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Dio's Rome, Volume 4

by Cassius Dio Cocceianus · English · Gutenberg #10883 · 688,796 chars · public domain (US)

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Title: Dio's Rome, Volume 4

Author: Cassius Dio Cocceianus

Translator: Herbert Baldwin Foster


        
Release date: January 1, 2004 [eBook #10883]
                Most recently updated: October 28, 2024

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DIO'S ROME, VOLUME 4 ***

DIO'S ROME



AN

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE ORIGINALLY COMPOSED IN GREEK

DURING THE REIGNS OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS, GETA

AND CARACALLA, MACRINUS, ELAGABALUS

AND ALEXANDER SEVERUS:


AND

NOW PRESENTED IN ENGLISH FORM

BY


HERBERT BALDWIN FOSTER, A.B. (Harvard), Ph. D. (Johns Hopkins), Acting
Professor of Greek in Lehigh University

FOURTH VOLUME


Extant Books 52-60 (B.C. 29-A.D. 54).


1905

PAFRAETS BOOK COMPANY TROY NEW YOKK



VOLUME CONTENTS

Book Fifty-two
Book Fifty-three
Book Fifty-four
Book Fifty-five
Book Fifty-six
Book Fifty-seven
Book Fifty-eight
Book Fifty-nine
Book Sixty


DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY

52

VOL. 4-1

The following is contained in the Fifty-second of Dio's Rome:

How Cæsar formed a plan to lay aside his sovereignty (chapters 1-40).

How he began to be called emperor (chapters 41-43).

Duration of time, the remainder of the consulship of Cæsar (5th) and
Sextus Apuleius. (B.C. 29 = a. u. 725.)


_(BOOK 52, BOISSEVAIN)_

[-1-] My record has so far stated what the Romans both did and endured
for seven hundred and twenty-five years under the monarchy, as a
democracy, and beneath the rule of a few. After this they reverted to
nothing more nor less than a state of monarchy again, although Cæsar had
a plan to lay down his arms and entrust affairs to the senate and the
populace. He held a consultation on the subject with Agrippa and Mæcenas,
to whom he communicated all his secrets. Agrippa, first of the two,
answered him as follows:--

[-2-] "Be not surprised, Cæsar, if I try to turn your mind away from
monarchy, in spite of the fact that I might enjoy many advantages from it
if you held the place. If it were going to prove serviceable to you, I
should be thoroughly enthusiastic for it. But those who hold supreme
power are not in a like position with their friends: the latter without
incurring jealousy or danger reap all the benefits they please, whereas
jealousies and dangers are the lot of the former. I have thought it
right, as in other cases, to look forward not for my own interest but for
yours and the public's. Let us consider leisurely all the features of the
system of government and turn whichever way our reflection may direct us.
For it will not be asserted that we ought to choose it under any and all
circumstances, even if it be not advantageous. Otherwise we shall seem to
have been unable to bear good fortune and to have gone mad through our
successes, or else to have been aiming at it long since, to have used our
father and our devotion to him as a mere screen, to have put "the people
and the senate" forward as an excuse. Our object will seem to have been
not to free them from conspirators but to enslave them to ourselves.
Either supposition entails censure. Who would not be indignant to see
that we had spoken words of one tenor, but to ascertain that we had had
something different in mind? How much more would he hate us now than if
we had at the outset laid bare our desires and aimed straight at the
monarchy! It has come to be generally believed that to adopt some violent
course belongs somehow to the nature of man, even if it involves taking
an unfair advantage. Every person who excels in any business thinks it
right that he should enjoy more advantages than his inferior. If he meets
with a success he ascribes it to the force of his individual temperament,
and if he fails in anything he refers it to the workings of the
supernatural. A man, however, who tries to gain advancement by plots and
injuries is in the first place held to be crafty and crooked, malicious
and vicious: (and this I know you would allow no one to say or think
about you, even if you might rule the whole world by it): again, if he
succeeds, he is thought to have gained an unjust advantage, and if he
fails, to have met with merited misfortune. [-3-] This being so, any one
might reproach us quite as much, even if we had nothing of the sort in
mind at the beginning and were to begin to devise it only now. For to let
the situation get the better of us and not restrain ourselves and not
make a right use of the gifts of Fortune is much worse than for a man to
do wrong through ill-luck. The latter sort are often compelled by their
very disasters and in consideration of their own need of profit to behave
against their will in an irregular way: the others voluntarily abandon
self-control even if to do so is contrary to their own interests. And
when men neither have any love of simplicity in their souls nor are able
to show moderation in regard to the blessings bestowed upon them, how
could one expect that they would either rule well over others or behave
themselves uprightly in trouble? Let us make our decision on the basis
that we are in neither of the classes mentioned and do not desire to
act in any way unreasonably, but will choose whatever course after
deliberation appears to us best. I shall speak quite frankly, for I could
not for my part express myself in any other way, and I am aware that you
do not enjoy hearing lies mingled with flattery.

[-4-] "Equality before the law has a pleasant name and its results are a
triumph of justice. If you take men who have received the same nature,
are of kindred race to one another, have been brought up under the same
institutions, have been trained in laws that are alike, and yield in
common the service of their bodies and of their minds to the same State,
is it not just that they should have all other things, too, in common? Is
it not best that they should secure no superior honors except as a result
of excellence? Equality of birth strives for equality of possessions,
and if it attains it is glad, but if it misses is displeased. And human
nature everywhere, because it is sprung from the gods and is to return to
the gods, gazes upward and is not content to be ruled forever by the
same person, nor will it endure to share in the toils, the dangers, the
expenditures, and be deprived of partnership in higher matters. Or, if
it is forced to submit to such conditions, it hates the power which has
applied coercion and if it obtains an opportunity takes vengeance on what
it hates. All men think they ought to rule, and for this reason submit to
being ruled in turn. They do not wish to be defrauded, and therefore do
not insist on defrauding others. They are pleased with honors bestowed by
their peers, and approve the penalties inflicted by their laws. If they
conduct their government on these lines, and believe that profits and the
opposite shall be shared in common, they wish no harm to happen to any
one of the citizens and devoutly hope that all good things may fall to
the lot of all of them. If one of them himself possesses any excellence,
he makes it known without hesitation, practices it enthusiastically,
and exhibits it very gladly: or, if he sees it in another, he readily
advances it, is eager to increase it, and honors it most brilliantly. On
the other hand if any one deteriorates, everybody hates him. If one meets
misfortune, everybody pities him. Each person regards the loss or shame
that such cause to be a common detriment to the city.

[-5-] "This is the constitution of democracies. Under tyrannies exactly
the opposite conditions are found. It is useless to go at length into all
of the details, but the chief feature is that no one is willing to
seem to know or possess anything good, because the whole ruling power
generally becomes hostile to him in such a case. Every one else takes the
tyrant's behavior as a standard of life, and pursues whatever objects he
may hope to gain through him by taking advantage of his neighbor while
incurring no danger himself. Consequently the majority of the people have
an eye only to their own interests and hate all other citizens: they
esteem their neighbor's good fortune as a personal loss, and his
misfortunes as a personal gain.

"Such being the state of the case, I do not see what could possibly
incite you to become sole ruler. Besides the fact that that system is
disagreeable to democracies, it would be far more unpleasant still to
yourself. You surely see how the City and its affairs are even now in a
state of turmoil. It is difficult, also, to overthrow our populace which
has lived during so many years in freedom, and difficult, since so many
enemies confront us round about, to reduce again to slavery the allies
and the subject nations, which from of old have been democratic
communities and were set free by our own selves.

[-6-] "To begin first with the smallest matter, it will be requisite that
you procure a large supply of money from all sides. It is impossible
that our present revenues should suffice for the very expenses, and
particularly for the support of the soldiers. This need exists also in
democracies, for it is not possible to organize any government without
expense. But under such a system many give largely in addition to what
is required, and do it frequently, making it a matter of rivalry and
securing proper honors for their liberality. Or, if perchance there
are compulsory levies upon everybody, they endure it because they can
persuade themselves that it is wise and because they are contributing in
their own behalf. Under sovereignties they think that the ruling power
alone, to which they credit boundless wealth, should bear the expense:
they are very ready to search out the ruler's sources of income, but do
not make a similar careful calculation about the outgo. They are not
inclined to pay out anything extra personally and of their own free will,
nor will they hear of voluntary public contributions. The former course
no one would choose, because he would not readily admit that he was rich,
and it is not to the advantage of the ruler to have it happen. So liberal
a citizen would immediately acquire a reputation for patriotism among the
mass of the people, would become conceited, and cause a disturbance in
politics. On the other hand, a general levy weighs heavily upon them all
and chiefly because they endure the loss whereas others take the gain. In
democracies those who contribute money as a general rule also serve in
the army, so that in a way they get it back again. But in monarchies one
set of people usually farm, manufacture, carry on maritime enterprises,
engage in politics,--the principal pursuits by which fortunes are
secured,--and a different set are under arms and draw pay.

"This single necessity, then, which is of such importance [-7-] will
cause you trouble. Here is another. It is by all means essential that
whoever from time to time commits a crime should pay some penalty. The
majority of men are not brought to reason by suggestion or by example,
but it is absolutely requisite to punish them by disenfranchisement, by
exile, and by death; and this often happens in so great an empire and in
so large a multitude of men, especially during a change of government.
Now if you appointed other men to judge these wrongdoers, they would
acquit them speedily, particularly all whom you may be thought to hate.
For judges secure a pretended authority when they act in any way contrary
to the wish of the ruling power. If, again, any are convicted, they will
believe they have been condemned on account of instructions for which
you are responsible. However, if you sit as judge yourself, you will be
compelled to chastise many of the peers,--and this is not favorable,--and
you will certainly be thought to be setting some of them right in anger
rather than in justice. No one believes that those who have the power to
use compulsion can execute judgment with justice, but everybody thinks
that out of shame they spread out a mere phantom and rough picture of
government in front of the truth, in order that under the legitimate
name of court they may fulfill their desire. This is what happens in
monarchies. In democracies, when any one is accused of committing a
private wrong, he is made defendant in a private suit before judges who
are his equals: or, if he is accused for a public crime, such a man has
empaneled a jury of his peers, whoever the lot shall designate. It is
easier for men to bear their decisions, since they do not think that any
verdict rendered is due to the power of the judge or has been wrung from
him as a favor.[1]

[-8-] "Then again there are many, apart from any criminals, some priding
themselves on birth, others on wealth, others on something different,
in general not bad men, who are by nature opposed to the conception of
monarchy. If a ruler allows them to become strong, he cannot live in
safety, and if he undertakes to impose a check on them, he cannot do so
justly. What then shall he do with them? How shall he treat them? If you
root out their families, diminish their wealth, humble their pride, you
will lose the good-will of your subjects. How can it be otherwise, if no
one is permitted to be born nobly or to grow rich honestly or to become
strong, brave, or learned? But if you allow all the separate classes to
grow strong, you will not be able to deal with them easily. If you alone
were sufficient for carrying on politics and war well and opportunely,
and needed no assistant for any of them, it would be a different story.
As the case stands, however, it is quite essential for you to have many
helpers, since they must govern so large a world: and they all ought
to be both brave and prudent. Now if you hand over the legions and
the offices to such men, there will be danger that both you and your
government will be overthrown. It is not possible for a valuable man to
be produced without good sense, and he cannot acquire any great good
sense from servile practices. But again, if he becomes a man of sense, he
cannot fail to desire liberty and to hate all masters. If, on the other
hand, you entrust nothing to these men, but put affairs in charge of the
worthless and chance comers, you will very quickly incur the anger of the
first class, who think themselves distrusted, and you will very quickly
fail in the greatest enterprises. What good could an ignorant or low-born
person accomplish? What enemy would not hold him in contempt? What allies
would obey him? Who, even of the soldiers themselves, would not disdain
to be ruled by such a man? What evils are wont to result from such a
condition I do not need to describe to you, for you know them thoroughly.
I feel obliged to say only this, that if such an assistant did nothing
right, he would injure you far more than the enemy: if he did anything
satisfactorily, his lack of education would cause him to lose his head,
and he would be a terror to you.

[-9-] "Such a question does not arise in democracies. The more men there
are who are wealthy and brave, so much the more do they vie with one
another and up-build the city. The latter uses them and is glad, unless
any one of them wishes to found a tyranny: him the citizens punish
severely. That this is so and that democracies are far superior to
monarchies the experience of Greece makes clear. As long as the people
had the monarchical government, they effected nothing of importance: but
when they began to live under the democratic system, they became most
renowned. It is shown also by the experience of other branches of
mankind. Those who are still conducting their governments under tyrannies
are always in slavery and always plotting against their rulers. But those
who have presidents for a year or some longer period continue to be both
free and independent.

"Yet, why need we use foreign examples, when we have some of our own? We
Romans, ourselves, after trying a different social organization at first,
later, when we had gone through many bitter experiences, felt a desire
for liberty; and having secured it we attained our present eminence,
strong in no advantages save those that come from democracy, through
which the senate debated, the people ratified, the force under arms
showed zeal, and the commanders were fired with ambition. None of these
things could be done under a tyranny. For that reason, indeed, the
ancient Romans detested it so much as to impose a curse upon that form of
government.

[-10-] "Aside from these considerations, if one is to speak about what is
disadvantageous for you personally, how could you endure the management
of so many interests by day and night alike? How could you hold out in
your enfeebled state? How could you participate in human enjoyments?
How could you be happy if deprived of them? What could cause you
real pleasure? When would you be free from biting grief? It is quite
inevitable that the man who holds so great an empire should reflect
deeply, be subject to many fears enjoy very little pleasure, but hear
and see, perform and suffer, always and everywhere, what is most
disagreeable. That is why, I think, both Greeks and some barbarians would
not accept government by a king when offered to them.

"Knowing this beforehand, take good counsel before you enter upon such an
existence. For it is disgraceful, or rather impossible, after you have
once plunged into it to rise to the upper air again. Do not be deceived
by the greatness of the authority nor the abundance of possessions, nor
the mass of body-guards, nor the throng of courtiers. Men who have great
power have great troubles: those who have large possessions are obliged
to spend largely: the crowd of body-guards is gathered because of the
crowd of conspirators: and the flatterers would be more glad to destroy
than to save any one. Consequently, in view of these facts, no sensible
man would desire to become supreme ruler. [-11-] If the fact that such
rulers can enrich and preserve others and perform many other good deeds,
and that, by Jupiter, they may also outrage others and injure whomsoever
they please leads any one to think that tyranny is worth striving for, he
is utterly mistaken. I need not tell you that to live licentiously and to
do evil is base and hazardous and hated of both gods and men. You are not
that sort of man, and it is not for these reasons that you would choose
to be sole ruler. I have elected to speak now not of everything which one
might accomplish who handled affairs badly, but of what even the very
best are compelled to do and endure when they adopt the system. The other
point,--that one may bestow abundant favors,--is worthy of zeal, to be
sure: yet when this disposition is indulged in private capacity, it is
noble, august, glorious, and safe, whereas in monarchies it is first of
all not a sufficient offset to the other, more disagreeable matters, that
any one should choose monarchy for this especially when one is to grant
to others the benefit to be derived therefrom, and accept himself the
unpleasantness involved in the rest of the conduct of the office.

[-12-] "In the next place, the matter is not simple, as people think. No
one could render assistance enough to satisfy all who need help. Those
who think they ought to receive some gift from the sovereign are
practically all mankind, even though no favors can at once be seen to be
due them. Every one naturally has his own approbation and wishes to enjoy
some benefit from him who is able to give. But the presents which can
be given them,--I mean honors and offices, and sometimes money,--can be
counted quite easily as compared with so great a multitude. This being
so, more hatred would fall to the monarch's lot from those who fail to
get what they want than friendship from such as obtain their desires.
The latter take what they regard as due to them and think there is no
particular reason for being very thankful to the one who gives it, since
they are getting no more than they expected. Moreover, they actually
shrink from such behavior for fear they may appear in the light
of persons undeserving of generous treatment. The others, who are
disappointed of their hopes, are grieved for two causes. First, they feel
that they are robbed of what belongs to them, for by nature all persons
think that everything which they desire is their own: second, they feel
as if they were finding themselves guilty of some wrong, if they show
resignation at not obtaining what they expect. The man who gives such
great gifts rightly of course investigates before all else each person's
worth: some he honors, others he neglects. As a result, then, of his
judgment, some are filled with pride and others with vexation by their
own consciousness of its correctness. If any one were to wish to guard
against this outcome and distribute his presents without system, he would
fail utterly. The base, being honored contrary to their deserts, would
become worse; for they would decide either that they were approved as
being good or, if not so, that they were courted as dangerous persons:
the excellent, on attaining no higher place than they, but held merely in
equal honor with the base, would be more indignant at their reduction to
the latter's level than the others would rejoice to be deemed valuable.
Accordingly, they would give up the practice of better principles and
strive to emulate less worthy men. Thus, even as a result of the very
honors, those who bestow them would reap no benefit and those who receive
them would become worse than before. So that this consideration, which
would please some persons most in the monarchical constitution, has been
proved to be a most difficult problem for you to deal with.

[-13-] "Reflecting on these facts and the rest which I mentioned a little
earlier, be prudent while you may, and restore to the people the arms,
the provinces, the offices, and the funds. If you do it at once and
voluntarily, you will be the most famous of men and the most secure. But
if you wait for some force to be applied, perhaps you might suffer some
disaster together with ill repute. Here is evidence. Marius, Sulla,
Metellus, and Pompey at first, when they got control of affairs, refused
to become princes, and by this attitude escaped harm. Cinna, however, and
Strabo,[2] the second Marius, Sertorius, and Pompey himself at a later
date, through their desire for sovereignty perished miserably. It is hard
for this city which has been under a democracy for so many years and
rules so many human beings to be willing to be a slave to any one. You
have heard that the people banished Camillus when he used white horses
for his triumph: you have heard that they overthrew Scipio after
condemning him for some fraudulent procedure: you remember how they
behaved toward your father because they had some suspicion that he wanted
monarchy. Yet there have never been any better men than these.

