The Memorabilia
by Xenophon · English · Gutenberg #1177 · 411,943 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: The Memorabilia
Author: Xenophon
Translator: Henry Graham Dakyns
Release date: January 1, 1998 [eBook #1177]
Most recently updated: February 12, 2019
Language: English
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THE MEMORABILIA
Recollections of Socrates
By Xenophon
Translated by H. G. Dakyns
Xenophon the Athenian was born 431 B.C. He was a
pupil of Socrates. He marched with the Spartans,
and was exiled from Athens. Sparta gave him land
and property in Scillus, where he lived for many
years before having to move once more, to settle
in Corinth. He died in 354 B.C.
The Memorabilia is a recollection of Socrates in
word and deed, to show his character as the best
and happiest of men.
PREPARER'S NOTE
First Published 1897 by Macmillan and Co.
This was typed from Dakyns' series, "The Works of Xenophon," a
four-volume set. The complete list of Xenophon's works (though
there is doubt about some of these) is:
Work Number of books
The Anabasis 7
The Hellenica 7
The Cyropaedia 8
The Memorabilia 4
The Symposium 1
The Economist 1
On Horsemanship 1
The Sportsman 1
The Cavalry General 1
The Apology 1
On Revenues 1
The Hiero 1
The Agesilaus 1
The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians 2
Text in brackets "{}" is my transliteration of Greek text into
English using an Oxford English Dictionary alphabet table. The
diacritical marks have been lost.
THE MEMORABILIA
or
Recollections of Socrates
BOOK I
I
I have often wondered by what arguments those who indicted (1) Socrates
could have persuaded the Athenians that his life was justly forfeit to
the state. The indictment was to this effect: "Socrates is guilty of
crime in refusing to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state,
and importing strange divinities of his own; he is further guilty of
corrupting the young."
(1) {oi grapsamenoi} = Meletus (below, IV. iv. 4, viii. 4; "Apol." 11,
19), Anytus ("Apol." 29), and Lycon. See Plat. "Apol." II. v. 18;
Diog. Laert. II. v. (Socr.); M. Schanz, "Plat. Apol. mit deutschen
Kemmentar, Einleitung," S. 5 foll.
In the first place, what evidence did they produce that Socrates refused
to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state? Was it that he did not
sacrifice? or that he dispensed with divination? On the contrary, he was
often to be seen engaged in sacrifice, at home or at the common altars
of the state. Nor was his dependence on divination less manifest. Indeed
that saying of his, "A divinity (2) gives me a sign," was on everybody's
lips. So much so that, if I am not mistaken, it lay at the root of
the imputation that he imported novel divinities; though there was no
greater novelty in his case than in that of other believers in oracular
help, who commonly rely on omens of all sorts: the flight or cry
of birds, the utterances of man, chance meetings, (3) or a victim's
entrails. Even according to the popular conception, it is not the mere
fowl, it is not the chance individual one meets, who knows what things
are profitable for a man, but it is the gods who vouchsafe by such
instruments to signify the same. This was also the tenet of Socrates.
Only, whereas men ordinarily speak of being turned aside, or urged
onwards by birds, or other creatures encountered on the path, Socrates
suited his language to his conviction. "The divinity," said he, "gives
me a sign." Further, he would constantly advise his associates to do
this, or beware of doing that, upon the authority of this same divine
voice; and, as a matter of fact, those who listened to his warnings
prospered, whilst he who turned a deaf ear to them repented afterwards.
(4) Yet, it will be readily conceded, he would hardly desire to present
himself to his everyday companions in the character of either knave
or fool. Whereas he would have appeared to be both, supposing (5) the
God-given revelations had but revealed his own proneness to deception.
It is plain he would not have ventured on forecast at all, but for his
belief that the words he spoke would in fact be verified. Then on whom,
or what, was the assurance rooted, if not upon God? And if he had faith
in the gods, how could he fail to recognise them?
(2) Or, "A divine something." See "Encyc. Brit." "Socrates." Dr. H.
Jackason; "The Daemon of Socrates," F. W. H. Myers; K. Joel, "Der
echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates," i. p. 70 foll.; cf.
Aristot. "M. M." 1182 a 10.
(3) See Aesch. "P. V." 487, {enodious te sombolous}, "and pathway
tokens," L. Campbell; Arist. "Birds," 721, {sombolon ornin}:
"Frogs," 196, {to sometukhon exion}; "Eccl." 792; Hor. "Od." iii.
27, 1-7.
(4) See "Anab." III. i. 4; "Symp." iv. 48.
(5) Or, "if his vaunted manifestations from heaven had but manifested
the falsity of his judgment."
But his mode of dealing with his intimates has another aspect. As
regards the ordinary necessities of life, (6) his advice was, "Act as
you believe (7) these things may best be done." But in the case of those
darker problems, the issues of which are incalculable, he directed his
friends to consult the oracle, whether the business should be undertaken
or not. "No one," he would say, "who wishes to manage a house or city
with success: no one aspiring to guide the helm of state aright, can
afford to dipense with aid from above. Doubtless, skill in carpentering,
building, smithying, farming, of the art of governing men, together with
the theory of these processes, and the sciences of arithmetic,
economy, strategy, are affairs of study, and within the grasp of human
intelligence. Yet there is a side even of these, and that not the least
important, which the gods reserve to themselves, the bearing of which is
hidden from mortal vision. Thus, let a man sow a field or plant a farm
never so well, yet he cannot foretell who will gather in the fruits:
another may build him a house of fairest proportion, yet he knows not
who will inhabit it. Neither can a general foresee whether it will
profit him to conduct a campaign, nor a politician be certain whether
his leadership will turn to evil or good. Nor can the man who weds a
fair wife, looking forward to joy, know whether through her he shall not
reap sorrow. Neither can he who has built up a powerful connection in
the state know whether he shall not by means of it be cast out of his
city. To suppose that all these matters lay within the scope of human
judgment, to the exclusion of the preternatural, was preternatural
folly. Nor was it less extravagant to go and consult the will of Heaven
on any questions which it is given to us to decide by dint of learning.
As though a man should inquire, "Am I to choose an expert driver as my
coachman, or one who has never handled the reins?" "Shall I appoint a
mariner to be skipper of my vessel, or a landsman?" And so with respect
to all we may know by numbering, weighing, and measuring. To seek advice
from Heaven on such points was a sort of profanity. "Our duty is plain,"
he would observe; "where we are permitted to work through our natural
faculties, there let us by all means apply them. But in things which are
hidden, let us seek to gain knowledge from above, by divination; for the
gods," he added, "grant signs to those to whom they will be gracious."
(6) Or, "in the sphere of the determined," {ta anagkaia} = certa,
quorum eventus est necessarius; "things positive, the law-ordained
department of life," as we might say. See Grote, "H. G." i. ch.
xvi. 500 and passim.
(7) Reading {os nomizoien}, or if {os enomizen}, translate "As to
things with certain results, he advised them to do them in the way
in which he believed they would be done best"; i.e. he did not
say, "follow your conscience," but, "this course seems best to me
under the circumstances."
Again, Socrates ever lived in the public eye; at early morning he was to
be seen betaking himself to one of the promenades, or wrestling-grounds;
at noon he would appear with the gathering crowds in the market-place;
and as day declined, wherever the largest throng might be encountered,
there was he to be found, talking for the most part, while any one who
chose might stop and listen. Yet no one ever heard him say, or saw him
do anything impious or irreverent. Indeed, in contrast to others he set
his face against all discussion of such high matters as the nature of
the Universe; how the "kosmos," as the savants (8) phrase it, came into
being; (9) or by what forces the celestial phenomena arise. To trouble
one's brain about such matters was, he argued, to play the fool. He
would ask first: Did these investigators feel their knowledge of
things human so complete that they betook themselves to these lofty
speculations? Or did they maintain that they were playing their proper
parts in thus neglecting the affairs of man to speculate on the concerns
of God? He was astonished they did not see how far these problems lay
beyond mortal ken; since even those who pride themselves most on their
discussion of these points differ from each other, as madmen do. For
just as some madmen, he said, have no apprehension of what is truly
terrible, others fear where no fear is; some are ready to say and do
anything in public without the slightest symptom of shame; (10) others
think they ought not so much as to set foot among their fellow-men; some
honour neither temple, nor altar, nor aught else sacred to the name
of God; others bow down to stocks and stones and worship the very
beasts:--so is it with those thinkers whose minds are cumbered with
cares (11) concerning the Universal Nature. One sect (12) has discovered
that Being is one and indivisible. Another (13) that it is infinite in
number. If one (14) proclaims that all things are in a continual flux,
another (15) replies that nothing can possibly be moved at any time.
The theory of the universe as a process of birth and death is met by the
counter theory, that nothing ever could be born or ever will die.
(8) Lit. "the sophists." See H. Sidgwick, "J. of Philol." iv. 1872; v.
1874.
(9) Reading {ephu}. Cf. Lucian, "Icaromenip." xlvi. 4, in imitation of
this passage apparently; or if {ekhei}, translate "is arranged."
See Grote, "H. G." viii. 573.
(10) See "Anab." V. iv. 30.
(11) See Arist. "Clouds," 101, {merimnophrontistai kaloi te kagathoi}.
(12) e.g. Xenophanes and Parmenides, see Grote, "Plato," I. i. 16
foll.
(13) e.g. Leucippus and Democritus, ib. 63 foll.
(14) e.g. Heraclitus, ib. 27 foll.
(15) e.g. Zeno, ib. ii. 96.
But the questioning of Socrates on the merits of these speculators
sometimes took another form. The student of human learning expects, he
said, to make something of his studies for the benefit of himself or
others, as he likes. Do these explorers into the divine operations hope
that when they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena
occur, they will create winds and waters at will and fruitful seasons?
Will they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? or has no
such notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content
simply to know how such things come into existence? But if this was
his mode of describing those who meddle with such matters as these, he
himself never wearied of discussing human topics. What is piety? what is
impiety? What is the beautiful? what the ugly? What the noble? what the
base? What are meant by just and unjust? what by sobriety and madness?
what by courage and cowardice? What is a state? what is a statesman?
what is a ruler over men? what is a ruling character? and other like
problems, the knowledge of which, as he put it, conferred a patent of
nobility on the possessor, (16) whereas those who lacked the knowledge
might deservedly be stigmatised as slaves.
(16) Or, "was distinctive of the 'beautiful and good.'" For the phrase
see below, ii. 2 et passim.
Now, in so far as the opinions of Socrates were unknown to the world at
large, it is not surprising that the court should draw false conclusions
respecting them; but that facts patent to all should have been ignored
is indeed astonishing.
At one time Socrates was a member of the Council, (17) he had taken
the senatorial oath, and sworn "as a member of that house to act in
conformity with the laws." It was thus he chanced to be President of the
Popular Assembly, (18) when that body was seized with a desire to put
the nine (19) generals, Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and the rest, to death
by a single inclusive vote. Whereupon, in spite of the bitter resentment
of the people, and the menaces of several influential citizens,
he refused to put the question, esteeming it of greater importance
faithfully to abide by the oath which he had taken, than to gratify the
people wrongfully, or to screen himself from the menaces of the mighty.
The fact being, that with regard to the care bestowed by the gods upon
men, his belief differed widely from that of the multitude. Whereas most
people seem to imagine that the gods know in part, and are ignorant in
part, Socrates believed firmly that the gods know all things--both the
things that are said and the things that are done, and the things that
are counselled in the silent chambers of the heart. Moreover, they are
present everywhere, and bestow signs upon man concerning all the things
of man.
(17) Or "Senate." Lit. "the Boule."
(18) Lit. "Epistates of the Ecclesia." See Grote, "H. G." viii. 271;
Plat. "Apol." 32 B.
(19) {ennea} would seem to be a slip of the pen for {okto}, eight. See
"Hell." I. v. 16; vi. 16; vi. 29; vii. 1 foll.
I can, therefore, but repeat my former words. It is a marvel to me
how the Athenians came to be persuaded that Socrates fell short of
sober-mindedness as touching the gods. A man who never ventured one
impious word or deed against the gods we worship, but whose whole
language concerning them, and his every act, closely coincided, word
for word, and deed for deed, with all we deem distinctive of devoutest
piety.
II
No less surprising to my mind is the belief that Socrates corrupted
the young. This man, who, beyond what has been already stated, kept
his appetites and passions under strict control, who was pre-eminently
capable of enduring winter's cold and summer's heat and every kind of
toil, who was so schooled to curtail his needs that with the scantiest
of means he never lacked sufficiency--is it credible that such a
man could have made others irreverent or lawless, or licentious, or
effeminate in face of toil? Was he not rather the saving of many through
the passion for virtue which he roused in them, and the hope he infused
that through careful management of themselves they might grow to be
truly beautiful and good--not indeed that he ever undertook to be a
teacher of virtue, but being evidently virtuous himself he made those
who associated with him hope that by imitating they might at last
resemble him.
But let it not be inferred that he was negligent of his own body
or approved of those who neglected theirs. If excess of eating,
counteracted by excess of toil, was a dietary of which he disapproved,
(1) to gratify the natural claim of appetite in conjunction with
moderate exercise was a system he favoured, as tending to a healthy
condition of the body without trammelling the cultivation of the spirit.
On the other hand, there was nothing dandified or pretentious about
him; he indulged in no foppery of shawl or shoes, or other effeminacy of
living.
(1) See (Plat.) "Erast." 132 C.
Least of all did he tend to make his companions greedy of money. He
would not, while restraining passion generally, make capital out of the
one passion which attached others to himself; and by this abstinence,
he believed, he was best consulting his own freedom; in so much that he
stigmatised those who condescended to take wages for their society as
vendors of their own persons, because they were compelled to discuss for
the benefits of their paymasters. What surprised him was that any one
possessing virtue should deign to ask money as its price instead of
simply finding his reward in the acquisition of an honest friend, as if
the new-fledged soul of honour could forget her debt of gratitude to her
greatest benefactor.
For himself, without making any such profession, he was content to
believe that those who accepted his views would play their parts as good
and true friends to himself and one another their lives long. Once more
then: how should a man of this character corrupt the young? unless the
careful cultivation of virtue be corruption.
But, says the accuser, (2) by all that's sacred! did not Socrates cause
his associates to despise the established laws when he dwelt on the
folly of appointing state officers by ballot? (3) a principle which, he
said, no one would care to apply in selecting a pilot or a flute-player
or in any similar case, where a mistake would be far less disastrous
than in matters political. Words like these, according to the accuser,
tended to incite the young to contemn the established constitution,
rendering them violent and headstrong. But for myself I think that
those who cultivate wisdom and believe themselves able to instruct
their fellow-citizens as to their interests are least likely to become
partisans of violence. They are too well aware that to violence attach
enmities and dangers, whereas results as good may be obtained by
persuasion safely and amicably. For the victim of violence hates with
vindictiveness as one from whom something precious has been stolen,
while the willing subject of persuasion is ready to kiss the hand which
has done him a service. Hence compulsion is not the method of him
who makes wisdom his study, but of him who wields power untempered
by reflection. Once more: the man who ventures on violence needs the
support of many to fight his battles, while he whose strength lies in
persuasiveness triumphs single-handed, for he is conscious of a cunning
to compel consent unaided. And what has such a one to do with the
spilling of blood? since how ridiculous it were to do men to death
rather than turn to account the trusty service of the living.
(2) {o kategoros} = Polycrates possibly. See M. Schantz, op. cit.,
"Einleitun," S. 6: "Die Anklagerede des Polykrates"; Introduction,
p. xxxii. foll.
(3) i.e. staking the election of a magistrate on the colour of a bean.
See Aristot. "Ath. Pol." viii. 2, and Dr. Sandys ad loc.
But, the accuser answers, the two men (4) who wrought the greatest evils
to the state at any time--to wit, Critias and Alcibiades--were both
companions of Socrates--Critias the oligarch, and Alcibiades the
democrat. Where would you find a more arrant thief, savage, and murderer
(5) than the one? where such a portent of insolence, incontinence,
and high-handedness as the other? For my part, in so far as these two
wrought evil to the state, I have no desire to appear as the apologist
of either. I confine myself to explaining what this intimacy of theirs
with Socrates really was.
(4) See "Hell." I. and II. passim.
(5) Reading {kleptistatos te kai biaiotatos kai phonikotatos}, or if
{pleonektistatos te kai biaiotatis}, translate "such a manner of
greed and violence as the one, of insolence, etc., as the other?"
See Grote, "H. G." viii. 337.
Never were two more ambitious citizens seen at Athens. Ambition was in
their blood. If they were to have their will, all power was to be in
their hands; their fame was to eclipse all other. Of Socrates they
knew--first that he lived an absolutely independent life on the
scantiest means; next that he was self-disciplined to the last degree
in respect of pleasures; lastly that he was so formidable in debate that
there was no antagonist he could not twist round his little finger. Such
being their views, and such the character of the pair, which is the more
probable: that they sought the society of Socrates because they felt the
fascination of his life, and were attracted by the bearing of the man?
or because they thought, if only we are leagued with him we shall become
adepts in statecraft and unrivalled in the arts of speech and action?
For my part I believe that if the choice from Heaven had been given them
to live such a life as they saw Socrates living to its close, or to die,
they would both have chosen death.
Their acts are a conclusive witness to their characters. They no sooner
felt themselves to be the masters of those they came in contact with
than they sprang aside from Socrates and plunged into that whirl of
politics but for which they might never have sought his society.
It may be objected: before giving his companions lessons in politics
Socrates had better have taught them sobriety. (6) Without disputing the
principle, I would point out that a teacher cannot fail to discover to
his pupils his method of carrying out his own precepts, and this along
with argumentative encouragement. Now I know that Socrates disclosed
himself to his companions as a beautiful and noble being, who would
reason and debate with them concerning virtue and other human interests
in the noblest manner. And of these two I know that as long as they were
companions of Socrates even they were temperate, not assuredly from fear
of being fined or beaten by Socrates, but because they were persuaded
for the nonce of the excellence of such conduct.
(6) {sophrosune} = "sound-mindedness," "temperence." See below, IV.
iii. 1.
Perhaps some self-styled philosophers (7) may here answer: "Nay, the man
truly just can never become unjust, the temperate man can never become
intemperate, the man who has learnt any subject of knowledge can
never be as though he had learnt it not." That, however, is not my own
conclusion. It is with the workings of the soul as with those of the
body; want of exercise of the organ leads to inability of function, here
bodily, there spiritual, so that we can neither do the things that
we should nor abstain from the things we should not. And that is why
fathers keep their sons, however temperate they may be, out of the reach
of wicked men, considering that if the society of the good is a training
in virtue so also is the society of the bad its dissolution.
(7) In reference to some such tenet as that of Antisthenes ap. Diog.
Laert. VI. ix. 30, {areskei d' autois kai ten areten didakten
einai, katha phesin 'Antisthenes en to 'Rraklei kai anapobleton
uparkhein}. Cf. Plat. "Protag." 340 D, 344 D.
To this the poet (8) is a witness, who says:
"From the noble thou shalt be instructed in nobleness; but, and if
thou minglest with the base thou wilt destroy what wisdom thou
hast now";
And he (9) who says:
"But the good man has his hour of baseness as well as his hour of
virtue"--
to whose testimony I would add my own. For I see that it is impossible
to remember a long poem without practice and repetition; so is
forgetfulness of the words of instruction engendered in the heart
that has ceased to value them. With the words of warning fades the
recollection of the very condition of mind in which the soul yearned
after holiness; and once forgetting this, what wonder that the man
should let slip also the memory of virtue itself! Again I see that a man
who falls into habits of drunkenness or plunges headlong into licentious
love, loses his old power of practising the right and abstaining from
the wrong. Many a man who has found frugality easy whilst passion was
cold, no sooner falls in love than he loses the faculty at once, and in
his prodigal expenditure of riches he will no longer withhold his hand
from gains which in former days were too base to invite his touch. Where
then is the difficulty of supposing that a man may be temperate to-day,
and to-morrow the reverse; or that he who once has had it in his power
to act virtuously may not quite lose that power? (10) To myself, at all
events, it seems that all beautiful and noble things are the result
of constant practice and training; and pre-eminently the virtue of
temperance, seeing that in one and the same bodily frame pleasures are
planted and spring up side by side with the soul and keep whispering in
her ear, "Have done with self-restraint, make haste to gratify us and
the body." (11)
(8) Theognis, 35, 36. See "Symp." ii. 4; Plat. "Men." 95 D.
(9) The author is unknown. See Plat. "Protag." l.c.
(10) Cf. "Cyrop." V. i. 9 foll.; VI. i. 41.
(11) See my remarks, "Hellenica Essays," p. 371 foll.
But to return to Critias and Alcibiades, I repeat that as long as they
lived with Socrates they were able by his support to dominate their
ignoble appetites; (12) but being separated from him, Critias had to
fly to Thessaly, (13) where he consorted with fellows better versed in
lawlessness than justice. And Alcibiades fared no better. His personal
beauty on the one hand incited bevies of fine ladies (14) to hunt him
down as fair spoil, while on the other hand his influence in the state
and among the allies exposed him to the corruption of many an adept in
the arts of flattery; honoured by the democracy and stepping easily
to the front rank he behaved like an athlete who in the games of the
Palaestra is so assured of victory that he neglects his training; thus
he presently forgot the duty which he owed himself.
