The Crisis of the Naval War
by John Rushworth Jellicoe · English · Gutenberg #10409 · 505,360 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: The Crisis of the Naval War
Author: John Rushworth Jellicoe
Release date: December 1, 2003 [eBook #10409]
Most recently updated: October 28, 2024
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CRISIS OF THE NAVAL WAR ***
The Crisis of the
Naval War
By
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.
_With 8 Plates and 6 Charts_
1920
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
1. ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION: THE CHANGES IN 1917
2. SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1917
3. ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
4. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM
5. THE CONVOY SYSTEM AT WORK
6. THE ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES: OUR NAVAL POLICY EXPLAINED
7. PATROL CRAFT AND MINESWEEPING SERVICES
8. THE DOVER PATROL AND THE HARWICH FORCES
9. THE SEQUEL
10. "PRODUCTION" AT THE ADMIRALTY DURING 1917
11. NAVAL WORK
12. THE FUTURE
INDEX
LIST OF PLATES
A Mine Exploding
A German Submarine of the U-C Type
A German Submarine of the later Cruiser Class
A Smoke Screen for a Convoy
The Dummy Deck-house of a Decoy Ship
A Convoy Zigzagging
A Convoy with an Airship
Drifters at Sea
A Paddle Minesweeper
A German Mine on the Surface
Two Depth Charges after Explosion
The Tell-tale Oil Patch
A Submarine Submerging
Periscope of Submerged Submarine Travelling at Slow Speed
A Submarine Submerged
LIST OF CHARTS
(CONTAINED IN THE POCKET AT THE END OF THE BOOK)
A. Approach Areas and Typical Routes.
B. Typical Approach Lines.
C. Barred Zones Proclaimed by the Germans.
D. Patrol Areas, British Isles.
E. Patrol and Minesweeping Zones in the Mediterranean.
F. Showing French and British Ports within Range of the
German Bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge.
To
The Officers and Men
of our
Convoy, Escort, Patrol and Minesweeping Vessels
and their
Comrades of the Mercantile Marine
by whose splendid gallantry, heroic self-sacrifice, and
unflinching endurance the submarine
danger was defeated
INTRODUCTION
Owing to the peculiar nature and demands of naval warfare, but few
dispatches, corresponding to those describing the work and achievements
of our great armies, were issued during the progress of the war. In a
former volume I attempted to supply this defect in the historical
records, which will be available for future generations, so far as the
Grand Fleet was concerned, during my period as its Commander-in-Chief.
The present volume, which was commenced and nearly completed in 1918,
was to have been published at the same time. My departure on a Naval
mission early in 1919 prevented me, however, from putting the finishing
touches to the manuscript until my return this spring.
I hesitated as to the publication of this portion of what is in effect
one complete narrative, but eventually decided not to depart from my
original purpose. There is some reason to believe that the account of
the work of the Grand Fleet gave the nation a fuller conception of the
services which the officers and men of that force rendered in
circumstances which were necessarily not easily appreciated by landsmen.
This second volume, dealing with the defeat of the enemy's submarine
campaign, the gravest peril which ever threatened the population of this
country, as well as of the whole Empire, may not be unwelcome as a
statement of facts. They have been set down in order that the sequence
and significance of events may be understood, and that the nation may
appreciate the debt which it owes, in particular, to the seamen of the
Royal Navy and the Mercantile Marine, who kept the seas during the
unforgettable days of the intensive campaign.
This book, therefore, gives the outline of the work accomplished by the
Navy in combating the unrestricted submarine warfare instituted by the
Central Powers in February, 1917. It would have been a labour of love to
tell at greater length and in more detail how the menace was gradually
overcome by the gallantry, endurance and strenuous work of those serving
afloat in ships flying the White or the Red Ensigns, but I had not the
necessary materials at my disposal for such an exhaustive record.
The volume is consequently largely concerned with the successive steps
taken at the Admiralty to deal with a situation which was always
serious, and which at times assumed a very grave aspect. The ultimate
result of all Naval warfare must naturally rest with those who are
serving afloat, but it is only just to the Naval officers and others who
did such fine work at the Admiralty in preparing for the sea effort,
that their share in the Navy's final triumph should be known. The
writing of this book appeared also to be the only way in which I could
show my keen appreciation of the loyalty and devotion to duty of the
Naval Staff, of the many clever, ingenious and audacious schemes
developed and carried through for the destruction of submarines and the
safeguarding of ocean-borne trade, and of the skilful organization which
brought into being, and managed with such success, that great network of
convoys by which the sea communications of the Allies were kept open.
The volume shows how the officers who accompanied me to the Admiralty
from the Grand Fleet at the end of 1916, in association with those
already serving in Whitehall and others who joined in 1917, with the
necessary and valuable assistance of our comrades of the Mercantile
Marine, gradually produced the measures by which the Sea Service
conquered the gravest danger which has ever faced the Empire.
There were at times inevitable set-backs as the enemy gained experience
of our methods, and new ones had then to be devised, and we were always
most seriously handicapped by the strain imposed upon the Fleet by our
numerous military and other commitments overseas, and by the difficulty
of obtaining supplies of material, owing to the pre-occupation of our
industries in meeting the needs of our Armies in equipment and
munitions; but, generally speaking, it may be said that in April, 1917,
the losses reached their maximum, and that from the following month and
onwards the battle was being slowly but gradually won. By the end of the
year it was becoming apparent that success was assured.
The volume describes the changes carried out in the Admiralty Staff
organization; the position of affairs in regard to submarine warfare in
the early part of 1917; and the numerous anti-submarine measures which
were devised and brought into operation during the year. The
introduction and working of the convoy system is also dealt with. The
entry of the United States of America into the war marked the opening of
a new phase of the operations by sea, and it has been a pleasure to give
particulars of our cordial co-operation with the United States Navy. The
splendid work of the patrol craft and minesweepers is described all too
briefly, and I have had to be content to give only a brief summary of
the great services of the Dover and Harwich forces.
Finally, an effort has been made to suggest the range and character of
the work of the Production Departments at the Admiralty. It is
impossible to tell this part of the story without conveying some
suggestion of criticism since the output never satisfied our
requirements. I have endeavoured also to indicate where it seemed to me
that changes in organization were not justified by results, so that in
future years we may benefit by the experience gained. But I would not
like it to be thought that I did not, and do not, realize the
difficulties which handicapped production, or that I did not appreciate
to the full the work done by all concerned.
It is unfortunate that attempts to draw attention to the lessons taught
us by the war are regarded by many people either as complaints of lack
of devotion to the country's interests on the part of some, or as
criticisms of others who, in the years before the war or during the war,
were responsible for the administration of the Navy. In anticipation of
such an attitude, I wish to state emphatically that, where mention is
made of apparent shortcomings or of action which, judged by results, did
not seem, to meet a particular situation, this is done solely in order
that on any future occasion of a similar character--and may the day be
long postponed--the nation may profit by experience.
Those who are inclined to indulge in criticism should ever bear in mind
that the Navy was faced with problems which were never foreseen, and
could not have been foreseen, by anyone in this country. Who, for
instance, would have ever had the temerity to predict that the Navy,
confronted by the second greatest Naval Power in the world, would be
called upon to maintain free communications across the Channel for many
months until the months became years, in face of the naval forces of the
enemy established on the Belgian coast, passing millions of men across
in safety, as well as vast quantities of stores and munitions? Who would
have prophesied that the Navy would have to safeguard the passage of
hundreds of thousands of troops from the Dominions to Europe, as well as
the movement of tens of thousands of labourers from China and elsewhere?
Or who, moreover, would have been believed had he stated that the Navy
would be required to keep open the sea communications of huge armies in
Macedonia, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia and East Africa, against attack
by surface vessels, submarines and mines, whilst at the same time
protecting the merchant shipping of ourselves, our Allies, and neutral
Powers against similar perils, and assisting to ensure the safety of the
troops of the United States when they, in due course, were brought
across the Atlantic? Compare those varied tasks with the comparatively
modest duties which in pre-war days were generally assigned to the Navy,
and it will be seen how much there may be to learn of the lessons of
experience, and how sparing we should be of criticism. Wisdom distilled
from events which were unforeseeable should find expression not in
criticisms of those who did their duty to the best of their ability, but
in the taking of wise precautions for the future.
Little mention is made in this volume of the work of the Grand Fleet
during the year 1917, but, although that Fleet had no opportunity of
showing its fighting power, it must never be forgotten that without the
Grand Fleet, under the distinguished officer who succeeded me as
Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1916, all effort would have been of no
avail, since every operation by sea, as well as by land, was carried out
under the sure protecting shield of that Fleet, which the enemy could
not face.
I am conscious of many shortcomings in the book, but it may prove of
interest to those who desire to know something of the measures which
gradually wore down the German submarine effort, and, at any rate, it is
the only record likely to be available in the near future of the work of
fighting the submarines in 1917.
June, 1920.
CHAPTER I
ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION; THE CHANGES IN 1917
It is perhaps as well that the nation generally remained to a great
extent unconscious of the extreme gravity of the situation which
developed during the Great War, when the Germans were sinking an
increasing volume of merchant tonnage week by week. The people of this
country as a whole rose superior to many disheartening events and never
lost their sure belief in final victory, but full knowledge of the
supreme crisis in our history might have tended to undermine in some
quarters that confidence in victory which it was essential should be
maintained, and, in any event, the facts could not be disclosed without
benefiting the enemy. But the position at times was undoubtedly
extremely serious.
At the opening of the war we possessed approximately half the merchant
tonnage of the world, but experience during the early part of the
struggle revealed that we had not a single ship too many for the great
and increasing oversea military liabilities which we were steadily
incurring, over and above the responsibility of bringing to these shores
the greater part of the food for a population of forty-five million
people, as well as nearly all the raw materials which were essential for
the manufacture of munitions. The whole of our war efforts, ashore as
well as afloat, depended first and last on an adequate volume of
merchant shipping.
It is small wonder, therefore, that those who watched from day to day
the increasing toll which the enemy took of the country's sea-carrying
power, were sometimes filled with deep concern for the future.
Particularly was this the case during the early months of unrestricted
submarine warfare in 1917. For if the menace had not been mastered to a
considerable extent, and that speedily, not only would the victory of
the Allies have been imperilled, but this country would have been
brought face to face with conditions approaching starvation. In pre-war
days the possibility of these islands being blockaded was frequently
discussed; but during the dark days of the unrestricted submarine
campaign there was ample excuse for those with imagination to picture
the implication of events which were happening from week to week. The
memories of those days are already becoming somewhat dim, and as a
matter of history and a guide to the future, it is perhaps well that
some account should be given, however inadequate, of the dangers which
confronted the country and of the means which were adopted to avert the
worst consequences of the enemy's campaign without ceasing to exert the
increasing pressure of our sea power upon his fighting efficiency, and
without diminishing our military efforts overseas.
The latter points were of great importance. It was always necessary to
keep the Grand Fleet at a strength that would ensure its instant
readiness to move in waters which might be infested by submarines in
large numbers should the Germans decide upon some operation by the High
Sea Fleet. The possibility of action between the fleets necessitated the
maintenance of very strong destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet.
Similarly our oversea military expeditions, with the consequent large
number of merchant ships in use as transports or supply ships, required
a considerable force of destroyers and other small craft. These
commitments greatly reduced the means at our disposal for dealing with
the hostile submarines that were attempting to prevent the import of
food and raw materials into the country.
Readers of books, and particularly books dealing with war, show a
natural avidity for what may be described as the human side of a contest
as well as for the dramatic events. But, whether it be prosecuted by sea
or by land, war is largely a matter of efficient and adequate
organization. It is a common saying that we muddle through our wars, but
we could not afford to muddle in face of the threat which the enemy's
unrestricted submarine campaign represented. It is impossible,
therefore, to approach the history of the successful efforts made by sea
to overcome this menace without describing in some detail the work of
organization which was carried out at the Admiralty in order to enable
the Fleet to fulfil its new mission. In effect those responsible for the
naval policy of the country conducted two wars simultaneously, the one
on the surface, and the other under the surface. The strategy, tactics
and weapons which were appropriate to the former, were to a large extent
useless in the contest against mines and submarines which the enemy
employed with the utmost persistency and no little ingenuity. Even in
the Russo-Japanese war, where the mine was little used, it exerted a
marked influence on the course of the war; the Germans based their hopes
of victory in the early days of the struggle entirely on a war of
attrition, waged against men-of-war, as well as merchant ships. The
submarine, which was thrown into the struggle in increasing numbers,
represented an entirely new development, for the submarine is a vessel
which can travel unseen beneath the water and, while still unseen,
except for a possible momentary glimpse of a few inches of periscope,
can launch a torpedo at long or short range and with deadly accuracy. In
these circumstances it became imperative to organize the Admiralty
administration to meet new needs, and to press into the service of the
central administration a large number of officers charged with the sole
duty of studying the new forms of warfare which the enemy had adopted
and of evolving with scientific assistance novel methods of defeating
his tactics.
Whilst the enemy's campaign against merchant shipping always gave rise
to anxiety, there were certain periods of greatly increased activity.
During the summer months of 1916 the losses from submarine attack and
from submarine-laid mines were comparatively slight, and, in fact, less
than during the latter half of 1915, but in the autumn of 1916 they
assumed very serious proportions. This will be seen by reference to the
following table, which gives the monthly losses in British, neutral and
Allied mercantile gross tonnage from submarine and mine attack _alone_
for the months of May to November inclusive:
May ... 122,793
June ... 111,719
July ... 110,757
August ... 160,077
September ... 229,687
October ... 352,902
November ... 327,245
Another disturbing feature was the knowledge that we were not sinking
enemy submarines at any appreciable rate, whilst we knew that the
Germans had under construction a very large number of these vessels, and
that they were thus rapidly adding to their fleet. It was a matter also
of common knowledge that our output of new merchant ships was
exceedingly small, and I, in common with others, had urged a policy of
greatly increased mercantile ship construction. These facts, combined
with the knowledge that our reserves of food and essential raw materials
for war purposes were very low, led me, when commanding the Grand Fleet,
to the inevitable conclusion that it was essential to concentrate all
our naval efforts so far as possible on the submarine menace, and to
adopt the most energetic measures for the protection of our sea
communications and the destruction of the enemy's submarines. Although
it was not easy to see the exact means by which this could be achieved,
it appeared necessary as a first step to form an organization having as
its sole duty the study of the question, comprising such officers as
would be most likely to deal effectively with the problem, supported by
the necessary authority to push forward their ideas. Another necessity
was the rapid production of such material as was found to be required
for anti-submarine measures.
With these ideas in my mind I had written letters to the Admiralty on
the subject, and was summoned to a conference in London on November 1 by
Mr. Balfour, the First Lord. The whole question of the submarine warfare
was fully discussed with Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry Jackson (then First
Sea Lord) during the two days spent in London. I had at that time formed
and expressed the view that there was very little probability of the
High Sea Fleet putting to sea again to risk a Fleet action until the new
submarine campaign had been given a thorough trial. With the High Sea
Fleet "in being" we could not afford to deplete the Grand Fleet of
destroyers, which could under other conditions be employed in
anti-submarine work, and therefore the probable German strategy in these
circumstances was to keep the Fleet "in being." At the same time the
situation appeared so serious that I went so far as to suggest that one
Grand Fleet flotilla of destroyers might under certain conditions be
withdrawn for anti-submarine duties in southern waters.
The misgivings which I entertained were, of course, shared by all those
in authority who were acquainted with the facts of the case, including
the Board of Admiralty.
On November 24 Mr. Balfour telegraphed offering me the post of First Sea
Lord, and in the event of acceptance requesting me to meet him in
Edinburgh to discuss matters. After consultation with Sir Charles
Madden, my Chief of Staff, I replied that I was prepared to do what was
considered best for the Service.
During the conference with Mr. Balfour in Edinburgh on November 27,
1916, and after I had agreed to go to the Admiralty, he informed me of
the consequent changes which he proposed to make in flag officers'
appointments in the Grand Fleet. Amongst the changes he included Admiral
Sir Cecil Burney, who would be relieved of his post as second in command
of the Grand Fleet and commander of the 1st Battle Squadron, as he had
practically completed his term of two years in command. I thereupon
asked that he might be offered the post of Second Sea Lord, and that
Commodore Lionel Halsey, who had been serving as Captain of the Fleet,
might be offered that of Fourth Sea Lord. In my view it was very
desirable that an officer with the great experience in command possessed
by Sir Cecil Burney should occupy the position of Second Sea Lord under
the conditions which existed, and that one who had served afloat during
the war in both an executive and administrative capacity should become
Fourth Sea Lord. I also informed Mr. Balfour of my desire to form an
Anti-Submarine Division of the War Staff at the Admiralty, and asked
that Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B., should be offered the post of
Director of the Division, with Captain F.C. Dreyer, C.B., my Flag
Captain in the _Iron Duke_, as his assistant.
All these appointments were made.
Although I arrived in London on November 29, I did not actually take
office as First Sea Lord until December 5, owing to an attack of
influenza. On that day I relieved Sir Henry Jackson, but only held
office under Mr. Balfour for two or three days, as the change of
Government took place just at this period, and Sir Edward Carson came to
the Admiralty in place of Mr. Balfour.
This book is intended to record facts, and not to touch upon personal
matters, but I cannot forbear to mention the extreme cordiality of Sir
Edward Carson's relations with the Board in general and myself in
particular. His devotion to the naval service was obvious to all, and in
him the Navy possessed indeed a true and a powerful friend.
The earliest conversations between the First Lord and myself had
relation to the submarine menace, and Sir Edward Carson threw himself
wholeheartedly into the work. This was before the days of the
unrestricted submarine campaign, and although ships were frequently
torpedoed, very large numbers were still being sunk by gun-fire. The
torpedo did not come into general use until March, 1917.
One of the most pressing needs of this period of attack by gun-fire was
consequently a great increase in the number of guns for use in
defensively armed merchant vessels, and here Sir Edward Carson's
assistance was of great value. He fully realized the urgent necessities
of the case, and was constant in his efforts to procure the necessary
guns. The work carried out in this connection is given in detail in
Chapter III (p. 68).
During Sir Edward's tenure of office the reorganization of the Naval
Staff was taken in hand. Changes from which great benefit resulted were
effected in the Staff organization. Sir Edward very quickly saw the
necessity for a considerable strengthening of the Staff. In addition to
the newly formed and rapidly expanding Anti-Submarine Division of the
Naval Staff, he realized that the Operations Division also needed
increased strength, and that it was essential to relieve the First Sea
Lord of the mass of administrative work falling upon his shoulders,
which had unfortunately been greatly magnified by the circumstances
already described.
It is as well at this point to describe the conditions in regard to
Staff organization that existed at the Admiralty at the end of 1916, and
to show how those conditions had been arrived at.
Prior to 1909 there was no real Staff, although the organization at the
Admiralty included an Intelligence Department and a Mobilization
Division. The Director of Naval Intelligence at that time acted in an
advisory capacity as Chief of the Staff. Indeed prior to 1904 there were
but few naval officers at the Admiralty at all beyond those in the
technical departments of the Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes
and the members of the Board itself. The Sea Lords were even without
Naval Assistants and depended entirely on the help of a secretary
provided by the civilian staff at the Admiralty.
In 1910 a new branch was formed termed the Mobilization and Movements
Department under a Director. This branch was a first step towards an
Operations Division.
