeks later the employers
reduced hours from thirteen and a half to twelve hours for five days and
to nine hours on Saturday. This broke the strike. The character of the
agitation among the factory workers stamps it as ephemeral. Even more
ephemeral was the agitation among immigrant laborers, mostly Irish, on
canals and roads, which usually took the form of riots.

As in the preceding period, the aggressiveness of the trade societies
eventually gave rise to combative masters' associations. These, goaded
by restrictive union practices, notably the closed shop, appealed to the
courts for relief. By 1836 employers' associations appeared in nearly
every trade in which labor was aggressive; in New York there were at
least eight and in Philadelphia seven. In Philadelphia, at the
initiative of the master carpenters and cordwainers, there came to exist
an informal federation of the masters' associations in the several
trades.

From 1829 to 1842 there were eight recorded prosecutions of labor
organizations for conspiracy. The workingmen were convicted in two
cases; in two other cases the courts sustained demurrers to the
indictments; in three cases the defendants were acquitted after jury
trials; and the outcome of one case is unknown. Finally, in 1842, long
after the offending societies had gone out of existence under the stress
of unemployment and depressions, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts handed down a decision, which for forty years laid to
rest the doctrine of conspiracy as applied to labor unions.[7]

The unity of action of the several trades displayed in the city trades'
unions engendered before long a still wider solidarity in the form of a
National Trades' Union. It came together in August 1834, in New York
City upon the invitation of the General Trades' Union of New York. The
delegates were from the trades' unions of New York, Philadelphia,
Boston, Brooklyn, Poughkeepsie, and Newark. Ely Moore, then labor
candidate for Congress, was elected president. An attempt by the only
"intellectual" present, a Doctor Charles Douglass, representing the
Boston Trades' Union, to strike a political note was immediately
squelched. A second convention was held in 1835 and a third one in 1837.

The National Trades' Union played a conspicuous part in securing the
ten-hour day for government employes. The victory of the ten-hour
principle in private employment in 1835 generally led to its adoption by
states and municipalities. However, the Federal government was slow to
follow the example, since Federal officials were immune from the direct
political pressure which the workingmen were able to use with advantage
upon locally elected office holders.

In October 1835, the mechanics employed in the New York and Brooklyn
Navy Yards petitioned the Secretary of the Navy for a reduction of the
hours of labor to ten. The latter referred the petition to the Board of
Navy Commissioners, who returned the petition with the opinion that it
would be detrimental to the government to accede to their request. This
forced the matter into the attention of the National Trades' Union. At
its second convention in 1835 it decided to petition Congress for a
ten-hour day for employes on government works. The petition was
introduced by the labor Congressman from New York, Ely Moore. Congress
curtly replied, however, that it was not a matter for legislation but
"that the persons employed should redress their own grievances." With
Congress in such a mood, the hopes of the workingmen turned to the
President.

A first step was made in the summer of 1836, when the workers in the
Navy Yard at Philadelphia struck for a ten-hour day and appealed to
President Jackson for relief. They would have nothing further to do with
Congress. They had supported President Jackson in his fight against the
United States Bank and now sought a return favor. At a town meeting of
"citizens, mechanics, and working men," a committee was appointed to lay
the issue before him. He proved indeed more responsive than Congress and
ordered the ten-hour system established.

But the order applied only to the localities where the strike occurred.
The agitation had been chiefly local. Besides Philadelphia and New York
the mechanics secured the ten-hour day in Baltimore and Annapolis, but
in the District of Columbia and elsewhere they were still working twelve
or fourteen hours. In other words, the ten-hour day was secured only
where trade societies existed.

But the organized labor movement did not rest with a partial success.
The campaign of pressure on the President went on. Finally, although
somewhat belatedly, President Van Buren issued on March 31, 1840, the
famous executive order establishing the ten-hour day on government work
without a reduction in wages.

The victory came after the National Trades' Union had gone out of
existence and should be, more correctly, correlated with a labor
political movement. Early in 1837 came a financial panic. The industrial
depression wiped out in a short time every form of labor organization
from the trade societies to the National Trades' Union. Labor stood
defenseless against the economic storm. In this emergency it turned to
politics as a measure of despair.

The political dissatisfaction assumed the form of hostility towards
banks and corporations in general. The workingmen held the banks
responsible for the existing anarchy in currency, from which they
suffered both as consumers and producers. Moreover, they felt that there
was something uncanny and threatening about corporations with their
continuous existence and limited liability. Even while their attention
had been engrossed by trade unionism, the workingmen were awake to the
issue of monopoly. Together with their employers they had therefore
supported Jackson in his assault upon the largest "monster" of them
all--the Bank of the United States. The local organizations of the
Democratic party, however, did not always remain true to faith. In such
circumstances the workingmen, again acting in conjunction with their
masters, frequently extended their support to the "insurgent"
anti-monopoly candidates in the Democratic party conventions. Such a
revolt took place in Philadelphia in 1835; and in New York, although
Tammany had elected Ely Moore, the President of the General Trades'
Union of New York, to Congress in 1834, a similar revolt occurred. The
upshot was a triumphant return of the rebels into the fold of Tammany in
1837. During the next twenty years, Tammany came nearer to being a
workingmen's organization than at any other time in its career.


(4) _The Long Depression, 1837-1862_

The twenty-five years which elapsed from 1837 to 1862 form a period of
business depression and industrial disorganization only briefly
interrupted during 1850-1853 by the gold discoveries in California. The
aggressive unions of the thirties practically disappeared. With industry
disorganized, trade unionism, or the effort to protect the standard of
living by means of strikes, was out of question. As the prospect for
immediate amelioration became dimmed by circumstances, an opportunity
arrived for theories and philosophies of radical social reform. Once the
sun with its life-giving heat has set, one begins to see the cold and
distant stars.

The uniqueness of the period of the forties in the labor movement
proceeds not only from the large volume of star-gazing, but also from
the accompanying fact that, for the first and only time in American
history, the labor movement was dominated by men and women from the
educated class, the "intellectuals," who thus served in the capacity of
expert astrologers.

And there was no lack of stars in the heaven of social reform to occupy
both intellectual and wage earner. First, there was the efficiency
scheme of the followers of Charles Fourier, the French socialist, or, as
they preferred to call themselves, the Associationists. Theirs was a
proposal aiming directly to meet the issue of the prevailing industrial
disorganization and wasteful competition. Albert Brisbane, Horace
Greeley, and the Brook Farm enthusiasts and "Associationists" of the
forties, made famous by their intimate association with Ralph Waldo
Emerson, had much in common with the present-day efficiency engineers.
This "old" efficiency of theirs, like the new one, was chiefly concerned
with increasing the production of wealth through the application of the
"natural" laws of human nature. With the enormous increase in production
to be brought about by "Fourierism" and "Association," the question of
justice in distribution was relegated to a secondary place. Where they
differed from the new efficiency was in method, for they believed
efficiency would be attained if only the human instincts or "passions"
were given free play, while the efficiency engineers of today trust less
to unguided instinct and more to "scientific management" of human
"passions."

Midway between trade unionism and the simon-pure, idealistic reform
philosophies stood producers' and consumers' cooperation. It had the
merit of being a practical program most suitable to a time of
depression, while on its spiritual side it did not fail to satisfy the
loftiest intellectual. It was the resultant of the two most potent
forces which acted upon the movement of the forties, the pressure of an
inadequate income of the wage earner and the influence of the
intellectuals. During no other period has there been, relatively
speaking, so much effort along that line.

Although, as we shall see, the eighties were properly the era of
producers' cooperation on a large scale, the self-governing workshop had
always been familiar to the American labor movement. The earliest
attempt, as far as we have knowledge, occurred in Philadelphia in 1791,
when the house carpenters out on strike offered by way of retaliation
against their employers to undertake contracts at 25 percent less than
the price charged by the masters. Fourteen years later, in 1806, the
journeymen cordwainers of the same city, following their conviction in
court on the charge of conspiracy brought in by their masters, opened up
a cooperative shoe warehouse and store. As a rule the workingmen took up
productive cooperation when they had failed in strikes.

In 1836 many of the trade societies began to lose their strikes and
turned to cooperation. The cordwainers working on ladies' shoes entered
upon a strike for higher wages in March 1836, and opened three months
later a "manufactory" or a warehouse of their own. The handloom weavers
in two of the suburbs of Philadelphia started cooperative associations
at the same time. At the end of 1836 the hand-loom weavers of
Philadelphia proper had two cooperative shops and were planning to open
a third. In New Brunswick, New Jersey, the journeymen cordwainers opened
a shop after an unsuccessful strike early in 1836; likewise the tailors
of Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Louisville. In New York the carpenters had
done so already in 1833, and the painters of New York and Brooklyn
opened their shops in 1837.

Before long the spirit became so contagious that the Trades' Union of
Philadelphia, the city federation of trade societies, was obliged to
take notice. Early in 1837 a conference of about 200 delegates requested
each trade society to submit estimates for a shop to employ ten members.
However, further steps were prevented by the financial panic and
business depression.

The forties witnessed several similar attempts. When the iron molders of
Cincinnati failed to win a strike in the autumn of 1847, a few of their
number collected what funds they could and organized a sort of
joint-stock company which they called "The Journeymen Molders' Union
Foundry." Two local philanthropists erected their buildings. In
Pittsburgh a group of puddlers tried to raise money by selling stock to
anyone who wished to take an interest in their cooperative venture.

The cooperative ventures multiplied in 1850 and 1851, following a
widespread failure of strikes and were entered upon with particular
readiness by the German immigrants. Among the Germans was an attitude
towards producers' cooperation, based more nearly on general principles
than the practical exigencies of a strike. Fresh from the scenes of
revolutions in Europe, they were more given to dreams about
reconstructing society and more trustful in the honesty and integrity of
their leaders. The cooperative movement among the Germans was identified
with the name of Wilhelm Weitling, the well-known German communist, who
settled in America about 1850. This movement centered in and around New
York. The cooperative principle met with success among the
English-speaking people only outside the larger cities. In Buffalo,
after an unsuccessful strike, the tailors formed an association with a
membership of 108 and in October 1850, were able to give employment to
80 of that number.

Again, following an unsuccessful Pittsburgh strike of iron founders in
1849, about a dozen of the strikers went to Wheeling, Virginia, each
investing $3000, and opened a cooperative foundry shop. Two other
foundries were opened on a similar basis in Stetsonville, Ohio, and
Sharon, Pennsylvania. These associations of iron founders, however,
might better be called association of small capitalists or
master-workmen.

During the forties, consumers' or distributive cooperation was also
given a trial. The early history of consumers' cooperation is but
fragmentary and, so far as we know, the first cooperative attempt which
had for its exclusive aim "competence to purchaser" was made in
Philadelphia early in 1829. A store was established on North Fifth
Street, which sold goods at wholesale prices to members, who paid twenty
cents a month for its privileges.

In 1831 distributive cooperation was much discussed in Boston by a "New
England Association of Farmers, Mechanics, and Other Working Men." A
half dozen cooperative attempts are mentioned in the Cooperator,
published in Utica in 1832, but only in the case of the journeymen
cordwainers of Lynn do we discover an undertaking which can with
certainty be considered as an effort to achieve distributive
cooperation. Several germs of cooperative effort are found between 1833
and 1845, but all that is known about them is that their promoters
sought to effect a saving by the purchase of goods in large quantities
which were then broken up and distributed at a slight advance above
original cost in order to meet expenses. The managers were unpaid, the
members' interest in the business was not maintained, and the stores
soon failed, or passed into the possession of private owners.

It was the depression of 1846-1849 which supplied the movement for
distributive cooperation with the needed stimulus, especially in New
England. Although the matter was discussed in New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and even as far west as Ohio and Illinois, yet
in none of the industrial centers of these States, except perhaps in New
York, was it put into successful operation.

In New England, however, the conditions were exceptionally favorable. A
strike movement for higher wages during a partial industrial revival of
1843-1844 had failed completely. This failure, added to the fact that
women and girls were employed under very unsatisfactory conditions,
strengthened the interest of humanitarians in the laboring people and
especially in cooperation as a possible means of alleviating their
distress.

Under the stimulus of these agitations, the New England Protective Union
was formed in 1845. Until 1849, however, it bore the name of the Working
Men's Protective Union. As often happens, prosperity brought disunion
and, in 1853, a schism occurred in the organization due to personal
differences. The seceders formed a separate organization known as the
American Protective Union.

The Working Men's Protective Union embodied a larger conception of the
cooperative idea than had been expressed before. The important thought
was that an economy of a few dollars a year in the purchase of
commodities was a poor way out of labor difficulties, but was valuable
only as a preparation for something better.

Though the resources of these laborers were small, they began the work
with great hopes. This business, starting so unpretentiously, assumed
larger and increasing proportions until in October, 1852, the Union
embraced 403 divisions of which 167 reported a capital of $241,712 and
165 of these announced annual sales amounting to $1,696,825. Though the
schism of 1853, mentioned above, weakened the body, the agent of the
American Protective Union claimed for the divisions comprising it sales
aggregating in value over nine and one-fourth millions dollars in the
seven years ending in 1859.

It is not possible to tell what might have been the outcome of this
cooperative movement had the peaceful development of the country
remained uninterrupted. As it happened, the disturbed era of the Civil
War witnessed the near annihilation of all workingmen's cooperation.

It is not difficult to see the causes which led to the destruction of
the still tender plant. Men left their homes for the battle field,
foreigners poured into New England towns and replaced the Americans in
the shops, while share-holders frequently became frightened at the state
of trade and gladly saw the entire cooperative enterprise pass into the
hands of the storekeeper.

This first American cooperative movement on a large scale resembled the
British movement in many respects, namely open membership, equal voting
by members irrespective of number of shares, cash sales and federation
of societies for wholesale purchases, but differed in that goods were
sold to members nearly at cost rather than at the market price. Dr.
James Ford in his _Cooperation in New England, Urban and Rural_,[8]
describes two survivals from this period, the Central Union Association
of New Bedford, Massachusetts, founded in 1848, and the Acushnet
Cooperative Association, also of New Bedford, which began business in
1849.

But the most characteristic labor movement of the forties was a
resurgence of the old Agrarianism of the twenties.

Skidmore's "equal division" of all property appealed to the workingmen
of New York because it seemed to be based on equality of opportunity.
One of Skidmore's temporary associates, a Welshman by the name of George
Henry Evans, drew from him an inspiration for a new kind of agrarianism
to which few could object. This new doctrine was a true Agrarianism,
since it followed in the steps of the original "Agrarians," the brothers
Gracchi in ancient Rome. Like the Gracchi, Evans centered his plan
around the "ager publicum"--the vast American public domain. Evans began
his agitation about 1844.

Man's right to life, according to Evans, logically implied his right to
use the materials of nature necessary for being. For practical reasons
he would not interfere with natural resources which have already passed
under private ownership. Evans proposed instead that Congress give each
would-be settler land for a homestead free of charge.

As late as 1852 debaters in Congress pointed out that in the preceding
sixty years only 100,000,000 acres of the public lands had been sold and
that 1,400,000,000 acres still remained at the disposal of the
government. Estimates of the required time to dispose of this residuum
at the same rate of sale varied from 400 or 500 to 900 years. With the
exaggerated views prevalent, it is no wonder that Evans believed that
the right of the individual to as much land as his right to live calls
for would remain a living right for as long a period in the future as a
practical statesman may be required to take into account.