(12) Cf. (Plat.) "Theag." 130 A.
(13) See "Hell." II. iii. 36.
(14) Cf. Plut. "Ages.," "Alcib."
Such were the misadventures of these two. Is the sequel extraordinary?
Inflated with the pride of ancestry, (15) exalted by their wealth,
puffed up by power, sapped to the soul's core by a host of human
tempters, separate moreover for many a long day from Socrates--what
wonder that they reached the full stature of arrogancy! And for the
offences of these two Socrates is to be held responsible! The accuser
will have it so. But for the fact that in early days, when they
were both young and of an age when dereliction from good feeling and
self-restraint might have been expected, this same Socrates kept them
modest and well-behaved, not one word of praise is uttered by the
accuser for all this. That is not the measure of justice elsewhere
meted. Would a master of the harp or flute, would a teacher of any sort
who has turned out proficient pupils, be held to account because one of
them goes away to another teacher and turns out to be a failure? Or what
father, if he have a son who in the society of a certain friend remains
an honest lad, but falling into the company of some other becomes
a good-for-nothing, will that father straightway accuse the earlier
instructor? Will not he rather, in proportion as the boy deteriorates in
the company of the latter, bestow more heartfelt praise upon the former?
What father, himself sharing the society of his own children, is held to
blame for their transgressions, if only his own goodness be established?
Here would have been a fair test to apply to Socrates: Was he guilty of
any base conduct himself? If so let him be set down as a knave, but if,
on the contrary, he never faltered in sobriety from beginning to end,
how in the name of justice is he to be held to account for a baseness
which was not in him?
(15) Or, "became overweening in arrogance." Cf. "Henry VIII. II. iv.
110": "But your heart is crammed with arrogancy, spleen, and
pride."
I go further: if, short of being guilty of any wrong himself, he saw
the evil doings of others with approval, reason were he should be held
blameworthy. Listen then: Socrates was well aware that Critias was
attached to Euthydemus, (16) aware too that he was endeavouring to deal
by him after the manner of those wantons whose love is carnal of the
body. From this endeavour he tried to deter him, pointing out how
illiberal a thing it was, how ill befitting a man of honour to appear
as a beggar before him whom he loved, in whose eyes he would fain be
precious, ever petitioning for something base to give and base to get.
(16) See below, IV. ii. 1 (if the same person).
But when this reasoning fell on deaf ears and Critias refused to be
turned aside, Socrates, as the story goes, took occasion of the presence
of a whole company and of Euthydemus to remark that Critias appeared to
be suffering from a swinish affection, or else why this desire to rub
himself against Euthydemus like a herd of piglings scraping against
stones.
The hatred of Critias to Socrates doubtless dates from this incident.
He treasured it up against him, and afterwards, when he was one of the
Thirty and associated with Charicles as their official lawgiver, (17)
he framed the law against teaching the art of words (18) merely from a
desire to vilify Socrates. He was at a loss to know how else to lay hold
of him except by levelling against him the vulgar charge (19) against
philosophers, by which he hoped to prejudice him with the public. It
was a charge quite unfounded as regards Socrates, if I may judge from
anything I ever heard fall from his lips myself or have learnt about him
from others. But the animus of Critias was clear. At the time when the
Thirty were putting citizens, highly respectable citizens, to death
wholesale, and when they were egging on one man after another to the
commission of crime, Socrates let fall an observation: "It would be
sufficiently extraordinary if the keeper of a herd of cattle (20) who
was continually thinning and impoverishing his cattle did not admit
himself to be a sorry sort of herdsman, but that a ruler of the state
who was continually thinning and impoverishing the citizens should
neither be ashamed nor admit himself to be a sorry sort of ruler was
more extraordinary still." The remark being reported to the government,
Socrates was summoned by Critias and Charicles, who proceeded to point
out the law and forbade him to converse with the young. "Was it open to
him," Socrates inquired of the speaker, "in case he failed to understand
their commands in any point, to ask for an explanation?"
(17) Lit. "Nomothetes." See "Hell." II. iii. 2; Dem. 706. For
Charicles see Lys. "c. Eratosth." S. 56; Aristot. "Pol." v. 6. 6.
(18) See Diog. Laert. II. v. ("Socr.")
(19) i.e. {to ton etto logon kreitto poiein}, "of making the worse
appear the better cause." Cf. Arist. "Clouds."
(20) See Dio Chrys. "Or." 43.
"Certainly," the two assented.
Then Socrates: I am prepared to obey the laws, but to avoid
transgression of the law through ignorance I need instruction: is it on
the supposition that the art of words tends to correctness of statement
or to incorrectness that you bid us abstain from it? for if the former,
it is clear we must abstain from speaking correctly, but if the latter,
our endeavour should be to amend our speech.
To which Charicles, in a fit of temper, retorted: In consideration of
your ignorance, (21) Socrates, we will frame the prohibition in
language better suited to your intelligence: we forbid you to hold any
conversation whatsoever with the young.
(21) See Aristot. "de Soph. El." 183 b7.
Then Socrates: To avoid all ambiguity then, or the possibility of my
doing anything else than what you are pleased to command, may I ask you
to define up to what age a human being is to be considered young?
For just so long a time (Charicles answered) as he is debarred from
sitting as a member of the Council, (22) as not having attained to the
maturity of wisdom; accordingly you will not hold converse with any one
under the age of thirty.
(22) The Boule or Senate. See W. L. Newman, "Pol. Aristot." i. 326.
Soc. In making a purchase even, I am not to ask, what is the price of
this? if the vendor is under the age of thirty?
Cha. Tut, things of that sort: but you know, Socrates, that you have
a way of asking questions, when all the while you know how the matter
stands. Let us have no questions of that sort.
Soc. Nor answers either, I suppose, if the inquiry concerns what I know,
as, for instance, where does Charicles live? or where is Critias to be
found?
Oh yes, of course, things of that kind (replied Charicles), while
Critias added: But at the same time you had better have done with your
shoemakers, carpenters, and coppersmiths. (23) These must be pretty well
trodden out at heel by this time, considering the circulation you have
given them.
(23) Cf. Plat. "Gorg." 491 A; "Symp." 221 E; Dio Chrys. "Or." 55, 560
D, 564 A.
Soc. And am I to hold away from their attendant topics also--the just,
the holy, and the like?
Most assuredly (answered Charicles), and from cowherds in particular; or
else see that you do not lessen the number of the herd yourself.
Thus the secret was out. The remark of Socrates about the cattle had
come to their ears, and they could not forgive the author of it.
Perhaps enough has been said to explain the kind of intimacy which
had subsisted between Critias and Socrates, and their relation to one
another. But I will venture to maintain that where the teacher is not
pleasing to the pupil there is no education. Now it cannot be said of
Critias and Alcibiades that they associated with Socrates because they
found him pleasing to them. And this is true of the whole period. From
the first their eyes were fixed on the headship of the state as their
final goal. During the time of their intimacy with Socrates there were
no disputants whom they were more eager to encounter than professed
politicians.
Thus the story is told of Alcibiades--how before the age of twenty he
engaged his own guardian, Pericles, at that time prime minister of the
state, in a discussion concerning laws.
Alc. Please, Pericles, can you teach me what a law is?
Per. To be sure I can.
Alc. I should be so much obliged if you would do so. One so often hears
the epithet "law-abiding" applied in a complimentary sense; yet, it
strikes me, one hardly deserves the compliment, if one does not know
what a law is.
Per. Fortunately there is a ready answer to your difficulty. You wish to
know what a law is? Well, those are laws which the majority, being met
together in conclave, approve and enact as to what it is right to do,
and what it is right to abstain from doing.
Alc. Enact on the hypothesis that it is right to do what is good? or to
do what is bad?
Per. What is good, to be sure, young sir, not what is bad.
Alc. Supposing it is not the majority, but, as in the case of an
oligarchy, the minority, who meet and enact the rules of conduct, what
are these?
Per. Whatever the ruling power of the state after deliberation enacts as
our duty to do, goes by the name of laws.
Alc. Then if a tyrant, holding the chief power in the state, enacts
rules of conduct for the citizens, are these enactments law?
Per. Yes, anything which a tyrant as head of the state enacts, also goes
by the name of law.
Alc. But, Pericles, violence and lawlessness--how do we define them?
Is it not when a stronger man forces a weaker to do what seems right to
him--not by persuasion but by compulsion?
Per. I should say so.
Alc. It would seem to follow that if a tyrant, without persuading
the citizens, drives them by enactment to do certain things--that is
lawlessness?
Per. You are right; and I retract the statement that measures passed by
a tyrant without persuasion of the citizens are law.
Alc. And what of measures passed by a minority, not by persuasion of the
majority, but in the exercise of its power only? Are we, or are we not,
to apply the term violence to these?
Per. I think that anything which any one forces another to do without
persuasion, whether by enactment or not, is violence rather than law.
Alc. It would seem that everything which the majority, in the exercise
of its power over the possessors of wealth, and without persuading them,
chooses to enact, is of the nature of violence rather than of law?
To be sure (answered Pericles), adding: At your age we were clever hands
at such quibbles ourselves. It was just such subtleties which we used to
practise our wits upon; as you do now, if I mistake not.
To which Alcibiades replied: Ah, Pericles, I do wish we could have met
in those days when you were at your cleverest in such matters.
Well, then, as soon as the desired superiority over the politicians of
the day seemed to be attained, Critias and Alcibiades turned their backs
on Socrates. They found his society unattractive, not to speak of the
annoyance of being cross-questioned on their own shortcomings. Forthwith
they devoted themselves to those affairs of state but for which they
would never have come near him at all.
No; if one would seek to see true companions of Socrates, one must
look to Crito, (24) and Chaerephon, and Chaerecrates, to Hermogenes,
to Simmias and Cebes, to Phaedondes and others, who clung to him not to
excel in the rhetoric of the Assembly or the law-courts, but with the
nobler ambition of attaining to such beauty and goodliness of soul as
would enable them to discharge the various duties of life to house and
family, to relatives and friends, to fellow-citizens, and to the state
at large. Of these true followers not one in youth or old age was ever
guilty, or thought guilty, of committing any evil deed.
(24) For these true followers, familiar to us in the pages of Plato,
("Crito," "Apol.," "Phaedo," etc) see Cobet, "Pros. Xen."
"But for all that," the accuser insists, "Socrates taught sons to pour
contumely upon their fathers (25) by persuading his young friends that
he could make them wiser than their sires, or by pointing out that
the law allowed a son to sue his father for aberration of mind, and to
imprison him, which legal ordinance he put in evidence to prove that it
might be well for the wiser to imprison the more ignorant."
(25) See "Apol." 20; Arist. "Clouds," 1407, where Pheidippides "drags
his father Strepsiades through the mire."
Now what Socrates held was, that if a man may with justice incarcerate
another for no better cause than a form of folly or ignorance, this same
person could not justly complain if he in his turn were kept in bonds by
his superiors in knowledge; and to come to the bottom of such questions,
to discover the difference between madness and ignorance was a problem
which he was perpetually working at. His opinion came to this: If a
madman may, as a matter of expediency to himself and his friends, be
kept in prison, surely, as a matter of justice, the man who knows not
what he ought to know should be content to sit at the feet of those who
know, and be taught.
But it was the rest of their kith and kin, not fathers only (according
to the accuser), whom Socrates dishonoured in the eyes of his circle
of followers, when he said that "the sick man or the litigant does not
derive assistance from his relatives, (26) but from his doctor in the
one case, and his legal adviser in the other." "Listen further to his
language about friends," says the accuser: "'What is the good of their
being kindly disposed, unless they can be of some practical use to you?
Mere goodness of disposition is nothing; those only are worthy of
honour who combine with the knowledge of what is right the faculty of
expounding it;' (27) and so by bringing the young to look upon himself
as a superlatively wise person gifted with an extraordinary capacity for
making others wise also, he so worked on the dispositions of those who
consorted with him that in their esteem the rest of the world counted
for nothing by comparison with Socrates."
(26) See Grote, "H. G." v. 535.
(27) Cf. Thuc. ii. 60. Pericles says, "Yet I with whom you are so
angry venture to say of myself, that I am as capable as any one of
devising and explaining a sound policy."--Jowett.
Now I admit the language about fathers and the rest of a man's
relations. I can go further, and add some other sayings of his, that
"when the soul (which is alone the indwelling centre of intelligence)
is gone out of a man, be he our nearest and dearest friend, we carry the
body forth and bury it out of sight." "Even in life," he used to say,
"each of us is ready to part with any portion of his best possession--to
wit, his own body--if it be useless and unprofitable. He will remove it
himself, or suffer another to do so in his stead. Thus men cut off their
own nails, hair, or corns; they allow surgeons to cut and cauterise
them, not without pains and aches, and are so grateful to the doctor for
his services that they further give him a fee. Or again, a man ejects
the spittle from his mouth as far as possible. (28) Why? Because it is
of no use while it stays within the system, but is detrimental rather."
(28) See Aristot. "Eth. Eud." vii. 1.
Now by these instances his object was not to inculcate the duty of
burying one's father alive or of cutting oneself to bits, but to show
that lack of intelligence means lack of worth; (29) and so he called
upon his hearers to be as sensible and useful as they could be, so that,
be it father or brother or any one else whose esteem he would deserve,
a man should not hug himself in careless self-interest, trusting to mere
relationship, but strive to be useful to those whose esteem he coveted.
(29) i.e. "witless and worthless are synonymous."
But (pursues the accuser) by carefully culling the most immoral
passages of the famous poets, and using them as evidences, he taught his
associates to be evildoers and tyrranical: the line of Hesiod (30) for
instance--
No work is a disgrace; slackness of work is the disgrace--
"interpreted," says the accuser, "by Socrates as if the poet enjoined us
to abstain from no work wicked or ignoble; do everything for the sake of
gain."
(30) "Works and Days," 309 {'Ergon d' ouden oneidos}. Cf. Plat.
"Charm." 163 C.
Now while Socrates would have entirely admitted the propositions that
"it is a blessing and a benefit to a man to be a worker," and that "a
lazy do-nothing is a pestilent evil," that "work is good and idleness
a curse," the question arises, whom did he mean by workers? In his
vocabulary only those were good workmen (31) who were engaged on good
work; dicers and gamblers and others engaged on any other base and
ruinous business he stigmatised as the "idle drones"; and from this
point of view the quotation from Hesiod is unimpeachable--
No work is a disgrace; only idlesse is disgrace.
But there was a passage from Homer (32) for ever on his lips, as the
accuser tells us--the passage which says concerning Odysseus,
What prince, or man of name,
He found flight-giv'n, he would restrain with words of gentlest blame:
"Good sir, it fits you not to fly, or fare as one afraid,
You should not only stay yourself, but see the people stayed."
Thus he the best sort us'd; the worst, whose spirits brake out in
noise, (33) He cudgell'd with his sceptre, chid, and said, "Stay,
wretch, be still, And hear thy betters; thou art base, and both in
power and skill Poor and unworthy, without name in counsel or in
war." We must not all be kings.
(31) See below, III. ix. 9.
(32) "Il." ii. 188 foll., 199 foll. (so Chapman).
(33) Lit. "But whatever man of the people he saw and found him
shouting."--W. Leaf.
The accuser informs us that Socrates interpreted these lines as though
the poet approved the giving of blows to commoners and poor folk. Now
no such remark was ever made by Socrates; which indeed would have been
tantamount to maintaining that he ought to be beaten himself. What he
did say was, that those who were useful neither in word nor deed, who
were incapable of rendering assistance in time of need to the army or
the state or the people itself, be they never so wealthy, ought to be
restrained, and especially if to incapacity they added effrontery.
As to Socrates, he was the very opposite of all this--he was plainly
a lover of the people, and indeed of all mankind. Though he had many
ardent admirers among citizens and strangers alike, he never demanded
any fee for his society from any one, (34) but bestowed abundantly upon
all alike of the riches of his soul--good things, indeed, of which
fragments accepted gratis at his hands were taken and sold at high
prices to the rest of the community by some, (35) who were not, as he
was, lovers of the people, since with those who had not money to give in
return they refused to discourse. But of Socrates be it said that in
the eyes of the whole world he reflected more honour on the state and a
richer lustre than ever Lichas, (36) whose fame is proverbial, shed
on Lacedaemon. Lichas feasted and entertained the foreign residents in
Lacedaemon at the Gymnopaediae most handsomely. Socrates gave a lifetime
to the outpouring of his substance in the shape of the greatest benefits
bestowed on all who cared to receive them. In other words, he made
those who lived in his society better men, and sent them on their way
rejoicing.
(34) See "Symp." iv. 43; Plat. "Hipp. maj." 300 D; "Apol." 19 E.
(35) See Diog. Laert. II. viii. 1.
(36) See "Hell." III. ii. 21; Thuc. v. 50; Plut. "Cim." 284 C. For the
Gymnopaediae, see Paus. III. xi. 9; Athen. xiv. p. 631.
To no other conclusion, therefore, can I come but that, being so good a
man, Socrates was worthier to have received honour from the state than
death. And this I take to be the strictly legal view of the case, for
what does the law require? (37) "If a man be proved to be a thief, a
filcher of clothes, a cut-purse, a housebreaker, a man-stealer, a robber
of temples, the penalty is death." Even so; and of all men Socrates
stood most aloof from such crimes.
(37) See "Symp." iv. 36; Plat. "Rep." 575 B; "Gorg." 508 E.
To the state he was never the cause of any evil--neither disaster in
war, nor faction, nor treason, nor any other mischief whatsoever. And if
his public life was free from all offence, so was his private. He never
hurt a single soul either by deprivation of good or infliction of evil,
nor did he ever lie under the imputation of any of those misdoings.
where then is his liability to the indictment to be found? Who, so
far from disbelieving in the gods, as set forth in the indictment, was
conspicuous beyond all men for service to heaven; so far from corrupting
the young--a charge alleged with insistence by the prosecutor--was
notorious for the zeal with which he strove not only to stay his
associates from evil desires, but to foster in them a passionate desire
for that loveliest and queenliest of virtues without which states and
families crumble to decay. (38) Such being his conduct, was he not
worthy of high honour from the state of Athens?
(38) Or, "the noblest and proudest virtue by means of which states and
families are prosperously directed."
III
It may serve to illustrate the assertion that he benefited his
associates partly by the display of his own virtue and partly by verbal
discourse and argument, if I set down my various recollections (1)
on these heads. And first with regard to religion and the concerns of
heaven. In conduct and language his behaviour conformed to the rule laid
down by the Pythia (2) in reply to the question, "How shall we act?" as
touching a sacrifice or the worship of ancestors, or any similar point.
Her answer is: "Act according to the law and custom of your state, and
you will act piously." After this pattern Socrates behaved himself, and
so he exhorted others to behave, holding them to be but busybodies and
vain fellows who acted on any different principle.
(1) Hence the title of the work, {'Apomenmoneumata}, "Recollections,
Memoirs, Memorabilia." See Diog. Laert. "Xen." II. vi. 48.
(2) The Pythia at Delphi.
His formula or prayer was simple: "Give me that which is best for me,"
for, said he, the gods know best what good things are--to pray for gold
or silver or despotic power were no better than to make some particular
throw at dice or stake in battle or any such thing the subject of
prayer, of which the future consequences are manifestly uncertain. (3)
(3) See (Plat.) "Alcib. II." 142 foll.; Valerius Max. vii. 2;
"Spectator," No. 207.
If with scant means he offered but small sacrifices he believed that he
was in no wise inferior to those who make frequent and large sacrifices
from an ampler store. It were ill surely for the very gods themselves,
could they take delight in large sacrifices rather than in small, else
oftentimes must the offerings of bad men be found acceptable rather
than of good; nor from the point of view of men themselves would life
be worth living if the offerings of a villain rather than of a righteous
man found favour in the sight of Heaven. His belief was that the joy of
the gods is greater in proportion to the holiness of the giver, and he
was ever an admirer of that line of Hesiod which says,
According to thine ability do sacrifice to the immortal gods. (4)
(4) Hesiod, "Works and Days," 336. See "Anab." III. ii. 9.
"Yes," he would say, "in our dealings with friends and strangers alike,
and in reference to the demands of life in general, there is no better
motto for a man than that: 'let a man do according to his ability.'"
Or to take another point. If it appeared to him that a sign from
heaven had been given him, nothing would have induced him to go against
heavenly warning: he would as soon have been persuaded to accept the
guidance of a blind man ignorant of the path to lead him on a journey
in place of one who knew the road and could see; and so he denounced the
folly of others who do things contrary to the warnings of God in order
to avoid some disrepute among men. For himself he despised all human
aids by comparison with counsel from above.
The habit and style of living to which he subjected his soul and body
was one which under ordinary circumstances (5) would enable any one
adopting it to look existence cheerily in the face and to pass his days
serenely: it would certainly entail no difficulties as regards expense.