Under Mr. Churchill's regime at the Admiralty in 1911 a more regular
Staff organization was introduced and a Chief of the War Staff, acting
under the First Sea Lord, was appointed. The organization introduced
during his term of office is thus shown graphically:
CHIEF OF STAFF
|
------------------------------------------------------------
| | |
Director of Director of Director of
Operations Division. Intelligence Division. Mobilization Division.
In addition to other duties, the Mobilization Division was charged with
the responsibility for the supply of fuel to the Fleet, from the Staff
point of view.
In the organization introduced in 1911 the duties of the Chief of the
Staff were defined as being of an advisory nature. He possessed no
executive powers. Consequently all orders affecting the movements of
ships required the approval of the First Sea Lord before issue, and the
consequence of this over-centralization was that additional work was
thrown on the First Sea Lord. The resultant inconvenience was not of
much account during peace, but became of importance in war, and as the
war progressed the Chief of the Staff gradually exercised executive
functions, orders which were not of the first importance being issued by
the Staff in accordance with the policy approved generally by the First
Sea Lord. The fault in the organization appeared to me to lie in
non-recognition of the fact that the First Sea Lord was in reality the
Chief of the Naval Staff, since he was charged with the responsibility
for the preparation and readiness of the Fleet for war and for all
movements. Another anomaly existing at the Admiralty, which was not
altered in the 1911 reorganization of the War Staff, was that the orders
to the Fleet were not drafted and issued by the War Staff, but by the
Military Branch of the Secretary's Department.
The system was only workable because the very able civil servants of the
Military Branch were possessed of wide Admiralty experience and worked
in the closest co-operation with the naval officers. Their work was of
the most strenuous nature and was carried out with the greatest
devotion, but the system was manifestly wrong in principle.
On the outbreak of war the necessity for placing the War Registry (a
part of the Military Branch) directly under the Chief of the Staff
became apparent, and this was done.
In December, 1916, when I took up the post of First Sea Lord, the
Admiralty War Staff was still being worked on the general lines of the
organization introduced by Mr. Churchill in 1911, but it had, of course,
expanded to a very considerable extent to meet war conditions, and a
most important Trade Division, which dealt with all questions connected
with the Mercantile Marine, had been formed at the outbreak of war under
the charge of Captain Richard Webb. This Division, under that very able
officer, had carried out work of the greatest national importance with
marked success.
The successive changes in the Staff organization carried out during the
year 1917 were as follows:
In December, 1916, an Anti-Submarine Division of the Staff was formed.
This Division did not, for some reason, appear in the Navy List as part
of the Staff organization until some months had elapsed, although it
started work in December, 1916. The officers who composed the Division
were shown as borne on the books of H.M.S. _President_.
The Division relieved the Operations Division of the control of all
vessels, including aircraft, which were engaged in anti-submarine
offensive and defensive work, and took over also the control of
mine-sweeping operations. The Division was also charged with the duty of
examining and perfecting all experimental devices for combating the
submarine menace and of producing fresh schemes for the destruction of
enemy submarines. This organization is open to the criticism that
matters concerning operations and material came under the same head, but
they were so closely allied at this stage that it was deemed advisable
to accept this departure from correct Staff organization. The personnel
of the Division came with me from the Grand Fleet, and at the outset
consisted of one flag officer--Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B.--two
captains, four commanders, three lieutenant-commanders, and two engineer
officers, in addition to the necessary clerical staff. The small staff
of four officers already at the Admiralty engaged in anti-submarine
experimental work, which had done much to develop this side of warfare,
was absorbed. The new Division worked directly under me, but in close
touch with the then Chief of the War Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry
Oliver.
In the early spring of 1917 the illogical nature of the War Staff
organization became apparent, in that it had no executive functions, and
as the result of discussions between Sir Edward Carson and myself the
decision was taken that the duties of the Naval Staff (the term decided
upon in place of that of War Staff) should be made executive, and that
the First Sea Lord should assume his correct title as Chief of the Naval
Staff, as he had, in fact, already assumed the position.
At the same time the operational work of the Staff was grouped under two
heads, the first mainly concerned with operations against the enemy's
surface vessels, and the second with the protection of trade and
operations against the enemy's under-water warfare, whether the means he
employed were submarines or mines.
The officer, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, K.C.B., charged with the
supervision of the first-named work was styled Deputy Chief of the Naval
Staff (D.C.N.S.), and the officer connected with the second,
Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff, C.B., was given the title of Assistant Chief of
the Naval Staff (A.C.N.S.).
The duties of Director of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Staff,
hitherto carried out by Admiral Duff, were at this time taken over by
Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B., who was brought down from the Grand Fleet for
the purpose. Captain Dreyer, who had been Admiral Duff's original
assistant, had in the meantime been appointed Director of Naval
Ordnance, and had been succeeded by Captain H. Walwyn, D.S.O.
The Mine-Sweeping Division of the Staff was also formed, and the
importance of the question of signal communications was recognized by
forming a Signal Section of the Staff.
The adoption of the title of Chief of the Naval Staff by the First Sea
Lord necessarily made the functions of the Staff executive instead of
advisory.
The Staff organization at this period is shown graphically below.
C.N.S.
|
+-- D.C.N.S.
| . |
| . +-- Operations Division.
| . | |
| . | +-- Home
| . | +-- Foreign
| . +-- Mobilization Division.
| . +-- Signal Section.
| . +-- Intelligence Division.
| .
+-- A.C.N.S.
|
+-- Trade Division.
+-- Convoys Section.
+-- Anti-Submarine Division.
+-- Mine-Sweeping Division.
Stress was laid in a Staff memorandum issued by me on the fact that the
various divisions were on no account to work in watertight compartments,
but were to be in the closest touch with one another. The dotted line
connecting the D.C.N.S. and the A.C.N.S. in the graph was defined as
indicating that there should be the fullest co-operation between the
different portions of the Staff.
In the summer of 1917 the growth of the convoy system necessitated
further expansion of the Naval Staff, and a Mercantile Movements
Division was added. The duties of this division were to organize and
regulate the movements of convoys of merchant ships. A staff of officers
had been by this time sent abroad to the ports from which convoys were
directed to sail, and the Mercantile Movements Division, acting in close
touch with the Ministry of Shipping, arranged the assembly and movements
of the convoys and their protection.
The organization of the portion of the Staff under the A.C.N.S. at this
stage is shown below.
A.C.N.S.
|
------------------------------------------------
| | | |
Director of Director of Director of Director of
Mercantile Trade Anti-Sub- Mine-Sweeping
Movements Division. marine Division.
Division. (Captain R.N.) Division. (Captain R.N.)
(Captain R.N.) | (Captain R.N.) |
| Staff. | Staff.
-------------- Staff.
| |
Convoy Movements
Section. Section.
The portion of the organization under the A.C.N.S. comprised the
following numbers in December, 1917:
Mercantile Movements Division, 36 Officers, with a clerical staff.
Trade Division, 43 Officers, with a clerical staff of 10 civilians.
Anti-Submarine Division, 26 Officers, with a clerical staff.
Mine-Sweeping Division, 8 Officers, with a clerical staff.
Of this number practically the whole of the Mercantile Movements and
Anti-Submarine Divisions were added during the year 1917, whilst large
additions were also made to the Trade Division, owing to the great
increase of work.
During the first half of the year 1917 the Operations Division of the
Naval Staff received a much needed increase of strength by the
appointment of additional officers, charged, under the Director of the
Operations Division, with the detailed preparation of plans for
operations. Further additions to this branch of the Staff were made in
the latter half of the year.
Matters were in this position with the reorganization of the Naval Staff
in hand and working towards a definite conclusion when, to the intense
regret of those who had been privileged to work with him, Sir Edward
Carson left the Admiralty to become a member of the War Cabinet.
Before leaving the subject of work at the Admiralty during Sir Edward
Carson's administration, mention should be made of the progress made in
the difficult task of providing officers for the rapidly expanding
Fleet. The large programme of small craft started in the early part of
1917 involved the eventual provision of a great number of additional
officers. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, the Second Sea Lord, took this
matter in hand with conspicuous success, and the measures which he
introduced tided us over a period of much difficulty and made provision
for many months ahead. Sir Cecil Burney, by reason of his intimate
knowledge of the personnel--the result of years of command afloat--was
able to settle also many problems relating to personnel which had been
the cause of dissatisfaction in the past.
Sir Edward Carson, on leaving the Admiralty, was succeeded by Sir Eric
Geddes as First Lord. Sir Eric had been brought into the Admiralty in
May, 1917, in circumstances which I will describe later. (_Vide_ Chapter
X.) One of his first steps as First Lord which affected Admiralty
organization was the appointment of a Deputy First Sea Lord. This
appointment was frankly made more as a matter of expediency than because
any real need had been shown for the creation of such an office. It is
unnecessary here to enter into the circumstances which led to the
appointment to which I saw objections, owing to the difficulty of
fitting into the organization an officer bearing the title of Deputy
First Sea Lord.
Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss--who had come to England for the purpose
of conferring with the Admiralty before taking up the post of British
Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean--was selected by the First Lord
as Deputy First Sea Lord.
Shortly after assuming office as First Lord, Sir Eric Geddes expressed a
wish for a further consideration of the question of Admiralty
organization. To this end he appointed a joint War Office and Admiralty
Committee to compare the two organizations.
Having received the report of the Committee, the First Lord and I both
formulated ideas for further reorganization. My proposals, so far as
they concerned the Naval Staff, were conceived on the general lines of
an extension of the organization already adopted since my arrival at the
Admiralty, but I also stated that the time had arrived when the whole
Admiralty organization should be divided more distinctly into two sides,
viz., the Operational side and the _Materiél_ or Administrative side,
and indicated that the arrangement existing in the time of the old Navy
Board might be largely followed, in order that questions of Operations
and _Materiél_ should be quite clearly separated. This, indeed, was the
principle of the Staff organization which I had adopted in the Grand
Fleet, and I was anxious to extend it to the Admiralty.
This principle was accepted--although the term "Navy Board" was not
reinstituted--the Admiralty Board being divided into two Committees, one
for _Operations_ and one for _Materiél_, the whole Board meeting at
least once a week, as required, to discuss important questions affecting
both sides. Whilst it was necessary that the Maintenance Committee
should be kept acquainted with the requirements in the shape of material
needed for operations in which the Fleet was engaged--and to the Deputy
Chief of Naval Staff was assigned this particular liaison duty--I was
not in favour of _discussing_ questions affecting ordinary operations
with the whole Board, since, in addition to the delay thereby involved,
members of the Maintenance Committee could not keep in sufficiently
intimate touch with such matters, and opinions might be formed and
conclusions expressed on an incomplete knowledge of facts. Questions of
broad policy or of proposed major operations were, of course, in a
different category, and the above objections did not apply.
The further alterations in Naval Staff organization were not adopted
without considerable discussion and some difference of opinion as to
detail, particularly on the subject of the organization of the
Operations Division of the Naval Staff, which I considered should
embrace the Plans Division as a sub-section in order to avoid
overlapping and delay. In my view it was undesirable for a body of
officers not working under the authority of those in close touch with
the daily operations of the Fleet to put forward plans for operations
which necessarily involved the use of the same vessels and material, as
such a procedure must inevitably lead to impracticable suggestions and
consequent waste of time; the system which I favoured was that in use in
the Army, where the Operations Section of the Staff dealt also with the
working out of plans.
The Admiralty Staff organization necessarily differed somewhat from that
at the War Office, because during the war the Admiralty in a sense
combined, so far as Naval operations were concerned, the functions both
of the War Office and of General Headquarters in France. This was due
primarily to the fact that intelligence was necessarily centred at the
Admiralty, and, secondly, because the Admiralty acted in a sense as
Commander-in-Chief of all the forces working in the vicinity of the
British Isles. It was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief of the
Grand Fleet to assume this function, since he could not be provided with
the necessary knowledge without great delay being caused, and, further,
when he was at sea the other commands would be without a head. The
Admiralty therefore necessarily assumed the duty, whilst supplying each
command with all the information required for operations. The general
lines of the Staff organizations at the War Office and at General
Headquarters in France are here given for the sake of comparison with
the Naval Staff organization.
1.--_The British War Office._
The approximate organization is shown as concisely as possible in the
following diagram:
CHIEF OF IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF
Director of Staff Duties.
Staff duties Organization and training.
War Organization of forces.
General questions of training.
Signals and communications.
Director of Military Operations.
Operations on all fronts.
Director of Military Intelligence.
Intelligence.
Espionage.
The Press.
The other important departments of the War Office on the administration
side are those of the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General,
the former dealing with all questions relating to the personnel of the
Army under the various headings of organization, mobilization, pay and
discipline, and the latter with all questions of supply and transport.
A Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff was attached to the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff. His main duty was to act as a liaison
between the General Staff and the administrative departments of the War
Office.
The whole organization of the British War Office is, of course, under
the direction and control of the Secretary of State for War.
2.--_The Staff Organization at General Headquarters in France._
FIELD MARSHAL
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
Chief of the General Staff
G.S. (a) (Operations) Plans and Execution Intelligence.
G.S. (b) (Staff Duties) War Organizations and
Establishments Liason between G.S. (a) and
Administrative Services.
Adjutant General (Personnel, Discipline, etc.)
Quartermaster General (Transport and Supply, etc.)
ATTACHED TO GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.
(BUT NOT STAFF OFFICERS.)
|
----------------------------------------------------
| | |
Artillery Adviser Engineer-in-Chief. Inspector of
(Advises Chief of Advises as in case of Training.
General Stall on Artillery.
Artillery matters
and operations).
|
Advises Administrative
Departments as
necessary.
N.B.--The Inspector of Training works in consultation with the Chief of
the General Staff.
It will be seen that whilst at the War Office the liaison between the
General Staff and the administrative side was maintained by a Deputy
Chief of the General Staff, in the organization in the field the same
function was performed by the Staff Officer known as G.S. (b).
It will also be seen that neither at General Headquarters nor in the
case of an Army command does the Chief of the General Staff exercise
control over the administrative side.
After some discussion the Admiralty organizations shown in the Tables A
and B on page 20 (below) were adopted, and I guarded as far as possible
against the objection to keeping the Plans Division separate from the
Operations Division by the issue of detailed orders as to the conduct of
the business of the Staff, in which directions were given that the
Director of the Plans Division should be in close touch with the
Director of the Operations Division before submitting any proposals to
the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff or myself.
During the remainder of my service at the Admiralty the organization
remained as shown in Tables A and B on p. 20 below. It was not entirely
satisfactory, for reasons already mentioned and because I did not obtain
all the relief from administrative work which was so desirable.
TABLE A
First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.
Director of Intelligence Division.
Director of Signals Division.
Director of Operations Division.
Deputy-Director of Operations
Operations at home.
Assistant Director Operations Division and Staff.
Operations abroad.
Director of Plans Division.
Preparation of Plans for operations at home and abroad.
Consideration of and proposals for use of new
weapons and material. Building programmes to
carry out approved policy.
Deputy First Sea Lord.
Director of Training and Staff Duties.
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff.
Director of Trade Division.
Director of Mercantile Movements.
Director of Mine-sweeping.
Director of Anti-Submarine Division.
TABLE B
Board of Admiralty.
Operations Committee.
Naval Staff.
Maintenance Committee.
Shipbuilding and Armaments.
Stores.
Air.
Finance.
Personnel and Discipline, etc.
Works.
Early in 1918, after my departure from the Admiralty, the following
announcement appeared in the Press:
The _Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement_:--
The Letters Patent for the new Board of Admiralty having now been
issued, it may be desirable to summarize the changes in the personnel of
the Board and to indicate briefly the alterations in organization that
have been decided upon.
Acting Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver now brings to a close his long
period of valuable service on the Naval Staff and will take up a
sea-going command, being succeeded as D.C.N.S. by Rear-Admiral Sydney
Fremantle. Rear-Admiral George P.W. Hope has been selected for the
appointment of Deputy First Sea Lord, formerly held by Admiral Wemyss,
but with changed functions. Commodore Paine, Fifth Sea Lord and Chief of
Naval Air Service, leaves the Board of Admiralty in consequence of the
recent creation of the Air Council, of which he is now a member, and
formal effect is now given to the appointment of Mr. A.F. Pease as
Second Civil Lord, which was announced on Thursday last.
In view of the formal recognition now accorded, as explained by the
First Lord in his statement in the House of Commons on the 1st November,
to the principle of the division of the work of the Board under the two
heads of Operations and Maintenance, the Members of the new Board (other
than the First Lord) may be grouped as follows:--
OPERATIONS. MAINTENANCE.
First Sea Lord Second Sea Lord.
and (Vice-Admiral Sir H.L. Heath.)
Chief of Naval Staff.
(Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss.)
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. Third Sea Lord.
(Rear-Admiral S.R. Fremantle.) (Rear-Admiral L. Halsey.)
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. Fourth Sea Lord.
(Rear-Admiral A.L. Duff.) (Rear-Admiral H.H.D.
Tothill.)
Deputy First Sea Lord. Civil Lord.
(Rear-Admiral G.P.W. Hope.) (Right Hon. E.G. Pretyman,
M.P.)
Controller.
(Sir A.G. Anderson.)
Second Civil Lord.
(Mr. A.F. Pease.)
Financial Secretary.
(Right Hon. T.J. Macnamara, M.P.)
Permanent Secretary.
(Sir O. Murray.)
The principle of isolating the work of planning and directing naval war
operations from all other work, in order that it may receive the entire
attention of the Officers selected for its performance, is now being
carried a stage further and applied systematically to the organization
of the Operations side of the Board and that of the Naval Staff.
In future the general distribution of duties between the Members of the
Board belonging to the Naval Staff will be as follows:--
FIRST SEA LORD AND CHIEF Naval policy and general direction
OF NAVAL STAFF of operations.
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL War operations in Home
STAFF Waters.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL Trade Protection and
STAFF anti-submarine operations.
DEPUTY FIRST SEA LORD General policy questions and
operations outside Home
Waters.
The detailed arrangements have been carefully worked out so as to
relieve the first three of these officers of the necessity of dealing
with any questions not directly connected with the main operations of
the war, and the great mass of important paper work and administrative
detail which is inseparably and necessarily connected with Staff work,
but which has hitherto tended to compete for attention with Operations
work generally will under the new organization be diverted to the Deputy
First Sea Lord.
The grouping of the Directors of the Naval Staff Divisions will be
governed by the same principle.
The only two Directors that will work immediately under the First Sea
Lord will be the Director of Intelligence Division (Rear-Admiral Sir
Reginald Hall) and the Director of Training and Staff Duties
(Rear-Admiral J. C. Ley), whose functions obviously affect all the other
Staff Divisions alike.
Under the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff will be grouped three Directors
whose duties will relate entirely to the planning and direction of
operations in the main sphere of naval activity, viz.:--
Director of Operations Division Captain A.D.P. Pound.
(Home)
Director of Plans Division Captain C.T.M. Fuller,
C.M.G., D.S.O.
Director of Air Division Wing Captain F.R. Scarlett,
D.S.O.
together with the Director of Signals Division, Acting-Captain R.L.
Nicholson, D.S.O., whose duties relate to the system of Fleet
communications.
Under the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff will be grouped four Directors,
whose duties relate to Trade Protection and Anti-Submarine Operations,
viz:--
Director of Anti-Submarine Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B.