"Moreover, I do not advise you merely to relinquish dominion, but to
accomplish beforehand all that is advantageous for the public, and by
decrees and laws to settle definitely whatever business needs attention,
just as Sulla did. For even if some of his ordinances were subsequently
overthrown, yet the majority of them and the more important still hold
their ground. Do not say that even then some will indulge in factional
quarrels, or I may be tempted to say again that all the more the Romans
would not submit to a single ruler. If we were to review all the
calamities that might befall a nation, it would be most unreasonable for
us to fear dissensions which are the outgrowth of democracy rather then
the tyrannies which spring from monarchy. Regarding the terrible nature
of the latter I have not even undertaken to say a word. It has been my
wish not merely to inveigh against a proposition so capable of censure,
but to show you this,--that it is naturally such a régime that not even
the most excellent men....[3]

[-14-] "They cannot easily persuade by frank argument men who possess
less power, or succeed in their enterprises, because their subjects are
not in accord with them. Hence, if you have any care at all of your
country, for whom you have fought so many wars, for whom you would gladly
surrender your life, attune her to greater moderation and order her
affairs with that in view. For the privilege of doing and saving
precisely what one pleases becomes in the case of sensible people, if you
examine it, a cause of prosperity to all: but in the case of the foolish,
a cause of disaster. Therefore he who confers authority upon such men is
holding out a sword to a child and a madman; but he who gives it to the
prudent, besides performing other services, preserves the objects of his
liberality themselves, though they may be unwilling. Therefore I ask you
not to be deceived by regarding fine-sounding names, but to look forward
to the results that spring from them, and so to put an end to the
insolence of the populace, and to impose the management of public affairs
upon yourself and the most excellent of the remainder of the community.
Then the most prudent may deliberate, those most qualified for generals
become commanders, and the strongest and most needy men serve as
soldiers and draw pay. In this way, all zealously discharging the duties
appertaining to their offices and paying without hesitation the debts
they owe one another, they will not be aware of their inferiority and
lack of certain advantages and will secure the real democracy and a safe
sort of freedom. The boasted "freedom" of the mob proves to be the most
bitter servitude of the best element and brings a common destruction upon
both. The other, which I advocate, honors responsible men everywhere and
bestows equal advantages upon all so far as they are worthy: thus it
renders prosperous all alike who possess it. [-15-] Do not think that I
am advising you to enslave the people and the senate and then play the
tyrant. This plan I should never dare to suggest nor you to execute. It
would, notwithstanding, be well and useful both for you and for the city
that you should yourself establish all proper laws with the approval of
the best men without any opposing talk or resistance on the part of the
masses, that you and your counselors should arrange the details of wars
according to your united wishes while all the rest straightway obey
orders, that the choice of officials should be in the power of the
cabinet to which you belong, and that the same men should also determine
honors and penalties. Then whatever pleases you after consulting the
Peers will be immediately a law, and wars against enemies may be waged
with secrecy and at an opportune time; those to whom a trust is committed
will be appointed because of excellence and not by lot and strife for
office; the good will be honored without jealousy and the bad punished
without opposition. Thus what was done would be accomplished in the best
way, not referred to the public, nor talked over openly, not committed to
packed committees, nor endangered by rivalry. We should reap the benefits
of the blessings that belong to us with enjoyment,[4] not entering upon
dangerous wars nor impious civil disputes. These two drawbacks are found
in every democracy: the more powerful, desiring first place and hiring
the weaker men, turn everything continually upside down. They have been
most frequent in our epoch and there is no other way save the one I
propose that will put a stop to them. The proof of my words is that
we have been warring abroad and fighting among ourselves for an
inconceivably long time: the cause is the multitude of men and the
magnitude of the interests at stake. The men are of all sorts in respect
to both race and nature and have the most diversified tempers and
desires. The interests have become so vast that it is very difficult to
attempt to administer them. [-16-] Witness to the truth of my words is
borne by our past. While we were but few, we had no important quarrel
with our neighbors, got along well with our government, and subjugated
almost all of Italy. But ever since we spread beyond the peninsula and
crossed to many foreign lands and islands, filling the whole sea and the
whole earth with our name and power, nothing good has been our lot. In
the first place we disputed in cliques at home and within our walls, and
later we exported this plague to the camps. Therefore our city, like a
great merchantman full of a crowd of every race borne without a pilot
these many years through rough water, rolls and shoots hither and thither
because it is without ballast. Do not, then, allow her to be longer
exposed to the tempest; for you see that she is waterlogged. And do not
let her split upon a reef[5]; for her timbers are rotten and will not be
able to hold out much longer. But since the gods have taken pity on this
land and have set you up as her arbiter and chief; do not betray your
country. Through you she has now revived a little: if you are faithful,
she may live with safety for ages to come.

[-17-] "That I do right to urge you to be sole ruler of the people I
think you have long ere this been persuaded. If so, then be ready and
eager to assume the leadership of the State, or rather, do not let it
slip. For we are not deliberating about taking something, but about not
losing it and about running hazards in addition. Who will spare you if
you commit matters to the people as they were, and to some other man,
seeing that there are great numbers whom you have injured, all of whom,
or nearly all, will lay claim to the sovereignty? No one of them will
fail to wish to punish you for what you have done, or will care to have
you survive as a rival. There is evidence of this in the case of Pompey,
who, when he withdrew from his supremacy, became the victim of scorn and
of plots: he found himself unable to win back his place, and so perished.
Also Cæsar your father, who did this very same thing, was slain for his
trouble. Marius and Sulla would certainly have endured a like fate, had
they not died too soon. Indeed, some say that Sulla anticipated this
very end by making away with himself. Many of the provisions of his
constitution, at any rate, began to be abolished while he was still
alive. You, too, must expect to find that many Lepiduses, Sertoriuses,
Brutuses, Cassiuses will arise against you.

[-18-] "Seeing these facts and reflecting on the other interests
involved, do not abandon yourself and your country, out of fear that you
may seem to some to be pursuing the office of set purpose. First of all,
even if any one does suspect it, the desire is not one repugnant to human
nature, and the danger from it is a noble danger. Second, is any one
unaware of the necessity under which you were led to take this action?
Hence, if there be any blame attached to it, one might most justly
censure your father's slayers therefor. For if they had not murdered him
in so unjust and pitiable a fashion, you would not have taken up arms,
would not have gathered your legions, would not have made a compact with
Antony and Lepidus, and would not have taken measures against those very
men. That you were right and were justified in doing all this no one is
unaware. If any slight errors have been committed, at least we cannot
safely make any further changes. Therefore for our own sakes and for that
of the city let us obey Fortune, who gives you the supremacy. Let us be
very thankful to her that she has not simply filled us with civil woes,
but has put the reorganization of the government in your hands. By paying
due reverence to her you may show all mankind that whereas others wrought
disturbance and injury, you are an upright man.

"Do not, I beg you, fear the magnitude of the empire. The greater its
extent, the more are the preservative influences it possesses; also, to
guard anything is a long way easier than to acquire it. Toils and dangers
are needed to win over what belongs to others, but a little prudence
suffices to retain what is already yours. Moreover, do not be afraid
that you will not live quite safely in the midst of it and enjoy all the
blessings extant among men, if you are willing to arrange all the details
as I shall advise you. And do not think that I am making my appeal depart
from the subject in hand, if I shall speak at some length about the
project. I shall not do this merely to hear myself talk, but to the end
that you may be positively assured that it is both possible and easy, for
a man of sense at least, to govern well and without danger.

[-19-] "I maintain, therefore, first of all that you ought to pick out
your friends in the senatorial body and then subject it to a sifting
process, because some who are not fit have become senators on account
of civil disputes: such of them as possess any excellence you ought to
retain, but the rest you should erase from the roll. Do not, however, get
rid of any man of worth, because of poverty, but give him the money that
he needs. In the place of those who have been dropped introduce the
noblest, the best, the richest men obtainable, selecting them not only
from Italy but from the allies and subject nations. In this way you will
not be employing many assistants and you will insure a correct attitude
on the part of the chief men from all the provinces. These districts,
having no renowned leader, will not be disposed to rebel, and their
prominent men will entertain affection for you because they have been
made sharers in your empire.

"Take precisely these same measures in the case of the knights, by
enrolling in the equestrian class such as hold second place everywhere in
birth, excellence, and wealth. Register as many in both classes as may
please you, not troubling at all about their numbers. The more men of
repute you have as your associates, the more easily will you yourself
settle everything in case of need and persuade your subjects that you are
treating them not as slaves nor in any way as inferior to us, but are
sharing with them besides all the other blessings that belong to us the
chief magistracy also, that so they may be devoted to it as their own
possession. I am so far from assuming this to be a mistaken policy that I
say they ought all to be given a share in the government. Thus, having an
equal allotment in it, they might be faithful allies of ours, believing
that they inhabited one single city owned in common by all of us,
and this _really_ a city, and regarding fields and villages as their
individual property. But about this and what ought to be done so as not
to grant them absolutely everything, we shall reflect in greater detail
at another time.

[-20-] "It is proper to put men on the roll of the knights at eighteen
years of age; for at that period of life physical condition is at its
best and suitability of temperament can be discerned. But for the
senate they should wait till they are twenty-five years old. Is it not
disgraceful and hazardous to entrust public business to men younger than
this, when we will commit none of our private affairs to any one before,
he has reached such an age? After they have served as quæstors and
ædiles, or tribunes, let them be prætors, when they have attained their
thirtieth birthday. These offices and that of consul are the only ones at
home which I maintain you ought to recognize; and that is for the sake of
remembrance of ancestral customs and in order not to seem to be changing
the constitution altogether. Do you, however, yourself choose all who are
to hold them and not put any of these offices longer in charge of the
rabble or the populace,--for they will surely quarrel,--nor in charge of
the senate, for its members will contend for the prize. Moreover, do
not keep up the ancient powers of these positions, for fear history
may repeat itself, but preserve the honor attached while abating the
influence to such an extent as will enable you to deprive each place of
none of its esteem but to forestall any desire of insubordination. This
can be done if you require the incumbents to stay in town, and do not
permit any of them to handle arms either during their period of office or
immediately afterward, but only after the lapse of some time, as much
as you think sufficient in each instance. In this way none of them will
rebel, because they become to an extent by their title masters of armies,
and their irritation will be assuaged by their faring as private citizens
for a time. Let these magistrates conduct such of the festivals as would
naturally belong to their office, and let them all individually try cases
save those of homicide, during their tenure of office in Rome. Courts
should also be made up of the senators and knights, but the final appeal
should be to the aforesaid officials.

[-21-] "Let a præfectus urbi be appointed from the ranks of the prominent
men and from such as have previously passed through the necessary
offices. His duties should not be to govern when the consuls are
somewhere out of town, but to exercise at all times a general supervision
of the City's interests and to decide the cases referred to him by all
the other magistrates I mentioned, both those demanding final decision
and such as may be appealed, together with any that involve the death
penalty; and he must have authority in all of them that concern men both
in the City (except such as I shall name) and those dwelling outside to
the distance of seven hundred and fifty stades.

"Still another magistrate ought to be chosen, himself also from a similar
class, to investigate and watch the matters of family, property, and
morals of senators and knights, alike of men and of the children and
wives belonging to them[6]. He should also set right such behavior as
properly entails no punishment, yet if neglected becomes the cause of
many great evils. The more important details he must report to you. This
duty ought to be assigned to some senator, and to the most distinguished
one after the præfectus urbi, rather than to one of the knights. He would
naturally receive his name from your authority as censor, (for you must
certainly be the dictator of the census), so that he might be called
sub-censor[7].--Let these two hold office for life, unless either of them
deteriorates in any way or becomes sick or superannuated. By reason of
the permanence of their positions they would do nothing dangerous, for
one would be entirely unarmed and the other would have but a few soldiers
and be acting for the most part under your eyes. By reason of their rank
they would shrink from coming into collision with any one and would be
afraid to do any act of violence, for they would foresee their retirement
to ordinary citizenship and the supremacy of others in their stead. Let
them also draw a certain salary, to compensate them for the time consumed
and to increase their reputation. This is the opinion I have to give you
in regard to these officials.

"Let those who have been prætors hold some office among the subject
nations. Before they have been prætors I do not think they should have
this privilege. Let those who have not yet been prætors serve for one
or two terms as lieutenants to such persons as you may have designated.
Then, under these conditions, let them be consuls if they continue to
govern rightly, and after that let them take the greater positions of
command. [-22-] The following is the way I advise you to arrange it.
Divide up all of Italy which is over seven hundred and fifty stades from
the city and all the rest of the territory which owns our sway, both on
the continents and in the islands,--divide it up everywhere according to
races and nations; and pursue the same course with as many cities as are
important enough to be ruled by one man with full powers. Then establish
soldiers and a governor in each one and send out one of the ex-consuls to
take charge of all, and two of the ex-prætors. One of the latter, fresh
from the City, should have the care of private business and the supplying
of provisions: the other should be one of those who have had this
training, who will attend to the public interests of the cities and will
govern the soldiers, except in cases that concern disenfranchisement or
death. These must be referred only to the ex-consul who is governor,
except in regard to the centurions who are on the lists and to the
foremost private individuals in every place. Do not allow any other
person than yourself to punish either of these classes, so that they may
never be impelled by fear of any one else to take any action against you.
As for my proposition that the second of the ex-prætors should be put in
charge of the soldiers, it is subject to the following limitations. If
only a few are in service in foreign forts or in one native post, it is
well enough for this to be so. But if two citizen legions are wintering
in the same province (and more than this number I should not advise you
to trust to one commander), it will be necessary for the two ex-prætors
to superintend them, each having charge of one besides managing
the remaining political and private interests. Therefore, let the
ex-consul[8]... these matters and likewise on the cases, both those
subject to appeal and those already referred which are sent up to him
from[9] his prætors. And do not be surprised that I recommend to you to
divide Italy also into such sections. It is large and populous, and so
is incapable of being well managed by the governors at the capital. The
governor of any district ought to be always present and no duties should
be laid upon our city magistrates[10] that are impossible of fulfillment.

[-23-] "Let all these men to whom affairs outside the city are committed
receive pay, the greater ones more, the inferior ones less, those of
medium importance a medium amount. They can not in a foreign land live
on their own resources nor as now stand an unlimited and uncalculated
expense. Let them govern not less than three years (unless any one of
them commits a crime), nor more than five. These limits are because
annual and short-time appointments after teaching persons what they
need to know send them back again before they can display any of their
knowledge: and, on the other hand, longer and more lasting positions fill
many with conceit and incline them to rebellion. Hence I think that
the greater posts of authority ought not to be given to persons
consecutively, without interval, for it makes no difference whether a man
is governor in the same province or in several in succession, if he holds
office longer than is proper. Appointees improve when a period of time is
allowed to elapse and they return home and live as ordinary citizens.

"The senators, accordingly, I affirm ought to discharge these duties and
in the way described. [-24-] Of the knights the two best should command
the body-guard which protects you. To entrust it to one man is hazardous,
and to several is sure to breed turmoil. Let these prefects therefore be
two in number, in order that, if one of them suffers any bodily harm, you
may still not lack a person to guard you: and let them be appointed from
those who have been on many campaigns and have been active also in many
other capacities. Let them have command both of the Pretorians and of all
the remaining soldiers in Italy with such absolute power that they
may put to death such of them as do wrong, except in the case of the
centurions and any others who have been assigned to members of the senate
holding office. These should be tried by the senatorial magistrates
themselves, in order that the latter may have authority both to honor
and to chastise their dependents and so be able to count on their
unhesitating support. Over all the other soldiers in Italy those prefects
should have dominion (aided of course by lieutenants), and further over
the Cæsarians, both such as wait upon you and all the rest that are of
any value. These duties will be both fitting and sufficient for them to
discharge.[11] They should not have more labors laid upon them than they
will be able to dispose of effectively, that they may not be weighed down
by the press of work or find it impossible to see to everything. These
men ought to hold office for life like the præfectus urbi and the
sub-censor. Let some one else be appointed night watchman, and still
another commissioner of grain and of the other market produce, both of
these from the foremost knights after those mentioned and appointed to
hold their posts for a definite time like the magistrates elected from
the senatorial class. [-25-] The disposition of the funds, also,--of both
the people and the empire, I mean, whether in Rome or in the rest of
Italy or outside,--should be entirely in the hands of the knights. These
treasurers also, as well as all of the same class who have the management
of anything, should draw pay, some more and some less, with reference to
the dignity and magnitude of their employment. The reason is that it is
not possible for them, since they are poorer than the senators, to spend
their own means while engaged in no business in Rome. And then again, it
is neither possible nor advantageous for you that the same men should be
made masters of both the troops and the finances. Furthermore, it is well
that all the business of the empire should be transacted through a number
of agents, in order that many may receive the benefit of it and become
experienced in affairs. In this way your subjects, reaping a multiform
enjoyment from the public treasures, will be better disposed toward you,
and you will have an abundant supply of the best men on each occasion for
all necessary lines of work. One single knight with as many subordinates
(drawn from the knights and from your freedmen) as the needs of the case
demand, is sufficient for every separate form of business in the City and
for each province outside. You need to have these assistants along with
them in order that your service may contain a prize of excellence, and
that you may not lack persons from whom you may learn the truth even
contrary to the wishes of their superiors, in case there is anything
irregular happening.

"If any one of the knights after passing through many forms of service
distinguishes himself enough to become a senator, his age ought not to
hinder him at all from being enrolled in the senate. Let some of those
even be registered who have held the post of company leaders in citizen
forces, unless it be one who has served in the rank and file; for it is
both a shame and a reproach to have on the list of the senate any of
these persons who have carried loaded panniers and charcoal baskets. But
in the case of such as were originally centurions there is nothing to
prevent the most distinguished of them from being advanced to a better
class.

[-26-] "With regard to the senators and the knights this is my advice to
you. And, by Jupiter, I have this to say further. While they are still
children they should attend schools, and when they come out of childhood
into youth they should turn their minds to horses and arms and have paid
public teachers in each of these two departments. In this way from very
boyhood they will both learn and practice all that they must themselves
do on becoming men, and so they will prove far more serviceable to you
for every work. The best ruler, who is of any value, must not only
himself perform all his required tasks, but also look forward to see how
the rest shall become also as excellent as possible. And this name can be
yours, not if you allow them to do whatever they please and then censure
those who err, but if before any mistakes occur you teach them everything
which, when practiced, will render them more useful both to themselves
and to you. And afford nobody any excuse whatever, either wealth or
birth, or anything else that accompanies excellence, for affecting
indolence or effeminacy or any other behavior that is not genuine. Many
persons, fearing that on account of some such possession they may incur
jealousy or danger, do much that is unworthy of themselves, expecting
by such behavior to live in greater security. As a consequence they
commiserate themselves, believing themselves wronged in this very
particular, that they are not allowed to appear to live aright. Their
ruler also suffers a loss because he is deprived of the services of good
men, and suffers ill repute for the censure imposed upon them. Therefore
never permit this to be done, and have no fears that any one brought up
and educated as I propose will ever adopt a rebellious policy. Quite the
reverse; it is only the ignorant and licentious that you need suspect.
Such persons are easily influenced to behave most disgracefully and
abominably in absolutely every way first toward their own selves and next
toward other people. Those, however, who have been well brought up and
educated are purposed not to wrong any one and least of all him who cared
for their rearing and education. If any one, accordingly, shows himself
wicked and ungrateful, do not entrust him with any such position as will
enable him to effect any harm: if even so he rebels, let him be tried and
punished. Do not be afraid that any one will blame you for this, if you
carry out all my injunctions. For in taking vengeance on the wrongdoer
you will be guilty of no sin any more than the physician who burns and
cuts. All will pronounce the man justly treated, because after partaking
of the same rearing and education as the rest he plotted against
you.--This is the course of action I advise in the case of the senators
and knights.

[-27-] "A standing army should be supported, drawn from the citizens,
the subject nations, and the allies, in one case more, in another less,
province by province, as the necessities of the case demand; and they
ought to be always under arms and make a practice of warfare continually.
They must have secured winter-quarters at the most opportune points, and
serve for a definite time, so that a certain period of active life may
remain for them before old age. For, separated so far as we are from the
frontiers of the empire, with enemies living near us on every side, we
should otherwise no longer be able to count on auxiliaries in the case of
emergencies. Again, if we allow all those of military age to have arms
and to practice warlike pursuits, quarrels and civil wars will always be
arising among them. However, if we prevent them from doing this and then
need their assistance at all in battle, we shall always have to face
danger with inexperienced and untrained soldiers at our back. For this
reason I submit the proposition that most of them live without arms
and away from forts; but that the hardiest and those most in need of a
livelihood be registered and kept in practice. They themselves will fight
better by devoting their leisure to this single business; and the rest
will the more easily farm, manage ships, and attend to the other pursuits
of peace, if they are not forced to be called out for service, but have
others to stand as their guardians. The most active and vigorous element,
that is, which is oftenest obliged to live by robbery, will be supported
without harming others, and all the rest of the population will lead a
life free from danger.