So frugal was it that a man must work little indeed who could not earn
the quantum which contented Socrates. Of food he took just enough
to make eating a pleasure--the appetite he brought to it was sauce
sufficient; while as to drinks, seeing that he only drank when thirsty,
any draught refreshed. (6) If he accepted an invitation to dinner, he
had no difficulty in avoiding the common snare of over-indulgence, and
his advice to people who could not equally control their appetite was to
avoid taking what would allure them to eat if not hungry or to drink if
not thirsty. (7) Such things are ruinous to the constitution, he said,
bad for stomachs, brains, and soul alike; or as he used to put it, with
a touch of sarcasm, (8) "It must have been by feasting men on so many
dainty dishes that Circe produced her pigs; only Odysseus through his
continency and the 'promptings (9) of Hermes' abstained from touching
them immoderately, and by the same token did not turn into a swine." So
much for this topic, which he touched thus lightly and yet seriously.
(5) {ei me ti daimonion eie}, "save under some divinely-ordained
calamity." Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 18; "Symp." viii. 43.
(6) See "Ages." ix; Cic. "Tusc." v. 34, 97; "de Fin." ii. 28, 90.
(7) Cf. Plut. "Mor." 128 D; Clement, "Paedag." 2. 173, 33; "Strom." 2,
492, 24; Aelian, "N. A." 8, 9.
(8) "Half in gibe and half in jest," in ref. to "Od." x. 233 foll.:
"So she let them in..."
(9) {upothemosune}, "inspiration." Cf. "Il." xv. 412; "Od." xvi. 233.
But as to the concerns of Aphrodite, his advice was to hold strongly
aloof from the fascination of fair forms: once lay finger on these
and it is not easy to keep a sound head and a sober mind. To take a
particular case. It was a mere kiss which, as he had heard, Critobulus
(10) had some time given to a fair youth, the son of Alcibiades. (11)
Accordingly Critobulus being present, Socrates propounded the question.
(10) For Critobulus (the son of Crito) see "Econ." i. 1 foll.; "Symp."
i. 3 foll.
(11) See Isocr. "Or." xvi. Cobet conj. {ton tou 'Axiokhou uion}, i.e.
Clinias.
Soc. Tell me, Xenophon, have you not always believed Critobulus to be a
man of sound sense, not wild and self-willed? Should you not have said
that he was remarkable for his prudence rather than thoughtless or
foolhardy?
Xen. Certainly that is what I should have said of him.
Soc. Then you are now to regard him as quite the reverse--a hot-blooded,
reckless libertine: this is the sort of man to throw somersaults into
knives, (12) or to leap into the jaws of fire.
(12) Cf. "Symp." ii. 10, iv. 16. See Schneider ad loc.
Xen. And what have you seen him doing, that you give him so bad a
character?
Soc. Doing? Why, has not the fellow dared to steal a kiss from the son
of Alcibiades, most fair of youths and in the golden prime?
Xen. Nay, then, if that is the foolhardy adventure, it is a danger which
I could well encounter myself.
Soc. Poor soul! and what do you expect your fate to be after that
kiss? Let me tell you. On the instant you will lose your freedom, the
indenture of your bondage will be signed; it will be yours on compulsion
to spend large sums on hurtful pleasures; you will have scarcely a
moment's leisure left for any noble study; you will be driven to concern
yourself most zealously with things which no man, not even a madman,
would choose to make an object of concern.
Xen. O Heracles! how fell a power to reside in a kiss!
Soc. Does it surprise you? Do you not know that the tarantula, which is
no bigger than a threepenny bit, (13) has only to touch the mouth and it
will afflict its victim with pains and drive him out of his senses.
(13) Lit. "a half-obol piece." For the {phalaggion} see Aristot. "H.
A." ix. 39, 1.
Xen. Yes, but then the creature injects something with its bite.
Soc. Ah, fool! and do you imagine that these lovely creatures infuse
nothing with their kiss, simply because you do not see the poison? Do
you not know that this wild beast which men call beauty in its bloom is
all the more terrible than the tarantula in that the insect must first
touch its victim, but this at a mere glance of the beholder, without even
contact, will inject something into him--yards away--which will make
him man. And may be that is why the Loves are called "archers," because
these beauties wound so far off. (14) But my advice to you, Xenophon,
is, whenever you catch sight of one of these fair forms, to run
helter-skelter for bare life without a glance behind; and to you,
Critobulus, I would say, "Go abroad for a year: so long time will it
take to heal you of this wound."
(14) L. Dindorf, etc. regard the sentence as a gloss. Cf. "Symp." iv.
26 ({isos de kai... entimoteron estin}).
Such (he said), in the affairs of Aphrodite, as in meats and drinks,
should be the circumspection of all whose footing is insecure. At least
they should confine themselves to such diet as the soul would dispense
with, save for some necessity of the body; and which even so ought
to set up no disturbance. (15) But for himself, it was clear, he was
prepared at all points and invulnerable. He found less difficulty in
abstaining from beauty's fairest and fullest bloom than many others from
weeds and garbage. To sum up: (16) with regard to eating and drinking
and these other temptations of the sense, the equipment of his soul made
him independent; he could boast honestly that in his moderate fashion
(17) his pleasures were no less than theirs who take such trouble to
procure them, and his pains far fewer.
(15) Cf. "Symp." iv. 38.
(16) L. Dindorf (brackets) this passage as spurious.
(17) On the principle "enough is as good as a feast," {arkountos}.
IV
A belief is current, in accordance with views maintained concerning
Socrates in speech and writing, and in either case conjecturally, that,
however powerful he may have been in stimulating men to virtue as a
theorist, he was incapable of acting as their guide himself. (1) It
would be well for those who adopt this view to weigh carefully not only
what Socrates effected "by way of castigation" in cross-questioning
whose who conceived themselves to be possessed of all knowledge, but
also his everyday conversation with those who spent their time in close
intercourse with himself. Having done this, let them decide whether he
was incapable of making his companions better.
(1) Al. "If any one believes that Socrates, as represented in certain
dialogues (e.g. of Plato, Antisthenes, etc.) of an imaginary
character, was an adept ({protrepsasthai}) in the art of
stimulating people to virtue negatively but scarcely the man to
guide ({proagein}) his hearers on the true path himself." Cf.
(Plat.) "Clitophon," 410 B; Cic. "de Or." I. xlvii. 204; Plut.
"Mor." 798 B. See Grote, "Plato," iii. 21; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 51
foll.; Cf. below, IV. iii. 2.
I will first state what I once heard fall from his lips in a discussion
with Aristodemus, (2) "the little," as he was called, on the topic of
divinity. (3) Socrates had observed that Aristodemus neither sacrificed
nor gave heed to divination, but on the contrary was disposed to
ridicule those who did.
(2) See Plat. "Symp." 173 B: "He was a little fellow who never wore
any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum."--Jowett.
(3) Or, "the divine element."
So tell me, Aristodemus (he began), are there any human beings who have
won your admiration for their wisdom?
Ar. There are.
Soc. Would you mention to us their names?
Ar. In the writings of epic poetry I have the greatest admiration for
Homer.... And as a dithyrambic poet for Melanippides. (4) I admire also
Sophocles as a tragedian, Polycleitus as a sculptor, and Zeuxis as a
painter.
(4) Melanippides, 430 B.C. See Cobet, "Pros. Xen." s.n.
Soc. Which would you consider the more worthy of admiration, a fashioner
of senseless images devoid of motion or one who could fashion living
creatures endowed with understanding and activity?
Ar. Decidedly the latter, provided his living creatures owed their birth
to design and were not the offspring of some chance.
Soc. But now if you had two sorts of things, the one of which presents
no clue as to what it is for, and the other is obviously for some useful
purpose--which would you judge to be the result of chance, which of
design?
Ar. Clearly that which is produced for some useful end is the work of
design.
Soc. Does it not strike you then that he who made man from the beginning
(5) did for some useful end furnish him with his several senses--giving
him eyes to behold the visible word, and ears to catch the intonations
of sound? Or again, what good would there be in odours if nostrils had
not been bestowed upon us? what perception of sweet things and pungent,
and of all the pleasures of the palate, had not a tongue been fashioned
in us as an interpreter of the same? And besides all this, do you
not think this looks like a matter of foresight, this closing of the
delicate orbs of sight with eyelids as with folding doors, which, when
there is need to use them for any purpose, can be thrown wide open and
firmly closed again in sleep? and, that even the winds of heaven may not
visit them too roughly, this planting of the eyelashes as a protecting
screen? (6) this coping of the region above the eyes with cornice-work
of eyebrow so that no drop of sweat fall from the head and injure them?
again this readiness of the ear to catch all sounds and yet not to be
surcharged? this capacity of the front teeth of all animals to cut
and of the "grinders" to receive the food and reduce it to pulp? the
position of the mouth again, close to the eyes and nostrils as a portal
of ingress for all the creature's supplies? and lastly, seeing that
matter passing out (7) of the body is unpleasant, this hindward
direction of the passages, and their removal to a distance from the
avenues of sense? I ask you, when you see all these things constructed
with such show of foresight can you doubt whether they are products of
chance or intelligence?
(5) Cf. Aristot. "de Part. Animal." 1. For the "teleological" views
see IV. iii. 2 foll.
(6) "Like a sieve" or "colander."
(7) "That which goeth out of a man."
Ar. To be sure not! Viewed in this light they would seem to be the
handiwork of some wise artificer, (8) full of love for all things
living. (9)
(8) "Demiurge."
(9) Passage referred to by Epictetus ap. Stob. "Flor." 121, 29.
Soc. What shall we say of this passion implanted in man to beget
offspring, this passion in the mother to rear her babe, and in the
creature itself, once born, this deep desire of life and fear of death?
Ar. No doubt these do look like the contrivances of some one
deliberately planning the existence of living creatures.
Soc. Well, and doubtless you feel to have a spark of wisdom yourself?
Ar. Put your questions, and I will answer.
Soc. And yet you imagine that elsewhere no spark of wisdom is to be
found? And that, too, when you know that you have in your body a tiny
fragment only of the mighty earth, a little drop of the great waters,
and of the other elements, vast in their extent, you got, I presume,
a particle of each towards the compacting of your bodily frame? Mind
alone, it would seem, which is nowhere to be found, (10) you had the
lucky chance to snatch up and make off with, you cannot tell how. And
these things around and about us, enormous in size, infinite in number,
owe their orderly arrangement, as you suppose, to some vacuity of wit?
(10) Cf. Plat. "Phileb." 30 B: "Soc. May our body be said to have a
soul? Pro. Clearly. Soc. And whence comes that soul, my dear
Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains
elements similar to our bodies but finer, has also a soul? Can
there be any other source?"--Jowett. Cic. "de N. D." ii. 6; iii.
11.
Ar. It may be, for my eyes fail to see the master agents of these, as
one sees the fabricators of things produced on earth.
Soc. No more do you see your own soul, which is the master agent of your
body; so that, as far as that goes, you may maintain, if you like, that
you do nothing with intelligence, (11) but everything by chance.
(11) Or, "by your wit," {gnome}.
At this point Aristodemus: I assure you, Socrates, that I do not disdain
the Divine power. On the contrary, my belief is that the Divinity is too
grand to need any service which I could render.
Soc. But the grander that power is, which deigns to tend and wait upon
you, the more you are called upon to honour it.
Ar. Be well assured, if I could believe the gods take thought for all
men, I would not neglect them.
Soc. How can you suppose that they do not so take thought? Who, in the
first place, gave to man alone of living creatures his erect posture,
enabling him to see farther in front of him and to contemplate more
freely the height above, and to be less subject to distress than other
creatures (endowed like himself with eyes and ears and mouth). (12)
Consider next how they gave to the beast of the field (13) feet as a
means of progression only, but to man they gave in addition hands--those
hands which have achieved so much to raise us in the scale of happiness
above all animals. Did they not make the tongue also? which belongs
indeed alike to man and beast, but in man they fashioned it so as to
play on different parts of the mouth at different times, whereby we can
produce articulate speech, and have a code of signals to express our
every want to one another. Or consider the pleasures of the sexual
appetite; limited in the rest of the animal kingdom to certain seasons,
but in the case of man a series prolonged unbroken to old age. Nor did
it content the Godhead merely to watch over the interests of man's body.
What is of far higher import, he implanted in man the noblest and most
excellent type of soul. For what other creature, to begin with, has
a soul to appreciate the existence of the gods who have arranged this
grand and beauteous universe? What other tribe of animals save man
can render service to the gods? How apt is the spirit of man to take
precautions against hunger and thirst, cold and heat, to alleviate
disease and foster strength! how suited to labour with a view to
learning! how capable of garnering in the storehouse of his memory all
that he has heard or seen or understood! Is it not most evident to you
that by the side of other animals men live and move a race of gods--by
nature excellent, in beauty of body and of soul supreme? For, mark you,
had a creature of man's wit been encased in the body of an ox, (14)
he would have been powerless to carry out his wishes, just as the
possession of hands divorced from human wit is profitless. And then you
come, you who have obtained these two most precious attributes, and give
it as your opinion, that the gods take no thought or care for you. Why,
what will you have them to do, that you may believe and be persuaded
that you too are in their thoughts?
(12) See Kuhner for an attempt to cure the text.
(13) {erpetois}, a "poetical" word. Cf. "Od." iv. 418; Herod. i. 140.
(14) See Aristot. "de Part. Animal." iv. 10.
Ar. When they treat me as you tell us they treat you, and send me
counsellors to warn me what I am to do and what abstain from doing, (15)
I will believe.
(15) See IV. iii. 12.
Soc. Send you counsellors! Come now, what when the people of Athens make
inquiry by oracle, and the gods' answer comes? Are you not an Athenian?
Think you not that to you also the answer is given? What when they send
portents to forewarn the states of Hellas? or to all mankind? Are you
not a man? a Hellene? Are not these intended for you also? Can it be
that you alone are excepted as a signal instance of Divine neglect?
Again, do you suppose that the gods could have implanted in the heart
of man the belief in their capacity to work him weal or woe had they not
the power? Would not men have discovered the imposture in all this lapse
of time? Do you not perceive that the wisest and most perdurable of
human institutions--be they cities or tribes of men--are ever the most
God-fearing; and in the individual man the riper his age and judgment,
the deeper his religousness? Ay, my good sir (he broke forth), lay to
heart and understand that even as your own mind within you can turn and
dispose of your body as it lists, so ought we to think that the wisdom
which abides within the universal frame does so dispose of all things as
it finds agreeable to itself; for hardly may it be that your eye is able
to range over many a league, but that the eye of God is powerless to
embrace all things at a glance; or that to your soul it is given to
dwell in thought on matters here or far away in Egypt or in Sicily,
but that the wisdom and thought of God is not sufficient to include all
things at one instant under His care. If only you would copy your
own behaviour (16) where human beings are concerned. It is by acts of
service and of kindness that you discover which of your fellows are
willing to requite you in kind. It is by taking another into your
counsel that you arrive at the secret of his wisdom. If, on like
principle, you will but make trial of the gods by acts of service,
whether they will choose to give you counsel in matters obscure to
mortal vision, you shall discover the nature and the greatness of
Godhead to be such that they are able at once to see all things and to
hear all things and to be present everywhere, nor does the least thing
escape their watchful care.
(16) Or, "reason as you are wont to do."
To my mind the effect of words like these was to cause those about him
to hold aloof from unholiness, baseness, and injustice, not only whilst
they were seen of men, but even in the solitary place, since they must
believe that no part of their conduct could escape the eye of Heaven.
V
I suppose it may be taken as admitted that self-control is a noble
acquirement for a man. (1) If so, let us turn and consider whether by
language like the following he was likely to lead his listeners onwards
(2) to the attainment of this virtue. "Sirs," he would say, "if a war
came upon us and we wished to choose a man who would best help us to
save ourselves and to subdue our enemy, I suppose we should scarcely
select one whom we knew to be a slave to his belly, to wine, or lust,
and prone to succumb to toil or sleep. Could we expect such an one to
save us or to master our foes? Or if one of us were nearing the end of
his days, and he wished to discover some one to whom he might entrust
his sons for education, his maiden daughters for protection, and his
property in general for preservation, would he deem a libertine worthy
of such offices? Why, no one would dream of entrusting his flocks and
herds, his storehouses and barns, or the superintendence of his works to
the tender mercies of an intemperate slave. If a butler or an errand boy
with such a character were offered to us we would not take him as a free
gift. And if he would not accept an intemperate slave, what pains should
the master himself take to avoid that imputation. (3) For with the
incontinent man it is not as with the self-seeker and the covetous.
These may at any rate be held to enrich themselves in depriving others.
But the intemperate man cannot claim in like fashion to be a blessing
to himself if a curse to his neighbours; nay, the mischief which he
may cause to others is nothing by comparison with that which redounds
against himself, since it is the height of mischief to ruin--I do not
say one's own house and property--but one's own body and one's own soul.
Or to take an example from social intercourse, no one cares for a guest
who evidently takes more pleasure in the wine and the viands than in the
friends beside him--who stints his comrades of the affection due to them
to dote upon a mistress. Does it not come to this, that every honest man
is bound to look upon self-restraint as the very corner-stone of virtue:
(4) which he should seek to lay down as the basis and foundation of his
soul? Without self-restraint who can lay any good lesson to heart or
practise it when learnt in any degree worth speaking of? Or, to put it
conversely, what slave of pleasure will not suffer degeneracy of soul
and body? By Hera, (5) well may every free man pray to be saved from the
service of such a slave; and well too may he who is in bondage to such
pleasures supplicate Heaven to send him good masters, seeing that is the
one hope of salvation left him."
(1) Lit. "a beautiful and brave possession."
(2) {proubibaze}.
(3) Or, "how should the master himself beware lest he fall into that
category."
(4) {krepida}. See Pind. "Pyth." iv. 138; ib. vii. 3; ib. fr. 93.
(5) See below, III. x. 9, xi. 5; IV. ii. 9, iv. 8; "Econ." x. 1;
"Cyrop." I. iv. 12; Plat. "Phaedr." 230 B. Cf. Shakesp. "by'r
Lakin."
Well-tempered words: yet his self-restraint shone forth even more in
his acts than in his language. Not only was he master over the pleasures
which flow from the body, but of those also which are fed by riches, his
belief being that he who receives money from this or that chance donor
sets up over himself a master, and binds himself to an abominable
slavery.
VI
In this context some discussions with Antiphon the sophist (1) deserve
record. Antiphon approaches Socrates in hope of drawing away his
associates, and in their presence thus accosts him.
(1) {o teratoskopos}, "jealous of Socrates," according to Aristotle
ap. Diog. Laert. II. v. 25. See Cobet, "Pros. Xen."
Antiphon. Why, Socrates, I always thought it was expected of students of
philosophy to grow in happiness daily; but you seem to have reaped other
fruits from your philosophy. At any rate, you exist, I do not say live,
in a style such as no slave serving under a master would put up with.
Your meat and your drink are of the cheapest sort, and as to clothes,
you cling to one wretched cloak which serves you for summer and winter
alike; and so you go the whole year round, without shoes to your feet
or a shirt to your back. Then again, you are not for taking or making
money, the mere seeking of which is a pleasure, even as the possession
of it adds to the sweetness and independence of existence. I do not know
whether you follow the common rule of teachers, who try to fashion
their pupils in imitation of themselves, (2) and propose to mould the
characters of your companions; but if you do you ought to dub yourself
professor of the art of wretchedness. (3)
(2) Or, "try to turn out their pupils as copies of themselves."
(3) See Arist. "Clouds," {on o kakodaimon Sokrates kai Khairephon}.
Thus challenged, Socrates replied: One thing to me is certain, Antiphon;
you have conceived so vivid an idea of my life of misery that for
yourself you would choose death sooner than live as I do. Suppose now we
turn and consider what it is you find so hard in my life. Is it that he
who takes payment must as a matter of contract finish the work for which
he is paid, whereas I, who do not take it, lie under no constraint to
discourse except with whom I choose? Do you despise my dietary on the
ground that the food which I eat is less wholesome and less stengthening
than yours, or that the articles of my consumption are so scarce and
so much costlier to procure than yours? Or have the fruits of your
marketing a flavour denied to mine? Do you not know the sharper the
appetite the less the need of sauces, the keener the thirst the less the
desire for out-of-the-way drinks? And as to raiment, clothes, you know,
are changed on account of cold or else of heat. People only wear boots
and shoes in order not to gall their feet and be prevented walking.
Now I ask you, have you ever noticed that I keep more within doors than
others on account of the cold? Have you ever seen me battling with
any one for shade on account of the heat? Do you not know that even a
weakling by nature may, by dint of exercise and practice, come to outdo
a giant who neglects his body? He will beat him in the particular point
of training, and bear the strain more easily. But you apparently will
not have it that I, who am for ever training myself to endure this,
that, and the other thing which may befall the body, can brave all
hardships more easily than yourself for instance, who perhaps are not
so practised. And to escape slavery to the belly or to sleep or lechery,
can you suggest more effective means than the possession of some
powerful attraction, some counter-charm which shall gladden not only in
the using, but by the hope enkindled of its lasting usefulness? And yet
this you do know; joy is not to him who feels that he is doing well in
nothing--it belongs to one who is persuaded that things are progressing
with him, be it tillage or the working of a vessel, (4) or any of the
thousand and one things on which a man may chance to be employed. To
him it is given to rejoice as he reflects, "I am doing well." But is
the pleasured derived from all these put together half as joyous as the
consciousness of becoming better oneself, of acquiring better and better
friends? That, for my part, is the belief I continue to cherish.