The consequences of free homesteads were not hard to picture. The
landless wage earners could be furnished transportation and an outfit,
for the money spent for poor relief would be more profitably expended in
sending the poor to the land. Private societies and trade unions, when
laborers were too numerous, could aid in transporting the surplus to the
waiting homesteads and towns that would grow up. With the immobility of
labor thus offering no serious obstacle to the execution of the plan,
the wage earners of the East would have the option of continuing to work
for wages or of taking up their share of the vacant lands. Moreover,
mechanics could set up as independent producers in the new settlements.
Enough at least would go West to force employers to offer better wages
and shorter hours. Those unable to meet the expenses of moving would
profit by higher wages at home. An equal opportunity to go on land would
benefit both pioneer and stay-at-home.

But Evans would go still further in assuring equality of opportunity. He
would make the individual's right to the resources of nature safe
against the creditors through a law exempting homesteads from attachment
for debts and even against himself by making the homestead inalienable.
Moreover to assure that right to the American people _in perpetuo_ he
would prohibit future disposal of the public land in large blocks to
moneyed purchasers as practiced by the government heretofore. Thus the
program of the new agrarianism: free homesteads, homestead exemption,
and land limitation.

Evans had a plan of political action, which was as unique as his
economic program. His previous political experiences with the New York
Workingmen's party had taught him that a minority party could not hope
to win by its own votes and that the politicians cared more for offices
than for measures. They would endorse any measure which was supported by
voters who held the balance of power. His plan of action was, therefore,
to ask all candidates to pledge their support to his measures. In
exchange for such a pledge, the candidates would receive the votes of
the workingmen. In case neither candidate would sign the pledge, it
might be necessary to nominate an independent as a warning to future
candidates; but not as an indication of a new party organization.

Evans' ideas quickly won the adherence of the few labor papers then
existing. Horace Greeley's New York Tribune endorsed the homestead
movement as early as 1845. The next five years witnessed a remarkable
spread of the ideas of the free homestead movement in the press of the
country. It was estimated in 1845 that 2000 papers were published in the
United States and that in 1850, 600 of these supported land reform.

Petitions and memorials having proved of little avail, the land
reformers tried Evans' pet plan of bargaining votes for the support of
their principles. Tammany was quick to start the bidding. In May, 1851,
a mass-meeting was held at Tammany Hall "of all those in favor of land
and other industrial reform, to be made elements in the Presidential
contest of 1852." A platform was adopted which proclaimed man's right to
the soil and urged that freedom of the public lands be endorsed by the
Democratic party. Senator Isaac A. Walker of Wisconsin was nominated as
the candidate of the party for President.

For a while the professional politician triumphed over the too trusting
workingman reformer. But the cause found strong allies in the other
classes of the American community. From the poor whites of the upland
region of the South came a similar demand formulated by the Tennessee
tailor, Andrew Johnson, later President of the United States, who
introduced his first homestead bill in 1845. From the Western pioneers
and settlers came the demand for increased population and development of
resources, leading both to homesteads for settlers and land grants for
railways. The opposition came from manufacturers and landowners of the
East and from the Southern slave owners. The West and East finally
combined and the policy of the West prevailed, but not before the South
had seceded from the Union.

Not the entire reform was accepted. The Western spirit dominated. The
homestead law, as finally adopted in 1862, granted one hundred and sixty
acres as a free gift to every settler. But the same Congress launched
upon a policy of extensive land grants to railways. The homestead
legislation doubtless prevented great estates similar to those which
sprang of a different policy of the Australian colonies, but did not
carry out the broad principles of inalienability and land limitation of
the original Agrarians.

Their principle of homestead exemption, however, is now almost
universally adopted. Thus the homestead agitation begun by Evans and a
group of wage earners and farmers in 1844 was carried to victory, though
to an incomplete victory. It contained a fruitful lesson to labor in
politics. The vested interests in the East were seen ultimately to
capitulate before a popular movement which at no time aspired toward
political power and office, but, concentrating on one issue, endeavored
instead to permeate with its ideas the public opinion of the country at
large.

Of all the "isms" so prevalent during the forties, "Agrarianism" alone
came close to modern socialism, as it alone advocated class struggle and
carried it into the political field, although, owing to the peculiarity
of the American party structure, it urged a policy of "reward your
friends, and punish your enemies" rather than an out and out labor
party. It is noteworthy that of all social reform movements of the
forties Agrarianism alone was not initiated by the intellectuals. On
the other hand, another movement for legislative reform, namely the
shorter-hour movement for women and children working in the mills and
factories, was entirely managed by humanitarians. Its philosophy was the
furthest removed from the class struggle idea.

For only a short year or two did prosperity show itself from behind the
clouds to cause a mushroom growth of trade unions, once in 1850-1851 and
again in 1853-1854, following the gold discoveries in California. During
these few years unionism disentangled itself from humanitarianism and
cooperationism and came out in its wholly modern form of restrictive
craft unionism, only to be again suppressed by the business depressions
that preceded and followed the panic of 1857. Considered as a whole,
however, the period of the forties and fifties was the zenith in
American history of theories of social reform, of "panaceas," of
humanitarianism.

The trade union wave of the fifties was so short lived and the trade
unionists were so preoccupied with the pressing need of advancing their
wages to keep pace with the soaring prices caused by the influx of
California gold, that we miss the tendency which was so strong in the
thirties to reach out for a wider basis of labor organization in city
trades' unions, and ultimately in a National Trades' Union. On the other
hand, the fifties foreshadowed a new form of expansion of labor
organization--the joining together in a nation-wide organization of all
local unions of one trade. The printers[9] organized nationally in
1850, the locomotive engineers and the hat-finishers in 1854; and the
iron molders, and the machinists and blacksmiths in 1859; in addition
there were at least a half dozen less successful attempts in other
trades.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] See below, 147-148.

[3] See below, 148-149.

[4] See below, 270-272.

[5] The workingmen felt that they required leisure to be able to
exercise their rights of citizens.

[6] The ship carpenters had been similarly defeated in 1832.

[7] For a detailed discussion of these trials see below, 149-152.

[8] Published in 1916 by the Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 16-18.

[9] The printers had organized nationally for the first time in 1836,
but the organization lasted less than two years; likewise the
cordwainers or shoemakers. But we must keep in mind that what
constituted national organization in the thirties would pass only for
regional or sectional organization in later years.




CHAPTER 2

THE "GREENBACK" PERIOD, 1862-1879


The few national trade unions which were formed at the close of the
fifties did not constitute by themselves a labor movement. It needed the
industrial prosperity caused by the price inflation of the Civil War
time to bring forth again a mass movement of labor.

We shall say little of labor's attitude towards the question of war and
peace before the War had started. Like many other citizens of the North
and the Border States the handful of organized workers favored a
compromise. They held a labor convention in Philadelphia, in which a
great labor leader of the sixties, William H. Sylvis, President of the
International Molders' Union, took a prominent part and pronounced in
favor of the compromise solution advanced by Congressman Crittenden of
Kentucky. But no sooner had Fort Sumter been fired upon by the
secessionists than labor rallied to the support of the Federal Union.
Entire local unions enlisted at the call of President Lincoln, and
Sylvis himself assisted in recruiting a company composed of molders.

The first effect of the War was a paralysis of business and an increase
of unemployment. The existing labor organizations nearly all went to the
wall. The period of industrial stagnation, however, lasted only until
the middle of 1862.

The legal tender acts of 1862 and 1863 authorized the issue of paper
currency of "greenbacks" to the amount of $1,050,000,000, and
immediately prices began to soar. For the next sixteen years, namely
until 1879, when the government resumed the redemption of greenbacks in
gold, prices of commodities and labor expressed in terms of paper money
showed varying degrees of inflation; hence the term "greenback" period.
During the War the advance in prices was due in part to the
extraordinary demand by the government for the supply of the army and,
of course, to speculation.

In July 1863, retail prices were 43 percent above those of 1860 and
wages only 12 percent above; in July 1864, retail prices rose to 70
percent and wages to 30 percent above 1860; and in July 1865, prices
rose to 76 percent and wages only to 50 percent above the level of 1860.
The unequal pace of the price movement drove labor to organize along
trade-union lines.

The order observed in the thirties was again followed out. First came a
flock of local trade unions; these soon combined in city centrals--or as
they came to be called, trades' assemblies--paralleling the trades'
union of the thirties; and lastly, came an attempt to federate the
several trades' assemblies into an International Industrial Assembly of
North America. Local trade unions were organized literally in every
trade beginning in the second half of 1862. The first trades' assembly
was formed in Rochester, New York, in March 1863; and before long there
was one in every town of importance. The International Industrial
Assembly was attempted in 1864, but failed to live up to the
expectations: The time had passed for a national federation of city
centrals. As in the thirties the spread of unionism over the breadth of
the land called out as a counterpart a widespread movement of employers'
associations. The latter differed, however, from their predecessors in
the thirties in that they made little use of the courts in their fight
against the unions.

The growth of the national trade unions was a true index of the
condition of business. Four were organized in 1864 as compared to two
organized in 1863, none in 1862, and one in 1861. During 1865, which
marked the height of the intense business activity, six more national
unions were organized. In 1866 industry entered upon a period of
depression, which reached its lowest depth in 1867 and continued until
1869. Accordingly, not a single national union was organized in 1866 and
only one in 1867. In 1868 two new national labor unions were organized.
In 1869 two more unions were formed--a total of seven for the four
depressed years, compared with ten in the preceding two prosperous
years. In the summer of 1870 business became good and remained good for
approximately three years. Nine new national unions appeared in these
three years. These same years are marked also by a growth of the unions
previously organized. For instance, the machinists and blacksmiths, with
only 1500 members in 1870, had 18,000 in 1873. Other unions showed
similar gains.

An estimate of the total trade union membership at any one time (in view
of the total lack of reliable statistics) would be extremely hazardous.
The New York _Herald_ estimated it in August 1869, to be about 170,000.
A labor leader claimed at the same time that the total was as high as
600,000. Probably 300,000 would be a conservative estimate for the time
immediately preceding the panic of 1873.

Although the strength of labor was really the strength of the national
trade unions, especially during the depression of the later sixties, far
greater attention was attracted outside as well as inside the labor
movement by the National Labor Union, a loosely built federation of
national trade unions, city trades' assemblies, local trade unions, and
reform organizations of various descriptions, from philosophical
anarchists to socialists and woman suffragists. The National Labor Union
did not excel in practical activity, but it formed an accurate mirror of
the aspirations and ideals of the American mechanics of the time of the
Civil War and after. During its six years' existence it ran the gamut of
all important issues which agitated the labor movement of the time.

The National Labor Union came together in its first convention in 1866.
The most pressing problem of the day was unemployment due to the return
of the demobilized soldiers and the shutting down of war industries. The
convention centered on the demand to reduce the working day to eight
hours. But eight hours had by that time come to signify more than a
means to increase employment. The eight-hour movement drew its
inspiration from an economic theory advanced by a self-taught Boston
machinist, Ira Steward. And so naturally did this theory flow from the
usual premises in the thinking of the American workman that once
formulated by Steward it may be said to have become an official theory
of the labor movement.

Steward's doctrine is well expressed by a couplet which was very popular
with the eight-hour speakers of that period: "Whether you work by the
piece or work by the day, decreasing the hours increases the pay."
Steward believed that the amount of wages is determined by no other
factor than the worker's standard of living. He held that wages cannot
fall below the standard of living not because, as the classical
economists said, it would cause late marriages and a reduction in the
supply of labor, but solely because the wage earner will refuse to work
for less than enough to maintain his standard of living. Steward
possessed such abundant faith in this purely psychological check on the
employer that he made it the cornerstone of his theory of social
progress. Raise the worker's standard of living, he said, and the
employer will be immediately forced to raise wages; no more can wages
fall below the level of the worker's standard of living than New England
can be ruled against her will. The lever for raising the standard of
living was the eight-hour day. Increase the worker's leisure and you
will increase his wants; increase his wants and you will immediately
raise his wages. Although he occasionally tried to soften his doctrine
by the argument that a shorter work-day not only does not decrease but
may actually increase output, his was a distinctly revolutionary
doctrine; he aimed at the total abolition of profits through their
absorption into wages. But the instrument was nothing more radical than
a progressive universal shortening the hours.

So much for the general policy. To bring it to pass two alternatives
were possible: trade unionism or legislation. Steward chose the latter
as the more hopeful and speedy one. Steward knew that appeals to the
humanity of the employers had largely failed; efforts to secure the
reform by cooperation had failed; the early trade unions had failed; and
there seemed to be no recourse left now but to accomplish the reduction
of hours by legislative enactment.

In 1866 Steward organized the Grand Eight-Hour League of Massachusetts
as a special propagandist organization of the eight-hour philosophy. The
League was a secret organization with pass words and obligations,
intended as the central organization of a chain of subordinate leagues
in the State, afterwards to be created. Of a total of about eighty local
leagues in existence from 1865 to 1877, about twenty were in
Massachusetts, eight elsewhere in New England, at least twenty-five in
Michigan, four or five in Pennsylvania, about seven in Illinois, as many
in Wisconsin, and smaller numbers in Missouri, Iowa, Indiana, and
California. Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, and Pennsylvania had each a Grand
Eight-Hour League. Practically all of these organizations disappeared
soon after the panic of 1873.

The National Labor Union centered on the passage of an eight-hour law
for employes of the Federal government. It was believed, perhaps not
without some justice, that the effect of such law would eventually lead
to the introduction of the same standard in private employment--not
indeed through the operation of the law of supply and demand, for it was
realized that this would be practically negligible, but rather through
its contagious effect on the minds of employes and even employers. It
will be recalled that, at the time of the ten-hour agitation of the
thirties, the Federal government had lagged about five years behind
private employers in granting the demanded concession. That in the
sixties the workingmen chose government employment as the entering wedge
shows a measure of political self-confidence which the preceding
generation of workingmen lacked.

The first bill in Congress was introduced by Senator Gratz Brown of
Missouri in March 1866. In the summer a delegation from the National
Labor Union was received by President Andrew Johnson. The President
pointed to his past record favorable to the workingmen but refrained
from any definite promises. Finally, an eight-hour bill for government
employes was passed by the House in March 1867, and by the Senate in
June 1868. On June 29, 1868, President Johnson signed it and it went
into effect immediately.

The result of the eight-hour law was not all that the friends of the
bill hoped. The various officials in charge of government work put their
own interpretations upon it and there resulted much diversity in its
observance, and consequently great dissatisfaction. There seemed to be
no clear understanding as to the intent of Congress in enacting the law.
Some held that the reduction in working hours must of necessity bring
with it a corresponding reduction in wages. The officials' view of the
situation was given by Secretary Gideon Wells. He pointed out that
Congress, by reducing the hours of labor in government work, had forced
upon the department of the Navy the employment of a larger number of men
in order to accomplish the necessary work; and that at the same time
Congress had reduced the appropriation for that department. This had
rendered unavoidable a twenty percent reduction in wages paid employes
in the Navy Yard. Such a state of uncertainty continued four years
longer. At last on May 13, 1872, President Grant prohibited by
proclamation any wage reductions in the execution of the law. On May 18,
1872, Congress passed a law for the restitution of back pay.