Division
Director of Mine-sweeping Captain L.G. Preston, C.B.
Division
Director of Mercantile Movements Captain F.A. Whitehead.
Division
Director of Trade Division Captain A.G. Hotham.
Under the Deputy First Sea Lord there will be one _Director of
Operations Division (Foreign)_--Captain C.P.R. Coode, D.S.O.
The chief change on the Maintenance side of the Board relates to the
distribution of duties amongst the Civil Members. The continuance of the
war has caused a steady increase in the number of cases in which
necessary developments of Admiralty policy due to the war, or experience
resulting from war conditions give rise to administrative problems of
great importance and complexity, of which a solution will have to be
forthcoming either immediately upon or very soon after the conclusion of
the war. The difficulty of concentrating attention on these problems of
the future in the midst of current administrative work of great urgency
may easily be appreciated, and the Civil Lord has consented to take
charge of this important matter, with suitable naval and other
assistance. He will, therefore, be relieved by the Second Civil Lord of
the administration of the programme of Naval Works, including the
questions of priority of labour and material requirements arising
therefrom and the superintendence of the Director of Works Department.
It has further been decided that the exceptional labour and other
difficulties now attending upon the execution of the very large
programme of urgent naval works in progress have so greatly transformed
the functions of the Director of Works Department of the Admiralty that
it is desirable, whilst these abnormal conditions last, to place that
Department under the charge of an expert in the rapid execution of large
engineering works.
The Army Council have consented, at the request of the First Lord of the
Admiralty, to lend for this purpose the services of Colonel Alexander
Gibb, K.B.E., C.B., R.E., Chief Engineer, Port Construction, British
Armies in France. Colonel Gibb (of the Firm of Easton, Gibb, Son and
Company, which built Rosyth Naval Base) will have the title of Civil
Engineer-in-Chief, and will be assisted by the Director of Works, who
retains his status as such, and the existing Staff of the Department,
which will be strengthened as necessary.
Another important change has reference to the organization of the
Admiralty Board of Invention and Research, and has the object at once of
securing greater concentration of effort in connection with scientific
research and experiment, and ensuring that the distinguished scientists
who are giving their assistance to the Admiralty are more constantly in
and amongst the problems upon which they are advising.
Mr. Charles H. Merz, M.Inst.C.E., the well-known Electrical Consulting
Engineer, who has been associated with the Board of Invention and
Research (B.I.R.) since its inception, has consented to serve as
Director of Experiments and Research (unpaid) at the Admiralty to direct
and supervise all the executive arrangements in connection with the
organization of scientific Research and Experiments. Mr. Merz will also
be a member of the Central Committee of the B.I.R. under the presidency
of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher. The functions of the Central
Committee will, as hitherto, be to initiate, investigate, develop and
advise generally upon proposals in respect to the application of Science
and Engineering to Naval Warfare, but the distinguished scientific
experts at present giving their services will in future work more much
closely with the Technical Departments of the Admiralty immediately
concerned with the production and use of apparatus required for specific
purposes.
The general arrangements in regard to the organization of scientific
research and experiment will in future come under the direct supervision
of the First Lord.
Possibly by reason of the manner in which the announcement was made, the
Press appeared to assume that the whole of this Admiralty organization
was new. Such was not the case. Apart from the changes in the personnel
of the Board itself and a slight rearrangement of their duties and those
due to the establishment of an Air Ministry (which had been arranged by
the Cabinet before December, 1917), there were but slight alterations in
the organization shown in Table A [above], as will be seen by comparing
it with Table C on p. 27 [below], which indicates graphically the
organization given in the Admiralty communique.
TABLE C
FIRST SEA LORD AND CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF.
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.
Director of Signals Division.
Director of Operations Division (Home).
Director of Plans Division.
Director of Air Division.
Deputy First Sea Lord.
Director of Operations Division (Foreign) and
Administrative detail work.
Director of Intelligence Division.
Director of Training and Staff Duties.
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff.
Director of Trade Division.
Director of Mercantile Movements.
Director of Mine-sweeping.
Director of Anti-Submarine Division.
It will be seen that the alterations in Naval Staff organization were as
follows:
(a) The new Deputy First Sea Lord--Rear-Admiral Hope--who since the
spring of 1917 had been Director of the Operations Division, was given
the responsibility for operations in foreign waters, with a Director of
Operations (foreign) under him, and was also definitely charged with the
administrative detail involving technical matters. The special gifts,
experience and aptitude of this particular officer for such work enabled
him, no doubt, to relieve the pressure on the First Sea Lord for
administrative detail very materially.
(b) The Operations Division was separated into two parts (home and
foreign), with a Director for each, instead of there being a Deputy
Director for home and an Assistant Director for foreign work, both
working under the Director. This was a change in name only, as the same
officer continued the foreign work under the new arrangement.
(c) The Director of the Intelligence Division and the Director of
Training and Staff Duties were shown as working immediately under the
First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.
(d) A Director of the Air Division was introduced as a result of the
Naval Air Service having been separated from the Admiralty and placed
under the Air Ministry. A larger Admiralty Staff organization for aerial
matters thus became necessary, since the Staff could no longer refer to
the Naval Air Service.
There were no other changes in the Staff organization. As regards the
general Admiralty organization, there was no change except that caused
by the disappearance of the separate Naval Air Service, the addition of
a Second Civil Lord, and some reorganization of the Board of Invention
and Research which had been under discussion for some months previously.
It is probable that in 1918 the Chief of the Naval Staff had more time
at his disposal than was the case in 1917, owing to the changes in
organization initiated in the later year having reached some finality
and to the fact that the numerous anti-submarine measures put in hand in
1917 had become effective in 1918.
The future Admiralty Naval Staff organization, which was in my mind at
the end of 1917, was a development of that shown in Table A, p. 20,
subject to the following remarks:
In the organization then adopted the personality and experience during
the war of many of the officers in high positions were of necessity
considered, and the organization to that extent adapted to
circumstances. This resulted in somewhat overloading the staff at the
head, and the principle on which the Board of Admiralty works, i.e.,
that its members are colleagues one of another, and seniority in rank
does not, theoretically, give greater weight in council, was not
altogether followed. Thus the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, the
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, and the Deputy First Sea Lord were,
by the nature of their duties, subordinate to the Chief of the Naval
Staff and yet were members of the Board. The well-known loyalty of naval
officers to one another tended to minimize any difficulties that might
have arisen from this anomaly, but the arrangement might conceivably
give rise to difficulty, and is best avoided if the Board system is to
remain.
The situation would be clearer if two of the three officers concerned
were removed altogether from the Board, viz., the Deputy First Sea Lord
and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, leaving only the Deputy
Chief of the Naval Staff as a member of the Board to act in the absence
of the Chief of the Naval Staff and to relieve him of the administrative
and technical work not immediately connected with operations.
The work of the two officers thus removed should, under these
conditions, be undertaken by officers who should preferably be Flag
Officers, with experience in command at sea, having the titles of
Directors of Operations, whose emoluments should be commensurate with
their position and responsibilities.
I did not consider it advisable to carry out this alteration during the
war, and it was also difficult under the hour to hour stress of war to
rearrange all the duties of the Naval Staff in the manner most
convenient to the conduct of Staff business, although its desirability
was recognized during 1917.
It may be as well to close this chapter by a few remarks on Staff work
generally in the Navy. In the first place it is necessary in the Navy to
give much weight to the opinions of specialist officers, and for this
reason it is desirable that they should be included in the Staff
organization, and not "attached" to it as was the case with our Army in
pre-war days. The reason for this is that in the Army there is, except
in regard to artillery, little "specialization." The training received
by an officer of any of the fighting branches of the Army at the Staff
College may fit him to assist in the planning and execution of
operations, provided due regard is paid to questions of supply,
transport, housing, etc.
This is not so in a navy. A ship and all that she contains is the
weapon, and very intimate knowledge of the different factors that go to
make a ship an efficient weapon is necessary if the ship is to be used
effectively and if operations in which the ship takes so prominent a
part are to be successfully planned and executed, or if a sound opinion
is to be expressed on the training necessary to produce and maintain her
as an efficient weapon.
The particular points in which this specially intimate knowledge is
required are:
(a) The science of navigation and of handling ships of all types and
classes.
(b) Gunnery.
(c) Torpedoes and mines.
It is the case at present (and the conditions are not likely to alter)
that each one of these subjects is a matter for specialist training.
Every executive officer has a general knowledge of each subject, but it
is not possible for any one officer to possess the knowledge of all
three which is gained by the specialist, and if attempts are made to
plan operations without the assistance of the specialists grave errors
may be made, and, indeed, such errors were made during the late war,
perhaps from this cause.
In my view, therefore, it is desirable that specialist officers should
be included in a Naval Staff organization and not be merely "attached"
to it. It may be said that a Staff can take the advice of specialist
officers who are _attached_ to it for that purpose. But there is a
danger that the specialist advice may never reach the heads of the
Staff. Human nature being what it is, the safest procedure is to place
the specialist officer where his voice must be heard, i.e. to give him a
position on the Staff, for one must legislate for the _average_
individual and for normal conditions of work.
The Chief of a Staff _might_ have specialist knowledge himself, or he
_might_ assure himself that due weight had been given to the opinions of
specialists attached to a Staff; but, on the other hand, it is possible
that he might not have that knowledge and that he might ignore the
opinions of the specialists. The procedure suggested is at least as
necessary when considering the question of training as it is in the case
of operations.
In passing from this point I may say that I have heard the opinion
expressed by military Staff officers that the war has shown that
artillery is so all important that it would be desirable to place the
Major-General of the Royal Artillery, now _attached_ to General
Headquarters, on the Staff for operational matters.
Finally, great care should be exercised to prevent the Staff becoming
larger than is necessary, and there is some danger that the ignorant may
gauge the value of the Staff by its size.
Von Schellendorff says on this subject:
"The principle strictly followed throughout the German Service of
reducing all Staffs to the smallest possible dimensions is moreover
vindicated by restricting every Staff to what is absolutely necessary,
and by not attaching to every Army, Army Corps and Divisional Staff
representatives of all the various branches and departments according to
any fixed rule.
"There cannot be the slightest doubt that the addition of every
individual not absolutely required on a Staff is in itself an evil. In
the first place, it unnecessarily weakens the strength of the regiment
from which an officer is taken. Again it increases the difficulty of
providing the Staff with quarters, which affects the troops that may
happen to be quartered in the same place; and these are quite ready
enough, as it is, occasionally to look with a certain amount of
dislike--though in most cases it is entirely uncalled for--on the
personnel of the higher Staffs. Finally, it should be remembered--and
this is the most weighty argument against the proceeding--that _idleness
is at the root of all mischief_. When there are too many officers on a
Staff they cannot always find the work and occupation essential for
their mental and physical welfare, and their superfluous energies soon
make themselves felt in all sorts of objectionable ways. Experience
shows that whenever a Staff is unnecessarily numerous the ambitious
before long take to intrigue, the litigious soon produce general
friction, and the vain are never satisfied. These failings, so common to
human nature, even if all present, are to a great extent counteracted if
those concerned have plenty of hard and constant work. Besides, the
numbers of a Staff being few, there is all the greater choice in the
selection of the men who are to fill posts on it. In forming a Staff for
war the qualifications required include not only great professional
knowledge and acquaintance with service routine, but above all things
character, self-denial, energy, tact and discretion."
CHAPTER II
THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IN THE EARLY PART OF 1917
The struggle against the depredations of the enemy submarines during the
year 1917 was two-fold; _offensive_ in the direction of anti-submarine
measures (this was partly the business of the Anti-Submarine Division of
the Naval Staff and partly that of the Operations Division); _defensive_
in the direction of protective measures for trade, whether carried in
our own ships or in ships belonging to our Allies or to neutrals, this
being the business of the Trade and Mercantile Movements Divisions.
Prior to the formation of the Mercantile Movements Division the whole
direction of trade was in the hands of the Trade Division of the Staff.
The difficulty with which we were constantly faced in the early part of
1917, when the effective means of fighting the submarine were very
largely confined to the employment of surface vessels, was that of
providing a sufficient number of such vessels for _offensive_ operations
without incurring too heavy risks for our trade by the withdrawal of
vessels engaged in what might be termed _defensive_ work. There was
always great doubt whether any particular offensive operation undertaken
by small craft would produce any result, particularly as the numbers
necessary for success were not available, whilst there was the practical
_certainty_ that withdrawal of defensive vessels would increase our
losses; the situation was so serious in the spring of 1917 that we could
not carry out experiments involving grave risk of considerably increased
losses.
On the other hand, the sinking of one enemy submarine meant the possible
saving of a considerable number of merchant ships. It was difficult to
draw the line between the two classes of operations.
The desire of the Anti-Submarine Division to obtain destroyers for
offensive use in hunting flotillas in the North Sea and English Channel
led to continual requests being made to me to provide vessels for the
purpose. I was, of course, anxious to institute offensive operations,
but in the early days of 1917 we could not rely much on depth-charge
attack, owing to our small stock of these charges, and my experience in
the Grand Fleet had convinced me that for success in the alternative of
hunting submarines for a period which would exhaust their batteries and
so force them to come to the surface, a large number of destroyers was
required, unless the destroyers were provided with some apparatus which
would, by sound or otherwise, locate the submarine. This will be
realized when the fact is recalled that a German submarine could remain
submerged at slow speed for a period which would enable her to travel a
distance of some 80 miles. As this distance could be covered in any
direction in open waters such as the North Sea, it is obvious that only
a very numerous force of destroyers steaming at high speed could cover
the great area in which the submarine might come to the surface. She
would, naturally, select the dark hours for emergence, as being the
period of very limited range of vision for those searching for her. In
confined waters such as those in the eastern portion of the English
Channel the problem became simpler. Requests for destroyers constantly
came from every quarter, such as the Commanders-in-Chief at Portsmouth
and Devonport, the Senior Naval Officer at Gibraltar, the Vice-Admiral,
Dover, the Rear-Admiral Commanding East Coast, and the Admiral at
Queenstown. The vessels they wanted did not, however, exist.
Eventually, with great difficulty, a force of six destroyers was
collected from various sources in the spring of 1917, and used in the
Channel solely for hunting submarines; this number was really quite
inadequate, and it was not long before they had to be taken for convoy
work.
Evidence of the difficulty of successfully hunting submarines was often
furnished by the experiences of our own vessels of this type, sometimes
when hunted by the enemy, sometimes when hunted in error by our own
craft. Many of our submarines went through some decidedly unpleasant
experiences at the hands of our own surface vessels and occasionally at
the hands of vessels belonging to our Allies. On several such occasions
the submarine was frequently reported as having been sunk, whereas she
had escaped.
As an example of a submarine that succeeded not only in evading
destruction, but in getting at least even with the enemy, the case of
one of our vessels of the "E" class, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight,
may be cited. This submarine ran into a heavy anti-submarine net, and
was dragged, nose first, to the bottom. After half an hour's effort,
during which bombs were exploding in her vicinity, the submarine was
brought to the surface by her own crew by the discharge of a great deal
of water from her forward ballast tanks. It was found, however, that the
net was still foul of her, and that a Zeppelin was overhead, evidently
attracted by the disturbance in the water due to the discharge of air
and water from the submarine. She went to the bottom again, and after
half an hour succeeded in getting clear of the net. Meanwhile the
Zeppelin had collected a force of trawlers and destroyers, and the
submarine was hunted for fourteen hours by this force, assisted by the
airship. During this period she succeeded in sinking one of the German
destroyers, and was eventually left unmolested.
For a correct appreciation of submarine warfare it is necessary to have
a clear idea of the characteristics and qualities of the submarine
herself, of the numbers possessed by the enemy, and of the rate at which
they were being produced. It is also necessary, in order to understand
the difficulty of introducing the counter measures adopted by the Royal
Navy, to know the length of time required to produce the vessels and the
weapons which were employed or which it was intended to employ in the
anti-submarine war.
The German submarines may be divided into four classes, viz.: Submarine
cruisers, U-boats, U.B.-boats, U.C.-boats. There were several variations
of each class.
The earlier _submarine cruisers_ of the "Deutschland" class were
double-hulled vessels, with a surface displacement of 1,850 tons, and
were about 215 feet long; they had a surface speed of about 12 knots and
a submerged speed of about 6 knots. They carried two 5.9-inch guns, two
22 pounders, two torpedo tubes, and 12 torpedoes. They could keep the
sea for quite four months without being dependent on a supply ship or
base.
The later _submarine cruisers_ were double-hulled, 275-320 feet long,
had a surface speed of 16-18 knots, and a submerged speed of about 7 to
8 knots. They carried either one or two 5.9-inch guns, six torpedo
tubes, and about 10 torpedoes. They had a very large radius of action,
viz., from 12,000 to 20,000 miles, at a speed of 6 knots. A large number
(some 30 to 40) of these boats were under construction at the time of
the Armistice, but very few had been completed.
There were two or three types of _U-boats_. The earlier vessels were 210
to 220 feet long, double-hulled, with a surface displacement of about
750 tons, a surface speed of 15 to 16 knots, and a submerged speed of
about 8 knots. They carried one or two 4.1-inch guns, four to six
torpedo tubes, and about 10 torpedoes.
Later vessels of the class were 230 to 240 feet long, and of 800 to 820
tons surface displacement, and carried six torpedo tubes and 16
torpedoes. Some of them, fitted as minelayers, carried 36 mines, and two
torpedo tubes, but only two torpedoes. A later and much larger class of
minelayers carried a 5.9-inch gun, four torpedo tubes, 42 mines, and a
larger number of torpedoes. The earlier _U-boats_ could keep the sea for
about five weeks without returning to a base or a supply ship; the later
_U-boats_ had much greater sea endurance.
The smaller _U.B.-boats_ were single-hulled, and about 100 feet long,
had a surface speed of 7 to 9 knots and a submerged speed of about 5
knots, and carried one 22-pounder gun, two torpedo tubes and four
torpedoes. These boats could keep the sea for about two weeks without
returning to a base or supply ship. A later class were double-hulled,
180 feet long, with greater endurance (8,000 miles at 6 knots), a
surface speed of 13 knots and a submerged speed of 8 knots; they carried
one 4.1-inch gun, five tubes and 10 torpedoes.
The earliest _U.C.-boats_ were 111 feet long, with a surface
displacement of 175 tons, a surface speed of 6-½ knots, and a submerged
speed of 5 knots. They carried 12 mines, but no torpedo tubes, and as
they had a fuel endurance of only 800 miles at 5-½ knots, they could
operate only in southern waters.
The later _U.C.-boats_ were 170 to 180 feet long, double-hulled, had a
surface speed of 11 to 12 knots and a submerged speed of about 7 knots,
carried 18 mines, three torpedo tubes, five torpedoes, and one
22-pounder gun, and their fuel endurance was 8,000 to 10,000 miles at a
speed of 7 to 8 knots.
At the end of February, 1917, it was estimated that the enemy had a
total of about 130 submarines of all types available for use in home
waters, and about 20 in the Mediterranean. Of this total an average of
between one-half and one-third was usually at sea. During the year about
eight submarines, on the average, were added monthly to this total. Of
this number some 50 per cent, were vessels of the mine-laying type.
All the German submarines were capable of prolonged endurance submerged.
The U-boats could travel under water at the slowest speed for some 48
hours, at about 4 knots for 20 hours, at 5 knots for about 12 hours, and
at 8 knots for about 2 hours.