(4) "The business of a shipowner or skipper."
Again, if it be a question of helping one's friends or country, which of
the two will have the larger leisure to devote to these objects--he who
leads the life which I lead to-day, or he who lives in the style which
you deem so fortunate? Which of the two will adopt a soldier's life more
easily--the man who cannot get on without expensive living, or he to
whom whatever comes to hand suffices? Which will be the readier to
capitulate and cry "mercy" in a siege--the man of elaborate wants, or
he who can get along happily with the readiest things to hand? You,
Antiphon, would seem to suggest that happiness consists of luxury and
extravagance; I hold a different creed. To have no wants at all is, to
my mind, an attribute of Godhead; (5) to have as few wants as possible
the nearest approach to Godhead; and as that which is divine is
mightiest, so that is next mightiest which comes closest to the divine.
(5) Cf. Aristot. "Eth. N." x. viii. 1.
Returning to the charge at another time, this same Antiphon engaged
Socrates in conversation thus.
Ant. Socrates, for my part, I believe you to be a good and upright man;
but for your wisdom I cannot say much. I fancy you would hardly dispute
the verdict yourself, since, as I remark, you do not ask a money payment
for your society; and yet if it were your cloak now, or your house, or
any other of your possessions, you would set some value upon it, and
never dream, I will not say of parting with it gratis, but of exchanging
it for less than its worth. A plain proof, to my mind, that if you
thought your society worth anything, you would ask for it not less than
its equivalent in gold. (6) Hence the conclusion to which I have come,
as already stated: good and upright you may be, since you do not
cheat people from pure selfishness; but wise you cannot be, since your
knowledge is not worth a cent.
(6) Or rather "money," lit. "silver."
To this onslaught Socrates: Antiphon, it is a tenet which we cling to
that beauty and wisdom have this in common, that there is a fair way and
a foul way in which to dispose of them. The vendor of beauty purchases
an evil name, but supposing the same person has discerned a soul of
beauty in his lover and makes that man his friend, we regard his choice
as sensible. (7) So is it with wisdom; he who sells it for money to the
first bidder we name a sophist, (8) as though one should say a man who
prostitutes his wisdom; but if the same man, discerning the noble nature
of another, shall teach that other every good thing, and make him his
friend, of such a one we say he does that which it is the duty of every
good citizen of gentle soul to do. In accordance with this theory, I
too, Antiphon, having my tastes, even as another finds pleasure in his
horse and his hounds, (9) and another in his fighting cocks, so I too
take my pleasure in good friends; and if I have any good thing myself I
teach it them, or I commend them to others by whom I think they will be
helped forwards on the path of virtue. The treasures also of the wise of
old, written and bequeathed in their books, (10) I unfold and peruse in
common with my friends. If our eye light upon any good thing we cull it
eagerly, and regard it as great gain if we may but grow in friendship
with one another.
(7) Add "and a sign of modesty," {sophrona nomizomen}.
(8) {sophistas}. See Grote, "H. G." viii. 482 foll.; "Hunting," xi.
foll.
(9) Cf. Plat. "Lys." 211 E.
(10) Cf. "Symp." iv. 27.
As I listened to this talk I could not but reflect that he, the master,
was a person to be envied, and that we, his hearers, were being led by
him to beauty and nobility of soul.
Again on some occasion the same Antiphon asked Socrates how he expected
to make politicians of others when, even if he had the knowledge, he did
not engage in politics himself.
Socrates replied: I will put to you a question, Antiphon: Which were
the more statesmanlike proceeding, to practise politics myself
single-handed, or to devote myself to making as many others as possible
fit to engage in that pursuit?
VII
Let us here turn and consider whether by deterring his associates from
quackery and false seeming he did not directly stimulate them to the
pursuit of virtue. (1) He used often to say there was no better road
to renown than the one by which a man became good at that wherein he
desired to be reputed good. (2) The truth of the concept he enforced as
follows: "Let us reflect on what a man would be driven to do who wanted
to be thought a good flute player, without really being so. He would
be forced to imitate the good flute player in the externals of his art,
would he not? and first or all, seeing that these artists always have
a splendid equipment, (3) and travel about with a long train of
attendants, he must have the same; in the next place, they can command
the plaudits of a multitude, he therefore must pack a conclave of
clackers. But one thing is clear: nothing must induce him to give
a performance, or he will be exposed at once, and find himself a
laughing-stock not only as a sorry sort of flute player, but as a
wretched imposter. And now he has a host of expenses to meet; and not
one advantage to be reaped; and worse than all his evil reputation. What
is left him but to lead a life stale and unprofitable, the scorn and
mockery of men? Let us try another case. Suppose a man wished to be
thought a good general or a good pilot, though he were really nothing of
the sort, let us picture to our minds how it will fare with him. Of two
misfortunes one: either with a strong desire to be thought proficient in
these matters, he will fail to get others to agree with him, which will
be bad enough; or he will succeed, with worse result; since it stands
to reason that anyone appointed to work a vessel or lead an army without
the requisite knowledge will speedily ruin a number of people whom he
least desires to hurt, and will make but a sorry exit from the
stage himself." Thus first by one instance and then another would
he demonstrate the unprofitableness of trying to appear rich, or
courageous, or strong, without really being the thing pretended. "You
are sure sooner or later to have commands laid upon you beyond your
power to execute, and failing just where you are credited with capacity,
the world will give you no commiseration." "I call that man a cheat, and
a great cheat too," he would say, "who gets money or goods out of some
one by persuasion, and defrauds him; but of all imposters he surely is
the biggest who can delude people into thinking that he is fit to lead
the state, when all the while he is a worthless creature." (4)
(1) {apotrepon proutrepen}. See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 450 foll.
(2) Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 22.
(3) Or, "furniture of the finest," like Arion's in Herod. i. 24.
Schneid. cf. Demosth. 565. 6.
(4) Here follows the sentence ({emoi men oun edokei kai tou
alazoneuesthai apotrepein tous sunontas toiade dialegomenos}),
which, for the sake of convenience, I have attached to the first
sentence of Bk. II. ch. i. ({edokei de moi... ponou.}) I
believe that the commentators are right in bracketing both one and
the other as editorial interpolations.
BOOK II
I
Now, if the effect of such discourses was, as I imagine, to deter his
hearers from the paths of quackery and false-seeming, (1) so I am
sure that language like the following was calculated to stimulate his
followers to practise self-control and endurance: self-control in
the matters of eating, drinking, sleeping, and the cravings of lust;
endurance of cold and heat and toil and pain. He had noticed the undue
licence which one of his acquaintances allowed himself in all such
matters. (2) Accordingly he thus addressed him:
(1) This sentence in the Greek concludes Bk. I. There is something
wrong or very awkward in the text here.
(2) Cf. Grote, "Plato," III. xxxviii. p. 530.
Tell me, Aristippus (Socrates said), supposing you had two children
entrusted to you to educate, one of them must be brought up with an
aptitude for government, and the other without the faintest propensity
to rule--how would you educate them? What do you say? Shall we begin our
inquiry from the beginning, as it were, with the bare elements of food
and nutriment?
Ar. Yes, food to begin with, by all means, being a first principle, (3)
without which there is no man living but would perish.
(3) Aristippus plays upon the word {arkhe}.
Soc. Well, then, we may expect, may we not, that a desire to grasp food
at certain seasons will exhibit itself in both the children?
Ar. It is to be expected.
Soc. Which, then, of the two must be trained, of his own free will, (4)
to prosecute a pressing business rather than gratify the belly?
(4) {proairesis}.
Ar. No doubt the one who is being trained to govern, if we would not
have affairs of state neglected during (5) his government.
(5) Lit. "along of."
Soc. And the same pupil must be furnished with a power of holding out
against thirst also when the craving to quench it comes upon him?
Ar. Certainly he must.
Soc. And on which of the two shall we confer such self-control in regard
to sleep as shall enable him to rest late and rise early, or keep vigil,
if the need arise?
Ar. To the same one of the two must be given that endurance also.
Soc. Well, and a continence in regard to matters sexual so great that
nothing of the sort shall prevent him from doing his duty? Which of them
claims that?
Ar. The same one of the pair again.
Soc. Well, and on which of the two shall be bestowed, as a further gift,
the voluntary resolution to face toils rather than turn and flee from
them?
Ar. This, too, belongs of right to him who is being trained for
government.
Soc. Well, and to which of them will it better accord to be taught all
knowledge necessary towards the mastery of antagonists?
Ar. To our future ruler certainly, for without these parts of learning
all his other capacities will be merely waste.
Soc. (6)Will not a man so educated be less liable to be entrapped by
rival powers, and so escape a common fate of living creatures, some
of which (as we all know) are hooked through their own greediness, and
often even in spite of a native shyness; but through appetite for
food they are drawn towards the bait, and are caught; while others are
similarly ensnared by drink?
(6) (SS. 4, 5, L. Dind. ed Lips.)
Ar. Undoubtedly.
Soc. And others again are victims of amorous heat, as quails, for
instance, or partridges, which, at the cry of the hen-bird, with
lust and expectation of such joys grow wild, and lose their power of
computing dangers: on they rush, and fall into the snare of the hunter?
Aristippus assented.
Soc. And would it not seem to be a base thing for a man to be affected
like the silliest bird or beast? as when the adulterer invades the
innermost sanctum (7) of the house, though he is well aware of the risks
which his crime involves, (8) the formidable penalties of the law,
the danger of being caught in the toils, and then suffering the direst
contumely. Considering all the hideous penalties which hang over the
adulterer's head, considering also the many means at hand to release him
from the thraldom of his passion, that a man should so drive headlong on
to the quicksands of perdition (9)--what are we to say of such frenzy?
The wretch who can so behave must surely be tormented by an evil spirit?
(10)
(7) {eis as eirktas}. The penetralia.
(8) Or, "he knows the risks he runs of suffering those penalties with
which the law threatens his crime should he fall into the snare,
and being caught, be mutilated."
(9) Or, "leap headlong into the jaws of danger."
(10) {kakodaimonontos}.
Ar. So it strikes me.
Soc. And does it not strike you as a sign of strange indifference that,
whereas the greater number of the indispensable affairs of men, as for
instance, those of war and agriculture, and more than half the rest,
need to be conducted under the broad canopy of heaven, (11) yet the
majority of men are quite untrained to wrestle with cold and heat?
(11) Or, "in the open air."
Aristippus again assented.
Soc. And do you not agree that he who is destined to rule must train
himself to bear these things lightly?
Ar. Most certainly.
Soc. And whilst we rank those who are self-disciplined in all these
matters among persons fit to rule, we are bound to place those incapable
of such conduct in the category of persons without any pretension
whatsoever to be rulers?
Ar. I assent.
Soc. Well, then, since you know the rank peculiar to either section of
mankind, did it ever strike you to consider to which of the two you are
best entitled to belong?
Yes I have (replied Aristippus). I do not dream for a moment of ranking
myself in the class of those who wish to rule. In fact, considering how
serious a business it is to cater for one's own private needs, I look
upon it as the mark of a fool not to be content with that, but to
further saddle oneself with the duty of providing the rest of the
community with whatever they may be pleased to want. That, at the cost
of much personal enjoyment, a man should put himself at the head of a
state, and then, if he fail to carry through every jot and tittle of
that state's desire, be held to criminal account, does seem to me the
very extravagance of folly. Why, bless me! states claim to treat their
rulers precisely as I treat my domestic slaves. I expect my attendants
to furnish me with an abundance of necessaries, but not to lay a finger
on one of them themselves. So these states regard it as the duty of a
ruler to provide them with all the good things imaginable, but to keep
his own hands off them all the while. (12) So then, for my part, if
anybody desires to have a heap of pother himself, (13) and be a nuisance
to the rest of the world, I will educate him in the manner suggested,
and he shall take his place among those who are fit to rule; but for
myself, I beg to be enrolled amongst those who wish to spend their days
as easily and pleasantly as possible.
(12) Or, "but he must have no finger in the pie himself."
(13) See Kuhner ad loc.
Soc. Shall we then at this point turn and inquire which of the two are
likely to lead the pleasanter life, the rulers or the ruled?
Ar. By all means let us do so.
Soc. To begin then with the nations and races known to ourselves. (14)
In Asia the Persians are the rulers, while the Syrians, Phrygians,
Lydians are ruled; and in Europe we find the Scythians ruling, and the
Maeotians being ruled. In Africa (15) the Carthaginians are rulers, the
Libyans ruled. Which of these two sets respectively leads the happier
life, in your opinion? Or, to come nearer home--you are yourself a
Hellene--which among Hellenes enjoy the happier existence, think you,
the dominant or the subject states?
(14) Or, "the outer world, the non-Hellenic races and nationalities of
which we have any knowledge."
(15) Lit. "Libya."
Nay, (16) I would have you to understand (exclaimed Aristippus) that I
am just as far from placing myself in the ranks of slavery; there is, I
take it, a middle path between the two which it is my ambition to tread,
avoiding rule and slavery alike; it lies through freedom--the high road
which leads to happiness.
(16) Or, "Pardon me interrupting you, Socrates; but I have not the
slightest intention of placing myself." See W. L. Newman, op. cit.
i. 306.
Soc. True, if only your path could avoid human beings, as it avoids rule
and slavery, there would be something in what you say. But being placed
as you are amidst human beings, if you purpose neither to rule nor to be
ruled, and do not mean to dance attendance, if you can help it, on those
who rule, you must surely see that the stronger have an art to seat the
weaker on the stool of repentance (17) both in public and in private,
and to treat them as slaves. I daresay you have not failed to note this
common case: a set of people has sown and planted, whereupon in comes
another set and cuts their corn and fells their fruit-trees, and in
every way lays siege to them because, though weaker, they refuse to pay
them proper court, till at length they are persuaded to accept slavery
rather than war against their betters. And in private life also,
you will bear me out, the brave and powerful are known to reduce the
helpless and cowardly to bondage, and to make no small profit out of
their victims.
(17) See "Symp." iii. 11; "Cyrop." II. ii. 14; Plat. "Ion," 535 E; L.
Dindorf ad loc.
Ar. Yes, but I must tell you I have a simple remedy against all such
misadventures. I do not confine myself to any single civil community. I
roam the wide world a foreigner.
Soc. Well, now, that is a masterly stroke, upon my word! (18) Of course,
ever since the decease of Sinis, and Sciron, and Procrustes, (19)
foreign travellers have had an easy time of it. But still, if I bethink
me, even in these modern days the members of free communities do
pass laws in their respective countries for self-protection against
wrong-doing. Over and above their personal connections, they provide
themselves with a host of friends; they gird their cities about with
walls and battlements; they collect armaments to ward off evil-doers;
and to make security doubly sure, they furnish themselves with allies
from foreign states. In spite of all which defensive machinery these
same free citizens do occasionally fall victims to injustice. But you,
who are without any of these aids; you, who pass half your days on the
high roads where iniquity is rife; (20) you, who, into whatever city
you enter, are less than the least of its free members, and moreover are
just the sort of person whom any one bent on mischief would single out
for attack--yet you, with your foreigner's passport, are to be
exempt from injury? So you flatter yourself. And why? Will the state
authorities cause proclamation to be made on your behalf: "The person
of this man Aristippus is secure; let his going out and his coming in
be free from danger"? Is that the ground of your confidence? or do you
rather rest secure in the consciousness that you would prove such a
slave as no master would care to keep? For who would care to have in
his house a fellow with so slight a disposition to work and so strong
a propensity to extravagance? Suppose we stop and consider that very
point: how do masters deal with that sort of domestic? If I am not
mistaken, they chastise his wantonness by starvation; they balk his
thieving tendencies by bars and bolts where there is anything to steal;
they hinder him from running away by bonds and imprisonment; they drive
the sluggishness out of him with the lash. Is it not so? Or how do you
proceed when you discover the like tendency in one of your domestics?
(18) Or, "Well foiled!" "A masterly fall! my prince of wrestlers."
(19) For these mythical highway robbers, see Diod. iv. 59; and for
Sciron in particular, Plut. "Theseus," 10.
(20) Or, "where so many suffer wrong."
Ar. I correct them with all the plagues, till I force them to serve me
properly. But, Socrates, to return to your pupil educated in the royal
art, (21) which, if I mistake not, you hold to be happiness: how, may I
ask, will he be better off than others who lie in evil case, in spite
of themselves, simply because they suffer perforce, but in his case the
hunger and the thirst, the cold shivers and the lying awake at nights,
with all the changes he will ring on pain, are of his own choosing? For
my part I cannot see what difference it makes, provided it is one and
the same bare back which receives the stripes, whether the whipping be
self-appointed or unasked for; nor indeed does it concern my body in
general, provided it be my body, whether I am beleaguered by a whole
armament of such evils (22) of my own will or against my will--except
only for the folly which attaches to self-appointed suffering.
(21) Cf. below, IV. ii. 11; Plat. "Statesm." 259 B; "Euthyd." 291 C;
K. Joel, op. cit. p. 387 foll. "Aristippus anticipates Adeimantus"
("Rep." 419), W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 395.
(22) Cf. "suffers the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune."
Soc. What, Aristippus, does it not seem to you that, as regards such
matters, there is all the difference between voluntary and involuntary
suffering, in that he who starves of his own accord can eat when he
chooses, and he who thirsts of his own free will can drink, and so for
the rest; but he who suffers in these ways perforce cannot desist from
the suffering when the humour takes him? Again, he who suffers hardship
voluntarily, gaily confronts his troubles, being buoyed on hope
(23)--just as a hunter in pursuit of wild beasts, through hope of
capturing his quarry, finds toil a pleasure--and these are but prizes of
little worth in return for their labours; but what shall we say of their
reward who toil to obtain to themselves good friends, or to subdue their
enemies, or that through strength of body and soul they may administer
their households well, befriend their friends, and benefit the land
which gave them birth? Must we not suppose that these too will take
their sorrows lightly, looking to these high ends? Must we not suppose
that they too will gaily confront existence, who have to support them
not only their conscious virtue, but the praise and admiration of the
world? (24) And once more, habits of indolence, along with the fleeting
pleasures of the moment, are incapable, as gymnastic trainers say, of
setting up (25) a good habit of body, or of implanting in the soul any
knowledge worthy of account; whereas by painstaking endeavour in the
pursuit of high and noble deeds, as good men tell us, through endurance
we shall in the end attain the goal. So Hesiod somewhere says: (26)
Wickedness may a man take wholesale with ease, smooth is the way
and her dwelling-place is very nigh; but in front of virtue the
immortal gods have placed toil and sweat, long is the path and
steep that leads to her, and rugged at the first, but when the
summit of the pass is reached, then for all its roughness the path
grows easy.
(23) Cf. above, I. vi. 8.
(24) Or, "in admiration of themselves, the praise and envy of the
world at large."
(25) See Hippocrates, "V. Med." 18.
(26) Hesiod, "Works and Days," 285. See Plat. "Prot." 340 C; "Rep."
ii. 364 D; "Laws," iv. 718 E.
And Ephicharmus (27) bears his testimony when he says:
The gods sell us all good things in return for our labours.
(27) Epicharmus of Cos, the chief comic poet among the Dorians, fl.
500 B.C. Cf. Plat. "Theaet." 152 E, "the prince of comedy";
"Gorg." 505 D.
And again in another passage he exclaims:
Set not thine heart on soft things, thou knave, lest thou light
upon the hard.
And that wise man Prodicus (28) delivers himself in a like strain
concerning virtue in that composition of his about Heracles, which
crowds have listened to. (29) This, as far as I can recollect it, is the
substance at least of what he says:
(28) Prodicus of Ceos. See Plat. "Men." 24; "Cratyl." 1; Philostr.
"Vit. Soph." i. 12.
(29) Or, "which he is fond of reciting as a specimen of style." The
title of the {epideixis} was {'Orai} according to Suidas,
{Prodikos}.
"When Heracles was emerging from boyhood into the bloom of youth, having
reached that season in which the young man, now standing upon the verge
of independence, shows plainly whether he will enter upon the path of
virtue or of vice, he went forth into a quiet place, and sat debating
with himself which of those two paths he should pursue; and as he there
sat musing, there appeared to him two women of great stature which drew
nigh to him. The one was fair to look upon, frank and free by gift
of nature, (30) her limbs adorned with purity and her eyes with
bashfulness; sobriety set the rhythm of her gait, and she was clad in
white apparel. The other was of a different type; the fleshy softness
of her limbs betrayed her nurture, while the complexion of her skin was
embellished that she might appear whiter and rosier than she really
was, and her figure that she might seem taller than nature made her;
she stared with wide-open eyes, and the raiment wherewith she was clad
served but to reveal the ripeness of her bloom. With frequent glances
she surveyed her person, or looked to see if others noticed her; while
ever and anon she fixed her gaze upon the shadow of herself intently.