The expectations of the workingmen that the Federal law would blaze the
way for the eight-hour system in private employment failed to
materialize. The depression during the seventies took up all the impetus
in that direction which the law may have generated. Even as far as
government work is concerned forty years had to elapse before its
application could be rounded out by extending it to contract work done
for the government by private employers.

We have dealt at length with this subject because it marked an important
landmark. It demonstrated to the wage earners that, provided they
concentrated on a modest object and kept up a steady pressure, their
prospects for success were not entirely hopeless, hard as the road may
seem to travel. The other and far more ambitious object of the
workingman of the sixties, that of enacting general eight-hour laws in
the several States, at first appeared to be within easy reach--so
yielding political parties and State legislatures seemed to be to the
demands of the organized workmen. Yet before long these successes proved
to be entirely illusory.

The year 1867 was the banner year for such State legislation. Eight-hour
laws were passed in Illinois, Wisconsin, Connecticut, Missouri, and New
York. California passed such a law in 1868. In Pennsylvania, Michigan,
Maryland, and Minnesota bills were introduced but were defeated. Two
common features characterized these laws, whether enacted or merely
proposed to the legislatures. There were none which did not permit of
longer hours than those named in the law, provided they were so
specified in the contract. A contract requiring ten or more hours a day
was perfectly legal. The eight-hour day was the legal day only "when the
contract was silent on the subject or where there is no express contract
to the contrary," as stated in the Wisconsin law. But the greatest
weakness was a lack of a provision for enforcement. New York's
experience is typical and characteristic. When the workingmen appealed
to Governor Fenton to enforce the law, he replied that the act had
received his official signature and he felt that it "would be an
unwarrantable assumption" on his part to take any step requiring its
enforcement. "Every law," he said, "was obligatory by its own nature,
and could derive no additional force from any further act of his."

In Massachusetts, however, the workingmen succeeded after hard and
protracted labor in obtaining an enforceable ten-hour law for women--the
first effective law of its kind passed in any American State. This law,
which was passed in 1874, provides that "no minor under the age of
eighteen years, and no woman over that age" shall be employed more than
ten hours in one day or sixty hours in any one week in any manufacturing
establishment in the State. The penalty for each violation was fixed at
fifty dollars.

The repeated disappointments with politics and legislation led in the
early seventies to a revival of faith in trade unionism. Even in the
early sixties we find not a few unions, national and local, limiting
their hours by agreement with employers. The national unions, however,
for the most part left the matter to the local unions for settlement as
their strength or local conditions might dictate. In some cases the
local unions were advised to accept a reduction of wages in order to
secure the system, showing faith in Steward's theory that such reduction
could not be permanent.

The movement to establish the eight-hour day through trade unionism
reached its climax in the summer of 1872, when business prosperity was
at its height. This year witnessed in New York City a general eight-hour
strike. However, it succeeded in only a few trades, and even there the
gain was only temporary, since it was lost during the years of
depression which followed the financial panic of 1873.

To come back to the National Labor Union. At the second convention in
1867 the enthusiasm was transferred from eight-hour laws to the bizarre
social reform philosophy known as "greenbackism."

"Greenbackism" was, in substance, a plan to give the man without capital
an equal opportunity in business with his rich competitor. It meant
taking away from bankers and middlemen their control over credit and
thereby furnishing credit and capital through the aid of the government
to the producers of physical products. On its face greenbackism was a
program of currency reform and derived its name from the so-called
"greenback," the paper money issued during the Civil War. But it was
more than currency reform--it was industrial democracy.

"Greenbackism" was the American counterpart of the contemporary
radicalism of Europe. Its program had much in common with that of
Lassalle in Germany who would have the state lend its credit to
cooperative associations of workingmen in the confident expectation that
with such backing they would drive private capitalism out of existence
by the competitive route. But greenbackism differed from the scheme of
Lassalle in that it would utilize the government's enormous Civil War
debt, instead of its taxing power, as a means of furnishing capital to
labor. This was to be done by reducing the rate of interest on the
government bonds to three percent and by making them convertible into
legal tender currency and convertible back into bonds, at the will of
the holder of either. In other words, the greenback currency, instead of
being, as it was at the time, an irredeemable promise to pay in specie,
would be redeemable in government bonds. On the other hand, if a
government bondholder could secure slightly more than three percent by
lending to a private borrower, he would return his bonds to the
government, take out the corresponding amount in greenbacks and lend it
to the producer on his private note or mortgage. This would involve, of
course, the possible inflation of legal tender currency to the amount of
outstanding bonds. But inflation was immaterial, since all prices would
be affected alike and meanwhile the farmers, the workingmen, and their
cooperative establishments would be able to secure capital at slightly
more than three percent instead of the nine or twelve percent which they
were compelled to pay at the bank. Thereby they would be placed on a
competitive level with the middleman, and the wage earner would be
assisted to escape the wage system into self-employment.

Such was the curious doctrine which captured the leaders of the
organized wage earners in 1867. The way had indeed been prepared for it
in 1866, when the wage earners espoused producers' cooperation as the
only solution. But, in the following year, 1867, they concluded that no
system of combination or cooperation could secure to labor its natural
rights as long as the credit system enabled non-producers to accumulate
wealth faster than labor was able to add to the national wealth.
Cooperation would follow "as a natural consequence," if producers could
secure through legislation credit at a low rate of interest. The
government was to extend to the producer "free capital" in addition to
free land which he received with the Homestead Act.

The producers' cooperation, which offered the occasion for the espousal
of greenbackism, was itself preceded by a movement for consumers'
cooperation. Following the upward sweep of prices, workmen had begun
toward the end of 1862 to make definite preparations for distributive
cooperation. They endeavored to cut off the profits of the middleman by
establishing cooperative grocery stores, meat markets, and coal yards.
The first substantial effort of this kind to attract wide attention was
the formation in December 1862, of the Union Cooperative Association of
Philadelphia, which opened a store. The prime mover and the financial
secretary of this organization was Thomas Phillips, a shoemaker who came
from England in 1852, fired with the principles of the Rochdale
pioneers, that is, cash sales, dividends on purchases rather than on
stock, and "one man, one vote." By 1866 the movement had extended until
practically every important industrial town between Boston and San
Francisco had some form of distributive cooperation. This was the high
tide of the movement. Unfortunately, the condition of the country was
unfavorable to these enterprises and they were destined to early
collapse. The year 1865 witnessed disastrous business failures. The
country was in an uncertain condition and at the end of the sixties the
entire movement had died out.

From 1866 to 1869 experiments in productive cooperation were made by
practically all leading trades including the bakers, coach makers,
collar makers, coal miners, shipwrights, machinists and blacksmiths,
foundry workers, nailers, ship carpenters, and calkers, glass blowers,
hatters, boiler makers, plumbers, iron rollers, tailors, printers,
needle women, and molders. A large proportion of these attempts grew out
of unsuccessful strikes. The most important undertakings were among the
workers in iron, undoubtedly due in large measure to the indefatigable
efforts of William H. Sylvis, the founder of the Iron Molders'
International Union.

At the close of 1869 members of the Iron Molders' International Union
owned and operated many cooperative foundries chiefly in New York and
Pennsylvania. The first of the foundries established at Troy in the
early summer of 1866 was followed quickly by one in Albany and then
during the next eighteen months by ten more--one each in Rochester,
Chicago, Quincy, Louisville, Somerset, Pittsburgh, and two each in Troy
and Cleveland. The original foundry at Troy was an immediate financial
success and was hailed with joy by those who believed that under the
name of cooperationists the baffled trade unionists might yet conquer.
The New York _Sun_ congratulated the iron molders of Troy and declared
that Sylvis had checkmated the association of stove manufacturers and,
by the establishment of this cooperative foundry, had made the greatest
contribution of the year to the labor cause.

But the results of the Troy experiment, typical of the others, show how
far from a successful solution of the labor problem is productive
cooperation. Although this "Troy Cooperative Iron Founders' Association"
was planned with great deliberation and launched at a time when the
regular stove manufacturers were embarrassed by strikes, and although it
was regularly incorporated with a provision that each member was
entitled to but one vote whether he held one share at $100, or the
maximum privilege of fifty in the total of two thousand shares, it
failed as did the others in furnishing permanent relief to the workers
as a class. At the end of the third year of this enterprise, the
_American Workman_ published a sympathetic account of its progress
unconsciously disclosing its fatal weakness, namely, the inevitable
tendency of cooperators to adopt the capitalistic view. The writer of
this account quotes from these cooperators to show that "the fewer the
stockholders in the company the greater its success."

A similar instance is furnished by the Cooperative Foundry Company of
Rochester. This venture has also been a financial success, though a
partial failure as a cooperative enterprise. When it was established in
1867 all employes were stockholders and profits were divided as follows:
Twelve percent on capital and the balance in proportion to the earnings
of the men. But the capitalist was stronger than the cooperative
brother. Dividends on capital were advanced in a few years to seventeen
and one-half percent, then to twenty-five, and finally the distribution
of any part of the profits in proportion to wages was discontinued.
Money was made every year and dividends paid, which in 1884 amounted to
forty percent on the capital. At that time about one-fifth of the
employes were stockholders. Also in this case cooperation did not
prevent the usual conflict between employer and employe, as is shown in
a strike of three and a half months' duration. It is interesting to
notice that one of the strikers, a member of the Molders' Union, owned
stock to the amount of $7000.

The machinists, too, throughout this period took an active interest in
cooperation. Their convention which met in October, 1865, appointed a
committee to report on a plan of action to establish a cooperative shop
under the auspices of the International Union. The plan failed of
adoption, but of machinists' shops on the joint-stock plan there were a
good many. Two other trades noted for their enthusiasm for cooperation
at this time were the shoemakers and the coopers. The former, organized
in the Order of St. Crispin, then the largest trade union in the
country, advocated cooperation even when their success in strikes was at
its height. "The present demand of the Crispin is steady employment and
fair wages, but his future is self-employment" was one of their mottoes.
During the seventies they repeatedly attempted to carry this motto into
effect. The seventies also saw the beginning of the most successful
single venture in productive cooperation ever undertaken in this
country, namely, the eight cooperative cooperage shops in Minneapolis,
which were established at varying intervals from 1874 to 1886. The
coopers took care to enforce true cooperation by providing for equal
holding of stock and for a division of ordinary profits and losses in
proportion to wages. The cooper shops prospered, but already ten years
later four out of the eight existing in 1886 had passed into private
hands.

In 1866 when the eight-hour demand was as yet uppermost, the National
Labor Union resolved for an independent labor party. The espousal of
greenbackism in 1867 only reenforced that resolution. The leaders
realized only too well that neither the Republican nor Democratic party
would voluntarily make an issue of a scheme purporting to assist the
wage earner to become an independent producer. Accordingly, the history
of the National Labor Union became largely the history of labor's first
attempt to play a lone political hand on a national scale.

Each annual session of the National Labor Union faithfully reaffirmed
the decision to "cut loose" from the old parties. But such a vast
undertaking demanded time. It was not until 1872 that the National Labor
Union met as a political convention to nominate a national ticket. From
the first the stars were inauspicious. Charges were made that political
aspirants sought to control the convention in order to influence
nominations by the Republican and Democratic parties. A "greenback"
platform was adopted as a matter of course and the new party was
christened the National Labor and Reform Party. On the first formal
ballot for nomination for President, Judge David Davis of Illinois, a
personal friend of Abraham Lincoln, received 88 votes, Wendell Phillips,
the abolitionist, 52, and the remainder scattered. On the third ballot
Davis was nominated. Governor J. Parker of New Jersey was nominated for
Vice-President. At first Judge Davis accepted the nomination, but
resigned after the Democrats had nominated Horace Greeley. The loss of
the candidate spelled the death of the party. The National Labor Union
itself had been only an empty shell since 1870, when the national trade
unions, disaffected with the turn towards politics, withdrew. Now, its
pet project a failure, it, too, broke up.

In 1873, on the eve of the financial panic, the national trade unions
attempted to reconstruct a national labor federation on a purely
trade-union basis in the form of a National Industrial Congress. But the
economic disaster of the panic nipped it in the bud just as it cut off
the life of the overwhelming majority of the existing labor
organizations. Another attempt to get together on a national basis was
made in the National Labor Congress at Pittsburgh in 1876. But those who
responded were not interested in trade unionism and, mirroring the
prevailing labor sentiment during the long years of depressions, had
only politics on their mind, greenback or socialist. As neither
greenbacker nor socialist would meet the other half-way, the attempt
naturally came to naught.

Greenbackism was popular with the working people during the depressed
seventies because it now meant to them primarily currency inflation and
a rise of prices and, consequently, industrial prosperity--not the
phantastic scheme of the National Labor Union. Yet in the Presidential
election of 1876 the Greenback party candidate, Peter Cooper, the well
known manufacturer and philanthropist, drew only a poor 100,000, which
came practically from the rural districts only. It was not until the
great strikes of 1877 had brought in their train a political labor
upheaval that the greenback movement assumed a formidable form.

The strikes of 1877, which on account of the wide area affected, the
degree of violence displayed, and the amount of life and property lost,
impressed contemporaries as being nothing short of social revolution,
were precipitated by a general ten percent reduction in wages on the
three trunk lines running West, the Pennsylvania, the Baltimore & Ohio,
and the New York Central, in June and July 1877. This reduction came on
top of an earlier ten percent reduction after the panic. The railway men
were practically unorganized so that the steadying influence of previous
organization was totally lacking in the critical situation of unrest
which the newly announced wage reduction created. One must take also
into account that in the four terrible years which elapsed since the
panic, America had developed a new type of a man--the tramp--who
naturally gravitated towards places where trouble was expected.

The first outbreak occurred at Martinsburg, West Virginia, on July 17,
the day after the ten percent reduction had gone into effect. The
strike spread like wildfire over the adjacent sections of the Baltimore
& Ohio road, the strikers assuming absolute control at many points. The
militia was either unwilling or powerless to cope with the violence. In
Baltimore, where in the interest of public safety all the freight trains
had stopped running, two companies of militia were beleaguered by a mob
to prevent their being dispatched to Cumberland, where the strikers were
in control. Order was restored only when Federal troops arrived.

But these occurrences fade into insignificance when compared with the
destructive effects of the strike on the Pennsylvania in and around
Pittsburgh. The situation there was aggravated by a hatred of the
Pennsylvania railway corporation shared by nearly all residents on the
ground of an alleged rate discrimination against the city. The
Pittsburgh militia fraternized with the strikers, and when 600 troops
which arrived from Philadelphia attempted to restore order and killed
about twenty rioters, they were besieged in a roundhouse by a furious
mob. In the battle the railway yards were set on fire. Damages amounting
to about $5,000,000 were caused. The besieged militia men finally gained
egress and retreated fighting rear-guard actions. At last order was
restored by patrols of citizens. The strike spread also to the Erie
railway and caused disturbances in several places, but not nearly of the
same serious nature as on the Baltimore & Ohio and the Pennsylvania. The
other places to which the strike spread were Toledo, Louisville,
Chicago, St. Louis, and San Francisco.