They were tested to depths of at least 180 feet, but many submerged to
depths exceeding 250 feet without injury. They did not usually lie on
the bottom at depths greatly exceeding 20 fathoms (120 feet).
All German submarines, except possibly the _cruiser class_, could dive
from diving trim in from 30 seconds to one minute. The _U.B. class_ had
particularly rapid diving qualities, and were very popular boats with
the German submarine officers. Perhaps the most noticeable features of
the German submarines as a whole were their excellent engines and their
great strength of construction.
Prior to the month of February, 1917, it was the usual practice of the
enemy submarine in the warfare against merchant ships to give some
warning before delivering her attack. This was by no means a universal
rule, particularly in the case of British merchant vessels, as is
evidenced by the attacks on the _Lusitania, Arabic_, and scores of other
ships.
In the years 1915 and 1916, however, only 21 and 29 per cent.
respectively of the British merchant ships sunk by enemy submarines were
destroyed without warning, whilst during the first four months of the
unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 the figure rose to 64 per cent.,
and went higher and higher as the months progressed.
Prior to February, 1917, the more general method of attack on ships was
to "bring them to" by means of gun-fire; they were then sunk by
gun-fire, torpedo, or bomb. This practice necessitated the submarine
being on the surface, and so gave a merchant ship defensively armed a
chance of replying to the gun-fire and of escaping, and it also gave
armed decoy ships a good opportunity of successful action if the
submarine could be induced to close to very short range.
The form of attack on commerce known as "unrestricted submarine warfare"
was commenced by Germany with the object of forcing Great Britain to
make peace by cutting off her supplies of food and raw material. It has
been acknowledged by Germans in high positions that the German Admiralty
considered that this form of warfare would achieve its object in a
comparatively short time, in fact in a matter of some five or six
months.
Experienced British naval officers, aware of the extent of the German
submarine building programme, and above all aware of the shadowy nature
of our existing means of defence against such a form of warfare, had
every reason to hold the view that the danger was great and that the
Allies were faced with a situation, fraught with the very gravest
possibilities.
The principal doubt was as to the ability of the enemy to train
submarine crews with sufficient rapidity to keep pace with his building
programme.
However, it was ascertained that the Germans had evidently devoted a
very great number of their submarines to training work during the period
September, 1915, to March, 1916, possibly in anticipation of the
unrestricted warfare, since none of their larger boats was operating in
our waters between these months; this fact had a considerable bearing on
the problem.
As events turned out it would appear either that the training given was
insufficient or that the German submarine officer was lacking in
enterprise.
There is no doubt whatever that had the German craft engaged in the
unrestricted submarine warfare been manned by British officers and men,
adopting German methods, there would have been but few Allied or neutral
merchant ships left afloat by the end of 1917.
So long as the majority of the German submarine attacks upon shipping
were made by gun-fire, the method of defence was comparatively simple,
in that it merely involved the supply to merchant ships of guns of
sufficient power to prevent the submarine engaging at ranges at which
the fire could not be returned. Whilst the _method_ of defence was
apparent, the problem of _supplying_ suitable guns in sufficient numbers
was a very different matter. It involved arming all our merchant ships
with guns of 4-inch calibre and above. In January, 1917, only some 1,400
British ships had been so armed since the outbreak of war.
It will be seen, therefore, that so long as ships sailed singly, very
extensive supplies of guns were required to meet gun attack, and as
there was most pressing need for the supply of guns for the Army in
France, as well as for the anti-aircraft defence of London, the prospect
of arming merchant ships adequately was not promising.
When the enemy commenced unrestricted submarine warfare attack by
gun-fire was gradually replaced by attack by torpedo, and the problem at
once became infinitely more complicated.
Gun-fire was no longer a protection, since the submarine was rarely
seen. The first intimation of her presence would be given by the track
of a torpedo coming towards the ship, and no defence was then possible
beyond an endeavour to manoeuvre the ship clear of the torpedo. Since,
however, a torpedo is always some distance ahead of the bubbles which
mark its track (the speed of the torpedo exceeding 30 knots an hour),
the track is not, as a rule, seen until the torpedo is fairly close to
the ship unless the sea is absolutely calm. The chance of a ship of low
speed avoiding a hit by a timely alteration of course after the torpedo
has been fired is but slight. Further, the only difficulty experienced
by a submarine in hitting a moving vessel by torpedo-fire, once she has
arrived in a position suitable for attack, lies in estimating correctly
the course and speed of the target. In the case of an ordinary cargo
ship there is little difficulty in guessing her speed, since it is
certain to be between 8 and 12 knots, and her course can be judged with
fair accuracy by the angle of her masts and funnel, or by the angle
presented by her bridge.
It will be seen, then, how easy was the problem before the German
submarine officers, and how very difficult was that set to our Navy and
our gallant Mercantile Marine.
It will not be out of place here to describe the methods which were in
force at the end of 1916 and during the first part of 1917 for affording
protection to merchant shipping approaching our coasts from the
direction of the Atlantic Ocean.
The general idea dating from the early months of the war was to disperse
trade on passage over wide tracts of ocean, in order to prevent the
successful attacks which could be so easily carried out if shipping
traversed one particular route. To carry out such a system it was
necessary to give each vessel a definite route which she should follow
from her port of departure to her port of arrival; unless this course
was adopted, successive ships would certainly be found to be following
identical, or practically identical, routes, thereby greatly increasing
the chance of attack. In the early years of the war masters of ships
were given approximate tracks, but when the unrestricted submarine
campaign came into being it became necessary to give exact routes.
The necessary orders were issued by officers stationed at various ports
at home and abroad who were designated Shipping Intelligence or
Reporting Officers. It was, of course, essential to preserve the secrecy
of the general principles governing the issue of route orders and of the
route orders themselves. For this reason each master was only informed
of the orders affecting his own ship, and was directed that such orders
should on no account fall into the hands of the enemy.
The route orders were compiled on certain principles, of which a few may
be mentioned:
(a) Certain definite positions of latitude and longitude were given
through which the ship was required to pass, and the orders were
discussed with the master of each vessel in order to ensure that they
were fully understood.
(b) Directions were given that certain localities in which submarines
were known to operate, such as the approaches to the coast of the United
Kingdom, were, if possible, to be crossed at night. It was pointed out
that when the speed of the ship did not admit of traversing the whole
danger area at night, the portion involving the greatest danger (which
was the inshore position) should, as a rule, be crossed during dark
hours.
(c) Similarly the orders stated that ships should, as a rule, leave port
so as to approach the dangerous area at dusk, and that they should make
the coast at about daylight, and should avoid, as far as possible, the
practice of making the land at points in general use in peace time.
(d) Orders were definite that ships were to zigzag both by day and at
night in certain areas, and if kept waiting outside a port.
(e) Masters were cautioned to hug the coast, as far as navigational
facilities admitted, when making coastal passages.
The orders (b), (c) and (d) were those in practice in the Grand Fleet
when circumstances permitted during my term in that command.
A typical route order from New York to Liverpool might be as follows:
"After passing Sandy Hook, hug the coast until dark, then make a good
offing before daylight and steer to pass through the following
positions, viz:
Lat. 38° N. Long. 68° W.
Lat. 41° N. Long. 48° W.
Lat. 46° N. Long. 28° W.
Lat. 51° 30' N. Long. 14° W.
"Thence make the coast near the Skelligs approximately at daylight, hug
the Irish coast to the Tuskar, up the Irish coast (inside the banks if
possible), and across the Irish Channel during dark hours. Thence hug
the coast to your port; zigzag by day and night after passing, Long. 20°
W."
Sometimes ships were directed to cross to the English coast from the
south of Ireland, and to hug the English coast on their way north.
The traffic to the United Kingdom was so arranged in the early part of
1917 as to approach the coast in four different areas, which were known
as Approach A, B, C, and D.
Approach A was used for traffic bound towards the western approach to
the English Channel.
Approach B for traffic making for the south of Ireland.
Approach C for traffic making for the north of Ireland.
Approach D for traffic making for the east coast of England via the
north of Scotland.
The approach areas in force during one particular period are shown on
Chart A (in pocket at the end of the book). They were changed
occasionally when suspicion was aroused that their limits were known to
the enemy, or as submarine attack in an area became intense.
[Transcriber's note: Chart A is a navigational map of the waters
southwest of England, with approach routes marked.]
The approach areas were patrolled at the time, so far as numbers
admitted, by patrol craft (trawlers, torpedo-boat destroyers, and
sloops), and ships with specially valuable cargoes were given directions
to proceed to a certain rendezvous on the outskirts of the area, there
to be met by a destroyer or sloop, if one was available for the purpose.
The areas were necessarily of considerable length, by reason of the
distance from the coast at which submarines operated, and of
considerable width, owing to the necessity for a fairly wide dispersion
of traffic throughout the area. Consequently, with the comparatively
small number of patrol craft available, the protection afforded was but
slight, and losses were correspondingly heavy. In the early spring of
1917, Captain H.W. Grant, of the Operations Division at the Admiralty,
whose work in the Division was of great value, proposed a change in
method by which the traffic should be brought along certain definite
"lines" in each approach area. Typical lines are shown in Chart B.
[Transcriber's note: Chart B is a navigational map of the waters
southwest of Ireland, with approach routes marked.]
The idea was that the traffic in, say, Approach Route B, should,
commencing on a certain date, be ordered by the Routeing Officer to pass
along the line Alpha. Traffic would continue along the line for a
certain period, which was fixed at five days, when it would be
automatically diverted to another line, say Gamma, but the traffic along
Gamma would not commence until a period of 24 hours had elapsed since
discontinuance of the use of the line Alpha. This was necessary in order
to give time for the patrol craft to change from one line to the other.
During this period of 24 hours the arrangement for routeing at the ports
of departure ensured that no traffic would reach the outer end of any of
the approach lines, and consequently that traffic would cease on line
Alpha 24 hours before it commenced on line Gamma. After a further period
of five days the line would again change automatically.
It was necessary that Shipping Intelligence Officers should have in
their possession the orders for directing traffic on to the various
lines for some considerable time ahead, and the masters of ships which
were likely to be for some time at sea were informed of the dates
between which the various lines were to be used, up to a date sufficient
to cover the end of their voyage. There was, therefore, some danger of
this information reaching the enemy if a vessel were captured by a
submarine and the master failed to destroy his instructions in time.
There was also some danger in giving the information to neutrals.
However, the system, which was adopted, did result in a reduction of
losses during the comparatively short time that it was in use, and the
knowledge that patrol craft on the line would be much closer together
than they would be in an approach area certainly gave confidence to the
personnel of the merchant ships, and those who had been forced to
abandon their ship by taking to the boats were afforded a better chance
of being picked up.
Various arrangements were in existence for effecting rapidly a diversion
of shipping from one route to another in the event of submarines being
located in any particular position, and a continual change of the
signals for this purpose was necessary to guard against the possibility
of the code being compromised by having fallen into enemy hands, an
event which, unfortunately, was not infrequent.
Elaborate orders were necessary to regulate coastal traffic, and fresh
directions were continually being issued as danger, especially danger
from mines, was located. Generally speaking, the traffic in home waters
was directed to hug the coast as closely as safe navigation permitted.
Two reasons existed for this, (a) in water of a depth of less than about
eight fathoms German submarines did not care to operate, and (b) under
the procedure indicated danger from submarine attack was only likely on
the side remote from the coast.
Here is an example of the instructions for passing up Channel:
_From Falmouth to Portland Bill._--Hug the coast, following round the
bays, except when passing Torbay. (Directions followed as to the
procedure here.)
_From Portland Bill to St. Catherines._--Pass close south of the
Shambles and steer for Anvil Point, thence hug the coast, following
round the bays.
And so on.
As it was not safe navigationally to follow round the bays during
darkness, the instructions directed that ships were to leave the
daylight route at dusk and to join the dark period route, showing dimmed
bow lights whilst doing so.
Two "dark period routes" were laid down, one for vessels bound up
Channel, and another for vessels bound down Channel, and these routes
were some five miles apart in order to minimize the danger of collision,
ships being directed not to use their navigation lights except for
certain portions of the route, during which they crossed the route of
transports and store ships bound between certain southern British ports
(Portsmouth, Southampton and Devonport) and French ports.
Routes were similarly laid down for ships to follow when navigating to
or from the Bristol Channel, and for ships navigating the Irish Sea.
Any system of convoy was at this time out of the question, as neither
the cruisers to marshal the convoy to the submarine area, nor the
destroyers to screen it when there, were available.
There was one very important factor in the situation, viz., the
comparative rate at which the Germans could produce submarines and at
which we could build vessels suitable for anti-submarine warfare and for
defence of commerce. The varying estimates gave cause for grave anxiety.
Our average output of _destroyers_ was four to five per month. Indeed,
this is putting the figure high; and, of course, we suffered losses. The
French and Italians were not producing any vessels of this type, whilst
the Japanese were, in the early part of 1917, not able to spare any for
work in European waters, although later in the year they lent twelve
destroyers, which gave valuable assistance in the Mediterranean. The
United States of America were not then in the war. Consequently measures
for the defence of the Allied trade against the new menace depended on
our own production.
Our _submarines_ were being produced at an average rate of about two per
month only, and--apart from motor launches, which were only of use in
the finest weather and near the coast--the only other vessels suitable
for anti-submarine work that were building at the time, besides some
sloops and P-boats, were trawlers, which, whilst useful for protection
patrol, were too slow for most of the escort work or for offensive
duties. The Germans' estimate of their own submarine production was
about twelve per month, although this figure was never realized, the
average being nearer eight. But each submarine was capable of sinking
many merchant ships, thus necessitating the employment of a very large
number of our destroyers; and therein lay the gravity of the situation,
as we realized at the Admiralty early in 1917 that no effort of ours
could increase the output of destroyers for at least fifteen months, the
shortest time then taken to build a destroyer in this country.
And here it is interesting to compare the time occupied in the
production of small craft in Great Britain and in Germany during the
war.
In pre-war days we rarely built a destroyer in less than twenty-four
months, although shortly before the war efforts were made to reduce the
time to something like eighteen to twenty months. Submarines occupied
two years in construction.
In starting the great building programme of destroyers and submarines at
the end of 1914, Lord Fisher increased very largely the number of firms
engaged in constructing vessels of both types. Hopes were held out of
the construction both of destroyers and of submarines in about twelve
months; but labour and other difficulties intervened, and although some
firms did complete craft of both classes during 1915 in less than twelve
months, by 1916 and 1917 destroyers _averaged_ about eighteen months and
submarines even longer for completion.
The Germans had always built their small craft rapidly, although their
heavy ships were longer in construction than our own. Their destroyers
were completed in a little over twelve months from the official date of
order in pre-war days. During the early years of the war it would seem
that they maintained this figure, and they succeeded in building their
smaller submarines of the U.B. and U.C. types in some six to eight
months, as U.B. and U.C. boats began to be delivered as early as April,
1915, and it is certain that they were not ordered before August, 1914.
The time taken by the Germans to build submarines of the U type was
estimated by us at twelve months, and that of submarine cruisers at
eighteen months. German submarine officers gave the time as eight to ten
months for a U-boat and eighteen months for a submarine cruiser.
(It is to be observed that Captain Persius in a recent article gives a
much longer period for the construction of the German submarines. It is
not stated whether he had access to official figures, and his statement
is not in agreement with the figures given by German submarine
officers.)
It is of interest to note here the rate of ship production attained by
some firms in the United States of America during the war.
As I mention later (_Vide_ Chapter vi, p. 157), the Bethlehem Steel
Company, under Mr. Schwab's guidance, produced ten submarines for us in
five months from the date of the order. Mr. Schwab himself informed me
that towards the end of the war he was turning out large destroyers in
six weeks. The Ford Company, as is well known, produced submarine
chasers of the "Eagle" type in even a shorter period, but these vessels
were of special design and construction.
I have dealt so far with the question of anti-submarine measures
involving only the use of destroyers and other small surface craft.
There were, of course, other methods both in use and under consideration
early in 1917 when we took stock of the situation.
For some time we had been using _Decoy vessels_, and with some success;
it was possible to increase the number of these ships at the cost of
taking merchant ships off the trade routes or by building. A very
considerable increase was arranged.
The use of our own _submarines_ offensively against enemy submarines had
also been tried, and had met with occasional success, but our numbers
were very limited (the total in December, 1916, fit for oversea or
anti-submarine work was about forty). They were much needed for
reconnaissance and offensive work against surface men-of-war in enemy
waters, and only a few were at the time available for anti-submarine
operations, and then only at the cost of other important services.
The _hydrophone_ had been in the experimental stage and under trial for
a considerable period, but it had not so far developed into an effective
instrument for locating submarines, and although trials of the different
patterns which had been devised were pushed forward with energy, many
months elapsed before it became a practicable proposition.
One of the best offensive measures against the enemy submarines, it was
realized, was the _mine_, if laid in sufficiently large numbers.
Unfortunately, in January, 1917, we did not possess a mine that was
satisfactory against submarines.
Our deficiency in this respect was clearly shown in the course of some
trials which I ordered, when one of our own submarines was run against a
number of our mines, with the result that only about 33 per cent. of the
mines (fitted, of course, only with small charges) exploded. The Germans
were well aware that our mines were not very effective against
submarines.
We possessed at the time mines of two patterns, and whilst proving
unsatisfactory against submarines, they were also found to be somewhat
unreliable when laid in minefields designed to catch surface vessels,
owing to a defect in the mooring apparatus. This defect was remedied,
but valuable time was lost whilst the necessary alterations were being
carried out, and although we possessed in April, 1917, a stock of some
20,000 mines, only 1,500 of them were then fit for laying. The position,
therefore, was that our mines were not a satisfactory anti-submarine
weapon.
A _new pattern mine_, which had been designed on the model of the German
mine during Sir Henry Jackson's term of office as First Sea Lord in
1916, was experimented with at the commencement of 1917, and as soon as
drawings could be prepared orders for upwards of 100,000 were placed in
anticipation of its success. There were some initial difficulties before
all the details were satisfactory, and, in spite of the greatest
pressure on manufacturers, it was not until November, 1917, that mines
of this pattern were being delivered in large numbers. The earliest
minefields laid in the Heligoland Bight in September and October, 1917,
with mines of the new pattern met with immediate success against enemy
submarines, as did the minefields composed of the same type of mine, the
laying of which commenced in November, 1917, in the Straits of Dover.
When it became possible to adopt the system of bringing merchant ships
in convoys through the submarine zone under the escort of a screen of
destroyers, this system became in itself, to a certain extent, an
offensive operation, since it necessarily forced the enemy submarines
desirous of obtaining results into positions in which they themselves
were open to violent attack by depth charges dropped by destroyers.
During the greater part of the year 1917, however, it was only possible
to supply destroyers with a small number of _depth charges_, which was
their principal anti-submarine weapon; as it became feasible to increase
largely the supply of these charges to destroyers, so the violence of
the attack on the submarines increased, and their losses became heavier.
The position then, as it existed in the early days of the year 1917, is
described in the foregoing remarks.