(30) Reading {eleutherion phusei,...} or if {eleutherion,
phusei...} translate "nature had adorned her limbs..."
"Now when these two had drawn near to Heracles, she who was first
named advanced at an even pace (31) towards him, but the other, in her
eagerness to outstrip her, ran forward to the youth, exclaiming, 'I see
you, Heracles, in doubt and difficulty what path of life to choose; make
me your friend, and I will lead you to the pleasantest road and easiest.
This I promise you: you shall taste all of life's sweets and escape all
bitters. In the first place, you shall not trouble your brain with
war or business; other topics shall engage your mind; (32) your only
speculation, what meat or drink you shall find agreeable to your palate;
what delight (33) of ear or eye; what pleasure of smell or touch; what
darling lover's intercourse shall most enrapture you; how you shall
pillow your limbs in softest slumber; how cull each individual pleasure
without alloy of pain; and if ever the suspicion steal upon you that the
stream of joys will one day dwindle, trust me I will not lead you where
you shall replenish the store by toil of body and trouble of soul. No!
others shall labour, but you shall reap the fruit of their labours; you
shall withhold your hand from nought which shall bring you gain. For to
all my followers I give authority and power to help themselves freely
from every side.'
(31) Or, "without change in her demeanour."
(32) Reading {diese}, or {dioisei}, "you shall continue speculating
solely."
(33) It will be recollected that Prodicus prided himself on {orthotes
onomaton}. Possibly Xenophon is imitating (caricaturing?) his
style. {terphtheies, estheies, euphrantheies}.
"Heracles hearing these words made answer: 'What, O lady, is the name
you bear?' To which she: 'Know that my friends call be Happiness,
but they that hate me have their own nicknames (34) for me, Vice and
Naughtiness.'
(34) So the vulg. {upokorizomenoi} is interpreted. Cobet ("Pros. Xen."
p. 36) suggests {upoknizomenoi} = "quippe qui desiderio
pungantur."
"But just then the other of those fair women approached and spoke:
'Heracles, I too am come to you, seeing that your parents are well
known to me, and in your nurture I have gauged your nature; wherefore I
entertain good hope that if you choose the path which leads to me, you
shall greatly bestir yourself to be the doer of many a doughty deed of
noble emprise; and that I too shall be held in even higher honour for
your sake, lit with the lustre shed by valorous deeds. (35) I will not
cheat you with preludings of pleasure, (36) but I will relate to you the
things that are according to the ordinances of God in very truth. Know
then that among things that are lovely and of good report, not one have
the gods bestowed upon mortal men apart from toil and pains. Would
you obtain the favour of the gods, then must you pay these same gods
service; would you be loved by your friends, you must benefit these
friends; do you desire to be honoured by the state, you must give the
state your aid; do you claim admiration for your virtue from all Hellas,
you must strive to do some good to Hellas; do you wish earth to yield
her fruits to you abundantly, to earth must you pay your court; do you
seek to amass riches from your flocks and herds, on them must you bestow
your labour; or is it your ambition to be potent as a warrior, able to
save your friends and to subdue your foes, then must you learn the arts
of war from those who have the knowledge, and practise their application
in the field when learned; or would you e'en be powerful of limb and
body, then must you habituate limbs and body to obey the mind, and
exercise yourself with toil and sweat.'
(35) Or, "bathed in the splendour of thy virtues."
(36) Or, "honeyed overtures of pleasure."
"At this point, (as Prodicus relates) Vice broke in exclaiming: 'See
you, Heracles, how hard and long the road is by which yonder woman would
escort you to her festal joys. (37) But I will guide you by a short and
easy road to happiness.'
(37) Hesiod, "Theog." 909; Milton, "L'Allegro," 12.
"Then spoke Virtue: 'Nay, wretched one, what good thing hast thou? or
what sweet thing art thou acquainted with--that wilt stir neither hand
nor foot to gain it? Thou, that mayest not even await the desire of
pleasure, but, or ever that desire springs up, art already satiated;
eating before thou hungerest, and drinking before thou thirsteth; who to
eke out an appetite must invent an army of cooks and confectioners; and
to whet thy thirst must lay down costliest wines, and run up and down
in search of ice in summer-time; to help thy slumbers soft coverlets
suffice not, but couches and feather-beds must be prepared thee and
rockers to rock thee to rest; since desire for sleep in thy case springs
not from toil but from vacuity and nothing in the world to do. Even the
natural appetite of love thou forcest prematurely by every means thou
mayest devise, confounding the sexes in thy service. Thus thou educatest
thy friends: with insult in the night season and drowse of slumber
during the precious hours of the day. Immortal, thou art cast forth
from the company of gods, and by good men art dishonoured: that sweetest
sound of all, the voice of praise, has never thrilled thine ears; and
the fairest of all fair visions is hidden from thine eyes that have
never beheld one bounteous deed wrought by thine own hand. If thou
openest thy lips in speech, who will believe thy word? If thou hast need
of aught, none shall satisfy thee. What sane man will venture to join
thy rablle rout? Ill indeed are thy revellers to look upon, young men
impotent of body, and old men witless in mind: in the heyday of life
they batten in sleek idleness, and wearily do they drag through an age
of wrinkled wretchedness: and why? they blush with shame at the thought
of deeds done in the past, and groan for weariness at what is left to
do. During their youth they ran riot through their sweet things, and
laid up for themselves large store of bitterness against the time of
eld. But my companionship is with the gods; and with the good among men
my conversation; no bounteous deed, divine or human, is wrought without
my aid. Therefore am I honoured in Heaven pre-eminently, and upon
earth among men whose right it is to honour me; (38) as a beloved
fellow-worker of all craftsmen; a faithful guardian of house and lands,
whom the owners bless; a kindly helpmeet of servants; (39) a brave
assistant in the labours of peace; an unflinching ally in the deeds of
war; a sharer in all friendships indispensable. To my friends is given
an enjoyment of meats and drinks, which is sweet in itself and devoid
of trouble, in that they can endure until desire ripens, and sleep more
delicious visits them than those who toil not. Yet they are not pained
to part with it; nor for the sake of slumber do they let slip the
performance of their duties. Among my followers the youth delights in
the praises of his elders, and the old man glories in the honour of the
young; with joy they call to memory their deeds of old, and in to-day's
well-doing are well pleased. For my sake they are dear in the sight
of God, beloved of their friends and honoured by the country of their
birth. When the appointed goal is reached they lie not down in oblivion
with dishonour, but bloom afresh--their praise resounded on the lips of
men for ever. (40) Toils like these, O son of noble parents, Heracles,
it is yours to meet with, and having endured, to enter into the heritage
assured you of transcendant happiness.'"
(38) Reading {ois prosekei}, or if {proseko}, translate "to whom I am
attached."
(39) Cf. "Econ." v. 8.
(40) Or, "so true is it, a branch is left them; undying honour to
their name!"
This, Aristippus, in rough sketch is the theme which Prodicus pursues
(41) in his "Education of Heracles by Virtue," only he decked out
his sentiments, I admit, in far more magnificent phrases than I have
ventured on. Were it not well, Aristippus, to lay to heart these
sayings, and to strive to bethink you somewhat of that which touches the
future of our life?
(41) Reading {diokei}, al. {diokei} = "so Prodicus arranged the parts
of his discourse."
II
At another time, he had noticed the angry temper shown by Lamprocles,
the elder of his sons, towards their mother, and thus addressed himself
to the lad.
Soc. Pray, my son, did you ever hear of certain people being called
ungrateful?
That I have (replied the young man).
Soc. And have you understood what it is they do to get that bad name?
Lamp. Yes, I have: when any one has been kindly treated, and has it in
his power to requite the kindness but neglects to do so, men call him
ungrateful.
Soc. And you admit that people reckon the ungrateful among wrongdoers?
Lamp. I do.
Soc. And has it ever struck you to inquire whether, as regards the right
or wrong of it, ingratitude may not perhaps resemble some such conduct
as the enslavement, say, of prisoners, which is accounted wrong towards
friends but justifiable towards enemies?
Lamp. Yes, I have put that question to myself. In my opinion, no matter
who confers the kindness, friend or foe, the recipient should endeavour
to requite it, failing which he is a wrongdoer.
Soc. Then if that is how the matter stands, ingratitude would be an
instance of pure unadulterate wrongdoing?
Lamprocles assented to the proposition.
Soc. It follows, then, that in proportion to the greatness of the
benefit conferred, the greater his misdoing who fails to requite the
kindness?
Lamprocles again assented.
Socrates continued: And where can we hope to find greater benefits than
those which children derive from their parents--their father and mother
who brought them out of nothingness into being, who granted them to look
upon all these fair sights, and to partake of all those blessings which
the gods bestow on man, things so priceless in our eyes that one and all
we shudder at the thought of leaving them, and states have made death
the penalty for the greatest crimes, because there is no greater evil
through fear of which to stay iniquity.
You do not suppose that human beings produce children for the sake of
carnal pleasure (1) merely; were this the motive, street and bordell are
full of means to quit them of that thrall; whereas nothing is plainer
than the pains we take to seek out wives who shall bear us the finest
children. (2) With these we wed, and carry on the race. The man has a
twofold duty to perform: partly in cherishing her who is to raise up
children along with him, and partly towards the children yet unborn
in providing them with things that he thinks will contribute to their
well-being--and of these as large a store as possible. The woman,
conceiving, bears her precious burthen with travail and pain, and at the
risk of life itself--sharing with that within her womb the food on which
she herself is fed. And when with much labour she has borne to the end
and brought forth her offspring, she feeds it and watches over it with
tender care--not in return for any good thing previously received, for
indeed the babe itself is little conscious of its benefactor and cannot
even signify its wants; only she, the mother, making conjecture of what
is good for it, and what will please it, essays to satisfy it; (3)
and for many months she feeds it night and day, enduring the toil nor
recking what return she shall receive for all her trouble. Nor does the
care and kindness of parents end with nurture; but when the children
seem of an age to learn, they teach them themselves whatever cunning
they possess, as a guide to life, or where they feel that another is
more competent, to him they send them to be taught at their expense.
Thus they watch over their children, doing all in their power to enable
them to grow up to be as good as possible.
(1) Lit. "the joys of Aphrodite."
(2) "For the procreation of children." See below, IV. iv. 22; "Pol.
Lac." i.
(3) Lit. "to leave nought lacking."
So be it (the youth answered); but even if she have done all that,
and twenty times as much, no soul on earth could endure my mother's
cross-grained temper.
Then Socrates: Which, think you, would be harder to bear--a wild beast's
savagery or a mother's?
Lamp. To my mind, a mother's--at least if she be such as mine.
Soc. Dear me! And has this mother ever done you any injury--such as
people frequently receive from beasts, by bite or kick?
Lamp. If she has not done quite that, she uses words which any one would
sooner sell his life than listen to.
Soc. And how many annoyances have you caused your mother, do you
suppose, by fretfulness and peevishness in word and deed, night and day,
since you were a little boy? How much sorrow and pain, when you were
ill?
Lamp. Well, I never said or did anything to bring a blush to her cheeks.
Soc. No, come now! Do you suppose it is harder for you to listen to your
mother's speeches than for actor to listen to actor on the tragic stage,
(4) when the floodgates of abuse are opened?
(4) See Grote, "H. G." viii. 457; Plut. "Solon," xxix.
Lamp. Yes; for the simple reason that they know it is all talk on their
parts. The inquisitor may cross-question, but he will not inflict
a fine; the threatener may hurl his menaces, but he will do no
mischief--that is why they take it all so easily.
Soc. Then ought you to fly into a passion, who know well enough that,
whatever your mother says, she is so far from meaning you mischief that
she is actually wishing blessings to descend upon you beyond all others?
Or do you believe that your mother is really ill disposed towards you?
Lamp. No, I do not think that.
Soc. Then this mother, who is kindly disposed to you, and takes such
tender care of you when you are ill to make you well again, and to see
that you want for nothing which may help you; and, more than all, who is
perpetually pleading for blessings in your behalf and offering her vows
to Heaven (5)--can you say of her that she is cross-grained and harsh?
For my part, I think, if you cannot away with such a mother, you cannot
away with such blessings either.
(5) Or, "paying vows."
But tell me (he proceeded), do you owe service to any living being,
think you? or are you prepared to stand alone? Prepared not to please or
try to please a single soul? to follow none? To obey neither general nor
ruler of any sort? Is that your attitude, or do you admit that you owe
allegiance to somebody?
Lamp. Yes; certainly I owe allegiance.
Soc. May I take it that you are willing to please at any rate your
neighbour, so that he may kindle a fire for you in your need, may prove
himself a ready helpmate in good fortune, or if you chance on evil and
are stumbling, may friendlily stand by your side to aid?
Lamp. I am willing.
Soc. Well, and what of that other chance companion--your
fellow-traveller by land or sea? what of any others, you may light upon?
is it indifferent to you whether these be friends or not, or do you
admit that the goodwill of these is worth securing by some pains on your
part?
Lamp. I do.
Soc. It stands thus then: you are prepared to pay attention to this,
that, and the other stranger, but to your mother who loves you more than
all else, you are bound to render no service, no allegiance? Do you
not know that whilst the state does not concern itself with ordinary
ingratitude or pass judicial sentence on it; whilst it overlooks the
thanklessness of those who fail to make return for kindly treatment, it
reserves its pains and penalties for the special case? If a man render
not the service and allegiance due to his parents, on him the finger
of the law is laid; his name is struck off the roll; he is forbidden to
hold the archonship--which is as much as to say, "Sacrifices in behalf
of the state offered by such a man would be no offerings, being tainted
with impiety; nor could aught else be 'well and justly' performed
of which he is the doer." Heaven help us! If a man fail to adorn the
sepulchre of his dead parents the state takes cognisance of the matter,
and inquisition is made in the scrutiny of the magistrates. (6) And as
for you, my son, if you are in your sober senses, you will earnestly
entreat your mother, lest the very gods take you to be an ungrateful
being, and on their side also refuse to do you good; and you will beware
of men also, lest they should perceive your neglect of your parents, and
with one consent hold you in dishonour; (7) and so you find yourself in
a desert devoid of friends. For if once the notion be entertained that
here is a man ungrateful to his parents, no one will believe that any
kindness shown you would be other than thrown away.
(6) Lit. "the docimasia." See Gow, "Companion," xiv.
(7) "Visiti with atimia."
III
At another time the differences between two brothers named Chaerephon
and Chaerecrates, both well known to him, had drawn his attention; and
on seeing the younger of the two he thus addressed him.
Soc. Tell me, Chaerecrates, you are not, I take it, one of those strange
people who believe that goods are better and more precious than a
brother; (1) and that too although the former are but senseless chattels
which need protection, the latter a sensitive and sensible being who
can afford it; and what is more, he is himself alone, whilst as for them
their name is legion. And here again is a marvellous thing: that a man
should count his brother a loss, because the goods of his brother are
not his; but he does not count his fellow-citizens loss, and yet their
possessions are not his; only it seems in their case he has wits to see
that to dwell securely with many and have enough is better than to own
the whole wealth of a community and to live in dangerous isolation; but
this same doctrine as applied to brothers they ignore. Again, if a
man have the means, he will purchase domestic slaves, because he wants
assistants in his work; he will acquire friends, because he needs their
support; but this brother of his--who cares about brothers? It seems
a friend may be discovered in an ordinary citizen, but not in a blood
relation who is also a brother. And yet it is a great vantage-ground
towards friendship to have sprung from the same loins and to have been
suckled at the same breasts, since even among beasts a certain natural
craving, and sympathy springs up between creatures reared together. (2)
Added to which, a man who has brothers commands more respect from the
rest of the world than the man who has none, and who must fight his own
battles. (3)
(1) Cf. "Merchant of Venice," II. viii. 17: "Justice! the law! my
ducats, and my daughter!"
(2) Or, "a yearning after their foster-brothers manifests itself in
animals." See "Cyrop." VIII. vii. 14 foll. for a parallel to this
discussion.
(3) Lit. "and is less liable to hostility."
Chaer. I daresay, Socrates, where the differences are not profound,
reason would a man should bear with his brother, and not avoid him for
some mere trifle's sake, for a brother of the right sort is, as you say,
a blessing; but if he be the very antithesis of that, why should a man
lay his hand to achieve the impossible?
Soc. Well now, tell me, is there nobody whom Chaerephon can please any
more than he can please yourself; or do some people find him agreeable
enough?
Chaer. Nay, there you hit it. That is just why I have a right to detest
him. He can be pleasing enough to others, but to me, whenever he appears
on the scene, he is not a blessing--no! but by every manner of means the
reverse.
Soc. May it not happen that just as a horse is no gain to the inexpert
rider who essays to handle him, so in like manner, if a man tries to
deal with his brother after an ignorant fashion, this same brother will
kick?
Chaer. But is it likely now? How should I be ignorant of the art of
dealing with my brother if I know the art of repaying kind words and
good deeds in kind? But a man who tries all he can to annoy me by word
and deed, I can neither bless nor benefit, and, what is more, I will not
try.
Soc. Well now, that is a marvellous statement, Chaerecrates. Your dog,
the serviceable guardian of your flocks, who will fawn and lick the hand
of your shepherd, when you come near him can only growl and show his
teeth. Well; you take no notice of the dog's ill-temper, you try to
propitiate him by kindness; but your brother? If your brother were what
he ought to be, he would be a great blessing to you--that you admit;
and, as you further confess, you know the secret of kind acts and words,
yet you will not set yourself to apply means to make him your best of
friends.
Chaer. I am afraid, Socrates, that I have no wisdom or cunning to make
Chaerephon bear himself towards me as he should.
Soc. Yet there is no need to apply any recondite or novel machinery.
Only bait your hook in the way best known to yourself, and you will
capture him; whereupon he will become your devoted friend.
Chaer. If you are aware that I know some love-charm, Socrates, of which
I am the happy but unconscious possessor, pray make haste and enlighten
me.
Soc. Answer me then. Suppose you wanted to get some acquaintance to
invite you to dinner when he next keeps holy day, (4) what steps would
you take?
(4) "When he next does sacrifice"; see "Hiero," viii. 3. Cf. Theophr.
"Char." xv. 2, and Prof. Jebb's note ad loc.
Chaer. No doubt I should set him a good example by inviting him myself
on a like occasion.
Soc. And if you wanted to induce some friend to look after your affairs
during your absence abroad, how would you achieve your purpose?
Chaer. No doubt I should present a precedent in undertaking to look
after his in like circumstances.
Soc. And if you wished to get some foreign friend to take you under his
roof while visiting his country, what would you do?
Chaer. No doubt I should begin by offering him the shelter of my own
roof when he came to Athens, in order to enlist his zeal in furthering
the objects of my visit; it is plain I should first show my readiness to
do as much for him in a like case.
Soc. Why, it seems you are an adept after all in all the philtres known
to man, only you chose to conceal your knowledge all the while; or is
it that you shrink from taking the first step because of the scandal you
will cause by kindly advances to your brother? And yet it is commonly
held to redound to a man's praise to have outstripped an enemy in
mischief or a friend in kindness. Now if it seemed to me that Chaerephon
were better fitted to lead the way towards this friendship, (5) I
should have tried to persuade him to take the first step in winning your
affection, but now I am persuaded the first move belongs to you, and to
you the final victory.
(5) Reading {pros ten philian}, or if {phusin}, transl. "natural
disposition."
Chaer. A startling announcement, Socrates, from your lips, and most
unlike you, to bid me the younger take precedence of my elder brother.
Why, it is contrary to the universal custom of mankind, who look to the
elder to take the lead in everything, whether as a speaker or an actor.
Soc. How so? Is it not the custom everywhere for the younger to step
aside when he meets his elder in the street and to give him place? Is he
not expected to get up and offer him his seat, to pay him the honour of
a soft couch, (6) to yield him precedence in argument?
(6) Lit. "with a soft bed," or, as we say, "the best bedroom."
My good fellow, do not stand shilly-shallying, (7) but put out your hand
caressingly, and you will see the worthy soul will respond at once with
alacrity. Do you not note your brother's character, proud and frank and
sensitive to honour? He is not a mean and sorry rascal to be caught by a
bribe--no better way indeed for such riff-raff. No! gentle natures need
a finer treatment. You can best hope to work on them by affection.
(7) Or, "have no fears, essay a soothing treatment."
Chaer. But suppose I do, and suppose that, for all my attempts, he shows
no change for the better?
Soc. At the worst you will have shown yourself to be a good, honest,
brotherly man, and he will appear as a sorry creature on whom kindness
is wasted. But nothing of the sort is going to happen, as I conjecture.
My belief is that as soon as he hears your challenge, he will embrace
the contest; pricked on by emulous pride, he will insist upon getting
the better of you in kindness of word and deed.