The strikes failed in every case but their moral effect was enormous.
The general public still retained a fresh memory of the Commune of Paris
of 1871 and feared for the foundations of the established order. The
wage earners, on the other hand, felt that the strikers had not been
fairly dealt with. It was on this intense labor discontent that the
greenback agitation fed and grew.

Whereas in 1876 the greenback labor vote was negligible, notwithstanding
the exhortations by many of the former trade union leaders who turned
greenback agitators, now, following the great strikes, greenbackism
became primarily a labor movement. Local Greenback-Labor parties were
being organized everywhere and a national Greenback-Labor party was not
far behind in forming. The continued industrial depression was a
decisive factor, the winter of 1877-1878 marking perhaps the point of
its greatest intensity. Naturally the greenback movement was growing
apace. One of the notable successes in the spring of 1878 was the
election of Terence V. Powderly, later Grand Master Workman of the
Knights of Labor, as mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania.

The Congressional election in the autumn of 1878 marked the zenith of
the movement. The aggregate greenback vote cast in the election exceeded
a million, and fourteen Representatives were sent to Congress. In New
England the movement was strong enough to poll almost a third of the
total vote in Maine, over 8 percent of the total vote in both
Connecticut and New Hampshire, and from 4 to 6 percent, in the other
States. In Maine the greenbackers elected 32 members of the upper house
and 151 members of the lower house and one Congressman, Thompson Murch
of Rochland, who was secretary of the National Granite Cutters' Union.
However, the bulk of the vote in that State was obviously agricultural.
In Massachusetts, the situation was dominated by General Benjamin F.
Butler, lifelong Republican politician, who had succeeded in getting
the Democratic nomination for governor and was endorsed by the Greenback
convention. He received a large vote but was defeated for office.

But just as the Greenback-Labor movement was assuming promising
proportions a change for the better in the industrial situation cut
under the very roots of its existence. In addition, one month after the
election of 1878, its principal issue disappeared. January 1, 1879, was
the date fixed by the act for resumption of redemption of greenbacks in
gold and on December 17, 1878, the premium on gold disappeared. From
that day on, the greenback became a dead issue.

Another factor of great importance was the large increase in the volume
of the currency. In 1881 the currency, which had averaged about
$725,000,000 for the years 1876-1878, reached over $1,111,000,000. Under
these conditions, all that remained available to the platform-makers and
propagandists of the party was their opposition to the so-called
"monopolistic" national banks with their control over currency and to
the refunding of the bonded debt of the government.

The disappearance of the financial issue snapped the threads which had
held together the farmer and the wage-worker. So long as depression
continued, the issue was financial and the two had, as they thought, a
common enemy--the banker. The financial issue once settled, or at least
suspended, the object of the attack by labor became the employer, and
that of the attack by the farmer--the railway corporation and the
warehouse man. Prosperity had mitigated the grievances of both classes,
but while the farmer still had a great deal to expect from politics in
the form of state regulation of railway rates, the wage earners'
struggle now turned entirely economic and not political.

In California, as in the Eastern industrial States, the railway strikes
of 1877 precipitated a political movement. California had retained gold
as currency throughout the entire period of paper money, and the labor
movement at no time had accepted the greenback platform. The political
issue after 1877 was racial, not financial, and the weapon was not
merely the ballot, but also "direct action"--violence. The anti-Chinese
agitation in California, culminating as it did in the Exclusion Law
passed by Congress in 1882, was doubtless the most important single
factor in the history of American labor, for without it the entire
country might have been overrun by Mongolian labor and the labor
movement might have become a conflict of races instead of one of
classes.[10]

The seventies witnessed another of those recurring attempts of
consumers' cooperation already noticed in the forties and sixties. This
time the movement was organized by the "Sovereigns of Industry," a
secret order, founded at Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1874 by one
William H. Earle. The spirit of the Order was entirely peaceful and
unobtrusive as expressed in the first paragraph of the Declaration of
Purposes which reads as follows:

"The Order of the Sovereigns of Industry is an association of the
industrial or laboring classes, without regard to race, sex, color,
nationality, or occupation; not founded for the purpose of waging any
war of aggression upon any other class, or for fostering any antagonism
of labor against capital, or of arraying the poor against the rich; but
for mutual assistance in self-improvement and self-protection."

The scheme of organization called for a local council including members
from the town or district, a state council, comprising representatives
from the local councils and a National Council in which the States were
represented. The president of the National Council was the founder of
the Order, William H. Earle.

Success accompanied the efforts of the promoters of the Sovereigns of
Industry for a few years. The total membership in 1875-1876 was 40,000,
of whom seventy-five percent were in New England and forty-three percent
in Massachusetts. Though the Order extended into other States and even
reached the territories, its chief strength always remained in New
England and the Middle States. During the last period of its existence a
national organ was published at Washington, but the Order does not
appear to have gained a foothold in any of the more Southern sections of
the country.

In 1875, 101 local councils reported as having some method of supplying
members with goods, 46 of whom operated stores. The largest store
belonged to the council at Springfield, Massachusetts, which in 1875
built the "Sovereign Block" at a cost of $35,500. In his address at the
fourth annual session in Washington, President Earle stated that the
store in Springfield led all the others with sales amounting to $119,000
for the preceding year. About one-half of the councils failed to report,
but at the Congress of 1876 President Earle estimated the annual trade
at $3,000,000.

Much enthusiasm accompanied the progress of the movement. The hall in
"Sovereign Block" at Springfield was dedicated amid such jubilation as
marks an event thought to be the forerunner of a new era. There is
indeed a certain pathos in the high hopes expressed in the Address of
Dedication by President Earle, for, though the Order continued to thrive
until 1878, shortly after a decline began, and dissolution was its fate
in 1880.

The failure of the Sovereigns marked the latest attempt on a large
scale[11] to inoculate the American workingmen with the sort of
cooperative spirit which proved so successful in England.[12]

This failure of distributive cooperation to gain the strong and lasting
foothold in this country that it has abroad has been accounted for in
various ways by different writers. Great emphasis has been laid upon the
lack of capital, the lack of suitable legislation on the subject of
cooperation, the mutual isolation of the educated and wage-earning
classes, the lack of business ability among wage earners, and the
altogether too frequent venality and corruption among cooperators.

Probably the lack of adequate leadership has played as important a part
as any. It is peculiar to America that the wage earner of exceptional
ability can easily find a way for escaping into the class of independent
producers or even employers of labor. The American trade union movement
has suffered much less from this difficulty. The trade unions are
fighting organizations; they demand the sort of leader who is of a
combative spirit, who possesses the organizing ability and the "personal
magnetism" to keep his men in line; and for this kind of ability the
business world offers no particular demand. On the other hand, the
qualifications which go to make a successful manager of a cooperative
store, namely, steadiness, conservatism of judgment, attention to detail
and business punctuality always will be in great demand in the business
world. Hence, when no barrier is interposed in the form of preempted
opportunities or class bias, the exceptional workingman who possesses
these qualifications will likely desert his class and set up in business
for himself. In England, fortunately for the cooperative movement, such
an escape is very difficult.

The failure of consumers' cooperation in America was helped also by two
other peculiarly American conditions. European economists, when speaking
of the working class, assume generally that it is fixed in residence and
contrast it with capital, which they say is fluid as between city and
city and even between country and country. American labor, however,
native as well as immigrant, is probably more mobile than capital; for,
tradition and habit which keep the great majority of European wage
earners in the place where their fathers and forefathers had lived
before them are generally absent in this country, except perhaps in
parts of New England and the South. It is therefore natural that the
cooperative spirit, which after all is but an enlarged and more
generalized form of the old spirit of neighborliness and mutual trust,
should have failed to develop to its full strength in America.

Another condition fatal to the development of the cooperative spirit is
the racial heterogeneity of the American wage-earning class, which
separates it into mutually isolated groups even as the social classes of
England and Scotland are separated by class spirit. As a result, we find
a want of mutual trust which depends so much on "consciousness of kind."
This is further aggravated by competition and a continuous displacement
in industry of nationalities of a high standard of living by those of a
lower one. This conflict of nationalities, which lies also at the root
of the closed shop policy of many of the American trade unions, is
probably the most effective carrier that there is to a widespread growth
of the cooperative spirit among American wage earners. This is further
hindered by other national characteristics which more or less pervade
all classes of society, namely, the traditional individualism--the
heritage of puritanism and the pioneer days, and the emphasis upon
earning capacity with a corresponding aversion to thrift.

FOOTNOTES:

[10] The National Labor Union came out against Chinese immigration in
1869, when the issue was brought home to the Eastern wage earners
following the importation by a shoe manufacturer in North Adams,
Massachusetts, of Chinese strike breakers.

[11] There were many cooperative stores in the eighties and a concerted
effort to duplicate the venture of the Sovereigns was attempted as late
as 1919 under the pressure of the soaring cost of living.

[12] Where Consumers' Cooperation has worked under most favorable
conditions as in England, its achievements have been all that its most
ardent champions could have desired. Such is the picture presented by
Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb in the following glowing terms:

"The organization of industry by Associations of Consumers offers, as
far as it goes, a genuine alternative to capitalist ownership, because
it supersedes the capitalist power, whether individual or joint-stock,
alike in the control of the instruments of production by which the
community lives, and in the absorption of the profits, which otherwise
support a capitalist class. The ownership and control are vested in, and
the profits are distributed among, the whole community of consumers,
irrespective of their industrial wealth. Through the device of dividend
on purchases the Cooperative Movement maintains an open democracy,
through the control of this democracy of consumers it has directly or
indirectly kept down prices, and protected the wage-earning class from
exploitation by the Credit System and from the extortions of monopolist
traders and speculators. By this same device on purchases, and the
automatic accumulation of part of the profit in the capital of each
society and in that of the Wholesales, it has demonstratedly added to
the personal wealth of the manual working class, and has, alike in Great
Britain, and in other countries, afforded both a valuable financial
reserve to the wage earners against all emergencies and an instrument
for their elevation from the penury to which competition is always
depressing them. By making possible the upgrowth of great business
enterprises in working class hands, the Cooperative Movement has,
without divorcing them from their fellows, given to thousands of the
manual workers both administrative experience and a well-grounded
confidence; and has thus enabled them to take a fuller part in political
and social life than would otherwise have been probable."--_New
Statesman_, May 30, 1916. "Special Supplement on the Cooperative
Movement."

Indeed the success of the consumer's cooperative movement in European
countries has been marvellous, even measured by bare figures. In all
Europe in 1914, there were about 9,000,000 cooperators of whom one-third
lived in Great Britain and not less than two and a half millions in
Germany. In England and Scotland alone, the 1400 stores and two
Wholesale Cooperative Societies controlled in 1914 about 420 million
dollars of retail distributive trade and employed nearly 50,000
operatives in processes of production in their own workshops and
factories.




CHAPTER 3

THE BEGINNING OF THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
LABOR


With the practical disintegration of the organized labor movement in the
seventies, two nuclei held together and showed promise of future growth.
One was the "Noble Order of the Knights of Labor" and the other a small
trade union movement grouped around the International Cigar Makers'
Union.

The "Noble Order of the Knights of Labor," while it first became
important in the labor movement after 1873, was founded in 1869 by Uriah
Smith Stephens, a tailor who had been educated for the ministry, as a
secret organization. Secrecy was adopted as a protection against
persecutions by employers.

The principles of the Order were set forth by Stephens in the secret
ritual. "Open and public association having failed after a struggle of
centuries to protect or advance the interest of labor, we have lawfully
constituted this Assembly," and "in using this power of organized effort
and cooperation, we but imitate the example of capital heretofore set in
numberless instances;" for, "in all the multifarious branches of trade,
capital has its combinations, and, whether intended or not, it crushes
the manly hopes of labor and tramples poor humanity into the dust."
However, "we mean no conflict with legitimate enterprise, no antagonism
to necessary capital." The remedy consists first in work of education:
"We mean to create a healthy public opinion on the subject of labor (the
only creator of values or capital) and the justice of its receiving a
full, just share of the values or capital it has created." The next
remedy was legislation: "We shall, with all our strength, support laws
made to harmonize the interests of labor and capital, for labor alone
gives life and value to capital, and also those laws which tend to
lighten the exhaustiveness of toil." Next in order were mutual benefits.
"We shall use every lawful and honorable means to procure and retain
employ for one another, coupled with a just and fair remuneration, and,
should accident or misfortune befall one of our number, render such aid
as lies within our power to give, without inquiring his country or his
creed."

For nine years the Order remained a secret organization and showed but a
slow growth. In 1878 it was forced to abolish secrecy. The public mind
was rendered uneasy by the revolutionary uprising of workingmen of Paris
who set up the famous "Commune of Paris" of 1871, by the destructive
great railway strikes in this country in 1877 and, lastly, by a wave of
criminal disorders in the anthracite coal mining region in Eastern
Pennsylvania,[13] and became only too prone to attribute revolutionary
and criminal intents to any labor organization that cloaked itself in
secrecy. Simultaneously with coming out into the open, the Knights
adopted a new program, called the Preamble of the Knights of Labor, in
place of the vague Secret Ritual which hitherto served as the
authoritative expression of aims.

This Preamble recites how "wealth," with its development, has become so
aggressive that "unless checked" it "will inevitably lead to the
pauperisation and hopeless degradation of the toiling masses." Hence, if
the toilers are "to enjoy the blessings of life," they must organize
"every department of productive industry" in order to "check" the power
of wealth and to put a stop to "unjust accumulation." The battle cry in
this fight must be "moral worth not wealth, the true standard of
individual and national greatness." As the "action" of the toilers ought
to be guided by "knowledge," it is necessary to know "the true condition
of the producing masses"; therefore, the Order demands "from the various
governments the establishment of bureaus of labor statistics." Next in
order comes the "establishment of cooperative institutions productive
and distributive." Union of all trades, "education," and producers'
cooperation remained forever after the cardinal points in the Knights of
Labor philosophy and were steadily referred to as "First Principles,"
namely principles bequeathed to the Order by Uriah Stephens and the
other "Founders."[14]

These idealistic "First Principles" found an ardent champion in Terence
V. Powderly, a machinist by trade and twice mayor of Scranton,
Pennsylvania, on a labor ticket, who succeeded Stephens in 1878 to the
headship of the Order. Powderly bore unmistakably the stamp of this sort
of idealism throughout all the time when he was the foremost labor
leader in the country. Unlike Samuel Gompers, who came to supplant him
about 1890, he was foreign to that spirit of combative unionism which
accepts the wage system but concentrates on a struggle to wrest
concessions from the employers. Even when circumstances which were
largely beyond his control made Powderly a strike leader on a huge
scale, his heart lay elsewhere--in circumventing the wage system by
opening to the worker an escape into self-employment through
cooperation.