[-28-] "From what source, then, will the money come for these warriors
and for the other expenses that will be found necessary? I shall make
this point clear, with only the short preliminary statement that even
were we under a democracy, we should in any case need money. We can not
survive without soldiers, and without pay none of them will serve. Hence
let us not feel downhearted in the belief that the compulsory collection
of money appertains only to monarchy, and let us not turn away from
the system for that reason, but conduct our deliberations with a full
knowledge of the fact that in any case it is necessary for us to obtain
funds, whatsoever form of government we may adopt. Consequently, I
maintain that you should first of all sell the goods which are in the
public treasury,--and I notice that these have become numerous on account
of the wars,--except a few which are exceedingly useful and necessary
to you: and you should loan all this money at some moderate rate of
interest. In this way the land will be worked, being delivered to men who
will cultivate it themselves, and the latter will obtain a starting-point
and so grow more prosperous, while the treasury will have a sufficient
and perpetual revenue. This amount should be computed together with all
the rest of the revenue that can be derived from the mines and with
certainty from any other source; and after that we ought to reckon on not
only the military service but everything else which contributes to the
successful life of a city, and further how much it will be necessary to
lay out in campaigns at short notice and other critical occurrences which
are wont to take place. Then, to make up the deficiency in income, we
ought to levy upon absolutely all instruments which produce any profit
for the men who possess them, and we should exact taxes from all whom we
rule. It is both just and proper that no one of them should be exempt
from taxation,--individual or people,--because they are destined to enjoy
the benefit of the taxes in common with the rest. We should set over them
tax-collectors in every case to manage the business, so that they may
levy from all sources of revenue everything that falls due during their
term of management. The following plan will render it easier for the
officers to gather the taxes and will be of no little service to those
who contribute them. I mean that they will bring in whatever they owe
in an appointed order and little by little, instead of remaining idle
a short time and then having the entire sum demanded of them in one
payment.

[-29-] "I am not unaware that some of the incomes and taxes established
will be disliked. But I know this, too,--that if the peoples secure
immunity from any further abuse and believe in reality that they will be
contributing all of this for their own safety and for reaping subsidiary
benefits in abundance and that most of it will be obtained by no others
than men of their own district, some by governing, others by managing,
others by army service, they will be very grateful to you, giving as they
do a small portion of large possessions, the profits of which they enjoy
without oppression. Especially will this be true if they see that you
live temperately and spend nothing foolishly. Who, if he saw you very
economical of your own means and very lavish of the public funds,
would not willingly contribute, and deem your possession of wealth to
constitute his safety and prosperity? By these means a very large amount
of money would be on hand.

[-30-] "The rest I urge you to arrange in the following way. Adorn this
city in the most expensive manner possible and add brilliance by every
form of festival. It is fitting that we who rule many people should
surpass all in everything, and such spectacles tend in a way to promote
respect on the part of our allies and alarm on the part of enemies. The
affairs of other nations you should order in this fashion. First, let the
various tribes have no power in any matter nor meet in assemblies at all.
They would decide nothing good and would always be creating more or less
turmoil. Hence I say that even our own populace ought not to gather at
court or for elections or for any other such meeting where any business
is to be transacted. Next, they should not indulge in numbers of houses
of great size and beyond what is necessary, and they should not expend
money upon many and all kinds of contests: so they will neither be worn
out by vain zeal nor become hostile through unreasonable rivalries. They
ought, however, to have certain festivals and spectacles, (apart from the
horse-race held among us), but not to such an extent that the treasury or
private estates will be injured, or any stranger be compelled to spend
anything whatever in their midst, or food for a lifetime be furnished
to all who have merely won in some contest. It is unreasonable that the
well-to-do should submit to compulsory expenditures outside their own
countries; and for the athletes the prizes for each event are sufficient.
This ruling does not apply to any one of them who might come out victor
in the Olympian or Pythian games, or some contest here at Rome.[12] Such
are the only persons who ought to be fed, and then the cities will not
exhaust themselves without avail nor anybody practice save those who have
a chance of winning, since one can follow some other pursuit that is
more advantageous both to one's self and to one's country. "This is my
decision about these matters.--Now to the horse-races which are held
without gymnastic contests, I think that no other city but ours should be
allowed to hold them, so that vast sums of money may not be dissipated
recklessly nor men go miserably frantic,--and most of all that the
soldiers may have a plentiful supply of the best horses. This, therefore,
I would forbid altogether, that those races should take place anywhere
else than here. The other amusements I have determined to moderate so
that all organizations should make the enjoyment of entertainments for
eye and ear inexpensive, and men thereby live more temperately and free
from discontent.

"Let none of the foreigners employ their own coinage or weights or
measures, but let them all use ours. And they should send no embassy to
you, unless it involve a point for decision. Let them instead present to
their governor whatever they please and through him forward to you all
such requests of theirs as he may approve. In this way they will neither
spend anything nor effect their object by crooked practices, but receive
their answers at first hand without any expenditure or intrigue.

[-31-] "Moreover, in respect to other matters, you would seem to be
ordering things in the best way if you should, in the first place,
introduce before the senate the embassies which come from the enemy and
from those under truce, both kings and peoples. For it is awe-inspiring
and impressive to let the senate appear to be master of all situations
and to exhibit many adversaries prepared for petitioners who are guilty
of double dealing. Next, have all the laws enacted by the senators, and
do not impose a single one upon all the people alike, except the decrees
of that body. In this way the dignity of the empire would be the more
confirmed and the decisions made in accordance with the laws would prove
indisputable and evident to all alike. Thirdly, it would be well in case
the senators who are serving in the city, their children or their wives,
are ever charged with any serious crime, so that a person convicted would
receive a penalty of disenfranchisement or exile or even death, that
you should set the situation before the senate, without any previous
condemnation, and commit to that body the entire decision at first hand
regarding it. Thus those guilty of any crime would be tried before all
their peers and punished without any ill-feeling against you. The rest,
seeing this, would improve in character for fear of being themselves
publicly apprehended. I am speaking here about those offences regarding
which laws are established, and judgments are rendered according to the
laws.

"As for talk that some one has abused you or spoken in an unfitting way
about you, do not listen to any one who brings such an accusation nor
investigate it. It is disgraceful to believe that any one has wantonly
insulted you who are doing no wrong and benefiting all. Only those who
rule badly will credit these reports. Because of their own conscience
they surmise that the matter has been stated truthfully. It is a shame to
be angry at complaints for which, if true, one had better not have been
responsible, and about which, if false, one ought not to pretend to care.
Many in times past by angry behavior have caused more things and worse to
be said against them. This is my opinion about those accused of uttering
some insult. Your personality should be too strong and too lofty to be
assailed by any insolence, and you should never allow yourself to think
nor lead others into thinking that any person can be indecent toward you.
Thus they will think of you as of the gods, that you are sacrosanct. If
any one should be accused of plotting against you (such a thing might
happen), do not yourself sit as judge on a single detail of the case nor
reach any decision in advance,--for it is absurd that the same man should
be made both accuser and judge,--but take him to the senate and make him
plead his defence. If he be convicted, punish him, though moderating the
sentence so far as is feasible, in order that belief in his guilt may be
fostered. It is very difficult to make most men believe that any unarmed
person will plot against him who is armed. And the only way you could
gain credence would be by punishing him not in anger nor overwhelmingly,
if it be possible.--This is aside from the case of one who had an army
and should revolt directly against you. It is not fitting that such an
one be tried, but that he be chastised as an enemy.

"In this way refer to the senate these matters and [-32-] most of the
highly important affairs that concern the commonwealth. Public interests
you must administer publicly. It is also an inbred trait of human nature
for individuals to delight in marks of esteem from a superior, which seem
to raise one to equality with him, and to approve everything which the
superior has determined after consulting them, as if it were their own
proposal, and to cherish it, as if it were their own choice. Consequently
I affirm that such business ought to be brought before the senate.--In
regard to most cases all those senators present ought equally to state
their opinions: but when one of their number is accused, not all of them
should do so, unless it be some one who is not yet a senator or is not
yet in the ranks of the ex-quæstors that is being tried. And, indeed, it
is absurd that one who has not yet been a tribune or an ædile should cast
a vote against such as have already filled these offices, or, by Jupiter,
that any one of the latter should vote against the ex-prætors or they
against the ex-consuls. Let the last named have authority to render a
decision in all cases, but the rest only in the cases of their peers and
their subordinates.

[-33-] "You yourself must try in person the referred and the appealed
cases which come to you from the higher officials, from the procurators,
from the præfectus urbi, from the sub-censor, and the prefects, both the
commissioner of grain[13] and the night-watch.[14] No single one of them
should have such absolute powers of decision and such independence that a
case can not be appealed from him. You should be the judge, therefore
in these instances, and also when knights are concerned and properly
enrolled centurions and the foremost private citizens, if the trial
involves death or disenfranchisement. Let these be your business alone,
and for the reasons mentioned let no one else on his own responsibility
render a decision in them. You should always have associated with you
for discussion the most honored of the senators and of the knights, and
further certain others from the ranks of the ex-consuls and ex-prætors,
some at one time and some at another. In this association you will become
more accurately acquainted with their characters beforehand, and so be
able to put them to the right kind of employment, and they by coming in
contact with your habits and wishes will have them in mind on going out
to govern the provinces. Do not, however, openly ask their opinions when
a rather careful consideration is required, for fear that they, being
outside their accustomed sphere, may hesitate to speak freely; but let
them record their views on tablets. To these you alone should have
access, that they may become known to no one else, and then order the
writing to be immediately erased. In this way you may best get at each
man's exact opinion, when they believe that it can not be identified
among all the rest.

"Moreover for the lawsuits, letters, and decrees of the cities, for the
consideration of the demands of individuals and everything else which
belongs to the administration of the empire you must have supporters and
assistants from among the knights. Everything will move along more easily
in this way, and you will neither err through want of fairness nor become
exhausted by doing everything yourself. Grant every one who wishes to
make any suggestion whatever to you the right of speaking freely and
fearlessly. If you approve what he says, it will be of great service:
and if you are not persuaded, it will do no harm. Those who obtain your
favorable judgment you should both praise and honor, since by their
devices you will receive glory: and those who fail of it you should never
dishonor or censure. It is proper to look at their intentions, and not to
find fault because their plans were unavailable. Guard against this same
mistake when war is concerned. Be not enraged at any one for involuntary
misfortune nor jealous of his good fortune, to the end that all may
zealously and gladly run risks for you, confident that if they make a
slip they will not be punished nor if successful become the objects of
intrigue. There are many who through fear of jealousy on the part of
those in power have chosen to meet reverses rather than to effect
anything. As a result they retained their safety, but the loss fell upon
their own heads. You, who are sure to reap the principal benefit from
both classes alike,--the inferior and the superior,--ought never to
choose to become nominally jealous of others, but really of yourself.

[-34-] "Whatever you wish your subjects to think and do _you_ must
say and do. You can better educate them in this way than if you
should desire to terrify them by the severities of the laws. The former
course inspires emulation, the latter fear. And any one can more easily
imitate superior conduct, when he actually sees it in some life, than he
can guard against low behavior which he merely hears to be prohibited by
edict. Act in every way yourself with circumspection, not condoning any
mistakes of your own, for be well assured that all will straightway learn
everything you say and do. You will live as it were in a kind of theatre,
whose audience is the whole world: and it will not be possible for you to
escape detection if you commit the very smallest error. No act of yours
will ever be in private, but all of them will be performed in the midst
of many persons. And all the remainder of mankind somehow take the
greatest delight in being officious with respect to what is done by their
rulers. Hence, if they once ascertain that you are urging them to one
course and following a different one yourself, they will not fear your
threats, but will imitate your deeds.

"Have an eye to the lives of others, but do not carry your investigations
unpleasantly close. Decide cases which are brought before you by
outsiders, but do not pretend to notice conduct that receives no
outspoken censure from any one, except irregularities not consonant with
public interest. The latter ought to be properly rebuked, even if no one
has aught to say against them. Other private failings you ought to know,
in order to avoid making a mistake some day by employing an assistant
unsuitable for a particular duty: do not, however, take individuals to
task. Their natures impel many persons to commit various violations of
the law. If you make an unsparing campaign against them, you might leave
scarcely one man unpunished. But if you humanely mingle consideration
with the strict command of the law, you may perhaps bring them to their
senses. For the law, though necessarily severe in its punishments, can
not always conquer nature. Some men, if permitted to think they are
unobserved, or if moderately admonished, improve, some through shame
at being discovered and others through fear of failure the next time.
Whereas when they are openly denounced and throw compunction to the
winds, or where they are chastised beyond measure, they overturn and
trample under foot all law and order and obey slavishly the impulses of
their nature. Therefore it is not easy to discipline all of them nor is
it fitting to allow some of them to continue publicly their outrageous
conduct.

"This is the way I advise you to treat people's offences, except the very
desperate cases: and you should honor even beyond the deserts of the deed
whatever they do rightly. In this way you can best make them refrain from
baser conduct by kindliness and cause them to aim at what is better by
liberality. Have no dread that either money or other means of rewarding
those who do well will ever fail you. I think those deserving of good
treatment will prove far fewer than the rewards, since you are lord of so
much land and sea. And fear not that any who are benefited will commit
some act of ingratitude. Nothing so captivates and conciliates any one,
be he foreigner or be he foe, as freedom from wrongs and likewise kindly
treatment.

[-35-] "This is the attitude which I urge you to assume toward others.
For your own part allow no extraordinary or overweening distinction to
be given you through word or deed by the senate or by anybody else. To
others honor which you confer lends adornment, but to your own self
nothing can be given that is greater than what you already have, and it
would arouse no little suspicion of failure in straightforwardness. None
of the ordinary people willingly approves of having any such distinction
voted to the man in power. As he receives everything of the kind
from himself, he not only obtains no praise for it but becomes a
laughing-stock instead. Any additional brilliance, then, you must create
for yourself by your good deeds. Never permit gold or silver images of
yourself to be made; they are not only costly, but they give rise to
plots and last but a brief time: you must build in the very hearts of
men others out of benefits conferred, which shall be both unalloyed and
undying. Again, do not ever allow a temple to be raised to yourself.
Large amounts of money are spent uselessly on such objects, which had
better be laid out upon necessary improvements. Great wealth is gathered
not so much by acquiring a great deal as by not spending a great deal.
Nor does a temple contribute anything to any one's glory. Excellence
raises many men to the level of the gods, but nobody ever yet was made a
god by show of hands. Hence if you are upright and rule well, the whole
earth will be your precinct, all cities your temple, all mankind your
statues. In their thoughts you will ever be enshrined and surrounded by
good repute. Those who administer their power in any other way are not
only not magnified by sites and edifices of worship, though these be
the choicest in all the cities, but erect for themselves therein mute
detractors which become trophies of their baseness, memorials of their
injustice. And the longer these last, the more steadfastly does the
ill-repute of such sovereigns abide. [-36-] Therefore if you desire to
become in very truth immortal, act in this way; and further, reverence
the Divine Power yourself everywhere in every way, following our fathers'
belief, and compel others to honor it. Those who introduce strange ideas
about it you should both hate and punish, not only for the sake of the
gods (because if a man despises them he will esteem naught else sacred)
but because such persons by bringing in new divinities persuade many to
adopt foreign principles of law. As a result conspiracies, factions, and
clubs arise which are far from desirable under a monarchy. Accordingly,
do not grant any atheist or charlatan the right to be at large. The art
of soothsaying is a necessary one and you should by all means appoint
some men to be diviners and augurs, to whom people can resort who desire
to consult them on any matter; but there ought to be no workers of magic
at all. Such men tell partly truth but mostly lies, and frequently
inspire many of their followers to rebel. The same thing is true of many
who pretend to be philosophers. Hence I urge you to be on your guard
against them. Do not, because you have come in contact with such
thoroughly admirable men as Areus and Athenodorus, think that all
the rest who say they are philosophers are like them. Some use this
profession as a screen to work untold harm to both populace and
individuals.

[-37-] "Your spirit, then, because you have no desire for anything more
than you possess, ought to be most peaceful, whereas your equipment
should be most warlike, in order that no one ordinarily may either wish
or try to harm you, but if he should, that he may be punished easily and
instantly. For these and other reasons it is requisite for some persons
to keep their ears and eyes open to everything appertaining to your
position of authority, in order that you may not fail to notice anything
which needs guarding against or setting right. Remember, however, that
you must not trust merely to all they say, but investigate their words
carefully. There are many who, some through hatred of certain persons,
others out of desire for what they possess, or as a favor to some one, or
because they ask money and do not receive it, oppress others under the
pretext that the latter are rebellious or are guilty of harboring some
design or uttering some statement against the supreme ruler. Therefore it
is not right to pay immediate or ready attention to them, but to enquire
into absolutely everything. If you are slow in believing anybody, you
will suffer no great harm, but if you are hasty, you may make a mistake
which can not easily be repaired.

"Now it is both right and necessary for you to honor the excellent both
among the freedmen and among the rest of your associates. This will
afford you great renown and security. They must, however not have any
extraordinary powers but all carefully moderate their conduct, that
so you may not be ill spoken of through them. For everything they do,
whether well or ill, will be accredited to you, and the estimate of
yourself to be made by all men will depend upon what you permit these
persons to do.

"Do not, then, allow the influential either to make unjust gains or to
concern themselves with blackmail: and let no one be complained of for
'having influence', even if he is otherwise irreproachable. Defend the
masses vigorously when they are wronged and do not attend too easily to
accusations against them. Examine every deed on its merits, not being
suspicious of every one who is prominent nor believing every one who is
lower in the social scale. Those who are active and are the authors of
any useful device you must honor, but the idle or such as busy themselves
with petty foolishness you must hate. Thus your subjects will be inclined
to the former conduct because of the benefits attached and will refrain
from the latter on account of the penalties, and will become better
as individuals and more serviceable for your employment in the public
service.

"It is an excellent achievement also to render private disputes as few as
possible and their settlement as rapid as may be. But it is best of all
to cut short the impetuosity of communities, and, if under guise of some
appeals to your sovereignty and safety and good fortune they undertake to
use force upon anybody or to undertake exploits or expenditures that are
beyond their power, not to permit it. You should abolish altogether their
enmities and rivalries among themselves and not authorize them to create
any empty titles or anything else which will breed differences between
them. All will readily obey you both in this and in every other matter,
private and public, if you never permit any one to transgress this rule.
Non-enforcement of laws makes null and void even wisely framed precepts.
Consequently you should not allow persons to ask for what you are not
accustomed to give. Try to compel them to avoid diligently this very
practice of petitioning for something prohibited. This is what I have to
say on that subject.

[-38-] "I advise you never to make use of your authority against all the
citizens at once nor to deem it in any way curtailed if you do not do
absolutely everything that is within your power. But in proportion as you
are able to carry out all your wishes, you must be anxious to wish only
what is proper, make always a self-examination, to see whether what you
are doing is right or not, what conduct will cause people to love you,
and what not, in order that you may perform the one set of acts and avoid
the other. Do not admit the thought that you will sufficiently escape
the reputation of acting contrary to this rule, if only you hear no one
censuring you; and do not look for any one to be so mad as to reproach
you openly for anything. No one would do this, not even if he should be
violently wronged. Quite the reverse,--many are compelled in public to
praise their oppressors, and while engaged in opposition not to manifest
their wrath. The ruler must infer the disposition of people not from what
they say but from the way it is natural for them to feel.