At present you two are in the condition of two hands formed by God to
help each other, but which have let go their business and have turned to
hindering one another all they can. You are a pair of feet fashioned on
the Divine plan to work together, but which have neglected this in order
to trammel each other's gait. Now is it not insensate stupidity (8) to
use for injury what was meant for advantage? And yet in fashioning
two brothers God intends them, methinks, to be of more benefit to one
another than either two hands, or two feet, or two eyes, or any other
of those pairs which belong to man from his birth. (9) Consider how
powerless these hands of ours if called upon to combine their action at
two points more than a single fathom's length apart; (10) and these feet
could not stretch asunder (11) even a bare fathom; and these eyes, for
all the wide-reaching range we claim for them, are incapable of seeing
simultaneously the back and front of an object at even closer quarters.
But a pair of brothers, linked in bonds of amity, can work each for the
other's good, though seas divide them. (12)
(8) "Boorishness verging upon monomania."
(9) "With which man is endowed at birth."
(10) "More than an 'arms'-stretch' asunder."
(11) Lit. "reach at one stretch two objects, even over that small
distance."
(12) "Though leagues separate them."
IV
I have at another time heard him discourse on the kindred theme of
friendship in language well calculated, as it seemed to me, to help a
man to choose and also to use his friends aright.
He (Socrates) had often heard the remark made that of all possessions
there is none equal to that of a good and sincere friend; but, in spite
of this assertion, the mass of people, as far as he could see, concerned
themselves about nothing so little as the acquisition of friends.
Houses, and fields, and slaves, and cattle, and furniture of all sorts
(he said) they were at pains to acquire, and they strove hard to keep
what they had got; but to procure for themselves this greatest of all
blessings, as they admitted a friend to be, or to keep the friends whom
they already possessed, not one man in a hundred ever gave himself a
thought. It was noticeable, in the case of a sickness befalling a man's
friend and one of his own household simultaneously, the promptness with
which the master would fetch the doctor to his domestic, and take every
precaution necessary for his recovery, with much expenditure of pains;
but meanwhile little account would be taken of the friend in like
condition, and if both should die, he will show signs of deep annoyance
at the death of his domestic, which, as he reflects, is a positive loss
to him; but as regards his friend his position is in no wise materially
affected, and thus, though he would never dream of leaving his other
possessions disregarded and ill cared for, friendship's mute appeal is
met with flat indifference. (1)
(1) Or, "the cry of a friend for careful tending falls on deaf ears."
Or to take (said he) a crowning instance: (2) with regard to ordinary
possessions, however multifarious these may be, most people are at least
acquainted with their number, but if you ask a man to enumerate his
friends, who are not so very many after all perhaps, he cannot; or if,
to oblige the inquirer, he essays to make a list, he will presently
retract the names of some whom he had previously included. (3) Such is
the amount of thought which people bestow upon their friends.
(2) Or, "Nor had he failed to observe another striking contrast." Cf.
Cic. "Lael." 17; Diog. Laert. ii. 30.
(3) i.e. "like a chess-player recalling a move."
And yet what thing else may a man call his own is comparable to this one
best possession! what rather will not serve by contrast to enhance the
value of an honest friend! Think of a horse or a yoke of oxen; they have
their worth; but who shall gauge the worth of a worthy friend? Kindlier
and more constant than the faithfullest of slaves--this is that
possession best named all-serviceable. (4) Consider what the post is
that he assigns himself! to meet and supplement what is lacking to
the welfare of his friends, to promote their private and their public
interests, is his concern. Is there need of kindly action in any
quarter? he will throw in the full weight of his support. Does some
terror confound? he is at hand to help and defend by expenditure of
money and of energy, (5) by appeals to reason or resort to force. His
the privilege alike to gladden the prosperous in the hour of success and
to sustain their footing who have well-nigh slipped. All that the hands
of a man may minister, all that the eyes of each are swift to see, the
ears to hear, and the feet to compass, he with his helpful arts will not
fall short of. Nay, not seldom that which a man has failed to accomplish
for himself, has missed seeing or hearing or attaining, a friend acting
in behalf of friend will achieve vicariously. And yet, albeit to try and
tend a tree for the sake of its fruit is not uncommon, this copious mine
of wealth--this friend--attracts only a lazy and listless attention on
the part of more than half the world.
(4) "A vessel fit for all work indeed is this friend." Cf. Ar. "Ach."
936, {pagkhreston aggos estai}, like the "leather bottel."
(5) Or, "by dint of his diplomacy."
V
I remember listening to another argument of his, the effect of which
would be to promote self-examination. The listener must needs be brought
to ask himself, "Of what worth am I to my friends?" It happened thus.
One of those who were with him was neglectful, as he noted, of a friend
who was at the pinch of poverty (Antisthenes). (1) Accordingly, in the
presence of the negligent person and of several others, he proceeded to
question the sufferer.
(1) Antisthenes, "cynicorum et stoicorum parens." Cic. "de Or." iii.
17; "ad Att." xii. 38. See below, III. iii. 17; "Symp." passim;
Diog. Laert. II. v.; VI. i.
Soc. What say you, Antisthenes?--have friends their values like domestic
slaves? One of these latter may be worth perhaps two minae, (2) another
only half a mina, a third five, and a fourth as much as ten; while they
do say that Nicias, (3) the son of Niceratus, paid a whole talent for
a superintendent of his silver mines. And so I propound the question to
myself as follows: "Have friends, like slaves, their market values?"
(2) A mina = L4 circ.
(3) For Nicias see Thuc. vii. 77 foll.; "Revenues," iv. 14; Plut.
"Nic." IV. v.; Lys. "de bon. Aristoph." 648.
Not a doubt of it (replied Antisthenes). At any rate, I know that I
would rather have such a one as my friend than be paid two minae, and
there is such another whose worth I would not estimate at half a mina,
and a third with whom I would not part for ten, and then again a fourth
whose friendship would be cheap if it cost me all the wealth and pains
in the world to purchase it.
Well then (continued Socrates), if that be so, would it not be well if
every one were to examine himself: "What after all may I chance to be
worth to my friends?" Should he not try to become as dear as possible,
so that his friends will not care to give him up? How often do I hear
the complaint: "My friend So-and-so has given me up"; or "Such an one,
whom I looked upon as a friend, has sacrificed me for a mina." And every
time I hear these remarks, the question arises in my mind: If the vendor
of a worthless slave is ready to part with him to a purchaser for what
he will fetch--is there not at least a strong temptation to part with a
base friend when you have a chance of making something on the exchange?
Good slaves, as far as I can see, are not so knocked down to the hammer;
no, nor good friends so lightly parted with.
VI
Again, in reference to the test to be applied, if we would gauge the
qualifications of a friend worth the winning, the following remarks of
Socrates could not fail, I think, to prove instructive. (1)
(1) Or, "Again, as to establishing a test of character, since a friend
worth having must be of a particular type, I cannot but think that
the following remarks would prove instructive."
Tell me (said Socrates, addressing Critobulus), supposing we stood in
need of a good friend, how should we set about his discovery? We
must, in the first place, I suppose, seek out one who is master of his
appetites, not under the dominion, that is, of his belly, not addicted
to the wine-cup or to lechery or sleep or idleness, since no one
enslaved to such tyrants could hope to do his duty either by himself or
by his friends, could he?
Certainly not (Critobulus answered).
Soc. Do you agree, then, that we must hold aloof from every one so
dominated?
Cri. Most assuredly.
Well then (proceeded Socrates), what shall we say of the spendthrift who
has lost his independence and is for ever begging of his neighbours;
if he gets anything out of them he cannot repay, but if he fails to get
anything, he hates you for not giving--do you not think that this man
too would prove but a disagreeable friend?
Cri. Certainly.
Soc. Then we must keep away from him too?
Cri. That we must.
Soc. Well! and what of the man whose strength lies in monetary
transactions? (2) His one craving is to amass money; and for that reason
he is an adept at driving a hard bargain (3)--glad enough to take in,
but loath to pay out.
(2) Or, "the money-lender? He has a passion for big money-bags."
(3) Or, "hard in all his dealings."
Cri. In my opinion he will prove even a worse fellow than the last.
Soc. Well! and what of that other whose passion for money-making is so
absorbing that he has no leisure for anything else, save how he may add
to his gains?
Cri. Hold aloof from him, say I, since there is no good to be got out of
him or his society.
Soc. Well! what of the quarrelsome and factious person (4) whose main
object is to saddle his friends with a host of enemies?
(4) "The partisan."
Cri. For God's sake let us avoid him also.
Soc. But now we will imagine a man exempt indeed from all the above
defects--a man who has no objection to receive kindnesses, but it never
enters into his head to do a kindness in return.
Cri. There will be no good in him either. But, Socrates, what kind of
man shall we endeavour to make our friend? what is he like?
Soc. I should say he must be just the converse of the above: he has
control over the pleasures of the body, he is kindly disposed, (5)
upright in all his dealings, (6) very zealous is he not to be outdone in
kindness by his benefactors, if only his friends may derive some profit
from his acquaintance.
(5) Reading {eunous}, or if {euorkos}, transl. "a man of his word."
(6) Or, "easy to deal with."
Cri. But how are we to test these qualities, Socrates, before
acquaintance?
Soc. How do we test the merits of a sculptor?--not by inferences drawn
from the talk of the artist merely. No, we look to what he has already
achieved. These former statues of his were nobly executed, and we trust
he will do equally well with the rest.
Cri. You mean that if we find a man whose kindness to older friends
is established, we may take it as proved that he will treat his newer
friends as amiably?
Soc. Why, certainly, if I see a man who has shown skill in the handling
of horses previously, I argue that he will handle others no less
skilfully again.
Cri. Good! and when we have discovered a man whose friendship is worth
having, how ought we to make him our friend?
Soc. First we ought to ascertain the will of Heaven whether it be
advisable to make him our friend.
Cri. Well! and how are we to effect the capture of this friend of our
choice, whom the gods approve? will you tell me that?
Not, in good sooth (replied Socrates), by running him down like a hare,
nor by decoying him like a bird, or by force like a wild boar. (7) To
capture a friend against his will is a toilsome business, and to bind
him in fetters like a slave by no means easy. Those who are so treated
are apt to become foes instead of friends. (8)
(7) Reading {kaproi}, al. {ekhthroi}, "an enemy."
(8) Or, "Hate rather than friendship is the outcome of these methods."
Cri. But how convert them into friends?
Soc. There are certain incantations, we are told, which those who know
them have only to utter, and they can make friends of whom they list;
and there are certain philtres also which those who have the secret of
them may administer to whom they like and win their love.
Cri. From what source shall we learn them?
Soc. You need not go farther than Homer to learn that which the Sirens
sang to Odysseus, (9) the first words of which run, I think, as follows:
Hither, come hither, thou famous man, Odysseus, great glory of the
Achaeans!
(9) "Od." xii. 184.
Cri. And did the magic words of this spell serve for all men alike? Had
the Sirens only to utter this one incantation, and was every listener
constrained to stay?
Soc. No; this was the incantation reserved for souls athirst for fame,
of virtue emulous.
Cri. Which is as much as to say, we must suit the incantation to the
listener, so that when he hears the words he shall not think that the
enchanter is laughing at him in his sleeve. I cannot certainly conceive
a method better calculated to excite hatred and repulsion than to go
to some one who knows that he is small and ugly and a weakling, and to
breathe in his ears the flattering tale that he is beautiful and tall
and stalwart. But do you know any other love-charms, Socrates?
Soc. I cannot say that I do; but I have heard that Pericles (10) was
skilled in not a few, which he poured into the ear of our city and won
her love.
(10) See above, I. ii. 40; "Symp." viii. 39.
Cri. And how did Themistocles (11) win our city's love?
(11) See below, III. vi. 2; IV. ii. 2.
Soc. Ah, that was not by incantation at all. What he did was to encircle
our city with an amulet of saving virtue. (12)
(12) See Herod. vii. 143, "the wooden wall"; Thuc. i. 93, "'the walls'
of Athens."
Cri. You would imply, Socrates, would you not, that if we want to win
the love of any good man we need to be good ourselves in speech and
action?
And did you imagine (replied Socrates) that it was possible for a bad
man to make good friends?
Cri. Why, I could fancy I had seen some sorry speech-monger who was fast
friends with a great and noble statesman; or again, some born commander
and general who was boon companion with fellows quite incapable of
generalship. (13)
(13) Or, "Why, yes, when I see some base orator fast friends with a
great leader of the people; or, again, some fellow incapable of
generalship a comrade to the greatest captains of his age."
Soc. But in reference to the point we were discussing, may I ask whether
you know of any one who can attach a useful friend to himself without
being of use in return? (14) Can service ally in friendship with
disservice?
(14) Add, "Can service ally in friendship with disservice? Must there
not be a reciprocity of service to make friendship lasting?"
Cri. In good sooth no. But now, granted it is impossible for a base man
to be friends with the beautiful and noble, (14) I am concerned at once
to discover if one who is himself of a beautiful and noble character
can, with a wave of the hand, as it were, attach himself in friendship
to every other beautiful and noble nature.
(14) {kalous kagathous}.
Soc. What perplexes and confounds you, Critobulus, is the fact that
so often men of noble conduct, with souls aloof from baseness, are not
friends but rather at strife and discord with one another, and deal more
harshly by one another than they would by the most good-for-nothing of
mankind.
Cri. Yes, and this holds true not of private persons only, but states,
the most eager to pursue a noble policy and to repudiate a base one,
are frequently in hostile relation to one another. As I reason on
these things my heart fails me, and the question, how friends are to
be acquired, fills me with despondency. The bad, as I see, cannot be
friends with one another. For how can such people, the ungrateful, or
reckless, or covetous, or faithless, or incontinent, adhere together as
friends? Without hesitation I set down the bad as born to be foes not
friends, and as bearing the birthmark of internecine hate. But then
again, as you suggest, no more can these same people harmonise in
friendship with the good. For how should they who do evil be friends
with those who hate all evil-doing? And if, last of all, they that
cultivate virtue are torn by party strife in their struggle for the
headship of the states, envying one another, hating one another, who are
left to be friends? where shall goodwill and faithfulness be found among
men?
Soc. The fact is there is some subtlety in the texture of these things.
(15) Seeds of love are implanted in man by nature. Men have need of
one another, feel pity, help each other by united efforts, and in
recognition of the fact show mutual gratitude. But there are seeds of
war implanted also. The same objects being regarded as beautiful or
agreeable by all alike, they do battle for their possession; a spirit of
disunion (16) enters, and the parties range themselves in adverse camps.
Discord and anger sound a note of war: the passion of more-having,
staunchless avarice, threatens hostility; and envy is a hateful fiend.
(17)
(15) i.e. a cunning intertwining of the threads of warp and woof.
(16) Cf. Shelley, "The devil of disunion in their souls."
(17) The diction is poetical.
But nevertheless, through all opposing barriers friendship steals her
way and binds together the beautiful and good among mankind. (18) Such
is their virtue that they would rather possess scant means painlessly
than wield an empire won by war. In spite of hunger and thirst they will
share their meat and drink without a pang. Not bloom of lusty youth, nor
love's delights can warp their self-control; nor will they be tempted
to cause pain where pain should be unknown. It is theirs not merely
to eschew all greed of riches, not merely to make a just and lawful
distribution of wealth, but to supply what is lacking to the needs of
one another. Theirs it is to compose strife and discord not in painless
oblivion simply, but to the general advantage. Theirs also to hinder
such extravagance of anger as shall entail remorse hereafter. And as to
envy they will make a clean sweep and clearance of it: the good things
which a man possesses shall be also the property of his friends, and the
goods which they possess are to be looked upon as his. Where then is
the improbability that the beautiful and noble should be sharers in the
honours (19) of the state not only without injury, but even to their
mutual advantage?
(18) Or, as we say, "the elite of human kind."
(19) "And the offices."
They indeed who covet and desire the honours and offices in a state
for the sake of the liberty thereby given them to embezzle the public
moneys, to deal violently by their fellow-creatures, and to batten in
luxury themselves, may well be regarded as unjust and villainous persons
incapable of harmony with one another. But if a man desire to obtain
these selfsame honours in order that, being himself secure against
wrong-doing, he may be able to assist his friends in what is right, and,
raised to a high position, (20) may essay to confer some blessing on the
land of his fathers, what is there to hinder him from working in harmony
with some other of a like spirit? Will he, with the "beautiful and
noble" at his side, be less able to aid his friends? or will his
power to benefit the community be shortened because the flower of that
community are fellow-workers in that work? Why, even in the contests
of the games it is obvious that if it were possible for the stoutest
combatants to combine against the weakest, the chosen band would come
off victors in every bout, and would carry off all the prizes. This
indeed is against the rules of the actual arena; but in the field of
politics, where the beautiful and good hold empery, and there is nought
to hinder any from combining with whomsoever a man may choose to benefit
the state, it will be a clear gain, will it not, for any one engaged
in state affairs to make the best men his friends, whereby he will find
partners and co-operators in his aims instead of rivals and antagonists?
And this at least is obvious: in case of foreign war a man will need
allies, but all the more if in the ranks opposed to him should stand the
flower of the enemy. (21) Moreover, those who are willing to fight
your battles must be kindly dealt with, that goodwill may quicken to
enthusiasm; and one good man (22) is better worth your benefiting that a
dozen knaves, since a little kindness goes a long way with the good, but
with the base the more you give them the more they ask for.
(20) "As archon," or "raised to rule."
(21) Lit. "the beautiful and good."
(22) Or, "the best, though few, are better worth your benefiting than
the many base."
So keep a good heart, Critobulus; only try to become good yourself, and
when you have attained, set to your hand to capture the beautiful and
good. Perhaps I may be able to give you some help in this quest, being
myself an adept in Love's lore. (23) No matter who it is for whom my
heart is aflame; in an instant my whole soul is eager to leap forth.
With vehemence I speed to the mark. I, who love, demand to be loved
again; this desire in me must be met by counter desire in him; this
thirst for his society by thirst reciprocal for mine. And these will
be your needs also, I foresee, whenever you are seized with longing to
contract a friendship. Do not hide from me, therefore, whom you would
choose as a friend, since, owing to the pains I take to please him
who pleases me, I am not altogether unversed, I fancy, in the art of
catching men. (24)
(23) "An authority in matters of love." Cf. Plat. "Symp." 177 D; Xen.
"Symp." viii. 2.
(24) See below, III. xi. 7; cf. Plat. "Soph." 222; N. T. Matt. iv. 19,
{alieis anthropon}.
Critobulus replied: Why, these are the very lessons of instruction,
Socrates, for which I have been long athirst, and the more particularly
if this same love's lore will enable me to capture those who are good of
soul and those who are beautiful of person.
Soc. Nay, now I warn you, Critobulus, it is not within the province of
my science to make the beautiful endure him who would lay hands upon
them. And that is why men fled from Scylla, I am persuaded, because she
laid hands upon them; but the Sirens were different--they laid hands on
nobody, but sat afar off and chanted their spells in the ears of all;
and therefore, it is said, all men endured to listen, and were charmed.
Cri. I promise I will not lay violent hands on any; therefore, if you
have any good device for winning friends, instruct your pupil.
Soc. And if there is to be no laying on of the hands, there must be no
application either of the lips; is it agreed?
Cri. No, nor application of the lips to any one--not beautiful.
Soc. See now! you cannot open your mouth without some luckless
utterance. Beauty suffers no such liberty, however eagerly the ugly may
invite it, making believe some quality of soul must rank them with the
beautiful.
Cri. Be of good cheer then; let the compact stand thus: "Kisses for the
beautiful, and for the good a rain of kisses." So now teach us the art
of catching friends.
Soc. Well then, when you wish to win some one's affection, you will
allow me to lodge information against you to the effect that you admire
him and desire to be his friend?
Cri. Lodge the indictment, with all my heart. I never heard of any one
who hated his admirers.
Soc. And if I add to the indictment the further charge that through your
admiration you are kindly disposed towards him, you will not feel I am
taking away your character?
Cri. Why, no; for myself I know a kindly feeling springs up in my heart
towards any one whom I conceive to be kindly disposed to me.
Soc. All this I shall feel empowered to say about you to those whose
friendship you seek, and I can promise further help; only there is a
comprehensive "if" to be considered: if you will further authorise me to
say that you are devoted to your friends; that nothing gives you so much
joy as a good friend; that you pride yourself no less on the fine deeds
of those you love than on your own; and on their good things equally
with your own; that you never weary of plotting and planning to procure
them a rich harvest of the same; and lastly, that you have discovered
a man's virtue is to excel his friends in kindness and his foes in
hostility. If I am authorised thus to report of you, I think you will
find me a serviceable fellow-hunter in the quest of friends, which is
the conquest of the good.
Cri. Why this appeal to me?--as if you had not free permission to say
exactly what you like about me.
Soc. No; that I deny, on the authority of Aspasia. (25) I have it from
her own lips. "Good matchmakers," she said tome, "were clever hands at
cementing alliances between people, provided the good qualities they
vouched for were truthfully reported; but when it came to their telling
lies, for her part she could not compliment them. (26) Their poor
deluded dupes ended by hating each other and the go-betweens as well."
Now I myself am so fully persuaded of the truth of this that I feel it
is not in my power to say aught in your praise which I cannot say with
truth.
(25) Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, of Miletus. See "Econ." iii. 14;
Plat. "Menex." 235 E; Aesch. Socrat. ap. Cic. "de Invent." I.
xxxi. 51. See Grote, "H. G." vi. 132 foll.; Cobet, "Pros. Xen."