The _result_ measured in loss of shipping (British, Allied, and neutral)
from submarine and mine attack in the first half of the year was as
follows in gross tonnage:
January - 324,016
February - 500,573
March - 555,991
April - 870,359
May - 589,754
June - 675,154
Because of the time required for production, it was a sheer
impossibility to _put into effect_ any fresh devices that might be
adopted for dealing with submarine warfare for many months, and all that
could be done was to try new methods of approach to the coast and, as
the number of small craft suitable for escort duty increased, to extend
gradually the convoy system already in force to a certain extent for the
French coal trade and the Scandinavian trade.
In the chapters which follow the further steps which were taken to deal
with the problem, and the degree of success which attended them, will be
described.
CHAPTER III
ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
The previous chapters have dealt with the changes in organization
carried out at the Admiralty during the year 1917 largely with the
object of being able to deal more effectively with the submarine warfare
against merchant ships. Mention has also been made of the submarine
problem with which the Navy had to deal; particulars of the
anti-submarine and other work carried out will now be examined.
A very large proportion of the successful anti-submarine devices brought
into use during 1917, and continued throughout the year 1918, were the
outcome of the work of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff,
and it is but just that the high value of this work should be recognized
when the history of the war comes to be written by future historians. As
has been stated in Chapter I, Rear-Admiral A.C. Duff, C.B., was the
original head of the division, with Captain F.C. Dreyer, C.B., Commander
Yeats Brown, and Commander Reginald Henderson as his immediate
assistants. Captain H.T. Walwyn took the place of Captain Dreyer on
March 1, 1917, when the latter officer became Director of Naval
Ordnance. When Admiral Duff was appointed Assistant Chief of the Naval
Staff, with a seat on the Board, in May, 1917, Captain W.W. Fisher,
C.B., became head of the division, which still remained one of the
divisions of the Staff working immediately under the A.C.N.S. It is to
these officers, with their most zealous, clever and efficient staff,
that the institution of many of the successful anti-submarine measures
is largely due. They were indefatigable in their search for new methods
and in working out and perfecting fresh schemes, and they kept their
minds open to _new ideas_. They received much valuable assistance from
the great civilian scientists who gave such ready help during the war,
the function of the naval officers working with the scientists being to
see that the effort was being directed along practical lines. They were
also greatly indebted to Captain Ryan, R.N., for the exceedingly
valuable work carried out by him at the experimental establishment at
Hawkcraig. Many brilliant ideas were due to Captain Ryan's clever brain.
I doubt whether the debt due to Admiral Duff and Captain Fisher and
their staff for their great work can ever be thoroughly appreciated, but
it is certainly my duty to mention it here since I am better able to
speak of it than any other person. In saying this I do not wish to
detract in the least from the value of the part performed by those to
whose lot it fell to put the actual schemes into operation. Without
them, of course, nothing could have been accomplished.
When the Anti-Submarine Division started in December, 1916, the earlier
devices to which attention was devoted were:
(1) The design and manufacture of howitzers firing shell fitted to
explode some 40 to 60 feet under water with which to attack submarines
when submerged.
(2) The introduction of a more suitable projectile for use against
submarines than that supplied at the time to the guns of destroyers and
patrol craft.
(3) The improvement of and great increase in the supply of smoke
apparatus for the screening of merchant ships from submarines attacking
by gunfire.
(4) A great increase in the number of depth charges supplied to
destroyers and other small craft.
(5) The development of the hydrophone for anti-submarine work, both from
ships and from shore stations.
(6) The introduction of the "Otter" for the protection of merchant ships
against mines.
(7) A very great improvement in the rapidity of arming merchant ships
defensively.
(8) The extended and organized use of air craft for anti-submarine work.
(9) A great development of the special service or decoy ship.
(10) The introduction of a form of net protection for merchant ships
against torpedo fire.
Other devices followed, many of which were the outcome of work in other
Admiralty Departments, particularly the Departments of the Director of
Naval Ordnance and the Director of Torpedoes and Mines, working in
conjunction with the Anti-Submarine or the Operations Division of the
Naval Staff. Some of the new features were the development of
depth-charge throwers, the manufacture and use of fast coastal
motor-boats for anti-submarine work, the production of mines of an
improved type for use especially against submarines, very considerable
developments in the use of minefields, especially deep minefields,
including persistent mining in the Heligoland Bight and the laying of a
complete minefield at varying depths in the Straits of Dover; also,
after the United States entered the war, the laying of a very extensive
minefield right across the northern part of the North Sea. The provision
of "flares" for illuminating minefields at night, and a system of
submarine detection by the use of electrical apparatus were also matters
which were taken up and pressed forward during 1917. During the year the
system of dazzle painting for merchant ships was brought into general
use.
On the operational side of the Naval Staff the work of dealing with
enemy submarines before they passed out of the North Sea was taken in
hand by organized hunting operations by destroyers and other patrol
craft, and by the more extended use offensively of our own submarines,
as vessels became available.
Considerable developments were effected in the matter of the control of
mercantile traffic, and much was done to train the personnel of the
mercantile marine in matters relating to submarine warfare.
Taking these subjects in detail, it will be of interest to examine the
progress made during the year.
HOWITZERS
The _howitzer_ as a weapon for use against the submarine when submerged
was almost non-existent at the beginning of 1917, only thirty
bomb-throwers, on the lines of trench-mortars, being on order. By April
of that year designs for seven different kinds of bomb-throwers and
howitzers had been prepared and approved, and orders placed for 1,006
weapons, of which number the first 41 were due for delivery in May. By
the end of May the number of bomb-throwers and howitzers on order had
been increased to 2,056, of eight different patterns. Over 1,000 of
these weapons fired a bomb or shell carrying a burster exceeding 90 lbs.
in weight, and with a range varying between 1,200 and 2,600 yards. Later
in the war, as we gained experience of the value of this form of attack,
heavier bombs were introduced for use in the existing bomb-throwers and
howitzers. The howitzer as an anti-submarine weapon was handicapped by
the comparatively small weight of the bursting charge of its shell. This
applied more particularly to the earlier patterns, and to inflict fatal
injury it was necessary to burst the shell in close proximity to the
submerged submarine. This weapon, although not very popular at first,
soon, however, proved its value, when employed both from patrol craft
and from merchant ships.
One curious instance occurred on March 28, 1918, of a merchant ship
being saved by a 7.5-inch howitzer. A torpedo was seen approaching at a
distance of some 600 yards, and it appeared certain to hit the ship. A
projectile fired from the howitzer exploded under water close to the
torpedo, deflected it from its course, and caused it to come to the
surface some 60 yards from the ship; a second projectile caused it to
stop, and apparently damaged the torpedo, which when picked up by an
escorting vessel was found to be minus its head.
Delivery of howitzers commenced in June, 1917, and continued as follows:
Total completed,
No. of Howitzers including those
Date. actually issued. under proof.
July 24, 1917 35 48
October 1, 1917 92 167
December 10, 1917 377 422
The slow rate of delivery, in spite of constant pressure, which is shown
by these figures gives some idea of the time required to bring new
devices into existence.
PROJECTILE FOR USE AGAINST SUBMARINES
In January, 1917, the Director of Naval Ordnance was requested by the
Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff to carry out trials against a
target representing the hull of a German submarine, so far as the
details were known to us, to ascertain _the most suitable type of
projectile_ amongst those then in existence for the attack of submarines
by guns of 4.7-inch calibre and below.
The results were published to the Fleet in March, 1917. They afforded
some useful knowledge and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of some of
the shells and fuses commonly in use against submarines from 12-pounder
guns, the weapon with which so many of our patrol craft were armed. The
target at which the shell was fired did not, however, fully represent a
German submarine under the conditions of service. The trials were
therefore continued, and as a result, in June, 1917, a further order was
issued to the Fleet, giving directions as to the type of projectile to
be used against submarines from all natures of guns, pending the
introduction of delay action fuses for the smaller guns; this was the
temporary solution of the difficulty until a new type of shell evolved
from the experience gained at the trials could be produced and issued.
The trials, which were exhaustive, were pressed forward vigorously and
continuously throughout the year 1917, and meanwhile more accurate
information as to the exact form of the hull and the thickness of the
plating of German submarines became available. Early in 1918 the first
supplies of the new fuses were ready for issue.
SMOKE APPARATUS
The earlier _smoke apparatus_ for supply to merchant ships was designed
towards the end of 1916.
One description of smoke apparatus consisted of an arrangement for
burning phosphorus at the stern of a ship; in other cases firework
composition and other chemicals were used. A dense smoke cloud was thus
formed, and, with the wind in a suitable direction, a vessel could hide
her movements from an enemy submarine or other vessel, and thus screen
herself from accurate shell fire.
In another form the apparatus was thrown overboard and formed a smoke
cloud on the water.
The rate of supply of sets of the smoke apparatus to ships is shown by
the following figures:
April 1, 1917 - 1,372 sets
July 3, 1917 - 2,563 sets
October 5, 1917 - 3,445 sets
November 26, 1917 - 3,976 sets
DEPTH CHARGES
_Depth charges_, as supplied to ships in 1917, were of two patterns:
one, Type D, contained a charge of 300 lb. of T.N.T., and the other,
Type D*, carried 120 lb. of T.N.T. At the commencement of 1917 the
allowance to ships was two of Type D and two of Type D*, and the supply
was insufficient at that time to keep up the stock required to maintain
on board four per destroyer, the number for which they were fitted, or
to supply all trawlers and other patrol craft with their allowance. The
great value of the depth charge as a weapon against submarines, and the
large number that were required for successful attack, became apparent
early in 1917, and the allowance was increased. Difficulty was
experienced throughout the year in maintaining adequate stocks owing to
the shortage of labour and the many demands on our industries made by
the war, but the improvement is shown by the fact that while the average
output _per week_ of depth charges was only 140 in July, it had become
over 500 by October, and that by the end of December it was raised to
over 800, and was still increasing very rapidly. As a consequence, early
in 1918 it was found possible to increase the supply very largely, as
many as 30 to 40 per destroyer being carried.
Improvements in the details of depth charges were effected during 1917.
One such improvement was the introduction of a pistol capable of firing
at much greater depths than had been in use before. The result was that
all vessels, whether fast or slow, could safely use the 300-lb. depth
charge if set to a sufficient depth. This led to the abolition of the
Type D* charges and the universal supply of Type D.
In spite of the difficulties of dropping depth charges so close to
submarines as to damage them sufficiently to cause them to come to the
surface, very good results were obtained from their use when destroyers
carried enough to form, so to speak, a ring round the assumed position
at which the submarine had dived. In order to encourage scientific
attack on submarines, a system of depth charge "Battle Practice" was
introduced towards the end of 1917.
It is as well to correct a common misapprehension as to the value of
depth charges in destroying submarines.
Many people held very exaggerated ideas on this subject, even to the
extent of supposing that a depth charge would destroy a submarine if
dropped within several hundred yards of her. This is, unfortunately,
very far indeed from being the case; it is, on the contrary, necessary
to explode the charge near the submarine in order to effect destruction.
Taking the depth charge with 300 lb. weight of explosive, ordinarily
supplied to destroyers in 1917, it was necessary to explode it within
fourteen feet of a submarine to ensure destruction; at distances up to
about twenty-eight feet from the hull the depth charge might be expected
to disable a submarine to the extent of forcing her to the surface, when
she could be sunk by gun-fire or rammed, and at distances up to sixty
feet the moral effect on the crew would be considerable and _might_
force the submarine to the surface.
A consideration of these figures will show that it was necessary for a
vessel attacking a submarine with depth charges to drop them in very
close proximity, and the first obvious difficulty was to ascertain the
position of a submarine that had dived and was out of sight.
Unless, therefore, the attacking vessel was fairly close to the
submarine at the moment of the latter diving there was but little chance
of the attack being successful.
HYDROPHONES
The _Hydrophone_, for use in locating submerged submarines, although
first evolved in 1915, was in its infancy, so far as supply to ships was
concerned, at the commencement of 1917. Experiments were being carried
out by the Board of Invention and Research at Harwich, and by Captain
Ryan, R.N., at Hawkcraig, and although very useful results had been
obtained and a considerable number of shore stations as well as some
patrol vessels had been fitted with hydrophones, which had a listening
range of one or two miles, all the devices for use afloat suffered from
the disadvantage that it was not possible to use them whilst the ship
carrying them was moving, since the noise of the vessel's own machinery
and of the water passing along the side prevented the noise made by
other vessels being located. What was required was a listening
instrument that could be used by a ship moving at least at slow speed,
otherwise the ship carrying the hydrophone was herself, when stopped, an
easy target for the submarine's torpedo. It was also essential, before
an attack could be delivered, to be able to locate the _direction_ of
the enemy submarine, and prior to 1917 all that these instruments showed
was the presence of a submarine somewhere in the vicinity.
Much research and experimental work was carried out during the year 1917
under the encouragement and supervision of the Anti-Submarine Division
of the Naval Staff. Two hydrophones were invented in the early part of
1917, one by Captain Ryan, R.N., and one by the Board of Invention and
Research, which could be used from ships at very slow speed and which
gave some indication of the _direction_ of the sound; finally, in the
summer of 1917, the ability and patience of one inventor, Mr. Nash, were
rewarded, and an instrument was devised termed the "fish" hydrophone
which to a considerable extent fulfilled the required conditions. Mr.
Nash, whose invention had been considered but not adopted by the Board
of Invention and Research before he brought it to the Anti-Submarine
Division of the Naval Staff, laboured under many difficulties with the
greatest energy and perseverance; various modifications in the design
were effected until, in October, 1917, the instrument was pronounced
satisfactory and supplies were put in hand.
The next step was to fit the "fish" hydrophone in certain auxiliary
patrol vessels as well as some destroyers, "P" boats and motor launches,
to enter and train men to work it, and finally to organize these vessels
into "submarine hunting flotillas," drill them, and then set them to
their task.
This work, which occupied some time, was carried out at Portland, where
a regular establishment was set up for developing the "fish" hydrophone
and for organizing and training the "hunting flotillas" in its use. A
considerable amount of training in the use of the hydrophone was
required before men became efficient, and only those with a very keen
sense of hearing were suited to the work. The chances of the success of
the hunting flotillas had been promising in the early experiments, and
the fitting out of patrol craft and organizing and drilling them,
proceeded as rapidly as the vessels could be obtained, but largely owing
to the slow production of trawlers it was not until November that the
first hunting flotilla fitted with the "fish" hydrophone was actually at
work. The progress made after this date is illustrated by the fact that
in December, 1917, a division of drifters, with a "P" boat, fitted with
this "fish" hydrophone hunted an enemy submarine for seven hours during
darkness, covering a distance of fifty miles, kept touch with her by
sound throughout this period, and finished by dropping depth charges in
apparently the correct position, since a strong smell of oil fuel
resulted and nothing further could be heard of the submarine, although
the drifters listened for several hours. On another occasion in the same
month a division of drifters hunted a submarine for five hours. The
number of hydrophones was increased as rapidly as possible until by the
end of the year the system was in full operation within a limited area,
and only required expansion to work, as was intended, on a large scale
in the North Sea and the English Channel.
Meanwhile during 1917 _directional_ hydrophones, which had been
successfully produced both by Captain Ryan and by the Board of Invention
and Research, had been fitted to patrol craft in large numbers, and
"hunting flotillas" were operating in many areas. A good example of the
working of one of these flotillas occurred off Dartmouth in the summer
of 1918, when a division of motor launches fitted with the Mark II
hydrophone, under the general guidance of a destroyer, carried out a
successful attack on a German submarine. Early in the afternoon one of
the motor launches dropped a depth charge on an oil patch, and shortly
afterwards one of the hydrophones picked up the sound of an internal
combustion engine; a line of depth charges was run on the bearing
indicated by the hydrophone. The motor launches and the destroyer
remained listening, until at about 6.0 P.M. a submarine came to the
surface not far from Motor Launch No. 135, which fired two rounds at the
submarine before the latter submerged. Other motor launches closed in,
and depth charges were dropped by them in close proximity to the wash of
the submarine. Oil came to the surface, and more depth charges were
dropped in large numbers on the spot for the ensuing forty-eight hours.
Eventually objects came to the surface clearly indicating the presence
of a submarine. Further charges were dropped, and an obstruction on the
bottom was located by means of a sweep. This engagement held peculiar
interest for me, since during my visit to Canada in the winter of 1919
the honour fell to me of presenting to a Canadian--Lieutenant G.L.
Cassady, R.N.V.R.--at Vancouver the Distinguished Service Cross awarded
him by His Majesty for his work in Motor Launch No. 135 on this
occasion.
_Motor Launches_ were organized into submarine hunting flotillas during
the year 1917. These vessels were equipped with the directional
hydrophone as soon as its utility was established, and were supplied
with depth charges. In the summer of 1917 four such hunting flotillas
were busy in the Channel; the work of one of these I have described
already, and they certainly contributed towards making the Channel an
uneasy place for submarine operations.
These results were, of course, greatly improved on in 1918, as the
numbers of ships fitted with the "fish" and other hydrophones increased
and further experience was gained.
The progress in supply of hydrophones is shown by the following table:
Supply of Directional
Date General Service Mark I and Shark Fin Fish
1917. Portable Type. Mark II. Type. Type.
Jul 31 2,750 500 - -
Aug 31 2,750 700 - -
Sep 30 2,750 850 - -
Oct 31 3,500 1,000 - -
Dec 31 3,680 1,950 870 37
HYDROPHONE STATIONS AND TRAINING SCHOOLS
At the beginning of 1917 four _shore hydrophone stations_ were in use.
During the year eight additional stations were completed and several
more were nearing completion. The first step necessary was a
considerable increase in the instructional facilities for training
listeners both for the increased number of shore stations and for the
large number of vessels that were fitted for hydrophone work during the
year.
The greater part of this training took place at the establishment at
Hawkcraig, near Rosyth, at which Captain Ryan, R.N., carried out so much
exceedingly valuable work during the war. I am not able to give exact
figures of the number of officers and men who were instructed in
hydrophone work either at Hawkcraig or at other stations by instructors
sent from Hawkcraig, but the total was certainly upwards of 1,000
officers and 2,000 men. In addition to this extensive instructional work
the development of the whole system of detecting the presence of
submarines by sound is very largely due to the work originally carried
out at Hawkcraig by Captain Ryan.
The first hydrophone station which was established in the spring of 1915
was from Oxcars Lighthouse in the Firth of Forth; it was later in the
year transferred to Inchcolm. Experimental work under Captain Ryan
continued at Hawkcraig during 1915, and in 1916 a section of the Board
of Invention and Research went to Hawkcraig to work in conjunction with
him. This station produced the Mark II directional hydrophone of which
large numbers were ordered in 1917 for use in patrol craft. It was a
great improvement on any hydrophone instrument previously in use.
Hawkcraig also produced the directional plates fitted to our submarines,
as well as many other inventions used in detecting the presence of
submarines.
In addition to the work at Hawkcraig an experimental station under the
Board of Invention and Research was established near Harwich in January,
1917. The Mark I directional hydrophone was designed at this
establishment in 1917, and other exceedingly valuable work was carried
out there connected with the detection of submarines.
At Malta an experimental station, with a hydrophone training school, was
started in the autumn of 1917, and good work was done both there and at
a hydrophone station established to the southward of Otranto at about
the same time, as well as at a hydrophone training school started at
Gallipoli at the end of the year.