[-39-] "This and a similar policy is the one I wish you to pursue. I pass
over many matters because it is not feasible to speak of them all at one
time and within present limits. One suggestion therefore I will make to
sum up both previous remarks and whatever is lacking. If you yourself by
your own motion do whatever you would wish some one else who ruled you
to do, you will make no mistakes and will be always successful, and
consequently your life will be most pleasant and free from danger. How
can all fail to regard you and to love you as father and preserver, when
they see you are orderly, leading a good life, good at warfare, but a man
of peace: when you are not wanton, do not defraud: when you meet them
on a footing of equality, and do not yourself grow rich while demanding
money from others: are not yourself given to luxury while imposing
hardships upon others: are not yourself unbridled while reproving others:
when, instead, your life in every way without exception is precisely
like theirs? Be of good cheer, for you have in your own hands a great
safeguard by never wronging another. And believe me when I tell you that
you will never be the object of hatred or plots. Since this is so, you
must quite inevitably lead a pleasant life. What is pleasanter, what is
more conducive to prosperity, than to enjoy in a rightful way all the
blessings among men and to have the power of granting them to others?

[-40-] "With this in mind, together with all the rest that I have told
you, heed my advice and let not that fortune slip which has chosen you
out of all and set you at the head of all. If you would choose the
substance of monarch but fear the name of 'kingdom' as accursed, then
refrain from taking possession of the latter and be satisfied to employ
merely the title of 'Cæsar.' If you need any further appellations, they
will give you that of _Imperator_, as they gave it to your father. They
will reverence you also by still another name, so that you may obtain all
the advantages of a kingdom without the disfavor that attaches to the
term itself."

[-41-] Mæcenas thus brought his speech to an end. Cæsar thanked them both
heartily for their many ideas, the exhaustiveness of their exposition,
and their frankness. He rather inclined, however, to the proposition of
Mæcenas. Yet he did not immediately put into practice all of the other's
suggestions, for fear that he might meet with some setback if he wanted
to reform men in multitudes. So he made some changes for the better at
once and others later. He left some things also for those who should
come to the head of the State afterward to do, as might be found more
opportune in the progress of time. Agrippa coöperated with him in all his
projects quite zealously, in spite of having stated a contrary opinion,
just as if he had been the one to propose the plan. Cæsar did this and
what I have recorded earlier in the narrative in that year when he was
consul for the seventh time, and added the title of _Imperator_. I do not
refer to the title anciently granted some persons for victories,--this he
received many times before and many times later for his deeds themselves,
so that he had the name of imperator twenty-one times,--but to the other
one which signifies supreme power, just as they had voted to his father
Cæsar and to the children and descendants of the same.

[-42-] After this he entered upon a censorship with Agrippa and besides
setting aright some other business he investigated the senate. Many
knights and many foot-soldiers, too, who did not deserve it were in the
senate as a result of the civil wars, so that the total of that body
amounted to a thousand. These he wished to remove, but did not himself
erase any of their names, urging them to become their own judges out of
the consciousness of their family and their life. So first he persuaded
fifty of them to retire voluntarily from the assemblage and then
compelled one hundred and forty others to imitate their example. He
disenfranchised none of them, but posted the names of the second
division. In the case of the first, because they had not delayed but had
straightway obeyed him, he remitted the reproach and their identity was
not made public. These accordingly returned willingly to private life. He
ousted Quintus Statilius, very much against the latter's will, from the
tribuneship to which he had been appointed. Some others he made senators,
and he counted among the ex-consuls two men of the senatorial class,--a
certain Cluvius and Gaius Furnius,--because they had been appointed
first, though certain others had taken possession of their offices
so that they were unable to become consuls. He added to the class of
patricians, the senate allowing him to do this because most of its
members had perished. No element is exhausted so fast in civil wars as
the nobility or is deemed to be so necessary for the continuance of
ancestral customs. In addition to the above measures he forbade all
persons in the senate to go outside of Italy, unless he himself should
order or permit any one of them to do so. This custom is still kept up at
the present day. Except that he may visit Sicily and Gallia Narbonensis
no senator is allowed to go anywhere out of the country. As these regions
are close at hand and the population is unarmed and peaceful, those who
have any possessions there have been granted the right to take trips to
them as often as they like, without asking leave.--Since also he saw that
many of the senators and of the others who had been devoted to Antony
still maintained an attitude of suspicion toward him, and as he was
afraid they might cause some uprising, he announced that all the letters
found in his rival's chest had been burned. Some of them as a matter of
fact had perished, but the majority of them he took pains to preserve and
did not even hesitate to use them later.

[-43-] Besides these acts related he also settled Carthage anew, because
Lepidus had laid waste a part of it and for that reason he maintained
that the colonists' rights of settlement had been abrogated. He summoned
Antiochus of Commagene to appear before him because this prince had
treacherously slain an envoy despatched to Rome by his brother, who was
at variance with him. Cæsar brought him before the senate, where he was
condemned and the sentence of death imposed. Capreæ was also obtained
from the Neapolitans, to whom it had anciently belonged, in exchange for
other land. It lies not far from the mainland opposite Surrentum and is
good for nothing but has a name even now on account of Tiberius's sojourn
there.--These were the events of that period.


[Footnote 1: Reading [Greek: anagchastae] (Boissevain)]

[Footnote 2: The same Strabo who is mentioned in the early part of
chapter 28, Book Forty-four.]

[Footnote 3: There is a gap here in the Greek text. The conclusion of
Agrippa'a speech is missing, as is also the earlier portion of Mæcenas's,
with some brief preface thereto. In the next chapter we are full in the
midst of the opposite argument,--in favor, namely, of the assumption of
supreme power by Octavius Cæsar.]

[Footnote 4: Cobet prefers to read "fearlessly" (substituting [Greek:
hadeos] for [Greek: aedeos]).]

[Footnote 5: Dio seems here to be imitating, in his phraseology,
Thukydides (VII, 25). The proper reading is [Greek: peri herma] (two
words), not [Greek: perierma] as in some of the MSS.]

[Footnote 6: Dindorf's reading (Greek: _gunaichon te ton prosaechouson
autois_).]

[Footnote 7: Compare Suetonius, _Augustus_, chapter 37. In practice there
were six of them,--three to nominate senators, and three to make a review
of the knights.]

[Footnote 8: Here some words have evidently fallen out of the text.]

[Footnote 9: Reading [Greek: hapo] with Dindorf.]

[Footnote 10: Reading [Greek: archousi] (MSS. and Boissevain) instead of
[Greek: archomenois] (Xylander).]

[Footnote 11: Adopting Boissevain's reading (Greek: diagein estai).]

[Footnote 12: A reference particularly to the ludi Capitolini, founded by
Domitian.]

[Footnote 13: Latin, _præfectus annonæ_.]

[Footnote 14: Latin, _præfectus vigilum_.]



DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY

53

The following is contained in the Fifty-third of Dio's Rome:

How the temple of Apollo on the Palatine was consecrated (chapters 1, 2).

How Cæsar delivered in the senate a speech as if retiring from the
sovereignty; and thereafter assigned to that body its proper provinces
(chapters 3-12).

About the appointment of the governors sent to the provinces (chapters
13-15).

How Cæsar was given the title of Augustus (chapter 16).

About the names which the emperors assume (chapters 17-22).

How the Sæpta were consecrated (chapters 23, 24).

How Cæsar fought against Astures and Cantabri (chapter 25).

How Gaul began to be governed Romans (chapter 26).

How the Portico of Neptune and the Baths of Agrippa were dedicated
(chapter 27).

How the Pantheon was dedicated (chapter 27).

How Augustus was released from the obligation of obeying the laws
(chapter 28).

How an expedition was made into Arabia Felix (chapters 29-33).

Duration of time six years, in which there were the following magistrates
here enumerated.

Cæsar (VI), M. Vipsanius L.F. Agrippa (II). (B.C. 28 = a. u. 726.)

Cæsar (VII), M. Vipsanius L.F. Agrippa (III). (B.C. 27 = a. u. 727.)

Cæsar Augustus (VIII), T. Statilius T.F. Taurus (II). (B.C. 26 = a. u.
728.)

Augustus (IX), M. lunius M.F. Silanus. (B.C. 25 = a. u. 729.)

Augustus (X), C. Norbanus C.F.C.N. Flaccus. (B.C. 24 = a. u. 730.)

Augustus (XI), Cn. Calpurnius Cn.F.Cn.N. Piso. (B.C. 23 = a. u. 731.)


_(BOOK 53, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[B.C. 28 (_a. u._ 726)]

[-1-] The following year Cæsar held office for the sixth time and did
everything according to the usage approved from very early times,
delivering to Agrippa his colleague the bundles of rods which belonged
to an incumbent of the consulship, while he himself used the others. On
completing his term he had the oath administered according to ancestral
custom. Whether he ever did this again I do not know. Agrippa he honored
exceedingly, even going so far as to give him his niece in marriage and
to provide him with a tent similar to his own whenever they went on a
campaign together; and the watchword was given by both of them. At that
particular time besides attending to the ordinary run of business he
finished the taking of the census, in which he was called _Princeps
Senatus_, as had been deemed proper under the real democracy. He further
completed and dedicated the temple of Apollo on the Palatine, the
precinct surrounding it, and the stores of books. And he celebrated in
company with Agrippa the festival in honor of the victory won at Actium,
which had been voted: in it he had the horse-race between boys and
between men of the nobility. This celebration every five years, as long
as it lasted, was in charge of the four priesthoods in succession,--I
mean the pontifices and augurs and the so-called septemviri and
quindecimviri. A gymnastic contest was also held at that time,--a wooden
stadium being built in the Campus Martius,--and there was an armed combat
of captives. This continued for several days without a break, in spite of
Cæsar's falling sick; for even so Agrippa filled his place.

[-2-] Cæsar spent some of his private means upon the festivals, and when
money was needed for the public treasury he borrowed it and supplied the
want. For the management of this branch of the service he ordered two
annual magistrates to be chosen from among the ex-prætors. To the
populace he distributed a quadruple allowance of grain and made a present
of money to some of the senators. For many of them had grown so poor as
not to be willing to be even ædile on account of the great expenses.
Moreover the courts which belonged to the ædileship were to be assigned
to the prætors as had been the custom, the more important to the prætor
urbanus and the others to the prætor peregrinus. Again, he himself
appointed the prætor urbanus, as he often did subsequently. The pledges
deposited with the public treasury before the battle of Actium he
released, save any that involved house property, and burned the old
acknowledgments of those who owed the State anything. Egyptian rites
he did not admit within the pomerium, but paid great attention to
the temples of Egyptian deities. Such as had been built by private
individuals he ordered their children and descendants, if any survived,
to repair, and the rest he restored himself. He did not, however,
appropriate the credit for their building but allowed it to rest with
those who had originally constructed them. And since very many unlawful
and unjust ordinances had been passed during the internecine strifes and
in the wars, and particularly in the dual reign of Antony and Lepidus, he
abolished them all by one promulgation, setting his sixth consulship as
the limit of their existence. As he obtained approbation and praise for
this act he desired to exhibit another instance of magnanimity, that by
such a policy he might be honored the more and that his supremacy might
be voluntarily confirmed by the people, which would enable him to
avoid the appearance of having forced them against their will. As a
consequence, after apprising those senators with whom he was most
intimate of his designs, he entered the senatorial body in his seventh
consulship and read the following document.

[B.C. 27 (_a. u._ 727)]

[-3-] "I am sure that I shall seem to some of you, Conscript Fathers, to
have made an incredible choice. For what each one of my hearers would not
wish to do himself, he does not like to believe when another states it as
accomplished. This is chiefly because every one is jealous of every one
who surpasses him and is more or less inclined to distrust anything said
that is higher than his own standard.[1] Moreover I know this, that those
who make apparently untrustworthy statements not only persuade nobody but
further have the appearance of cheats. And, indeed, if it were a case of
announcing something that I was not intending to do immediately, I should
hesitate very much about making it public, for fear of obtaining some
unworthy charge against me instead of gratitude. But, as it is, when
the performance will follow the promise this very day, I feel entirely
confident not only of avoiding any shame for prevarication but of
surpassing all mankind in good repute. [-4-] You all see that I am so
situated that I could rule you perpetually. All the revolutionists either
have been disciplined and been made to halt or have had pity shown them
and so have come to their senses. My helpers have been made devoted by
a recompense of benefits and steadfast by a participation in the
government: therefore they do not desire any political innovations, and
if anything of the sort should take place, the men to assist me are even
more ready for it than the instigators of rebellion. My military is in
prime condition, we have good-will, strength, money, and allies, and
chiefest of all you and the people are so disposed toward me that you
would be quite willing to have me at your head. However, I will lead you
no longer, nor shall any one say that all the acts of my previous career
have been with the object of sole rulership. I give up the entire domain,
and I restore to you absolutely everything,--the arms, the laws, and the
provinces,--not only all those which you committed to me but also all
that I myself subsequently acquired for you. Thus by my deeds themselves
you may ascertain that I did not from the outset desire any position of
power, but wished in very truth to avenge my father cruelly murdered and
to extricate the city from great and continuous evils. [-5-] I would that
I had never taken charge of affairs even to the present extent. That is,
I would that the city had never needed me for any such purpose, but that
we of this age had from the outset lived in peace and harmony as our
fathers once did. But since an inflexible fate, as it seems, brought you
to a place where there was need even of me, though I was still young,
and I was put to the test, I was always ready to labor zealously at
everything even beyond what was expected of my years, so long as the
situation demanded my help, and I accomplished everything with good
fortune, even surpassing my powers. There was not one consideration out
of all that might be cited which could turn me from aiding you when you
were in danger, not toil or fear or threats of foes or prayers of friends
or the numbers of the confederates or the desperation of our adversaries.
I gave myself to you unsparingly for all the tasks that fell to our
lot, and my performances and sufferings you know. From it I myself have
derived no gain except that I caused my country to survive, but you are
both preserved and in your sober senses. Since, then, the gracious act
of Fortune has restored to you by my hands peace without treachery and
harmony without turmoil, receive back also liberty and democracy.
Take possession of the arms and the subject nations, and conduct the
government as has been your wont.

[-6-] "You should not be surprised at my attitude when you see my right
conduct in other ways, my mildness and freedom from meddling, and reflect
moreover that I have never accepted any extraordinary privilege, beyond
what the majority might gain, though you have often voted many of them to
me. Do not, again, condemn me for folly because, when it is in my power
to rule over you and hold so great a sovereignty over this great world, I
am unwilling. Examining the merits of the situation I deem it most just
for you to manage your own affairs: examining the advantages, I regard it
as most advantageous to myself to be free from trouble, from jealousy,
from plots, and for you to conduct a free government with moderation and
love: examining where the glory lies (for the sake of which men often
choose to enter war and danger), will it not add most to my reputation
to resign so great a dominion? Will it not be most glorious to leave so
exalted a sovereignty and voluntarily become a plain citizen? So if any
one of you doubts that any one else could show true moderation in this
and bring himself to speak out, let him at all events believe me. For,
though I could recite many great benefits which have been conferred upon
you by me and by my father for which you would naturally love and honor
us above all the rest, I could say nothing greater and I should take
pride in nothing else more than this, that he would not accept the
monarchy which you strove to give him, and that I, holding it, lay it
aside.

[-7-] "What need to set side by side his separate exploits,--the conquest
of Gaul, the subduing of Moesia, the subjugation of Egypt, the enslaving
of Pannonia? Or again Pharnaces, Juba, Phraates, the campaign against
the Britons, the crossing of the Rhine? Yet these are greater and more
important deeds than all our forefathers performed in all previous time.
Still, any of these accomplishments scarcely deserves a place beside my
present act, nor yet, indeed, does the fact that the civil wars, the
greatest and most diverse that have occurred in the history of man, we
fought to a successful finish, and that we made humane terms, overcoming
all who withstood us, as enemies, and saving alive all who yielded, as
friends; (so that if our city should ever again be fated to suffer from
disaffection, we might pray that the quarrel should follow this same
course). For that in spite of our possessing such great power and
standing at the summit of excellence and good fortune so that we might
govern you willing or unwilling, we should neither lose our heads nor
desire sole supremacy, but that instead he should reject it when offered
and I return it when given is a superhuman achievement. I speak in this
way not for idle boasting,--I should not have said it at all if I were
to derive any advantage whatever from it,--but in order that you may see
that whereas there are many public benefits to our credit and we have
in private many lofty titles, we take greatest pride in this, that what
others desire to gain even by doing violence to their neighbors we
surrender without any compulsion.

[-8-] Who could be found more magnanimous than I (not to mention again
my father deceased) or whose conduct more godlike? With so many fine
soldiers at my back and citizens and allies (O Jupiter and Hercules!),
that love me, supreme over the entire sea within the Pillars of Hercules
except a very few tribes, possessing both cities and provinces on all the
continents, at a time when there is no longer any foreign enemy opposing
me and there is no disturbance at home, but you all are at peace,
harmonious and strong, and greatest of all are willingly obedient,--under
such conditions I voluntarily, of my own motion, resign so great a
dominion and alienate so vast a property. For if Horatius, Mucius,
Curtius, Regulus, the Decii wished to encounter danger and death with the
object of seeming to have done a great and noble deed, why should I not
even more desire to do this as a result of which I shall while alive
excel both them and all the rest of mankind in glory? No one of you
should think that whereas the ancient Romans pursued excellence and good
repute, all manliness has now become extinct in the city. Again, do not
entertain a suspicion that I wish to betray you and confide you to any
base fellows or expose you to mob rule, from which nothing good but all
the most terrible evils always result to mankind. Upon you, upon you, the
most excellent and prudent, I lay all public interests. The other course
I should never have followed, had it been necessary for me to die or even
to become monarch ten thousand times. This policy I adopt for my own
good and for that of the city. I myself have undergone both labors
and hardships and I can no longer hold out either in mind or in body.
Furthermore I foresee the jealousy and hatred which rises in the breasts
of some against the best men, and the plots which result from those
feelings; and for that reason I choose rather to be a private citizen
with glory than to be a monarch in danger. And the public business would
be managed much better if carried on publicly and by many people at once
than if it were dependent upon any one man.

[-9-] "For these reasons, then, I supplicate and beseech all of you both
to commend my course and to coöperate heartily with me, reflecting upon
all that I have done for you in war and in government. You will be paying
me all the thanks due for it by allowing me now at last to lead a life of
quiet. Thus you will come to know that I understand not only how to rule
but to be ruled, and that all commands which I have laid upon others I
can endure to have laid upon me. I must surely expect to live in security
and to suffer no harm from any one by either deed or word, such is the
confidence (based upon the consciousness of my own rectitude) that I have
in your good-will. I may of course meet with some catastrophe, as happens
to many; for it is not possible for a man to please everybody, especially
when he has been involved in so great wars, some foreign and some civil,
and has had affairs of such magnitude entrusted to him: yet even so, I
am quite ready to choose to die as a private citizen before my appointed
time rather than to become immortal as a sole ruler. That very
circumstance will bring me fame,--that I not only murdered no one in
order to hold possession of the sovereignty but even died untimely in
order to avoid becoming monarch. The man who has dared to slay me will
certainly be punished by Heaven and by you, as took place in the case
of my father. He was declared to be equal to a god and obtained eternal
honors, whereas those who slew him perished, the evil men, in evil
plight. We could not become deathless, yet by living well and by dying
well we do in a sense gain this boon. Therefore I, who possess the first
requisite and hope to possess the second, return to you the arms and the
provinces, the revenues and the laws. I make only this final suggestion,
that you be not disheartened through fear of the magnitude of affairs or
the difficulty of handling them, nor neglect them in disdain, with the
idea that they can be easily managed.