(26) Reading {ouk ethelein epainein}, or if {ouk ophelein epainousas}
with Kuhner transl. "Good matchmakers, she told me, have to
consult truth when reporting favourably of any one: then indeed
they are terribly clever at bringing people together: whereas
false flatterers do no good; their dupes," etc.
Cri. Really, Socrates, you are a wonderfully good friend to me--in so
far as I have any merit which will entitle me to win a friend, you will
lend me a helping hand, it seems; otherwise you would rather not forge
any petty fiction for my benefit.
Soc. But tell me, how shall I assist you best, think you? By praising
you falsely or by persuading you to try to be a good man? Or if it is
not plain to you thus, look at the matter by the light of some examples.
I wish to introduce you to a shipowner, or to make him your friend: I
begin by singing your praises to him falsely thus, "You will find him a
good pilot"; he catches at the phrase, and entrusts his ship to you,
who have no notion of guiding a vessel. What can you expect but to make
shipwreck of the craft and yourself together? or suppose by similar
false assertions I can persuade the state at large to entrust her
destinies to you--"a man with a fine genius for command," I say, "a
practised lawyer," "a politician born," and so forth. The odds are, the
state and you may come to grief through you. Or to take an instance
from everyday life. By my falsehoods I persuade some private person to
entrust his affairs to you as "a really careful and business-like
person with a head for economy." When put to the test would not your
administration prove ruinous, and the figure you cut ridiculous? No, my
dear friend, there is but one road, the shortest, safest, best, and it
is simply this: In whatsoever you desire to be deemed good, endeavour
to be good. For of all the virtues namable among men, consider, and
you will find there is not one but may be increased by learning and
practice. For my part then, Critobulus, these are the principles on
which we ought to go a-hunting; but if you take a different view, I am
all attention, please instruct me.
Then Critobulus: Nay, Socrates, I should be ashamed to gainsay what you
have said; if I did, it would neither be a noble statement nor a true.
(27)
(27) {kala... alethe}.
VII
He had two ways of dealing with the difficulties of his friends: where
ignorance was the cause, he tried to meet the trouble by a dose of
common sense; or where want and poverty were to blame, by lessoning them
that they should assist one another according to their ability; and here
I may mention certain incidents which occurred within my own knowledge.
How, for instance, he chanced upon Aristarchus wearing the look of one
who suffered from a fit of the "sullens," and thus accosted him.
Soc. You seem to have some trouble on your mind, Aristarchus; if so, you
should share it with your friends. Perhaps together we might lighten the
weight of it a little.
Aristarchus answered: Yes, Socrates, I am in sore straits indeed. Ever
since the party strife declared itself in the city, (1) what with the
rush of people to Piraeus, and the wholesale banishments, I have been
fairly at the mercy of my poor deserted female relatives. Sisters,
nieces, cousins, they have all come flocking to me for protection. I
have fourteen free-born souls, I tell you, under my single roof, and how
are we to live? We can get nothing out of the soil--that is in the hands
of the enemy; nothing from my house property, for there is scarcely a
living soul left in the city; my furniture? no one will buy it; money?
there is none to be borrowed--you would have a better chance to find
it by looking for it on the road than to borrow it from a banker. Yes,
Socrates, to stand by and see one's relatives die of hunger is hard
indeed, and yet to feed so many at such a pinch impossible.
(1) i.e. circa 404-403 B.C. See "Hell." II. iv.
After he listened to the story, Socrates asked: How comes it that
Ceramon, (2) with so many mouths to feed, not only contrives to furnish
himself and them with the necessaries of life, but to realise a handsome
surplus, whilst you being in like plight (3) are afraid you will one and
all perish of starvation for want of the necessaries of life?
(2) An employer of labour, apparently, on a grand scale.
(3) Lit. "with your large family to feed." L. Dindorf would like to
read {su de oligous}, "you with your small family."
Ar. Why, bless your soul, do you not see he has only slaves and I have
free-born souls to feed?
Soc. And which should you say were the better human beings, the
free-born members of your household or Ceramon's slaves?
Ar. The free souls under my roof without a doubt.
Soc. Is it not a shame, then, that he with his baser folk to back
him should be in easy circumstances, while you and your far superior
household are in difficulties?
Ar. To be sure it is, when he has only a set of handicraftsmen to feed,
and I my liberally-educated household.
Soc. What is a handicraftsman? Does not the term apply to all who can
make any sort of useful product or commodity?
Ar. Certainly.
Soc. Barley meal is a useful product, is it not?
Ar. Pre-eminently so.
Soc. And loaves of bread?
Ar. No less.
Soc. Well, and what do you say to cloaks for men and for women--tunics,
mantles, vests? (4)
(4) For these articles of dress see Becker's "Charicles," Exc. i. to
Sc. xi. "Dress."
Ar. Yes, they are all highly useful commodities.
Soc. Then your household do not know how to make any of these?
Ar. On the contrary, I believe they can make them all.
Soc. Then you are not aware that by means of the manufacture of one of
these alone--his barley meal store--Nausicydes (5) not only maintains
himself and his domestics, but many pigs and cattle besides, and
realises such large profits that he frequently contributes to the state
benevolences; (6) while there is Cyrebus, again, who, out of a bread
factory, more than maintains the whole of his establishment, and lives
in the lap of luxury; and Demeas of Collytus gets a livelihood out of
a cloak business, and Menon as a mantua-maker, and so, again, more than
half the Megarians (7) by the making of vests.
(5) Nausicydes. Cobet, "Pros. Xen." cf. Aristoph. "Eccles." 426.
(6) Lit. "state liturgies," or "to the burden of the public services."
For these see Gow, "Companion," xviii. "Athenian Finance."
(7) Cf. Arist. "Acharnians," 519, {esukophantei Megareon ta
khlaniskia}. See Dr. Merry's note ad loc.
Ar. Bless me, yes! They have got a set of barbarian fellows, whom they
purchase and keep, to manufacture by forced labour whatever takes their
fancy. My kinswomen, I need not tell you, are free-born ladies.
Soc. Then, on the ground that they are free-born and your kinswomen,
you think that they ought to do nothing but eat and sleep? Or is it your
opinion that people who live in this way--I speak of free-born people
in general--lead happier lives, and are more to be congratulated, than
those who give their time and attention to such useful arts of life as
they are skilled in? Is this what you see in the world, that for the
purpose of learning what it is well to know, and of recollecting the
lessons taught, or with a view to health and strength of body, or for
the sake of acquiring and preserving all that gives life its charm,
idleness and inattention are found to be helpful, whilst work and study
are simply a dead loss? Pray, when those relatives of yours were taught
what you tell me they know, did they learn it as barren information
which they would never turn to practical account, or, on the contrary,
as something with which they were to be seriously concerned some day,
and from which they were to reap advantage? Do human beings in general
attain to well-tempered manhood by a course of idling, or by carefully
attending to what will be of use? Which will help a man the more to grow
in justice and uprightness, to be up and doing, or to sit with folded
hands revolving the ways and means of existence? As things now stand,
if I am not mistaken, there is no love lost between you. You cannot help
feeling that they are costly to you, and they must see that you find
them a burthen? This is a perilous state of affairs, in which hatred and
bitterness have every prospect of increasing, whilst the pre-existing
bond of affection (8) is likely to be snapped.
(8) Or, "the original stock of kindliness will be used up."
But now, if only you allow them free scope for their energies, when you
come to see how useful they can be, you will grow quite fond of them,
and they, when they perceive that they can please you, will cling to
their benefactor warmly. Thus, with the memory of former kindnesses
made sweeter, you will increase the grace which flows from kindnesses
tenfold; you will in consequence be knit in closer bonds of love and
domesticity. If, indeed, they were called upon to do any shameful work,
let them choose death rather than that; but now they know, it would
seem, the very arts and accomplishments which are regarded as the
loveliest and the most suitable for women; and the things which we know,
any of us, are just those which we can best perform, that is to say,
with ease and expedition; it is a joy to do them, and the result is
beautiful. (9) Do not hesitate, then, to initiate your friends in what
will bring advantage to them and you alike; probably they will gladly
respond to your summons.
(9) Or, "with ease, rapidity, pleasure and effect."
Well, upon my word (Aristarchus answered), I like so well what you
say, Socrates, that though hitherto I have not been disposed to borrow,
knowing that when I had spent what I got I should not be in a condition
to repay, I think I can now bring myself to do so in order to raise a
fund for these works.
Thereupon a capital was provided; wools were purchased; the good man's
relatives set to work, and even whilst they breakfasted they worked, and
on and on till work was ended and they supped. Smiles took the place of
frowns; they no longer looked askance with suspicion, but full into each
other's eyes with happiness. They loved their kinsman for his kindness
to them. He became attached to them as helpmates; and the end of it all
was, he came to Socrates and told him with delight how matters fared;
"and now," he added, "they tax me with being the only drone in the
house, who sit and eat the bread of idleness."
To which Socrates: Why do not you tell them the fable of the dog? (10)
Once on a time, so goes the story, when beasts could speak, the sheep
said to her master, "What a marvel is this, master, that to us, your
own sheep, who provide you with fleeces and lambs and cheese, you give
nothing, save only what we may nibble off earth's bosom; but with this
dog of yours, who provides you with nothing of the sort, you share
the very meat out of your mouth." When the dog heard these words, he
answered promptly, "Ay, in good sooth, for is it not I who keep you safe
and sound, you sheep, so that you are not stolen by man nor harried by
wolves; since, if I did not keep watch over you, you would not be able
so much as to graze afield, fearing to be destroyed." And so, says
the tale, the sheep had to admit that the dog was rightly preferred to
themselves in honour. And so do you tell your flock yonder that like the
dog in the fable you are their guardian and overseer, and it is thanks
to you that they are protected from evil and evildoers, so that they
work their work and live their lives in blissful security.
(10) See Joseph Jacobs, "The Fables of Aesop," vol. i. p. 26 foll.,
for "a complete list of the Fables given in Greek literature up to
the fall of Greek independence." Cf. Hesiod, "Works and Days," 202
foll.; Archilochus, 89 (60), Bergk; Herod. i. 141; Aesch.
"Myrmid." fr. 123; Aristot. "Rhet." II. xx.
VIII
At another time chancing upon an old friend whom he had not seen for a
long while, he greeted him thus.
Soc. What quarter of the world do you hail from, Eutherus?
The other answered: From abroad, just before the close of the war; but
at present from the city itself. (1) You see, since we have been denuded
of our possessions across the frontier, (2) and my father left me
nothing in Attica, I must needs bide at home, and provide myself with
the necessaries of life by means of bodily toil, which seems preferable
to begging from another, especially as I have no security on which to
raise a loan.
(1) Lit. "from here." The conversation perhaps takes place in Piraeus
404 B.C.
(2) Or, "colonial possession." Cf. "Symp." iv. 31.
Soc. And how long do you expect your body to be equal to providing the
necessaries of life for hire?
Euth. Goodness knows, Socrates--not for long.
Soc. And when you find yourself an old man, expenses will not diminish,
and yet no one will care to pay you for the labour of your hands.
Euth. That is true.
Soc. Would it not be better then to apply yourself at once to such
work as will stand you in good stead when you are old--that is, address
yourself to some large proprietor who needs an assistant in managing his
estate? (3) By superintending his works, helping to get in his crops,
and guarding his property in general, you will be a benefit to the
estate and be benefited in return.
(3) Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. iii. 48.
I could not endure the yoke of slavery, Socrates! (he exclaimed).
Soc. And yet the heads of departments in a state are not regarded as
adopting the badge of slavery because they manage the public property,
but as having attained a higher degree of freedom rather.
Euth. In a word, Socrates, the idea of being held to account to another
is not at all to my taste.
Soc. And yet, Eutherus, it would be hard to find a work which did
not involve some liability to account; in fact it is difficult to do
anything without some mistake or other, and no less difficult, if
you should succeed in doing it immaculately, to escape all unfriendly
criticism. I wonder now whether you find it easy to get through your
present occupations entirely without reproach. No? Let me tell you what
you should do. You should avoid censorious persons and attach yourself
to the considerate and kind-hearted, and in all your affairs accept
with a good grace what you can and decline what you feel you cannot do.
Whatever it be, do it heart and soul, and make it your finest work. (4)
There lies the method at once to silence fault-finders and to minister
help to your own difficulties. Life will flow smoothly, risks will be
diminished, provision against old age secured.
(4) Or, "study to make it your finest work, the expression of a real
enthusiasm."
IX
At another time, as I am aware, he had heard a remark made by Crito (1)
that life at Athens was no easy matter for a man who wished to mind his
own affairs.
(1) Crito. See above, I. ii. 48; Cobet, "P. X."; cf. Plat. "Rep."
viii. 549 C.
As, for instance, at this moment (Crito proceeded) there are a set
of fellows threatening me with lawsuits, not because they have any
misdemeanour to allege against me, but simply under the conviction that
I will sooner pay a sum of money than be troubled further.
To which Socrates replied: Tell me, Crito, you keep dogs, do you not, to
ward off wolves from your flocks?
Cr. Certainly; it pays to do so.
Soc. Then why do you not keep a watchman willing and competent to ward
off this pack of people who seek to injure you?
I should not at all mind (he answered), if I were not afraid he might
turn again and rend his keeper.
What! (rejoined Socrates), do you not see that to gratify a man like
yourself is far pleasanter as a matter of self-interest than to quarrel
with you? You may be sure there are plenty of people here who will take
the greatest pride in making you their friend.
Accordingly, they sought out Archedemus, (2) a practical man with a
clever tongue in his head (3) but poor; the fact being, he was not the
sort to make gain by hook or by crook, but a lover of honesty and of
too good a nature himself to make his living as a pettifogger. (4) Crito
would then take the opportunity of times of harvesting and put aside
small presents for Achedemus of corn and oil, or wine, or wool, or any
other of the farm produce forming the staple commodities of life, or he
would invite him to a sacrificial feast, and otherwise pay him marked
attention. Archedemus, feeling that he had in Crito's house a harbour
of refuge, could not make too much of his patron, and ere long he
had hunted up a long list of iniquities which could be lodged against
Crito's pettifogging persecutors themselves, and not only their numerous
crimes but their numerous enemies; and presently he prosecuted one of
them in a public suit, where sentence would be given against him "what
to suffer or what to pay." (5) The accused, conscious as he was of
many rascally deeds, did all he could to be quit of Archedemus, but
Archedemus was not to be got rid of. He held on until he had made the
informer not only loose his hold of Crito but pay himself a sum of
money; and now that Archedemus had achieved this and other similar
victories, it is easy to guess what followed. (6) It was just as when
some shepherd has got a very good dog, all the other shepherds wish
to lodge their flocks in his neighbourhood that they too may reap the
benefit of him. So a number of Crito's friends came begging him to allow
Archedemus to be their guardian also, and Archedemus was overjoyed to
do something to gratify Crito, and so it came about that not only Crito
abode in peace, but his friends likewise. If any of those people with
whom Archedemus was not on the best of terms were disposed to throw
it in his teeth that he accepted his patron's benefits and paid in
flatteries, he had a ready retort: "Answer me this question--which is
the more scandalous, to accept kindnesses from honest folk and to repay
them, with the result that I make such people my friends but quarrel
with knaves, or to make enemies of honourable gentlemen (7) by attempts
to do them wrong, with the off-chance indeed of winning the friendship
of some scamps in return for my co-operation, but the certainty of
losing in the tone of my acquaintances?" (8)
(2) Archedemus, possibly the demagogue, "Hell." I. vii. 2. So Cobet,
"P. X.," but see Grote, "H. G." viii. 245.
(3) Lit. "very capable of speech and action"--the writer's favourite
formula for the well-trained Athenian who can speak fluently and
reason clearly, and act energetically and opportunely.
(4) Reading {kai euphuesteros on} (or {e os})... {apo sukophanton}
(or {sukophantion}), after Cobet, "P. X." s.v. Archedemus. The
MSS. give {kai ephe raston einai}--"nothing is easier," he said,
"than recovering from sycophants."
(5) For this formula cf. "Econ." vi. 24. Cf. Plat. "Statesm." 299 A.
(6) {ede tote}. Cf. Plat. "Laws," vi. 778 C.
(7) Lit. the {kaloi kagathoi}, which like {khrestous} and {ponerous}
has a political as well as an ethical meaning.
(8) Lit. "must associate with these (the {ponerois}) instead of those
(the {kalois te kagathois}).
The net result of the whole proceedings was that Archedemus was now
Crito's right hand, (9) and by the rest of Crito's friends he was held
in honour.
(9) He was No. 1--{eis}.
X
Again I may cite, as known to myself, (1) the following discussion; the
arguments were addressed to Diodorus, one of his companions. The master
said:
(1) Or, "for which I can personally vouch."
Tell me, Diodorus, if one of your slaves runs away, are you at pains to
recover him?
More than that (Diodorus answered), I summon others to my aid and I have
a reward cried for his recovery.
Soc. Well, if one of your domestics is sick, do you tend him and call in
the doctors to save his life?
Diod. Decidedly I do.
Soc. And if an intimate acquaintance who is far more precious to you
than any of your household slaves is about to perish of want, you would
think it incumbent on you to take pains to save his life? Well! now you
know without my telling you that Hermogenes (2) is not made of wood or
stone. If you helped him he would be ashamed not to pay you in kind.
And yet--the opportunity of possessing a willing, kindly, and trusty
assistant well fitted to do your bidding, and not merely that, but
capable of originating useful ideas himself, with a certain forecast
of mind and judgment--I say such a man is worth dozens of slaves. Good
economists tell us that when a precious article may be got at a low
price we ought to buy. And nowadays when times are so bad it is possible
to get good friends exceedingly cheap.
(2) Hermogenes, presumably the son of Hipponicus. See I. ii. 48.
Diodorus answered: You are quite right, Socrates; bid Hermogenes come to
me.
Soc. Bid Hermogenes come to you!--not I indeed! since for aught I can
understand you are no better entitled to summon him that to go to him
yourself, nor is the advantage more on his side than your own.
Thus Diodorus went off in a trice to seek Hermogenes, and at no great
outlay won to himself a friend--a friend whose one concern it now was to
discover how, by word or deed, he might help and gladden Diodorus.
BOOK III
I
Aspirants to honour and distinction (1) derived similar help from
Socrates, who in each case stimulated in them a persevering assiduity
towards their several aims, as the following narratives tend to show. He
had heard on one occasion of the arrival in Athens of Dionysodorus, (2)
who professed to teach the whole duty of a general. (3) Accordingly he
remarked to one of those who were with him--a young man whose anxiety to
obtain the office of Strategos (4) was no secret to him:
(1) {ton kalon} = everything which the {kalos te kagathos} should aim
at, but especially the honourable offices of state such as the
Archonship, Strategia, Hipparchia, etc. See Plat. "Laches."
(2) Dionysodorus of Chios, presumably. See Plat. "Euthyd." 271 C foll.
(3) A professor of the science and art of strategy.
(4) Lit. "that honour," sc. the Strategia.
Soc. It would be monstrous on the part of any one who sought to become
a general (5) to throw away the slightest opportunity of learning the
duties of the office. Such a person, I should say, would deserve to be
fined and punished by the state far more than the charlatan who without
having learnt the art of a sculptor undertakes a contract to carve a
statue. Considering that the whole fortunes of the state are entrusted
to the general during a war, with all its incidental peril, it is only
reasonable to anticipate that great blessings or great misfortunes
will result in proportion to the success or bungling of that officer. I
appeal to you, young sir, do you not agree that a candidate who, while
taking pains to be elected neglects to learn the duties of the office,
would richly deserve to be fined?
(5) i.e. "head of the war department, and commander-in-chief," etc.
With arguments like these he persuaded the young man to go and take
lessons. After he had gone through the course he came back, and Socrates
proceeded playfully to banter him.
Soc. Behold our young friend, sirs, as Homer says of Agamemnon, of mein
majestical, (6) so he; does he not seem to move more majestically, like
one who has studied to be a general? Of course, just as a man who
has learned to play the harp is a harper, even if he never touch the
instrument, or as one who has studied medicine is a physician, though he
does not practise, so our friend here from this time forward is now and
ever shall be a general, even though he does not receive a vote at the
elections. But the dunce who has not the science is neither general
nor doctor, no, not even if the whole world appointed him. But (he
proceeded, turning to the youth), in case any of us should ever find
ourselves captain or colonel (7) under you, to give us some smattering
of the science of war, what did the professor take as the starting-point
of his instruction in generalship? Please inform us.
(6) "Il." iii. 169, 170.
(7) Or, "brigadier or captain," lit. taxiarch or lochagos.
Then the young man: He began where he ended; he taught me tactics
(8)--tactics and nothing else.
(8) Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 12 foll.; VIII. v. 15.