Producers' cooperation, then, was the ambitious program by which the
Order of the Knights of Labor expected to lead the American wage-earning
class out of the bondage of the wage system into the Canaan of
self-employment. Thus the Order was the true successor of the
cooperative movement in the forties and sixties. Its motto was
"Cooperation of the Order, by the Order, and for the Order." Not
scattered local initiative, but the Order as a whole was to carry on the
work. The plan resembled the Rochdale system of England in that it
proposed to start with an organization of consumers--the large and
ever-growing membership of the Order. But it departed radically from the
English prototype in that instead of setting out to save money for the
consumer, it primarily aimed to create a market for the productive
establishments which were to follow. Consumers' cooperation was to be
but a stepping stone to producers' self-employment. Eventually when the
Order had grown to include nearly all useful members of society--so the
plan contemplated--it would control practically the whole market and
cooperative production would become the rule rather than the exception.
So far, therefore, as "First Principles" went, the Order was not an
instrument of the "class struggle," but an association of idealistic
cooperators. It was this pure idealism which drew to the Order of the
Knights of Labor the sympathetic interest of writers on social subjects
and university teachers, then unfortunately too few in number, like Dr.
Richard T. Ely[15] and President John Bascom of Wisconsin.

The other survival in the seventies of the labor movement of the
sixties, which has already been mentioned, namely the trade union
movement grouped around the Cigar Makers' Union, was neither so purely
American in its origin as the Knights of Labor nor so persistently
idealistic. On the contrary, its first membership was foreign and its
program, as we shall see, became before long primarily opportunist and
"pragmatic." The training school for this opportunistic trade unionism
was the socialist movement during the sixties and seventies,
particularly the American branch of the International Workingmen's
Association, the "First _Internationale_," which was founded by Karl
Marx in London in 1864. The conception of _economic_ labor organization
which was advanced by the _Internationale_ in a socialistic formulation
underwent in the course of years a process of change: On the one hand,
through constant conflict with the rival conception of _political_ labor
organization urged by American followers of the German socialist,
Ferdinand Lassalle, and on the other hand, through contact with American
reality. Out of that double contact emerged the trade unionism of the
American Federation of Labor.

The _Internationale_ is generally reputed to have been organized by Karl
Marx for the propaganda of international socialism. As a matter of fact,
its starting point was the practical effort of British trade union
leaders to organize the workingmen of the Continent and to prevent the
importation of Continental strike-breakers. That Karl Marx wrote its
_Inaugural Address_ was merely incidental. It chanced that what he wrote
was acceptable to the British unionists rather than the draft of an
address representing the views of Giuseppe Mazzini, the leader of the
"New Italy" and the "New Europe," which was submitted to them at the
same time and advocated elaborate plans of cooperation. Marx emphasized
the class solidarity of labor against Mazzini's harmony of capital and
labor. He did this by reciting what British labor had done through the
Rochdale system of cooperation without the help of capitalists and what
the British Parliament had done in enacting the ten-hour law of 1847
against the protest of capitalists. Now that British trade unionists in
1864 were demanding the right of suffrage and laws to protect their
unions, it followed that Marx merely stated their demands when he
affirmed the independent economic and political organization of labor in
all lands. His _Inaugural Address_ was a trade union document, not a
_Communist Manifesto_. Indeed not until Bakunin and his following of
anarchists had nearly captured the organization in the years 1869 to
1872 did the program of socialism become the leading issue.

The philosophy of the _Internationale_ at the period of its ascendency
was based on the economic organization of the working class in trade
unions. These must precede the political seizure of the government by
labor. Then, when the workingmen's party should achieve control, it
would be able to build up successively the socialist state on the
foundation of a sufficient number of existing trade unions.

This conception differed widely from the teaching of Ferdinand Lassalle.
Lassallean socialism was born in 1863 with Lassalle's _Open Letter_ to a
workingmen's committee in Leipzig. It sprang from his antagonism to
Schultze-Delizsch's[16] system of voluntary cooperation. In Lassalle's
eagerness to condemn the idea of the harmony of capital and labor, which
lay at the basis of Schultze's scheme for cooperation, he struck at the
same time a blow against all forms of non-political organization of wage
earners. Perhaps the fact that he was ignorant of the British trade
unions accounts for his insufficient appreciation of trade unionism. But
no matter what the cause may have been, to Lassalle there was but one
means of solving the labor problem-political action. When political
control was finally achieved, the labor party, with the aid of state
credit, would build up a network of cooperative societies into which
eventually all industry would pass.

In short, the distinction between the ideas of the _Internationale_ and
of Lassalle consisted in the fact that the former advocated trade
unionism prior to and underlying political organization, while the
latter considered a political victory as the basis of socialism. These
antagonistic starting points are apparent at the very beginning of
American socialism as well as in the trade unionism and socialism of
succeeding years.

Two distinct phases can be seen in the history of the _Internationale_
in America. During the first phase, which began in 1866 and lasted until
1870, the _Internationale_ had no important organization of its own on
American soil, but tried to establish itself through affiliation with
the National Labor Union. The inducement held out to the latter was of a
practical nature, the international regulation of immigration. During
the second phase the _Internationale_ had its "sections" in nearly every
large city of the country, centering in New York and Chicago, and the
practical trade union part of its work receded before its activity on
behalf of the propaganda of socialism.

These "sections," with a maximum membership which probably never
exceeded a thousand, nearly all foreigners, became a preparatory school
in trade union leadership for many of the later organizers and leaders
of the American Federation of Labor: for example, Adolph Strasser, the
German cigar maker, whose organization became the new model in trade
unionism, and P.J. McGuire, the American-born carpenter, who founded the
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners and who was for many years the
secretary-treasurer of the American Federation of Labor.

Fate had decreed that these sections of a handful of immigrants should
play for a time high-sounding parts in the world labor movement. When,
at the World Congress of the International Workingmen's Association at
the Hague in 1872, the anarchist faction led by Bakunin had shown such
strength that Marx and his socialist faction deemed it wise to move the
General Council out of mischief's way, they removed it to New York and
entrusted its powers into the hands of the faithful German Marxians on
this side of the Atlantic. This spelled the end of the _Internationale_
as a world organization, but enormously increased the stakes of the
factional fights within the handful of American Internationalists. The
organization of the workers into trade unions, the _Internationale's_
first principle, was forgotten in the heat of intemperate struggles for
empty honors and powerless offices. On top of that, with the panic of
1873 and the ensuing prolonged depression, the political drift asserted
itself in socialism as it had in the labor movement in general and the
movement, erstwhile devoted primarily to organization of trade unions,
entered, urged on by the Lassalleans, into a series of political
campaigns somewhat successful at first but soon succumbing to the
inevitable fate of all amateurish attempts. Upon men of Strasser's
practical mental grasp these petty tempests in the melting pot could
only produce an impression of sheer futility, and he turned to trade
unionism as the only activity worth his while. Strasser had been elected
president of the Cigar Makers' International Union in 1877, in the midst
of a great strike in New York against the tenement-house system.

The president of the local New York union of cigar makers was at the
time Samuel Gompers, a young man of twenty-seven, who was born in
England and came to America in 1862. In his endeavor to build up a model
for the "new" unionism and in his almost uninterrupted headship of that
movement for forty years is indicated Gompers' truly representative
character. Born of Dutch-Jewish parents in England in 1850, he typifies
the cosmopolitan origins of American unionism. His early contact in the
union of his trade with men like Strasser, upon whom the ideas of Marx
and the International Workingmen's Association had left an indelible
stamp, and his thorough study of Marx gave him that grounding both in
idealism and class consciousness which has produced many strong leaders
of American unions and saved them from defection to other interests.
Aggressive and uncompromising in a perpetual fight for the strongest
possible position and power of trade unions, but always strong for
collective agreements with the opposing employers, he displays the
business tactics of organized labor. At the head of an organization
which denies itself power over its constituent unions, he has brought
and held together the most widely divergent and often antagonistic
unions, while permitting each to develop and even to change its
character to fit the changing industrial conditions.

The dismal failure of the strike against the tenement house system in
cigar making brought home to both Strasser and Gompers the weakness of
the plan of organization of their union as well as that of American
trade unions in general. They consequently resolved to rebuild their
union upon the pattern of the British unions, although they firmly
intended that it should remain a militant organization. The change
involved, first, complete authority over the local unions in the hands
of the international officers; second, an increase in the membership
dues for the purpose of building up a large fund; and, third, the
adoption of a far-reaching benefit system in order to assure stability
to the organization. This was accomplished at the convention held in
August, 1879. This convention simultaneously adopted the British idea of
the "equalization of funds," which gave the international officers the
power to order a well-to-do local union to transfer a portion of its
funds to another local union in financial straits. With the various
modifications of the feature of "equalization of funds," the system of
government in the Cigar Makers' International Union was later used as a
model by the other national and international trade unions.

As Strasser and men of his ilk grew more and more absorbed in the
practical problems of the everyday struggle of the wage-earners for
better conditions of employment, the socialistic portion of their
original philosophy kept receding further and further into the
background until they arrived at pure trade unionism. But their trade
unionism differed vastly from the "native" American trade unionism of
their time, which still hankered for the haven of producers'
cooperation. The philosophy which these new leaders developed might be
termed a philosophy of pure wage-consciousness. It signified a labor
movement reduced to an opportunistic basis, accepting the existence of
capitalism and having for its object the enlarging of the bargaining
power of the wage earner in the sale of his labor. Its opportunism was
instrumental--its idealism was home and family and individual
betterment. It also implied an attitude of aloofness from all those
movements which aspire to replace the wage system by cooperation,
whether voluntary or subsidized by government, whether greenbackism,
socialism, or anarchism.

Perhaps the most concise definition of this philosophy is to be found
in Strasser's testimony before the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor in 1883:

     "_Q._ You are seeking to improve home matters first?

     "_A._ Yes, sir, I look first to the trade I represent; I look first
     to cigars, to the interests of men who employ me to represent their
     interest.

     "_Chairman_: I was only asking you in regard to your ultimate ends.

     "_Witness_: We have no ultimate ends. We are going on from day to
     day. We are fighting only for immediate objects--objects that can
     be realized in a few years.

     "By Mr. Call: _Q._ You want something better to eat and to wear,
     and better houses to live in?

     "_A._ Yes, we want to dress better and to live better, and become
     better citizens generally.

     "_The Chairman_: I see that you are a little sensitive lest it
     should be thought that you are a mere theoriser, I do not look upon
     you in that light at all.

     "_The Witness_: Well, we say in our constitution that we are
     opposed to theorists, and I have to represent the organization
     here. We are all practical men."

Another offshoot of the same Marxian _Internationale_ were the "Chicago
Anarchists."[17] The _Internationale_, as we saw, emphasized trade
unionism as the first step in the direction of socialism, in opposition
to the political socialism of Lassalle, which ignored the trade union
and would start with a political party outright. Shorn of its
socialistic futurity this philosophy became non-political "business"
unionism; but, when combined with a strong revolutionary spirit, it
became a non-political revolutionary unionism, or syndicalism.

The organization of those industrial revolutionaries was called the
International Working People's Association, also known as the "Black"
or anarchist International, which was formed at Pittsburgh in 1883. Like
the old _Internationale_ it busied itself with forming trade unions, but
insisted that they conform to a revolutionary model. Such a "model"
trade union was the Federation of Metal Workers of America, which was
organized in 1885. It said in its Declaration of Principles that the
entire abolition of the present system of society can alone emancipate
the workers, but under no consideration should they resort to politics;
"our organization should be a school to educate its members for the new
condition of society, when the workers will regulate their own affairs
without any interference by the few. Since the emancipation of the
productive classes must come by their own efforts, it is unwise to
meddle in present politics.... All _direct_ struggles of the laboring
masses have our fullest sympathy." Alongside the revolutionary trade
unions were workers' armed organizations ready to usher in the new order
by force. "By force," recited the Pittsburgh Manifesto of the Black
International, "our ancestors liberated themselves from political
oppression, by force their children will have to liberate themselves
from economic bondage. It is, therefore, your right, it is your duty,
says Jefferson,--to arms!"

The following ten years were to decide whether the leadership of the
American labor movement was to be with the "practical men of the trade
unions" or with the cooperative idealists of the Knights of Labor.

FOOTNOTES:

[13] After the defeat of a strong anthracite miners' union in 1869,
which was an open organization, the fight against the employers was
carried on by a secret organization known as the Molly Maguires, which
used the method of terrorism and assassination. It was later exposed and
many were sentenced and executed.

[14] The Preamble further provides that the Order will stand for the
reservation of all lands for actual settlers; the "abrogation of all
laws that do not bear equally upon capital and labor, the removal of
unjust technicalities, delays, and discriminations in the administration
of justice, and the adopting of measures providing for the health and
safety of those engaged in mining, manufacturing, or building pursuits";
the enactment of a weekly pay law, a mechanics' lien law, and a law
prohibiting child labor under fourteen years of age; the abolition of
the contract system on national, state, and municipal work, and of the
system of leasing out convicts; equal pay for equal work for both sexes;
reduction of hours of labor to eight per day; "the substitution of
arbitration for strikes, whenever and wherever employers and employees
are willing to meet on equitable grounds"; the establishment of "a
purely national circulating medium based upon the faith and resources of
the nation, issued directly to the people, without the intervention of
any system of banking corporations, which money shall be a legal tender
in payment of all debts, public or private".

[15] Dr. Ely in his pioneer work, _The Labor Movement in America_,
published in 1886, showed a most genuine sympathy for the idealistic
strivings and gropings of labor for a better social order. He even
advised some of his pupils at the Johns Hopkins University to join the
Knights of Labor in order to gain a better understanding of the labor
movement.

[16] Schultze-Delizsch was a German thinker and practical reformer of
the liberal school.

[17] The Anarchists who were tried and executed after the Haymarket
Square bomb in Chicago in May, 1886. See below, 91-93.




CHAPTER 4

REVIVAL AND UPHEAVAL, 1879-1887


With the return of business prosperity in 1879, the labor movement
revived. The first symptom of the upward trend was a rapid
multiplication of city federations of organized trades, variously known
as trade councils, amalgamated trade and labor unions, trades
assemblies, and the like. Practically all of these came into existence
after 1879, since hardly any of the "trades' assemblies" of the sixties
had survived the depression.

As was said above, the national trade unions existed during the sixties
and seventies in only about thirty trades. Eighteen of these had either
retained a nucleus during the seventies or were first formed during that
decade. The following is a list of the national unions in existence in
1880 with the year of formation: Typographical (1850), Hat Finishers
(1854), Iron Molders (1859), Locomotive Engineers (1863), Cigar Makers
(1864), Bricklayers and Masons (1865), Silk and Fur Hat Finishers
(1866), Railway Conductors (1868), Coopers (1870), German-American
Typographia (1873), Locomotive Firemen (1873), Horseshoers (1874),
Furniture Workers (1873), Iron and Steel Workers (1876), Granite Cutters
(1877), Lake Seamen (1878), Cotton Mill Spinners (1878), New England
Boot and Shoe Lasters (1879).

In 1880 the Western greenbottle blowers' national union was established;
in 1881 the national unions of boiler makers and carpenters; in 1882,
plasterers and metal workers; in 1883, tailors, lithographers, wood
carvers, railroad brakemen, and silk workers.