[-10-] "I have, indeed, no objection to suggesting to you in a summary
way what ought to be done in each of the leading categories. And what
are these suggestions? First, guard vigilantly the established laws and
change none of them. What remains fixed, though it be inferior, is more
advantageous than what is always subject to innovations, even though it
seem to be superior. Next, whatever injunctions these laws lay upon you
be careful to perform, and to refrain from whatever they forbid, and do
this scrupulously not only in word but also in deed, not only in public
but in private, that you may obtain not penalties but honors. The offices
both of peace and of war you should entrust to those who are each time
the most excellent and sensible, without jealousy of any persons, and
entering into rivalry not that this man or that man may reap some
advantage but that the city may be preserved and prosperous. Such men you
must honor but chastise those who show any different spirit in politics.
Make your private means public property of the city, and keep your hands
off public money as you would off your neighbors' goods. Keep careful
watch over what belongs to you but be not eager for that upon which you
can have no claim. Treat the allies and subject nations with neither
insolence nor rapacity, and neither wrong nor fear the enemy. Have your
arms always in hand, but do not use them against one another nor against
a peaceful population. Give the soldiers a sufficient support, so that
they may not on account of want desire anything which belongs to others.
Keep them together and discipline them, to prevent their doing any damage
through audacity.

"But why need I make a long story by going into everything which it is
your duty to do? You may easily understand from this how the remaining
business must be conducted. I will close with this one remark. If you
conduct the government in this way, you will enjoy prosperity yourselves
and you will gratify me, who found you in the midst of wretched dishonor
and have rendered you such as you are. If you prove impotent to carry out
any single branch as you should, you will cause me regret and you will
cast the city again into many wars and great dangers."

[-11-] While Cæsar was engaged in setting his decision before them, a
varied feeling took possession of the senators. A few of them knew his
real intention and as a result they kept applauding him enthusiastically.
Of the rest some were suspicious of what was said and others believed
in it, and therefore both marveled equally, the one class at his great
artifice and the other at the determination that he had reached. One side
was displeased at his involved scheming and the other at his change
of mind. For already there were some who detested the democratic
constitution as a breeder of factional difficulties, were pleased at the
change of government, and took delight in Cæsar. Consequently, though
the announcement affected different persons differently, their views in
regard to it were in each case the same. As for those who believed his
sentiments to be genuine, any who wished it could not rejoice because of
fear, nor the others lament because of hopes. And as many as disbelieved
it did not venture to accuse him and confute him, some because they were
afraid and others because they did not care to do so. Hence they all
either were compelled or pretended to believe him. As for praising him,
some did not have the courage and others were unwilling. Even in the
midst of his reading there were frequent shouts and afterward many more.
The senators begged that a monarchy be established, and directed all
their remarks to that end until (naturally) they forced him to assume the
reins of government. At once they saw to it that twice as much pay was
voted to the men who were to compose his body-guard as to the rest of the
soldiers, that this might incite the men to keep a careful watch of him.
Then he began to show a real interest in setting up a monarchy.

[-12-] In this way he had his headship ratified by the senate and the
people. As he wished even so to appear to be democratic in principle,
he accepted all the care and superintendence of public business on the
ground that it required expert attention, but said that he should not
personally govern all the provinces and those that he did govern he
should not keep in his charge perpetually. The weaker ones, because
(as he said) they were peaceful and free from war, he gave over to the
senate. But the more powerful he held in possession because they were
slippery and dangerous and either had enemies in adjoining territory or
on their own account were able to cause a great uprising. His pretext was
that the senate should fearlessly gather the fruits of the finest portion
of the empire, while he himself had the labors and dangers: his real
purpose was that by this plan the senators be unarmed and unprepared for
battle, while he alone had arms and kept soldiers. Africa and Numidia,
Asia and Greece with Epirus, the Dalmatian and Macedonian territories,
Sicily, Crete, and Libya adjacent to Cyrene, Bithynia with the adjoining
Pontus, Sardinia and Baetica, were consequently held to belong to
the people and the senate. Cæsar's were--the remainder of Spain, the
neighborhood of Tarraco and Lusitania, all Gauls (the Narbonensian and
the Lugdunensian, the Aquitani and the Belgæ), both themselves and the
aliens among them. Some of the Celtae whom we call Germani had occupied
all the Belgic territory near the Rhine and caused it to be called
Germania, the upper part extending to the sources of the river and the
lower part reaching to the Ocean of Britain. These provinces, then,
and the so-called Hollow Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia, Cyprus and the
Egyptians, fell at that time to Cæsar's share. Later he gave Cyprus and
Gaul adjacent to Narbo back to the people, and he himself took Dalmatia
instead. This was also done subsequently in the case of other provinces,
as the progress of my narrative will show. I have enumerated these in
such detail because now each one of them is ruled separately, whereas in
old times and for a long period the provinces were governed two and three
together. The others I have not mentioned because some of them were
acquired later, and the rest, even if they had been already subdued, were
not being governed by the Romans, but either were left to enjoy their own
laws or had been turned over to some kingdom or other. All of them that
after this came into the Roman empire were attached to the possessions
of the man temporarily in power.--This, then, was the division of the
provinces.

[-13-] Wishing to lead the Romans still further away from the idea
that he looked upon himself as absolute monarch, Cæsar undertook the
government of the regions given him for ten years. In the course of this
time he promised to reduce them to quiet and he carried his playfulness
to the point of saying that if they should be sooner pacified, he would
deliver them sooner to the senate. Thereupon he first appointed the
senators themselves to govern both classes of provinces except Egypt.
This land alone, for the reasons mentioned, he assigned to the knight
previously named.[2] Next he ordained that the rulers of senatorial
provinces should be annual magistrates, elected by lot, unless any one
had the special privilege accorded to a large number of children or
marriage. They were to be sent out by the assembly of the senate as a
body, with no sword at their side nor wearing the military garb. The name
proconsul was to belong not only to the two ex-consuls but also to
the rest who had served as prætors or who at least held the rank of
ex-prætors. Both classes were to employ as many lictors as were usual in
the capital. He ordered further that they were to put on the insignia of
their office immediately on leaving the pomerium and were to wear them
continually until they should return. The heads of imperial provinces, on
the other hand, were to be chosen by himself and be his agents, and they
were to be named proprætors even if they were from the ranks of the
ex-consuls. Of these two names which had been extremely common under the
democracy he gave that of prætor to the class chosen by him because
from very early times war had been their care, and he called them also
proprætors: the name of consul he gave to the others, because their
duties were more peaceful, and called them in addition proconsuls. These
particular names of prætor and consul he continued in Italy, and spoke of
all officials outside as governing as their representatives. He caused
the class of his own choosing to employ the title of proprætor and to
hold office for as much longer than a year as should please him, wearing
the military costume and having a sword with which they are empowered to
punish soldiers. No one else, proconsul or proprætor or procurator, who
is not empowered to kill a soldier, has been given the privilege of
wearing a sword. It is permitted not only to senators but also to knights
who have this function. This is the condition of the case.--All the
proprætors alike employ six lictors: as many of them as do not belong to
the number of ex-consuls are named from this very number.[3] Both classes
alike assume the decorations of their position of authority when they
enter their appointed district and lay them aside immediately upon
finishing their term.

[-14-] It is thus and on these conditions that governors from among the
ex-prætors and ex-consuls have been customarily sent to both kinds
of provinces. The emperor would send one of them on his mission
whithersoever and whenever he wished. Many while acting as prætors and
consuls secured the presidency of provinces, as sometimes happens at the
present day. In the case of the senate he privately gave Africa and Asia
to the ex-consuls and all the other districts to the ex-prætors. He
publicly forbade all the senators to cast lots for anybody until five
years after such a candidate had held office in the City. For a short
time all persons that fulfilled these requirements, even if they were
more numerous than the provinces, drew lots for them. Later, as some
of them did not govern well, this I appointment, too, reverted to the
emperor. Thus they also in a sense receive their position from him, and
he ordains that only a number equal to the number of provinces shall draw
lots, and that they shall be whatever men he pleases. Some emperors have
sent men of their own choosing there also, and have allowed certain of
them to hold office for more than a year: some have assigned certain
provinces to knights instead of to senators.

These were the customs thus established at that time in regard to those
senators that were authorized to execute the death penalty upon their
subjects. Some who have not this authority are sent out to the provinces
called "provinces of the senate and the people",--namely, such quæstors
as the lot may designate and men who are co-assessors with those who hold
the actual authority. This would be the correct way to speak of these
associates, with reference not to the ordinary name but to their duties:
others call these also _presbeutai_, using the Greek term; about this
title enough has been said in the foregoing narrative. Each separate
official chooses his own assessors, the exprætors selecting one from
either their peers or their inferiors, and the ex-consuls three from
among those of equal rank, subject to the approval of the emperor.

There were certain innovations made also in regard to these men, but
since they soon lapsed this is sufficient to say here.

[-15-] This is the method followed in regard to the provinces of the
people. To the others, called provinces of the emperor, which have more
than one citizenlegion, lieutenants are sent chosen by the ruler himself,
generally from the ex-prætors but in some instances already from the
ex-quæstors or those who had held some office between the two. Those
positions, then, appertain to the senators.

From among the knights the emperor himself despatches, some to the
citizen posts alone but others to foreign places (according to the
custom then instituted by [the same] Cæsar), the military tribunes, the
prospective senators and the remainder, concerning whose difference in
rank I have previously spoken in the narrative.[4] The procurators (a
name that we give to the men who collect the public revenues and spend
what is ordered) he sends to all the provinces alike, his own and the
people's, and some of these officers belong to the knights, others to the
freedmen. By way of exception the proconsuls levy the tribute upon
the people they govern. The emperor gives certain injunctions to the
procurators, the proconsuls, and the proprætors, in order that they may
proceed to their place of office on fixed conditions. Both this practice
and the giving of salary to them and to the remaining employees of the
government were made the custom at this period. In old times some by
contracting for work to be paid for from the public treasury furnished
themselves with everything needed for their office. It was only in the
days of Cæsar that these particular persons began to receive something
definite. This salary was not assigned to all of them in equal amounts,
but as need demands. The procurators get their very name, a dignified
one, from the amount of money given into their charge. The following laws
were laid down for all alike,--that they should not make up lists for
service or levy money beyond the amount appointed, unless the senate
should so vote or the emperor so order: also that when their successors
should arrive, they were immediately to leave the province and not to
delay on their return, but to be back within three months.

[-16-] These matters were so ordained at that time,--or, at least, one
might say so. In reality Cæsar himself was destined to hold absolute
control of all of them for all time, because he commanded the soldiers
and was master of the money; nominally the public funds had been
separated from his own, but in fact he spent the former also as he saw
fit.

When his decade had come to an end, there was voted him another five
years, then five more, after that ten, and again another ten, and a like
number the fifth time,[5] so that by a succession of ten-year periods he
continued monarch for life. Consequently the subsequent emperors, though
no longer appointed for a specified period but for their whole life at
once, nevertheless have been wont to hold a festival every ten years as
if then renewing their sovereignty once more: this is done even at the
present day.

Cæsar had received many honors previously, when the matter of declining
the sovereignty and that regarding the division of the provinces were
under discussion. For the right to fasten the laurel in front of his
royal residence and to hang the oak-leaf crown above the doors was then
voted him to symbolize the fact that he was always victorious over
enemies and preserved the citizens. The royal building is called
Palatium, not because it was ever decreed that that should be its name,
but because Cæsar dwelt on the Palatine and had his headquarters there;
and his house secured some renown from the mount as a whole by reason
of the former habitation of Romulus there. Hence, even if the emperor
resides somewhere else, his dwelling retains the name of Palatium.

When he had really completed the details of administration, the name
Augustus was finally applied to him by the senate and by the people. They
wanted to call him by some name of their own, and some proposed this,
while others chose that. Cæsar was exceedingly anxious to be called
Romulus, but when he perceived that this caused him to be suspected of
desiring the kingship, he no longer insisted on it but took the title of
Augustus, signifying that he was more than human. All most precious and
sacred objects are termed _augusta_. Therefore they saluted him also
in Greek as _sebastós_, meaning an _august_ person, from the verb
_sebazesthai_. [-17-] In this way all the power of the people and that of
the senate reverted to Augustus, and from his time there was a genuine
monarchy. Monarchy would be the truest name for it, no matter how much
two and three hold the power together. This name of monarch the Romans so
detested that they called their emperors neither dictators nor kings nor
anything of the sort. Yet since the management of the government devolves
upon them, it can not but be that they are kings. The offices that
commonly enjoy some legal sanction are even now maintained, except that
of censor. Still, everything is directed and carried out precisely as the
emperor at the time may wish. In order that they may appear to hold this
power not through force, but according to law, the rulers have taken
possession,--names and all,--of every position (save the dictatorship)
which under the democracy was of mighty influence among the citizens who
bestowed the power. They very frequently become consuls and are always
called proconsuls whenever they are outside the pomerium. The title of
imperator is invariably given not only to such as win victories but to
all the rest, to indicate the complete independence of their authority,
instead of the name "king" or "dictator." These particular names they
have never assumed since the terms first fell out of use in the Senate,
but they are confirmed in the prerogatives of these positions by the
appellation of imperator. By virtue of the titles mentioned they get the
right to make enrollments, to collect moneys, declare wars make peace,
rule foreign and native territory alike everywhere and always, even to
the extent of putting to death both knights and senators within the
pomerium, and all the other privileges once granted to the consuls and
other officials with full powers. By virtue of the office of censor they
investigate our lives and characters and take the census. Some they list
in the equestrian and senatorial class and others they erase from
the roll, as pleases them. By virtue of being consecrated in all the
priesthoods and furthermore having the right to give the majority of them
to others and from the fact that _one_ of the high priests (if there be
two or three holding office at once) is chosen from their number, they
are themselves also masters of holy and sacred things. The so-called
tribunician authority which the men of very greatest attainment used to
hold gives them the right to stop any measure brought up by some one
else, in case they do not join in approving it, and to be free from
personal abuse. Moreover if they are thought to be wronged in even the
slightest degree not merely by action but even by conversation they may
destroy the guilty party without a trial as one polluted. They do not
think it lawful to be tribune, because they belong altogether to the
patrician class, but they assume all the power of the tribuneship
undiminished from the period of its greatest extent; and thereby the
enumeration of the years they have held the office in question goes
forward on the assumption that they receive it year by year along with
the others who are successively tribunes. Thus by these names they have
secured these privileges in accordance with all the various usages of the
democracy, in order that they may appear to possess nothing that has not
been given them.

[-18-] They have gained also another prerogative which was given to none
of the ancient Romans outright to apply to all cases, and it is through
this alone that it would be possible for them to hold the above offices
and any others besides. They are freed from the action of the laws, as
the very words in Latin indicate. That is, they are liberated from every
consideration of compulsion and are subjected to none of the written
ordinances. So by virtue of these democratic names they are clothed in
all the strength of the government and have all that appertains to kings
except the vulgar title. "Cæsar" or "Augustus" as a mode of address
confers upon them no distinct privilege of its own but shows in the one
case the continuance of their family and in the other the brilliance and
dignity of their position. The salutation "father" perhaps gives them a
certain authority over us which fathers once had over their children. It
was not used, however, for this purpose in the beginning, but for their
honor, and to admonish them to love their subjects as they would their
children, while the subjects were to respect them as they respect their
fathers.

Such is the number and quality of the titles to which those in power
are accustomed according to the and according to what has now become
tradition. At present all of them are, as a rule, bestowed upon the
rulers at once, except the title of censor: to the earlier emperors they
were voted separately and from time to time. Some of the emperors took
the censorship in accordance with ancient custom and Domitian took it for
life. This is, however, no longer done at the present day. They possess
its powers and are not chosen for it and do not employ its name except in
the censuses.

[-19-] Thus was the constitution made over at that time for the better
and in a way to provide greater security. It was doubtless absolutely
impossible for the people to be preserved under a democracy. Events after
this, however, can not be said to be similar to those preceding this
period. Formerly everything was referred to the senate and the people
even if it occurred at a distance; hence all learned of it and many
recorded it. Consequently the truth of happenings, no matter with how
much fear and gratitude and friendship and enmity toward any one they
were related, has been found at least In the works of those who wrote of
them and to a certain extent also in the public records. But after this
time business began to be transacted more often with concealment and
secrecy. Nowadays, even if anything is made public, it is distrusted
because it can not be proved. It is suspected that all speeches and acts
are to meet the wishes of the men at the time in power and of their
associates. As a result much that never occurs is noised abroad and
much that really happens is unknown. Nearly everything is reported in a
different form from what really takes place. Yet the magnitude of the
empire and the number of events render accuracy in regard to them most
difficult. In Rome there are many operations going on, and so in its
subject territory, as well as against hostile tribes, always and every
day, so to speak, clear information about which no one can easily get
except those actively concerned. There are great numbers who do not hear
at all of what has taken place. Hence all that follows which will require
mention I shall narrate as it has been published, whether it is so in
truth or is really somewhat different. In addition, however, my own
opinion so far as possible will be stated in matters where I have been
able to deduce something else than the common report from the many things
I have read or heard or seen.

[-20-] Cæsar, as I have said, received the further designation of
Augustus, and a sign of no little moment in regard to him occurred that
very night. The Tiber overflowed and occupied all of Rome that was built
in the plain country so that it was submerged. From this the soothsayers
inferred that he would rise to great heights and keep the whole city
subservient. While different persons were rivals to show him excessive
honors, one Sextus Pacuvius, or, as others say, Apudius[6] surpassed them
all. In the open senate he consecrated himself to him after the fashion
of the Spaniards and advised the rest to do the same. When Augustus
hindered him he rushed out to the crowd standing near by, and (as he was
tribune) compelled them and next all the rest who were wandering about
through the streets and lanes to consecrate themselves; to Augustus. From
this episode we are wont even now to say in appeals to the sovereign
"we have consecrated ourselves to you." Pacuvius ordered all to offer
sacrifice for this occurrence and before the people he once said he
should make Augustus his inheritor on equal terms with his son. This was
not because he possessed anything much, but because he wished to get
more. And his desire was accomplished.

[-21-] Augustus attended with considerable zeal to all the business of
the empire to make it appear that he had received it in accordance with
the wishes of all, and he also enacted many laws. (I need not go into
each one of them in detail except those which have a bearing upon my
history. This same course I shall follow in the case of later events, in
order not to become wearisome by introducing all such matters as not even
those who specialize on them most narrowly know with accuracy.) Not all
of these laws were enacted on his sole responsibility: some of them he
brought before the public in advance, in order that, if any featured
caused displeasure, he might learn it in time and correct them. He urged
that any one at all give him advice, if any one could think of anything
better. He accorded them full liberty of speech and some provisions he
actually did alter. Most important of all, he took as advisers for six
months the consuls or the consul (when he himself also held the office),
one of each of the other kinds of officials, and fifteen men chosen
by lot from the remainder of the senatorial body. Through them he was
accustomed to a certain extent to communicate to all the rest the
provisions of his laws. Some features he brought before the entire
senate. He deemed it better, however, to consider most of the laws and
the greater ones in company with a few persons at leisure, and acted
accordingly. Sometimes he tried cases with their assistance. The entire
senate by itself sat in judgment as formerly and transacted business with
occasional groups of envoys and heralds from both peoples and kings.
Furthermore the people and the plebs came together for the elections, but
nothing was done that would not please Cæsar. Some of those who were
to hold office he himself chose out and nominated and others he put,
according to ancient custom, in the power of the people and the plebs,
yet taking care that no unfit persons should be appointed, nor by
factious cliques nor by bribery. In this way he controlled the entire
empire.