"OTTERS" AND PARAVANES
_The "Otter" system_ of defence of merchant ships against mines was
devised by Lieutenant Dennis Burney, D.S.O., R.N. (a son of Admiral Sir
Cecil Burney), and was on similar lines to his valuable invention for
the protection of warships. The latter system had been introduced into
the Grand Fleet in 1916, although for a long period considerable
opposition existed against its general adoption, partly on account of
the difficulties experienced in its early days of development, and
partly owing to the extensive outlay involved in fitting all ships.
However, this opposition was eventually overcome, and before the end of
the war the system had very amply justified itself by saving a large
number of warships from destruction by mines. It was computed that there
were at least fifty cases during the war in which paravanes fitted to
warships had cut the moorings of mines, thus possibly saving the ships.
It must also be borne in mind that the cutting of the moorings of a mine
and the bringing of it to the surface may disclose the presence of an
hitherto unknown minefield, and thus save other ships.
Similarly, the "Otter" defence in its early stages was not introduced
without opposition, but again all difficulties were overcome, and the
rate of progress in its use is shown in the following statement giving
the number of British merchant ships fitted with it at different periods
of 1917:
By July 1, 95 ships had been fitted.
By September 1, 294 ships had been fitted.
By December 1, 900 ships had been fitted.
The system was also extended to foreign merchant ships, and supplies of
"Otters" were sent abroad for this purpose.
A considerable number of merchant ships were known to have been saved
from destruction by mine by the use of this system.
DEFENSIVE ARMING OF MERCHANT SHIPS
The _defensive arming_ of merchant ships was a matter which was pressed
forward with great energy and rapidity during the year 1917. The matter
was taken up with the Cabinet immediately on the formation of the Board
of Admiralty presided over by Sir Edward Carson, and arrangements made
for obtaining a considerable number of guns from the War Office, from
Japan, and from France, besides surrendering some guns from the
secondary and anti-torpedo boat armament of our own men-of-war,
principally those of the older type, pending the manufacture of large
numbers of guns for the purpose. Orders for some 4,200 guns were placed
by Captain Dreyer, the Director of Naval Ordnance, with our own gun
makers in March, April and May, 1917, in addition to nearly 3,000 guns
already on order for this purpose; 400 90-m.m. guns were obtained from
France, the mountings being made in England. Special arrangements were
also made by Captain Dreyer for the rapid manufacture of all guns,
including the provision of the material and of extra manufacturing
plant.
These orders for 4,200 guns and the orders for 2,026 howitzers placed at
the same time brought the total number of guns and howitzers under
manufacture in England for naval and merchant service purposes in May,
1917, up to the high figure of 10,761.
At the end of the year 1916 the total number of merchant ships that had
been armed since the commencement of the war (excluding those which were
working under the White Ensign and which had received _offensive_
armaments) was 1,420. Of this number, 83 had been lost.
During the first six months of 1917 armaments were provided for an
additional 1,581 ships, and during the last six months of that year a
further total of 1,406 ships were provided with guns, an aggregate
number of 2,987 ships being thus furnished with armaments during the
year. This total was exclusive of howitzers.
The progress of the work is shown by the following figures:
Number or guns that had been
Date. provided for British Merchant
Ships excluding Howitzers.
January 1, 1917 1,420
April 1, 1917 2,181
July 1, 1917 3,001
October 1, 1917 3,763
January 1, 1918 4,407
The figures given include the guns mounted in ships that were lost
through enemy action or from marine risks.
It should be stated that the large majority of the guns manufactured
during 1917 were 12-pounders or larger guns, as experience had shown
that smaller weapons were usually outranged by those carried in
submarines, and the projectiles of even the 12-pounder were smaller than
was desirable. Of the 2,987 new guns mounted in merchant ships during
the year 1917 only 190 were smaller than 12-pounders.
AIRCRAFT FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE WORK
_Anti-submarine work by aircraft_ was already in operation round our
coasts by the beginning of 1917, and during the year the increase in
numbers and improvement in types of machines rendered possible
considerable expansion of the work. Closer co-operation between surface
vessels and aircraft was also secured, and as the convoy system was
extended aircraft were used both for escort and observation work, as
well as for attack on submarines. For actual escort work airships were
superior to heavier-than-air machines owing to their greater radius of
action, whilst for offensive work against a submarine that had been
sighted the high speed of the seaplane or aeroplane was of great value.
In 1916 and the early part of 1917 we were but ill provided with
aircraft suitable for anti-submarine operations at any considerable
distance from the coast, and such aircraft as we possessed did not carry
sufficiently powerful bombs to be very effective in attacking
submarines, although they were of use in forcing these vessels to
submerge and occasionally in bringing our surface craft to the spot to
press home the attack.
The Royal Naval Air Service, under Commodore Godfrey Paine, devoted much
energy to the provision of suitable aircraft, and the anti-submarine
side of the Naval Staff co-operated in the matter of their organization;
with the advent of the large "America" type of seaplane and the
Handley-Page type of aeroplane, both of which carried heavy bombs,
successful attacks on enemy submarines became more frequent. They were
assisted by the airships, particularly those of the larger type.
Improvements which were effected in signalling arrangements between
ships and aircraft were instrumental in adding greatly to their
efficiency, and by the early summer of 1917 aircraft had commenced to
play an important part in the war against submarines and in the
protection of trade.
Thereafter progress became rapid, as the following figures show:
In June, 1917, aeroplanes and seaplanes patrolling for anti-submarine
operations covered 75,000 miles, sighted 17 submarines, and were able to
attack 7 of them.
In September, 1917, the distance covered by anti-submarine patrols of
aeroplanes and seaplanes was 91,000 miles, 25 submarines were sighted,
of which 18 were attacked.
In the four weeks ending December 8, 1917, in spite of the much shorter
days and the far less favourable flying weather experienced, the mileage
covered was again 91,000 miles; 17 submarines were sighted, of which 11
were attacked during this period.
As regards airships the figures again show the increased anti-submarine
work carried out:
In June, 1917, airships engaged in anti-submarine patrol covered 53,000
miles, sighted and attacked 1 submarine.
In September, 1917, they covered 83,000 miles, and sighted 8 submarines,
of which 5 were attacked.
In the four weeks ending December 8, 1917, they covered 50,000 miles,
sighted 6 submarines, and attacked 5 of them.
The airships were more affected by short days, and particularly by bad
weather, than the heavier than air craft, and the fact that they covered
practically the same mileage in the winter days of December as in the
summer days of June shows clearly the development that took place in the
interval.
During the whole of 1917 it was estimated that our heavier than air
craft sighted 135 submarines and attacked 85 of them, and our lighter
than air craft sighted 26 and attacked 15. The figures given in Chapter
IX of the number of submarines sunk during the war by aircraft (viz. 7
as a minimum), when compared with the number of attacks during 1917
alone suggest the difficulties of successful attack.
In September, 1917, as extensive a programme as was consistent with
manufacturing capabilities, in view of the enormous demands of the Army,
was drawn up by the Naval Staff for the development of aircraft for
anti-submarine operations during 1918.
The main developments were in machines of the large "America" type and
heavy bombing machines for attacking enemy bases, as well as other
anti-submarine machines and aircraft for use with the Grand Fleet.
Included in the anti-submarine operations of aircraft during 1917 were
the bombing attacks on Bruges, since the German submarines and the
shelters in which they took refuge were part of the objective.
These attacks were carried out from the aerodrome established by the
Royal Naval Air Service at Dunkirk. During 1917 the Naval Air Forces of
the Dover Command, which included the squadrons at Dunkirk, were under
the command of Captain C.L. Lambe, R.N., and the operations of this
force were of a very strenuous character and of the utmost value.
Bombing operations prior to the year of 1917 had been carried out by
various types of machines, but the introduction of the Handley-Page
aeroplanes in the spring of 1917 enabled a much greater weight of
bombs--viz. some 1,500 lbs.--to be carried than had hitherto been
possible. These machines were generally used for night bombing, and the
weight of bombs dropped on the enemy bases in Belgium rose with great
rapidity as machines of the Handley-Page type were delivered, as did the
number of nights on which attacks were made. It was no uncommon
occurrence during the autumn of 1917 for six to eight tons of bombs to
be dropped in one night. I have not the figures for 1918, but feel no
doubt that with the great increase in aircraft that became possible
during that year this performance was constantly exceeded.
SPECIAL SERVICE OR DECOY SHIPS
The story of the work of these vessels constitutes a record of
gallantry, endurance and discipline which has never been surpassed
afloat or ashore. The earliest vessels were fitted out during the year
1915 at Scapa, Rosyth, Queenstown and other ports, and from the very
first it was apparent that they would win for themselves a place in
history. The earliest success against an enemy submarine by one of these
vessels was achieved by the _Prince Charles_, fitted out at Scapa, and
commanded by Lieutenant Mark-Wardlaw, an officer on the Staff of Admiral
Sir Stanley Colville, then Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands.
In the early months of 1917 it was decided to augment greatly the force
of these special service vessels, and steps were taken to organize a
separate Admiralty Department for the work. Special experience was
needed, both for the selection of suitable ships and for fitting them
out, and care was taken to select officers who had been personally
connected with the work during the war; the advice of successful
commanders of decoy ships was also utilized. At the head was Captain
Alexander Farrington, under whose directions several ships had been
fitted out at Scapa with great ingenuity and success. Every class of
ship was brought into the service: steam cargo vessels, trawlers,
drifters, sailing ships, ketches, and sloops specially designed to have
the appearance of cargo ships. These latter vessels were known as
"convoy sloops" to distinguish them from the ordinary sloop. Their
design, which was very clever, had been prepared in 1916 by Sir Eustace
T. D'Eyncourt, the Director of Naval Construction. The enemy submarine
commanders, however, became so wary owing to the successes of decoy
ships that they would not come to the surface until they had inspected
ships very closely in the submerged condition, and the fine lines of the
convoy sloops gave them away under close inspection.
In the early spring of 1917 the Director of Naval Construction was asked
whether the "P" class of patrol boats then under construction could be
altered to work as decoy vessels, as owing to their light draught they
would be almost immune from torpedo attack.
A very good design was produced, and some of the later patrol boats were
converted and called "P Q's." These vessels had the appearance of small
merchant ships at a cursory glance. They would not, however, stand close
examination owing, again, to their fine lines, but being better sea
boats than the "P's," by reason of their greater freeboard, the design
was continued, and they met with considerable success against submarines
(especially in the Irish Sea) by ramming and depth charge tactics, the
submarines when submerged probably not realizing when observing the "P
Q.'s" through a periscope the speed of which they were capable.
During 1917, when the unrestricted submarine warfare was in progress,
many of the decoy vessels were fitted with torpedo tubes, either above
water or submerged, since, as the submarine commanders became more wary,
they showed great dislike to coming to the surface sufficiently close to
merchant ships to admit of the gun armament being used with certainty of
success. A torpedo, on the other hand, could, of course, be used
effectively against a submarine whilst still submerged. The use also
became general of casks or cargoes of wood to give additional flotation
to decoy ships after being torpedoed, so as to prolong their life in
case the submarine should close near enough to allow of effective
gunfire.
Another ruse adopted was that of changing the disguise of a decoy ship
during the night, so that she could not be identified by a submarine
which had previously made an attack upon her. In all cases of disguise
or of changing disguise it was essential that the decoy ship should
assume the identity of some class of vessel likely to be met with in the
particular area in which she was working, and obviously the courses
steered were chosen with that object in view.
Again, since for success it was essential to induce the submarine to
come within close range so that the decoy ship's gunfire should be
immediately effective, it was necessary that her disguise should stand
the closest possible examination through the periscope of a submarine.
German submarine commanders, after a short experience of decoy ships,
were most careful not to bring their vessels to the surface in proximity
to craft that were apparently merchant ships until they had subjected
them to the sharpest scrutiny at short range through the periscope, and
the usual practice of an experienced submarine commander was to steer
round the ship, keeping submerged all the time.
Not only was it essential that there should be no sign of an armament in
the decoy ship, or a man-of-war-like appearance in any respect, but when
the "panic" signal was made to lead the submarine commander to think
that his attack had succeeded, precautions had to be taken against the
presence of more than the ordinary number of men in the boats lowered
and sent away with the supposed whole ship's company; also the sight of
any men left on board would at once betray the real character of the
decoy ship and result in the disappearance of the submarine and the
probable sinking of the disguised craft by torpedo fire.
During the late summer of 1917 it became evident that the submarine
commanders had become so suspicious of decoy craft that the chances of
success by the larger cargo vessels were not sufficient to justify any
further addition to existing numbers in view of the increasing shortage
of shipping; a considerable fleet of steamers building for this purpose
was therefore diverted to trade purposes. The number of smaller vessels,
particularly sailing craft, was, however, increased especially in
Mediterranean waters where they had not been previously operating on an
extensive scale.
It is impossible to close these remarks on this class of vessel without
testifying once more to the splendid gallantry, self-sacrifice, skilful
resource and magnificent discipline shown by those on board. This is
illustrated by descriptions of a few typical actions fought during 1917.
The first which I relate took place on February 17, 1917, when a decoy
vessel, a steamship armed with five 12-pounder guns, commanded by that
most gallant officer, Captain Gordon Campbell, R.N., was torpedoed by a
submarine in a position Lat. 51.34 N., Long. 11.23 W.
Captain Campbell saw the torpedo coming and manoeuvred to try and avoid
being hit in the engine-room, but as he purposely always selected a very
slow ship for decoy work his attempt was only partially successful and
the engine-room began to fill. No signal for assistance was made,
however, as Captain Campbell feared that such a signal might bring
another vessel on the scene and this would naturally scare the submarine
away. The usual procedure of abandoning the ship in the boats with every
appearance of haste was carried out, only sufficient hands remaining
hidden on board to work the guns. The periscope of the submarine was
next sighted on the quarter within 200 or 300 yards, and she came slowly
past the ship still submerged and evidently examining the vessel closely
through the periscope. She passed within a few yards of the ship, then
crossed the bow and came to the surface about 200 yards off and passed
down the port side again close to. Captain Campbell waited until every
gun would bear before giving the signal for "action." The decoy ship's
true character was then revealed; concealed gunports were thrown open;
colours were hoisted, and a hot fire opened from all guns. The submarine
was hit at once and continued to be hit so rapidly that it was evidently
impossible for her to submerge. She sank in a very short time. One
officer and one man were picked up. A signal was then made for
assistance and help arrived within a couple of hours. The decoy ship was
rapidly filling, but efforts were made to tow her into port, and with
the greatest difficulty, and entirely owing to the splendid manner in
which all hands stuck to the work, she was brought into Berehaven with
her stern under water thirty-six hours later and beached. The great
restraint shown by Captain Campbell, in withholding fire as the
submarine passed her in a submerged condition, and the truly wonderful
discipline and steadiness and ingenuity which baffled so close an
examination of the ship were the outstanding features of this great
exploit.
On April 22, 1917, a decoy ship known as "Q22," a small sailing vessel
with auxiliary power, armed with two 12-pounder guns, and commanded by
Lieutenant Irvine, R.N.R., while in a position about fifty miles south
of Kinsale Head, sighted a submarine on the surface which opened fire
immediately at a range of about 4,000 yards. The fire was accurate and
the decoy ship was hit frequently, two men being killed and four wounded
in a few minutes and the vessel considerably damaged. As further
concealment appeared useless the guns were then unmasked and the fire
returned with apparently good results, several hits being claimed. The
enemy's fire then fell off in accuracy and she increased the range, and
after about one and a half hours' fighting the light became too bad to
continue the action. It was thought that the submarine was sunk, but
there was no positive evidence of sinking.
On April 30, 1917, a decoy ship--H.M.S. _Prize_--a small schooner with
auxiliary power, armed with two 12-pounder guns and commanded by
Lieutenant W.E. Sanders, R.N.R., a New Zealand officer, sighted, when in
position Lat. 49.44 N., Long. 11.42 W., a submarine about two miles away
on the port beam at 8.30 P.M. At 8.45 P.M. the submarine opened fire on
the _Prize_ and the "abandon ship" party left in a small boat. The
submarine gradually approached, continuing to pour in a heavy fire and
making two hits on the _Prize_ which put the motor out of action,
wrecked the wireless office, and caused much internal damage besides
letting a great deal of water into the ship.
The crew of the _Prize_ remained quietly hidden at their concealed guns
throughout this punishment, which continued for forty minutes as the
submarine closed, coming up from right astern, a position no doubt which
she considered one of safety. When close to she sheered off and passed
to the port beam at a distance of about one hundred yards. At this
moment Lieutenant Sanders gave the order for "action." The guns were
exposed and a devastating fire opened at point blank range, but not
before the submarine had fired both her guns, obtaining two more hits,
and wounding several of the crew of the _Prize_. The first shell fired
from the _Prize_ hit the foremost gun of the submarine and blew it
overboard, and a later shot knocked away the conning tower. The
submarine went ahead and the _Prize_ tried to follow, but the damage to
her motor prevented much movement. The firing continued as the submarine
moved away, and after an interval she appeared to be on fire and to
sink. This occurred shortly after 9.0 P.M., when it was nearly dark. The
_Prize_ sent her boats to pick up survivors, three being taken out of
the water, including the commander and one other officer. The prisoners
on coming on board expressed their willingness to assist in taking the
_Prize_ into port. It did not at this time seem likely that she would
long remain afloat, but by great exertion and good seamanship the leaks
were got under to a sufficient extent to allow of the ship being kept
afloat by pumping. The prisoners gave considerable help, especially when
the ship caught fire whilst starting the motor again. On May 2 she met a
motor launch off the coast of Ireland and was towed into port. In spite
of the undoubted great damage to the submarine, damage confirmed by the
survivors, who were apparently blown overboard with the conning tower,
and who had no thought other than that she had been sunk, later
intelligence showed that she succeeded in reaching Germany in a very
disabled condition. This incident accentuated still further the
recurrent difficulty of making definite statements as to the fate of
enemy submarines, for the evidence in this case seemed absolutely
conclusive. The commander of the submarine was so impressed with the
conduct of the crew of the _Prize_ that when examined subsequently in
London he stated that he did not consider it any disgrace to have been
beaten by her, as he could not have believed it possible for any ship's
company belonging to any nation in the world to have been imbued with
such discipline as to stand the shelling to which he subjected the
_Prize_ without any sign being made which would give away her true
character.
Lieut.-Commander Sanders was awarded the Victoria Cross for his action
and many decorations were given to the officers and ship's company for
their conduct in the action. It was sad that so fine a commander and so
splendid a ship's company should have been lost a little later in action
with another submarine which she engaged unsuccessfully during daylight,
and which followed her in a submerged condition until nightfall and then
torpedoed her, all hands being lost.
It was my privilege during my visit to New Zealand in 1919 to unveil a
memorial to the gallant Sanders which was placed in his old school at
Takapuna, near Auckland.
On June 7, 1917, a decoy ship, the S.S. _Pargust_, armed with one 4-inch
gun, four 12-pounder guns and two torpedo tubes, commanded by Captain
Gordon Campbell, R.N., who had meanwhile been awarded the Victoria
Cross, was in a position Lat. 51.50 N., Long. 11.50 W., when a torpedo
hit the ship abreast the engine-room and in detonating made a hole
through which water poured, filling both engine-room and boiler-room.