Yet surely (replied Socrates) that is only an infinitesimal part of
generalship. A general (9) must be ready in furnishing the material of
war: in providing the commissariat for his troops; quick in devices, he
must be full of practical resource; nothing must escape his eye or tax
his endurance; he must be shrewd, and ready of wit, a combination at
once of clemency and fierceness, of simplicity and of insidious
craft; he must play the part of watchman, of robber; now prodigal as
a spendthrift, and again close-fisted as a miser, the bounty of his
munificence must be equalled by the narrowness of his greed; impregnable
in defence, a very dare-devil in attack--these and many other qualities
must he possess who is to make a good general and minister of war; they
must come to him by gift of nature or through science. No doubt it is a
grand thing also to be a tactician, since there is all the difference in
the world between an army properly handled in the field and the same
in disorder; just as stones and bricks, woodwork and tiles, tumbled
together in a heap are of no use at all, but arrange them in a certain
order--at bottom and atop materials which will not crumble or rot,
such as stones and earthen tiles, and in the middle between the two put
bricks and woodwork, with an eye to architectural principle, (10) and
finally you get a valuable possession--to wit, a dwelling-place.
(9) A strategos. For the duties and spheres of action of this officer,
see Gow, op. cit. xiv. 58.
(10) "As in the building of a house." See Vitrivius, ii. 3; Plin. xxv.
14.
The simile is very apt, Socrates (11) (replied the youth), for in
battle, too, the rule is to draw up the best men in front and rear,
with those of inferior quality between, where they may be led on by the
former and pushed on by the hinder.
(11) Cf. "Il." iv. 297 foll.; "Cyrop." VI. iii. 25; Polyb. x. 22.
Soc. Very good, no doubt, if the professor taught you to distinguish
good and bad; but if not, where is the use of your learning? It would
scarcely help you, would it, to be told to arrange coins in piles, the
best coins at top and bottom and the worst in the middle, unless you
were first taught to distinguish real from counterfeit.
The Youth. Well no, upon my word, he did not teach us that, so that the
task of distinguishing between good and bad must devolve on ourselves.
Soc. Well, shall we see, then, how we may best avoid making blunders
between them?
I am ready (replied the youth).
Soc. Well then! Let us suppose we are marauders, and the task imposed
upon us is to carry off some bullion; it will be a right disposition of
our forces if we place in the vanguard those who are the greediest of
gain? (12)
(12) "Whose fingers itch for gold."
The Youth. I should think so.
Soc. Then what if there is danger to be faced? Shall the vanguard
consist of men who are greediest of honour?
The Youth. It is these, at any rate, who will face danger for the sake
of praise and glory. (13) Fortunately such people are not hid away in
a corner; they shine forth conspicuous everywhere, and are easy to be
discovered.
(13) Cf. Shakesp. "seeking the bubble reputation even in the cannon's
mouth."
Soc. But tell me, did he teach you how to draw up troops in general,
or specifically where and how to apply each particular kind of tactical
arrangement?
The Youth. Nothing of the sort.
Soc. And yet there are and must be innumerable circumstances in which
the same ordering of march or battle will be out of place.
The Youth. I assure you he did not draw any of these fine distinctions.
He did not, did not he? (he answered). Bless me! Go back to him again,
then, and ply him with questions; if he really has the science, and is
not lost to all sense of shame, he will blush to have taken your money
and then to have sent you away empty.
II
At another time he fell in with a man who had been chosen general and
minister of war, and thus accosted him.
Soc. Why did Homer, think you, designate Agamemnon "shepherd of the
peoples"? (1) Was it possibly to show that, even as a shepherd must care
for his sheep and see that they are safe and have all things needful,
and that the objects of their rearing be secured, so also must a general
take care that his soldiers are safe and have their supplies, and attain
the objects of their soldiering? Which last is that they may get the
mastery of their enemies, and so add to their own good fortune and
happiness; or tell me, what made him praise Agamemnon, saying--
He is both a good king and a warrior bold? (2)
Did he mean, perhaps, to imply that he would be a 'warrior bold,' not
merely in standing alone and bravely battling against the foe, but as
inspiring the whole of his host with like prowess; and by a 'good king,'
not merely one who should stand forth gallantly to protect his own life,
but who should be the source of happiness to all over whom he reigns?
Since a man is not chosen king in order to take heed to himself, albeit
nobly, but that those who chose him may attain to happiness through him.
And why do men go soldiering except to ameliorate existence? (3) and to
this end they choose their generals that they may find in them guides to
the goal in question. He, then, who undertakes that office is bound to
procure for those who choose him the thing they seek for. And indeed it
were not easy to find any nobler ambition than this, or aught ignobler
than its opposite.
(1) "Il." ii. 243. "The People's Paster," Chapman.
(2) "Il." iii. 179; cf. "Symp." iv. 6. A favourite line of Alexander
the Great's, it is said.
(3) Of, "that life may reach some flower of happiness."
After such sort he handled the question, what is the virtue of a good
leader? and by shredding off all superficial qualities, laid bare as
the kernel of the matter that it is the function of every leader to make
those happy whom he may be called upon to lead. (4)
(4) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 342.
III
The following conversation with a youth who had just been elected
hipparch (1) (or commandant of cavalry), I can also vouch for. (2)
(1) Cf. "Hipparch."
(2) Lit. "I know he once held."
Soc. Can you tell us what set you wishing to be a general of cavalry,
young sir? What was your object? I suppose it was not simply to ride at
the head of the "knights," an honour not denied to the mounted archers,
(3) who ride even in front of the generals themselves?
(3) Lit. "Hippotoxotai." See Boeckh, "P. E. A." II. xxi. p. 264 (Eng.
tr.)
Hipp. You are right.
Soc. No more was it for the sake merely of public notoriety, since a
madman might boast of that fatal distinction. (4)
(4) Or, "as we all know, 'Tom Fool' can boast," etc.
Hipp. You are right again.
Soc. Is this possibly the explanation? you think to improve the
cavalry--your aim would be to hand it over to the state in better
condition than you find it; and, if the cavalry chanced to be called
out, you at their head would be the cause of some good thing to Athens?
Hipp. Most certainly.
Soc. Well, and a noble ambition too, upon my word--if you can achieve
your object. The command to which you are appointed concerns horses and
riders, does it not?
Hipp. It does, no doubt.
Soc. Come then, will you explain to us first how you propose to improve
the horses.
Hipp. Ah, that will scarcely form part of my business, I fancy. Each
trooper is personally responsible for the condition of his horse.
Soc. But suppose, when they present themselves and their horses, (5) you
find that some have brought beasts with bad feet or legs or otherwise
infirm, and others such ill-fed jades that they cannot keep up on the
march; others, again, brutes so ill broken and unmanageable that they
will not keep their place in the ranks, and others such desperate
plungers that they cannot be got to any place in the ranks at all. What
becomes of your cavalry force then? How will you charge at the head of
such a troop, and win glory for the state?
(5) For this phrase, see Schneider and Kuhner ad loc.
Hipp. You are right. I will try to look after the horses to my utmost.
Soc. Well, and will you not lay your hand to improve the men themselves?
Hipp. I will.
Soc. The first thing will be to make them expert in mounting their
chargers?
Hipp. That certainly, for if any of them were dismounted he would then
have a better chance of saving himself.
Soc. Well, but when it comes to the hazard of engagement, what will
you do then? Give orders to draw the enemy down to the sandy ground (6)
where you are accustomed to manouvre, or endeavour beforehand to put
your men through their practice on ground resembling a real battlefield?
(6) e.g. the hippodrome at Phaleron.
Hipp. That would be better, no doubt.
Soc. Well, shall you regard it as a part of your duty to see that as
many of your men as possible can take aim and shoot on horseback? (7)
(7) Cf. "Hipparch," i. 21.
Hipp. It will be better, certainly.
Soc. And have you thought how to whet the courage of your troopers? to
kindle in them rage to meet the enemy?--which things are but stimulants
to make stout hearts stouter?
Hipp. If I have not done so hitherto, I will try to make up for lost
time now.
Soc. And have you troubled your head at all to consider how you are to
secure the obedience of your men? for without that not one particle
of good will you get, for all your horses and troopers so brave and so
stout.
Hipp. That is a true saying; but how, Socrates, should a man best bring
them to this virtue? (8)
(8) {protrepsasthai}. See above, I. ii. 64; below, IV. v. 1.
Soc. I presume you know that in any business whatever, people are more
apt to follow the lead of those whom they look upon as adepts; thus in
case of sickness they are readiest to obey him whom they regard as
the cleverest physician; and so on a voyage the most skilful pilot; in
matters agricultural the best farmer, and so forth.
Hipp. Yes, certainly.
Soc. Then in this matter of cavalry also we may reasonably suppose that
he who is looked upon as knowing his business best will command the
readiest obedience.
Hipp. If, then, I can prove to my troopers that I am better than all of
them, will that suffice to win their obedience?
Soc. Yes, if along with that you can teach them that obedience to you
brings greater glory and surer safety to themselves.
Hipp. How am I to teach them that?
Soc. Upon my word! How are you to teach them that? Far more easily, I
take it, than if you had to teach them that bad things are better than
good, and more advantageous to boot.
Hipp. I suppose you mean that, besides his other qualifications a
commandant of cavalry must have command of speech and argument? (9)
(9) Or, "practise the art of oratory"; "express himself clearly and
rationally." See Grote, "H. G." VIII. lxvii. p. 463 note;
"Hipparch," i. 24; viii. 22.
Soc. Were you under the impression that the commandant was not to open
his mouth? Did it never occur to you that all the noblest things
which custom (10) compels us to learn, and to which indeed we owe our
knowledge of life, have all been learned by means of speech (11) and
reason; and if there be any other noble learning which a man may learn,
it is this same reason whereby he learns it; and the best teachers are
those who have the freest command of thought and language, and those
that have the best knowledge of the most serious things are the most
brilliant masters of disputation. Again, have you not observed that
whenever this city of ours fits out one of her choruses--such as that,
for instance, which is sent to Delos (12)--there is nothing elsewhere
from any quarter of the world which can compete with it; nor will you
find in any other state collected so fair a flower of manhood as in
Athens? (13)
(10) Cf Arist. "Rhet." ii. 12, {oi neoi pepaideuntai upo tou nomou
monon}.
(11) {dia logou}.
(12) See Thuc. iii. 104; and below, IV. viii. 2.
(13) See references ap. Schneider and Kuhner; "Symp." iv. 17.
Hipp. You say truly.
Soc. But for all that, it is not in sweetness of voice that the
Athenians differ from the rest of the world so much, nor in stature of
body or strength of limb, but in ambition and that love of honour (14)
which most of all gives a keen edge to the spirit in the pursuit of
things lovely and of high esteem.
(14) See below, v. 3; Dem. "de Cor." 28 foll.
Hipp. That, too, is a true saying.
Soc. Do you not think, then, that if a man devoted himself to our
cavalry also, here in Athens, we should far outstrip the rest of the
world, whether in the furnishing of arms and horses, or in orderliness
of battle-array, or in eager hazardous encounter with the foe, if only
we could persuade ourselves that by so doing we should obtain honour and
distinction?
Hipp. It is reasonable to think so.
Soc. Have no hesitation, therefore, but try to guide your men into this
path, (15) whence you yourself, and through you your fellow-citizens,
will reap advantage.
(15) Or, "to conduct which will not certainly fail of profit to
yourself or through you to..."
Yes, in good sooth, I will try (he answered).
IV
At another time, seeing Nicomachides on his way back from the
elections (of magistrates), (1) he asked him: Who are elected generals,
Nicomachides?
(1) Cf. "Pol. Ath." i. 3; Aristot. "Ath. Pol." 44. 4; and Dr. Sandys'
note ad loc. p. 165 of his edition.
And he: Is it not just like them, these citizens of Athens--just like
them, I say--to go and elect, not me, who ever since my name first
appeared on the muster-roll have literally worn myself out with military
service--now as a captain, now as a colonel--and have received all these
wounds from the enemy, look you! (at the same time, and suiting the
action to the word, he bared his arms and proceeded to show the scars
of ancient wounds)--they elect not me (he went on), but, if you please,
Antisthenes! who never served as a hoplite (2) in his life nor in the
cavalry ever made a brilliant stroke, that I ever heard tell of; no! in
fact, he has got no science at all, I take it, except to amass stores of
wealth.
(2) Cf. Lys. xiv. 10.
But still (returned Socrates), surely that is one point in his
favour--he ought to be able to provide the troops with supplies.
Nic. Well, for the matter of that, merchants are good hands at
collecting stores; but it does not follow that a merchant or trader will
be able to command an army.
But (rejoined Socrates) Antisthenes is a man of great pertinacity, who
insists on winning, and that is a very necessary quality in a general.
(3) Do not you see how each time he has been choragos (4) he has been
successful with one chorus after another?
(3) See Grote, "Plato," i. 465 foll.
(4) Choir-master, or Director of the Chorus. It was his duty to
provide and preside over a chorus to sing, dance, or play at any
of the public festivals, defraying the cost as a state service of
{leitourgia}. See "Pol. Ath." iii. 4; "Hiero," ix. 4; Aristot.
"Pol. Ath." 28. 3.
Nic. Bless me! yes; but there is a wide difference between standing at
the head of a band of singers and dancers and a troop of soldiers.
Soc. Still, without any practical skill in singing or in the training
of a chorus, Antisthenes somehow had the art to select the greatest
proficients in both.
Nic. Yes, and by the same reasoning we are to infer that on a campaign
he will find proficients, some to marshal the troops for him and others
to fight his battles?
Soc. Just so. If in matters military he only exhibits the same skill in
selecting the best hands as he has shown in matters of the chorus, it is
highly probable he will here also bear away the palm of victory; and we
may presume that if he expended so much to win a choric victory with a
single tribe, (5) he will be ready to expend more to secure a victory in
war with the whole state to back him.
(5) See Dem. "against Lept." 496. 26. Each tribe nominated such of its
members as were qualified to undertake the burden.
Nic. Do you really mean, Socrates, that it is the function of the same
man to provide efficient choruses and to act as commander-in-chief?
Soc. I mean this, that, given a man knows what he needs to provide,
and has the skill to do so, no matter what the department of things may
be--house or city or army--you will find him a good chief and director
(6) of the same.
(6) Or, "representative."
Then Nicomachides: Upon my word, Socrates, I should never have expected
to hear you say that a good housekeeper (7) and steward of an estate
would make a good general.
(7) Or, "economist"; cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 12.
Soc. Come then, suppose we examine their respective duties, and so
determine (8) whether they are the same or different.
(8) Lit. "get to know."
Nic. Let us do so.
Soc. Well then, is it not a common duty of both to procure the ready
obedience of those under them to their orders?
Nic. Certainly.
Soc. And also to assign to those best qualified to perform them their
distinctive tasks?
That, too, belongs to both alike (he answered).
Soc. Again, to chastise the bad and reward the good belongs to both
alike, methinks?
Nic. Decidedly.
Soc. And to win the kindly feeling of their subordinates must surely be
the noble ambition of both?
That too (he answered).
Soc. And do you consider it to the interest of both alike to win the
adherence of supporters and allies? (9)
(9) In reference to the necessity of building up a family connection
or political alliances cf. Arist. "Pol." iii. 9, 13.
Nic. Without a doubt.
Soc. And does it not closely concern them both to be good guardians of
their respective charges?
Nic. Very much so.
Soc. Then it equally concerns them both to be painstaking and prodigal
of toil in all their doings?
Nic. Yes, all these duties belong to both alike, but the parallel ends
when you come to actual fighting.
Soc. Yet they are both sure to meet with enemies?
Nic. There is no doubt about that.
Soc. Then is it not to the interest of both to get the upper hand of
these?
Nic. Certainly; but you omit to tell us what service organisation and
the art of management will render when it comes to actual fighting.
Soc. Why, it is just then, I presume, it will be of most service, for
the good economist knows that nothing is so advantageous or so lucrative
as victory in battle, or to put it negatively, nothing so disastrous
and expensive as defeat. He will enthusiastically seek out and provide
everything conducive to victory, he will painstakingly discover and
guard against all that tends to defeat, and when satisfied that all is
ready and ripe for victory he will deliver battle energetically, and
what is equally important, until the hour of final preparation has
arrived, (10) he will be cautious to deliver battle. Do not despise men
of economic genius, Nicomachides; the difference between the devotion
requisite to private affairs and to affairs of state is merely one of
quantity. For the rest the parallel holds strictly, and in this respect
pre-eminently, that both are concerned with human instruments: which
human beings, moreover, are of one type and temperament, whether we
speak of devotion to public affairs or of the administration of private
property. To fare well in either case is given to those who know the
secret of dealing with humanity, whereas the absence of that knowledge
will as certainly imply in either case a fatal note of discord. (11)
(10) Lit. "as long as he is unprepared."
(11) L. Dindorf, "Index Graec." Ox. ed.; cf. Hor. "Ep." II. ii. 144,
"sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae," "the harmony of
life," Conington.
V
A conversation held with Pericles the son of the great statesman may
here be introduced. (1) Socrates began:
(1) Or, "On one occasion Pericles was the person addressed in
conversation." For Pericles see "Hell." I. v. 16; vii. 15; Plut.
"Pericl." 37 (Clough, i. 368).
I am looking forward, I must tell you, Pericles, to a great improvement
in our military affairs when you are minister of war. (2) The prestige
of Athens, I hope, will rise; we shall gain the mastery over our
enemies.
(2) "Strategos."
Pericles replied: I devoutly wish your words might be fulfilled, but how
this happy result is to be obtained, I am at a loss to discover.
Shall we (Socrates continued), shall we balance the arguments for and
against, and consider to what extent the possibility does exist?
Pray let us do so (he answered).
Soc. Well then, you know that in point of numbers the Athenians are not
inferior to the Boeotians?
Per. Yes, I am aware of that.
Soc. And do you think the Boeotians could furnish a better pick of fine
healthy men than the Athenians?
Per. I think we should very well hold our own in that respect.
Soc. And which of the two would you take to be the more united
people--the friendlier among themselves?
Per. The Athenians, I should say, for so many sections of the Boeotians,
resenting the selfish policy (3) of Thebes, are ill disposed to that
power, but at Athens I see nothing of the sort.
(3) "The self-aggrandisement."
Soc. But perhaps you will say that there is no people more jealous of
honour or haughtier in spirit. (4) And these feelings are no weak
spurs to quicken even a dull spirit to hazard all for glory's sake and
fatherland.
(4) Reading {megalophronestatoi}, after Cobet. See "Hipparch," vii. 3;
or if as vulg. {philophronestatoi}, transl. "more affable."
Per. Nor is there much fault to find with Athenians in these respects.
Soc. And if we turn to consider the fair deeds of ancestry, (5) to
no people besides ourselves belongs so rich a heritage of stimulating
memories, whereby so many of us are stirred to pursue virtue with
devotion and to show ourselves in our turn also men of valour like our
sires.
(5) See Wesley's anthem, Eccles. xliv. 1, "Let us now praise famous
men and our fathers that begat us."
Per. All that you say, Socrates, is most true, but do you observe that
ever since the disaster of the thousand under Tolmides at Lebadeia,
coupled with that under Hippocrates at Delium, (6) the prestige of
Athens by comparison with the Boeotians has been lowered, whilst the
spirit of Thebes as against Athens had been correspondingly exalted, so
that those Boeotians who in old days did not venture to give battle
to the Athenians even in their own territory unless they had the
Lacedaemonians and the rest of the Peloponnesians to help them, do
nowadays threaten to make an incursion into Attica single-handed; and
the Athenians, who formerly, if they had to deal with the Boeotians (7)
only, made havoc of their territory, are now afraid the Boeotians may
some day harry Attica.
(6) Lebadeia, 447 B.C.; Delium, 424 B.C. For Tolmides and Hippocrates
see Thuc. i. 113; iv. 100 foll.; Grote, "H. G." v. 471; vi. 533.
(7) Reading {ote B. monoi}, al. {ou monoi}, "when the Boeotians were
not unaided."
To which Socrates: Yes, I perceive that this is so, but it seems to me
that the state was never more tractably disposed, never so ripe for
a really good leader, as to-day. For if boldness be the parent of
carelessness, laxity, and insubordination, it is the part of fear to
make people more disposed to application, obedience, and good order.
A proof of which you may discover in the behaviour of people on
ship-board. It is in seasons of calm weather when there is nothing
to fear that disorder may be said to reign, but as soon as there is
apprehension of a storm, or an enemy in sight, the scene changes; not
only is each word of command obeyed, but there is a hush of silent
expectation; the mariners wait to catch the next signal like an
orchestra with eyes upon the leader.
Per. But indeed, given that now is the opportunity to take obedience
at the flood, it is high time also to explain by what means we are
to rekindle in the hearts of our countrymen (8) the old fires--the
passionate longing for antique valour, for the glory and the wellbeing
of the days of old.
(8) Reading {anerasthenai}, Schneider's emendation of the vulg.
{aneristhenai}.
Well (proceeded Socrates), supposing we wished them to lay claim
to certain material wealth now held by others, we could not better
stimulate them to lay hands on the objects coveted than by showing them
that these were ancestral possessions (9) to which they had a natural
right. But since our object is that they should set their hearts on
virtuous pre-eminence, we must prove to them that such headship combined
with virtue is an old time-honoured heritage which pertains to them
beyond all others, and that if they strive earnestly af
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