An illustration of the rapid growth in trade union membership during
this period is given in the following figures: the bricklayers' union
had 303 in 1880; 1558 in 1881; 6848 in 1882; 9193 in 1883. The
typographical union had 5968 members in 1879; 6520 in 1880; 7931 in
1881; 10,439 in 1882; 12,273 in 1883. The total trade union membership
in the country, counting the three railway organizations and those
organized only locally, amounted to between 200,000 and 225,000 in 1883
and probably was not below 300,000 in the beginning of 1885.

A distinguishing characteristic of the trade unions of this time was the
predominance in them of the foreign element. The Illinois Bureau of
Labor describes the ethnical composition of the trade unions of that
State during 1886, and states that 21 percent were American, 33 percent
German, 19 percent Irish, 10 percent British other than Irish, 12
percent Scandinavian, and the Poles, Bohemians, and Italians formed
about 5 percent. The strong predominance of the foreign element in
American trade unions should not appear unusual, since, owing to the
breakdown of the apprenticeship system, the United States had been
drawing its supply of skilled labor from abroad.

The Order of the Knights of Labor, despite its "First Principles" based
on the cooperative ideal, was soon forced to make concessions to a large
element of its membership which was pressing for strikes. With the
advent of prosperity, the Order expanded, although the Knights of Labor
played but a subordinate part in the labor movement of the early
eighties. The membership was 20,151 in 1879; 28,136 in 1880; 19,422 in
1881; 42,517 in 1882; 51,914 in 1883; showing a steady and rapid growth,
with the exception of the year 1881. But these figures are decidedly
deceptive as a means of measuring the strength of the Order, for the
membership fluctuated widely; so that in the year 1883, when it reached
50,000 no less than one-half of this number passed in and out of the
organization during the year. The enormous fluctuation, while reducing
the economic strength of the Order, brought large masses of people under
its influence and prepared the ground for the upheaval in the middle of
the eighties. It also brought the Order to the attention of the public
press. The labor press gave the Order great publicity, but the Knights
did not rely on gratuitous newspaper publicity. They set to work a host
of lecturers, who held public meetings throughout the country adding
recruits and advertising the Order.

The most important Knights of Labor strike of this period was the
telegraphers' strike in 1883. The telegraphers had a national
organization in 1870, which soon collapsed. In 1882 they again organized
on a national basis and affiliated with the Order as District Assembly
45.[18] The strike was declared on June 19, 1883, against all commercial
telegraph companies in the country, among which the Western Union, with
about 4000 operators, was by far the largest. The demands were one day's
rest in seven, an eight-hour day shift and a seven-hour night shift, and
a general increase of 15 percent in wages. The public and a large
portion of the press gave their sympathy to the strikers, not so much on
account of the oppressed condition of the telegraphers as of the general
hatred that prevailed against Jay Gould, who then controlled the
Western Union Company. This strike was the first in the eighties to call
the attention of the general American public to the existence of a labor
question, and received considerable attention at the hands of the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor. By the end of July, over a month after
the beginning of the strike, the men who escaped the blacklist went back
to work on the old terms.

From 1879 till 1882 the labor movement was typical of a period of rising
prices. It was practically restricted to skilled workmen, who organized
to wrest from employers still better conditions than those which
prosperity would have given under individual bargaining. The movement
was essentially opportunistic and displayed no particular class feeling
and no revolutionary tendencies. The solidarity of labor was not denied
by the trade unions, but they did not try to reduce the idea to
practice: each trade coped more or less successfully with its own
employers. Even the Knights of Labor, the organization _par excellence_
of the solidarity of labor, was at this time, in so far as practical
efforts went, merely a faint echo of the trade unions.

But the situation radically changed during the depression of 1884-1885.
The unskilled and the semi-skilled, affected as they were by wage
reductions and unemployment even in a larger measure than the skilled,
were drawn into the movement. Labor organizations assumed the nature of
a real class movement. The idea of the solidarity of labor ceased to be
merely verbal and took on life! General strikes, sympathetic strikes,
nationwide boycotts and nation-wide political movements became the order
of the day. The effects of an unusually large immigration joined hands
with the depression. The eighties were the banner decade of the entire
century for immigration. The aggregate number of immigrants arriving was
5,246,613--two and a half millions larger than during the seventies and
one million and a half larger than during the nineties. The eighties
witnessed the highest tide of immigration from Great Britain and the
North of Europe and the beginning of the tide of South and East European
immigration.

However, the depression of 1883-1885 had one redeeming feature by which
it was distinguished from other depressions. With falling prices,
diminishing margins of profit, and decreasing wages, the amount of
employment was not materially diminished. Times continued hard during
1885, a slight improvement showing itself only during the last months of
the year. The years 1886 and 1887 were a period of gradual recovery, and
normal conditions may be said to have returned about the middle of 1887.
Except in New England, the old wages, which had been reduced during the
bad years, were won again by the spring of 1887.

The year 1884 was one of decisive failure in strikes. They were
practically all directed against reductions in wages and for the right
of organization. The most conspicuous strikes were those of the Fall
River spinners, the Troy stove mounters, the Cincinnati cigar makers and
the Hocking Valley coal miners.

The failure of strikes brought into use the other weapon of labor--the
boycott. But not until the latter part of 1884, when the failure of the
strike as a weapon became apparent, did the boycott assume the nature of
an epidemic. The boycott movement was a truly national one, affecting
the South and the Far West as well as the East and Middle West. The
number of boycotts during 1885 was nearly seven times as large as during
1884. Nearly all of the boycotts either originated with, or were taken
up by, the Knights of Labor.

The strike again came into prominence in the latter half of 1885. This
coincided with the beginning of an upward trend in general business
conditions. The strikes of 1885, even more than those of the preceding
year, were spontaneous outbreaks of unorganized masses.

The frequent railway strikes were a characteristic feature of the labor
movement in 1885. Most notable was the Gould railway strike in March,
1885. On February 26, a cut of 10 percent was ordered in the wages of
the shopmen of the Wabash road. A similar reduction had been made in
October, 1884, on the Missouri, Kansas & Texas. Strikes occurred on the
two roads, one on February 27 and the other March 9, and the strikers
were joined by the men on the third Gould road, the Missouri Pacific, at
all points where the two lines touched, making altogether over 4500 men
on strike. The train service personnel, that is, the locomotive
engineers, firemen, brakemen, and conductors, supported the strikers and
to this fact more than to any other was due their speedy victory. The
wages were restored and the strikers reemployed. But six months later
this was followed by a second strike. The road, now in the hands of a
receiver, reduced the force of shopmen at Moberly, Missouri, to the
lowest possible limit, which virtually meant a lockout of the members of
the Knights of Labor in direct violation of the conditions of settlement
of the preceding strike. The General Executive Board of the Knights,
after a futile attempt to have a conference with the receiver, declared
a boycott on Wabash rolling stock. This order, had it been carried out,
would have affected over 20,000 miles of railway and would have equalled
the dimensions of the great railway strike of 1877. But Jay Gould would
not risk a general strike on his lines at this time. According to an
appointment made between him and the executive board of the Knights of
Labor, a conference was held between that board and the managers of the
Missouri Pacific and the Wabash railroads, at which he threw his
influence in favor of making concessions to the men. He assured the
Knights that in all troubles he wanted the men to come directly to him,
that he believed in labor organizations and in the arbitration of all
difficulties and that he "would always endeavor to do what was right."
The Knights demanded the discharge of all new men hired in the Wabash
shops since the beginning of the lockout, the reinstatement of all
discharged men, the leaders being given priority, and an assurance that
no discrimination against the members of the Order would be made in the
future. A settlement was finally made at another conference, and the
receiver of the Wabash road agreed, under pressure by Jay Gould, to
issue an order conceding the demands of the Knights of Labor.

The significance of the second Wabash strike in the history of railway
strikes was that the railway brotherhoods (engineers, firemen, brakemen,
and conductors), in contrast with their conduct during the first Wabash
strike, now refused to lend any aid to the striking shopmen, although
many of the members were also Knights of Labor.

But far more important was the effect of the strike upon the general
labor movement. Here a labor organization for the first time dealt on an
equal footing with probably the most powerful capitalist in the country.
It forced Jay Gould to recognize it as a power equal to himself, a fact
which he conceded when he declared his readiness to arbitrate all labor
difficulties that might arise. The oppressed laboring masses finally
discovered a powerful champion. All the pent-up feeling of bitterness
and resentment which had accumulated during the two years of depression,
in consequence of the repeated cuts in wages and the intensified
domination by employers, now found vent in a rush to organize under the
banner of the powerful Knights of Labor. To the natural tendency on the
part of the oppressed to exaggerate the power of a mysterious
emancipator whom they suddenly found coming to their aid, there was
added the influence of sensational reports in the public press. The
newspapers especially took delight in exaggerating the powers and
strength of the Order.

In 1885 the New York _Sun_ detailed one of its reporters to "get up a
story of the strength and purposes of the Knights of Labor." This story
was copied by newspapers and magazines throughout the country and aided
considerably in bringing the Knights of Labor into prominence. The
following extract illustrates the exaggerated notion of the power of the
Knights of Labor.

"Five men in this country control the chief interests of five hundred
thousand workingmen, and can at any moment take the means of livelihood
from two and a half millions of souls. These men compose the executive
board of the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor of America. The ability
of the president and cabinet to turn out all the men in the civil
service, and to shift from one post to another the duties of the men in
the army and navy, is a petty authority compared with that of these five
Knights. The authority of the late Cardinal was, and that of the
bishops of the Methodist Church is, narrow and prescribed, so far as
material affairs are concerned, in comparison with that of these five
rulers.

"They can stay the nimble touch of almost every telegraph operator; can
shut up most of the mills and factories, and can disable the railroads.
They can issue an edict against any manufactured goods so as to make
their subjects cease buying them, and the tradesmen stop selling them.

"They can array labor against capital, putting labor on the offensive or
the defensive, for quiet and stubborn self-protection, or for angry,
organized assault, as they will."

Before long the Order was able to benefit by this publicity in quarters
where the tale of its great power could only attract unqualified
attention, namely, in Congress. The Knights of Labor led in the
agitation for prohibiting the immigration of alien contract laborers.
The problem of contract immigrant labor rapidly came to the front in
1884, when such labor began frequently to be used to defeat strikes.

Twenty persons appeared to testify before the committee in favor of the
bill, of whom all but two or three belonged to the Knights of Labor. The
anti-contract labor law which was passed by Congress on February 2,
1885, therefore, was due almost entirely to the efforts of the Knights
of Labor. The trade unions gave little active support, for to the
skilled workingmen the importation of contract Italian and Hungarian
laborers was a matter of small importance. On the other hand, to the
Knights of Labor with their vast contingent of unskilled it was a strong
menace. Although the law could not be enforced and had to be amended in
1887 in order to render it effective, its passage nevertheless attests
the political influence already exercised by the Order in 1885.

The outcome of the Gould strike of 1885 and the dramatic exaggeration of
the prowess of the Order by press and even by pulpit were largely
responsible for the psychological setting that called forth and
surrounded the great upheaval of 1886. This upheaval meant more than the
mere quickening of the pace of the movement begun in preceding years and
decades. It signalled the appearance on the scene of a new class which
had not hitherto found a place in the labor movement, namely the
unskilled. All the peculiar characteristics of the dramatic events in
1886 and 1887, the highly feverish pace at which organizations grew, the
nation-wide wave of strikes, particularly sympathetic strikes, the wide
use of the boycott, the obliteration, apparently complete, of all lines
that divided the laboring class, whether geographic or trade, the
violence and turbulence which accompanied the movement--all of these
were the signs of a great movement by the class of the unskilled, which
had finally risen in rebellion. This movement, rising as an elemental
protest against oppression and degradation, could be but feebly
restrained by any considerations of expediency and prudence; nor, of
course, could it be restrained by any lessons from experience. But, if
the origin and powerful sweep of this movement were largely spontaneous
and elemental, the issues which it took up were supplied by the existing
organizations, namely the trade unions and the Knights of Labor. These
served also as the dykes between which the rapid streams were gathered
and, if at times it seemed that they must burst under the pressure,
still they gave form and direction to the movement and partly succeeded
in introducing order where chaos had reigned. The issue which first
brought unity in this great mass movement was a nation-wide strike for
the eight-hour day declared for May 1, 1886.

The initiative in this strike was taken not by the Order but by the
trade unionists and on the eve of the strike the general officers of the
Knights adopted an attitude of hostility. But if the slogan failed to
arouse the enthusiasm of the national leaders of the Knights, it
nevertheless found ready response in the ranks of labor. The great class
of the unskilled and unorganized, which had come to look upon the
Knights of Labor as the all-powerful liberator of the laboring masses
from oppression, now eagerly seized upon this demand as the issue upon
which the first battle with capital should be fought.

The agitation assumed large proportions in March. The main argument for
the shorter day was work for the unemployed. With the exception of the
cigar makers, it was left wholly in the hands of local organizations.
The Knights of Labor as an organization figured far less prominently
than the trade unions, and among the latter the building trades and the
German-speaking furniture workers and cigar makers stood in the front of
the movement. Early in the strike the workingmen's cause was gravely
injured by a bomb explosion on Haymarket Square in Chicago, attributed
to anarchists, which killed and wounded a score of policemen.

The bomb explosion on Haymarket Square connected two movements which had
heretofore marched separately, despite a certain mutual affinity. For
what many of the Knights of Labor were practising during the upheaval in
a less drastic manner and without stopping to look for a theoretical
justification, the contemporary Chicago "anarchists,"[19] the largest
branch of the "Black International," had elevated into a well
rounded-out system of thought. Both syndicalism and the Knights of Labor
upheaval were related chapters in the revolutionary movement of the
eighties. Whether in its conscious or unconscious form, this syndicalism
was characterized by an extreme combativeness, by the ease with which
minor disputes grew into widespread strikes involving many trades and
large territories, by a reluctance, if not an out and out refusal, to
enter into agreements with employers however temporary, and lastly by a
ready resort to violence. In 1886 the membership of the Black
International probably was about 5000 or 6000 and of this number about
1000 were English speaking.

The circumstances of the bomb explosion were the following. A strikers'
meeting was held near the McCormick Reaper Works in Chicago, late on the
third of May. About this time strike-breakers employed in these works
began to leave for home and were attacked by strikers. The police
arrived in large numbers and upon being received with stones, fired and
killed four and wounded many. The same evening the International issued
a call in which appeared the word _"Revenge"_ with the appeal:
"Workingmen, arm yourselves and appear in full force." A protest mass
meeting met the next day on Haymarket Square and was addressed by
Internationalists. The police were present in numbers and, as they
formed in line and advanced on the crowd, some unknown hand hurled a
bomb into their midst killing and wounding many.

It is unnecessary to describe here the period of police terror in
Chicago, the hysterical attitude of the press, or the state of panic
that came over the inhabitants of the city. Nor is it necessary to deal
in detail with the trial and sentence of the accused. Suffice it to say
that the Haymarket bomb showed to the labor movement what it might
expect from the public and the government if it combined violence with a
revolutionary purpose.