The explosion of the torpedo also blew one of the boats to pieces. The
usual procedure of abandoning ship was carried out, and shortly after
the boats had left, the periscope of a submarine was sighted steering
for the port side. The submarine passed close under the stern, steered
to the starboard side, then recrossed the stern to the port side, and
when she was some fifty yards off on the port beam her conning tower
appeared on the surface and she steered to pass round the stern again
and towards one of the ship's boats on the starboard beam. She then came
completely to the surface within one hundred yards, and Captain Campbell
disclosed his true character, opened fire with all guns, hitting the
submarine at once and continuing to hit her until she sank. One officer
and one man were saved. The decoy ship lost one man killed, and one
officer was wounded by the explosion of the torpedo.
As in the case of the action on February 17 the distinguishing feature
of this exploit was the great restraint shown by Captain Campbell in
withholding his fire although his ship was so seriously damaged. The
gallantry and fine discipline of the ship's company, their good shooting
and splendid drill, contributed largely to the success. The decoy ship,
although seriously damaged, reached harbour.
On July 10, 1917, a decoy ship, H.M.S. _Glen_, a small schooner with
auxiliary power and armed with one 12-pounder and one 6-pounder gun,
commanded by Sub-Lieutenant K. Morris, R.N.R., was in a position about
forty miles south-west of Weymouth when a submarine was sighted on the
surface some three miles away. She closed to within two miles and opened
fire on the _Glen_. The usual practice of abandoning ship was followed,
the submarine closing during this operation to within half a mile and
remaining at that distance examining the _Glen_ for some time. After
about half an hour she went ahead and submerged, and then passed round
the ship at about 200 yards distance, examining her through the
periscope, finally coming to the surface about 50 yards off on the port
quarter. Almost immediately she again started to submerge, and fire was
at once opened. The submarine was hit three or four times before she
turned over on her side and disappeared. There was every reason to
believe that she had sunk, although no one was on deck when she
disappeared. No survivors were rescued.
The feature of this action was again the restraint shown by the
commanding officer of the _Glen_ and the excellent discipline of the
crew.
On August 8, 1917, the decoy ship H.M.S. _Dunraven_, in Lat. 48.0 N.,
Long. 7.37 W., armed with one 4-inch and four 12-pounder guns and two
torpedo tubes, commanded by Captain Gordon Campbell, V.C., R.N., sighted
a submarine on the surface some distance off. The submarine steered
towards the ship and submerged, and soon afterwards came to the surface
some two miles off and opened fire. The _Dunraven_, in her character of
a merchant ship, replied with an after gun, firing intentionally short,
made a smoke screen, and reduced speed slightly to allow the submarine
to close.
When the shells from the submarine began to fall close to the ship the
order to abandon her was given, and, as usual with the splendidly
trained ship's company working under Captain Campbell, the operation was
carried out with every appearance of disorder, one of the boats being
purposely left hanging vertical with only one end lowered. Meanwhile the
submarine closed. Several shells from her gun hit the after part of the
_Dunraven_, causing a depth charge to explode and setting her on fire
aft, blowing the officer in charge of the after gun out of his control
station, and wounding severely the seaman stationed at the depth
charges. The situation now was that the submarine was passing from the
port to the starboard quarter, and at any moment the 4-inch magazine and
the remaining depth charges in the after part of the _Dunraven_ might be
expected to explode. The 4-inch gun's crew aft knew the imminence of
this danger, but not a man moved although the deck beneath them was
rapidly becoming red hot; and Captain Campbell was so certain of the
magnificent discipline and gallantry of his crew that he still held on
so that the submarine might come clearly into view on the starboard side
clear of the smoke of the fire aft. In a few minutes the anticipated
explosion occurred. The 4-inch gun and gun's crew were blown into the
air just too soon for the submarine to be in the best position for being
engaged. The explosion itself caused the electrical apparatus to make
the "open fire" signal, whereupon the White Ensign was hoisted and the
only gun bearing commenced firing; but the submarine submerged at once.
Fifteen minutes later a torpedo hit the ship, and Captain Campbell again
ordered "abandon ship" and sent away a second party of men to give the
impression that the ship had now been finally abandoned although her
true character had been revealed. Meanwhile he had made a wireless
signal to other ships to keep away as he still hoped to get the
submarine, which, now keeping submerged, moved round the ship for three
quarters of an hour, during which period the fire gained on the
_Dunraven_ and frequent explosions of ammunition took place.
The submarine then came to the surface right astern where no guns could
bear on her, and recommenced her shellfire on the ship, hitting her
frequently. During this period the officers and men still remaining on
board gave no sign of their presence, Captain Campbell, by his example,
imbuing this remnant of his splendid ship's company with his own
indomitable spirit of endurance. The submarine submerged again soon
afterwards, and as she passed the ship Captain Campbell from his
submerged tube fired a torpedo at her, which just missed. Probably the
range was too short to allow the torpedo to gain its correct depth. She
went right round the ship, and a second torpedo was fired from the other
tube, which again missed. This torpedo was evidently seen from the
submarine, as she submerged at once. The ship was sinking, and it was
obviously of no use to continue the deception, which could only lead to
a useless sacrifice of life; wireless signals for assistance were
therefore made, and the arrival of some destroyers brought the action to
a conclusion. The wounded were transferred to the destroyers and the
ship taken in tow, but she sank whilst in tow forty-eight hours later.
This action was perhaps the finest feat amongst the very many gallant
deeds performed by decoy ships during the war. It displayed to the full
the qualities of grim determination, gallantry, patience and resource,
the splendid training and high standard of discipline, which were
necessary to success in this form of warfare. Lieutenant Charles G.
Bonner, R.N.R., and Petty-Officer Ernest Pitcher, R.N., were awarded the
V.C. for their services in this action, and many medals for conspicuous
gallantry were also given to the splendid ship's company.
Captain Campbell, as will be readily realized, met with great success in
his work, and he was the first to acknowledge how this success was due
to those who worked so magnificently under his command, and he also
realized the magnitude of the work performed by other decoy ships in all
areas, since he knew better than most people the difficulties of
enticing a submarine to her doom.
On September 17, 1917, in position Lat. 49.42 N., Long. 13.18 W., the
decoy ship _Stonecrop_, a small steamer commanded by Commander M.
Blackwood, R.N., armed with one 4-inch, one 6-pounder gun and some
stick-bomb throwers and carrying four torpedo tubes, sighted a
submarine, which opened fire on her at long range, the fire being
returned by the 6-pounder mounted aft. After the shelling had continued
for some time the usual order was given to "abandon ship," and a little
later the periscope of the submarine was sighted some distance away. The
submarine gradually closed, keeping submerged, until within about a
quarter of a mile, when she passed slowly round the ship, and finally
came to the surface at a distance of about 500 yards on the starboard
quarter. She did not close nearer, so the order was given to open fire,
and hitting started after the third round had been fired and continued
until the submarine sank stern first. No survivors were picked up, but
all the indications pointed to the certainty of the destruction of the
submarine.
PATROL GUNBOATS
Mention may here be made of another vessel of a special class designed
in 1917. In the early summer, in consequence of the shortage of
destroyers, of the delays in the production of new ones, and the great
need for more small craft suitable for escorting merchant ships through
the submarine zone, arrangements were made to build a larger and faster
class of trawler which would be suitable for convoy work under
favourable conditions, and which to a certain extent would take the
place of destroyers. Trawlers could be built with much greater rapidity
than destroyers, and trawler builders who could not build destroyers
could be employed for the work, thus supplementing the activities of the
yards which could turn out the bigger craft.
Accordingly a 13-knot trawler was designed, and a large number ordered.
Great delays occurred, however, in their construction, as in that of all
other classes of vessel owing to the pressure of various kinds of war
work and other causes, and only one was delivered during 1917 instead of
the twenty or so which had been promised, whilst I believe that by July,
1918, not more than fourteen had been completed instead of the
anticipated number of forty. I was informed that they proved to be a
most useful type of vessel for the slower convoys, were excellent sea
boats, with a large radius of action, were a great relief to the
destroyers, and even to light cruisers, for convoy work. It is
understood that some fifty were completed by the end of the war.
NET PROTECTION FOR MERCHANT SHIPS
This idea originated in 1915 or 1916 with Captain Edward C. Villiers, of
the _Actaeon_ Torpedo School ship. Experiments were carried out by a
battleship at Rosyth, in the first instance, and later at Scapa. They
were at that time unsuccessful.
At the end of 1916 I gave directions for a reconsideration of the
matter, and fresh trials were made; but early in 1917 there seemed to be
no prospect of success, and the trials were again abandoned. However,
Captain Villiers displayed great confidence in the idea, and he
introduced modifications, with the result that later in the year 1917
directions were given for fresh trials to be undertaken. At the end of
the year success was first obtained, and this was confirmed early in
1918, and the device finally adopted. A curious experience during the
trials was that the vessel carrying them out was actually fired at by a
German submarine, with the result that the net protection saved the ship
from being torpedoed. It is not often that an inventor receives such a
good advertisement.
DEPTH CHARGE THROWERS
The first proposal for this device came from Portsmouth, where the
Commander-in-Chief, Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville, was
indefatigable in his efforts to combat the submarine; throwers
manufactured by Messrs. Thornycroft, of Southampton, were tried and gave
good results. The arrangement was one by which depth charges could be
projected to a distance of 40 yards from a vessel, and the throwers were
usually fitted one on each quarter so that the charges could be thrown
out on the quarter whilst others were being dropped over the stern, and
the chances of damaging or sinking the submarine attacked were thus
greatly increased.
As soon as the earliest machines had been tried orders were placed for
large numbers and the supplies obtained were as follows:
Deliveries commenced in July, 1917.
By September 1, 30 had been delivered.
By October 1, 97 had been delivered.
By December 1, 238 had been delivered.
COASTAL MOTOR BOATS
At the end of 1916 we possessed 13 fast coastal motor boats, carrying
torpedoes, and having a speed of some 36 knots. They had been built to
carry out certain operations in the Heligoland Bight, working from
Harwich, but the preliminary air reconnaissance which it had been
decided was necessary had not been effected by the end of 1916 owing to
bad weather and the lack of suitable machines.
When winter set in it became impossible, with the type of aircraft then
existing, to carry out the intended reconnaissance, and early in 1917 I
abandoned the idea of the operations for the winter and sent the boats
to the Dover Command for Sir R. Bacon to use from Dunkirk in operations
against enemy vessels operating from Ostend and Zeebrugge. They quickly
proved their value, and it became evident that they would also be useful
for anti-submarine work. A large number were ordered, some for
anti-submarine work and some for certain contemplated operations in
enemy waters, including a night attack on the enemy's light cruisers
known to lie occasionally in the Ems River, an operation that it was
intended to carry out in the spring of 1918. A daylight operation in
this neighbourhood, which was carried out during 1918, did not, from the
published reports, meet with success, the coastal motor boats being
attacked by aircraft, vessels against which they were defenceless. The
new boats were of an improved and larger type than the original 40-feet
boats. Delays occurred in construction owing principally to the
difficulty in obtaining engines by reason of the great demand for
engines for aircraft, and but few of the new boats were delivered during
the year 1917.
MINING OPERATIONS
The policy which was carried out during 1917 in this respect, so far as
the supply of mines admitted, aimed at preventing the exit of submarines
from enemy ports. Incidentally, the fact that we laid large numbers of
mines in the Heligoland Bight rendered necessary such extensive sweeping
operations before any portion of the High Sea Fleet could put to sea as
to be very useful in giving us some indication of any movement that
might be intended. In view of the distance of the Grand Fleet from
German bases and the short time available in which to intercept the High
Sea Fleet if it came out for such a purpose as a raid on our coasts, or
on convoys, the information thus gathered would have proved of great
value.
In planning mining operations in the Heligoland Bight, it was necessary
to take into consideration certain facts. The _first_ was the knowledge
that the Germans themselves had laid minefields in some portions of the
Bight, and it was necessary for our minelayers to give such suspected
areas a wide berth. _Secondly_, it was obvious that we could not lay
minefields in areas very near those which we ourselves had already
mined, since we should run the risk of blowing up our own ships with our
own mines.
Mining operations had necessarily to be carried out at night, and as
there were no navigational aids in the way of lights, etc., in the
Heligoland Bight, the position in which our mines were laid was never
known with _absolute_ accuracy. Consequently an area in which we had
directed mines to be laid, and to which a minelayer had been sent, could
not safely be approached within a distance of some five miles on a
subsequent occasion.
The use in mining operations of the device known as "taut wire" gear,
introduced by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, was of great help in
ensuring accuracy in laying minefields and consequently in reducing the
danger distance surrounding our own minefields.
As our mining operations increased in number we were driven farther and
farther out from the German ports for subsequent operations. This
naturally increased the area to be mined as the Heligoland Bight is
bell-mouthed in shape, but it had the advantage of making the operations
of German minesweepers and mine-bumpers more difficult and hazardous as
they had to work farther out, thus giving our light forces better
chances of catching them at work and engaging them. Such actions as that
on November 17, 1917, between our light forces and the German light
cruisers and minesweepers were the result. We did not, of course, lay
mines in either the Danish or Dutch territorial waters, and these waters
consequently afforded an exit for German vessels as our minefields
became most distant from German bases.
Broadly speaking, the policy was to lay mines so thoroughly in the
Heligoland Bight as to force enemy submarines and other vessels to make
their exits along the Danish or Dutch coasts in territorial waters.
At the end of the exit we stationed submarines to signal enemy movements
and to attack enemy vessels. We knew, of course, that the enemy would
sweep other channels for his ships, but as soon as we discovered the
position of these channels, which was not a very difficult matter, more
mines were laid at the end. In order to give neutrals fair warning,
certain areas which included the Heligoland Bight were proclaimed
dangerous. In this respect German and British methods may be contrasted:
We never laid a minefield which could possibly have been dangerous to
neutrals without issuing a warning stating that a certain area (which
included the minefield) was dangerous. The Germans never issued such a
warning unless the proclamation stating that half the Atlantic Ocean,
most of the North Sea, and nine-tenths of the Mediterranean were
dangerous could be considered as such. It was also intended, as mines
became available, to lay more deep minefields in positions near our own
coast in which enemy submarines were known to work; these minefields
would be safe for the passage of surface vessels, but our patrol craft
would force the submarines to dive into them. This system to a certain
extent had already been in use during 1915 and 1916.
Schemes were also being devised by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur
Wilson, who devoted much of his time to mining devices, by which mines
some distance below the surface would be exploded by an enemy submarine
even if navigating on the surface.
Such was the policy. Its execution was difficult.
The first difficulty lay in the fact that we did not possess a
thoroughly satisfactory mine. A percentage only of our mines exploded
when hit by a submarine, and they failed sometimes to take up their
intended depth when laid, betraying their presence by appearing on the
surface.
Energetic measures were adopted to overcome this latter defect, but it
took time and but few mines were available for laying in the early
months of 1917.
The result of our minelaying efforts is shown in the following table:
Mines laid Deep mines laid
Year. in the Heligoland off our own coasts
Bight. to catch submarines.
1915 4,498 983
1916 1,679 2,573
First quarter of 1917 4,865 )
Second quarter of 1917 6,386 ) 3,843
Third quarter of 1917 3,510 )
In the Straits of Dover, Thames Estuary and off the Belgian coast we
laid 2,664 mines in 1914, 6,337 in 1915, 9,685 in 1916, and 4,669 in the
first three quarters of 1917.
These last mines were laid as fast as the alterations, made with a view
to increasing their efficiency, could be carried out.
During the early part of the year 1917 the new pattern of mine, known as
the "H" Type, evolved in 1916, had been tried, and although not
perfectly satisfactory at the first trials, the success was sufficient
to warrant the placing of orders for 100,000 mines and in making
arrangements for the quickest possible manufacture. This was done by the
Director of Torpedoes and Mines, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Edward
Fitzherbert, under the direction of the then Fourth Sea Lord,
Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey.
Deliveries commenced in the summer of 1917, but by the end of September
only a little over 1,500 were ready for laying. Some 500 of these were
laid in September in the Heligoland Bight and were immediately
successful against enemy submarines. More were laid in the Bight during
October, November and December, and the remainder, as they were
produced, were prepared for laying in the new minefield in the Straits
of Dover. _In the fourth quarter of the year a total of 10,389 mines was
laid in the Heligoland Bight and in the Straits of Dover._
During this last quarter delivery of "H" pattern mines was as follows:
In October 2,350, November 5,300, December 4,800; total 12,450. So that
it will be seen that the mines were laid as fast as delivery was made.
The great increase in projected minelaying operations during the year
1917 made it necessary also to add considerably to the number of
minelaying vessels.
In January, 1917, the only vessels equipped for this service were four
merchant ships and the Flotilla Leader _Abdiel_, with a total minelaying
capacity of some 1,200 mines per trip. It was not advisable to carry out
minelaying operations in enemy waters during the period near full moon
owing to the liability of the minelayers being seen by patrol craft.
Under such conditions the position of the minefield would be known to
the enemy. As the operation of placing the mines on board occupied
several days, it was not passible to depend on an average of more than
three operations per ship per month from the larger minelayers.
Consequently, with the intended policy in view, it was obvious that more
minelayers must be provided.
It was inadvisable to use merchant ships, since every vessel was
urgently required for trade or transport purposes, and the alternative
was to fit men-of-war for minelaying. The only old vessels of this type
suitable for mining in enemy waters were ships of the "Ariadne" class,
and although their machinery was not too reliable, two of these vessels
that were seaworthy were converted to minelayers. In addition a number
of the older light cruisers were fitted with portable rails on which
mines could be carried when minelaying operations were contemplated, in
place of a portion of the armament which could be removed; a flotilla of
destroyers, with some further flotilla leaders, were also fitted out as
minelayers, and several additional submarines were fitted for this
purpose.
For a projected special scheme of minelaying in enemy waters a number of
lighters were ordered, and some of the motor launches and coastal motor
boats were fitted out and utilized for mining operations on the Belgian
coast towards the end of 1917.
By the end of that year 12 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and flotilla
leaders and 5 submarines had been fitted for minelaying. Two old
cruisers had been added to the minelaying fleet and several other
vessels were in hand for the same purpose. The detailed plans of the
arrangements were prepared and the work of fitting out minelayers
carried out under the supervision of Admiral R.N. Ommanney, C.B., whose
services in this matter were of great value. The rapidity with which
ships were added to the minelaying fleet was largely due to his efforts.
On the entry of the United States of America into the war a further
development of mining policy became feasible. The immense manufacturing
resources of the United States rendered a large production of mines an
easy matter, with the result that as soon as the United States Navy
produced a reliable type of mine the idea of placing a mine barrage
across the northern part of the North Sea which had been previously
discussed became a matter of practical politics. With this end in view a
still further addition to the minelaying fleet became necessary, and
since the mining would be carried out at leisure in this case and speed
was no great necessity for the minelayer owing to the distance of the
minefields from enemy waters, an old battleship was put in hand for
conversion.
With the enormous increase in the number of mines on order the problem
of storage became of importance, including as it did the storage of the
very large number, some 120,000, required for the northern barrage. The
Third Sea Lord, Admiral Lionel Halsey, took this matter in hand with
characteristic energy, and in conjunction with United States naval
officers made all the necessary arrangements.
The United States mines were stored in the vicinity of Invergordon, and
the British mines intended for use in the northern barrage were located
at Grangemouth, near Leith, where Rear-Admiral Clinton Baker was in
charge, as well as in other places, whilst those for use in the
Heligoland Bight and Channel waters were stored at Immingham and other
southern depots.