[-22-] I shall relate also in detail all his acts that need mentioning,
together with the names of the consuls under whom they were performed.
In the year previously named, seeing that the roads outside the wall had
become through neglect hard to traverse, he ordered different senators to
repair different ones at their own expense. He himself attended to the
Flaminian Way, since he was going to lead an army out by that route.
This operation was finished forthwith and images of him were accordingly
erected on arches on the bridge over the Tiber and at Ariminum. The other
roads were repaired later either at public expense (for none of the
senators liked to spend money on it) or by Augustus, as one may wish to
state. I can not distinguish their treasures in spite of the fact that
Augustus coined into money some silver statues of himself made by his
friends and by certain of the tribes, purposing thereby to make it appear
that all the expenditures which he said he made were from his own means.
Therefore I have no opinion to record as to whether a ruler at any
particular time took money from the public treasury or whether he ever
gave it himself. For both of these things were often done. Why should any
one list such things as either expenditures or donations, when the people
and the emperor are constantly making both the one and the other in
common?

These were the acts of Augustus at that time. He also set out apparently
to make a campaign into Britain, but on coming to the provinces of Gaul
lingered there. For the Britons seemed likely to make terms with him
and Gallic affairs were still unsettled, as the civil wars had begun
immediately after their subjugation. He made a census of the people and
set in order their life and government.

[ B.C. 26 (_a. u. 728_)]

[-23-] From there he came to Spain and reduced that country also to
quiet. After this he became consul for the eighth time with Statilius
Taurus, and Agrippa dedicated the so-called for he had not promised to
repair any road. This edifice in the Campus Martius had been constructed
by Lepidus by the addition of porticos all about for the tribal
elections, and Agrippa adorned it with stone tablets and paintings, naming
it Julian, from Augustus. The builder incurred no jealousy for it but was
greatly honored both by Augustus himself and by all the rest of the
people. The reason is that he gave his master the most kindly, the most
distinguished, the most beneficial advice and coöperation, yet claimed
not even a small share of the consequent glory. He used the honors which
Cæsar gave not for personal gain or enjoyment but for the benefit of the
giver himself and of the public.--On the other hand Cornelius Gallus
was led to insolent behavior by honor. He talked a great deal of idle
nonsense against Augustus and was guilty of many sly reprehensible
actions. Throughout nearly all Egypt he set up images of himself and he
inscribed upon the pyramids a list of his achievements. For this he
was accused by Valerius Largus, his comrade and intimate, and was
disenfranchised by Augustus, so that he was prevented from living in the
emperor's provinces. After this took place others attacked him, and
brought many indictments against him. The senate unanimously voted that
he should be convicted in the courts, be deprived of his property, and be
exiled, that his possessions be given to Augustus, and that they should
sacrifice oxen. In overwhelming grief at this Gallus committed suicide
before the decrees took effect. [-24-] The false behavior of most men was
evidenced by this fact, that they now treated the man whom they once used
to flatter in such a way that they forced him to die by his own hand.
To Largus they showed devotion because his star was beginning to
rise,--though they were sure to vote the same measures against him, if
anything similar should ever occur in his case. Proculeius, however, felt
so toward him that on meeting him once he clapped his hand over his nose
and his mouth, thereby signifying to the bystanders that it was not safe
even to breathe in the man's presence. Another person, although unknown,
approached him with witnesses and asked if Largus recognized him. When
the one questioned said "no", he recorded his denial on a tablet, thus
making it beyond the power of the rascal to inform against a person at
least whom he had not previously known.

Thus we see that most men emulate the exploits of others, though they be
evil, instead of guarding against their fate. So also at this time there
was Marcus Egnatius Rufus, who had been an ædile: the majority of his
deeds had been good, and with his own slaves and with some others that
were hired he lent aid to the houses that took fire during his year of
office. In return he received from the people the expenses incurred in
his position and by a suspension of the law was made prætor. Elated at
these marks of favor he despised Augustus so much as to record that he
(Rufus) had delivered the City unimpaired and entire to his successor.
All the foremost men, and Augustus himself most of all, became indignant
at this. He prepared therefore to teach the upstart a lesson in the near
future not to exalt his mind above the mass of men. For the time being
he issued an edict to the ædiles to see to it that no building took fire
and, if aught of the kind did happen, to extinguish the blaze.

[-25-] In this same year also Polemon, who was king of Pontus, was
enrolled among the friends and allies of the Roman People; front seats
for the senators were provided in all the theatres of the emperor's whole
domain. Augustus, finding that the Britons would not come to terms,
wished to make an expedition into their country, but was detained by the
Salassi, who had revolted against him, and by the Cantabri and Astures,
who had been made hostile. The former dwell close under the Alps, as
has been herein stated,[7] whereas both of the latter tribes hold the
strongest region of the Pyrenees on the Spanish side and the plain which
is below it. For these reasons Augustus, now in his ninth consulship with
Marcus Silanus, sent Terentius Varro against the Salassi.

[B.C. 25 (_a. u._ 729)]

The latter invaded their territory at many points at once in order that
they might not unite and become harder to subdue, and had a very easy
time in conquering them because they attacked him only in small groups.
Having forced them to capitulate he demanded a fixed sum of money,
allowing it to be supposed that he would impose no other punishment.
After that he sent soldiers everywhere, apparently to attend to the
collection of the indemnity and arrested those of military age, whom he
sold under an agreement that none of them should be liberated within
twenty years. The best of their land was given to members of the
Pretorians and came to include a city called Augusta Prætoria.[8]
Augustus himself waged war upon the Astures and upon the Cantabri at
the same time. These refused to yield, because of confidence in their
position on the heights, and would not come to close quarters owing
to their inferior numbers and the fact that most of them were javelin
throwers, but they caused him much trouble, whenever he made any
movement, by always seizing the higher ground in advance and placing
ambuscades in depressions and in wooded spots. He found himself therefore
quite unable to cope with the difficulty, and having fallen ill from
weariness and worry retired to Tarraco, and there remained sick. Meantime
Gaius Antistius fought against them, accomplishing considerable, not
because he was a better general than Augustus, but because the barbarians
felt contempt for him and thus joined battle with the Romans and were
defeated. In this way he captured some points, and afterward Titus[9]
Carisius took Lancia, the principal fortress of the Astures, which had
been abandoned, and won to his side many towns.

[-26-] At the conclusion of this war Augustus dismissed the more aged of
his soldiers and gave them a city to settle in Lusitania,--the so-called
Augusta Emerita. For those who were still of the military age he arranged
some spectacles right among the legions, through the agency of Tiberius
and Marcellus as ædiles. To Juba he gave portions of Gætulia in return
for the prince's ancestral domain (for the majority of the inhabitants
had been enrolled as members of the Roman polity), and also the
possessions of Bocchus and Bogud. On the death of Amyntas he did not
entrust the country to the children of the deceased but made it a part of
the subject territory. Thus Gaul together with Lycaonia obtained a Roman
governor. The regions of Pamphylia formerly assigned to Amyntas were
restored to their own district.--About this same time Marcus Vinicius
in making reprisals against the Celtæ, because they had arrested and
destroyed Romans who had entered their country to have friendly dealings
with them, himself gave the name of imperator to Augustus. For this and
for the other achievements of the time a triumph was voted to Cæsar;
but as he did not care to celebrate it, an arch bearing a trophy was
constructed in the Alps for his glory and authority was given him to wear
always on the first day of the year both the crown and the triumphal
garb. After these successes in the wars Augustus closed the precinct of
Janus, which had been opened because of the strife.

[-27-] Meanwhile Agrippa had been beautifying the city at his own
expense. First, in honor of the naval victories he built over the
so-called _Portico of Neptune_ and lent it further brilliance by the
painting of the Argonauts. Secondly, he repaired the Laconian sudatorium.
He gave the name Laconian to the gymnasium because the Lacedæmonians had,
in those days, a greater reputation than anybody else for stripping
naked and exercising smeared with oil. Also, he completed the so-called
_Pantheon_. It has this name perhaps because it received the images
of many gods and among them the statues of Mars and Venus; but my own
opinion is that the name is due to its round shape, like the sky. Agrippa
desired to place Augustus also there and to take the designation of the
structure from his title. But, as his master would not accept either
honor, he placed in the temple itself a statue of the former Cæsar and in
the anteroom representations of Augustus and himself. This was done not
from any rivalry and ambition on Agrippa's part to make himself equal to
Augustus, but from his superabundant devotion to him and his perpetual
affection for the commonwealth; hence Augustus, so far from censuring
him for it, honored him the more. For, being unable through sickness
to superintend at that time the marriage of his daughter Julia and his
nephew Marcellus, he commissioned Agrippa to hold the festival in his
absence. And when the house on the Palatine hill, which had formerly been
Antony's but was later given to Agrippa and Messala, was burned down,
he made a grant of money to Messala and gave Agrippa equal rights of
domicile. The latter not unnaturally gained high distinction as a result
of this. And one Gaius Toranius also acquired a good reputation because
while tribune he brought his father, though some one's freedman, into the
theatre and made him sit beside him upon the tribune's bench. Publius
Servilius, too, made a name for himself because while prætor he caused to
be killed at a festival three hundred bears and other Libyan wild beasts
equal in number.

[B.C. 24 (_a. u._ 730)]

[-28-] Augustus now entered upon office for the tenth time with Gaius
Norbanus, and on the first day of the month the senate took oaths,
confirming his deeds. When he was announced as drawing near the city
(his sickness had delayed him), he promised to give the people a hundred
denarii each and issued instructions that the document concerning the
money should not be bulletined until the senate also should approve.
They had freed him from all compulsion of the laws to the end, as I have
stated,[10] that being really independent and possessed of full powers
over both himself and the laws he should follow all of them that he
wished and not follow any that he did not wish. This right was voted to
him while still absent. On his arrival in Rome there were various events
in honor of his preservation and return, and Marcellus was accorded the
right to be a senator of the class of ex-prætors and to be a candidate
for the consulship ten years earlier than was customary. Tiberius was
permitted in a similar fashion to be a candidate five years before the
age set for each office. The latter was at once appointed quæstor and
the former ædile. As the quæstors needed to serve in the provinces were
proving insufficient, all drew lots for the places who for ten years
previous had been named quæstors without the duties of the office. These,
then, were the occurrences in the City worthy of note that year.

[-29-] As soon as Augustus had departed from Spain, leaving behind Lucius
Æmilius[11] as governor of it, the Cantabri and Astures made an uprising.
They sent to Æmilius before anything about it became known to him and
said they wished to give the army grain and some other presents. Then,
having secured a number of soldiers, who were presumably to carry the
supplies, they led them to suitable places and butchered them. Their
pleasure, however, did not last long. When their country had been
devastated and some forts burned and, chiefest of all, the hands of every
one that was caught were cut off, they were quickly subdued. While this
was going on, another new campaign had its beginning and end. It was
led by Ælius Gallus, governor of Egypt, against the so-called _Arabia
Felix_[12] of which Sabos was king. At first he encountered no one at
all, yet did not proceed without effort. The desert, the sun, and the
water (which had some peculiar nature), distressed them greatly so that
the majority of the army perished. The disease proved to be dissimilar
to any ordinary complaint, and fell upon the head, which it caused
to wither. This killed most of them at once, but in the case of the
survivors it descended to the legs, skipping all the intervening parts of
the body, and wrought injury to them. There was no remedy for it except
by both drinking and rubbing on olive oil mixed with wine. This was in
the power of only a few of them to do, for the country produces neither
of these articles and the men had not provided a large supply of them
beforehand. In the midst of this trouble the barbarians also fell upon
them. For a while the enemy were defeated whenever they joined battle and
lost some places: later, however, with the disease as an ally they won
back their own possessions and drove the survivors of the expedition out
of the country. These were the first of the Romans (and I think the only
ones) who traversed so much of this part of Arabia in warfare. They had
advanced as far as the so-named Athlula, a famous locality.

[B.C. 23 (_a. u._ 731)]

[-30-] Augustus was for the eleventh time consul with Calpurnius Piso,
when he fell so sick once more as to have no hope of saving his life. He
accordingly arranged everything in the idea that he was about to die, and
gathering about him the officials and the other foremost senators and
knights he appointed no successor, though they were expecting that
Marcellus would be preferred before all for the position. After
conversing briefly with them about public matters he gave Piso the list
of the forces and the public revenues written in a book, and handed his
ring to Agrippa. The emperor became unable to do even the very simplest
things, yet a certain Antonius Musas managed to restore him to health by
means of cold baths and cold drinks. For this he received a great deal
of money from both Augustus and the senate, as well as the right to wear
gold rings,--he was a freedman,--and secured exemption from taxes for
both himself and the members of his profession, not only those then
living but also those of coming generations. But he who assumed the
powers of Fortune and Fate was destined soon after to be well worsted.
Augustus had been saved in this manner: but Marcellus, falling sick not
much later, was treated in the same way by Musas and died. Augustus gave
him a public burial with the usual eulogies, placed him in the monument
which was being built, and honored his memory by calling the theatre,
the foundations of which had already been laid by the former Cæsar, the
Theatre of Marcellus. He ordered also that a gold image of the deceased,
a golden crown, and his chair of office be carried into the theatre at
the Ludi Romani and be placed in the midst of the officials having charge
of the function. This he did later.

[-31-] After being restored to health on this occasion he brought his
will into the senate and wished to read it, by way of showing people that
he had left no successor to his position. He did not, however, read it,
for no one would permit that. Quite every one, however, was astonished
at him in that since he loved Marcellus as son-in-law and nephew yet he
failed to trust him with the monarchy but preferred Agrippa before him.
His regard for Marcellus had been shown by many honors, among them his
lending aid in carrying out the festival which the young man gave as
ædile; the brilliance of this occasion is shown by the fact that in
midsummer he sheltered the Forum by curtains overhead and introduced a
knight and a woman of note as dancers in the orchestra. But his final
attitude seemed to show that he was not yet confident of the youth's
judgment and that he either wanted the people to get back their liberty
or Agrippa to receive the leadership from them. He understood well that
Agrippa and the people were on the best of terms and he was unwilling to
appear to be delivering the supreme power with his own hands. [-32-] When
he recovered, therefore, and learned that Marcellus on this account was
not friendly toward Agrippa, he immediately despatched the latter to
Syria, so that no delay and desultory dispute might arise by their being
in the same place. Agrippa forthwith started from the City but did not
make his way to Syria, but, proceeding even more moderately than usual,
he sent his lieutenants there and himself lingered in Lesbos.

Besides doing this Augustus appointed ten prætors, feeling that he did
not require any more. This number remained constant for several years.
Some of them were intended to fulfill the same duties as of yore and two
of them to have charge of the administration of the finances each year.
Having settled these details he resigned the consulship and went to
Albanum. He himself ever since the constitution had been arranged had
held office for the entire year, as had most of his colleagues, and he
wished now to interrupt this custom again, in order that as many as
possible might be consuls. His resignation took place outside the city to
prevent his being hindered in his purpose.

For this act he received praise, as also because he chose to take his
place Lucius Sestius, who had always been an enthusiastic follower of
Brutus, had campaigned with the latter in all his wars, and even at this
time made mention of him, had his images, and delivered eulogies. So
far from disliking the friendly and faithful qualities of the man, the
emperor even honored him.

The senate consequently voted that Augustus be tribune for life and that
he might bring forward at each meeting of the senate any business he
liked concerning any one matter, even if he should not be consul at
the time, and allowed him to hold the office of proconsul once for all
perpetually, so that he had neither to lay it down on entering the
pomerium nor to take it up again outside. The body also granted him more
power in subject territory than the several governors possessed. As a
result both he and subsequent emperors gained a certain legal right to
the use of the tribunican authority, in addition to their other powers.
But the actual name of tribune neither Augustus nor any other emperor has
held.

[-33-] And it seems to me that he then acquired these rights as described
not from flattery but as a mark of real honor. In most ways he behaved
toward the Romans as if they were free citizens. For, when Tiridates in
person and envoys from Phraates arrived to settle their mutual disputes,
he introduced them to the senate. After this, when the decision of the
question had been entrusted to him by that body, he refused to surrender
Tiridates to Phraates, but sent back to him his son, whom Tiridates had
formerly received from the other and was keeping, on condition that the
captives and the military standards taken in the disasters of Crassus and
of Antony be returned.

In this same year one of the inferior ædiles died and Gaius Calpurnius
succeeded him, in spite of having served previously as one of the
patrician ædiles. This is not mentioned as having occurred in the case of
any other man. During the Feriæ there were two præfecti urbi each day,
and one of them, who was not yet admitted to the standing of a youth,
nevertheless held office.

Livia, however, was accused of having caused the death of Marcellus
because he had been preferred before her sons. This suspicion became
a matter of controversy both in that year and in the following, which
proved so unhealthful that great numbers perished during its progress.
And, as it usually happens that some sign occurs before such events,
so on this occasion a wolf had been caught in the city, fire and storm
damaged many buildings, and the Tiber, rising, washed away the wooden
bridge and rendered the city submerged for three days.


[Footnote 1: Following Dindorf's reading [Greek: hyper heauton].]

[Footnote 2: A reference to Cornelius Gallus (see Book Fifty-one, chapter
17).]

[Footnote 3: The expression to which Dio here refers is doubtless the
adjective _quinquefascalis_, found in inscriptional Latin. All the
editions from Xylander to Dindorf gave "six lictors", erroneously, as was
pointed out by Mommsen (_Romisches Staatsrecht_, 12, p. 369, note 4).
Boissevain is the first editor to make the correction. (See the latter
portion of chapter 17, Book Fifty-seven, which should be compared with
Tacitus, Annals, II, 47, 5.)

The Greek language had a phrase [Greek: hae hexapelekus archae],
corresponding to the Latin _sexfascalis_, but no adjective [Greek:
pentapelekus], which would be the equivalent of _quinquefascalis_, is
reported in the lexicons.]

[Footnote 4: Cp. Book Fifty-two, chapter 25.]

[Footnote 5: Translating Boissevain's conjecture, [Greek: dela chahi
pempton isa], in place of a corruption in the text.]

[Footnote 6: In view of the fact that _Sex. Pacuvius Taurus_ does not
come on the scene (as tribune of the plebs) till B.C. 9-7, it seems more
likely, as Boissevain remarks, that Apudius is the correct name of the
author of this piece of flattery.]

[Footnote 7: Boissevain thinks that the passage indicated was probably in
Book Twenty-two (one of the lost portions of the work). Compare Fragment
LXXIV (1) in Volume VI of this translation.--Boissée suggested Book
Forty-nine, Chapter 34. There, too, the correspondence is not complete.]

[Footnote 8: The modern _Aosta_.]