Although the bomb outrage was attributed to the anarchists and not
generally to the strikers for the eight-hour day, it did materially
reduce the sympathy of the public as well as intimidate many strikers.
Nevertheless, _Bradstreet's_ estimated that no fewer than 340,000 men
took part in the movement; 190,000 actually struck, only 42,000 of this
number with success, and 150,000 secured shorter hours without a strike.
Thus the total number of those who secured with or without strikes the
eight-hour day was something less than 200,000. But even those who for
the present succeeded, whether with or without striking, soon lost the
concession, and _Bradstreet's_ estimated in January, 1887, that, so far
as the payment of former wages for a shorter day's work is concerned,
the grand total of those retaining the concession did not exceed, if it
equalled, 15,000.

American labor movements have never experienced such a rush to organize
as the one in the latter part of 1885 and during 1886. During 1886 the
combined membership of labor organizations was exceptionally large and
for the first time came near the million mark. The Knights of Labor had
a membership of 700,000 and the trade unions at least 250,000, the
former composed largely of unskilled and the latter of skilled. The
Knights of Labor gained in a remarkably short time--in a few
months--over 600,000 new members and grew from 1610 local assemblies
with 104,066 members in good standing in July 1885, to 5892 assemblies
with 702,924 members in July 1886. The greatest portion of this growth
occurred after January 1, 1886. In the state of New York there were in
July 1886, about 110,000 members (60,809 in District Assembly 49 of New
York City alone); in Pennsylvania, 95,000 (51,557 in District Assembly
1, Philadelphia, alone); in Massachusetts, 90,000 (81,191 in District
Assembly 30 of Boston); and in Illinois, 32,000.

In the state of Illinois, for which detailed information for that year
is available, there were 204 local assemblies with 34,974 members, of
which 65 percent were found in Cook County (Chicago) alone. One hundred
and forty-nine assemblies were mixed, that is comprised members of
different trades including unskilled and only 55 were trade assemblies.
Reckoned according to country of birth the membership was 45 percent
American, 16 percent German, 13 percent Irish, 10 percent British, 5
percent Scandinavian, and the remaining 2 percent scattered. The trade
unions also gained many members but in a considerably lesser proportion.

The high water mark was reached in the autumn of 1886. But in the early
months of 1887 a reaction became visible. By July 1, the membership of
the Order had diminished to 510,351. While a share of this retrogression
may have been due to the natural reaction of large masses of people who
had been suddenly set in motion without experience, a more immediate
cause came from the employers. Profiting by past lessons, they organized
strong associations. The main object of these employers' associations
was the defeat of the Knights. They were organized sectionally and
nationally. In small localities, where the power of the Knights was
especially great, all employers regardless of industry joined in a
single association. But in large manufacturing centers, where the rich
corporation prevailed, they included the employers of only one industry.
To attain their end these associations made liberal use of the lockout,
the blacklist, and armed guards and detectives. Often they treated
agreements entered into with the Order as contracts signed under duress.
The situation in the latter part of 1886 and in 1887 had been clearly
foreshadowed in the treatment accorded the Knights of Labor on the Gould
railways in the Southwest in the early part of 1886.

As already mentioned, at the settlement of the strike on the Gould
system in March 1885, the employes were assured that the road would
institute no discriminations against the Knights of Labor. However, it
is apparent that a series of petty discriminations was indulged in by
minor officials, which kept the men in a state of unrest. It culminated
in the discharge of a foreman, a member of the Knights, from the car
shop at Marshall, Texas, on the Texas & Pacific Road, which had shortly
before passed into the hands of a receiver. A strike broke out over the
entire road on March 1, 1886. It is necessary, however, to note that the
Knights of Labor themselves were meditating aggressive action two months
before the strike. District Assembly 101, the organization embracing the
employes on the Southwest system, held a convention on January 10, and
authorized the officers to call a strike at any time they might find
opportune to enforce the two following demands: first, the formal
"recognition" of the Order; and second, a daily wage of $1.50 for the
unskilled. The latter demand is peculiarly characteristic of the Knights
of Labor and of the feeling of labor solidarity that prevailed in the
movement. But evidently the organization preferred to make the issue
turn on discrimination against members. Another peculiarity which marked
off this strike as the beginning of a new era was the facility with
which it led to a sympathetic strike on the Missouri Pacific and all
leased and operated lines. This strike broke out simultaneously over the
entire system on March 6. It affected more than 5000 miles of railway
situated in Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, Indian Territory, and Nebraska.
The strikers did not content themselves with mere picketing, but
actually took possession of the railroad property and by a systematic
"killing" of engines, that is removing some indispensable part,
effectively stopped all the freight traffic. The number of men actively
on strike was in the neighborhood of 9000, including practically all of
the shopmen, yardmen, and section gangs. The engineers, firemen,
brakemen, and conductors took no active part and had to be forced to
leave their posts under threats from the strikers.

The leader, one Martin Irons, accurately represented the feelings of the
strikers. Personally honest and probably well-meaning, his attitude was
overbearing and tyrannical. With him as with those who followed him, a
strike was not a more or less drastic means of forcing a better labor
contract, but necessarily assumed the aspect of a crusade against
capital. Hence all compromise and any policy of give and take were
excluded.

Negotiations were conducted by Jay Gould and Powderly to submit the
dispute to arbitration, but they failed and, after two months of
sporadic violence, the strike spent itself and came to an end. It left,
however, a profound impression upon the public mind, second only to the
impression made by the great railway strike of 1877; and a
Congressional committee was appointed to investigate the whole matter.

The disputes during the second half of 1886 ended, for the most part,
disastrously to labor. The number of men involved in six months, was
estimated at 97,300. Of these, about 75,300 were in nine great lockouts,
of whom 54,000 suffered defeat at the hands of associated employers. The
most important lockouts were against 15,000 laundry workers at Troy, New
York, in June; against 20,000 Chicago packing house workers; and against
20,000 knitters at Cohoes, New York, both in October.

The lockout of the Chicago butcher workmen attracted the most attention.
These men had obtained the eight-hour day without a strike during May. A
short time thereafter, upon the initiative of Armour & Company, the
employers formed a packers' association and, in the beginning of
October, notified the men of a return to the ten-hour day on October 11.
They justified this action on the ground that they could not compete
with Cincinnati and Kansas City, which operated on the ten-hour system.
On October 8, the men, who were organized in District Assemblies 27 and
54, suspended work, and the memorable lockout began. The packers'
association rejected all offers of compromise and on October 18 the men
were ordered to work on the ten-hour basis. But the dispute in October,
which was marked by a complete lack of ill-feeling on the part of the
men and was one of the most peaceable labor disputes of the year, was in
reality a mere prelude to a second disturbance which broke out in the
plant of Swift & Company on November 2 and became general throughout the
stockyards on November 6. The men demanded a return to the eight-hour
day, but the packers' association, which was now joined by Swift &
Company, who formerly had kept aloof, not only refused to give up the
ten-hour day, but declared that they would employ no Knights of Labor in
the future. The Knights retaliated by declaring a boycott on the meat of
Armour & Company. The behavior of the men was now no longer peaceable as
before, and the employers took extra precautions by prevailing upon the
governor to send two regiments of militia in addition to the several
hundred Pinkerton detectives employed by the association. To all
appearances, the men were slowly gaining over the employers, for on
November 10 the packers' association rescinded its decision not to
employ Knights, when suddenly on November 15, like a thunderbolt out of
a clear sky, a telegram arrived from Grand Master Workman Powderly
ordering the men back to work. Powderly had refused to consider the
reports from the members of the General Executive Board who were on the
ground, but, as was charged by them, was guided instead by the advice of
a priest who had appealed to him to call off the strike and thus put an
end to the suffering of the men and their families.

New York witnessed an even more characteristic Knights of Labor strike
and on a larger scale. This strike began as two insignificant separate
strikes, one by coal-handlers at the Jersey ports supplying New York
with coal and the other by longshoremen on the New York water front;
both starting on January 1, 1887. Eighty-five coal-handlers employed by
the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, members of the Knights of
Labor, struck against a reduction of 2-1/2 cents an hour in the wages of
the "top-men" and were joined by the trimmers who had grievances of
their own. Soon the strike spread to the other roads and the number of
striking coal-handlers reached 3000. The longshoremen's strike was begun
by 200 men, employed by the Old Dominion Steamship Company, against a
reduction in wages and the hiring of cheap men by the week. The strikers
were not organized, but the Ocean Association, a part of the Knights of
Labor, took up their cause and was assisted by the longshoremen's union.
Both strikes soon widened out through a series of sympathetic strikes of
related trades and finally became united into one. The Ocean Association
declared a boycott on the freight of the Old Dominion Company and this
was strictly obeyed by all of the longshoremen's unions. The
International Boatmen's Union refused to allow their boats to be used
for "scab coal" or to permit their members to steer the companies'
boats. The longshoremen joined the boatmen in refusing to handle coal,
and the shovelers followed. Then the grain handlers on both floating and
stationary elevators refused to load ships with grain on which there was
scab coal, and the bag-sewers stood with them. The longshoremen now
resolved to go out and refused to work on ships which received scab
coal, and finally they decided to stop work altogether on all kinds of
craft in the harbor until the trouble should be settled. The strike
spirit spread to a large number of freight handlers working for
railroads along the river front, so that in the last week of January the
number of strikers in New York, Brooklyn, and New Jersey, reached
approximately 28,000; 13,000 longshoremen, 1000 boatmen, 6000 grain
handlers, 7500 coal-handlers, and 400 bag-sewers.

On February 11, August Corbin, president and receiver of the
Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, fearing a strike by the miners
working in the coal mines operated by that road, settled the strike by
restoring to the eighty-five coal-handlers, the original strikers, their
former rate of wages. The Knights of Labor felt impelled to accept such
a trivial settlement for two reasons. The coal-handlers' strike, which
drove up the price of coal to the consumer, was very unpopular, and the
strike itself had begun to weaken when the brewers and stationary
engineers, who for some obscure reason had been ordered to strike in
sympathy, refused to come out. The situation was left unchanged, as far
as the coal-handlers employed by the other companies, the longshoremen,
and the many thousands of men who went out on sympathetic strike were
concerned. The men began to return to work by the thousands and the
entire strike collapsed.

The determined attack and stubborn resistance of the employers'
associations after the strikes of May 1886, coupled with the obvious
incompetence displayed by the leaders, caused the turn of the tide in
the labor movement in the first half of 1887. This, however, manifested
itself during 1887 exclusively in the large cities, where the movement
had borne in the purest form the character of an uprising by the class
of the unskilled and where the hardest battles were fought with the
employers. District Assembly 49, New York, fell from its membership of
60,809 in June 1886, to 32,826 in July 1887. During the same interval,
District Assembly 1, Philadelphia, decreased from 51,557 to 11,294, and
District Assembly 30, Boston, from 81,197 to 31,644. In Chicago there
were about 40,000 Knights immediately before the packers' strike in
October 1886, and only about 17,000 on July 1, 1887. The falling off of
the largest district assemblies in 10 large cities practically equalled
the total loss of the Order, which amounted approximately to 191,000. At
the same time the membership of the smallest district assemblies, which
were for the most part located in small cities, remained stationary and,
outside of the national and district trade assemblies which were formed
by separation from mixed district assemblies, thirty-seven new district
assemblies were formed, also mostly in rural localities. In addition,
state assemblies were added in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin, with an average membership of about 2000 each.

It thus becomes clear that by the middle of 1887, the Great Upheaval of
the unskilled and semi-skilled portions of the working class had already
subsided beneath the strength of the combined employers and the
unwieldiness of their own organization. After 1887 the Knights of Labor
lost its hold upon the large cities with their wage-conscious and
largely foreign population, and became an organization predominantly of
country people, of mechanics, small merchants, and farmers,--a class of
people which was more or less purely American and decidedly middle class
in its philosophy.

The industrial upheaval in the middle of the eighties had, like the
great strike of 1877, a political reverberation. Although the latter was
heard throughout the entire country, it centered in the city of New
York, where the situation was complicated by court interference in the
labor struggle.

A local assembly of the Knights of Labor had declared a boycott against
one George Theiss, a proprietor of a music and beer garden. The latter
at first submitted and paid a fine of $1000 to the labor organization,
but later brought action in court against the officers charging them
with intimidation and extortion.

The judge, George C. Barrett, in his charge to the jury, conceded that
striking, picketing, and boycotting as such were not prohibited by law,
if not accompanied by force, threats, or intimidation. But in the case
under consideration the action of the pickets in advising passers-by not
to patronize the establishment and in distributing boycott circulars
constituted intimidation. Also, since the $1000 fine was obtained by
fear induced by a threat to continue the unlawful injury to Theiss
inflicted by the "boycott," the case was one of extortion covered by the
penal code. It made no difference whether the money was appropriated by
the defendants for personal use or whether it was turned over to their
organization. The jury, which reflected the current public opinion
against boycotts, found all of the five defendants guilty of extortion,
and Judge Barrett sentenced them to prison for terms ranging from one
year and six months to three years and eight months.

The Theiss case, coming as it did at a time of general restlessness of
labor and closely after the defeat of the eight-hour movement, greatly
hastened the growth of the sentiment for an independent labor party. The
New York Central Labor Union, the most famous and most influential
organization of its kind in the country at the time, with a membership
estimated at between 40,000 and 50,000, placed itself at the head of the
movement in which both socialists and non-socialists joined. Henry
George, the originator of the single tax movement, was nominated by the
labor party for Mayor of New York and was allowed to draw up his own
platform, which he made of course a simon-pure single tax platform. The
labor demands were compressed into one plank. They were as follows: The
reform of court procedure so that "the practice of drawing grand jurors
from one class should cease, and the requirements of a property
qualification for trial jurors should be abolished"; the stopping of the
"officious intermeddling of the police with peaceful assemblages"; the
enforcement of the laws for safety and the sanitary inspection of
buildings; the abolition of contract labor on public work; and equal pay
for equal work without distinction of sex on such work.

The George campaign was more in the nature of a religious revival than
of a political election campaign. It was also a culminating point in the
great labor upheaval. The enthusiasm of the laboring people reached its
highest pitch. They felt that, baffled and defeated as they were in
their economic struggle, they were now nearing victory in the struggle
for the control of government. Mass meetings were numerous and large.
Most of them were held in the open air, usually on the street corners.
From the system by which one speaker followed another, speaking at
several meeting places in a night, the labor campaign got its nickname
of the "tailboard campaign." The common people, women and men, gathered
in hundreds and often thousands around trucks from which the shifting
speakers addressed the crowd. The speakers were volunteers, including
representatives of the liberal professions, lawyers, physicians,
teachers, ministers, and labor leaders. At such mass meetings George did
most of his campaigning, making several speeches a night, once as many
as eleven. The single tax and the prevailing political corruption were
favorite topics. Against George and his adherents were pitted the
powerful press of the city of New York, all the political power of the
old parties, and all the influence of the business class. George's
opponents were Abram S. Hewitt, an anti-Tammany Democrat whom Tammany
had picked for its candidate in this emergency, and Theodore Roosevelt,
then as yet known only as a courageous young politician.

The vote cast was 90,000 for Hewitt, 68,000 for George, and 60,000 for
Roosevelt. There is possible ground for the belief that George was
counted out of thousands of votes. The nature of the George vote can be
sufficiently gathered from an analysis of the pledges to vote for him.
An apparently trustworthy investigation was made by a representative of
the New York Sun. He drew the conclusion that the vast majority were not
simply wage earners, but also naturalized immigrants, mainly Irish,
Germans, and Bohemians, the native element being in the minority. While
the Irish were divided between George and Hewitt, the majority of the
German element had gone over to Henry George. The outcome was hailed as
a victory by George and his supporters and this view was also taken by
the general press.