The laying of the North Sea mine barrage was not accomplished without
very considerable delay, and many difficulties were encountered. It was
originally anticipated that the barrage would be completed in the spring
of 1918, but owing to various defects in both British and United States
mines which made themselves apparent when the operations commenced, due
partly to the great depth of water as well as to other causes, a delay
of several months took place; and, even when near completion, the
barrage was not so effective as many had hoped in spite of the great
expenditure of labour and material involved. I have not the figures of
the number of submarines that the barrage is thought to have accounted
for, but it was known to be disappointing.
FLARES
In the late summer of 1917 _flares_ were experimented with; they were
intended to be used from kite balloons with the object of sighting
submarines when on the surface at night. Previously searchlights in
destroyers had been used for this purpose. The flares were not much
used, however, from kite balloons owing to lack of opportunity, but
trials which were carried out with flares from patrol craft, such as
trawlers and drifters, demonstrated that they would be of value from
these vessels, and when the Folkestone-Grisnez minefield was laid in
November and December, 1917, it was apparent that the flares would be of
use in forcing submarines to dive at night into the minefield to escape
detection on the surface and attack by gunfire.
Manufacture on a large scale was therefore commenced, and during 1918
the flares were in constant use across the Straits of Dover.
ELECTRICAL SUBMARINE DETECTOR
The existence of this very valuable device was due to the work of
certain distinguished scientists, and experiments were carried out
during 1917. It was brought to perfection in the late autumn, and orders
were given to fit it in certain localities. Some difficulty was
experienced in obtaining the necessary material, but the work was well
in hand by the end of the year, and quickly proved its value.
SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE
Prior to the year 1917 the only areas in which our own submarines
operated against enemy vessels of the same type was in the North Sea, or
occasionally in the vicinity of the Hebrides. Grand Fleet submarines
were used in the northern areas during 1916, and Harwich submarines
operated farther south, but the number of underwater craft available was
insufficient for any extended method of attack. Early in 1917, when our
mercantile losses were very heavy, some submarines were withdrawn from
the Harwich and Humber districts and formed into a flotilla off the
coast of Ireland for this form of operation. Some risk had to be
accepted in thus reducing our submarine strength in southern waters. At
the same time some Grand Fleet submarines were organized into a watching
patrol in the area off the Shetland Islands, through which enemy
submarines were expected to pass. The watch off the Horn Reef and in the
Heligoland Bight, which had previously been in force, was also
maintained.
A little later the submarine flotilla off the Irish coast was
strengthened, and a regular patrol instituted near the North Channel
between Ireland and Scotland. The next step was the withdrawal of some
"C" Class submarines from coastal work on our east coast to work in the
area between England and Holland near the North Hinder Lightship, a
locality much frequented by enemy submarines on passage. Still later
some submarines were attached to the Portsmouth Command, where, working
under Sir Stanley Colville, they had some striking successes; others
went to the Dover Command. The latter were fitted with occulting lights
on top of the conning-tower, and were moored at night to buoys in the
Dover Net Barrage, in places where enemy submarines were likely to pass,
in order that they might have a chance of torpedoing them. A division of
submarines was also sent to Gibraltar, to operate against enemy cruiser
submarines working in that vicinity or near the Canaries. Successes
against enemy submarines were also obtained in the latter locality.
Finally, the arrival of some United States submarines enabled the areas
in which this form of attack was in force to be still further extended,
after the American personnel had been trained to this form of warfare.
There was a great increase in the number of enemy submarines sunk by
this method of attack during 1917 as compared with previous years; the
number of vessels sunk does not, however, convey a complete appreciation
of the effect of this form of anti-submarine warfare. The great value of
it lay in the feeling of insecurity that it bred in the minds of the
enemy submarine commanders. The moral effect of the constant
apprehension that one is being "stalked" is considerable. Indeed, the
combination of our aircraft and our submarine patrols led to our vessels
reporting, regretfully, that it was very seldom that German submarines
were found on the surface in daylight, and towards the end of 1917 quite
a large proportion of the attacks on merchant ships took place at night.
The work for our own vessels was very arduous indeed. It was only on
rare occasions that it was possible to bring off a successful attack on
a submarine that had been sighted, the low underwater speed of
submarines making it difficult to get into position when the enemy was
only sighted at short range, which was naturally usually the case.
In order to obviate this difficulty directions were given in 1917 to
design a special type of submarine for this form of warfare, and I
believe that the first vessel was completed by the autumn of 1918.
This account of the development of anti-submarine measures during 1917
would not be complete without mention of the work of the Trade Division
of the Staff, of which Captain Richard Webb, C.B., was the Director
until September.
This Division was either partly or wholly responsible for:
(1) The great increase in the rapidity of placing the armaments on board
merchant ships.
(2) The establishment of schools of instruction for captains and
officers of the Mercantile Marine.
This training scheme was begun at Chatham Barracks in February, 1917, by
Commander E.L.B. Lockyer, acting under Captain Webb, and later was
extended to Portsmouth, Cardiff and Greenock. Its success was so marked,
and its benefit in assisting officers to handle their ships in the
manner best calculated to save them from submarine attack so great, that
the Admiralty was continually being pressed by shipowners and by the
officers of the Mercantile Marine to extend the instruction to more and
more ports. This was done so far as possible, our principal difficulty
being to provide officers capable of giving the instruction required.
(3) The provision of wireless plant and operators to the Mercantile
Marine. This was another matter taken up with energy during 1917, and
with excellent results.
(4) The drilling of guns crews for the merchant ships. Men were invited
to go through a course of drill, and large numbers responded and were
instructed at the Royal Naval Depot at the Crystal Palace.
All these matters were additional to the important work upon which the
Trade Division was constantly employed, which included all blockade
questions, the routeing of merchant ships, examination of ships, etc.
In addition to the instructional anti-submarine course for masters and
officers, gunnery courses for cadets and apprentices were started at
Portsmouth, Chatham and Devonport. A system of visits to ships by
officer instructors for the purpose of affording instruction and for
inspection, as well as for the purpose of lecturing, was instituted, and
arrangements were made for giving instruction in signalling. Some idea
of the work carried out will be gathered from the following figures
showing the instructional work carried out during the year 1917:
Masters 1,929
Officers 2,149
Number of cadets and apprentices passed through
the gunnery course 543
Number of merchant seamen trained in gunnery at
the Crystal Palace 3,964
Number of ships visited by officer instructors 6,927
Numbers attending these lectures:
Masters 1,361
Officers 5,921
Number of officers and men instructed in signalling 10,487
The keenness shown by officers and men of the merchant service
contributed in a marked degree to the success of the courses instituted;
just one example may be given. I visited the Royal Naval Depot at the
Crystal Palace early in 1918, and amongst other most interesting scenes
witnessed a large number of men of the merchant service at gun drill. I
questioned several of them as to their experiences, and many of the men
had had their ships torpedoed under them three, four or five times.
Amongst the gun crews was a steward who had been through this experience
four times. On my asking why he, as a steward, should be going through
the gunnery course, he replied that he hoped that by so doing he might
stand a chance of getting his own back by assisting to sink a submarine.
The knowledge which I possessed of the measures introduced during the
year 1917 to combat the German submarine warfare, and the continual
increase in the efficiency of the anti-submarine work which I knew would
result from increased production of anti-submarine vessels and weapons,
led me in February, 1918, to state that in my opinion the submarine
menace would be "held" by the autumn of the year 1918. The remark, which
was made at what I understood to be a private gathering, was given very
wide publicity, and was criticized at the time, but it was fulfilled, as
the figures will indicate.
CHAPTER IV
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM
The question of the introduction of convoys for the protection of
merchant ships was under consideration at various times during the war.
The system had been employed during the old wars and had proved its
value in the case of attack by vessels on the surface, and it was
natural that thoughts should be directed towards its reintroduction when
the submarine campaign developed. There is one inherent disadvantage in
this system which cannot be overcome, although it can be mitigated by
careful organization, viz. the delay involved. Delay means, of course, a
loss of carrying-power, and when tonnage is already short any proposal
which must reduce its efficiency has to be very carefully examined. The
delay of the convoy system is due to two causes, (a) because the speed
of the convoy must necessarily be fixed by the speed of the slowest
ship, and (b) the fact that the arrival of a large number of ships at
one time may cause congestion and consequent delay at the port of
unloading. However, if additional safety is given there is compensation
for this delay when the risk is great. One danger of a convoy system
under modern conditions should be mentioned, viz. the increased risk
from attack by mines. If ships are sailing singly a minefield will in
all probability sink only one vessel--the first ship entering it. The
fate of that ship reveals the presence of the field, and with adequate
organization it is improbable that other vessels will be sunk in the
same field. In the case of a convoy encountering a minefield, as in the
case of a fleet, several ships may be sunk practically simultaneously.
During the year 1916, whilst I was still in command of the Grand Fleet,
suggestions as to convoys had been forwarded to the Admiralty for the
better protection of the ocean trade against attack by surface vessels;
but it was pointed out to me that the number of cruisers available for
escort work was entirely insufficient, and that, consequently, the
suggestions could not be adopted. This objection was one that could only
be overcome by removing some of the faster merchant ships from the trade
routes and arming them. To this course there was the objection that we
were already--that is before the intensive campaign began--very short of
shipping.
Shortly after my taking up the post of First Sea Lord at the Admiralty,
at the end of 1916, the question was discussed once more. At that time
the danger of attack by enemy raiders on shipping in the North Atlantic
was small; the protection needed was against attack by submarines, and
the dangerous area commenced some 300-400 miles from the British
Islands. It was known that unrestricted submarine warfare was about to
commence, and that this would mean that shipping would usually be
subjected to torpedo attack from submarines when in a submerged
condition. Against this form of attack the gun armament of cruisers or
armed merchant ships was practically useless, and, however powerfully
armed, ships of this type were themselves in peril of being torpedoed.
Small vessels of shallow draught, possessing high speed, offered the
only practicable form of protection. Shallow draught was necessary in
order that the protecting vessels should themselves be comparatively
immune from successful torpedo fire, and speed was essential for
offensive operations against the submarines.
Convoy sailing was, as has been stated, the recognized method of trade
protection in the old wars, and this was a strong argument in favour of
its adoption in the late war. It should, however, be clearly understood
that the conditions had entirely changed. Convoy sailing for the
protection of merchant ships against torpedo attack by submarines was
quite a different matter from such a system as a preventive against
attack by surface vessels and involved far greater difficulties. In the
days of sailing ships especially, accurate station keeping was not very
necessary, and the ships comprising the convoy sailed in loose order and
covered a considerable area of water. On a strange vessel, also a
sailing vessel, being sighted, the protecting frigate or frigates would
proceed to investigate her character, whilst the ships composing the
convoy closed in towards one another or steered a course that would take
them out of danger.
In the circumstances with which we were dealing in 1917 the requirements
were quite otherwise. It was essential for the protection of the convoy
that the ships should keep close and accurate station and should be able
to manoeuvre by signal. Close station was enjoined by the necessity of
reducing the area covered by the convoy; accurate station was required
to ensure safety from collision and freedom of manoeuvre. It will be
realized that a convoy comprising twenty to thirty vessels occupies
considerable space, even when steaming in the usual formation of four,
five or six columns. Since the number of destroyers or sloops that could
be provided for screening the convoy from torpedo attack by submarines
was bound to be very limited under any conditions, it was essential that
the columns of ships should be as short as possible; in other words,
that the ships should follow one another at close intervals, so that the
destroyers on each side of the convoy should be able as far as possible
to guard it from attack by submarines working from the flank, and that
they should be able with great rapidity to counter-attack a submarine
with depth charges should a periscope be sighted for a brief moment
above the surface, or the track of a torpedo be seen. In fact, it was
necessary, if the protection of a convoy was to be real protection, that
the ships composing the convoy should be handled in a manner that
approached the handling of battleships in a squadron. The diagram on p.
107 shows an ideal convoy with six destroyers protecting it, disposed in
the manner ordered at the start of the convoy system.
[Illustration on page 107, with caption "Diagram illustrating a convoy
of 25 Merchant Ships, with an escort of 6 Destroyers zigzagging at high
speed for protection. The convoy shown in close order and on its normal
course."]
[Illustration on page 108 shows, according to its caption, "Typical
convoy and escort of 10 Trawlers in the early days of convoy."]
How far this ideal was attainable was a matter of doubt. Prior to 1917
our experience of merchant ships sailing in company had been confined to
troop transports. These vessels were well officered and well manned,
carried experienced engine-room staffs, were capable of attaining
moderate speeds, and were generally not comparable to ordinary cargo
vessels, many of which were of very slow speed, and possessed a large
proportion of officers and men of limited sea experience, owing to the
very considerable personnel of the Mercantile Marine which had joined
the Royal Naval Reserve and was serving in the Fleet or in patrol craft.
Moreover, even the troop transports had not crossed the submarine zone
in company, but had been escorted independently; and many naval officers
who had been in charge of convoys, when questioned, were not convinced
that sailing in convoy under the conditions mentioned above was a
feasible proposition, nor, moreover, were the masters of the transports.
In February, 1917, in order to investigate this aspect of the question,
a conference took place between the Naval Staff and the masters of cargo
steamers which were lying in the London docks. The masters were asked
their opinion as to how far their ships could be depended on to keep
station in a convoy of 12 to 20 vessels. They expressed a unanimous
opinion that it was not practicable to keep station under the conditions
mentioned, the difficulty being due to two causes: (1) the inexperience
of their deck officers owing to so many of them having been taken for
the Royal Naval Reserve, and (2) the inexperience of their engineers,
combined with the impossibility of obtaining delicate adjustments of
speed by reason of the absence of suitable engine-room telegraphs and
the poor quality of much of the coal used. When pressed as to the
greatest number of ships that could be expected to manoeuvre together in
safety, the masters of these cargo steamers, all experienced seamen,
gave it as their opinion that two or possibly three was the maximum
number. The opinions thus expressed were confirmed later by other
masters of merchant ships who were consulted on the subject. It is to
the eternal credit of the British Merchant Marine, which rendered
service of absolutely inestimable value to the Empire throughout the
war, that when put to the test by the adoption of the convoy system,
officers and men proved that they could achieve far more than they
themselves had considered possible. At the same time it should be
recognized how severe a strain was imposed on officers, particularly the
masters, of vessels sailing in convoy.
The matter was kept constantly under review. In February, 1917, the
Germans commenced unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant ships
of all nationalities, and as a consequence our shipping losses, as well
as those of Allied and neutral countries, began to mount steadily each
succeeding month. The effect of this new phase of submarine warfare is
best illustrated by a few figures.
During the last four months of 1916 the gross tonnage lost by _submarine
attack_ alone gave the following monthly average: British, 121,500;
Allies, 59,500; neutrals, 87,500; total, 268,500.
In the first four months of 1917 the figures became, in round numbers:
British. Allies. Neutrals. Total.
January 104,000 62,000 116,000 282,000
February 256,000 77,000 131,000 464,000
March 283,000 74,000 149,000 506,000
April 513,000 133,000 185,000 831,000
(The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917.)
NOTE.--In neither case is the loss of fishing craft included.
It will be realized that, since the losses towards the end of 1916 were
such as to give just cause for considerable anxiety, the later figures
made it clear that some method of counteracting the submarines must be
found and found quickly if the Allied cause was to be saved from
disaster.
None of the anti-submarine measures that had been under consideration or
trial since the formation of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval
Staff in December, 1916, could _by any possibility_ mature for some
months, since time was necessary for the production of vessels and more
or less complicated matériel, and in these circumstances the only step
that could be taken was that of giving a trial to the convoy system for
the ocean trade, although the time was by no means yet ripe for
effective use of the system, by reason of the shortage of destroyers,
sloops and cruisers, which was still most acute, although the situation
was improving slowly month by month as new vessels were completed.
Prior to this date we had already had some experience of convoys as a
protection against submarine attack. The coal trade of France had been
brought under convoy in March, 1917. The trade between Scandinavia and
North Sea ports was also organized in convoys in April of the same year,
this trade having since December, 1916, been carried out on a system of
"protected sailings." It is true that these convoys were always very
much scattered, particularly the Scandinavian convoy, which was composed
largely of neutral vessels and therefore presented exceptional
difficulties in the matter of organization and handling. The number of
destroyers which could be spared for screening the convoys was also very
small. The protection afforded was therefore more apparent than real,
but even so the results had been very good in reducing the losses by
submarine attack. The protection of the vessels employed in the French
coal trade was entrusted very largely to trawlers, as the ships
composing the convoy were mostly slow, so that in this case more
screening vessels were available, although they were not so efficient,
being themselves of slow speed.
For the introduction of a system of convoy which would protect merchant
ships as far as their port of discharge in the United Kingdom, there
were two requirements: (a) A sufficient number of convoying cruisers or
armed merchant ships, whose role would be that of bringing the ships
comprising the convoy to some selected rendezvous outside the zone of
submarine activity, where it would be met by the flotilla of small
vessels which would protect the convoy through the submarine area. It
was essential that the ships of the convoy should arrive at this
rendezvous as an organized unit, well practised in station-keeping by
day, and at night, with the ships darkened, and that the vessels should
be capable also of zigzagging together and of carrying out such
necessary movements as alterations of course, etc.; otherwise the convoy
could not be safely escorted through the danger area. (b) The other
essential was the presence of the escorting flotilla in sufficient
strength.
It has been mentioned that there was an insufficient number of vessels
available for use as convoying cruisers. It was estimated that about
fifty cruisers or armed merchant ships would be required for this
service if the homeward-bound trade to the British Isles alone was
considered. An additional twelve vessels would be necessary to deal with
the outward-bound trade. At the time only eighteen vessels were
available, and these could only be obtained by denuding the North
Atlantic entirely of cruisers.
The situation in regard to destroyers or other fast vessels presented
equal difficulties. Early in February, 1917, we had available for
general convoy or patrol work only fourteen destroyers stationed at
Devonport and twelve sloops at Queenstown, and owing to repairs and the
necessity of resting officers and men periodically, only a proportion of
these were available at any one time. A number of these vessels were
required to escort troop transports through the submarine danger zone.
During the month of February six sloops were diverted from their proper
work of minesweeping in the North Sea and added to the patrol force at
Queenstown, and eight destroyers were taken from the Grand Fleet and
sent to southern waters for patrol and escort duty. There were obvious
objections to this weakening of the North Sea forces, but it was
necessary in the circumstances to ignore them.
This total of forty destroyers and sloops represented the whole
available force at the end of February. Simultaneously a careful
investigation showed that for the institution of a system of convoy and
escort for homeward-bound Atlantic trade alone to the United Kingdom,
our requirements would be eighty-one destroyers or sloops and
forty-eight trawlers (the latter vessels being only suitable for
escorting the slow 6-7-knot ships of the trade from Gibraltar to the
United Kingdom). For the outward Atlantic trade from the United Kingdom
our estimated requirements were forty-four additional destroyers or
sloops.
The deficiency in suitable vessels of this class is best shown by the
following table, which reveals the destroyer position at different
periods during the year 1917:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Mediterranean.
----------------------------------------------------------------+
Pembroke. |
-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
Queenstown. | |
---------------------------------------------------------+ | |
Bunerana. | | |
------------------------------------------------------+ | | |
North Channel. | | | |
---------------------------------------------------+ | | | |
Scapa and Invergordon. | | | | |
------------------------------------------------+ | | | | |
The Tyne.
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