[Footnote 9: Possibly this prænomen is an error for _Publius_.]

[Footnote 10: Chapter 18 of this Book.]

[Footnote 11: Another writer reports his name as _Lucius Lamia_.]

[Footnote 12: The "prosperous" or fertile part of Arabia, as opposed to
_Arabia Deserta_ or _Petræa_.]



DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY

54

The following is contained in the Fifty-fourth of Dio's Rome:

How road commissioners were appointed from among the ex-prætors (chapter
8).

How grain commissioners were appointed from among the ex-prætors
(chapters 1 and 17).

How Noricum was reduced (chapter 20).

How Rhætia was reduced (chapter 22).

How the Maritime Alps began to yield obedience to the Romans (chapter
24).

How the theatre of Balbus was dedicated (chapter 25).

How the theatre of Marcellus was dedicated (chapter 26).

How Agrippa died and Augustus acquired the Chersonese (chapters 28, 29).

How the Augustalia was instituted (chapter 34).

Duration of time, 13 years, in which there were the following magistrates
here enumerated:

M. Claudius M. F. Marcellus Æserninus, L. Arruntius L.F. (B.C. 22 = a. u.
732.)

M. Lollius M. F., Q. Æmilius M. F. Lepidus. (B.C. 21 = a. u. 733.)

M. Apuleius Sex, F., P. Silius P. F. Nerva. (B.C. 20 = a. u. 734.)

C. Sentius C. F. Saturninus, Q. Lucretius Q. F. Vispillo. (B.C. 19 = a.
u. 735.)

Cn. Cornelius L. F., P. Cornelius P. F. Lentulus Marcellinus. (B.C. 18 =
a. u. 736.)

C. Furnius C. F., C. Iunius C. F. Silanus. (B.C. 17 = a. u. 737.)

L. Domitius Cn. F. Cn. N. Ahenobarbus, P. Cornelius P. F. P. N. Scipio.
(B.C. 16 = a. u. 738.)

M. Livius L. F. Drusus Libo, L. Calpurnius L. F. Piso Frugi. (B.C. 15 =
a. u. 739.)

M. Licinius M. F. Crassus, Cn. Cornelius Cn. F. Lentulus. (B.C. 14 = a.
u. 740.)

Tib. Claudius Tib. F. Nero, P. Quintilius Sex. F. Varus. (B.C. 13 = a. u.
741.)

M. Valerius M. F. Messala Barbatus, P. Sulpicius P. F. Quirinus. (B.C. 12
= a. u. 742.)

Paulus Fabius Q. F. Maximus, Q. Ælius Q. F. Tubero. (B.C. 11 = a. u.
743.)

Iullus Antonius M. F., Africanus Q. Fabius Q. F. (B.C. 10 = a. u. 744.)


_(BOOK 54, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[B.C. 22 (_a. u._ 732)]

[-1-] The following year, during which Marcus Marcellus and Lucius
Arruntius were the consuls, the river caused another flood which
submerged the City, and many objects were struck by thunderbolts, among
them the statues in the Pantheon; and the spear even fell from the hand
of Augustus. The pestilence raged throughout Italy so that no one tilled
the land, and I think that the same was the case in foreign parts. The
Romans, therefore, reduced to dire straits by disease and by famine,
thought that this had happened to them for no other reason than that they
did not have Augustus for consul this time also. They accordingly wished
to elect him as dictator, and shutting the senate up within its halls
they forced it to vote this measure by threatening to burn down the
building. Next they took the twenty-four rods and accosted Augustus,
begging him both to be named dictator and to become commissioner of
grain, as Pompey had once been. He accepted the latter duty under
compulsion and ordered two men from among those who had served as prætors
five years or more previously, in every instance, to be chosen annually
to attend to the distribution of grain. As for the dictatorship, however,
he would not hear of it and went so far as to rend his clothing when
he found himself unable to restrain them in any other way, either by
reasoning or by prayer. As he already had authority and honor even beyond
that of dictators he did right to guard against the jealousy and hatred
which the title would arouse. [-2-] His course was the same when they
wished to elect him censor for life. Without entering upon the office
himself he immediately designated others as censors, namely Paulus
Æmilius Lepidus and Lucius Munatius Plancus, the latter a brother of that
Plancus who had been proscribed and the former a person who at that time
had himself been under sentence of death. These were the last private
citizens to hold the appointment, as was at once made manifest by the
men themselves. The platform on which they were intended to perform the
ceremonies pertaining to their position fell to the ground in pieces when
they had ascended it on the first day of their office. After that there
were no other censors appointed together, as they had been. Even at this
time Augustus in spite of their having been chosen took care of many
matters which properly belonged to them. Of the Public Messes he
abolished some altogether and reformed others so that greater temperance
prevailed. He committed the charge of all the festivals to the prætors,
commanding that an appropriation be given them from the public treasury.
Moreover he forbade them to spend from their own means on these occasions
more than they received from the other source, or to have armed combat
under any other conditions than if the senate should vote for it, and
even then there were to be not more than two such contests in each year
and they should consist of not more than one hundred and twenty men. To
the curule ædiles he entrusted the extinguishment of conflagrations, for
which purpose he granted them six hundred slave assistants. And since
knights and women of note had thus early appeared in the orchestra, he
forbade not only the children of senators, to whom the prohibition had
even previously extended, but also their grandchildren, who naturally
found a place in the equestrian class, to do anything of the sort again.
[-3-] In these ordinances he let both the substance and the name of the
lawgiver and emperor be seen. In other matters he was more moderate
and even came to the aid of some of his friends when their conduct was
subjected to official scrutiny. But a certain Marcus Primus was accused
of having made war upon the Odrysae, while he was governor of Macedonia,
who said at one time that he had done it with the approval of Augustus,
and again with that of Marcellus. The emperor thereupon came of his own
accord into the court and, when interrogated by the prætors as to whether
he had instructed the man to make war, entered a denial. The advocate
of Primus, Licinius Murena, in the course of some rather disrespectful
remarks that he made to him enquired: "What are you doing here!" and "Who
summoned you!" To this Augustus only replied: "The Public Good." For this
he received praise from sensible persons and was even given the right to
convene the senate as often as he pleased. Some of the others looked down
upon him. Indeed, not a few voted for the acquittal of Primus and others
united to form a plot against Cæsar. Fannius Cæpio was at the head of it,
though others had a share. Murena also was said, whether truly or by way
of calumny, to have been one of the conspirators, since he was insatiate
and unsparing in his outspokenness to all alike. These men did not appear
for trial in court but were convicted by default on the supposition that
they intended to flee; shortly after, however, they were put to death.
Murena found neither his brother Proculeius nor Mæcenas his sister's
husband of any avail, though they were the recipients of distinguished
honors from Augustus. And as some of the jurymen actually voted to acquit
these conspirators, the emperor made a law that votes should not be cast
secretly in cases by default and that the persons on trial must receive
a unanimous conviction. That he authorized these provisions not in anger
but as really conducive to the public good he gave overwhelming evidence.
Cæpio's father liberated one of his slaves who had accompanied his son on
his flight, because he had wished to defend the younger man when he met
his death; but a second slave who had betrayed him the father led through
the middle of the Forum with an inscription making known the reason why
he should be killed, and after that crucified him: yet at all this the
emperor showed no indignation. He would have allayed all the criticism
of those not pleased with the course of events, had he not allowed
sacrifices, as for some victory, to be both voted and offered.

[-4-] It was at this period that he restored both Cyprus and Gallia
Narbonensis to the people as provinces no longer needing his
administration of martial law.

Thus proconsuls began to be sent to these places also. He also dedicated
the temple of Jupiter Tonans, concerning which event these two traditions
survive,--that at the time thunder occurred during the ritual, and that
later Augustus had a dream, which I shall proceed to describe. He thought
that the throng had come to do reverence to the deity, partly attracted
by the novelty of his name and form and partly because he had been put in
place by Augustus, but chiefest of all because they encountered him first
when they ascended the Capitol; and he dreamed that Jupiter in the great
temple was angry because he was now reduced to second place, and that he
himself thereupon said to the offended god (as he reported the story)
that he had Tonans as an advance guard. When it became day he attached a
bell to the statue by way of confirming the vision. For those who guard
apartment houses by night carry a bell, in order to be able to signal the
inhabitants whenever they wish.--These events, then, took place at Rome.

[-5-] About this same period the Cantabri and the Astures broke out into
war again. The action of the Astures was due to the haughtiness and
cruelty of Carisius. The Cantabri, on the other hand, took the field
because they learned that the other tribe was in revolt and because they
despised their governor, Gaius Furnius, since he had but lately arrived
and they conceived him to be unacquainted with conditions in their
territory. He did not, however, show himself that sort of man in action,
for both tribes were defeated and reduced to slavery by him, Carisius
even receiving help from him. Not many of the Cantabri were captured. As
they had no hope of freedom they did not choose to live, but some after
setting the forts on fire stabbed themselves, and others let themselves
be consumed with the works, while still others in the sight of all took
poison. Thus the most of them and the fiercest faction perished. As for
the Astures, as soon as they had been repulsed in a siege at some
point and had subsequently been beaten in battle, they made no further
resistance but were straightway subdued.

About this same time the Ethiopians, who dwell beyond Egypt, advanced
as far as the city called Elephantine, with Candace as their leader,
ravaging the whole region that they traversed. On learning that Gaius[1]
Petronius, the governor of Egypt, was approaching and somewhere near,
they hastily retreated hoping to make good their escape. Overtaken on the
road, however, they suffered defeat and then drew him on into their own
country. There, too, he contended nobly and took among other cities
Napata, the royal residence of that tribe. This town was razed to the
ground and a garrison left at another post. For Petronius, not being able
to advance farther on account of the sand and the heat, nor to remain
conveniently on the spot with his entire army, withdrew, taking the most
of it with him. At that the Ethiopians attacked the garrisons, but he
again proceeded against them, rescued his own men, and compelled Candace
to make terms with him.

[ B.C. 21 (_a. u._ 733)]

[-6-] While this was going on Augustus went to Sicily in order to settle
the affairs of that island and of other countries as far as Syria. While
he was still there, the Roman populace fell to disputing over an election
of the consuls. This incident showed clearly that it was impossible for
them to be safe under a democracy, for with the little power that they
had over elections and in regard to offices, even, they began rioting.
The place of one of the consuls was being kept for Augustus and in this
way at the beginning of the year Marcus Lollius alone entered upon
office. As the emperor would not accept the place, Quintus Lepidus and
Lucius Silvanus became rival candidates and threw everything into such
turmoil that Augustus was invoked by those who still retained their
senses. He would not return, however, and sent them back when they came
to him, rebuking them and bidding them cast their votes during the
absence of both claimants. This did not promote peace any the more, but
they began to quarrel and dispute again vehemently, so that it was long
before Lepidus was chosen. Augustus was displeased at this, for he could
not spend all his time at Rome alone, and he did not dare to leave the
city without a head; seeking, therefore, for some one to set over it he
judged Agrippa to be most suitable for the purpose. And as he wished to
clothe him in some greater dignity than common, in order that this might
help him to govern the people more easily, he summoned him, compelled him
to divorce his wife (although she was Cæsar's own niece), and to marry
Julia, and forthwith sent him to Rome to attend both to the wedding and
to the administration of the City. This step is said to have been due
partly to the advice of Mæcenas, who in conversation with him upon these
very matters said: "You have made him so great that he should either
become your son-in-law or be killed."--Agrippa healed the sores which he
found still festering and repelled the advance of the Egyptian rites,
which were returning once more to the City, forbidding any one to perform
them even in the suburbs within eight half-stadia. A disturbance arose
regarding the election of the præfectus urbi--the one chosen on account
of the Feriæ--and he did not attempt to quell it, but they lived through
that year without that official. This was what _he_ accomplished.

[-7-] Augustus after settling various affairs in Sicily and making
Syracuse together with certain other cities Roman colonies crossed over
into Greece. The Lacedæmonians he honored by giving them Cythera and
attending their Public Mess, because Livia, when she fled from Italy with
her husband and son, passed some time there. From the Athenians, as some
say, he took away Ægina and Eretria, the produce of which they were
enjoying, because they had espoused the cause of Antony. Moreover he
forbade them to make any one a citizen for money. It seemed to them that
what happened to the statue of Athena had tended to their misfortune.
Placed on the Acropolis facing the east it had turned about to the west
and spat blood.

[ B.C. 20 (_a. u._ 734)]

As for Augustus, after setting the Greek world in order, he sailed to
Samos, passed the winter there, and in the spring when Marcus Apuleius
and Publius Silius became consuls proceeded to Asia and gave his
attention to matters there and in Bithynia. Though these and the
foregoing provinces were regarded as belonging to the people, he did not
make light of them, but accorded them the very best of care, as if they
were his own. He instituted all reforms that seemed desirable and made a
present of money to some, while others he instructed to collect an amount
in excess of the tribute. The people of Cyzicus he reduced to slavery
because during an uprising they had flogged and put to death some Romans.
And when he reached Syria he took the same action in the case of the
people of Tyre and Sidon on account of their uprising.

[-8-] Meanwhile Phraates, fearing that he might lead an expedition
against him because as yet none of the agreements had been carried out,
sent back to him the standards and all the captives, save a few who in
shame had destroyed themselves or by eluding detection had remained
in the country. Augustus received them with the appearance of having
conquered the Parthian in some war. He took great pride in the event,
saying that what had been lost in former battles he had recovered without
a struggle. Indeed, in honor of his success he both commanded sacrifices
to be voted and performed them, besides constructing a temple of Mars
Ultor on the Capitol, in imitation of Jupiter Feretrius, for the offering
up of the standards. Moreover he rode into the City on a charger and
was with an arch carrying a trophy. That was what was done later in
commemoration of the event. At this time he was chosen commissioner of
the highways round about Rome, set up the so-called golden milestone,
and assigned road-builders from the ranks of the ex-prætors, with two
lictors, to take care of the various streets. Julia also gave birth to a
child, who received the name Gaius; and a sacrifice of kine was permitted
forever upon his birthday. Now this was done, like everything else,
in pursuance of a decree: privately the ædiles had a horse-race and
slaughter of wild beasts on the birthday of Augustus.--These were the
occurrences in the City.

[-9-] Augustus ordained that the subject territory should be managed
according to the customs of the Romans, but permitted allied countries to
be governed according to their own ancestral usage. He did not think it
desirable that there should be any additions to the former or that any
new regions should be acquired, but deemed it best for the people to
be thoroughly satisfied with what they already possessed; and he
communicated this opinion to the senate. Therefore he began no war at
this time, but gave out certain sovereignties,--to Iamblichus son of
Iamblichus his ancestral dominion over the Arabians, and to Tarcondimotus
son of Tarcondimotus the kingdom of Cilicia which his father held, except
a few coast districts. For these together with Lesser Armenia he granted
to Archelaus, because the Median king, who had previously ruled them, was
dead. To Herod he entrusted the tetrarchy of a certain Zenodorus and to
one Mithridates, though a mere lad, Commagene, since the king of it had
killed his father. And as the other Armenians had preferred charges
against Artaxes and had summoned his brother Tigranes, who was in Rome,
the emperor sent for Tiberius to cast the former out of his kingdom and
restore the latter to it once more. Nothing was accomplished, however,
worthy of the preparations he had made, for the Armenians slew Artaxes
before his arrival. Still, Tiberius assumed a lofty bearing as if he had
effected something by his own ability, and all the more when sacrifices
were voted in honor of the result. And he now began to have thoughts
about obtaining the monarchy when, as he was approaching Philippi, an
outcry was heard from the field of battle, as if coming from an army, and
fire of its own accord shot up from the altars founded by Antony upon the
ramparts. These things contributed to the exalted feelings of Tiberius.

Augustus returned to Samos and once more passed the winter there. As a
recompense for his stay he awarded the islanders freedom, and he attended
to many kinds of business. Great numbers of embassies came to him, and
the Indi, who had previously opened negotiations about friendship, now
made terms, sending among other gifts tigers, which were then for the
first time seen by the Romans, as also, I think, by the Greeks. They
likewise presented to him a boy without shoulders (like the statues of
Hermes that we now see). Yet this creature in spite of his anatomy made
perfect use of his feet and hands: he would stretch a bow for them, shoot
missiles, and sound the trumpet,--how, I do not know; I merely record the
story. One of the Indi, Zarmarus, whether he belonged to the class of
sophists and was ambitious on this account or because he was old and was
following some immemorial custom, or because he wished to make a display
for Augustus and the Athenians (for it was there that he had obtained an
audience), chose to die; he was therefore initiated into the service of
the two goddesses,--although it was not the proper time, it is said, for
the ritual,[2]--through the influence of Augustus, and having become an
initiate he threw himself alive into the fire.

[B.C. 19 (_a. u._ 735)]

[-10-] The consul that[2] year was Gaius Sentius. When it was found
necessary that a colleague be appointed to hold office with him,--for
Augustus again refused to accept the post which was being saved for
him,--an uprising once more broke out in Rome and assassinations
occurred, so that the senators voted Sentius a guard. When he expressed
himself as opposed to using it, they sent envoys to Augustus, each with
two lictors. As soon as the emperor learned this and felt assured that
nothing but evil would come of it, he did not adopt an attitude like
his former one toward them but appointed consul from among the envoys
themselves Quintus Lucretius, though this man's name had been posted
among the proscribed, and he hastened to Rome himself. For this and his
other actions while absent from the city many honors of all sorts were
voted none of which he would accept, save the founding of a temple to
Fortuna Redux,[3] (this being the name they applied to her), and that the
day on which he arrived should be numbered among the thanksgiving days
and be called Augustalia. Since even then the magistrates and the rest
made preparations to go out to meet him, he entered the city by night;
and on the following day he gave Tiberius the rank of the ex-prætors and
allowed Drusus to become a candidate for offices five years earlier than
custom allowed. The quarrelsome behavior of the people during his absence
did not accord at all with their conduct, influenced by fear, when he was
present; he was accordingly invited and elected to be commissioner of
morals for five years, held the authority of the censors for the same
length of time and that of the consuls for life, being allowed to use the
twelve rods always and everywhere and to sit in the chair of office in
the midst of the consuls of any year. After voting these measures they
begged him to set right all these matters and to enact what laws he
liked. And whatever ordinances might be composed by him they called from
that very moment _leges Augustæ_ and desired to take an oath that they
would abide by them. He accepted their principal propositions, believing
them to be necessary, but absolved them from the requirement of an oath.
If they should vote for a measure that suited them, he knew well that
they would observe it even if they made no agreement to that effect.
Otherwise they would not pay any attention to it, even if they should
take ten thousand pledges to secure it.--Augustus did this. Of the ædiles
one voluntarily resigned his office by reason of poverty.