In spite of this propitious beginning the political labor movement soon
suffered the fate of all reform political movements. The strength of the
new party was frittered away in doctrinaire factional strife between the
single taxers and the socialists. The trade union element became
discouraged and lost interest. So that at the next State election, in
which George ran for Secretary of State, presumably because that office
came nearest to meeting the requirement for a single taxer seeking a
practical scope of action, the vote in the city fell to 37,000 and in
the whole State amounted only to 72,000. This ended the political labor
movement in New York.

Outside of New York the political labor movement was not associated
either with the single tax or any other "ism." As in New York it was a
spontaneous expression of dissatisfaction brought on by failure in
strikes. The movement scored a victory in Milwaukee, where it elected a
mayor, and in Chicago where it polled 25,000 out of a total of 92,000.
But, as in New York, it fell to pieces without leaving a permanent
trace.

FOOTNOTES:

[18] See the next chapter for the scheme of organization followed by the
Order.

[19] See above, 79-80.




CHAPTER 5

THE VICTORY OF CRAFT UNIONISM AND THE FINAL FAILURE OF PRODUCERS'
COOPERATION


We now come to the most significant aspect of the Great Upheaval: the
life and death struggle between two opposed principles of labor
organization and between two opposed labor programs. The Upheaval
offered the practical test which the labor movement required for an
intelligent decision between the rival claims of Knights and trade
unionists. The test as well as the conflict turned principally on
"structure," that is on the difference between "craft autonomists" and
those who would have labor organized "under one head," or what we would
now call the "one big union" advocates.

As the issue of "structure" proved in the crucial eighties, and has
remained ever since, the outstanding factional issue in the labor
movement, it might be well at this point to pass in brief review the
structural developments in labor organization from the beginning and try
to correlate them with other important developments.

The early[20] societies of shoemakers and printers were purely local in
scope and the relations between "locals" extended only to feeble
attempts to deal with the competition of traveling journeymen.
Occasionally, they corresponded on trade matters, notifying each other
of their purposes and the nature of their demands, or expressing
fraternal greetings; chiefly for the purpose of counteracting
advertisements by employers for journeymen or keeping out dishonest
members and so-called "scabs." This mostly relates to printers. The
shoemakers, despite their bitter contests with their employers, did even
less. The Philadelphia Mechanics' Trades Association in 1827, which we
noted as the first attempted federation of trades in the United States
if not in the world, was organized as a move of sympathy for the
carpenters striking for the ten-hour day. During the period of the
"wild-cat" prosperity the local federation of trades, under the name of
"Trades' Union,"[21] comes to occupy the center of the stage in New
York, Philadelphia, Boston, and appeared even as far "West" as
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Louisville. The constitution of the New York
"Trades' Union" provided, among other things, that each society should
pay a monthly per capita tax of 6-1/4 cents to be used as a strike fund.
Later, when strikes multiplied, the Union limited the right to claim
strike aid and appointed a standing committee on mediation. In 1835 it
discussed a plan for an employment exchange or a "call room." The
constitution of the Philadelphia Union required that a strike be
endorsed by a two-thirds majority before granting aid.

The National Trades' Union, the federation of city trades' unions,
1834-1836, was a further development of the same idea. Its first and
second conventions went little beyond the theoretical. The latter,
however, passed a significant resolution urging the trade societies to
observe a uniform wage policy throughout the country and, should the
employers combine to resist it, the unions should make "one general
strike."

The last convention in 1836 went far beyond preceding conventions in its
plans for solidifying the workingmen of the country. First and foremost,
a "national fund" was provided for, to be made up of a levy of two cents
per month on each of the members of the trades' unions and local
societies represented. The policies of the National Trades' Union
instead of merely advisory were henceforth to be binding. But before the
new policies could be tried, as we know, the entire trade union movement
was wiped out by the panic.

The city "trades' union" of the thirties accorded with a situation where
the effects of the extension of the market were noticeable in the labor
market, and little as yet in the commodity market; when the competitive
menace to labor was the low paid out-of-town mechanic coming to the
city, not the out-of-town product made under lower labor costs selling
in the same market as the products of unionized labor. Under these
conditions the local trade society, reenforced by the city federation of
trades, sufficed. The "trades' union," moreover, served also as a source
of reserve strength.

Twenty years later the whole situation was changed. The fifties were a
decade of extensive construction of railways. Before 1850 there was more
traffic by water than by rail. After 1860 the relative importance of
land and water transportation was reversed. Furthermore, the most
important railway building during the ten years preceding 1860 was the
construction of East and West trunk lines; and the sixties were marked
by the establishment of through lines for freight and the consolidation
of connecting lines. The through freight lines greatly hastened freight
traffic and by the consolidations through transportation became doubly
efficient.

Arteries of traffic had thus extended from the Eastern coast to the
Mississippi Valley. Local markets had widened to embrace half a
continent. Competitive menaces had become more serious and threatened
from a distance. Local unionism no longer sufficed. Consequently, as we
saw, in the labor movement of the sixties the national trade union was
supreme.

There were four distinct sets of causes which operated during the
sixties to bring about nationalization; two grew out of the changes in
transportation, already alluded to, and two were largely independent of
such changes.

The first and most far-reaching cause, as illustrated by the stove
molders, was the competition of the products of different localities
side by side in the same market. Stoves manufactured in Albany, New
York, were now displayed in St. Louis by the side of stoves made in
Detroit. No longer could the molder in Albany be indifferent to the fate
of his fellow craftsman in Louisville. With the molders the
nationalization of the organization was destined to proceed to its
utmost length. In order that union conditions should be maintained even
in the best organized centers, it became necessary to equalize
competitive conditions in the various localities. That led to a
well-knit national organization to control working conditions, trade
rules, and strikes. In other trades, where the competitive area of the
product was still restricted to the locality, the paramount
nationalizing influence was a more intensive competition for employment
between migratory out-of-town journeymen and the locally organized
mechanics. This describes the situation in the printing trade, where the
bulk of work was newspaper and not book and job printing. Accordingly,
the printers did not need to entrust their national officers with
anything more than the control of the traveling journeymen and the
result was that the local unions remained practically independent.

The third cause of concerted national action in a trade union was the
organization of employers. Where the power of a local union began to be
threatened by an employers' association, the next logical step was to
combine in a national union.

The fourth cause was the application of machinery and the introduction
of division of labor, which split up the established trades and laid
industry open to invasion by "green hands." The shoemaking industry,
which during the sixties had reached the factory stage, illustrates this
in a most striking manner. Few other industries experienced anything
like a similar change during this period.

Of course, none of the causes of nationalization here enumerated
operated in entire isolation. In some trades one cause, in other trades
other causes, had the predominating influence. Consequently, in some
trades the national union resembled an agglomeration of loosely allied
states, each one reserving the right to engage in independent action and
expecting from its allies no more than a benevolent neutrality. In other
trades, on the contrary, the national union was supreme in declaring
industrial war and in making peace, and even claimed absolute right to
formulate the civil laws of the trade for times of industrial peace.

The national trade union was, therefore, a response to obvious and
pressing necessity. However slow or imperfect may have been the
adjustment of internal organizations to the conditions of the trade,
still the groove was defined and consequently the amount of possible
floundering largely limited. Not so with the next step, namely the
national federation of trades. In the sixties we saw the national trade
unions join with other local and miscellaneous labor organizations in
the National Labor Union upon a political platform of eight-hours and
greenbackism. In 1873 the same national unions asserted their rejection
of "panaceas" and politics by attempting to create in the National Labor
Congress a federation of trades of a strictly economic character. The
panic and depression nipped that in the bud. When trade unionism revived
in 1879 the national trade unions returned to the idea of a national
federation of labor, but this time they followed the model of the
British Trades Union Congress, the organization which cares for the
legislative interests of British labor. This was the "Federation of
Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada,"
which was set up in 1881.

It is easy to understand why the unions of the early eighties did not
feel the need of a federation on economic lines. The trade unions of
today look to the American Federation of Labor for the discharge of
important economic functions, therefore it is primarily an economic
organization. These functions are the assistance of national trade
unions in organizing their trades, the adjustment of disputes between
unions claiming the same "jurisdiction," and concerted action in matters
of especial importance such as shorter hours, the "open-shop," or
boycotts. None of these functions would have been of material importance
to the trade unions of the early eighties. Existing in well-defined
trades, which were not affected by technical changes, they had no
"jurisdictional" disputes; operating at a period of prosperity with
full employment and rising wages, they did not realize a necessity for
concerted action; the era of the boycotts had not yet begun. As for
having a common agency to do the work of organizing, the trade unions of
the early eighties had no keen desire to organize any but the skilled
workmen; and, since the competition of workmen in small towns had not
yet made itself felt, each national trade union strove to organize
primarily the workmen of its trade in the larger cities, a function for
which its own means were adequate.

The new organization of 1881 was a loose federation of trade and labor
unions with a legislative committee at the head, with Samuel Gompers of
the cigar makers as a member. The platform was purely legislative and
demanded legal incorporation for trade unions,[22] compulsory education
for children, the prohibition of child labor under fourteen, uniform
apprentice laws, the enforcement of the national eight-hour law, prison
labor reform, abolition of the "truck" and "order" system, mechanics'
lien, abolition of conspiracy laws as applied to labor organizations, a
national bureau of labor statistics, a protective tariff for American
labor, an anti-contract immigrant law, and recommended "all trade and
labor organizations to secure proper representation in all law-making
bodies by means of the ballot, and to use all honorable measures by
which this result can be accomplished." Although closely related to the
present American Federation of Labor in point of time and personnel of
leadership, the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the
United States and Canada was in reality the precursor of the present
state federations of labor, which as specialized parts of the national
federation now look after labor legislation.

Two or three years later it became evident that the Federation as a
legislative organization proved a failure.[23] Manifestly the trade
unions felt no great interest in national legislation. The indifference
can be measured by the fact that the annual income of the Federation
never exceeded $700 and that, excepting in 1881, none of its conventions
represented more than one-fourth of the trade union membership of the
country. Under such conditions the legislative influence of the
Federation naturally was infinitesimal. The legislative committee
carried out the instructions of the 1883 convention and communicated to
the national committees of the Republican and Democratic parties the
request that they should define their position upon the enforcement of
the eight-hour law and other measures. The letters were not even
answered. A subcommittee of the legislative committee appeared before
the two political conventions, but received no greater attention.

It was not until the majority of the national trade unions came under
the menace of becoming forcibly absorbed by the Order of the Knights of
Labor that a basis appeared for a vigorous federation.

The Knights of Labor were built on an opposite principle from the
national trade unions. Whereas the latter started with independent
crafts and then with hesitating hands tried, as we saw, to erect some
sort of a common superstructure that should express a higher solidarity
of labor, the former was built from the beginning upon a denial of craft
lines and upon an absolute unity of all classes of labor under one
guiding head. The subdivision was territorial instead of occupational
and the government centralized.

The constitution of the Knights of Labor was drawn in 1878 when the
Order laid aside the veil of secrecy to which it had clung since its
foundation in 1869. The lowest unit of organization was the local
assembly of ten or more, at least three-fourths of whom had to be wage
earners at any trade. Above the local assembly was the "district
assembly" and above it the "General Assembly." The district assembly had
absolute power over its local assemblies and the General Assembly was
given "full and final jurisdiction" as "the highest tribunal" of the
Order.[24] Between sessions of the General Assembly the power was vested
in a General Executive Board, presided over by a Grand Master Workman.

The Order of the Knights of Labor in practice carried out the idea which
is now advocated so fervently by revolutionary unionists, namely the
"One Big Union," since it avowedly aimed to bring into one organization
"all productive labor." This idea in organization was aided by the
weakness of the trade unions during the long depression of the
seventies, which led many to hope for better things from a general
pooling of labor strength. But its main appeal rested on a view that
machine technique tends to do away with all distinctions of trades by
reducing all workers to the level of unskilled machine tenders. To its
protagonists therefore the "one big union" stood for an adjustment to
the new technique.

First to face the problem of adjustment to the machine technique of the
factory system were the shoemakers. They organized in 1867 the Order of
the Knights of St. Crispin, mainly for the purpose of suppressing the
competitive menace of "green hands," that is unskilled workers put to
work on shoe machines. At its height in 1872, the Crispins numbered
about 50,000, perhaps the largest union in the whole world at that time.
The coopers began to be menaced by machinery about the middle of the
sixties, and about the same time the machinists and blacksmiths, too,
saw their trade broken up by the introduction of the principle of
standardized parts and quantity production in the making of machinery.
From these trades came the national leaders of the Knights of Labor and
the strongest advocates of the new principle in labor organization and
of the interests of the unskilled workers in general. The conflict
between the trade unions and the Knights of Labor turned on the question
of the unskilled workers.

The conflict was held in abeyance during the early eighties. The trade
unions were by far the strongest organizations in the field and scented
no particular danger when here or there the Knights formed an assembly
either contiguous to the sphere of a trade union or even at times
encroaching upon it.

With the Great Upheaval, which began in 1884, and the inrushing of
hundreds of thousands of semi-skilled and unskilled workers into the
Order, a new situation was created. The leaders of the Knights realized
that mere numbers were not sufficient to defeat the employers and that
control over the skilled, and consequently the more strategic
occupations, was required before the unskilled and semi-skilled could
expect to march to victory. Hence, parallel to the tremendous growth of
the Knights in 1886, there was a constantly growing effort to absorb the
existing trade unions for the purpose of making them subservient to the
interests of the less skilled elements. It was mainly that which
produced the bitter conflict between the Knights and the trade unions
during 1886 and 1887. Neither the jealousy aroused by the success of the
unions nor the opposite aims of labor solidarity and trade separatism
gives an adequate explanation of this conflict. The one, of course,
aggravated the situation by introducing a feeling of personal
bitterness, and the other furnished an appealing argument to each side.
But the struggle was one between groups within the working class, in
which the small but more skilled group fought for independence of the
larger but weaker group of the unskilled and semi-skilled. The skilled
men stood for the right to use their advantage of skill and efficient
organization in order to wrest the maximum amount of concessions for
themselves. The Knights of Labor endeavored to annex the skilled men in
order that the advantage from their exceptional fighting strength might
lift up the unskilled and semi-skilled. From the point of view of a
struggle between principles, this was indeed a clash between the
principle of solidarity of labor and that of trade separatism, but, in
reality, each of the principles reflected only the special interest of a
certain portion of the working class. Just as the trade unions, when
they fought for trade autonomy, really refused to consider the unskilled
men, so the Knights of Labor overlooked the fact that their scheme would
retard the progress of the skilled trades.

The Knights were in nearly every case the aggressors, and it is
significant that among the local organizations of the Knights inimical
to trade unions, District Assembly 49, of New York, should prove the
most relentless. It was this assembly which conducted the longshoremen's
and coal miners' strike in New York in 1887 and which, as we saw,[25]
did not hesitate to tie up the industries of the entire city for the
sake of securing the demands of several hundred unskilled workingmen.

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