[-11-] Agrippa on being sent at this time, as described from Sicily to
Rome, transacted whatever business was urgent and was later assigned to
the Gauls. The inhabitants there were at war among themselves and were
being harshly used by the Celtæ. After settling those troubles he went
over to Spain. For the Cantabri, who had been captured alive in the war
and had been sold, severally killed their masters, returned home, and
united many for a revolt. With the aid of these accessions they occupied
available sites, walled them about and concocted schemes against
the Roman garrisons. It was against this tribe that Agrippa led an
expedition, but he had some trouble also with the soldiers. Not a few of
them were too old, exhausted by the succession of wars, and in fear of
the Cantabri, whom they regarded as hard to subdue; and they consequently
would not obey him. However, by admonition, exhortation, and the hopes
that he held out[4] he soon made them yield obedience: in fighting the
Cantabri, on the other hand, he met with many failures. They had the
advantage of experience in affairs, since they had been slaves to the
Romans, and of despair of ever gaining safety again in case of capture.
Agrippa lost numbers of his soldiers and degraded numerous others because
they had been defeated; among other actions he prohibited a whole
division called the Augustan from being so named any longer; still, after
a long time he destroyed nearly all of the enemy who were of age for
warfare. He deprived the rest of their arms and made them go down from
the heights to the flat lands. Yet he made no communication about them to
the senate and did not accept the triumph although voted in accordance
with instructions from Augustus. In these matters he showed moderation,
as was his wont, and when asked once by the consul for an opinion in a
case concerning his brother he would not give it. At his own expense
he brought in the so-called Parthenian water-supply and named it the
Augustan. In this the emperor took so great delight that once when a
great scarcity of wine had arisen and persons were making a terrible
to-do about it, he declared that Agrippa had carefully seen to it that
they should never perish of thirst.

[-12-]Such was the character of this man. Of the rest many both made a
triumph their object and celebrated it, not for rendering these same
services, but some for having arrested robbers and others for quieting
cities that were in a state of turmoil. For Augustus, at first at least,
bestowed these rewards lavishly upon some and honored a very great
number with public burials. Those persons, then, gained splendor by
these fêtes; but Agrippa was advanced by him to a position of comparative
independence. Augustus saw that the public business required strict
attention and feared that he might, as often happens in such cases,
become the victim of plots.

[B.C. 18 (a. u. 736)]

The breastplate which he often wore beneath his dress even on entering
the senate itself he expected would be of small and slight assistance to
him in that case. Therefore he himself first added five years to his term
as supreme ruler when the ten-year period had expired (this took place in
the consulship of Publius and Gnaeus Lentulus), and then he gave Agrippa
many rights almost equal to his own, together with the tribunician
authority for the same length of time. He then said that so many years
would suffice them. Not much later he obtained the remaining five
belonging to his imperial sovereignty, so that the number of years became
ten again.

[-13-] When he had done this he next investigated the senatorial body.
The members seemed to him even now to be numerous and he saw
danger in so large a throng, while he felt a hatred for not only such as
were notorious for some baseness, but also those who were distinguished
for their flattery. And when no one, as previously, would resign willingly
nor wished alone to incur accusation, he himself selected the thirty best
men (a point which he confirmed by oath) and bade them after first taking
the same oath to choose and write down groups of five, outside of their
relatives, on tablets. After this he subjected the groups of five to a
casting of lots, with the arrangement that the one man in each who drew
a lot should himself be a senator, and enroll five others on the same
conditions.

There would, of course, properly be thirty of those chosen by others and
by those who drew a lot. And since some of them were out of town others
drew as substitutes and attended to what should have been their duties.
At first this went on so for several days; but when some abuses crept
in, he no longer put the documents in the charge of the quaestors nor
submitted the groups of five to lot, but he himself read whatever
remained and he himself chose the members that were lacking: and thus six
hundred in all were appointed. [-14-]It had been his plan to make them
three hundred as in old times, and he thought he ought to be well
satisfied if he found so many of them worthy of the senate. But he
finally chose a list of six hundred because of the universal displeasure;
for it came out, by reason of the fact that those whose names would be
cancelled would be many more than those who remained in the body, that
greater fear of becoming private citizens prevailed among its members
than expectation of being senators. Not even here did the matter rest,
since some unsuitable persons were still enrolled. A certain Licinius
Regulus after this, indignant because his name had been erased whereas
his son and several others to whom he thought himself superior had been
counted in, rent his clothing in the very senate, laid bare his body,
enumerated his campaigns, and showed them his scars. And Articuleius
Pætus, one of the senators _in posse_, besought earnestly that he might
retire from his seat in the senate in place of his father, who had been
rejected. Augustus then made a new organization, getting rid of some and
choosing others in their place. Since even so the names of many had been
stricken out and some of them, as usually happens in such a case, charged
that they had been driven out unjustly, he immediately accorded them
the right to behold spectacles and join in festivals in common with the
senators, wearing the same garb, and he permitted them for the future to
stand for offices. Most of them came back in the course of time into
the senate: some few were left in an intermediate position, regarded as
belonging neither to the senate nor to the people.

[-15-] After this many at once and many subsequently gained the
reputation, whether it was true or false, of plotting against both the
emperor and Agrippa. It is not possible for one outside of such matters
to have certain knowledge about them. Much of what a sovereign does by
way of punishment either personally or through the senate on the ground
that plots have been made against him is viewed with suspicion as
probably a display of wanton power, no matter how justly he may have
acted. For that reason my intention is to record in all matters of this
nature simply the regular version of the story, not busying myself with
aught beyond the public report, except in perfectly patent cases, nor
making any ulterior suggestions as to whether any act was just or unjust
or any statement true or false. Let this principle apply to everything
which I shall write after this.

At the time Augustus executed a few: Lepidus he hated because his son
had been detected in a against him and had been punished, as well as for
other reasons; he did not, however, wish to kill him but kept insulting
him now in one way, now in another. He ordered Lepidus against his
will to come down from the country to the city and always took him to
gatherings, in order that the man might be subjected to the greatest
amount of jeering and insolence in view of the change from his former
power and dignity. He did not treat him in any way as worthy his
consideration, and at this time he afforded him, last of all the
ex-consuls, the chance of voting. To the rest he was wont to put the
question in the order that belonged to them, but of the ex-consuls he
used to make one first, another second, and third and fourth and so on as
he liked. This the consuls also did. Thus it was that he treated Lepidus.
And when Antistius Labeo enrolled the latter among the men who were to be
senators at the time the vote on this matter was taken, the emperor first
declared that he had perjured himself and threatened to take vengeance.
Thereupon the other replied: "Why, what harm have I done by keeping in
the senate one whom you even now still permit to be high priest?" This
answer quieted Augustus's anger, for though he had often, both privately
and publicly, been judged worthy of this priesthood, he did not deem
it right to take it while Lepidus lived. The reply of Antistius seemed,
indeed, to have been a rather happy one, as was the case once when there
was talk in the senate to the effect that they ought to take turns in
guarding Augustus; for he had said, not daring to speak in opposition nor
willing to agree: "As for me, I snore, and so can not sleep at the door
of his chamber."

[-16-] Among the laws that Augustus enacted was one which provided that
those who to gain office bribed any person should be debarred from the
said office for five years. He laid heavier penalties upon the unmarried
men and women without husbands, and on the other hand offered prizes for
marriage and the procreation of children. And since among the nobility
there were far more males than females he allowed those who pleased, save
the senators, to marry freedwomen, and ordered that the offspring of such
a man should be deemed legitimate.

At this period a clamor arose in the senate regarding the disorderly
conduct of the women and the young men, this being alleged as a reason
for the difficulty of persuading them to contract marriage; and when they
urged him to remedy this abuse also, meanwhile indulging in sarcasms
because he enjoyed the favors of many women, at first he made answer that
the most necessary restrictions had been laid down and that anything
further could not be defined in a similar fashion. Then, when he was
driven into a corner, he said: "You ought to admonish and command your
wives what you wish,--just as I myself do." When they heard that, they
plied him with questions all the more, wishing to learn the admonitions
which he said he gave Livia. Reluctantly thereupon he made a few remarks
about dress and about other adornment, about going out and modest
behavior on such occasions. He cared not at all that he did not make good
his words in fact. Something of the sort he had done also while censor.
They brought before him a young man who had married a woman after
seducing her, making the most violent accusations against him: Augustus
was at a loss what to do, not daring to overlook the affair nor yet to
administer any rebuke. After a very long time he heaved a deep sigh and
said: "The factional disputes have borne many terrible fruits: let us try
to forget them and give our attention to the future, to see that nothing
of the sort occurs again."

Inasmuch, too, as certain infants were obtaining by betrothal the honors
of married couples, but did not accomplish the object in view, he ordered
that no betrothal should be valid where a person did not marry before two
years had passed. That is, any one betrothed must be certainly ten years
old in order to reap any benefit from it. Twelve full years, as I have
said, is required by custom for girls to reach the marriageable age.

[-17-] Besides these separate enactments there was one instructing those
from time to time in office each to propose one of those who had been
prætors three years previously to attend to the distribution of the
grain, and providing that of that number the four who secured the lot
should give out grain in turn: and the præfectus urbi, appointed for the
Feriæ, was always to choose one of them. The Sibylline verses which had
become indistinct through lapse of time he ordered the priests to copy
out with their own hands in order that no one else should read them. He
allowed the offices to be thrown open to all such as had property worth
ten myriad denarii and were competent to hold office in accordance with
the law. This was the value which he at first set upon the senatorial
rank: later he raised it to twenty-five myriads. Upon some of those who
lived upright lives but possessed less than ten myriads in the first case
or twenty-five in the second he bestowed the amount lacking. Again, he
allowed those prætors who so desired to spend on the festivals besides
what was given them from the public treasury three times as much
again, so that even if some were vexed at the minuteness of his other
regulations yet by reason of this one and also because he brought
back from exile one Pylades, a dancer, driven out on account of civil
quarrels, they remembered them no longer. Hence Pylades is said to have
rejoined very cleverly when the emperor rebuked him for having quarreled
with Bathyllus, an artist in the same line and a relative of Mæcenas: "It
is to your advantage, Cæsar, that the populace should exhaust its energy
over us."--These were the occurrences of that year.

[B.C. 17 (_a. u._ 737)]

[-18-]In the consulship of Gaius Furnius and Gaius Silanus Agrippa again
announced the birth of a son named Lucius, and Augustus immediately
adopted him together with his brother Gaius, not waiting for them to
become men but appointing them that very moment successors to his office,
in order that less plots might be directed against him. The festival
of Honor and of Virtus he transferred to the days which are at present
theirs. Those that celebrated triumphs he commanded to erect out of the
spoils some public work to commemorate their deeds. The Sæcularia he
brought for the fifth time to a successful conclusion. The orators, he
ordered, were to give their services without pay, on pain of a fine of
quadruple the amount they might receive. Those whom the lot made jurymen
in any season he forbade to enter any person's house during that year.
And since members of the senate showed lack of interest in attending
meetings of that body, he increased the penalties for such as were late
without some good excuse.

[B.C. 16 (_a. u._ 7386)]

[-19-] Next he started for Gaul, during the consulship of Lucius Domitius
and Publius Scipio, making an excuse of the wars that had arisen in that
region. For since he had become disliked by many as a result of his
long stay in the capital and by inflicting penalties offended many who
committed some act contrary to the laws laid down, while he was compelled
in sparing many others to transgress his own enactments, he decided to
leave the country, somewhat after the manner of Solon. Some suspected
that he had gone away on account of Terentia, the wife of Mæcenas, and
intended, because there was much talk made about them in Rome, to join
her without any gossip during his trip abroad. So great was his passion
for her that he once had her enter a contest of beauty against Livia.

Before starting he dedicated the temple of Quirinus, which he had built
up anew. By this I mean he had adorned it with seventy-six columns, equal
to the total number of years he had lived. This consequently caused some
to say that he had chosen the number purposely and not by mere chance.
After the consecration of this edifice he arranged through Tiberius and
Drusus for gladiatorial combats, permission having been granted them
by the senate. Then he committed to Taurus the management of the City
together with the rest of Italy,--for Agrippa had been despatched again
to Syria and he no longer looked with equal favor on Mæcenas because of
the latter's wife,--and taking Tiberius, though he was prætor, along, he
set out on his journey. Tiberius had become prætor in spite of holding
the honors of an ex-prætor, and his entire office by a decree was placed
in the hands of Drusus. The night following their departure the Hall
of Youth burned to the ground. This was not the only portent that had
occurred, for a wolf had rushed along the Sacred Way into the Forum,
tearing men to pieces, and at a distance from the Forum ants were very
plainly seen together in swarms; likewise a gleam all night long kept
shooting from the south toward the north. Prayers were therefore
offered for the safe return of Augustus. Meantime they celebrated the
quinquennial festival of his sovereignty, the expense being borne by
Agrippa; for the latter had been consecrated by his fellow priests to
be one of the quindecimviri to whom the oversight of the event fell in
regular succession.

[-20-] There was much other confusion, too, during that period. The
Camunni and Vennones, Alpine tribes, flew to arms but were conquered and
subdued by Publius Silius. The Pannonians in company with the Norici
overran Istria, and after suffering damage at the hands of Silius and
his lieutenants the former came to terms again and were the cause of the
Norici falling into the same slavery. The uprisings in Dalmatia and
in Spain were in a short time quelled. Macedonia was ravaged by the
Dentheleti and the Scordisci. In Thrace somewhat earlier Marcus Lollius
while aiding Rhoemetalces, the uncle and guardian of the children of
Cotys, had subjugated the Bessi. Later Lucius Gallus conquered the
Sarmatæ in the same dispute and drove them back across the Ister. The
greatest, however, of the wars which at that time fell to the lot of the
Romans, which also had something to do, probably, with Augustus's leaving
the city, was against the Celtæ.

The Sugambri, Usipetes, and Tencteri had first seized in their own
territory some of the Romans and had crucified them, after which they
crossed the Rhine and plundered Germania and Gaul. When the Roman cavalry
approached they laid an ambush and by taking to flight drew their
assailants to follow them; and though they fell in unexpectedly with
the Roman leader Lollius, they conquered even him. On ascertaining this
Augustus hastened against them but found no warfare to carry on. For the
barbarians, learning that Lollius was getting ready and that the emperor
was also heading an expedition, retired into their own territory and made
peace, giving hostages.

[B.C. 15 (_a. u._ 739)]

[-21-] On this account Augustus had no need of arms, but the demands of
various other business consumed the entire time of this year, as well as
of the next, in which Marcus Libo and Calpurnius Piso were consuls.
For much injury had been wrought by the Celtæ and much by a certain
Licinnius.[5] And of this, I think, the sea-monster had very plainly
given them warning beforehand. This creature, twenty feet broad and three
times as long and resembling a woman except for its head, had been washed
up on the land from the ocean. Now Licinnius was originally a Gaul but
was captured, brought among Romans, and made a slave to Cæsar, by whom he
was set free, and then by Augustus he had been made procurator of Gaul.
He had barbarian avarice and Roman haughtiness, and tried to overthrow
every person and thing deemed superior to himself and to annihilate
any power which temporarily appeared strong. It was his care to supply
himself with plenty of funds for the requirements of his ministry as well
as to secure a plenty for himself and for members of his family. His
abuses went so far that in some cases where the population paid tribute
by the month he made the months fourteen in number. He declared that this
month called December was really the tenth, and for that reason it was
necessary to count in also the two last months (of which he called one
Undecimber and the other Duodecimber), and to contribute the money that
was due for them. These quibbles brought him into danger. The Gauls
secured the ear of Augustus and made a terrible protest, so that the
emperor first shared their indignation and next begged them to be
patient. Of some of the extortions he said he was unaware and others
he affected not to believe. Some things he concealed, being ashamed of
having employed such a procurator. Licinnius however, by devising another
scheme was enabled to laugh to scorn absolutely all their efforts. When
found that Augustus was displeased with him and that he was likely to
be punished, he took the emperor into his house, and showing him many
treasures of silver and gold and many other valuables piled up in heaps,
he said: "I have gathered these purposely, master, for you and for the
rest of the Romans, to prevent the inhabitants from getting control of so
much money and therefore revolting. You see I have kept it all for you
and herewith give it to you." Thus the sophist was saved, by pretending
that he had sapped the strength of the barbarians to serve Augustus.

[-22-] Drusus and Tiberius meanwhile were concerned with the following
undertakings. The Rhæti, who dwell between Noricum and Gaul, near the
Tridentine Alps close to Italy, overran a good part of the adjacent
territory of Gaul and carried plunder even out of Italy. Such of the
Romans or their allies as used the road going through their country met
with depredations. These actions of theirs were of course more or less
like those of any nation which has not accepted terms of peace, but
further they destroyed all the males among their captives, not only those
who were apparent but also the embryo ones in the wombs of women, the sex
of which they discovered by some divination. For these reasons Augustus
first sent Drusus against them: he joined battle with a detachment of
theirs that met him near the Tridentine mountains, and speedily had them
routed; for this exploit he received the honors belonging to prætors.
Later, when the tribe had been repulsed from Italy but still harassed
Gaul, the emperor despatched Tiberius in addition. Both of the leaders
then invaded the Rhætian country at many points at once,--the lieutenants
leading such divisions as they did not command personally,--and Tiberius
even crossed the lake[6] in boats. In this way, by encountering them
separately, the Roman commanders spread alarm and had no difficulty in
overcoming those who came near enough for fighting at any time, because
they had only to deal with scattered forces; the remainder, who had
become weaker and more despondent through such tactics, they captured.
And because the land had a large population of males and seemed ripe
for revolt, they deported most of those of military age, especially the
strongest, leaving behind only so many as would be sufficient to inhabit
the country but unable to make any uprising.

[-23-] This same year Vedius Pollio died, a man who in general had done
nothing deserving notice, being the son of liberti, ranking as a knight,
without any achievement of consequence in his record; but he had become
exceedingly renowned for his wealth and his cruelty, so that he has
even won a place in history. Most of the things that he did it would be
wearisome to relate, but I may mention that he kept in tanks huge eels
trained to eat men, and was accustomed to throw to them the slaves that
he desired to put to death. Once, when he was entertaining Augustus, the
cupbearer shattered a crystal goblet, and without respect to the guest he
ordered that the fellow be thrown to the eels. Hereupon the boy fell on
his knees supplicating Augustus who at first tried to persuade Pollio not
to carry out his intentions. As his host would not yield the point the
emperor said: "Bring all the rest of the drinking vessels which are of
the same sort or any others of value that you may possess, for I want to
use them," and when they were brought he ordered them to be broken. The
master seeing this was of course vexed but could no longer be angry over
one cup, considering the great number of others that were ruined, and
could not punish his servant for what Augustus had done; therefore
reluctantly he took no action. That was the sort of person this Pollio
was, who died. He left various bequests to many different persons and to
Augustus a good share of his inheritance together with Pausilypum[7], a
place between Neapolis and Puteoli, with instructions that some public
work of great beauty should be erected. Augustus razed his house to the
foundation, on the pretext that it was necessary for the preparation of
the other structure, but really with the purpose that he should have no
monument in the city, and built a colonnade, inscribing on it the name
not of Pollio but of Livia.

This he did later. At the time mentioned he founded a number of cities as
colonies in Gaul and in Spain and restored to the people of Cyzicus their
freedom. To the Paphians, who had suffered from an earthquake, he gave
money and allowed them, by a decree, to call their city Augusta. I have
recorded this, not because Augustus himself and the senators failed to
aid many other cities both before and after this, in case of similar
misfortunes,--if any one should attempt to mention them all, the task of
such a historian would be endless,--but my aim is to show that the senate
assigned names to cities as an honor and the latter did not, as is the
usual procedure now, compile for themselves (each separately) such lists
of names as they might choose.

[B.C. 14 (_a. u._ 740)]

[-24-] The next year Marcus Crassus and Gnæus Cornelius became consuls;
and the curule ædiles after resigning their office because they had
entered upon it under unfavorable auguries took it back again, contrary
to precedent, at another meeting of the assembly. The Portico of Paulus
was burned and the fire from it reached the temple of Ves

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